Being Sweethearts Does Not Prove Consent

The trial court refused to believe that appellant and complainant were sweethearts because
appellant failed to rebut complainant's denial of such relationship. More importantly, it properly
concluded that being sweethearts did not prove consent by complainant to the sexual act. The lower
court appropriately applied People vs. Cabilao which held that:  49

. . . Moreover, even if such averment is true, it does not necessarily follow that no
rape can be committed against one's sweetheart. Such a relationship provides no
license to explore and invade that which every virtuous woman holds so dearly and
trample upon her honor and dignity. That relationship is held sacred by many . . . . A
sweetheart cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her will. As a
matter of fact, proof even of a prior history of a common-law marital relationship will
not prevail over clear and positive evidence of copulation by the use of force or
intimidation.

Not to be overlooked is the complainant's willingness to face police investigators and to submit to a
physical examination which are eloquent and sufficient affirmations of the truth of her charge.  50

49 210 SCRA 326, 337, June 25, 1992 and People vs. Tacipit, supra., p. 249.

50 People vs. Baculi, supra., p. 764.

G.R. No. 114383 March 3, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEL COREA alias "Digoy," accused-appellant.

While the Court has upheld the defense of consensual sex in some cases, this was on the basis of
strong evidence, consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, showing that the alleged rape
was actually sex by mutual consent. 31 Having been raised as an affirmative defense, the "sweetheart
theory" must be established by convincing proof. 32 Accused-appellant bears the burden of proving
that he and complainant had an affair which naturally led to a sexual relationship. This accused-
appellant failed to do.

Besides, even if indeed accused-appellant and complainant are sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape. "A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a
man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the
pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust." 38

31
 See People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, Sept. 7, 1999.
32
 People v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, June 17, 1999.

37
 People v. Manahan, G.R. No. 128157, Sept. 29, 1999.

38
 Ibid.

G.R. No. 125341           February 9, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEY BARCELONA y SADILLE, accused-appellant.

A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the
relationship like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Such relationship, if proven,
would not necessarily establish consent, for love is not a license for lust.

G. R. No. 132368 - January 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PACITO GARCES JR., Accused-Appellant.

Sweetheart Defense

Appellant alleges in his defense that the sexual congress between him and Rosalie was consensual.
Several points militate against this argument. One, apart from the testimony of Porferio Paculanang,
no documentary or any other concrete proof of their alleged relationship was shown by appellant. 29 No
love letter, picture, gift or any other memento was presented to substantiate his claim. 30 Two, even if
we assume by a considerable stretch of imagination that they indeed were lovers, this fact would not
have precluded rape,31 as it did not necessarily mean there was consent. 32 A love affair would not
justified what appellant did subjecting Rosalie to his carnal desires against her will.33

Moreover, we agree with the trial court's observation that it was unnatural for Rosalie to have filed
this case against appellant if they really lovers. 34 Appellant testified that after their afternoon tryst,
she brought up the issue of marriage, warning him that if he did not agree to it, she would file a rape
case against him. Based on his testimony, he had agreed to marry her, and he left her that day with
that promise.35 Why then would she still charge him with rape? The inconsistency in his testimony
betrayed the contrived nature of his story.

Further evidencing the culpability of appellant was his flight after the charges against him had been
filed. For one and a half years until he was arrested in Ozamis City, he was a fugitive from justice. A
clear conscience would have precluded that course of action.

All told, we find that the prosecution established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

29
 TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 7-12.

30
 See People v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, June 17, 1999; People v. Manahan, G.R. No.
128157, September 29, 1999. Cf. People v. Accion, supra.

31
 See People v. Monfero; supra; People v. Accion, supra.

32
 See People v. Corea, 269 SCRA 76, March 3, 1997.
33
 See People v. Shareff Ali El Akhtar, GR No. 130640, June 21, 1999; People v.
Manahan, supra.

34
 Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 19.

35
 TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 17-18.

G. R. No. 132368 - January 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PACITO GARCES JR., Accused-Appellant.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully
opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her
yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal
constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in
Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

G.R. No. 187495               April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.