FOTHERGILL V MONARCH AIRLINES LTD: HL

10 JUL 1980

Coram: Lord Diplock, Lord Wilberforce 

Ratio: The plaintiff, on arriving at the airport found that his luggage had been
lost. The defendant denied liability saying he had not notified his claim within
the requisite period. 
Held: Elementary justice requires that the rules by which the citizen is bound
should be ascertainable by reference to sources that are accessible. A court
may in appropriate cases have regard to travaux preparatoires in construing a
treaty but such an aid is only helpful if the materials clearly and indisputably
point to a definite treaty intention. As to the Convention: ‘The language of that
Convention that has been adopted at the international conference to express
the common intention of the majority of the states represented there is meant
to be understood in the same sense by the courts of all those states which
ratify or accede to the Convention. Their national styles of legislative
draftsmanship will vary considerably as between one another. So will the
approach of their judiciaries to the interpretation of written laws and to the
extent to which recourse may be had to travaux preparatoires, doctrine and
jurisprudence as extraneous aids to the interpretation of the legislative text. The
language of an international convention has not been chosen by an English
parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English
legislative idiom nor designed to be construed exclusively by English judges. It
is addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial audience than is an Act
of Parliament that deals with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted, as
Lord Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan & Co. Ltd v Babco Forwarding &
Shipping (U.K.) Ltd [1978] A.C. 141, 152, `unconstrained by technical rules of
English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general
acceptation.’ and where a treaty is directly incorporated into English law by Act
of the legislature, its terms become subject to the interpretative jurisdiction of
the court in the same way as any other Act of the legislature. 
Statutes: Warsaw Convention 1929 17, Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 
Pickstone v Freemans plc [1989] AC 66 House of Lords
 
Miss Pickstone brought a claim against her employer under the Equal Pay Act
1970. She was employed as a warehouse operative and was paid the same as
male warehouse operatives. However, Miss Pickstone claimed that the work of
the warehouse operative was of equal value to that done by male warehouse
checkers who were paid £1.22 per week more than she was.
 
The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have left the
United Kingdom in breach of its Treaty obligations to give effect to an EU
directive. It therefore used the purposive approach and stated that Miss
Pickstone was entitled to claim on the basis of work of equal value even
though there was a male employee doing the same work as her.

Pepper v Hart   [1992] 3 WLR 1032 House of Lords

The House of Lords had to decide whether a teacher at a private school had
to pay tax on the perk he received in the form of reduced school fees. The
teacher sought to rely upon a statement in Hansard made at the time the
Finance Act was passed in which the minister gave his exact circumstance as
being where tax would not be payable. Previously the courts were not allowed
to refer to Hansard (See Davis v Johnson).

Held:

The House of Lords departed from Davis v Johnson  and took a purposive

approach to interpretation holding that Hansard may be referred to and the
teacher was not required to pay tax on the perk he received.

Lord Griffiths on the purposive approach: 

"The days have passed when the courts adopted a literal approach. The courts
use a purposive approach, which seeks to give effect to the purpose of
legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears
upon the background against which the legislation was enacted." 

Lord Brown Wilkinson on reference to Hansard:

"My Lords, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, there are
sound reasons for making a limited modification to the existing rule (subject to
strict safeguards) unless there are constitutional or practical reasons which
outweigh them. In my judgment, subject to the questions of the privileges of the
House of Commons, reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as
an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the
literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in
court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material
clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind
the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in Parliament,
as at present advised I cannot foresee that any statement other than the
statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these
criteria."

R v Bentham (2003) CA Statutory Interpretation – the

Purposive Approach
[Statutory Interpretation – the Purposive Approach]
D robbed A, whom he believed owed him money. A was still in bed. The
defendant pointed his finger, covered by his jacket at A and demanded “every
penny in the house”.  A believed his fingers were a gun.

Held: A purposive approach had to be adopted.  Section 17 of the Firearms Act

1968 was clearly designed to protect the victim confronted with what he
thought was a firearm. It did not matter whether it was a plastic gun or a biro
or simply anorak material stiffened by a figure. If it had the appearance of a
firearm the jury were entitled to find the offence made out.Guilty

REGINA V BARNET LONDON BOROUGH

COUNCIL, EX PARTE SHAH: HL 16 DEC 1982

Coram: Lord Scarman 
Ratio: The five applicants had lived in the UK for at least three years while
attending school or college. All five were subject to immigration control, four
had entered as students with limited leave to remain for the duration of their
studies, and the fifth had entered with his parents for settlement and had
indefinite leave to remain. They challenged the refusal to allow them grants for
their education. 
Held: The House construed the expression ‘ordinarily resident’ in the 1962 and
1980 Acts. Long-standing authority on the meaning of the expression was
referred to. The natural and ordinary meaning of ordinary residence had been
settled by two tax cases.
Lord Scarman said: ‘Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the statutory
framework or the legal context in which the words are used requires a different
meaning, I unhesitatingly subscribe to the view that ‘ordinarily resident’ refers to
a man’s abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted
voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for
the time being, whether of short or of long duration.’ 
The court allowed one exception: ‘If a man’s presence in a particular place or
country is unlawful, eg in breach of the immigration laws, he cannot rely on his
unlawful residence as constituting ordinary residence (even though in a tax case
the Crown may be able to do so.

R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 House of Lords

The five appellants were convicted on various counts of ABH and wounding a
under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted
during consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities. The trial judge ruled
that the consent of the victim conferred no defence and the appellants thus
pleaded guilty and appealed. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and
certified the following point of law of general public importance:

"Where A wounds or assaults B occasioning him actual bodily harm in the

course of a sado-masochistic encounter, does the prosecution have to prove
lack of consent on the part of B before they can establish A's guilt under
section 20 and section 47 of the 1861, Offences Against the Person Act?"

Held: 3:2
The defence of consent cannot be relied on in offences under s.47 and s.20
OAPA 1861 where the injuries resulted from sadomasochist activities.
CLARKE V KATO AND OTHERS; CUTTER V
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE CO LTD: HL 25 NOV
1998
Coram: Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Slynn of Hadley,
Lord Steyn, Lord Clyde 
Ratio: Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road
traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the
language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was
artificial and unhelpful. Whether any particular area was a road is a question of
fact in each case. ‘In the generality of the matter it seems to me that in the
ordinary use of language a car park does not so qualify. In character and more
especially in function they are distinct. It is of course possible to park on a
road, but that does not mean that the road is a car park. Correspondingly one
can drive from one point to another over a car park, but that does not mean
that the route which has been taken is a road. It is here that the distinction in
function between road and car park is of importance. The proper function of a
road is to enable movement along it to a destination. Incidentally a vehicle on
it may be stationary. One can use a road for parking. ‘ 
Statutes: Road Traffic Act 1988 145(3)(a) 

Pringles Case 2008

Procter & Gamble will be forced to pay tens of millions of pounds in VAT after
losing a legal battle with the taxman over its Pringles snack.
The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the Revenue, which has long maintained that Pringles
constitute a potato snack and are, therefore, liable for VAT.
A High Court judge ruled last summer that the snack was exempt from the tax.
Foods are usually exempt from VAT, but one of the few exceptions is the humble potato
crisp.
'Reasonable view'
A High Court judge ruled last July that Pringles' packaging, "unnatural shape" and the fact
that the potato content is less than 50% meant the snack was exempt from VAT.
The Appeal Court judges disagreed.
"There is more than enough potato content for it to be a reasonable view that it is made
from potato," said Lord Justice Jacob.
Potatoes make up 42% of the Pringles' ingredients.
He added that the lawyer acting for the Revenue advised him the VAT due on the sale of
Pringles was "as much as £100m of tax for the past and about £20m a year for the future."
But a spokesperson for Procter & Gamble said the company had been paying VAT on the
snack pending the appeal process, and so was not liable for any back taxes.
Unnatural
While praising the "simplicity and common sense" of the judges, Toby O'Reilly, director in
indirect tax at Ernst & Young, said an opportunity had been missed to provide "coherent
guidance" on which snacks are, and which are not, subject to VAT.
At last year's High Court hearing, Procter & Gamble insisted that their best-selling product
was not similar to potato crisps, because of their "mouth melt" taste, "uniform colour" and
"regular shape" which "is not found in nature".
It also argued that potato crisps - unlike Pringles - did not contain non-potato flours, and
were not packaged in tubes.
Pringles are more like a cake or a biscuit, it claimed, because they are manufactured from
dough.