Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220

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Journal of Air Transport Management

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Alitalia e The failure of a national carrier

Paolo Beria a, *, Hans-Martin Niemeier b, Karsten Fröhlich b, c
a
DiAP - Politecnico di Milano,Via Bonardi 3, 20133 Milano, Italy
b
University of Applied Sciences Bremen, Werderstr. 73, 28199 Bremen, Germany
c
Dresden University of Technology, 01069 Dresden, Germany

a b s t r a c t
Keywords: The paper examines the case of Alitalia, Italy’s former flag carrier, as a case of a state-managed failure.
European transport liberalization The history of the airline is characterized by a continuous decline in its competitive position since the
Airline competition
progressive liberalization of the European aviation market. The root cause of this decline lies in the
Airline privatization
Alitalia
carrier being mainly used as a political tool rather than operating as a competitive firm. In a liberalized
market this doomed Alitalia to failure, which was artificially delayed by numerous state financial and
regulatory interventions. The paper starts with a historical overview of the most important events in
recent Alitalia history. Thereafter the main causes of the airline’s weak competitive position relative to
other European carriers are analyzed. We argue that the underlying causes of the decline were contin-
uous political protection, lack of strategic views in favor of short-term objectives, and poor managerial
decisions.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 2. An historical overview

There is general agreement that liberalization of air transport
has increased economic welfare in the US and in Europe. While in
the US private firms were forced to rapidly compete and adapt, in
Europe state owned firms had time to adapt over three ‘Packages’ of
deregulation. Some of the former national airlines were trans-
formed into successful private airlines while others found it diffi-
cult to adapt.
This paper analyzes one of the airlines, Alitalia, that has failed
to adapt to competition. The expectation in the 1990s was that
European flag carriers would consolidate; a process that is still
taking place and some analysts expect that only three or four
mega airlines and some niche carriers will survive. In principle,
Alitalia could have played an important role in this process as
a major carrier. For instance, in the late 1990s it was thought to
have a strong alliance with KLM to become one of main European
players, but already a few years later the company’s share price
was already collapsed. This paper addresses the reasons why Ali-
talia had such problems competing in a commercial environment
by firstly providing a historical overview of Alitalia, secondly
quantifying and explaining the poor performance and thirdly
discussing the role of the state.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Paolo.beria@polimi.it (P. Beria).
Alitalia started operations in 1947. Being the Italian flag carrier, it
was a monopolist until the end of the last century, when liber-
alization in Europe began. In 1991 domestic competition emerged
when Meridiana entered market, although initially it was more of
a complement since the Italian antitrust authority enforced code
share agreements between the companies. In November 1995 Air-
One also started operations and was de facto the only significant
competitor for Alitalia for more than a decade (Spagnuolo, 2000).
The Italian market remained however substantially a monopoly
with Alitalia, which was 100% owned by the Italian Treasury, never
producing a business plan and remaining independent in the
international marketplace.
Only in 1996 the “Cempella” plan, named after Alitalia’s CEO,
Domenico Cempella, was implemented in an attempt at solving
some of the airlines problems. It aimed at cutting costs and raising
capital in the stock market to strengthen Alitalia’s fleet. For the first
time Milan Malpensa Airport is mentioned as key for the company’s
re-launch, together with an alliance with KLM. Alitalia’s market
share, however, had already began declining from more than 90% to
less than 80% already in 1996. Further other airlines including Alpi
Eagles, Volare Airlines, Air Dolomiti, Gandalf and Air Europe started
offering domestic and European flights.
To overcome raising financial problems, several capital injections
of state funds were made into the airline. The first, of €1,400million,
was over 1996 to 2000 (Fisconelmondo, 2008) and was immediately

0969-6997/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2011.02.007
216 P. Beria et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220
scrutinized by the European Commission that declared it compatible
with the EU norms as long as certain conditions were fulfilled
regarding anticompetitive behavior. These were partially met and in
2002 the Commission agreed to the full recapitalization with no
strings attached (Giraudi, 2008). However, the pervasive political
influence on AZ did not end.
The new Milan “Malpensa 2000” airport opened in October 1998
allowing Alitalia to switch hub operations from Rome Fiumicino
(Beria and Scholz, 2010). At the same time, all flights from the exis-
ting Milan Linate airport, including those of the competing carriers,
were transferred to Malpensa. The announced merger/alliance
between Alitalia and KLM was signed in January 1999, scheduled for
completion at the end of 2000 and the new hub was a key element of
this alliance. In September 1999, however, because of strong oppo-
sition to the shift of hub operations to Malpensa, the Italian author-
ities suspended the relocation program. At the same time Alitalia was
found guilty by the Italian Antitrust Authority of anticompetitive
behavior on domestic routes; market being characterized by high
concentration, few competitors and significant barriers to entry.1
The joint operations involving Alitalia and KLM were ended in
August 2001 by the latter. The official line was that the partnership
ceased due to insufficient development of Malpensa and Alitalia’s
incomplete privatization but it appears that political opposition in
Italy to change Alitalia into an international carrier also played
a role. Alitalia decided to start a double-hub structure, moving back
a significant part of connecting traffic to Rome Fiumicino.
Without a strong partner, Alitalia began facing increasing
competition, including that from low cost carriers (LCCs) and this
led to significant pressures on air fares (CERTeT, 2003). Alitalia
experienced a decline in load factors, leading to a marked wors-
ening of its yields and by 2003 its flights were less than 50% of the
domestic market; the crisis post September 11th 2001 did not help
the problem. In October 2003 the new CEO, Francesco Mengozzi
issued a plan that foresaw, on the financial side, an increase in
capital with state ownership falling from 62% to less than 50%. The
privatization, however, was not accepted by unions and failed.
Other measures included a 41% cut in intercontinental flights,
including some profitable ones, to allow a focusing on short and
medium haul connections; but this did nothing to improve the
situation vis-à-vis LCCs given Alitalia’s high costs.
In May 2004 Giancarlo Cimoli became Alitalia’s new CEO at
a time the airline’s losses reached €1 million per day, and the airline
was on the edge of bankruptcy (Boitani, 2008a). In October 2004, the
Italian Government made a “bridge loan” of €400 million to be paid
back within a year. The EC considered this loan public aid and
applied the “one time, last time” rule together with additional
conditions.2 In December 2005, however, the airline, still in financial
difficulty, got a capital injection of €1 billion, almost half of it from
the Italian State thereby lowering its share to below 50%. A few days
later Alitalia repaid the €400million loan. In hindsight, this privat-
ization gesture appears trivial being irrelevant with respect to
control the firm (Scarpa, 2004). It was effective only to guarantee the
survival of the carrier until the government elections of 2006.
In March 2006, Ryanair began offering services between Milano
Bergamo and Rome Ciampino; the first time a foreign carrier
engaged in cabotage in Italy, but soon many routes are routinely
flown by foreign carriers.
1
In 2001 the main four Italian carriers had a market share of 95% of passengers.
Alitalia, with approximately 50 routes, controlled 60e70% of the domestic market.
2
Basically, Alitalia was not be allowed to receive public money until 2014,
a realistic plan to restructure the company was required, the loan could not be used
to expand its competitive capacity for some years, and the state had to decrease its
ownership below 50% (Ponti and Boitani, 2004).
By 2006 Alitalia’s losses had increased to €2 million per day
(Scarpa, 2007) and in December the new government embarked on
a path to sell its remaining 39.9% of shares involving a new
“transparent and non-discriminatory process”. Several applicants
qualified for the share offer, including AirOne, Alitalia’s main
competitor. But Alitalia was not an attractive buy: its fleet was
obsolete and diverse, its productivity low, its brand name nearly
worthless and its finances far from sound. Alitalia only two
attractions were its slots at some congested airports and the quasi-
monopoly position it enjoyed due to political protection.
To stop stem financial losses, Alitalia’s management issued
a further plan named “Emergency Plan 2008e2010” in August 2008
aimed at abandonment of Malpensa as a hub and to concentrate
flights on Rome.
A second round of privatization took place in December 2007
that involved possible foreign participation to select one single
partner Alitalia could negotiate with. In the meantime, Alitalia sold
three pairs of slots in London Heathrow for €92 million to finance
operations. In March 2008 AF-KLM made a bid to buy 100% of
Alitalia and to recapitalize the firm with around €1 billion; a total
offer of €1.7 billion. The Italian government would be given 1.4% of
AF-KLM’s shares. The offer however was bound by conditions: the
full agreement of labor unions was needed as was a written
commitment of the government to guarantee a full set of traffic
rights, Rome airport society (AdR) and the maintenance firm
(Fintecna) had to support the plan, and the Milan airport society
request of reimbursement had to be withdrawn. In return, Alitalia
was guaranteed autonomy and job losses would be limited to
2100. The fleet was to shrink to 149 aircraft, before the start of
a renewal and expansion from 2010. Alitalia’s hub would be Rome
Fiumicino.
The political discussion surrounding the proposal was heated and
amplified by forthcoming elections. The opposition leader, Berlus-
coni, and also some left-wing political leaders called the deal
a “clearance sale” and called for its refusal. Consequently, AF-KLM
withdraw its offer in April, with the surge in oil prices and crisis in the
air travel contributing to the decision. One day later, the government
approved a short-term loan of €300 million to Alitalia, to be repaid
before the 31st December 2008. The EC informally declared this loan
a state aid and in May, it was changed to a non-repayable capital
investment.
In May 2008 the banking group Intesa Sanpaolo was put in as
advisor for Alitalia’s new privatization process by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and the laws governing the declaration of bank-
ruptcy are suspended “to face this extraordinary situation”, as
stated by the Economics Minister. The result was a restructuring
plan, “Piano Fenice” aimed at a:
- declaration of receivership, together with modifications of the
law regulating this legal institution (“legge Marzano”);
- merger with AirOne into a new company free of debts and with
less workers; and
- the application of redundancy funds for more than 3000
workers.
In September 2008 the administrator of Alitalia received a bid for
its the purchase from Compagnia Aerea Italiana (CAI), a new company
founded by the advisor Intesa Sanpaolo itself and 15 other Italian
shareholders. The purchase was strongly supported by politicians to
“guarantee” an Italian flag carrier and to avoid speculations and
a transfer to a foreign competitor. In September 2008 CAI retracted its
bid, however, after failing to reach agreement with one of the
national labor unions (CGIL) and unions representing pilots and
cabin crew. CAI did not fully retire from the take-over and a week
later, signed the agreement after the direct intervention of
 P. Beria et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220
Fig. 1. Airline profits.
a representative of Prime Minister Mr. Berlusconi. CAI’s bid was
finally accepted on 22nd September 2008 and becomes the new
owner of Alitalia and AirOne in November with conditions:
- It would pay €1,052,000,000, partially in cash and partially by
taking over Alitalia’s debt;
- It would operate for at least two years according to the “Piano
Fenice”;
- There would be new contractual conditions for both pilots and
cabin crew; and
- Alitalia’s debt and any redundant workers are to be left in
a “bad” company.
The “new” Alitalia began operations in January 2009 with all its
debts transferred and excess labor made redundant with generous
severance pay. Half of the flights operated previously by Alitalia and
AirOne were cut, with those from Malpensa reduced by almost 89%
(Corriere della Sera, 2009); increases of flights from Fiumicino did
match this not reduction. Moreover, flights became concentrated
on the Milan e Rome route (Boitani, 2009).
In January 2009, AF-KLM effectively gained the control of Ali-
talia by buying 25% of the shares of the new Alitalia for €32million;
Italian investors enjoyed a speculative profit of about 14% in one
month. Alitalia’s use of Milan airports changed again (La
Repubblica, 2009) with a return to the conveniently located
Linate and virtual withdrawal from Malpensa. As Alitalia owns the
217
large majority of Linate slots, this determined a monopoly
situation.3
3. Quantifying the performance of Alitalia
The main emphasis here is less on explaining Alitalia’s poor
performance but more to give an idea of its scope. Alitalia is
compared with other, similar European mid-sized and regional
legacy airlines e Iberia (IB), SAS (SK), Austrian Airways (OS), Finnair
(AY), Cyprus (CY) and Turkish Airways (TK) e using a number of
performance indicators. CY, AY, OS and TK are chosen because they
are more niche carriers and might serve as a reference point for
Alitalia. SK and IB are chosen because they are of comparable size to
Alitalia; larger airlines such as AF-KLM, British Airways and Luf-
thansa are excluded because of their global reach and larger fleets.
Prior work by Bergamini et al. (2010) investigated the business
model of Alitalia measuring its total factor productivity and found
this declined from 1998 to about 2002 abut then rebounded until
about 2006. In their view Alitalia suffered from high costs coupled
with losses in market share. Barros and Peypoch (2009), in exam-
ining the performance of European carriers, found the Italian
carrier to have mixed scores and concluded from their sample that
3
Some degree of competition exists only between Milan and Rome from high
speed rail that enjoys a 50% share (La Repubblica, 2009).
218 P. Beria et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220
the demography of an airline’s home country is major determinant
its efficiency. Barbot et al. (2008) similarly in a global analysis found
Alitalia to perform poorly, and attribute this to larger regional
variations that extend to all types of carrier.
Choosing an appropriate measure of airline profits is, however,
difficult. Fig. 1 Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation
(EBITDA) appear appropriate, but exclude the impact of potentially
high capital costs if airlines own their aircraft. Carriers may also face
large write-offs, different fuel price hedging or exceptional items in
their profit accounts that all relate to financial management, but
have little to do with operational performance or strategic business
decisions. Earnings before taxes (EBT) on the other hand include
capital costs but also financial management’s fortunes or
misfortunes.
As can be seen Alitalia, AY and CY, the only considerably smaller
airline in the sample, have negative EBITDA. In terms of EBT, OS also
shows negative values. Furthermore, when measured in terms of
EBT, Alitalia shows losses throughout the 2001 to 2007, which was
a time of economic growth in Europe and provided regular positive
returns in the European airline industry. In terms of overall profits
Alitalia, therefore, performed badly, in terms of profit margin.
When, however, performance is measured relative to its size in
terms of revenues, Alitalia’s performance improves a little,
although it still has the highest losses. Fig. 2 shows the costs per
ASK for the seven airlines and it can be seen that low costs do not
necessarily ensure profitability; SK has the highest costs per ASK
but is not facing any substantial losses. Further, it is not unusual for
a carrier not to cover costs from ticket sales, especially where it has
significant cargo operations, but even allowing for this Alitalia does
not make a profit.
A number of managerial mistakes would seem to have been the
main causes of Alitalia’s failure: the lack of a consistent hub and
alliance strategy, inefficient cost controls, issues concerning
ownership and political influence, etc. This raises the question of
why neither the Italian government nor the carrier’s management
have been either able or willing to redress the problems.
The economics of strategy provides some necessary conditions
for the profitability of firms (Porter, 1985). Basically to earn sus-
tained profits, firms can either differentiate their product and find
a niche in which to operate, or become the costs leader. Failure to
decide on an option and carry it through successfully can result in an
inconsistent ‘straddling strategy’, which sends confusing signals to
the market and ultimately leads to the firm’s demise. These strate-
gies should be seen in more general terms as relationships between
management behavior and government direction.
Fig. 2. Cost per passenger (€).
In terms of product differentiation a carrier might decide to offer
a high quality product by providing broad geographic coverage and
high frequencies, most probably by adopting the full service carrier
model (FSC) that relies on hub-and-spoke (H&S) networks for
economies of scale, scope and density. Before 1998 Alitalia had no
fully integrated H&S network but with the opening of Malpensa
and the KLM partnership, it tried to develop one by focusing on
Malpensa. At that time the Alitalia’s flight schedule was based on
four hub waves per day (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005) but between
2000 and 2008 its strategy changed with a move back of part of its
capacity to Rome (Beria and Scholz, 2010). The majority of long haul
flights involving only 17 routes remained in Malpensa together
with feeder services structured on three bank, whereas many
domestic and European flights were moved to Rome. This led to
a duplication of short haul connections and decreased productivity
(Bergamini et al., 2008).
The situation worsened because of the third network airport at
Milan Linate that connected North Italy to southern Italian cities.
This configuration, partially due to the bi-polar Italian economic
geography, made economies of scale difficult to achieve and was
largely the outcome of the politically biased management imposed
on Alitalia (Macchiati, 2006; Beria and Scholz, 2010).
Instead of becoming a full service carrier, Alitalia could have
opted to become a niche carrier, operating in regional markets and
feeding traffic to other larger airlines; there are plenty of cases
where small network carriers team with alliances to reap network
economies and to take advantage of frequent flyer programs,
branding, and economies of density. From 1999 to 2001 Alitalia was
among the first to pursue this strategy by allying with KLM. The
Italian airline was not, though, able to create a stable relationship
with its partner, which in the end withdrew its collaboration,
justifying its decision because Malpensa was never really estab-
lished as a hub and Alitalia was not privatized by June 2001. Both
arguments reflect political interference, at various levels and in
various forms, in Alitalia’s business activities. KLM was concerned
about the political uncertainty regarding Alitalia’s ownership and
market positioning. This changed political situation subsequently
made air France and SkyTeam a more attractive option (Giraudi,
2008), but continued uncertainty was caused by the lack of
agreement among Italian political bodies and unions with a general
lack of willingness to curtail control over the “flag carrier’s”
strategies.
Cost leadership is another strategic option Alitalia could theo-
retically have followed: Aer Lingus, for example, had done just this.
But Alitalia had major structural problems that mitigated against
 P. Beria et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220
Table 1
Million ASK per employee (2007).
Air Berlin AF Alitalia British Airways
7.1029 2.3413 4.7449 3.4096
Source: Based on Jacobs Consultancy (2008).
low cost model including a heterogeneity and excessively favorable
labor conditions - its cost per employee were about €66,000 (Jacobs
Consultancy, 2008), well above easyJet’s and Ryanair’s which were
€54,000 and €50,000 respectively, although Alitalia’s average
wages were aligned with AF, LH or OS, its direct competitors.
However, The Italian carrier’s productivity in terms of ASK per
employee was, however, comparable or even better than other
legacy carriers (Table 1), so costs were the main issue. These were
compounded by a lack of willingness of the company to reallocate
labor. Despite the downgrading in 1998 of Rome airport in favor of
the new hub in Milan, the majority of labor remained in Rome.
Cavalli et al. (2004) find, for example, that only 6.6% of the 21,000
labor force was based in Milan implying that 250 workers moved
daily from Rome to their workplace in Milan.
Privatization as such does not necessarily increase efficiency
unless it changes the nature of competition. A common explanation
of a positive change is in reform of the principal-agent relationship
between the owners of a firm and its management. While public
owners generally have a variety of often conflicting, financial and
social objectives, private owners are assumed to aim at profit
maximization. Given the imperfections of capital and labor markets,
varying quality of managers, and incomplete contracts between
management and owner, perfect incentives are not easily devised.
Nevertheless, a privately owned firm in a competitive market should
have a strong incentive to reduce costs and increase revenues
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
Few words can be spent on the differences among the four
privatization trials. The first attempt in 2006 can be seen as an
effort to maximize the value of the firm without compromising its
structure. Alitalia’s value, though, lays not in its physical assets but
in its monopolistic position in the Italian market and its political
protection. These intangibles could not be guaranteed anymore and
hence the privatization failed. The second attempt in 2007 was
aimed at finding a stronger partner to merge with, but again,
political protection and guarantees regarding slots and bilateral
agreements would be needed. The ambiguity of political decision
makers and a forthcoming general election did not give sufficient
assurances to the buyers. The third privatization attempt was in
May 2008 and was stimulated by Alitalia’s bankruptcy and domi-
nated by strong political clashes around the “Italian character” of
the former flag carrier. The finally, successful privatization was
Table 2
Characteristics of two of the four privatization attempts.
Privatization Offer Estimated Other conditions
trial firings
2nd (AF-KLM) €1.7b (of which 2100 Guarantee of all traffic
€1bapprox. for rights of Alitalia (slots,
recapitalization), bilateral agreement, etc.);
plus
1.4% of AF-KLM
shares
4th (CAI) €1.05b (partially >10,000a AirOne becomes part of
cash and partially the group
taking off Alitalia Guarantee of all traffic
debt) rights of Alitalia and
AP (slots, bilateral
agreements, etc.);
a
According to ANSA (10th December 2008) 12,500 (10,000 Alitalia and 2500
AirOne) workers eligible for the redundancy fund.
219
Ryanair Iberia Luft-hansa OS SK easyJet
10.7068 2.4318 3.5470 3.3062 2.1969 7.9194
driven by large private interests, in addition to political motivations
and labor protection. A compromise was made possible because the
desires of a large coalition of interests were fulfilled. The labor
unions obtained excellent conditions for a redundancy fund, the
politicians succeeded in “defending the Italian character of the flag-
carrier” as promised before the elections and private investors
obtained control of the carrier for a very small outlay and without
any industrial or and financial risk (Giuricin, 2009). AF-KLM took
control of Alitalia paying only 20% of that previously planned. Only
the Italian taxpayers and competitors, such as small regional
carriers and big LCCs, lost out. Table 2 summarizes the main aspects
of the second and of the last bid, showing how conditions for Italian
state and workers worsened.
4. The role of the State in Alitalia’s troubles
The role of the state has impacted on Alitalia history since the
airlines inception. The company has been an instrument for political
rent seeking serving the interests of particular groups, but not the
consumers or taxpayers. The continued protection of vested interest
groups resulted in “soft budget constraints” that stymied efficiency
and optimal growth (Ponti and Ragazzi, 2005), disempowering
management and discharging the political decision makers of their
responsibilities (Boitani, 2008b). The business model that Alitalia
evolved had little to do with economic efficiency and the creation of
utility for its customers and, in the long term, its workers.
The events surrounding the final privatization highlight some of
these points. First there are conflicts of interests that have domi-
nated Alitalia’s recent history. The bank Intesa SanPaolo was, at the
same time, the privatization advisor and one of the main share-
holders of CAI, that finally bought Alitalia. Moreover, Intesa San-
Paolo was the main lender also to AirOne, initially a competitor
airline (Giuricin and Falasca, 2008). The merger with Alitalia meant
not only the creation of a quasi-monopoly in the domestic market,
but also that AirOne debts to the bank were absorbed.
Another issue is the role of the State. Once the sole decision
maker for all aspects of Alitalia activities, this role formally ceased
once Alitalia went into receivership, leaving decision making in the
hands of a legally appointed administrator and, rhetorically, in the
“market”. Because the bid by CAI was accepted, the government
theoretically excluded itself from subsequent decision-making.
Politicians, however, continue to interfere in at least two ways; by
media manipulation in ongoing, open political debates on the fate
of the carrier and, more subtly, by interfering in mediations
between various stakeholders groups such as unions, CAI, banks,
and local authorities.
5. Conclusions
Airline markets throughout the world have gradually become
more market oriented. In Europe this process began in the 1990s
and as a result there has been the privatization of airlines with free
market entry and fare setting. Alitalia, the traditional Italian flag
carriers, along with some other airlines such as Olympic, have
found it challenging to operate successfully in this new commercial
environment. While there would obviously be winners and losers
as the European airline market rationalized and adjusted, Alitalia
was hamstrung from the outset by both its initial network
220 P. Beria et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011) 215e220
configuration and, more importantly by the interference of politi-
cians. The legacy of many years of political meddling had left the
carrier with management not attuned to deal with market forces,
a fleet not suited to the new dynamics of European aviation, and
a network designed to meet political rather than commercial
agendas. Post-regulatory reform in the EU, continued interference
by politicians and other vested interest groups, not only labor
unions, impeded any rapid changes to meet the new challenges of
competition from low cost carriers and the need to make profits to
cover costs. The issues surrounding the hub structure to be adopted
in Italy, and the privatization of Alitalia epitomize the reasons why
the company failed to realize it potential as an airline, and has, de
facto, ceased to exist as a major carrier.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Peter Forsyth, David Gillen, Nathalie
McCaughey, Bernard Wieland, Henning Schmidt and seminar
participants of the 2009 ATRS World Conference in Abu Dhabi for
their useful comments and Christoph Prühn for research assistance.
Financial support by the German Ministry of Education and
Research and the DAAD is gratefully acknowledged.
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