THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

CASE DIGESTS ON CIVIL CODE AND FAMILY CODE
JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO
TABLE OF CONTENTS Article 22: Unjust Enrichment Article 40: Final Judgment for Purposes of Remarriage
1. Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank 1. Landicho v. Relova
2. Donato v. Luna
A. CIVIL CODE
Article 26: Respect of Other’s Privacy, Personality, etc. 3. Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy
1. Van Dorn v Romillo 4. Domingo v. CA et al.
Aricle 2: Effectivity of Laws
2. Pilapil v. Somera et al. 5. Beltran v. People
1. Tanada v. Tuvera
6. Mercado v. Tan
2. De Roy v. CA

Article 7: Appeal of Laws B. FAMILY CODE Article 41: Bigamous Marriage

1. Navarro v. Judge Dumagtoy 1. Republic v. Nolasco
2. Beso v. Dagunuan Article 26: Divorce 2. Armas v. Calisterio
1. Van Dorn v. Romillo 3. Lam v. Chua
Article 9: Duty of Judges 2. Pilapil v. Somera et al. 4. Manuel v. People
1. Chuayan v. Bernas 3. Edgar San Luis v. San Luis 5. Morigo v. People
4. Republic v. Iyoy 6. Tenebro v. CA
2. People v. Veneracion
5. Republic v. Orbecido
Article 46: Fraudulent Consent
Aricle 11-12: Customs
Article 34: No Marriage License Required 1. Bucat v. Bucat
1. Ninal v. Bayadog 2. Aquino v. Delizo
1. Martinez v Van Buskirk
2. Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales
Article 35: Void and Voidable Marriages Article 48: Collusion
1. Ninal v. Bayadog 1. Tuason v CA
Article 13: Computation of Period & Time
1. Garcia v. Recio 2. Villanueva v. CA 2. Corpus v Orchotorena

Article 15: Nationality Rule Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Article 49: Support Pendente Lite
1. Van Dorn v. Ronillo Jr., et al. 1. Santos v. CA 1. Cervantes v. Fajardo
2. Barreto v. Gonzales 2. Republic v. CA 2. Espiritu v. CA
3. Government v. Frank 3. Lucita Hernandez v. CA
3. Mangonon v. CA
4. Dedel v. CA
5. Lam v. Chua
Article 16: Laws Governing Real Properties Article 55: Legal Separation
6. Mallion v. Alcantara
1. Testate Estate of Bohanan v. Bohanan, et al.
7. Carating-Siayngo v. Siayngo 1. Francisco v. Tayao
2. Bellis v. Bellis
8. Navarro v. Cecilio-Navarro 2. Gaudencio v. Hon. Penaranda
9. Antonio v. Reyes 3. Ong v. Onge
Article 19-21: Abuse of Right Doctrine
10. Republic v. Quintero-Hamano 4. Republic v. Iyoy
1. Uypitching v. Quiamco

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Article 56: Grounds for Denial of Legal Separation 5. Wong v. IAC Article 151:Earnest Efforts at Compromise Before Suits
1. Bugayong v. Ginez 6. Carangdang v. Heirs of Quirino Between Family Members
2. Lapuz v. Eufemio 1. Gayon v. Gayon
2. O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit
Article 117: What Constitutes Conjugal Partnership of
Article 63: Effects of Decree of Legal Separation Property
Article 152: Family Home
1. Cervantes v. Fajardo 1. Liluis and Liluis v. Manila Railroad Co.
1. MANACOP v. CA
2. Espiritu v. CA 2. Go v. Yamane
2. Modequillo v. Brevo
3. Gomez v. Sta. Ines
Article 68: Rights and Obligations of Husband and Wife Article 121: Charges and Obligations to Conjugal Partnership
4. Patricio v. Dario III
of Property
5. Taneo v. CA
1. Goitia v. Campos-Rueda 1. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. CA
2. Arroyo v. Vasquez 2. Ching v. CA
Article 164: Legitimate Children
3. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo
1. SSS v. Aguas
Article 87: Donation by lack of marriage
1. Agapay v. Palang Article 122: Personal Debts, Fines, and Pecuniary Liabilities
Article 167: Paternity and Filiation
2. Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance of Each Spouse
1. Benitez-Badua v. CA
3. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez 1. Lacson v. Diaz
2. Macadangdang v. CA
4. Arcaba v. Vda. De Batocael 2. People v. Lagrimas

Article 170: Action for Legitimacy

Article 94: Charges and Obligations to Absolute Community Article 124: Administration of Conjugal Partnership of
1. Babiera v. Catotal
Property Property
1. BA Finance Corporation v. CA 1. Uy v. CA
Article 171: Who May File Action for Legitimacy
2. Marmount Resort Hotel Enterprises v. Guiang 2. Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa
1. Tison v. CA
3. PNB v. CA Article 125: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
Article 105: Regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains 1. Valdez v. RTC, Br. 102, QC
Article 172: Proof of Filiation
1. Villanueva v. CA 2. Carino v. Carinog
1. Mariategui v. CA
3. Buenaventura v. CA
2. Reyes v. CA
Article 109: Exclusive Property of Spouses 4. Gonzales v. Gonzales
3. Jison v. CA
1. Villanueva v. CA
4. Mendoza v. CA
2. Tan v. CA Article 148: Rules on Wages and Salaries, Acquired
5. Liyao v. Tanhati-Liyao
Properties, Etc.
6. Eceta v. Eceta
Article 113: Property Donated to Spouses 1. Agapay v. Palang
7. Verceles v. Posada
1. Genato v. De Lorenzo 2. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Teodoro
8. Angeles v. Maglaya
2. BPI V. Posadas 3. Juaniza v. Jose
4. Belcodero v. CA
DNA Testing
Article 116: Conjugal Partnership Property 5. Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp.
1. Agustin v. CA
1. Jocson v. CA 6. Atienza v. De Castro
2. Herrera v. Alba
2. Maramba v. Lozano 7. Joaquino v. Reyes
3. Magalon v. Montejo
Article 175: Illegitimate Children
4. In Re: Estate of Narciso Padilla
1. Mendoza v. CA
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2. Tayag v. CA 1. Briones v. Miguel

Adoption Article 218: Substitute and Special Parental Authority

1. In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie 1. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos
2. Landingin v. Republic
Inter- Country Adoption Law of 1995
1. Magnonon v. CA
2. Zaguirre v. Castillo

Article 195: Who are Obliged to Give Support

1. De Villanueva v. Villanueva
2. Quintana v. Lerma
3. Francisco v. Zandueta
4. Quimiguing v. Icao

Article 201: Amount of Support

1. Advincula v. Advincula
2. Jocson v. Empire Insurance Co.
3. Baltazar v. Serafino

Article 206: Support Given by Stranger

1. De Marcaida v. Redfern

Article 210: Parental Authority

1. Santos v. CA
2. Vancil v. Belmes

Article 213: Effects of Separation of Parents

1. Espiritu v. CA
2. Medina v. Makabili
3. Cervantes v. Fajardo
4. David v. CA
5. Luna v. IAC
6. Pablo v. Gualberto
7. Tan v. Andre

Parental Authority over Illegitimate Children

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EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
ARTICLE 2: EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
1. TANADA V. TUVERA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Tanada invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Article 2 of the
Civil Code. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code refers
to the date of the effectivity and not to the mandatory publication of laws?
C. HELD:
1.
YES. The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of the effectivity
and not the requirement of the publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the
lack of publication, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they
did not know of its existence. Moreover, Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
2. DE ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS
A. FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners Felisa P. De Roy and
Virgilio Ramos collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. The RTC thereafter rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On September 9, 1987, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration but said motion was denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987 applying the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. Petitioners
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contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the CA was promulgated.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar for non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette?
C. HELD:
NO. Contrary to petitioner’s view, there is no law requiring the publication of SC
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the duty of counsel to keep abreast of decisions of the SC particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of SC
decisions and in such publications as the Supreme Courts Annotated and law journals.
ARTICLE 7: REPEAL OF LAWS
NAVARRO V. JUDGE DUMAGTOY
A. FACTS:
On September 27, 1994, respondent Judge Dumagtoy, whose jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga in Dapa, Surigao del Norte, despite the knowledge that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. The certified true copy of the marriage contract
between Tagadan and Borga states that Tagadan’s civil status is “separated”. Respondent, in
his defense, states that he merely relied on the joint affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years. Moreover, respondent maintained that he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction” and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Judge Dumagtoy acted in excess or lack of jurisdiction?
C. HELD:
YES. Respondent judge’s jurisdiction cover the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. There is no pretense that either Tagadan or Borga was at the point of death
or in a remote place hence Art. 8 of the Family Code cannot be applied. Moreover, the court
disagreed to the excuse of Judge Dumagtoy that the joint affidavit above-mentioned is
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sufficient proof of Mrs. Tagadan’s presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed
with the marriage ceremony. Absent the summary proceeding, such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage under Art. 35 of the Code.
2. BESO V. DAGUNDAN
A. FACTS:
On August 28, 1997, Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. solemnized a marriage between
Nardito A. Yman and Zenaida S. Beso in the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar. Judge
Daguman, Jr., as presiding judge of the MCTC of Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar
the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. The respondent
Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because
complainant was “*a+n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy.” Respondent Judge further avers
that in solemnizing the marriage in question, “*h+e believed in good faith that by doing so he
was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.”
B. ISSUE:
W/N Judge Dumagon acted within his jurisdiction when he solemnized the wedding
between Yman and Beso?
2.
C. HELD:
NO. Art. 8 of the Family Code (“Code”) allows for marriages to be contracted other
than the judge’s jurisdiction “in cases contracted at the point of death, or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.” Clearly, Yman and Beso were not at the point of
death nor were they in a remote place. Not even a written request to the Judge was made by
both. Therefore, it is only imperative that a person presiding over a court of law must not only
apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.
ARTICLE 9: DUTY OF JUDGES
1. CHU JAN V. BERNAS
A. FACTS:
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On June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit in the municipality of Tabaco,
Albay between two cocks belonging to plaintiff Chu Jan and defendant Lucio Bernas. The
referee of the cockpit declared the defendant’s cock the winner hence, the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant asking his own rooster to be declared the winner. The justice of
peace court declared that the bout was a draw. The case was appealed to the Court of First
Instance (“CFI”) praying to render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by the rules and
regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of Php 160; to return other like
amount and to assess the costs of both instances against the defendant. The CFI dismissed the
case reasoning that the judge is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties
of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally,
that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in
questions concerning cockfights.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the complaint by the plaintiff by
reason of absence or unfamiliarity on rules governing cockfights?
C. HELD:
YES. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable
to the case submitted are not valid reasons in terminating the proceedings without deciding
the issues. The Civil Code, in the second paragraph of Art. 6 provides that the customs of the
place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
PEOPLE V. VENERACION
A. FACTS:
On January 31, 1995, Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela were
found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Rape with Homicide of Angel Aquiza
and sentenced both accused with the “penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law.” Disagreeing with the sentence imposed the City Prosecutor of Manila on
February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be “modified in
that the penalty of death be imposed” against Petilla and Cordero, in place of the original
penalty, reclusion perpetua.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under
RA 7659, after finding the accused guilty of Rape with Homicide?
C. HELD:
YES. Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code clearly provides that “when by reason or on
the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.” As long as that
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penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret laws and, if not in
disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them.
ARTICLE 10: DOUBTFUL STATUTES
3. PEOPLE V. PURISIMA
A. FACTS:
Informations were filed charging the respective accused with “illegal possession of
deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 (“P.D. No. 9”) which provides for
punishment for simply carrying any bladed, pointed or blunted weapon for reasons other than
livelihood. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, three judges on the ground that the
information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9 because
it failed to state one essential element of the crime – the act was in furtherance of, or, to abet,
or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or
public disorder.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance to constitute the
offense penalized under P.D. No. 9?
C. HELD:
NO. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be 2.
perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or extortion. Thus, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described under P.D. No. 9 is not a crime in itself. What makes the act criminal under the
decree is the intent behind it thereby allowing for another element – that the act was in
furtherance of, or, to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. When ambiguity exists, it becomes judicial task
to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused
and strictly against the state. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone.
ARTICLE 11-12: CUSTOMS
1. MARTINEZ V. VAN BUSKIRK
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A. FACTS:
On September 11, 1908, the despondent while unloading and in the act of carrying
some forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away,
and the driver was thrown to the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses.
Eventually the horses came into collision with the carromata occupied by plaintiff, Carmer Ong
de Martinez, with her child and overturned it , severely wounding plaintiff and also injuring
the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. Upon these facts,
the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment
against him for Php 424.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from
October 17, 1908, and for the costs of the action. This judgment was appealed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the CFI is correct in determining that the defendant is guilty of negligence
when it left the horses to assist in unloading of the forage?
C. HELD:
NO. The act of the defendant’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner provided
of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced
in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be of
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been
permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than prejudicial. Moreover, the decision
was supported by either Spanish or American jurisprudence as in the cases of Hayman v.
Hewitt, Griggs v. Fleckentein, Belles v. Kellner and Southworth v. Ry. Co.
YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES
A. FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real estate and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
Php 300,000 more or less. Thereafter, Yao Kee claimed that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
whom she married on January 19, 1931 in China. The testimony of Yao Kee presents that they
were married according to Chinese customs, that the practice during the time of her marriage
was a signed written document exchanged between the parents of the bride and the parents
of the groom, or any elder for that matter and that there was no solemnizing officer as is
known in the Philippines. In addition, Gan Ching, younger brother of Yao Kee, testified that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or
elders of the parties being sufficient. Petitioner contends further that the same procedure of
mutually exchanging matrimonial letters constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be
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considered duly solemnized in China as in the marriage of Sy Joc Lieng celebrated in 1847 (Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia).
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals seriously erred in declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao
See has not been proven valid in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China?
C. HELD:
NO. Petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as
proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence,
but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. Further, petitioners have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or 84 years later. Accordingly, in the
absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as
ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is
known here in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it
therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
1.
ARTICLE 13: COMPUTATION OF PERIOD AND TIME
1. GARCIA V. RECIO
A. FACTS:
Respondent, Rederick A. Recio was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen and on January 12, 1994, married petitioner Grace J.
Garcia in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
“single” and “Filipino.” Then, on March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage in the ground of bigamy. The trial court declared the prior marriage of
Recio with Samson to be dissolved based on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
B. ISSUES:
1. W/N the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
2. W/N the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
C. HELD:
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1. YES. The divorce decree between respondent and Samson appears to be an
authentic one issue by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately,
for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected not to its admissibility but only to the fact that it had not been registered
in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, failure of the petitioner to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
2. REMANDED. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. As it is however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner since it failed to provide the type of divorce
taken. The court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The court however agreed with petitioner
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show
the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
ARTICLE 15: NATIONALITY RULE
VAN DORN V. RONILLO, JR., ET AL.
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while respondent is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, US
and that petitioner re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8,
1983, respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business, The Galleon
Shop, located in Ermita, Manila, is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Further, respondent contends that the divorce is
not valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and policy.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
“community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Divorce Decree between Van Dorn and Romillo, Jr. issued by the Nevada
Court is valid and binding in the Republic of the Philippines?
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C. HELD:
YES. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. The marriage tie, whent thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to law.
2. BARRETO V. GONZALES
A. FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and were married in the
City of Manila on Januray 19, 1919. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not
lived together as man and wife. Negotiations between parties, both being represented by
attorneys, continued for several months. Shortly after this agreement, the husband left the
Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, US, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute
divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. On that
same date, he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of the Islands. Both
parties prayed for the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed by Court.
B. ISSUE:
4.
W/N any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in Philippine laws?
C. HELD:
NO. Art. 9 of the Family Code reads “The laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though they reside in a foreign country. Further, the last part of Art. 11 provides “xxx the
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their and their property, and those intended to promote
public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments entered into a foreign country.” Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the
courts to approve their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these
Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government
believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
3. INSULAR GOVERNMENT V. FRANK
A. FACTS:
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On April 17, 1903, in Chicago, Illinois, George I. Frank entered into a contract with
the Government of Philippine Islands as a stenographer for Php 1,200 dollars per year and in
addition was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in 6raveling from Chicago to Manila,
and one-half salary during said period of travel. The defendant entered upon the performance
th
of his contract upon the 30 day of April, 1903, and was paid half-salary from the date until
June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands. On February 11, 1904, the
defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the
terms of the contract. Frank claimed that although he was an adult when the contract was
entered into in Chicago, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at that same time, male
persons did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, therefore, he
was not liable under said contract contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the defense of infancy by Frank is valid?
C. HELD:
NO. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place the contract is
made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility
of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
A. FACTS:
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage
in the city of Malaga, Spain. In 1892, Fuster came to Manila and was later joined in by his wife
seven years after. In 1899 they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they
“resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof
the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain and to reside therein in such place as the
said lady pleases.” The wife commenced divorced proceedings alleging as cause of action the
adultery committed by Barnuevo. As a special preferred defense, Barnuevo alleged that first,
neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint because neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents
of Manila or any other place in the Philippines. Second, the action sought by Yanez was
without jurisdiction over other two causes of action.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to the decree
now in appeal?
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C. HELD:
YES. The Courts of First Instance (“CFI”) of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to
try actions for divorce or separation when the parties litigant, one or both, are citizens or
residents, even though they are Spanish subjects and were married in accordance with the
ecclesiastical forms and ceremonies. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree
a divorce is not compromised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply
because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not
go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a
matter of the private law of persons, but of the public and political nation. As said by Torres
Campos, “In order to foster relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are
interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who
contract within the country or outside of its juridical ties which in some manner affect their
sovereignty.”
ARTICLE 16: LAWS GOVERNING REAL PROPERTIES
1. TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHOMAN V. BOHOMAN, ET AL
A. FACTS:
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo,
presiding, admitted to probate last will and testament of C.O. Bohanan, executed by him on
April 23, 1944 in Manila. The court finds that the testator C.O. Bohanan was at the time of
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament is fully in accordance with the laws of said state and admits the same to probate.
The testator gave his grandson Php 90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a
legacy of only Php 6,000 each, or a total of Php 12,000. The wife, Magdalena C. Bohanan and
her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions claiming that they have
been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum, that is two-thirds of the estate left
by him at the time of his death, allows them.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children are short of the
legitime given by them by the Civil Code of the Philippines?
C. HELD:
NO. Par. 2 of Art. 16 of the Civil Code allows for the disposition of testamentary
provisions to be regulated by the national law of the country of the person whose succession
is under consideration. C.O. Bohanan is an American citizen and the State of Nevada.
Consequently, Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 allows him to dispose of all of
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife more so, it is
not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will.
2. BELLIS V. BELLIS
A. FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the United States and the State of
Texas, had five children in his first marriage, three children on the second marriage and had
three illegitimate children from neither marriages. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed
a will in the Philippines and subsequently, on July 8, 1958, testator died, a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958. On January 17, 1964, two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective petitions to the project partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased. The lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor’s final account, report and administration and project
of partition, relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code. In addition, appellants pointed out that the
decedent executed two wills – one to govern in Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate – arguing that from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the court erred in applying Texas law over Philippine law in the testate of Amos
G. Bellis?
C. HELD:
NO. Art. 16 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. The national law shall govern
the succession of the deceased since it has been established that he is in fact an American
citizen and of the State of Texas. Texas law governing over Philippine law, do not provide for
legitimes, hence, the petition of the two illegitimate children for legitimes was correctly
overruled by the lower court. Further, the contention of the appellants that the will of the
decedent executed in the Philippines was intended to govern his Philippine estate was wrong.
A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to these matters that the same Art. 16 of the Civil
Code states that national law should govern.
3. AZNAR V. GARCIA
A. FACTS:
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Edward E. Christensen, the person whose succession is under consideration, is an
American citizen under the State of California but who at the time of his death is domiciled in
the Philippines. Decedent executed a will under Philippine laws for the payment of Php 3,600
to Helen Christensen Garcia and the residue to be given to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child. The legal grounds of
opposition are (1) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines and
(2) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as at denies her, one of the two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. The court below
however ruled that the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will are
to be governed by the law “national law” of the decedent in accordance with Art. 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code. The national law of the Civil Code cannot possibly mean or apply to any
general American law but only the state of which the decedent is a citizen, the State of
California. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California: “If
there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed
to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile”, the law on the
contrary being Art. 16 of the Philippine Civil Code.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the renvoi doctrine should be applied?
C. HELD:
YES. Under the renvoi doctrine, the conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile.
II. HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 19-21: ABUSE OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
1. REPUBLIC V. BERMUDEZ-LORINO, JR.
A. FACTS:
Respondent married Francisco Lorino, Jr.and bore three children. Because of the
violent character of his husband, she decided to go back to her parents and lived separately
from her husband. Nine years after, she received no news about him and she believes that he
is already dead. Respondent instituted a summary proceeding for a Court declaration that her
husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage. The Regional Trial Court
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
(“RTC”) granted respondent’s petition and according Art. 247 of the Family Code, such
judgment shall be immediately final and executing. The Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”)
nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals (“CA”) in turn denied the
Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
B. ISSUES:
1. W/N CA duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executor judgment of
the RTC?
2. W/N the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art.
41 of the Family Code were duly established in this case?
C. HELD:
1. NO. In summary proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect and appeal precisely because judgments rendered under Art. 245
of the Family Code are immediately final and executory. It was erroneous for the OSG to
file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The CA acquired no
jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
2. YES. The decision by the RTC is final and executory.
2. UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO
A. FACTS:
Respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso and
surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100m, without its original certificate, as settlement for
robbery filed against them and parked the said vehicle outside respondent’s business
establishment where it is visible and accessible. It turned out that a year before the
settlement to respondent, Gatbutero sold on installment basis the motorcycle to Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc. Davalan assumed the obligation to pay but eventually he eventually
stopped and told that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by “respondent’s men.” Nine
years later, Uypitching, accompanied by policemen went to respondent’s business
establishment to recover the tricycle but found respondent was nowhere to be found in the
premises. While the policemen were talking to the clerk, Uypitching paced back and forth in
the establishment while uttering “Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle.” The policemen went to
respondent’s residence as Uypitching took pictures of the motorcycle. Unable to find the
respondent, Uypitching took with him the motorcycle over the clerk’s objection.
Petitioner filed a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law while respondent moved for dismissal. Respondent sought to hold the petitioners liable
for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle, (2) utterance of defamatory remark
and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. Petitioners held claim that they
should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of right as seller-mortgagee to
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recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of his right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Uypitching acted with abused their right of recovery as mortgagees?
C. HELD:
YES. Petitioner failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal
possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search
warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
even mouthed a slanderous statement. Petitioner’s acts violated the law as well as public
morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations as embodied in Art. 19 of the
Civil Code. A person should have not used his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.
1. VAN DORN V. ROMILLO, JR.
ARTICLE 22: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
1. VILLALVA V. RCBC SAVINGS BANK
A. FACTS:
Forty-eight checks were issued by petitioner spouses to cover installment payments
due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (“TQA”) for the
purchase of a 1993 Toyota Corolla. Said notes were secured by a chattel mortgage executed
by petitioners on the vehicle in favor of TQA. Petitioners were to insure the vehicle under the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to RCBC
then later too RCBC Savings Bank. They faithfully complied with the obligation to insure the
mortgage for the period of three years from August 14, 1996, procuring the necessary
insurance but did not deliver the same to respondent until January 17, 1997. As a
consequence, respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for one year from October 21,
1996. The latter’s insurance policy was subsequently cancelled and reimbursed by Malayan
Insurance Company due to the insurance policy secured by petitioner over the mortgaged
vehicle but not for the insurance paid by the respondent from August 18 to October 21 of
1997.
Respondent filed a complaint for Recovert of Possession with Replevin with the MTC
of Pasay City while petitioners asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance
with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Respondent further contends that its payment of the
insurance premiums on behalf of the petitioner s unjustly enriched the latter.
B. ISSUE:
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
W/N petitioner spouses Villalva unjustly enriched themselves?
C. HELD:
NO. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantages, so long
as it is appreciable in money. It must also take form of avoidance of expenses and other
indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person or of prevention of a loss or injury.
Petitioners complied with the obligation under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Due to the
mortgagee’s failure to notify the mortgagor’s prior to application of the latter’s payments to
the insurance premiums, the mortgagors had not defaulted on their obligation to secure
insurance over the mortgaged vehicle. Petitioner was not unjustly enriched by the act of the
respondent when the former had already obtained the required coverage for the vehicle.
ARTICLE 26: RESPECT OF OTHER’S
PRIVACY, PERSONALITY, ETC.
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hong Kong and after marriage, established their
residence in the Philippines. Soon after, the parties were divorced in Nevada, US and that
petitioner re-married also in Nevada. Respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that
petitioner’s business, The Galleon Shop, located in Ermita, Manila, is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Further,
respondent contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and policy. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no “community property” as of the date of divorce.
B. ISSUE:
W/N The Galleon Shop remains to be a conjugal property of Van Dorn and Romillo,
Jr.?
C. HELD:
NO. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
who married a Filipino citizen may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
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under which divorce dissolves the marriage. The marriage tie, went thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. The marriage between Van Dorn and Romillo, Jr. having been
previously severed makes the previously conjugal property dissolved. As such, Romillo, Jr.
cannot claim ownership rights over The Galleon Shop. He shall respect the peace of mind by
Van Dorn by discontinuing his claim over the said shop as the Court had determined the
conjugal property to be dissolved.
2. PILAPIL V. SOMERA, ET AL.
A. FACTS:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, Filipino citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national were married before the Registrar in the Federal Republic of Germany (“Germany”).
After about three and a half years of marriage, respondent initiated a divorce proceeding in
Germany which was recognized under Philippine law. More than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair
with William Chia and Jesus Chua. Petitioner contends that the court is without jurisdiction for
the purported complainant does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under Germany prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.
B. ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
material bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action?
C. HELD:
YES. The court based its ruling on the Loftus case of the Supreme Court of Iowa. The
status of the complainant vis-à-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner for when the
divorce decree was issued in Germany, the same shall take effect under Art. 26 of the
2.
Philippine Family Code. Petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under
the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed his suit. The allegation of
respondent that he could have not brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence. There was no longer a
family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
III. FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 26 : DIVORCE
1. VAN DORN V. RONILLO, JR.
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while respondent is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, US
and that petitioner re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8,
1983, respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business, The Galleon
Shop, located in Ermita, Manila, is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Further, respondent contends that the divorce is
not valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and policy.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
“community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Divorce Decree between Van Dorn and Romillo, Jr. issued by the Nevada
Court is valid and binding in the Republic of the Philippines?
C. HELD:
YES. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. The marriage tie, whent thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to law.
PILAPIL V. SOMERA
A. FACTS:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, Filipino citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national were married before the Registrar in the Federal Republic of Germany (“Germany”).
After about three and a half years of marriage, respondent initiated a divorce proceeding in
Germany which was recognized under Philippine law. More than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair
with William Chia and Jesus Chua. Petitioner contends that the court is without jurisdiction for
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the purported complainant does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under Germany prior to his filing of the criminal complaint.
B. ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
material bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action?
C. HELD:
YES. The court based its ruling on the Loftus case of the Supreme Court of Iowa. The
status of the complainant vis-à-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner for when the
divorce decree was issued in Germany, the same shall take effect under Art. 26 of the
Philippine Family Code. Petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under
the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed his suit. The allegation of
respondent that he could have not brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence. There was no longer a
family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
3. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS
A. FACTS:
Felecisimo T. San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit out which he bore six children. Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. Five years later Felecisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, with
who he had a son. Three years after, Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce which was
subsequently granted by the State of Hawaii, USA. The third marriage was then contracted
after three years on June 20, 1974 and this time with Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, in California, USA. He had no children with the respondent but lived with her 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
Meanwhile, petitioner claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
married to Merry Lee. Respondent present the decree of absolute divorce between Merry Lee
and Felicisimo. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue
of Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Petitioners countered that the mentioned provision cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo.
B. ISSUE:
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
W/N Felicisimo who is divorced by his alien spouse, Merry Lee, abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988?
C. HELD:
YES. The provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, Par. 2 need no
retroactive application considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing the
court to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage
between a foreigner and a Filipino, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. The Court recognized the validity of the divorce.
Consequently, if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. With the enactment of the Family Code and Art. 26,
Par. 2 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where on is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it.
4. REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO III
A. FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Ciprano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueve in Ozamis
City, Philippines. The marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Ciprano’s wife
left for the Unites States of America bringing along their son. Subsequently, Ciprano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. He also learned through
his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married another man. Ciprano
thereafter filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that such provision is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
B. ISSUE:
W/N respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code?
C. HELD:
YES. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
said provision should be interpreted to include cases involving the parties, who at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. According to Judge Sempio-Dy, a
member of the Civil Code Commision Committee, the intent of Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family
Code is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse, who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Moreover,
in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court hinted by way of an orbiter dictum that a Filipino
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divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and thus
can remarry. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
5. REPUBLIC V. IYOY
A. FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on December 16, 1951 in Cebu City, Philippines.
The marriage thereafter was blessed with five children. Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America in 1984 and barely year after, her husband received a letter requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers. Crasus ignored Fely’s request. Sometime in 1985, Crasus
learned that Fely married an American, with whom she eventually had a child. It had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus and apparently, there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Fely filed her Answr and Counterclaim asserting
that she was already an American citizen and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
Crasus filed a complaint alleging that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity. He petitioned for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Fely under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Fely obtained a valid divorce from Crasus making her subsequent marriage with
Stephen Micklus valid?
C. HELD:
NO. By a plain and literal interpretation of Art. 26, Par. 26 of the Civil Code, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. In the Answer by her, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At 1985, when she filed her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity, even when she was living abroad. Philippine laws do not recognize divorce between
Filipino spuses. The Court sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between Crasus
and Fely. Consequently, Felys have not validly contracted a marriage with Stephen Micklus
under Philippine law.
ARTICLE 34: NO MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIRED
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
1. NINAL V. BADAYOG
A. FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 1985. A year and 8 months after, Pepito and Norma Bayadog
got married without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for 5 years and was thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Pepito’s son
with Teodulfa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito with Norma
alleging that said marriage was “void for lack of marriage license”.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the marriage is exempt from marriage license?
C. HELD:
NO. The exemption sought by Pepito and Norma is grounded on cohabitation for at
least five years consecutively. Such exemption requires that in those five years, the parties
must have no legal impediment to marry each other. In the instant case, Pepito only had no
legal impediment to marry when Teodulfa died. One year and 8 months after Teodulfa’s
death, he executed an affidavit stating that he lived Norma for at least five years. Such claim is
clearly erroneous as he was only capacitated to marry again in less than two years, hence, the
marriage is not exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license.
ARTICLE 35: VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
1. NINAL V. BADAYOG
A. FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 1985. A year and 8 months after, Pepito and Norman Bayadog
got married without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for 5 years and was thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Pepito’s son
with Teodulfa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito with Norma
alleging that said marriage was “void for lack of marriage license”.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the marriage is void ab initio?
C. HELD:
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YES. The law applicable is the Civil Code for it was solemnized prior the effectivity of
the Family Code. Art. 53 of the Civil Code renders the marriage void ab initio if the
requirement of marriage license is not complied with. Art. 76 however provides for
circumstances wherein the requirement for marriage license is dispensed with; if the man and
woman cohabited together for at least 5 years. The 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time- that is
unbroken. There shall be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of exception. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the tome when he started cohabiting with Norma. In fact, only 20 months had passed when
his first wife died. Therefore, it cannot be said that Pepito and Norma had been together for 5
years exclusively.
2. VILLANUEVA V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence
and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that
he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls
from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises
of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain
Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan
to marry her. He also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with
her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her
after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent?
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C. HELD:
NO. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of
marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked
as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume
that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to
bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening
him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their
marriage.
Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did
not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
ARTICLE 36: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
1. SANTOS V. CA
A. FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On
May 18, 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return
to the country. In 1991, Leouel filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding
of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA
affirmed the dismissal.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?
C. HELD:
NO. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestation may emerge only after
the marriage; and must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
2. REPUBLIC V. CA
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NO. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by

A. FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union
bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his
parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting
in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.
B. ISSUE:
W/N irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological
incapacity?
C. HELD:
NO. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.
3. LUCITA HERNANDEZ V. CA
A. FACTS:
On Januray 1, 1981, Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez in which they bore
three children. Petitioner Lucita said that respondent Mario showed lack of drive to work for
his family. After respondent’s chooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself
of the early retirement plan and spent the entire amount to himself. He indulged in smoking
and drinking sprees and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his wife. On July 10,
1992, Lucita filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage under 5.
Art. 36 invoking psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent. The RTC dismissed
while the CA affirmed.
themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these facts are manifestations of a discolored personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling
of being handsome, as the appellate court held.
4. DEDEL V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel and Sharon respondent Sharon L. Corpuz-Dedel were
married on September 28, 1966 and the union produced four children. During the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-
marital affairs with several men, one of whom is a Jordanian national, Mustafa Ibrahim, with
whom she had two children. Respondent abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Moreover, Dr. Dayan diagnosed respondent with Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity. Since then, Sharon would only return to
the country on special occasions. Finally giving up on all possible reconciliations, petitioner
filed for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. RTC
granted while the CA dismissed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N private respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment fall
within the purview of psychological incapacity?
C. HELD:
NO. It appears that private respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage; in fact, the record disclosed that there was a blissful marital union.
It must be shown that the acts are a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
LAM V. CHUA
A. FACTS:

B. ISSUE: Petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam were married on January 13, 1984
and out of said marriage begot one son. Petitioner alleged that respondent is psychologically
W/N habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment are incapacitated when he frequently failed to go hoe, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
grounds for psychological incapacity? activities such as mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains. A separation of properties
followed as well as a set-up of a child support fund by both. For the grounds earlier
C. HELD: mentioned, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Later, petitioner
submitted two marriage certificates, contracted prior to their marriage, of Jose Lam to
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different women. Petitioner then inserted to include child support as an amendment to the heard in the earlier case.
original petition without serving substantially amended or supplemental pleadings to
respondent who is in default.
7. CARATING-SIAYNGCO V. SIAYNGCO
B. ISSUE:
A. FACTS:
W/N the insertion to include child support in the petition to declare nullity of
marriage without service of amended or supplemental pleadings is valid? Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel Siayngco were married
on June 27, 1973. After 24 years of married life together, respondent filed for the declaration
C. HELD:
of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
NO. A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially
towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
amended or supplemental pleadings. Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his
marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
Rules of Court in relation to Art. 48 of the Family Code, it is with more reason that petitioner
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she
should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of
the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
6. MALLION V. ALCANTARA
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement;
that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
A. FACTS:
resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from
her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and,
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC of San
even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional
Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alacantara
and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Said RTC denied the petition upon finding that petitioner
and loveless marriage to her for 22 years.
failed to produce evidence. Petitioner appealed with the CA but it was likewise dismissed for
failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
B. ISSUE:
After which, Petitioner filed another petition, this time alleging that the marriage was void ab
initio for it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent moved to dismiss the
W/N the grounds above-mentioned constitute psychological incapacity?
petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

B. ISSUE: C. HELD:

W/N Petitioner’s subsequent filing is barred by res judicata? NO. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
C. HELD: psychological incapacity.

YES. A plaintiff is mandated to place ion issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in
his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the
same wrong injury.
Petitioner had impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and
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8. NAVARRO V. CECILLIO-NAVARRO
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Narciso S. Navarro, Jr. and respondent Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro’s union bore
four children. Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he did not have
time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could
not give her the things she wanted. He added that respondent was not supportive of his
medical career. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him
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and even told him to look for other women. Petitioner prayed for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with petitioner
and be supportive to him constitute psychological incapacity?
C. HELD:
NO. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty”, “refusal” or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
9. ANTONIO V. REYES
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio and respondent Marie Ivonne F. Reyes were married on
December 6, 1990 and out of their union bore one child which died five months later. On
March of 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. As
manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.
B. ISSUE:
W/N repeated lying amounts to psychological incapacity?
C. HELD:
YES. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from
the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of perennially telling lies, fabricating
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ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.
10. REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO
A. FACTS:
Respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano was married to Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national on January 14, 1988 and bore one child. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. In 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but
he did not bother to see her and their child. Respondent filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Toshio due to his
abandonment.
B. ISSUE:
W/N abandonment is a ground for psychological incapacity?
C. HELD:
NO. We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
ARTICLE 40: FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES
OF REMARRIAGE
1. LANDICHO V. RELOVA
A. FACTS:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner Rolando Landicho was charged before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense of
bigamy. It was alleged that petitioner being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay
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(which marriage has not been legally dissolved) contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes
Pasia. On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the CFI of Batangas seeking to declare
her marriage to petitioner as void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.
On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against
the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with
the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her 3.
before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the
second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the
first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question?
C. HELD:
NO. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court, therefore,
has not abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as
sought by petitioner.
2. DONATO V. LUNA
A. FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, an information was filed by respondent Paz Abayan against
petitioner Leonilo Donato for bigamy. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior
marriage of petitioner. Petitioner countered that his second marriage was void because is was
solemnized without a valid marriage license (notwithstanding the fact that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to its solemnization) and that violence, 4.
intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent. Prior to the date
set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of
the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined
before the criminal case can proceed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on
the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
C. HELD:
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho v. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if its is proved
that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary
one and as such cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the
case at bar.
WIEGEL V. SEMPIO-DY
A. FACTS:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with petitioner Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground of petitioner’s previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion. Petitioner, while admitting the existence of said prior marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the Maxion having been allegedly forced
to enter said marital union. Petitioner petitioned for certiorari
B. ISSUE:
W/N the validity of the first marriage need to be determined first before proceeding
to the annulment case filed by respondent?
C. HELD:
NO. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.
DOMINGO V. CA, ET AL
A. FACTS:
Respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with petitioner Roberto Domingo. It was alleged that when they were married on
November 29, 1976, unknown to respondent, petitioner had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which valid and still existing. Respondent came to know of
the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for declaration of nullity os, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio is necessary?
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C. HELD:
YES. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
5. BELTRAN V. PEOPLE
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran seeked to set aside the Order issued by Judge Tuazon,
Jr.. Said Order denied petition’s prayer from proceeding with the trial of a concubinage case
against petitioner. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Charmaine E. Felix posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order
and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said Order of denial was likewise denied. In
view of the denials, petitioner went to the RTC of Makati questioning the Orders.
B. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’s subsequent filing for the declaration of nullity of marriage is a
prejudicial question which should hold the proceedings of the crimincal case on concubinage?
C. HELD:
NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is
not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial
to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of
the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
6. MERCADO V. TAN
A. FACTS:
During the subsistence of a previous marriage with Ma. Thelma Oliva, petitioner Dr.
Vincent Mercado married respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5,
1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed against petitioner. A month after, petitioner filed
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Oliva and such petition was
granted.
Petitioner contends that having declared the previous marriage void ab initio, there
is no first marriage to speak of concluding that the bigamy case is baseless. Respondent on the
other hand points out that the declaration came only after the Information has been filed.
Hence, the crime had already been consummated.
B. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner can still be held liable for bigamy despite the declaration of nullity of
his previous marriage?
C. HELD:
YES. The fact that petitioner obtained judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. The crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his
view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply
file a petition to declares his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
a prejudicial question.
ARTICLE 41: BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
1. REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO
A. FACTS:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman when he met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. Parker lived with
respondent on his ship until they got married on November 19, 1980 in Antique, Philippines.
After the marriage celebration, respondent engaged on another employment contract and
while working overseas, he learned that Parker had left Antique after giving birth to their son.
Respondent now filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of Parker, invoking Art. 41 of the Family Code.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead?
C. HELD:
NO. There are serious doubts to respondent’s credibility. Respondent testified that
immediately after receiving his mother’s letter, he cut short his employment contract to
return to Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine months when he allegedly
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asked leave from his captain. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Parker without
inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. Also, respondent failed to explain
why he did not try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in
his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Parker’s departure and respondent’s
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Parker was dead a
well-founded one.
2. ARMAS V. CALISTERIO
A. FACTS:
On January 13, 1946, respondent Marietta Calisterio married James William Bounds.
Bounds disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. Eleven years later, respondent
married Teodorico Calisterio, who died intestate on April 24, 2992 leaving parcels of land with
an estimated value of Php 604,750.000. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of the
deceased, claims to be the sole surviving heir of the deceased contending that the marriage
between the latter and respondent being bigamous and thereby null and void. Respondent 4.
opposed stating that her first marriage with Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter’s
absence.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the first marriage of respondent had been dissolved prior to her marriage with
the deceased?
C. HELD:
NO. A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. In this case,
absent the summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of Bounds, the first
marriage still exists thereby making respondent’s subsequent marriage bigamous.
3. LAM V. CHUA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam were married on January 13, 1984
and out of said marriage begot one son. Petitioner alleged that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated when he frequently failed to go hoe, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
activities such as mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains. A separation of properties
followed as well as a set-up of a child support fund by both. For the grounds earlier
mentioned, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Later, petitioner
submitted two marriage certificates, contracted prior to their marriage, of Jose Lam to
different women. Petitioner then inserted to include child support as an amendment to the
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original petition without serving substantially amended or supplemental pleadings to
respondent who is in default.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the insertion to include child support in the petition to declare nullity of
marriage without service of amended or supplemental pleadings is valid?
C. HELD:
NO. A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially
amended or supplemental pleadings. Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Art. 48 of the Family Code, it is with more reason that petitioner
should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
MANUEL V. PEOPLE
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo P. Manuel married Tina Gandalera-Manuel on April 22, 1996.
Three years after, petitioner began ill-treating Tina. Tina became curious and found out
through the National Statistics Office that petitioner had been married when they exchanged
their vows. Petitioner then claimed that he was only forced to marry his Rubylus Gana because
she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. He visited her in jail after three months
and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was
no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
B. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner should not be charged for bigamy because of his mere honest belief
that his first marriage no longer subsisted?
C. HELD:
NO. Petitioner should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife required by Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Art. 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof
that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy
in such a case.
5. MORIGO V. PEOPLE
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A. FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were married on August 30, 1990. Lucia
reported back to Canada and after one year, a petition for divorce against Lucio was granted
by the Ontario Court. On October 4, 1992, appellant married Maria Jeecha Lumbago.
Subsequently, appellant filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of the accused’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any
requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Moreover,
what petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned.
ARTICLE 46: FRAUDULENT CONSENT

B. ISSUE: 1. BUCCAT V. BUCCAT

W/N accused appellant should continue to be charged for bigamy? A. FACTS:

C. HELD: The husband petitioned for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraudulent
consent. Buccat’s wife had already been seven months pregnant when they contracted the
NO. The trial court found that no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly marriage.
authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio and Lucio merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, B. ISSUE:
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he W/N fraudulent consent can be appreciated to annul a marriage when petitioner married
contracts a subsequent marriage. a woman who was already seven months pregnant

6. TENEBRO V. CA C. HELD:

A. FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted three marriages: first with Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, second with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990 and last with Nilda Villegas
on January 25, 1993. When Ancajas learned of the third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for
bigamy against petitioner. Petitioner as defense (1) denies the existence of his first marriage
of Villareyes due to the absence of marriage record in the NSO and the Civil Registry of Manila 2.
and (2) argues that the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an indicator that his marriage with Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Tenebro was rightfully convicted for bigamy by the CA?
NO. When the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was
pregnant, the marriage, fraudulent consent cannot be appreciated. Here, the child was born
less than 3 months after the celebration of the marriage. The Court refuse to annul the
marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advance stage of pregnancy at the time of
the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband.
AQUINO V. DELIZO
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Fernando Aquino and respondent Conchita Delizo were married on
December 27, 1054. Four months after, respondent gave birth to a child who petitioner denies
to be his. On September 6, 1955, petitioner filed a petition to annul the marriage on the
ground of fraudulent consent.

C. HELD: B. ISSUE:

YES. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the W/N the concealment of the four months pregnancy prior to the celebration of the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by marriage can be appreciated for annulment?

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C. HELD:
YES. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat as
alleged by the plaintiff. According to medical authorities, it is only on the sixth month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
ARTICLE 48: COLLUSION
1. TUASON V. CA
A. FACTS:
Respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason was married to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason
on June 3, 1972. In 1989, respondent filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of
her marriage with petitioner on the grounds that the latter used prohibited drugs, cohabited
with three women in succession, gave minimal support to the family and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership. Two hearings were held in which petitioner failed
to appear. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. Petitioner justifies his
absence on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or medical reasons.
Moreover, petitioner appeals invoking Art. 48 of the Family Code in collusion.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner was denied due process?
C. HELD:
NO. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is to determined whether collusion
exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. Under these circumstances, the Court was convinced
that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
2. CORPUS V. ORCHOTORENA
A. FACTS:
Margie Corpus-Macia filed a complaint accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotrena of the
RTC of Zamboanga of bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his
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disposition of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage between the former and
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias. Margie alleged that instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss
filed by her within the 30-day reglementary period , respondent judge completely ignored it
and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias’ evidence ex
parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter considered the case submitted for
decision despite Mrs. Macias’ filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the decision by respondent judge is valid?
C. HELD:
NO. Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: “If the defending party
in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.” Thus, the report of the Public
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go in the case. Respondent
judge ignored this rule.
3. REPUBLIC V. IYOY
A. FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on December 16, 1951 in Cebu City, Philippines.
The marriage thereafter was blessed with five children. Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America in 1984 and barely year after, her husband received a letter requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers. Crasus ignored Fely’s request. Sometime in 1985, Crasus
learned that Fely married an American, with whom she eventually had a child. It had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus and apparently, there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Fely filed her Answr and Counterclaim asserting
that she was already an American citizen and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
Crasus filed a complaint alleging that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity. He petitioned for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Fely under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Fely obtained a valid divorce from Crasus making her subsequent marriage with
Stephen Micklus valid?
C. HELD:
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NO. By a plain and literal interpretation of Art. 26, Par. 26 of the Civil Code, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. In the Answer by her, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At 1985, when she filed her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity, even when she was living abroad. Philippine laws do not recognize divorce between
Filipino spuses. The Court sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between Crasus
and Fely. Consequently, Felys have not validly contracted a marriage with Stephen Micklus
under Philippine law.
ARTICLE 49: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
1. CERVANTES V. FAJARDO
A. FACTS:
Minor Angelie Anne Cervantes was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. When the minor was barely 2-weeks old, an Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child was executed to petitioner spouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes. Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioner pouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus over the person of the minor.
B. ISSUE:
3.
W/N the adoptive parents should be granted the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus?
C. HELD:
YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners,
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically and financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relationship with a married man, can most likely give
her. Moreover, with the decree of adoption, the adoptive parents have the right to the care
and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
2. ESPIRITU V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding bore a daughter
named Rosalind, thereafter married each other and bore another offspring named Reginald.
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Both children are now over seven years of age. The relationship of the couple deteriorated
until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. Teresita
claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a bigamy case
against her. Meanwhile, she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over
the children.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the custody of children seven years of age shall automatically be given to the
mother?
C. HELD:
NO. Whether a child is under or below seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child’s interest. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best
assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. The
Court found that Rosalind felt unloved and uncared for by the mother. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. The children’s interest
would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in records to show that Reynaldo is an “unfit”
person.
MANGONON V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with the Makati RTC. It was
alleged that petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married on February 16,
1975. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent was only 19 years old.
As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was annulled on August 11,
1975. Seven months after the annulment, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. At the
time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the USA,
hence the petition for support. Meanwhile, respondents stated that as the birth certificates of
the twins do not bear the signature of Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first
established and even assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent contends that
he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could not afford.
B. ISSUE:
W/N respondents are obliged to give financial support to the twins?
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C. HELD:
YES. The Court was exhibited letters of which the father of the respondent address
the twins as “Rica and Rina Delgado”. Likewise, the father referred to himseld as either “Lolo
Paco” or “Daddy Paco”. On top of this, respondent even gave the twins a treat to Hong Kong
during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown
beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico. In view however of Federico’s
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco, Federico’s
father. Under Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate
relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents. Moreover, Francisco insists that the twins should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities as he has the option under the law as to how he could
perform his obligation to support the them. This option however cannot be availed of in case
there are circumstances, legal or mral, which should be considered. The Court could not see
Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have
disowned them.
ARTICLE 55: LEGAL SEPARATION
1. FRANCISCO V. TAYAO
A. FACTS:
Juanaria Francisco, plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, were married in 1912.
They separated in 1917. The husband then moved to Zamboanga. There he was convicted for
having committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of
Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. On these facts, the
action of the plaintiff against the defendant to have bonds of matrimony between them
dissolved has been denied. Plaintiff appealed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been
convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was
convicted of adultery may also constiture concubinage?
C. HELD:
NO. The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. Counsel argues that the plaintiff is here the innocent
spouse and that the acts for which the defendant was convicted of adultery also constitute
concubinage. But the undeniable fact remains that defendant was prosecuted for, and was
convicted of adultery and not the crime of concubinage.
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2. GAUDINCO V. HON. PENARANDA
A. FACTS:
On October 13, 1986, the wife also filed a complaint against petitioner for
concubinage. Subsequently on December 10, 1986, respondent judge ordered petitioner to
pay support pendente lite to the wife and their child while the case was pending. Petitioner
now contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto,
such as the application for support pendent e lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him by the private respondent.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the order to pay support may be given prior the conviction of the petitioner for
concubinage?
C. HELD:
NO. A decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support and disqualification from inheriting from
the innocent spouse, among others.
3. ONG V. ONG
A. FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13, 1975. They have three
children who are now all of the age of majority. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint
for Legal Separation under Art. 55 of the Family Code before the RTC of Dagupan City alleging
that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct. William however argues that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing
the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership; these properties were acquired during the marriage through his sole efforts.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the petition for legal separation should be granted?
C. HELD:
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YES. The Court reiterates that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does not
establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribed the grounds for declaration
of nullity and those for legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a
ground of legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and
the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled under the law.
4. REPUBLIC V. IYOY
A. FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on December 16, 1951 in Cebu City, Philippines.
The marriage thereafter was blessed with five children. Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America in 1984 and barely year after, her husband received a letter requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers. Crasus ignored Fely’s request. Sometime in 1985, Crasus
learned that Fely married an American, with whom she eventually had a child. It had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus and apparently, there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Fely filed her Answr and Counterclaim asserting
that she was already an American citizen and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
Crasus filed a complaint alleging that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity. He petitioned for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Fely under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Fely obtained a valid divorce from Crasus making her subsequent marriage with
Stephen Micklus valid?
C. HELD:
NO. By a plain and literal interpretation of Art. 26, Par. 26 of the Civil Code, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. In the Answer by her, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At 1985, when she filed her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity, even when she was living abroad. Philippine laws do not recognize divorce between
Filipino spuses. The Court sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between Crasus
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and Fely. Consequently, Felys have not validly contracted a marriage with Stephen Micklus
under Philippine law.
ARTICLE 56: GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF LEGAL SEPARATION
1. BUGAYONG V. GINEZ
A. FACTS:
In 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her
they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he
tried to verify from her the truth about the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to
attain his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to
desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to
locate her in vain. Later, Bugayong filed a petition for legal separation on the ground of
infidelity. The wife however contends that she has been condoned as they have already slept
together.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged
belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed
adulterous acts?
C. HELD:
YES. There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but the Court has no
reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various Supreme Courts
of the USA. The general rule in American jurisprudence is that cohabitation with the guilty
party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the
injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation.
2. LAPUZ V. EUFEMIO
A. FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married on September 21, 1934.
On August 18, 1953, Carmen filed a petition for legal separation alleging that her husband
cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, among others, would order that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits. Carmen however died in a vehicular accident during the
pendency of the case. His father, Macario Lapuz, substituted her in the case.
B. ISSUE:
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W/N the Carmern’s cause of action has survived?
C. HELD:
NO. A reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
ARTICLE 63: EFFECTS OF DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
1. CERVANTES V. FAJARDO
A. FACTS:
Minor Angelie Anne Cervantes was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. When the minor was barely 2-weeks old, an Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child was executed to petitioner spouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes. Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioner pouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus over the person of the minor.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the adoptive parents should be granted the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus?
C. HELD:
YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners,
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically and financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relationship with a married man, can most likely give
her. Moreover, with the decree of adoption, the adoptive parents have the right to the care
and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
2. ESPIRITU V. CA
A. FACTS:
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Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding bore a daughter
named Rosalind, thereafter married each other and bore another offspring named Reginald.
Both children are now over seven years of age. The relationship of the couple deteriorated
until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. Teresita
claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a bigamy case
against her. Meanwhile, she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over
the children.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the custody of Rosalind and Reynald should be given to the mother?
C. HELD:
NO. Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on
December 17, 1984 in California. Less than a year later, she had already driven across the
continental United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo in
Pittsburgh. Moreover, Judge Bersamin believed the testimony of the various witnesses that
while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales
right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been
assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was
staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter’s house. When Perdencio was reassigned
to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying
in one room and taking breakfast together.
Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the
father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in
Rosalind. Assuming that the presumption have persuasive value for children only one or two
years beyond the age of seven years mentione din the statute, there are compelling reasons
and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother.
ARTICLE 68: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
HUSBAND AND WIFE
1. GOITIA V. CAMPOS-RUEDA
A. FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara was married to Jose Campos Rueda on January 7, 1915
and immediately established their residence at Calle San Mercelino, where they lived together
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for about a month, when Eloisa returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa left the conjugal
home as Jose demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs and after her refusal, the husband maltreated her by word and deed and inflict injuries
upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body. Eloise now files an action against her
husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Eloise should be given support outside of the conjugal domicile?
C. HELD:
YES. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This ibligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; and obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit
him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the
parental home.
2. ARROYO V. VASQUEZ
A. FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez Arroyo were married in the year 1910
and continued to live together until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common
home with the intention of living separate from her husband. An action was later filed by
Mariano to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
Dolores refused averring by way of defense that she had been treated cruelly by Mariano.
Accordingly, she prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of legal separation; (2)
a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; and (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Court can compel Dolores to return to the matrimonial home?
C. HELD:
NO. In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the
marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband,
as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue
to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. But it does not appear that
this order was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited
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upon her in respect to the use and control of property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.
The Court is therefore unable to hold that Mariano is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile though he is, without
doubt, entitle to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.
ARTICLE 87: DONATION BY LACK OF MARRIAGE
1. AGAPAY V. PALANG
A. FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 with Carlina Vallesterol
and from this marriage bore one Herminia. On July 15, 1973, when Miguel was already 63
years old, he married Erlinda Agapay who was only 19 years old and from this marriage
produced Kristopher. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased an
agricultural land and was issued in their names. Also, a house and lot was purchased, allegedly
by Erlinda as the sole vendee. On 1981, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia now instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages on the said properties.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded to Carlina and
Herminia?
C. HELD:
YES. Art. 87 of the Family Code expressly prohibits donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Since Miguel’s marriage with Erlinda
was contracted during the subsistence of a previous one with Carlina, the relationship that
governs between the former two is co-ownership. In co-ownership, the ownership extends
only to the amount shared. Since Erlinda was barely 20 years old at the time the purchases
were made, it cannot be said that she had the financial means sufficient enough to purchase
said lands. Moreover, the notary public testified that it was Miguel who provided the money
for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
Rightfully, all the properties belong to the estate of Miguel and shall be distributed to the heirs
according to law.
2. HARDING V. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE
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A. FACTS:
Mrs. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile which was insured with
Smith, Bell & Co. for the amount of P 3,000.00. Said automobile was totally destroyed by fire
hence Mrs. Harding furnished the insurance company with proofs of her loss and interest.
The company however failed to pay said loss contending that Mrs. Harding was not the
owner of the automobile at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no
insurable interest in it. It further contends that the gift was void citing Art. 1334 of the Civil
Code which provides that “All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow each other on festive days of the family are not
included in this rule.”
B. ISSUE:
W/N the insurance company can attack the ownership of Mrs. Harding on the
automobile on the contention that it was unlawfully donated by her husband?
C. HELD:
NO. Although certain transfers from husband o wife are prohibited in the article
referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer
interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer cannot
be attacked.
3. RODRIGUEZ V. RODRIGUEZ
A. FACTS:
Concepcion Felix Vda. Rodriguez, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with
whom she had one daughter, contracted a second marriage with Domingo Rodriguez, a
widower of four children. Prior to her marriage with Domingo, Concepcion was the registered
owner of 2 fishponds. She executed a deed of sale conveying ownership to her daughter, who
in turn conveyed it to the conjugal properties of spouses Rodriguez. Domingo died intestate
and the fishpond was lawfully transferred to the heirs. Concepcion leased a part of it with the
Rodriguez children but upon failure to pay them P 3,000.00, the children sent a letter of
demand. Concepcion now petitions to declare the two prior conveyances to be null and void
on the ground that it was executed through violence or intimidation. Further, she contends
that the conveyances were simulated or fictitious.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the conveyances were simulated or fictitious to render it null and void?
C. HELD:
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NO. The contention of the appellant that the sale by her to her daughter and
eventually to the conjugal partnership were done for the purpose of converting the property
from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest in Domingo, and evading the
prohibition against donations from one spouse to another during coverture. If this is true, then
appellant and her daughter must have intended the two conveyances to be real and effective;
for appellant could not intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time
vest half of them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could have not been
simulated, but were real and intended to be fully operative, being the means to achieve the
desired result.
Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts the law
against donations between spouses make them simulated ones.
4. ARCABA V. VDA. DE BATOCAEL
A. FACTS:
Francisco T. Comille was a widower of Zosima Montanalla. Having no children to
take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter’s
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his
house, as well as the store inside. Leticia said Francisco and Cirilia were lovers while Erlinda,
another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirilia was his mistress.
Cirilia denied all these. A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed a Deed of
Donation conveying a parcel of land to Cirilia for the faithful service she had given to him for
the past ten years. The relatives of Francisco questions the donation as being prohibited under
Art. 87 of the Family Code.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the donation executed by Francisco is favour of Cirilia is valid?
C. HELD:
NO. Cirilia admitted the she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. At
the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver
and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Second, documents were
presented apparently signed by Cirilia using the surname of Francisco. These documents show
that Cirilia saw herself as Francisco’s common-law wife, otherwise, she would have not used
his last name. Finally, the fact that Cirilia did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is
an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco’s common law
spouse.
ARTICLE 94: CHARGES AND OBLIGATION TO
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ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
1. BA FINANCE CORPORATION V. CA
A. FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner as evidenced by a promissory note
he signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Indstries. Augusto presented an
alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who manages A & L
Industries and under whose name the said business is registered. About two months prior to
the loan, however, Augusto had already left Lily and their children and had abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the
same. Petitioner now demands payment from the spouses.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the conjugal property, A & Industries, of the Yulo spouses should be liable for
the loan contracted solely by Augusto?
3.
C. HELD:
NO. The obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership under Art. 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation
which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the
private respondent Lily was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their
conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of
A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries
liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil
Code.
2. MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES V. GUIANG
A. FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner
Marmon Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc., a corporation engaged in the hotel and resort
business. Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all
equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply facility to service the Hotel. Five
months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and
Aurora Guiang, with Frederico Guiang as witness. After some time, the Hotel secured the
service of another, after which the Managaer sought permission from the Guiang spouses to
inspect the water pump which had been installed on the portion of the land occupied by the
spouses. The Hotel now files a complaint against the spouses for damages resulting from their
refusal to allow the second contractor entry into the water facility site. Meanwhile, the
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
spouses assailed the validity of the second agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof
involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora without the marital consent of her husband,
Federico.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the second Memorandum of Agreement is void for having executed by the wife
only; without the signature of the husband?
C. HELD:
NO. In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of
Agreement, although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was
also signed by her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance
indicates not only that Federico was present during the execution of the agreement but also
that he had, in fact, given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise,
he should not have appended his signature to the document as witness.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. CA
A. FACTS:
Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the PNB
several parcels of land to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and
Pedro Bacani. Donata also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties to guarantee the
payment of the loan account of her son Salavador. The TCTs were free from all liens and
encumbrances. The loans were failed to be paid hence the lands were sold at public auction
and likewise, PNB was the buyer thereof. Meanwhile, before the properties were mortgaged,
a contract of lease was executed in favor of her children. The children now claim that the
lands mortgaged were conjugal properties. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB was null
and void. They invoked the case of Vitug v. Montemayor, which is an action for partition and
liquidation of the said lands wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the mortgages by Donata are valid?
C. HELD:
YES. When the property registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil
Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. As to the case cited, the PNB not being a party in said
cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the
said decisions when it extended the above described mortgage loans.
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Indeed, if the ONB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have 1.
approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without
requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said
properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith so its
right thereto is beyond question.
ARTICLE 105: REGIME OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
VILLANUEVA V. IAC
A. FACTS:
Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were owners in simple fee of a parcel of land.
After they died, their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the
land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. On April 1973, Modesto died. His
wife, predeceased him two years earlier. They had no children, hence, Modesto was survived
by two illegitimate children.

1. VILLANUEVA V. CA
A. FACTS:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya and
from their marriage bore five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties
and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, Consolacion and Cebu. Also, Nicolas is the co-
owner of a land which he inherited from his parents.
B.
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and
cohabitated with defendant Pacita Villanueva wherein they bore one illegitimate child named
Procorpio. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-
mentioned properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas,
has no occupation, she had no properties of her own which she could derive income. From the
time Nicolas suffered a stroke, Procorpio has been receiving the income of these properties.
Eusebia now claims income on those properties.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the properties and the fruits and income therefrom belong to the conjugal
partnership of spouses Eusebia and Nicolas?
C. HELD:
2.
YES. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusbia even if they were married before the effectivity of
Family Code. Art. 105 of the Family Code explicitly states that it shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on
the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that
the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.
ARTICLE 109: EXLUSIVE PROPERTY OF SPOUSES
Sometime later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas discovered two wills
executed each by the deceased spouses. Victoria Commorro’s will allegedly bequeathed to
Consolacion and Raymundo, and to the illegitimate children, in equal shares pro indiviso, all of
Victoria’s interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her net share from the conjugal
partnership property with her husband. Modesto’s will on the other hand bequeathed to the
illegitimate children only, all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria “as well as
his own capital property brought by him to his marriage with his said wife”.
ISSUE:
W/N the will of Victoria bequeathing the parcels of land inherited by Modesto from
his parents is valid?
C. HELD:
NO. Certain is that the land itself was not conjugal partnership property of Victoria
Comorro and her husband, Modesto Aranas. It was the latter’s exclusive, private property
which he had inherited from his parents – Graciano and Nicolasa, the original owners of the
property – registered solely in his name. Moreover, Victoria died about two years ahead of
Modesto. Victoria never therefore inherited any part of the land and hence, had nothing of
the land to bequeath by will or othwerise to Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.
TAN V. CA
A. FACTS:
A case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria
Tan against Alfonso’s brothers and their respective wives. After, Alfonso filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged
wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family
business is concerned. It appears that Alfonso and Eteria had been living separately by virtue
of a decree of legal separation, yet, Eteria claims ownership to the land inherited by Alfonso
from his mother.
B. ISSUE:

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W/N Eteria has ownership over the land inherited by his husband Alfonso?
C. HELD:
There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso’s marriage to
Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as Alfonso’s own exclusively,
as a matter of law. On the other hand, petitioner had adduced no evidence at all that the lot
was acquired by her and her husband with their funds. Neither was her allegation that the
house was constructed with the loan she and her husband obtained duly sustained. From
whom the loan was obtained was not revealed.
ARTICLE 113: PROPERTY DONATED TO SPOUSES
The Bank of the Philippine Islands (“BPI”), as administrator of the estate of Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze, seeks to recover from the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal
Revenue, the amount of P 1,209.00 paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of
administrator of the estate of the late Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum of
P20,150.00 which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased’s life, wherein his own
estate was named beneficiary. Said insurance policy was paid for five consecutive years by
Schuetze from the conjugal properties with Rosario Gelano, except for the first installment.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the insurance proceeds should be included in the inventory of Schuetze’s
intestate estate?

1. GENATO V. D LORENZO C. HELD:

A. FACTS:
The Genata Commercial Corporation is a family corporation founded by the spouses
Vicente Genato and Simona B. De Genato. The spouses had six children and one of them,
Florentino Genato, was designated as Assistant Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation. Four
or five days after, Florentino cancelled share certificates No. 7 and 18 and in lieu thereof
issued share certificate No. 118 for 265 shares in favor of him and Francisco, his brother. The
other siblings filed a complaint to recover said shares and be included in the inventory of the
intestate estate of their mother. In answer, Florentino and Francisco alleged that they had
acquired the shares by simple donation from their mother.
B. ISSUE:
1.
W/N there has been a valid donation?
C. HELD:
NO. The act did not constitute a valid manual donation in law for lack of proper
acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is
no showing that he, Fransico, had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of
them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous, and the
acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power of
attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.
2. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. POSADAS
NO. Although the husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership, he cannot of
his own free will convert the partnership property into his own exclusive property. As all the
premiums on the life-insurance policy were taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,
were paid out of the conjugal funds, with the exception of the first, the proceeds of the policy,
excluding the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute community
property, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was made payable to the deceased’s estate,
so that one-half of said proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other half to the deceased’s
widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. De Scheuetze.
ARTICLE 116: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
JOCSON V. CA
A. FACTS:
Moises Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the
spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her
intestate estate being settled. The present controversy concerns the validity of three
documents: (1) A Deed of Sale conveying six parcels of land from Emilio to Agustina for the
price of P 10,000.00, (2) A Deed of Sale conveying two rice mills and a camarin from Emilio to
Agustina for the price of P 5,000.00, and (3) a Deed of Sale selling 1/3 of Emilio’s share in the
intestate estate of Alejandra to Agustina for the price of P 8,000.00. Petitioner Moises posits
that since the properties sold to Agustina were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete” the certificates of title he presented were enough proof to
show that the properties covered therein were acquired during the marriageof their parents
and therefore under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.

A. FACTS: B. ISSUE:

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W/N the certificates bearing the owners as “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is proof that the properties form part of the conjugal properties?
C. HELD:
NO. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete” is no prof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The words
“married to” preceding “Alejandra Poblete” are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocscon. In other words, the import from the certificate of title is that Emilio Jocson is the
owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is
married to Alejandra Poblete.
2. MARAMBA V. POBLETE
A. FACTS:
Plaintiff Maramba was awarded an action to collect a sum of money from spouses
Lozano and subsequently, a levy was made upon a parcel of land owned by the latter. The wife
now alleges that the husband, during the pendency of the case, died and that the property
levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying that he liability be fixed at one-half of
the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the resolution of the issue an order be
issue restraining the Sheriff from carrying out the auction sale.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the paraphernal property of the wife should be levied in satisfaction of her
deceased husband’s obligation?
C. HELD: 4.
NO. Plaintiff Maramba contends that in any event the entire judgment debt can be
satisfied from the proceeds of the property sold at public auction in view of the presumption
that it is conjugal in character although in the name of only one spouse. The Court finds
plaintiff’s contention incorrect. When the judgment does not order the defendants to pay
jointly and severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to
satisfy the judgment in full. In the instant case, there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is
determinative. The construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of a
spouse does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that, in the meantime, the conjugal
partnership may use both the land and the building, but it does so not as owner but as
usufructuary. The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid. This
payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership.
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3. MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
A. FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the annulment of a writ of execution. The case was
instituted by the plaintiffs against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of land to which said
defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common
children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right
to one-half of the land as their mother’s share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. The
trial court found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to
the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The Original Title of Certificate reads
“Martin Lacerna, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania Magallon…”.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the common children of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan should receive
one-half of the land by reason of the descriptive title?
C. HELD:
NO. From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relied
mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the
“wife” of the owner named therein, Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the
certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a
mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. The phrase “married to Epifania
Magallon” written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not
necessarily prove that the land is “conjugal” property of Lacerna and petitioner herein.
IN RE: ESTATE OF NARCISO PADILLA
A. FACTS:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late Narciso A.
Padilla. In order that his property may be divided according to his last will and testament, it is
necessary first to liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in this connection with such
liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. De Padilla, commenced the instant
proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property
be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the
corresponding reimbursements and indemnities.
B. ISSUE:
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1. W/N the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to make possible the
construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership, should be
reimbursed to the wife?
2. W/N interest withdrawn by the surviving spouse should be charged against the conjugal
partnership?
3. W/N the P7,000.00 amount borrowed by the husband from the wife should be charged
against the conjugal partnership. As itemized: (1) P3,000.00 lost in horse-races and in
poker, (2) P3,000.00 spent for pastime and (3) P1,000.00 to pay for personal debt?
C. HELD:
1. YES. The Court is certain that these old buildings had some value, though small, and it will
be the duty of the commissioners mentioned in the judgment appealed from, to assess
the value. The Court entertains no doubt that the conjugal partnership derived a positive
advantage from the demolition, which made it possible to erect new construction for the
partnership.
2. NO. Withdrawal was made two months after the husband’s death. There being no
evidence in the record as to the purpose for which this amount was used, although 5.
counsel for appellee suggests the possibility that the same might have been disbursed for
funeral and similar expenses, we believe she should pay such interest, if any, as the
Monte Piedad (savings account) would have paid on the amount aforesaid, had not the
same been withdrawn by the widow.
3. NO. When the husband contracts any debt in his own name, it is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership as a general rule because it is presumed that the debt is beneficial
to the family. But when such a debt is enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal
property, such a presumption no longer applies. But when such a debt is enforced against
the fruits of the paraphernal peoperty, such a presumption no longer applies. As for the
gambling losses, it cannot by any process of reasoning be considered beneficial to the
family.
4. WONG V. IAC
A. FACTS:
Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They have three children but even during
the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living
separately. Sometime later, Romarico bought a parcel of land with money borrowed from an
officemate. His father needed the amoun for investments. Meanwhile, Katrina entered into an
agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry. When
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan
demanded payment of their value. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against
Katrina and her husband an action for collection of a sum of money. A writ of execution was
thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots all in the name of Romarico Henson, married to
Katrina Henson. The properties were later auctioned.
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B. ISSUE:
W/N the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may
be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are
the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife’s business
transaction from which said action stemmed?
C. HELD:
YES. The properties are Romarico’s exlusive capital having been bought byhim with
his own funds. But granting that the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina’s
obligations as the latter were exclusively hers because they were incurred without the consent
of her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and they did not redound
to the benefit of the family.
CARANDANG V. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN
A. FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision[1] and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision rendering herein
petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly
and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de Guzman.
Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty
four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%) respectively.
The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000
of this increase was subscribed by the spouses Carandang. Thereafter, when MBS again
increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, the spouses Carandang yet again
subscribed to the increase. De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these
subscriptions were paid by him, thus, he sent a demand letter to the spouses for the
payment. [The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-
incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman,
whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in
consideration for Arcadio Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment,
and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
indebtedness on their part.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary?
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C. HELD:
NO. The spouses were married way before the effectivity of the Family
Code hence; their property regime is conjugal partnership under the Civil Code.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is
primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in
their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability, as between them, does
not apply.
ARTICLE 117: WHAT CONSTITUTES CONJUGAL PROPERTY
1. LILIUS AND LILIUS V. MANILA RAILDORAD CO.
A. FACTS:
Laura Lindley Shuman, the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and the Manila Motor Co., Inc., have appealed from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila fixing the degree of preference of the claimants and distributing the
proceeds of the judgment of this court in the case of Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co. The
appellants, the Manila Wine Merchants. Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine islands also
contend that the sum separately awarded Sonja Maria Lilius is conjugal property and
therefore liable for the payment of the private debts of her husband, Aleko E. Lilius,
contracted during her marriage.
It is contended that the damages awarded for personal injury are not classified as
separate property of each of the spouses in article 1396 of the Civil Code and they should
therefore be resumed conjugal. In answer to this, article 1401 of the same Code, in
enumerating the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, does not mention damages
for personal injury.
B. ISSUE:
W/N damages shall form part of the conjugal property
C. HELD:
NO. There are two distinct theories as to whether damages rising from an injury
suffered by one of the spouses should be considered conjugal or separate property of the
injured spouse. The theory holding that such damages should form part of the conjugal
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partnership property is based wholly on the proposition that by the injury the earning capacity
of the injured spouse is diminished to the consequent prejudice of the conjugal partnership.
Assuming the correctness of this theory, a reading of the decision of this court in G. R. No.
39587 will show that the sum of P10,000 was awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius "by way of
indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages." It is held that the sum of P10,000 with interest
thereon awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius as damages is paraphernal property.
2. GO V. YAMANE
A. FACTS:
Involved in this case is a 750 sq. m. parcel of lotregisteres in the name of Muriel
Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane. The subject property was levied to satisfy the lien
for the attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00. Four days prior the auction sale,
respondent Leonardo filed a filed a Third-Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff
to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and,
therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters.
However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale despite respondent's protest. The
subject property was sold to spouses Josephine and Henry Go (petitioners) as highest bidder.
CA found the property to be conjugal. Nonetheless, petitioners Go insist that it belonged
exclusively to Muriel for three reasons: (1) Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim
that the disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal property, (2) the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name of Muriel and (3) the failure of respondent to
redeem the parcel of land within the redemption period after the auction sale indicated that
he was not its co-owner.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the property is conjugal?
C. HELD:
YES. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967 or specifically during
the marriage. The Court then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject
property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear
enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be
conjugal in nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence that the property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to
have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Further, the nature of a property -- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined
by law and not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse
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can change the character of a conjugal property. Moreover, the mere registration of a
property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be
contended in the present case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the
parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive
property. Lastly, the non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period
prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his right or title to it.
ARTICLE 121: CHARGES AND OBLIGATIONS TO CCP
1. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. CA
A. FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50.3M loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executited security agreements making himself jointly
and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent Alfredo Ching. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Ching to jointly and severally pay AID the principal amount of P50.3M
with interests.
B. ISSUE:
W/N a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal property”?
C. HELD:
NO. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a
contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.
2. CHING V. CA
A. FACTS:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. obtained a loan of P9M from the Allied
Banking Corporation. By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its EVP, Alfedo Ching,
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay at an interest rate of 14%
per annum. As added security for the loan, Ching, together with Tanedo and Chung, executed
a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38M.
Earlier, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13M
payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI,
through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of promissory notes entered into by the petitioners is considered “for the
benefit of the conjugal property”?
C. HELD:
NO. The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement as security for the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private
respondent in the amount of P38M. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals this Court ruled "that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry
or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or
was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he
thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty."
3. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK V. DAILO
A. FACTS:
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner HSLB to be secured by the
spouses Dailo’s house. Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from
petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The above-mentioned transactions,
including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge
and consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After
the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the
highest bidder.
B. ISSUE:
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W/N the real estate mortgage is valid despite the absence of the wife’s consent? already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is
insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the husband or
C. HELD: wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon
the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its
applicability are obtaining.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.[23] Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must
2. PEOPLE V. LAGRIMAS
prove).[24] Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
A. FACTS:
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other
than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
The lower court found the accused Froilan Lagrimas guilty of the crime charged and
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as
benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
such heirs in the sum of P6,000.00 plus the additional sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of
payment of the principal obligation.
damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses. A levy was had on eleven parcels of land in the
ARTICLE 122: PERSONAL DEBTS, FINES AND
province declared for tax purposes in the name of the accused. The sale thereof at public
PECUNIARY LIABILITIES OF EACH SPOUSE
auction was scheduled but the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a
motion to quash the writ of attachment as well as the writ of execution with the allegation
1. LACSON V. DIAZ
that the property levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not
be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
A. FACTS:
B. ISSUE:
The Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental sent to the manager of Talisay-Silay
Milling Company, wherein defendant Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish one-third of his
W/N the termination of the conjugal partnership is required for the satisfaction of
monthly salary and of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant.
fines and indemnities if the paraphernal properties of one of the spouses are insufficient?
Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the
C. HELD:
notice of garnishment (of his salary), on the ground that the same are not enforceable against
his present family. It was claimed that since the money-judgment arose out of a contract
NO. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "may be enforced
entered into by him during his first marriage said judgment cannot be enforced against his
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been
salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for extinction of obligations. As his
insufficient; ... ." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability may be
aforesaid motion after hearing was denied by the court for lack of merit, the defendant
enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. The law speaks of
instituted the present appeal.
"partnership assets." It contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Article
161, chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. It is thus obvious that the
B. ISSUE:
termination of the conjugal partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever
doubt may still remain should be erased by the concluding portion of this article which
W/N the debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well
provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged
as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed are chargeable to the conjugal partnership?
for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
C. HELD:
ARTICLE 124: ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL
YES. As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the wife
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
before the marriage, as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced against
1. UY V. CA
the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have

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A. FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one
hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy
and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a
result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke, which left him comatose and bereft
of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Gilda filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of his husband for the
assumption of conjugal properties and authorirzation to sell the same. She signified to the
court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She
also alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling
up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently
needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its
improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the wife should be given the sole power to administrate the conjugal
properties due to the husband’s incompetence?
C. HELD:
NO. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in
fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do
not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who
was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.[9] In such case,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
1.
2. JADER-MANALO V. CAMAISA
A. FACTS:
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo
allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez
C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN
TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as
that in Taytay, Rizal. An offer was made to purchase the properties and the agreement was
handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the
sale.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at
Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when
respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they
needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration.13 Petitioner reminded
respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma's
refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the
contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages
against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29,
1992, to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s
written consent?
C. HELD:
NO. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the
sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for
its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to
sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
ARTICLE 125: DONATION OF CPG PROPERTY VOID
WITHOUT MARITAL CONSENT
VALDES V. RTC, BR. 102, QC
A. FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan. 5, 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were five children. In 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code – psychological incapacity. The trial court
rendered judgment and declared such marriage to be null and void. The parties were directed
to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 47 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50-52 of the same code, within 30 days
from notice of the decision. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage.”
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B. ISSUE:
W/N the Family Code contains no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage?
C. HELD:
NO. The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.
3.
2. CARINO V. CARINO
A. FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago Carino, he contracted two marriages,
the first with Susan Nicdao Carino and the second was with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, SPO4
Carino became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tubercolosis. He
passed away under the care of Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig. Yee now contests that Carino’s
marriage with Nicdao was celebrated without a marriage license, thus, it is her (Yee’s)
marriage with Carino that should receive the death benefits.
B. ISSUE:
W/N it is the second marriage that is rightfully entitled to the subject “death
benefits” of the deceased?
C. HELD:
NO. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of Yee
and the deceased is, likewise, void ab ignition.
One of the effects of declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community
or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Art. 147 and
148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
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In contrast to Art. 148, wages and salaries earned by wither party (Nicdao) during
the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Art. 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
“death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
BUENAVENTURA V. CA
A. FACTS:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was
filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating
that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
The Court found merit in the petition. As a result, a dissolution of the conjugal
properties is in order. The issue now involves the apportionment of the retirement benefits
received by the petitioner from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the wife is entitled to the retirement benefits and shares of stock earned by the
husband?
C. HELD:
YES.Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust
Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the
benefits accrued from plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank for a number of years, most of
which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The
same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time
he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in
the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
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4. GONZALES V. GONZALES
A. FACTS:
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent,
started living as husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got
married.
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the RTC, for annulment of
marriage with prayer for supportpendente lite. The complaint alleges that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. During the time they
lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard
for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used to beat respondent
without justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of people and
even in front of their children. He has been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his indiscriminate
womanizing. Hence, the CA granted the petition for declaration of nullity and divided the
properties equally between the parties.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally between
the parties?
2.
C. HELD:
NO. Art. 147 and 148 of the Family Code enumerate the two instances when the
property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These
are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman
live together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares.
ARTICLE 148: RULES ON WAGES AND SALARIES, ACQUIRED PROPERTIES, ETC.
1. AGAPAY V. PALANG
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A. FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 with Carlina Vallesterol
and from this marriage bore one Herminia. On July 15, 1973, when Miguel was already 63
years old, he married Erlinda Agapay who was only 19 years old and from this marriage
produced Kristopher. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased an
agricultural land and was issued in their names. Also, a house and lot was purchased, allegedly
by Erlinda as the sole vendee. On 1981, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia now instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages on the said properties.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded to Carlina and
Herminia?
C. HELD:
YES. Art. 87 of the Family Code expressly prohibits donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Since Miguel’s marriage with Erlinda
was contracted during the subsistence of a previous one with Carlina, the relationship that
governs between the former two is co-ownership. In co-ownership, the ownership extends
only to the amount shared. Since Erlinda was barely 20 years old at the time the purchases
were made, it cannot be said that she had the financial means sufficient enough to purchase
said lands. Moreover, the notary public testified that it was Miguel who provided the money
for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
Rightfully, all the properties belong to the estate of Miguel and shall be distributed to the heirs
according to law.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO.
A. FACTS:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On
November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada
dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr.
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. On
March 26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their
return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street,
Manila. On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second
time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.
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Having obtained an invalid divorce abroad, Corominas’ marriage with Teodoro is
bigamous and void. As such, the CA ruled that the status precludes the establishment of a co-
ownerhip and therefore, Teodoro’s properties cannot answer for the debts incurred by
Corominas.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the paraphernal properties of Teodoro can answer for the payment of debts
incurred by Corominas?
C. HELD:
NO. The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by
respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by
the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said
properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her
"marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the
partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and
hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's
exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of
Corominas.
3. JUANIZA V. JOSE
A. FACTS:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that
took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical
injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo,
for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly
and severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-
defendant.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Art. 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a
common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry?
C. HELD:
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NO. Co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the
man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code,
Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership
of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney
which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable
for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences
incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
4. BELCODERO V. CA
A. FACTS:
The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he
had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and
he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child,
named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R.
Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to
Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife
Josefa R. Bosing."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana
was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 march 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September
1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot
in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the property should be part of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage?
C. HELD:
YES. It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in
the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The
property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to
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Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have title to the property transferred
to her name.
5. FRANCISCO V. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONTRUCTION CORPORATION
A. FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were
married on January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private
corporation. A little more than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the
Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for P320,000.00 in favor of
Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house.
The Register of Deeds made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal portion of
the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared
that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the
house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he
had over the property.7 On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila
Cando for a loan of P157,000.00.8 It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to
the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of
Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement worthP768,750.00 from Master
Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November
27, 1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the
said commodities, or the value thereof. Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim15 over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal
property hence should not be the subject to forclosure because of Eduardo’s failure to pay.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Eduardo has propriety right or interest over the properties as evidence by his
affidavit of waiver?
7.
C. HELD:
YES. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, apply Art. 148. Absent proof that the wife/husband has actually
contributed money, property or industry to the properties acquired during such union the
presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
6. ATIENZA V. DE CASTRO
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A. FACTS:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General
Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the
services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate.
Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium
beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born. However, after
the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda
for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-
Air Subdivision, Makati City. Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his
union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by
them.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Bel-Air properties should be co-owned by the parties?
C. HELD:
NO. It is not disputed that the parties herein were incapacitated to marry each other
because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Art. 148
of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married
to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them incommon in proportion to their respective
contributions . Proof of actual contribution is required.
JOAQUINO V. REYES
A. FACTS:
Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981.
For years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with Milagros B. Joaquino.
Also, that before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner
Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on
September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits and emoluments. The wife was not
the recipient of any portion of the said amount.
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The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a Deed of Sale of a property
consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila was executed by the
spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino. The
property title was issued in the name of Milagros B. Joaquino. The funds used to purchase this
property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of
Warner Barnes and Company.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the retirement benefits and the properties should belong to the wife although
the titles be under the name of the paramour?
C. HELD:
YES. Though registered in the paramour’s name, property acquired with the salaries
and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse.
ARTICLE 151: EARNEST EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE
BEFORE SUITS BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS
1. GAYON V. GAYON
A. FACTS:
On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses
executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of
unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of
Guimbal, Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within fiveyears
or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by
Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration
of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a
deed of sale dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for
the sum of P614.00. Meanwhile, Mrs. Gayon alleged that being a brother of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff “did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case before
filing his complaint.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the case should be dismissed for not having a compromise before suits
between family members?
C. HELD:
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NO. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits
"filed or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the
same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the Civil Code.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces.
Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 and
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the
same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
2. O’ LAO V. CO CHO CHIT
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering
the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter who is the former's
older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought
the property from their conjugal funds. To be resolved therefore is the issue of whether a
resulting trust was intended by them in the acquisition of the property. The trial court
declared that there was no trust relation of any sort between the sisters. 1 The Court of
Appeals ruled otherwise.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for non-compliance of mandatory efforts to reconcile is
assailable at any stage of the proceedings?
C. HELD:
YES. Admittedly, the present action is between members of the same family since
petitioner Emilia O'Laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently, there should
be an averment in the compliant that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under
Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. For, it is well-settled that the attempt to
compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit
between members of the same family. Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
ARTICLE 152: DEFINITION OF FAMILY HOME
1. MANACOP V. CA
A. FACTS:
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Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-
square-meter residential lot with a bungalow. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. The property now subject of execution is the
family home of Manacop.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the exception to foreclose a family home has retroactive effect to debts
incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code?
C. HELD:
NO. Under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said
code. However,Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not
have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by
the Civil Code 9 had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being
absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner.
Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued
prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the
Family Code.
2. MODEQUILLO V. BREVA
A. FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao
del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and
assessed value of P7,570.00, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under
Article 155 of the Family Code.
B. ISSUE:
W/N a final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code?
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C. HELD:
YES. The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from
the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Art. 162
of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152
and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
3. GOMEZ V. STA INES
A. FACTS:
Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez filed a complaint alleging
that they are the children of the deceased Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez, who, during her
lifetime, entrusted her rice land to Marietta for the latter to manage and supervise. Mary
Josephine and Socorro further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the
produce of said rice land while under the management of Marietta, and for the return of the
TCT to the property, but the latter refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a civil case
before the Pasig RTC. After said judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued by the Pasig RTC, by virtue of which Marietta’s family home, beong merely occupied in
1972, was levied upon to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the family home of Marietta can be executed?
C. HELD:
YES. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to
the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was
not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta
incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred
before the constitution of the family home.
4. PATRICIO V. DARIO III
A. FACTS:
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Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario
III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of
their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted
an action for partition before the RTC of Quezon City. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons
to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent,
who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary
of the family home.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the grandson of the decedent is considered a beneficiary of the family home?
1.
C. HELD:
A. FACTS:
NO. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. As
to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal
support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein
private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
5. TANEO V. CA
A. FACTS:
Two of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis
Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home. Petitioner
now contends that the family home is exempt from execution.
B. ISSUE:
B. ISSUE:
W/N the family home is exempt from execution?
C. HELD:
C. HELD:
NO. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house
in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
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constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt"
was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners'
alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243 (2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering
that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found
that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one
Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling
13
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated," it is
understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another.
ARTICLE 164: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. AGUAS
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died
on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS
for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim for
monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997.
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter dated April 2, 1997 from
Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She
alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before,
and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further
averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children
with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized
copy of the original birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter was
born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the
two were married on November 1, 1990. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of
Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997
W/N the Janet is entitled to the benefits by being a legitimate child of Pablo?
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, cannot be extend to
Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents
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were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of
that marriage. It should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s
alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same
probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It
stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no
confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the
certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not
undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only “legally adopted” children are considered dependent
children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot
consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
ARTICLE 167: PATERNITY & FILIATION
1. BENITEZ-BADUA V. CA
A. FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially
in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13,
1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and
nephew, respectively). They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's
estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
On November 2, 1990, petitioner Marissa opposed the petition. She alleged that she
is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. She
also testified that the said spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial
evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late
Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a
noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio,
elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that petitioner was
not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate
B. ISSUE:
W/N Marissa is a legitimate child of the spouses?
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C. HELD:
NO. Appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood
kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that
she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the
late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and
his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their
own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was
really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
2. MACADANGDANG V. CA
A. FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She
allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967.
She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30,
1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who
was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Elizabeth filed a complaint for
recognition and support against Macadangdang. The latter, however, filed an answer opposing
Elizabeth’s claim and praying for its dismissal.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Rolando is presumably the legitimate child of Macadangdang?
C. HELD:
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual
contact between petitioner and respondent is proof that the said child was not of
Macadangdang since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her
spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or
refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.In order to
overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that
there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or
proved, the husband must be taken to be the father of the child.
ARTICLE 170: ACTION FOR LEGITIMACY
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1. BABIERA V. CATOTAL
A. FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6,
1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl, named Teofista Babiera, was
delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her
child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging
her signature. She asserted that a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically
impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa
Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the
year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated
birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect her hereditary rights. Meanwhile, Teofista
contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has
already prescribed.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has
already prescribed?
C. HELD:
NO. This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period
1.
set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth
Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
ARTICLE 171: WHO MAY FILE AN ACTION FOR LEGITIMACY
1. TISON V. CA
A. FACTS:
The present action involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears
that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of
the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes
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Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as
sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo and thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation. Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
B. ISSUE:
W/N a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of
Hermogenes?
C. HELD:
NO. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount to an insult to his memory.
ARTICLE 172: PROOF OF FILIATION
MARIATEGUI V. CA
A. FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, he contracted three
marriages. With his first wife in 1953, he begot 4 children; with his second wife in, a daughter.
Lupo and Felipa, the third wife, got married sometime in 1930. They had three children.
At the time of Lupo’s death, he left certain properties whch he acquired when he
was still unmarried. Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves said lot. Lupo’s children by
his third marriage now claims that they were depreived of their respective shares in the lots.
They pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition.
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B. ISSUE:
rd
W/N the children from the 3 marriage enjoys presumption of legitimacy and is
therefore entitle to inherit portions of the property?
C. HELD:
YES. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married
in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him)
that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig,
Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
3.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
rd
Jacinto's (son from 3 marriage) birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said
article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina
rd
(daughters form the 3 marriage), they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
2. REYES V. CA
A. FACTS:
Plaintiffs, brothers, sisters and niece of the deceased Francisco Delgado, seeks to
cancel the inheritance of eight parcels of land made to Irene Reyes. They contend that Irene is
not an illegitimate child hence she is not entitled to the properties. Irene filed an answer and
set up the affirmative defense that she is illegitimate daughter of Genoveva Romero and the
deceased; that for several years preceding her birth, her mother Genoveva had separated
from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was
born
during the cohabitation of the deceased and Genoveva as common-law husband
and wife, and since her birth, lived with them, who reared and treated her as their child.
B. ISSUE:
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
W/N Irene may inherit from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado?
C. HELD:
NO. Although Irene was the spurious daughter of the deceased, she nevertheless
cannot inherit from the estate because she was not recognized voluntarily or by court action.
As an unrecognized natural child, she has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate.
Her rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child’s acknowledgment by the
natural parent.
It can be seen from the record of birth the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero,
and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown “Francisco”. Any of these records of birth
cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient
recognition, must be signed by the father and morther jointly, or by the mother alone if the
father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized and if the alleged father did not sign in the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent
evidence of paternity of said child.
JISON V. CA
A. FACTS:
Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since
1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar. As a result, Monina was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood,
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his
acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent
for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public
accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to
expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and
that Francisco support and treat her as such.
In his answer, Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his
employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never
recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the presumption of filiation can be granted to Monina?
C. HELD:
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YES. The proof of filiation established by a birth certificate or an admission in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned is not
needed. In the absence of those evidences, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by either:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the statius of the legitimate child; or (2) Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. With this in my mind, the Court
concludes that Francisco recognized Monina as his child through overt acts and conduct:
Like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms,
books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying
appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her with a monthly allowance,
paying for the funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's
paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office
personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in
Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend
her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing
appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records.
Moreover, if Monina were truly not Francisco's illegitimate daughter, it would have
been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, Monina had resigned from Miller & Cruz
(company owened by Francisco) five months prior to the execution of the sworn
statement in question, hence negating Franciso's theory of the need to quash rumors
circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of Monina's father. Hence,
coupled with the assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the
parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial
document, i.e. clear and convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant, has
been met by Monina. Plainly then, the burden of evidence is fully shifted to Francisco.
4. MENDOZA V. CA
A. FACTS:
Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she
was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according
her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who
told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her
mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When
she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito
Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot
from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint
savings account with her as a co-depositor. Morever, two witnesses for Teopista attest
that both acted as deliverers of money often given to Teopista’s mother.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?
C. HELD
NO. To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they
were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court
observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife.
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to
live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case.
In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived
with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note
that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving
money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been
sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were
"off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this
point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her mother solely spent for her
education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting her.
5. LIYAO, JR. V. TANHOTI-LIYAO
A. FACTS:
William Liyao, Jr. filed an action for compulsory recognition as the
“illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liayo”. The complaint was later
amended to include the allegation that petitioner “was in continuous possession and
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enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” petitioner having been
“recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M.
Yulo for more than ten years at the time of the institution of the said civil case.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William
Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three day stay at the
hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr.
(Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the
account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs.
Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed
Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring
Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken
together
B. ISSUE:
W/N Billy may file an action for himself to be recognized as an illegitimate
child?
C. HELD:
Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several
properties. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs.
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an
illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother,
Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she
became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina
alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Rosalina may directly ask for inheritance without instituting a separate
proceeding to establish filiation?
C. HELD:
YES. What was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one
for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by
Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already
agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is
Rosalina’s granddaughter.

NO. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment.
by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is
birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that
deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa
the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of
7. VERCELES V. POSADAS
the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for
the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
A. FACTS:
which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether
to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles,
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that
mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a
would amount o an insult to his memory
job.

The mayor made amorous advances towards Posada and while on an out-of-town
6. ECETA V. ECETA
function of the Municipality of Pandan, the two copulated and thereafter sired a daughter.
A. FACTS:
In a hand-written note made prior the birth of the child, Verceles promised to
support the child. Later however, Verceles refused to recognize the child. Posada now claims

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support and damages to be awarded to her without first establishing filiation in a separate
proceeding.
B. ISSUE:
W/N paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages?
C. HELD:
YES. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string of cases
we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning
to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof In
determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition
and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling.
8. ANGELES V. MAGLAYA
A. FACTS:
Francisco died intestate leaving behind four parcels of land and a building among
others valuable properties, hence, arises a need to appoint an administrator of his estate.
Respondent Corazon, is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva.
Petitioner Belen opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of
respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. In support of her opposition and
plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco. Petitioner also averred that
respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as
Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.
Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.
Meanwhile, respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears
on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”; pictures taken during
respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage
contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco?
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
C. HELD:
NO. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless
the best evidence of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized – was
offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the
witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four
witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed
marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s daughter but not
necessarily a legitimate child.
DNA TESTING
1. HERRERA V. ALBA
A. FACTS:
Then thirteen-year-old respondent Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. Petitioner Rosendo Herrera filed his answer with counterclaim where he
denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact
with respondent’s mother. Then, respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA
paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent
presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
B. ISSUE:
1. W/N an Order to take a DNA test is violative of the right against self-
incrimination?
2. W/N a DNA test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation?
C. HELD:
1. NO. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his
body; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts
of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof; an order by the
judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed; and the court can compel a
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woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on “testimonial compulsion.”
2. YES. The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to
the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.Where the evidence to aid
this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
1.
2. AGUSTIN V. CA
A. FACTS:
Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
th
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34 birthday. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion,
Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000
at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child.
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court. The trial court ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the
expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
B. ISSUE:
1. W/N a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition?
2. W/N DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination?
C. HELD:
1. YES. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends
completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity
of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
2. YES. As to the right against self-incrimination, the kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
As to the right to privacy, in no uncertain terms, the Court also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
good.
ARTICLE 175: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
TAYAG V. CA
A. FACTS:
The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real
and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga
with approximate value of several millions of pesos. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian
of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties
left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate. Plaintiff has been
estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,
plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a
consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance
with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired,
showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his
only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo
to herein plaintiff.
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the
estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite. Respondent disputes that
plaintiff states no cause of action and that the suit is barred by prescription.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the suit is barred by prescription?
C. HELD:
NO. Action to compel recognition and a claim to inheritance may be joined in a
single complaint. If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or
an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
child. It is irrelevant whether the father is alive or not.
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2. MENDOZA V. CA
A. FACTS:
Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she
was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according
her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who
told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her
mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When
she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito
Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot
from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint
savings account with her as a co-depositor. Morever, two witnesses for Teopista attest
that both acted as deliverers of money often given to Teopista’s mother.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?
C. HELD
NO. To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they
were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court
observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife.
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to
live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case.
In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived
ASHLEIGH P. PANOPIO | 2014
with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note
that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving
money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been
sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were
"off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this
point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her mother solely spent for her
education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting her.
ADOPTION
1. IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
A. FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
B. ISSUE:
W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
C. HELD:
YES. First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Art. 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir
of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code.
In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before
the surname of the mother.”
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2. LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC
A. FACTS:
US citizen Diwata Ramos Landingin, of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, ,
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramosand Eugene
Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos. When Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother. Their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has
two children by her second marriage and no longer communicates with her kids nor with her
in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. The minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad. As the
grandmother passed away, petitioner desires to adopt the children.
The minors have given their written consent to the adoption. Petitioner is qualified
to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families. She lives alone in
her own home and works as a restaurant server. Her children gave their written consent to
the adoption of the minors.
B. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother?
C. HELD:
NO. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION LAW OF 1995
1. MAGNONON V. CA
A. FACTS:
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Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with the Makati RTC. It was
alleged that petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married on February 16,
1975. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent was only 19 years old.
As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was annulled on August 11,
1975. Seven months after the annulment, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. At the
time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the USA,
hence the petition for support. Meanwhile, respondents stated that as the birth certificates of
the twins do not bear the signature of Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first
established and even assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent contends that
he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could not afford.
B. ISSUE:
W/N respondents are obliged to give financial support to the twins?
C. HELD:
YES. The Court was exhibited letters of which the father of the respondent address
the twins as “Rica and Rina Delgado”. Likewise, the father referred to himseld as either “Lolo
Paco” or “Daddy Paco”. On top of this, respondent even gave the twins a treat to Hong Kong
during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown
beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico. In view however of Federico’s
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco, Federico’s
father. Under Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate
relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents. Moreover, Francisco insists that the twins should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities as he has the option under the law as to how he could
perform his obligation to support the them. This option however cannot be availed of in case
there are circumstances, legal or mral, which should be considered. The Court could not see
Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have
disowned them.
2. ZAGUIRRE V. CASTILLO
A. FACTS:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was found guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and imposed upon
him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. Respondent, who was already married with three
children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for
the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and
respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the
child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however,
respondent started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
Atty. Alfredo Castillo then submitted certificates from government and civic organizations
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appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious groups, and
certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro.
Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her
and her three children that respondent had to support complainant’s daughter when it is not
clear who the child’s father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have filed a case for
support where the paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present
administrative case to get support from respondent.
B. ISSUE:
W/N complainant should have filed a separate case for support other than this
instant administrative case?
C. HELD:
YES. Complainant’s further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the
proper court in a proper case.
ARTICLE 195: WHO ARE OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT
1. DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA V. VILLANUEVA
A. FACTS:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva was married to defendant, Rafael Villanueva. To them
them have been born three children. The grounds on which separate maintenance sought are
infidelity and cruelty. The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other
women, coupled with a lack of consideration and even brutality towards the plaintiff, caused
her to withdraw from the domestic hearth and to establish a separate abode for herself and
two younger children. This final separation occurred on April 20, 1927, about one month
before the present action was begun.
B. ISSUE:
W/N Aurelia is entitled to support?
C. HELD:
YES. In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine
into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital
establishment are enough. A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from
the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and
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unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage
of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his
duties thereunder.
2. QUINTANA V. LERMAI
A. FACTS:
Parties were lawfully married in 1901 and that in February, 1905, they entered
into a written agreement of separation whereby each renounced certain rights as against the
other and divided the conjugal property between them, the defendant undertaking in
consideration of the premises to pay the plaintiff within the first three days of each month the
sum of P20 for her support and maintenance.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the wife is entitle to support in the absence of a judicial decree?
C. HELD:
NO. Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides: "In default of express declarations in the
marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only
take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50."
Under this article the agreement in suit is void. The wife, however, has a right of
action against her husband for support under the provisions of the Civil Code and, although
the contract in question is void, her right of action does not for that reason fail.
However, the Court is of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by
the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended complaint is a good
defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.
3. FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA
A. FACTS:
Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged two years, through his natural mother and
guardianad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against Rosario Gomez.
Plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and as such is entitled to support. The
petitioner, as defendant in that case, answered by a general denial of each and every material
allegation contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged that he never
acknowledged and could not have acknowledged that he never acknowledged and could not
have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son.
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B. ISSUE:
W/N Eugenio is entitled to support pendent lite?
C. HELD:
NO. It is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son. it is apparent that no
effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the
existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the
capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to
be in possession of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists
other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a
final judgment, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente lite.
4. QUIMIGUING V. ICAO
A. FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao. In her complaint it was averred that the parties
were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite
efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl.
B. ISSUE:
W/N an unborn child is entitled to support?
C. HELD:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, particularly of Icao, whose paternity is deemed admitted for
the purpose of the motion to dismiss, even if the said child is only in the mother’s womb just
as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations. Its being ignored by the
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parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator.
ARTICLE 201: AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
1. ADVINCULA V. ADVINCULA
A. FACTS:
Manuela Advincula filed a Civil Case for acknowledgment and support. On motion of
both parties, said case was dismissed. Five years after, Manuela filed another case for the
same consideration. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal
of the first case was without reservation, that it was with prejudice, hence final.
B. ISSUE:
W/N judgment for support does become final?
C. HELD:
NO. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and
with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. The right
to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither
can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
2. JOCSON V. THE EMPIRE INS. CO. AND JOCSON LAGNITON
A. FACTS:
Agustin A. Jocson was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his then
minor children and as such guardian, he had a bond filed with the Empire Insurance Co. as
surety. Among the properties of the minors were sums of money from war damage payments
which formed part of their inheritance from their mother. In the course of guardianship,
Jocson submitted periodic accounts to the court, among them those for expenses incurred for
the education and clothing of the wards.
Agustin died and three of the 5 siblings who had already attained majority was
appointed guardians of the remaining minors. Perla, one of the guardian, filed a petition to
have the accounts of Agustin reopened claiming that the expenses for their education and
clothing during their minority were part of the support they were entitled to recive from their
father, so that when the latter paid those expenses from the guardianship funds, he made
illegal disbursements therefrom for which his bond as guardian should be made to answer.
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B. ISSUE:
W/N the disbursements were illegal?
C. HELD:
NO. Support does include what is necessary for the education and clothing of the
person entitled thereto. But support must be demanded and the right to it established before
it becomes payable. For the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship,
even from the relationship of parents and children, but “from imperative necessity without
which it cannot be demanded, and the law presumed that such necessity does not exist unless
support is demanded.
In the present case, it does not appear that support for the minors, be it only for their
education and clothing was never demanded from their father and the need for it duly
established. The need for support, as already states, cannot be presumed, and especially must
this be true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means of their own.
3. BALTAZAR V. SERFINO
A. FACTS:
Armenio was born on December 19, 1943, the son of Olympia Baltazar, a widow,
and Sergio Serfino, a married man. Now, Olympia, in behalf of Amenio, appeals from the
Court of First Instance that the amount of support awarded be made payable from the time
Aremenio was born.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the the amount of support awarded be made payable from the time Aremenio
was born absent a judicial proceeding upon his birth?
C. HELD:
NO. As to when payment thereof should begin, the law says that the obligation to
give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is
extrajudicially demanded (Article 298, Civil Code). In this case, payment should begin June
1959, for it was then that appellants made the extrajudicial demand on appellee.
ARTICLE 206: AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
1. RAMIREZ AND DE MARCAIDA V. REDFERN
A. FACTS:
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In 1908, J.R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to Englad and left them
there. He returned to the Philippines the following year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing
until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided hi wife with funds for her expenses. Mr. Redfern is now
furinishing P300.00 per month for the support of herself and one child. The two grown sons
are employed and are earning their own living.
In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, the sum of
$600.00. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional $185.00 from her sister in Englad. Mrs.;
Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922.
B. ISSUE:
W/N J.R. Redfern is liable for the sums of money here sought to be recovered?
C. HELD:
NO. it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a
dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was
supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative
qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.
It may be conceded that Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez did not supply Mrs. Redfern with
money out of charity. The third requisite of the law is also taken out of consideration since
Mr. Redfern is the first to acknowledge that the money was handed to his wife by Mr. and
Mrs. Ramirez without his knowledge. We think, however, that there is a failure of proof as to
the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of the law. But in this connection, the
point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that
she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her
allowance. Before one can tender succor to the wife of another with an expectation or
recouping himself for the loan, the husband should be given an opportunity to render the
needful assistance.
ARTICLE 210: PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. SANTOS V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
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Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the
latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for
the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her
whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private
respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial
support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that
through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the Santos spouses should be awarded custody of the child?
C. HELD:
YES. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to
the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
ARTICLE 211: JOINT PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. SAGALA-ESLAO V. CA
A. FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. During their marriage,
the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband/ Out of their
marriage, two children were begotten namely Leslie and Angelica. In the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner’s mother while Angelica stayed with her
parents at respondent’s house. Reynaldo died and petitioner intended to bring Angelica with
her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to
her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she
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needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the
meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's house in Pampanga where she stayed with
Leslie.
Maria Paz is now married to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye and now resides in California,
USA. She returned to the country to bring her two daughters along with her. Teresita refused.
B. ISSUE:
W/N parental authority has been transferred to Teresita?
C. HELD:
NO. when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do
not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the
parental relationship.
2. VANCIL V. BELMES
A. FACTS:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in the said country. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987, however, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition
for guardianship under Special Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
During the pendency of the case, Valerie became emancipated therefore the subject of the
cases is only Vincent.
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B. ISSUE:
W/N the grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
C. HELD:
NO. Helen, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over
that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother
of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is
very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has
to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not
suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit
as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.
ARTICLE 213: EFFECTS OF SEPARATION OF PARENTS
1. ESPIRITU V. CA
A. FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding bore a daughter
named Rosalind, thereafter married each other and bore another offspring named Reginald.
Both children are now over seven years of age. The relationship of the couple deteriorated
until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. Teresita
claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a bigamy case
against her. Meanwhile, she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over
the children.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the custody of children seven years of age shall automatically be given to the
mother?
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C. HELD:
NO. Whether a child is under or below seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child’s interest. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best
assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. The
Court found that Rosalind felt unloved and uncared for by the mother. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. The children’s interest
would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in records to show that Reynaldo is an “unfit”
person.
2. MEDINA V. MAKABILI
A. FACTS:
On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named
Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by
respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was
Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero. The mother left the child with Dra.
Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him
treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered
his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited
her child, and never paid for his expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with
her two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros
lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with
each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself
earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
B. ISSUE:
W/N custody should be awarded to Zenaida, the biological mother?
C. HELD:
NO. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts
must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education
and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount". As remarked by the Court
below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to
provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what
advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love
to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero
and the latter's legitimate wife.
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3. CERVANTES V. FAJARDO
A. FACTS:
Minor Angelie Anne Cervantes was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. When the minor was barely 2-weeks old, an Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of
the child was executed to petitioner spouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes. Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioner pouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus over the person of the minor.
B. ISSUE:
W/N the adoptive parents should be granted the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus?
C. HELD:
YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five years of
age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners,
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically and financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relationship with a married man, can most likely give
her. Moreover, with the decree of adoption, the adoptive parents have the right to the care
and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
4. DAVID V. CA
A. FACTS:
Christopher J is an illegitimate child of Daisie and Ramon, a married man and the
father of four children, all grown-up. Christopher J. was followed by two more children.
The relationship became known to Ramon’s wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to
Ramon’s house and introducued him to Ramon’s legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie
were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give
back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the
next school year. Daisie petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus for the body of Christopher J.
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B. ISSUE:
W/N the petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the body of Christopher J. should be
granted?
C. HELD:
YES. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the
child. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support
them on her own since they were born. Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of
affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however,
that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her
means.
Moreover, under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." Pursuant to Art. 176 of the same Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of the mother, who as a consequence of such authority is entitled to have custody of
him.
5. LUNA V. IAC
A. FACTS:
Maria is an illegitimate child of Horacio, petitioner, who is married to Liberty, co-
petitioner. Mari is married to Sixto, and are the parents of Shirley (born 1975), who is the
subject of child custody.
Within four months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to petitioners, a
childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and
affection and brought her up as their very own. When Shirley reached the age of 4, she was
enrolled at the Maryknoll College where she is now in third grade.
In 1980, petitioners sought for the written consent of the parents to the child’s
application for a US visa, to bring Shirley to Disneyland and other places of interest in America.
The parents refused and asked petitioners to leave the child with them during their vacation.
However, when the petitioners returned, they found out that Shirley was transferred to St.
Scholastica’s College. The parents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the
parents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the CFI against the parents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver
her to their care and custody. CFI granted while the appellate court reversed. Upon finality of
judgment, the case was remanded to the CFI in view of supervening events - the emotional,
psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which make the enforcement of
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the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair, and cause
irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child.
B. ISSUE:
W/N procedural rules, more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final
decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire
and preference of the child?
C. HELD:
NO. The manifestation of the child that she would kill herself or run away from
home if she should be taken away from the petitioners and forced to live with the parents is a
circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment inequitable, unfair and unjust, if
not illegal. Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. This means that the
best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children.
6. PABLO-GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO V
A. FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of
their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello, whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from
the conjugal home and his school. Joycelyn and the child are present staying with the former’s
step-father at the latter’s residence. Because Joycelyn failed to appear despite notice and
because documentary evidence was presented, the court awarded the petition. The order
partly read: (1) Joycelyn and the child are at present staying with the former’s step-father at
the latter’s residence; (2) Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he
was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the
conclusion that she is having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano; and (3) the
findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses
who stated that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house
and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child. Joycelyn now insists that based on
Art. 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her.
B. ISSUE:
W/N custody should be granted to Joycelyn?
C. HELD:
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YES. The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has
been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling
reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain
circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive
her of custody. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her
husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect
on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.
7. TAN V. ANDRE
A. FACTS:
Complainant Charlton Tan alleged that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
authority when the latter: (1) at once issued the an Order granting the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus commanding Tan to appear before the court; (2) hurriedly turned over the
custody od their daughter to his wife Rosana on the day of the hearing; and (3) should have
considered the fitness of Rosana as a mother, as the latter is not qualified because she is
working in Japan and only comes to the Philippines for a five (5) to ten (10) days vacation -
that she is now involved with another man, a Canadian named Marc Beauclair and she does
not possess the financial capacity to support the child.
B. ISSUE:
1. W/N the order of respondent judge issuing the writ constitutes abuse of
authority?
2. W/N the order of respondent judge ordering the provisional custody of the four-
year old child to her mother constitutes ignorance of the law?
C. HELD:
1. NO. A close scrutiny of Section 5, Rule 102 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
on Habeas Corpus, shows that a court may grant the writ if it appears upon presentation of
the petition that the writ ought to be issued. Thus, Section 5 states: “SEC. 5. When the writ
must be granted and issued. –A court or judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a
petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same
forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of
the court; or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may
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depute any officer or person to serve it.”Clearly therefore, respondent judge was well within
his authority when he issued the writ as no hearing is required before a writ may be issued.
2. NO. The law grants the mother the custody of a child under seven years of age. In
the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that the child subject of the habeas corpus case is only
four years old, thus, the custody should be given to the mother. Be it noted also that the
questioned order was only provisional. As the term implies, "provisional" means temporary,
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preliminary or tentative. The provisional custody granted to the mother of the child does not
preclude complainant from proving the "compelling reasons" cited by him which can be
properly ventilated in a full-blown hearing scheduled by the court for that purpose. We find
the judge’s actuation in conformity with existing law and jurisprudence.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
1. BRINOES V. MIGUEL
A. FACTS:
Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda. Later, he filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the
minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth
Certificate. The respondent Loreta is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the
minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to
school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of
Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City. According to the petitioner, his parents, who
are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
The Court of Appeals awarded the custody of the child to his mother.
B. ISSUE:
W/N as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away?
C. HELD:
YES. Petitioner insists that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves
for Japan and during the period she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over
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the minor. At present however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying, thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot.
Anyway, the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for
ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers
to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative
father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody
to someone else.
ARTICLE 218: SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS
A. FACTS:
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of said school, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle
and Sherwin died.
The parents of Sherwin now claims damages for the death of their only son against
James Daniel II and his parents, the vehicle owner and St. Mary’s Academy.
B. ISSUE:
W/N St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin?
C. HELD:
NO. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
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For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident. When documents were presented, Sherwin’s
parents admitted that the cause of the accident was not recklessness of James Daniel II but
the mechanical defect in the jeep – detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the
jeep to turn turtle. Further, there was no evidence that the school allowed James to drive the
jeep. he negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

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