GIOVANI SERRANO y CERVANTES vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, BRION, J.

Facts: The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of

two (2) rival groups that occurred at the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City (UP) on the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident
resulted in the stabbing of Anthony Galang (victim).Pinpointed as the
victims assailant, the petitioner was charged on March 11, 1999, [5] with
frustrated homicide.
at around 9:30 p.m. of March 8, 1999, the victim and his two friends,
Arceo and Richard Tan, were on their way to Fatima II in Pook Dagohoy,
UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the petitioners
brother, who was with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and Tan
approached Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel between
Gener and Roberto Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking,
Comia suddenly appeared and hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener
challenged Comia to a fistfight to settle their quarrel once and for all;
Comia rose to the challenge.
 
It was at this point that the petitioner appeared with other members of
his group. He was a guest at a party nearby, and was informed that a fight
was about to take place between his brother and Comia. Members of the
victims group also started to show up.
 
The petitioner watched Gener fight Comia. When Gener lost the fight, the
petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus, the one-
on-one escalated into a rumble between the members of the two
groups. During the rumble, and with the aid of the light emanating from
two Meralco posts, the victim and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a
knife and used it to chase away the members of their group. The
petitioner also chased Arceo away, leaving the victim alone; the
petitioners group ganged up on him.
 
The petitioner went to where the victim was being beaten by Gener and
one Obet Orieta. It was then that the victim was stabbed. The petitioner
stabbed the left side of his stomach while he was standing, with Gener
and Orieta holding his arms. The petitioner, Gener and Orieta thereafter
continued to beat and stone the victim until he fell into a nearby
creek. The petitioner and his group left him there.
 
From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw
that a portion of his intestines showed. On foot, he went to find help. The
victim was initially taken to the UP Infirmary, but was referred to
the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent surgery. The victim
stayed at the hospital for a week, and thereafter stayed home for one
month to recuperate.

Issue: WON the victim is entitled to temperate damages

Ruling: YES

We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioners civil

liability. The CA ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount
of P3,858.50. This is erroneous and contrary to the prevailing
jurisprudence.
 
In People v. Andres,[35] we held that if the actual damages, proven by
receipts during the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall
be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of
actual damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article
2224 of the New Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. In this case,
the victim is entitled to the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages
considering that the amount of actual damages is only P3,858.50. The
amount of actual damages shall be deleted.
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. vs. CELESTE trial court and the Court of Appeals awarded actual damages based on the
M. CHUA value of the items at the time they were bought, which was around two
G.R. No. 195031, March 28, 2014, PEREZ, J. years prior to their shipment to the Philippines.

Facts: On April 2, 1997, the twenty (20)-feet container van loaded Article 2199 of the Civil Code states that "[e]xcept as provided by law or
with the personal effects of [respondent] Celeste M. Chua arrived at the by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
North Harbor, Manila, from Oakland, California, x x x. On even date, it was pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
unloaded from the vessel and was placed in the depot belonging to compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
[petitioner] for safekeeping pending the customs inspection. damages."37 "Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put
the injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They
pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained
On April 6, 1997, the container van was stripped and partially inspected
and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by
by custom authorities. Further inspection thereof was scheduled on May
stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such
8, 1997. However, on the date scheduled, [petitioner’s] depot was gutted
pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual
by fire and [respondent’s] container van, together with forty-four (44)
damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it
others, were burned. In the survey conducted thereafter, seventy percent
must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
(70%) of the contents of the van was found to be totally burnt while
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable."
thirty percent (30%) thereof was wet, dirty, and unusable. [Respondent]
demanded reimbursement for the value of the goods. However, her
demands fell on deaf ears. In the case before us, respondent failed to adduce evidence adequate
enough to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damages
claimed.1âwphi1 The receipts she submitted cannot be considered
On August 23, 1999, [respondent] filed the suit below alleging, in essence,
competent proof since she failed to prove that the items listed therein are
that the proximate cause of the fire that engulfed [petitioner’s] depot was
indeed the items that were in her container van and vice versa. As
the combustible chemicals stored threreat; and, that [petitioner], in
pointed out above, there are discrepancies between the items listed in the
storing the said flammable chemicals in its depot, failed to exercise due
submitted receipts and those contained in the respective inspection
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and/or of their
reports of the marine surveyors. Hence, the said receipts cannot be made
work. She also claims that, while the value of the goods destroyed is x x x
the basis for the grant of actual damages.
(US$87,667.00) x x x, she has in her possession only the machine-copies
of receipts showing an aggregate value of only x x x (US$67,535.61)
because, pursuant to [petitioner’s] request, she gave to the latter’s In the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages
representative the original receipts. x x x. suffered, a party is entitled to receive temperate damages.44 Article 2224
of the New Civil Code provides that: "Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
In its Answer, [petitioner] admits that it accepted, in good order,
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
[respondent’s] container van for storage and safekeeping at its depot but
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved
denies that there was negligence on its part or that of its employees. It
with certainty." The amount thereof is usually left to the sound discretion
asserts that the fire that gutted its depot was due to a fortuitous event
of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that
because it exercised the due diligence required by law. It maintains that
temperate damages should be "more than nominal but less than
[respondent] is not entitled to her claim because she did not declare the
compensatory."45 Considering the concomitant circumstances prevailing
true and correct value of the goods, as the Bill of Lading indicates that the
in this case, temperate damages in the amount of P350,000.00 is deemed
contents of the van have no commercial value. Asserting that
equitable.
[respondent] has no cause of action or that [respondent’s] cause of action,
if any, has already prescribed because the complaint was not filed within
twelve (12) months from the time of damage or loss, it prays for the
dismissal of the complaint.

Issue: WON the Petitioner was able to prove actual damages.

Ruling: NO

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the liability of
petitioner to respondent amounts to US$67,535.61 as actual damages.
This amount purportedly represents the value of respondent’s shipment
that was lost or destroyed as a result of the fire in petitioner’s container
yard where the van holding the said shipment was in storage at that time.
The value was computed based on the receipts submitted by respondent,
which receipts allegedly cover the items that were in the container van.

A painstaking examination of Exhibits "K" to "K-63" ("the receipts")

reveals, however, that the items specified therein do not exactly tally or
coincide with the items listed in the respective inspection reports
submitted by the different marine surveyors which conducted an
inventory of the contents of respondent’s van after the fire.

this Court is, therefore, at a loss as to how the trial court and the Court of
Appeals arrived at the conclusion that the items in both lists (Exhibits "K"
to "K-63" and the inspection reports) are identical, so as to justify the
award of US$67,535.61 – the alleged total value of the receipts – as actual
damages. On the contrary, all the foregoing actually prove that the
submitted receipts do not accurately reflect the items in the container van
and, therefore, cannot be the basis for a grant of actual damages.
Furthermore, the award of the trial court failed to take into consideration
that since most of the contents of respondent’s container van are
electronics or electrical items, the same are subject to depreciation. The
 SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. DMC-
CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 193914, November 26, 2014, SERENO, CJ
Facts: Petitioner Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation is the owner
of the cargo ship M/V "Diamond Rabbit," (vessel), while respondent DMC
Construction Resource, Inc. is the owner of coal-conveyor facility, which
was destroyed when the vessel became uncontrollable and
unmanueverable during a storm.
On 23 February 1996, the cargo ship M/V "Diamond Rabbit" (the Vessel)
owned and operated by defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
(Seven Brothers),was at the PICOP Pier in Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur to dock there. According to the record, the weather that day was
windy with a wind force of 10 to 20 knots, and the sea condition was
rough, with waves 6 to 8 feet high. However, the parties also stipulated
during pre-trial that prior to the occurrence of the incident, the vessel
was anchored at the cause way of the port of Bislig, where it was safe
from inclement weather.
According to the report of the Master, it heaved its anchor and left the
causeway in order to dock at the PICOP Pier. A lifeboat pulled the vessel
towards the Pier with a heaving line attached to the vessel’s astern
mooring rope, when suddenly, the heaving line broke loose, causing the
astern mooring rope to drift freely. The mooring rope got entangled in the
vessel’s propeller, thereby choking and disabling it, and preventing the
further use of its main engine for maneuvering.
In order to stop the vessel from further drifting and swinging, its Master
dropped her starboard anchor. To help secure the vessel, its forward
mooring rope was sent ashoreand secured at the mooring fender.
However, because of the strong winds and rough seas, the vessel’s anchor
and the mooring rope could not hold the vessel.
Under the influence of the wind and current, the dead weight of the vessel
caused it to swung from side to side until the fender, where the mooring
rope was attached, collapsed. The uncontrollable and unmaneuverable
vessel drifted and dragged its anchor until it hit several structures at the
Pier, including the coal conveyor facility owned by DMC Construction
Equipment Resources, Inc. (DMC).  Inc. v. Paras,41 the respondent was likewise awarded temperate damages
When petitioner failed to pay, respondent filed with the RTC a Complaint
for damages against respondent on 23 March 1998.
RTC awarded respondent actual damages in the amount of ₱3,523,175.92
plus legal interest of 6%, based on the testimony of respondent’s
engineer, Loreto Dalangin (Engr. Dalangin). The RTC concluded that
"there was negligence on the part of the captain; hence, defendant
[petitioner] as his employer and owner of the vessel shall be liable for
damages caused thereby."
The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision with respect to the finding of
negligence on the part of the vessel’s captain. However, the appellate
court modified the nature of damages awarded (from actual to nominal),
on the premise that actual damages had not been proved.
Issue: WON the CA erred in awarding nominal damages to respondent
after having ruled that the actual damages awarded by the RTC was
unfounded.
Ruling: We rule that temperate, and not nominal, damages should be
awarded to respondent in the amount of ₱3,523,175.92.
In this case, two facts have been established by the appellate and trial
courts: that respondent suffered a loss caused by petitioner; and that
respondent failed to sufficiently establish the amount due to him, as no
actual receipt was presented.
Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded
in order that the plaintiff’s right, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. We have laid down the
concept of nominal damages in the following wise:
Nominal damages are ‘recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of
contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have
been or can be shown.’33
In contrast, under Article 2224, temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided
with certainty. This principle was thoroughly explained in Araneta v.
Bank of America,38 which cited the Code Commission, to wit:
The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages
under Article 2224, makes the following comment:
In some States of the American Union, temperate damages are allowed.
There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that
there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit
or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty
in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases,
rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the
defendant's wrongful act. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc.,39 temperate damages were rightly
awarded because plaintiff suffered a loss, although definitive proof of its
amount cannot be presented as the photographs produced as evidence
were deemed insufficient. Established in that case, however, was the fact
that respondent’s truck was responsible for the damage to petitioner’s
property and that petitioner suffered some form of pecuniary loss. In
Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,40 temperate damages
were also awarded wherein respondent’s goods did not reach the Pepsi
Cola Plant at Muntinlupa City as a result of the negligence of petitioner in
conducting its trucking and hauling services, even ifthe amount of the
pecuniary loss had not been proven. In Philtranco Services Enterprises,
in an action for breach of contract of carriage, even if his medical
expenses had not been established with certainty. In People v.
Briones,42 in which the accused was found guilty of murder, temperate
damages were given even if the funeral expenses for the victim had not
been sufficiently proven.
Given these findings, we are of the belief that temperate and not nominal
damages should have been awarded, considering that it has been
established that respondent herein suffered a loss, even if the amount
thereof cannot be proven with certainty.
The amount of temperate damages to be awarded is usually left to the
discretion of the courts, but such amount must be reasonable.
Consequently, in computing the amount of temperate or moderate
damages, it is usually left to the discretion of the courts, but the amount
must be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be
more than nominal but less than compensatory.43
Here, we are convinced that respondent sustained damages to its
conveyor facility due to petitioner's negligence. Nonetheless, for failure of
respondent to establish by competent evidence the exact amount of
damages it suffered, we are constrained to award temperate damages.
Considering that the lower courts have factually established that the
conveyor facility had a remaining life of only five of its estimated total life
of ten years during the time of the collision, then the replacement cost of
₱7,046,351.84 should rightly be reduced to 50% or ₱3,523, 175.92. This
is a fair and reasonable valuation, having taking into account the
remaining useful life of the facility.
 NANITO Z. EVANGELISTA* (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS,
REPRESENTED BY THE SURVIVING SPOUSE, LEOVIGILDA C.
EVANGELISTA) v. SPOUSES NEREO V. ANDOLONG III AND ERLINDA T.
ANDOLONG** AND RINO AMUSEMENT INNOVATORS, INC.
G.R. No. 221770, November 16, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts: The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for sum of

money, accounting and specific performance with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary attachment and damages6 filed on November 22, 1995
by Nanito against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-25680. Nanito alleged that Spouses Andolong are the majority
shareholders of RAII, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
operating amusement centers.7 On various dates, Nanito and respondents
entered into various memoranda of agreement (MOA),8 as well as deeds
of assignment/sale with right to repurchase over machines, equipment,
and amenities, which were used in the operations of amusement centers
in different malls, such as SM Centerpoint in Manila, 9 Sta. Lucia East
Grand Mall in Cainta, Rizal, 10 and Gaisano Country Mall in Cebu11 (subject
contracts).12 In the subject MOA, the parties agreed, inter alia, that they
would equally share, i.e., 50%-50%, from the net profits of said
amusement centers and that respondents would remit Nanito's share on
the 15th and 30th of the month. 13 Claiming that respondents failed to
comply with their obligation to remit his share of the net profits, Nanito
filed the instant complaint.

In a Decision23 dated October 25, 2012, the RTC dismissed petitioners'

complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Essentially, the RTC found that
Nanito failed to establish his claim against respondents in the stipulated
amount of P2,241,632.00, as all the evidence he presented did not prove
his entitlement thereto. The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling in toto.

Issue: WON Nonito is entitled for the remittances under their MOA

Ruling: NO, but he is entitled to temperate damages.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that under the subject contracts,

Nanito had invested a grand total of P5,728,800.00. 38 Under the subject
MOA, he is entitled to receive 50% of the net profits of the amusement
centers and that such profits must be remitted to him on the 15 th and the
30th of each month.39 However and as correctly pointed out by the CA, the
documents presented by Nanito only showed the gross monthly revenue
of the amusement centers without taking into consideration their daily
operational expenses, as well as there-infusion of any possible earnings
as capital in order to sustain the maintenance of the machines and
equipment. As such, these documents are inconclusive in proving the
existence of any net profits that respondents failed to remit to Nanito.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court is convinced that Nanito

should have received remittances representing net profits from
respondents, albeit he failed to prove the exact amount he should receive
from the latter. In Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. DMC-
Construction Resources Inc.,42 the Court allowed the recovery of
temperate damages in instances where it has been established that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot be proven with
certainty.

As already adverted to, respondents' failure to remit the net profits to

Nanito pursuant to the subject MOA caused some pecuniary loss on the
part of the latter, albeit he failed to prove the exact amount of such loss.
In view of such circumstance, the Court deems it reasonable to award
temperate damages to petitioners in the amount of P1,100,000.00, which
is roughly half44 of P2,241,632.00, or the amount of gross revenue
claimed to have been earned by the amusement centers. Notably, the
award of P1,100,000.00 shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. MAKILITO B. 2. Php 10,316,640.00 representing defendant’s share of the
MAHINAY proceeds of the sale of the Molino property (defendant’s
G.R. No. 171736, July 5, 2010, NACHURA, J. charging lien) plus interest at the rate of 16% per annum, to be
computed from September 23, 1998 until the said amount shall
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money against respondent have been fully paid;
Makilito Mahinay based on two separate loans obtained by the latter,
amounting to P1,520,000.00 and P416,800.00, or a total amount 3. Php 50,000.00 as attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit;
of P1,936,800.00. These loans were evidenced by two promissory notes.
4. Php 50,000.00 litigation expenses, plus costs of suit.
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim: Petitioner had no cause of action
because the PNs were subject to a condition that did not occur. 8 While
Issue: Whether or not the attorney’s fees as liquidated damages can be
admitting that he indeed signed the promissory notes, he insisted that he
reduced by the court?
never took out a loan and that the notes were not intended to be
evidences of indebtedness.9 By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed
Held: Yes.
for the payment of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees. 10

The promissory notes likewise required the payment of a penalty charge

Respondent explained that he was the counsel of Ciudad Real
Development Inc. (CRDI). In 1994, Pentacapital Realty Corporation
(Pentacapital Realty) offered to buy parcels of land known as the Molino
Properties, owned by CRDI. The Molino Properties were sold. As the
Molino Properties were the subject of a pending case, Pentacapital Realty
paid only the down payment amounting to P12,000,000.00. CRDI
allegedly instructed Pentacapital Realty to pay the former’s creditors,
including respondent who thus received a check worth P1,715,156.90.
Respondent, Pentacapital Realty and CRDI allegedly agreed that
respondent had a charging lien equivalent to 20% of the total
consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,277,040.00. Pending the
submission of the Entry of Judgment and as a sign of good faith,
respondent purportedly returned the P1,715,156.90 check to
Pentacapital Realty. However, the Molino Properties continued to be
haunted by the seemingly interminable court actions initiated by
different parties which thus prevented respondent from collecting his
commission.
On motion of respondent, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowed him to
file a Third Party Complaint14 against CRDI, subject to the payment of
docket fees.15
Admittedly, respondent earlier instituted an action for Specific
Performance against Pentacapital Realty before the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 57, praying for the payment of his commission on the sale of the
Molino Properties.16In an Amended Complaint,17 respondent referred to
the action he instituted as one of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
instead of Specific Performance. Acting on Pentacapital Realty’s Motion to
Dismiss, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. 18 The
dismissal became final and executory.
of 3% per month or 36% per annum. We find such rates unconscionable.
This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of
ensuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special
prestation (generally consisting of the payment of a sum of money) in
case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately
fulfilled.46 However, a penalty charge of 3% per month is
unconscionable;47 hence, we reduce it to 1% per month or 12% per
annum, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. 48
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as
attorney’s fees in case of non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in
the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon
respondent. Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the
same is iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above-quoted
provision.49 This sentiment is echoed in Article 2227 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorney’s fees from 25% to 10%. 50

With the dismissal of the aforesaid case, respondent filed a Motion to

Permit Supplemental Compulsory Counterclaim. 19 In addition to the
damages that respondent prayed for in his compulsory counterclaim, he
sought the payment of his commission amounting to P10,316,640.00, plus
interest at the rate of 16% per annum, as well as attorney’s fees
equivalent to 12% of his principal claim.20 Respondent claimed that
Pentacapital Realty is a 100% subsidiary of petitioner. Thus, although
petitioner did not directly participate in the transaction between
Pentacapital Realty, CRDI and respondent, the latter’s claim against
petitioner was based on the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction. Simply stated, respondent alleged that petitioner and Pentacapital
Realty are one and the same entity belonging to the Pentacapital Group of
Companies.21

TC: This court hereby orders the plaintiff to pay unto defendant the
following sums, to wit:

1. P1,715,156.90 representing the amount plaintiff is obligated

to pay defendant as provided for in the deed of sale and the
supplemental agreement, plus interest at the rate of 16% per
annum, to be computed from September 23, 1998 until the said
amount shall have been fully paid;
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS
G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, BERSAMIN, J
Facts: In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the
bedroom that she and her five younger siblings shared with their father,
was roused from sleep by someone undressing her. [5] It was her father.
AAA resisted, but the accused, wielding a bladed weapon, [6] threatened to
kill her if she shouted. [7] The accused then forcibly kissed her on the lips,
mashed her breasts, touched her private parts, and had carnal knowledge
of her. After her ordeal, she put on her garments and just cried. [8] She
recalled that her father had first sexually abused her on February 14,
1992.[9]
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father
touching her body. Noticing that her shorts were already unzipped and
unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them up and covered herself with a
blanket. But her father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her
shorts. However, she was able to go under the wooden bed to evade him. 
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
 
That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of
the crimes charged did not matter. Like any other judicial interpretation
of an existing law, the ruling in People v. Catubig settled the circumstances
when Article 2230 of the Civil Codeapplied, thereby reflecting the
meaning and state of that legal provision. The retroactivity of the
ruling vis--vis the accused could not be challenged or be barred by virtue
of its being civil, not penal, in effect.

On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and
attempted rape through separate informations.
On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal
Case No. 98-2304-MK, and imposed the death penalty, ordering him to
pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral
damages; and of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, and
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four years, nine months, and eleven
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and
twenty days, as maximum, ordering him to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as
moral damages.

The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
was reclusion perpetua because the accused was liable only for simple
rape by virtue of the information not alleging any qualifying
circumstances; and that in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused
was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his
act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and
pulling her from under the bed constituted only acts of lasciviousness.

Issue: WON accused should also be held liable for exemplary damages.

Ruling: YES

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,[32] the attendance of any aggravating

circumstance (generic, qualifying, or attendant) entitles the offended
party to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the
aggravating circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to
award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.
 
Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not
specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at trial) cannot
be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind
or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article
2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the
information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability. The Court has well explained this in People v. Catubig:[33]
 
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores
the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to
be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and
JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO
G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Facts: At around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants
were causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by
throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim,
Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street.
Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high
ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara
threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio,
and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako."
Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued
by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City
General Hospital where he died.
The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and ordered them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs
of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual
damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of earnings of the same
deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs. CA affirmed this
decision with modification in that the accused-appellants are jointly and
severally held liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the exclusion of his
common-law-wife, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.
Issue: WON exemplary damages should also be awarded
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the
deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis
omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of
Appeals since no documentary evidence was presented to buttress the
claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his
common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by
the exceptions mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals
stated:
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost
caused by the crime, must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured
party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was
presented to support the contention of the common-law-wife of the
victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning ₱500.00 a day.
Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the
common-law-wife of the victim which lacks specific details or particulars
on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation omitted.)
We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to
conform to recent jurisprudence.41

Ruling: YES
We deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We
have ruled as follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)
Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim’s heirs. 42 As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. 43 While no
amount of damages may totally compensate the sudden and tragic loss of
a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at
least assuage them.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to

conform to existing jurisprudence. 40

SC discussion on other damages awarded:

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.35

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able
to prove before the trial court, actual damages in the amount of
₱51,250.00 based on the receipts 36 they submitted to the trial
court.1âwphi1

We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s
award respecting the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity. As we
have already previously ruled that:

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages,

which as a rule must be duly proven by documentary evidence, not
merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
 SPOUSES JESUS FERNANDO and ELIZABETH S. FERNANDO vs.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 212038, February 8, 2017, PERALTA, J.
Facts: The spouses Jesus and Elizabeth S. Fernando (Fernandos) are
frequent flyers of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and are holders of Elite
Platinum World Perks Card, the highest category given to frequent flyers
of the carrier.4 They are known in the musical instruments and sports
equipments industry in the Philippines being the owners of JB Music and
JB Sports with outlets all over the country. They likewise own the five (5)
star Hotel Elizabeth in Baguio City and Cebu City, and the chain of Fersal
Hotels and Apartelles in the country.
In Trans World Airlines v. Court of Appeals,58 this Court considered the
social standing of the aggrieved passenger:
At the time of this unfortunate incident, the private respondent was
a practicing lawyer, a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. He
was a director of several companies and was active in civic and
social organizations in the Philippines. Considering the circumstances
of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the
community, he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary
damages. x x x This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify
private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he
suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition of
similar oppressive and discriminatory acts.59

Sometime on December 20, 2001, Jesus Fernando arrived at the LA

Airport via Northwest Airlines Flight No. NW02 to join his family who
flew earlier to the said place for a reunion for the Christmas holidays. He
was asked by the Immigration Officer to have his return ticket verified
and validated since the date reflected thereon. Instead the personnel of
the respondent merely glanced at his ticket without checking its status
with the computer and peremptorily said that the ticket has been used
and could not be considered as valid. He presented his Elite Platinum
World Perks Card but the personnel refused to check the validity of the
ticket in the computer, instead, looked at Jesus Fernando with contempt,
then informed the Immigration Officer that the ticket is not valid.
The Immigration Officer brought Jesus Fernando to the interrogation
room of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) where he was
asked humiliating questions for more than two (2) hours. When he was
finally cleared by the Immigration Officer, he was granted only a twelve
(12)-day stay in the United States (US), instead of the usual six (6)
months. He further incurred other expenses due to the said incident.
Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction
for the public good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, if
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.60 They are designed by our civil law to permit the
courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence
by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such
behavior.61 Hence, given the facts and circumstances of this case, We hold
Northwest liable for the payment of exemplary damages in the amount of
₱2,000,000.00.
In the case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong, 62 Chiong was given the
run-around at the Northwest check-in counter, instructed to deal with a
man in barong to obtain a boarding pass, and eventually barred from
boarding a Northwest flight to accommodate an American passenger
whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest, and did not even
personally check-in at the counter. Under the foregoing circumstances,
the award of moral and exemplary damages was given by this Court.

The second incident happened on January 29, 2002, the Fernandos were
Time and again, We have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case,
on their way back to the Philippines. When the Fernandos reached the
air transport, is primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus,
gate area where boarding passes need to be presented, Northwest
imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers
supervisor Linda Tang stopped them and demanded for the presentation
consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. 63 A contract to
of their paper tickets. They failed to present the same since Northwest
transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
issued electronic tickets (attached to the boarding passes) which they
contractual relation because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains
showed to the supervisor. The personnel rudely pulled them out of the
with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
queue. Elizabeth Fernando explained to Linda Tang that the matter could
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of
be sorted out by simply verifying their electronic tickets in her computer
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
and all she had to do was click and punch in their Elite Platinum World
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
Perks Card number. But Linda Tang arrogantly told them that if they
ground for an action or damages.
wanted to board the plane, they should produce their credit cards and
pay for their new tickets, otherwise Northwest would order their luggage
off-loaded from the plane. The Fernandos printed coupon tickets and
rushe back to the boarding gates since the plane was about to depart. But
when the Fernandos reached the boarding gate, the plane had already
departed. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON Defendant Northwest is liable to petitioner spouses for

exemplary damages

Ruling: YES

We note that even if both the CA and the RTC ruled out bad faith on the
part of Northwest, the award of "some moral damages" was recognized.
Both courts believed that considering that the Fernandos are good clients
of Northwest for almost ten (10) years being Elite Platinum World Perks
Card holders, and are known in their business circle, they should have
been given by Northwest the corresponding special treatment. 56 They
own hotels and a chain of apartelles in the country, and a parking garage
building in Indiana, USA. From this perspective, We adopt the said view.
We, thus, increase the award of moral damages to the Fernandos in the
amount of ₱3,000,000.00.

As held in Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 57 the social and financial standing of

a claimant may be considered if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMAN APACIBLE y RODRIGUEZ jurisprudence, we hereby reduce the civil indemnity
G.R. No. 189091, August 25, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J. awarded herein to P50,000.00. x x x (italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring
Facts: From the account of prosecution witness Mylene Vizconde supplied; citations omitted)
(Mylene), widow of Arnold Vizconde (the victim), the following  
transpired on the day her husband died: As reflected earlier, appellant was sentenced by the trial court
to reclusion perpetua.
On May 23, 1999, starting at about 2:00 p.m., her husband, her
uncle and appellant, who is her first cousin, had a drinking spree at a
neighbors house.[2] The spree lasted up to 8:30 p.m. following which her
husband returned home and slept in their room. [3] She thereupon placed
their eight-month old child beside him and went to the kitchen to prepare
milk for the child. Shortly thereafter, she, from a distance of about three
to four meters, heard appellant utter Putang ina mo, papatayin kita! and
then saw appellant, through the open door to the room, stab her husband
several times.[4]
 
She thus shouted for help and called appellants mother with
whom he lives about five (5) steps away. [5] While appellants mother who
heeded her call repaired to the house, the latter and appellant left as they
saw the victim drenched in blood. [6]
 
She then brought her child to a neighbor and sought help from
the Tuy Police Station who responded and conducted an investigation
with dispatch.[7]
 
At the time of his death, the victim was 26 years old and was
working at the National Power Corporation, earning P10,000 per month.
[8]

Mylene surmised that appellant killed her husband in view of

his (her husbands) refusal to amicably settle the malicious mischief case
he had filed against appellants brother for breaking the glass windshield
of his car.

The RTC convicted him of murder and sentencedhim to suffer

imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of victim
Arnold Vizconde y Famoso the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS as death indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
as moral damages.

The appellate court increased the award of civil indemnity from P50,000

to P75,000 in light of recent jurisprudence, [14]and awarded exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 to the heirs of the victim in view of the
attending qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Issue: WON the CA is correct in modifying the award of civil indemnity.

Ruling: NO

The Court reduces the amount of civil indemnity awarded by

the appellate court from P75,000 to P50,000, as determined by the trial
court. People v. Anod[16]explains why the award of P75,000 as civil
indemnity lies only in cases where the proper imposable penalty
is death, viz:
 
It is worth stressing that, at the outset, the
appellant, together with Lumbayan, was sentenced
by the RTC to suffer the penalty of  reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the CAs reliance on our ruling
in People v. dela Cruz was misplaced. In dela
Cruz, this Court cited our ruling in People v.
Tubongbanua, wherein we held that the civil
indemnity imposed should be P75,000.00. However,
the instant case does not share the same factual
milieu as dela Cruz and Tubongbanua. In the said
cases, at the outset, the accused were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of  death. However, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty on
June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to the accused was
reduced to reclusion perpetua. This jurisprudential
trend was followed in the recent case of People of
the Philippines v. Generoso Rolida y Moreno, etc.,
where this Court also increased the civil indemnity
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Based on the
foregoing disquisitions and the current applicable
 RODEL CRISOSTOMO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171526, September 1, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts: On February 12, 2001, at around 12:20 in the afternoon, Rodelio Pangilinan
(Rodelio) was working at a gasoline station owned by Jose Buencamino (Jose) at
Buliran, San Miguel, Bulacan. He was by the gasoline tank which was two or three
arms length from the cashiers office when three armed men on board a motorcycle
arrived. Two of the men immediately went to the cashier while the driver stayed
on the motorcycle. Inside the office, one of the men pulled out a fan knife while the
other, armed with a gun, fired a shot at Janet Ramos (Janet), the cashier. They
forcibly took the money in the cash register and the man with the gun fired a
second shot that fatally hit Janet in the right side of her head. The two armed men
returned to their companion waiting by the motorcycle and together sped away
from the scene of the crime.

On February 23, 2001, the petitioner was detained after being implicated in a
robbery that occurred in San Miguel, Bulacan. During his detention, Rodelio and
another gasoline boy arrived and identified him in a police lineup as one of the
three robbers who killed Janet.

The RTC convicted him as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of victim Janet Ramos in the
amount of P75,000.00, the owner or operator, Jose Buencamino, Jr., of the gasoline
station that was robbed, in the amount of P40,000.00 plus P14,500.00 as funeral
expenses (Exh. H) defrayed by said owner for its cashier Janet Ramos, as actual
damages, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The CA affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner that the awarded
civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000,00.

Issue: WON the CA is correct.

Ruling: NO.

The crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294 (as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659) of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63[28] of the Revised Penal Code states that when the law prescribes a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed.Considering that no modifying circumstance was proven to have attended
the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly sentenced the petitioner to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 each is granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying
aggravating circumstances.[30] These awards are mandatory without need of
allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the
commission of the crime. In this case, the CA properly awarded the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 
 PHILIPPINE HAWK
C O R P O R A T I O N vs. VIVIAN TAN LEE
G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010, PERALTA, J.
Facts: On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC
of Quezon City a Complaint[2] against petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-
delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991
in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the
death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent
physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, [3] in
her own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages
against petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and
interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the
motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
 
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a
bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine
Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.
In its Answer,[4] petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident,
alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the
recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on
their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who was on the wheel, at a
place after a Caltex gasoline station in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca,
Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon.  They were on a stop position at the
side of the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a
bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep
parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost
consciousness and was brought to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where
she was confined for a week. She was later transferred to St. Lukes
Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a fracture on her left chest,
her left arm became swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high
blood pressure.[8]
Respondent’s husband died due to the vehicular accident.
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing[10] and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one
million pesos a year in revenue. They also had a copra business, which
gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year.
In this case, the records show that respondents husband
was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca,
Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual income
of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of
Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, [38] which
showed that respondents husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43
in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondents testimony
as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million
pesos before respondents husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no
documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived from
their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such
income cannot be considered.
 
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net
earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or
income, less living and other incidental expenses. [39] In the absence of
documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the
lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross
income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross
income less necessary expenses).
 
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as
follows:
 
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income
Reasonable and
Capacity [2/3 (80-age at the (GAI) Necessary
time of death)] Expenses
(80% of GAI)
X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 - P100,000.00
(Living Expenses)
X = 30/3 x P100,000.00
 
X = 10 x P100,000.00
X = P1,000,000.00
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil
indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been fixed by current
jurisprudence at P50,000.00.[47] The award is proper under Art. 2206 of
the Civil Code.

The RTC ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered the Petitioner and
Margarito Avila to pay them jointly and solidarily the sum of P745,575.00
representing loss of earnings and actual damages plus P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC and ordered
Philippine Hawk and Avila to pay jointly and severally the following
amount: (a) P168,019.55 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as temperate
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P590,000.00 as
unearned income; and (e) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Issue: (1) WON Petitioner is liable to respondent for damages and (2)
WON the damages awarded by the CA are proper.

Ruling: (1) and (2) YES

The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for
by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the

claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence
of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which
case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
 EMILIA LIM vs. MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, a Single
Proprietorship Business Outfit Owned by Evelyn S. Valdevieso
G.R. No. 175851, July 4, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts: Sales Invoice No. 1711[3] dated November 24, 1995, as well as Statement of
Accounts No. 076[4] indicate that respondent Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria
(Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned
by Emilia, for which the latter issued four Philippine National Bank (PNB)
postdated checks worth P25,000.00 each. When two of these checks, particularly
PNB Check Nos. 951453[5] and 951454[6] dated October 10, 1996 and October 20,
1996, respectively, bounced for the reasons ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN
AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, Mindanao Wines, thru its proprietress Evelyn
Valdevieso, demanded from H & E Commercial the payment of their value through
two separate letters both dated November 18, 1996. [7] When the demands went
unheeded, Mindanao Wines filed before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Davao City Criminal Case Nos. 68,309-B-98 and 68,310-B-98
against Emilia for violations of BP 22.

The MTCC ruled in favor of Emilia and held that not all the elements of BP 22 are
present. However, it adjudged her to pay the complainant the total amounts of the
2 checks which is P50,000.00, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum; to
reimburse complainant of the expenses incurred in filing these cases in the amount
of P1,245.00, and to pay attorneys fees of P10,000.00.

The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The CA also affirmed the same
decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.

Issue: WON the dismissal of Emilias BP 22 cases likewise includes the dismissal of
their civil aspect.

Ruling: NO

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required[27] in civil cases. On this basis, Emilia insists
that the MTCC dismissed the BP 22 cases against her not on the ground of
reasonable doubt but on insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the civil liability should
likewise be extinguished. Emilias Demurrer to Evidence, however, betrays this
claim. Asserting insufficiency of evidence as a ground for granting said demurrer,
Emilia herself argued therein that the prosecution has not proven [her] guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[28] And in consonance with such assertion, the MTCC in its
judgment expressly stated that her guilt was indeed not established beyond
reasonable doubt, hence the acquittal.[29]

In any case, even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based on
insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a
dismissal based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the
criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of
the banks dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the
crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution. This,
however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since
the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of
evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor
does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect
which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of
evidence.
Note: I included both 2011 and 2012 Ochoa case (mam’s syllabus only
included 2012) 
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170071 & G.R. No. 170125, March 9, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10,
1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S
Transport Corporation (G & S), a common carrier. As narrated by the trial
court, the circumstances attending Jose Marcial’s death are as follows:
It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila
Domestic Airport, the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a
taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire owned and
operated by defendant corporation under the business name "Avis
Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its employee and authorized driver
Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher’s Village, Diliman, Quezon
City.
At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos
Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed.
While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another
cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler
cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of
the fly-over and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass
and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable to control it. To
avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing
his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the
middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the vehicle on the
floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and
passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital.
At the East Avenue Medical Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who
was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the accident.
On May 13, 1999, Jose Marcial’s wife, Ruby Bueno Ochoa, and his two
minor children, Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa (the heirs), through
counsel, sent G & S a letter 4 demanding that the latter indemnify them for
Jose Marcial’s death, his loss of earning capacity, and funeral expenses in
the total amount of ₱15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed the same, the
heirs filed a Complaint5 for Damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said court.
The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and
ordered it to pay the heirs the following amounts:1. P50,000 as civil
indemnity;2. P6,537,244.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;3.
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and,4. costs of litigation. 6 The RTC also
ordered G & S to pay the heirs the following:1. P300,000.00 as moral
damages;2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC and ordered G &
S to pay the heirs the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of the deceased Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, ₱200,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
the costs of litigation. The trial court’s award of ₱6,537,244.96 for the loss
of earning capacity of the deceased is DELETED for lack of basis.
Issue: WON the court of appeals erred in completely deleting the trial
court’s award for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
Ruling: YES
In Ereño, we denied the claim for loss of income because the handwritten
estimate of the deceased’s daily income as a self-employed vendor was
not supported by competent evidence like income tax returns or receipts.
This was in view of the rule that compensation for lost income is in the
nature of damages and as such requires due proof of damages suffered.
We reiterated this rule in People v. Yrat43 where we likewise denied the
same claim because the only evidence presented to show that the
deceased was earning ₱50,000.00 a month was the testimony of the wife.
There we stated that for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased
proof of the deceased’s average income. Self-serving, hence, unreliable
statement is not enough. In People v. Caraig,44 we declared that
"documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
therefor may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence,
provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws".
However, we subsequently ruled in Pleyto v. Lomboy45 that "failure to
present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial
evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair
and reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity". Hence, we held
as sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of
earning capacity the testimony of the victim’s widow that her husband
was earning a monthly income of ₱8,000.00. Later, in Victory Liner, Inc. v.
Gammad,46 after finding that the deceased’s earnings does not fall within
the exceptions laid down in Caraig, we deleted the award for
compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity as same was awarded
by the lower courts only on the basis of the husband’s testimony that the
deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue with a salary of ₱83,088.00 per annum at the time of her death.
This same rule was also applied in the 2008 case of Licyayo v. People.47
In all of the cases mentioned except for Ereño, the sole basis for the claim
for loss of earning capacity were the testimonies of the claimants. This is
not the case here. Just like in Ereño where the testimony of the mother of
the deceased was accompanied by a handwritten estimate of her
daughter’s alleged income as a fish vendor, the testimony of Jose Marcial’s
wife that he was earning around ₱450,000.00 a year was corroborated by
a Certification issued by the USAID. However in Ereño, we declared as
self-serving the handwritten estimate submitted by the mother hence we
denied the claim for such award. Based on said ruling, the CA in this case
deleted the award for lost income after it found the USAID Certification to
be self-serving and unreliable.
We disagree. The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification is
self-serving and unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to
arrive at such a conclusion. A research on USAID reveals that it is the
"principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to countries
recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in
democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal government agency
that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the
State [of the United States]."49 Given this background, it is highly
improbable that such an agency will issue a certification containing
unreliable information regarding an employee’s income. 
While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to
determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy * x (gross annual income -
reasonable living expenses),53
*
Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – age of the deceased)
we, however, find incorrect the amount of ₱6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The
award should be ₱6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following
computation:
2 (80-3654)
Net earning capacity
x 450,844.4955-50%56
=
3
88
= x 225,422.25
3
= 29.33 x 225,422.25
= ₱6, 611,634.59
 HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170071 & G.R. No. 170125, July 16, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: A Complaint5 for Damages was filed by the heirs against G & S with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 164 on account of Jose
Marcial’s death while onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G & S.
The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and
ordered it to pay the heirs the following amounts:1. P50,000 as civil
indemnity;2. P6,537,244.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;3.
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and,4. costs of litigation. 6 The RTC also
ordered G & S to pay the heirs the following:1. P300,000.00 as moral
damages;2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision but with
the modifications that the awards for loss of income in the amount of
P6,537,244.96 be deleted and that moral damages be reduced to
P200,000.00.9
The deletion was ordered on the ground that the income certificate
issued by Jose Marcial’s employer, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), is self-serving, unreliable and biased,
and that the same was not supported by competent evidence such as
income tax returns or receipts.
The parties’ respective appeals11 from the CA Decision became the subject
of this Court’s March 9, 2011 Decision which denied G & S’s petition and
partly granted that of the heirs. The Court affirmed the assailed CA
Decision with the modifications that G & S is ordered to pay the heirs
P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased, as well as
moral damages in the reduced amount of P100,000.00.
G & S filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 arguing that the USAID
Certification used as basis in computing the award for loss of income is
inadmissible in evidence because it was not properly authenticated and
identified in court by the signatory thereof.
Issue: WON the Court should reconsider its decision dated March 9,
2011.
Ruling: The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
The requirement of authentication of documentary evidence applies only to
a private document.
It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must first be
proved.15 However, it must be remembered that this requirement of
authentication only pertains to private documents and "does not apply to
public documents, these being admissible without further proof of their
due execution or genuineness. Two reasons may be advanced in support
of this rule, namely: said documents have been executed in the proper
registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is
shown by clear and convincing proof; and, second, because public
documents are authenticated by the official signature and seals which
they bear and of which seals, courts may take judicial notice." 16 Hence, in a
case, the Court held that in the presentation of public documents as
evidence, due execution and authenticity thereof are already presumed. 17
The subject USAID Certification is a public document, hence, does not
require authentication.
It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the subject
USAID Certification is a private or public document before this Court can
rule upon the correctness of its admission and consequent use as basis
for the award of loss of income in these cases.
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as either
public or private, viz:
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph (a) of the above-quoted provision classifies the written official
acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of
a foreign country, as public documents. As mentioned in our March 9,
2011 Decision, USAID is the principal United States agency that extends
assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty,
and engaging in democratic reforms and that it is an independent federal
government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from
the Secretary of State of the United States.18
A further research on said agency shows that it was created through
Executive Order 1097319 by President John F. Kennedy on November 3,
1961 pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 20 It is headed by an
Administrator and Deputy Administrator, both appointed by the
President of the Unites States and confirmed by its Senate. 21 From these,
there can be no doubt that the USAID is an official government agency of a
foreign country, the United States. Hence, Cruz, as USAID’s Chief of the
Human Resources Division in the Philippines, is actually a public officer.
Apparently, Cruz’s issuance of the subject USAID Certification was made
in the performance of his official functions, he having charge of all
employee files and information as such officer. In view of these, it is clear
that the USAID Certification is a public document pursuant to paragraph
(a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, and consistent with our
above discussion, the authenticity and due execution of said Certification
are already presumed. Moreover, as a public document issued in the
performance of a duty by a public officer, the subject USAID Certification
is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.22
And, there being no clear and sufficient evidence presented by G & S to
overcome these presumptions, the RTC is correct when it admitted in
evidence the said document. The USAID Certification could very well be
used as basis for the award for loss of income to the heirs.
The award of attorney’s fees and cost of litigation should be deleted.
While we are constrained to deny the present Motion for Reconsideration
for the reasons above-stated, we cannot, however, end without discussing
the awards of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.
In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Banking,25 the Court held, viz:
On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled
that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the
decision of the court. Since the trial court’s decision did not give the basis
of the award, the same must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing
Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, we held:
Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses should be
deleted. Well-enshrined is that an award for attorney’s fees must be
stated in the text of the court’s decision and not in the dispositive portion
only (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation Solidbank v. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 1995 and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals. 286 SCRA 257 1998). This is also true with the litigation
expenses where the body of the decision discusses nothing for its basis.
The text of the court a quo’s Decision is bereft of any factual or legal
justification for the awards of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. It
merely declared the grant of said awards to the heirs in the dispositive
portion of its decision.
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. vs. ELLEN JOHANNE
HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO
GILLERA
G.R. No. 189998, August 29, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
Facts: In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to
Manila on a business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia
of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at
Room 1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early
morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by
still unidentified malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
How the crime was discovered was a story in itself. A routine verification
call from the American Express Card Company to cardholder Harper’s
residence in Oslo, Norway (i.e., Bygdoy Terasse 16, 0287 Oslo, Norway)
led to the discovery. It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6,
1999, a Caucasian male of about 30–32 years in age, 5’4" in height, clad in
maroon long sleeves, black denims and black shoes, entered the Alexis
Jewelry Store in Glorietta, Ayala Center, Makati City and expressed
interest in purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch valued at ₱ 320,000.00 with
the use of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit
card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in
answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative
sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba),
who asked for the customer’s passport upon suggestion of the credit card
representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble
for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit
cards and the passport behind.
In the meanwhile, Harper’s family in Norway must have called him at his
hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express
card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested
Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on
Harper’s room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to Room 1428 at
11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the
bed.
On August 30, 2002, respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to
recover various damages from petitioner alleging that the murderer
succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel’s private rooms area and
into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel’s gross
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the
lack of which owing to the acts or omissions of its employees was the
immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased.
The RTC finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in its duties and thus
liable for the death of Christian Harper, this Court orders the defendant to
pay plaintiffs the amount of: PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual
and compensatory damages; PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses
of transporting the remains of Harper to Oslo, Norway; PhP 250,000.00
attorney’s fees; and to pay the cost of suit.
The CA affirmed the said decision but with modification, as follows: ₱
52,078,702.50, as actual and compensatory damages; ₱ 25,000.00, as
temperate damages; ₱ 250,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs
of the suit.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs-appellees were able to prove with
competent evidence the affirmative allegations in the complaint that they
are the widow and son of Mr. Christian harper.
(2) WON the Petitioner is liable due to its own negligence.
Ruling: (1) YES
The documentary evidence that plaintiffs-appellees offered relative to
their heirship consisted of the following –
1. Exhibit "Q" - Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher
Harper, son of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne
Harper;
2. Exhibit "Q-1" - Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen
and Christian Fredrik Harper;
3. Exhibit "R" - Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick Harper,
son of Christopher Shaun Harper and Eva Harper; and
4. Exhibit "R-1" - Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court
stating that Ellen Harper was married to the deceased,
Christian Fredrick Harper and listed Ellen Harper and Jonathan
Christopher Harper as the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper.
Although Exhibit Q,12 Exhibit Q-1,13 Exhibit R14 and Exhibit R-115 were not
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his
deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and said
documents did not comply with the requirement under Section 24 of Rule
132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines a
certificate of the person having custody must accompany the copy of the
document that was duly attested stating that such person had custody of
the documents, the deviation was not enough reason to reject the utility
of the documents for the purposes they were intended to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of Oslo,
Norway issued on March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal,
Registrar, and corresponded to respondent Jonathan Christopher Harper
and victim Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively. 16 Exhibit Q explicitly
stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen
Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the birth of Christian Fredrik
Harper on December 4, 1968. Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were authenticated
on March 29, 2004 by the signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway as well as by the official seal of that office. In
turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in
Stockholm, Sweden authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the
official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit
Q and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie "to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway."17
Exhibit Q-1,18 the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen Harper
and Christian Fredrik Harper, contained the following data, namely: (a)
the parties were married on June 29, 1996 in Ullern Church; and (b) the
certificate was issued by the Office of the Vicar of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, with the official seal of
that office. Philippine Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the
capacity of Sorlie "to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway,"19 and further certified that the document was
a true translation into English of a transcript of a Marriage Certificate
issued to Christian Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by the
Vicar of the Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1,20 a Probate Court certificate issued by the Oslo Probate Court
on February 18, 2000 through Morten Bolstad, its Senior Executive
Officer, was also authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie and with
the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. As with
the other documents, Philippine Consul Tirol explicitly certified to the
capacity of Sorlie "to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Norway," and further certified that the document was a
true translation into English of the Oslo Probate Court certificate issued
on February 18, 2000 to the effect that Christian Fredrik Harper, born on
December 4, 1968, had reportedly died on November 6, 1999. 21
The Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both Ellen Johanne Harper
and Christopher S. Harper were Harper’s heirs, to wit:
The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility for the
commitments of the deceased in accordance with the provisions of
Section 78 of the Probate Court Act (Norway), and the above substitute
guardian has agreed to the private division of the estate.
The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake the private
division of the estate:
Ellen Johanne Harper
Christopher S. Harper
This probate court certificate relates to the entire estate.
Oslo Probate Court, 18 February 2000.22
The official participation in the authentication process of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment of the
official seal of that office on each authentication indicated that Exhibit Q,
Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of a public nature
in Norway, not merely private documents. It cannot be denied that based
on Philippine Consul Tirol’s official authentication, Tanja Sorlie was "on
the date of signing, duly authorized to legalize official documents for the
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway." Without a showing to the
contrary by petitioner, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1
should be presumed to be themselves official documents under
Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth of
their contents under Philippine law.

At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1

substantially met the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule
132 as a condition for their admission as evidence in default of a showing
by petitioner that the authentication process was tainted with bad faith.
Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of the documents
prior to their admission as evidence was substantially achieved.
In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,23 the Court has said that
substantial compliance, by its very nature, is actually inadequate
observance of the requirements of a rule or regulation that are waived
under equitable circumstances in order to facilitate the administration of
justice, there being no damage or injury caused by such flawed
compliance.

(2) YES

Even so, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner failed to provide the
basic and adequate security measures expected of a five-star hotel; and
that its omission was the proximate cause of Harper’s death.

The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that the management practice

prior to the murder of Harper had been to deploy only one security or
roving guard for every three or four floors of the building; that such ratio
had not been enough considering the L-shape configuration of the hotel
that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the other end; and that
he had recommended to management to post a guard for each floor, but
his recommendation had been disapproved because the hotel "was not
doing well" at that particular time.

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but
also security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business. 43 Applying by analogy Article
2000,44 Article 200145 and Article 200246 of the Civil Code (all of which
concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the
personal effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater
reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility
when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved.
Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have
unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors
of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward befall
the unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law
would ever envision.
 ROGELIO J. GONZAGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES rate of six percent (6) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

Facts: At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio

Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara,
Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc 5 of the same municipality, to
bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and
Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry), to school.7 While they were ascending the
curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the
road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly
descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew
the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. 8 In order to avoid collision,
Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly
swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.9

As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown
off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land
Cruiser,10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the
Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road,11 causing injuries to their
legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, 12 and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing
the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed
the victims together13 on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy.
Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser. 15

Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his
two (2) sisters to cater to the victims. 16Eventually, he chanced upon
Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his store,
and informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the
incident to the police and getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to
the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s
assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio,
Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had
transpired.18 Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency
Hospital of Maramag where they were treated. 19 Operations were
performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter
eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was confined
in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month,
or until July 26, 1997.20 All the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia. 21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an
Information22 charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
"with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot
to the injured party such help that was in his hands to give" 23 before the
RTC.

The RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property and ordered him to pay the following
civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of
Dionesio, Sr.; (b) ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish
suffered by the family; (c) ₱200,000.00 for the medical expenses
incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the wake and
the burial; (e) ₱30,000.00 for the damaged motorcycle; (f) ₱60,000.00 for
the loss of earning capacity; and (g) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The CA
upheld the RTC decision.

Issue: WON the order for payment of “moral damages” was proper.

Ruling: NO (the order for the payment of "moral damages" in the amount
of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking,
denominated as one for the payment of "civil indemnity")

The Court clarifies that the order for the payment of "moral damages" in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio, Sr. should be,
properly speaking, denominated as one for the payment of "civil
indemnity" as they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil
Code relevant thereto,52 but was one "given without need of proof other
than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of [the accused’s]
responsibility for it."53 This is a palpable legal error which the Court
should correct if only for terminological propriety. With the private
complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of the RTC’s July 31, 2006
Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should remain
undisturbed. Note that, in line with existing jurisprudence, interest atthe
 EDDIE CORTEL Y CARNA AND YELLOW BUS LINE, INC. v.CECILE
GEPAYA-LIM
G.R. No. 218014, December 07, 2016, CARPIO, J.
Facts: On 29 October 2004, Cartel was driving a bus, operated by Yellow
Bus Line, which was on its way from Marbel, Koronadal to Davao City. At
around 9:45 in the evening, as the bus was traversing Crossing Rubber in
the Municipality of Tupi, South Cotabato, Cortel noticed two trucks with
glaring headlights coming from the opposite direction. Cortel stated that
he was driving at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. He claimed that
upon noticing the trucks, he reduced his speed to 20 kilometers per hour.
However, the bus hit a black motorcycle which allegedly had no tail light
reflectors. The impact dragged the motorcycle at a distance of three
meters before it came to a full stop. Lim, who was riding the motorcycle,
was thrown upward and then slammed into the bus, hitting the base of its
right windshield wiper. The motorcycle got entangled with the broken
bumper of the bus. According to Cortel, Lim was wearing a black jacket
and was riding without a helmet at the time of the accident.
Felix Larang (Larang), the bus conductor, alighted from the bus to aid
Lim. Larang gave instructions to Cortel to move back to release Lim and
the motorcycle from the front bumper of the bus. Two bystanders
proceeded to the scene to assist Lim. After reversing the bus and freeing
Lim and the motorcycle, Cortel drove the bus away and went to a nearby
bus station where he surrendered to authorities. Cortel claimed that he
left the scene of the incident because he feared for his life.
Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim's widow, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners.
The trial court rendered judgment against Defendants Eddie Cortely
Carna and the owners of the Yellow Bus Line, Inc. pursuant to [A]rticles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines[,] and ordered said
Defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the following
amount: death compensation of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00) plus: a) Funeral and burial expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00); b) [C]ompensation for loss of earning capacity in the
amount of P100,000.00; (c) x x x Damages [to] the motorcycle in the
amount of [Fifteen Thousand Pesos] (P15,000.00);d) Attorney's fees of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00);e) Costs of suit.
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the award of 100,000 as death
compensation given by the trial court to the heirs of Lim was inadequate.
However, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount of death indemnity
from 150,000 to 50,000. The Court of Appeals deleted the 15,000
awarded by the trial court for the damages to the motorcycle for absence
of proof but awarded 25,000 for funeral and burial expenses. In addition,
the Court of Appeals awarded 100,000 as moral damages to the heirs of
Lim.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error m
affirming with modifications the decision of the trial court.
Ruling: NO
We sustain the Court of Appeals in its award of loss of earning capacity
and damages to respondent. The increase in the award for loss of earning
capacity is proper due to the computation of the award in accordance
with the following formula:
Net earning capacity Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income- Living
Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy 2/3 (80 -
the age of the deceased).14
We note that the Court of Appeals clearly intended to award to
respondent temperate damages amounting to P25,000 for burial and
funeral expenses, instead of the P15,000 representing the actual damage
to the motorcycle awarded by the trial court, because no evidence was
presented to prove the same. However, the term "temperate damages"
was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision although it was stated that the amount was for funeral
and burial expenses. We reduce the interest rate to 6% per annum on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

In its 16 October 2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor.

The Court of Appeals modified the amount of damages awarded to the

heirs of Lim. Using the formula set by this Court in The Heirs of Poe v.
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.5 and Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court of Appeals recomputed Lim's lost earning capacity, as
follows:

Life expectancy 2/3 x [80- age of deceased at the time of death]

=

2/3 x (80-41]

2/3 x [39]

FORMULA – NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)

If:

Age at time of death of Robert Lim = 41

Monthly Income at time of death = 13,715.00
Gross Annual Income (GAI)= [(P13,715.00) (12)] = P164,580.00
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) – 50% of GAI = P82,290

NEC = [2/3 (80-41)] [164,580-82,290]

= [2/3 (39)] [82,290]

= [26] [82,290]

= P2,139,540.00[7]
 ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR vs COSMOS BOTTLING
COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC.
G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.
Facts: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the
negligence causing the death of a participant in an organized marathon
bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race.
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with
Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. The
organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads
and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel
applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest
and after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was
accepted and he was given an official number. Consequently, on June 15,
1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other
participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned
out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide
adequate safety and precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence
required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to
insulate and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular
and other dangers along the marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a
jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don
Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical
treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later
that same day due to severe head injuries.
Issues: WON Inergamers was liable for damages.
Ruling: YES
Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a suit
upon crimes and quasi-delicts can recover from the defendant, viz.:
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the natural
and probable consequences of its negligence. In its judgment, the RTC
explained the award of damages in favor of the petitioners, as follows:
As borne by the evidence on record, the plaintiffs incurred medical,
hospitalization and burial expenses for their son in this aggregate amount
of ₱28,061.65 (Exhibits "D'', "D-1" and "D-2"). In instituting this case, they
have paid their lawyer ₱5,000 as initial deposit, their arrangement being
that they would pay attorney's fees to the extent of 10% of whatever
amount would be awarded to them in this case.
For the loss of a son, it is unquestionable that plaintiffs suffered untold
grief which should entitle them to recover moral damages, and this Court
believes that if only to assuage somehow their untold grief but not
necessarily to compensate them to the fullest, the nominal amount of
₱l00,00.00 should be paid by the defendants.
For failure to adopt elementary and basic precautionary measure to
insure the safety of the participants so that sponsors and organizers of
sports events should exercise utmost diligence in preventing injury to the
participants and the public as well, exemplary damages should also be
paid by the defendants and this Court considers the amount of
₱50,000.00 as reasonable.87
Although we will not disturb the foregoing findings and determinations,
we need to add to the justification for the grant of exemplary damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that exemplary damages are to be
awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The foregoing characterization by the RTC indicated that
Intergames' negligence was gross. We agree with the characterization.
Gross negligence, according to Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez,88 is the absence
of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of
persons or property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed, the failure of
Intergames to adopt the basic precautionary measures for the safety of
the minor participants like Rommel was in reckless disregard of their
safety. Conduct is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent; it must
be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement,
or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or
simple inattention.89 The RTC did not recognize the right of the
petitioners to recover the loss of earning capacity of Rommel. It should
have, for doing so would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the
Court has unhesitatingly allowed such recovery in respect of children,
students and other non-working or still unemployed victims. The legal
basis for doing so is Article 2206 (l) of the Civil Code, which stipulates
that the defendant "shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."
Indeed, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the heirs
of a deceased non-working victim simply because earning capacity, not
necessarily actual earning, may be lost.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 90 damages for loss
of earning capacity were granted to the heirs of a third-year high school
student of the University of the Philippines Integrated School who had
been killed when she was hit and run over by the petitioner's passenger
bus as she crossed Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. The Court justified
the grant in this wise:
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for
loss of capacity to earn money. Evidence must be presented that the
victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably certain to
complete training for a specific profession. In People v. Teehankee, no
award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the
heirs of a college freshman because there was no sufficient evidence on
record to show that the victim would eventually become a professional
pilot. But compensation should be allowed for loss of earning capacity
resulting from the death of a minor who has not yet commenced
employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is
presented to establish the amount thereor.91 (bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis)
In People v. Sanchez,92 damages for loss of earning capacity was also
allowed to the heirs of the victims of rape with homicide despite the lack
of sufficient evidence to establish what they would have earned had they
not been killed. The Court rationalized its judgment with the following
observations:
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the
country's leading educational institution in agriculture.1âwphi1 As
reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have
graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them
of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their
heirs are entitled to compensation. xxxx. However, considering that
Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due time from a reputable
university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they
would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered,
the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income
that the two would have earned in 1993 at ₱8,000.000 per month (or
₱96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and other incidental
expenses at ₱3,000.00 per month (or ₱36,000.00/year). 93 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In Perena v. Zarate,94 the Court fixed damages for loss of earning capacity
to be paid to the heirs of the 15-year-old high school student of Don
Bosco Technical Institute killed when a moving train hit the school van
ferrying him to school while it was traversing the railroad tracks. The
RTC and the CA had awarded damages for loss of earning capacity
computed on the basis of the minimum wage in effect at the time of his
death. Upholding said findings, the Court opined:
x x x, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should
not be taken against his parents and in favor of the defendants whose
negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right to work and earn
money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and his
services as well. x x x. Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of the
indemnification for Aaron's loss of earning capacity despite him having
been unemployed, because compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased's power or ability
to earn money.

The petitioners sufficiently showed that Rommel was, at the time of his
untimely but much lamented death, able-bodied, in good physical and
mental state, and a student in good standing. 95 It should be reasonable to
assume that Rommel would have finished his schooling and would turn
out to be a useful and productive person had he not died. Under the
foregoing jurisprudence, the petitioners should be compensated for
losing Rommel's power or ability to earn. The basis for the computation
of earning capacity is not what he would have become or what he would
have wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in
effect at the time of his death. The formula for this purpose is:

Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income less

Necessary Living Expenses ]96

Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the difference of 80 and

the age of the deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at the time of
his death, his life expectancy was 41 years. His projected gross annual
income, computed based on the minimum wage for workers in the non-
agricultural sector in effect at the time of his death, 97then fixed at
₱l4.00/day, is ₱5,535.83. Allowing for necessary living expenses of 50%
of his projected gross annual income, his total net earning capacity is
₱l13,484.52.

Article 2211 of the Civil Code expressly provides that interest, as a part of

damages, may be awarded in crimes and quasi-delicts at the discretion of
the court. The rate of interest provided under Article 2209 of the Civil
Code is 6% per annum in the absence of stipulation to the contrary. The
legal interest rate of 6% per annum is to be imposed upon the total
amounts herein awarded from the time of the judgment of the RTC on
May 10, 1991 until finality of judgment.98 Moreover, pursuant to Article
221299 of the Civil Code, the legal interest rate of 6o/o per annum is to be
further imposed on the interest earned up to the time this judgment of
the Court becomes final and executory until its full satisfaction. 100

Article 2208 of the Civil Code expressly allows the recovery of attorney's

fees and expenses of litigation when exemplary damages have been
awarded.1âwphi1 Thus, we uphold the RTC's allocation of attorney's fees
in favor of the petitioners equivalent to 10% of the total amount to be
recovered, inclusive of the damages for loss of earning capacity and
interests, which we consider to be reasonable under the circumstances.