BEFORE THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

Bernard NOURRICE
Solomon Pierre PROSPER

Complainants in their Individual Capacities & as Representatives of the Chagossian People

v.

Republic of Mauritius

Re: The Chagos Archipelago Military Occupying Authority

Communication to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights under Article 55 of
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights alleging that the Military Occupying Authority
(“Occupying Authority”) in the Chagos Archipelago, a territory of the Republic of Mauritius, a
state party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, has violated one or more of the
rights contained therein including the right of a people to their property (Article 14), the right of
equality under the law (Article 19), the right of self-determination (Article 20), the right to their
property and in particular the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its
property as well as to an adequate compensation (Article 21), and the right to economic
development (Article 22).

Legal Representative for the Complainants

Dr. Jonathan Levy

Attorney and Solicitor for Complainants
37 Royal Pointe Dr.
Hilton Head Island, SC USA 29926
Tel 1-707-298-2132
Email info@jlevy.co

OF COUNSEL

Dr. Clement Chigbo

Special Counsel
College of Law
Afe Babalola University

1
A Communication Pursuant to Article 55 of The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,

Complainants hereinafter referred to as “Chagossians” state that the Military Occupying

Authority in the Chagos Archipelago (a territory of the Republic of Mauritius 1) is the United
Kingdom. The United Kingdom created the military colony known as British Indian Ocean
Territory through the use of military force and crimes against humanity targeting the Chagossian
people. The Military Occupier has violated multiple articles of The African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights and continues to occupy territory of the Republic of Mauritius in open
defiance of international law and international governmental organizations. In so doing the
United Kingdom has flaunted the findings and resolutions of the African Union, the United Nations
General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice

Under international law and specifically Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article
43 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907, the United Kingdom occupies the Chagos Archipelago
by military force thus applicable law of the legitimate power Mauritius will apply, specifically The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

This complaint is based on the personal knowledge of the Complainants of the events described
herein, the findings of superior tribunals, international organizations and the pleadings of their
legal representatives. The Complainants have exhausted domestic remedies or nonesuch exist or
are futile and this communication is timely.

Background

1. The United Nations requested an advisory opinion for the International Court of Justice which
was rendered in February 2019 on the matter of the Chagos Archipelago and is incorporated herein
by reference.

2. The ruling of the International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the
Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Request for Advisory Opinion), 25, February 2019
stated 2:

The Chagos Archipelago consists of a number of islands and atolls. The largest
island is Diego Garcia, located in the south-east of the archipelago. With an
area of about 27 sq. km, Diego Garcia accounts for more than half of the
archipelago’s total land area. (¶27)

Between 1814 and 1965, the Chagos Archipelago was administered by the United
Kingdom as a dependency of the colony of Mauritius. From as early as 1826, the
islands of the Chagos Archipelago were listed by Governor Lowry-Cole as
dependencies of Mauritius. The islands were also described in several ordinances,
including those made by Governors of Mauritius in 1852 and 1872, as dependencies
of Mauritius. The Mauritius Constitution Order of 26 February 1964 (hereinafter
the “1964 Mauritius Constitution Order”), promulgated by the United Kingdom

1
Republic of Mauritius: http://www.govmu.org/English/ExploreMauritius/Geography-People/Pages/GeographyPeople/Location.aspx
2
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169

2
 Government, defined the colony of Mauritius in section 90 (1) as “the island of
Mauritius and the Dependencies of Mauritius” (¶28)

On 8 November 1965, by the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965,

the United Kingdom established a new colony known as the British Indian Ocean
Territory (hereinafter the “BIOT”) consisting of the Chagos Archipelago,
detached from Mauritius, and the Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches islands,
detached from Seychelles. (¶33)

On 16 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2066 (XX)

on the “Question of Mauritius”, in which it expressed deep concern about
the detachment of certain islands from the territory of Mauritius for the purpose
of establishing a military base and invited the “administering Power to take no
action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its
territorial integrity”. (¶34)

Between 1967 and 1973, the entire population of the Chagos Archipelago was
either prevented from returning or forcibly removed and prevented
from returning by the United Kingdom. The main forcible removal of
Diego Garcia’s population took place in July and September 1971. (¶43)

In July 1980, the Organisation of African Unity (hereinafter the “OAU”)

adopted resolution 99 (XVII) (1980) in which it “demands” that Diego Garcia be
“unconditionally returned to Mauritius”. (45)

In July 2000, the OAU adopted Decision AHG/Dec.159 (XXXVI) (2000)

expressing its concern that the Chagos Archipelago was “excised by the
colonial power from Mauritius prior to its independence in violation of UN
Resolution 1514”. (¶47)

On 27 July 2010, the African Union adopted Decision 331 (2010), in which it stated
that the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, was detached “by the
former colonial power from the territory of Mauritius in violation of [General
Assembly] Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2066 (XX) of 16
December 1965 which prohibit colonial powers from dismembering colonial
territories prior to granting independence”. (¶49)

On 30 January 2017, the Assembly of the African Union adopted

resolution AU/Res.1 (XXVIII) on the Chagos Archipelago which resolved, among
other things, to support Mauritius with a view to ensuring “the completion of
the decolonization of the Republic of Mauritius.” (¶52)

To date, the Chagossians remain dispersed in several countries, including the

United Kingdom, Mauritius and Seychelles. By virtue of United Kingdom law and
judicial decisions of that country, they are not allowed to return to the Chagos
Archipelago. (¶131)

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 On 23 June 2017, the General Assembly adopted resolution 71/292 requesting
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.

The Court concludes that, as a result of the Chagos Archipelago’s unlawful

detachment and its incorporation into a new colony, known as the BIOT, the
process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when
Mauritius acceded to independence in 1968. (174)

The United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring an end to its

administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, thereby
enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory in a manner
consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination (178)

3. The ICJ found:

The process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that
country acceded to independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos
Archipelago;

The United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its

administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible

All UN Member States are under an obligation to cooperate with the United
Nations in order to complete the decolonization of Mauritius.

The United Kingdom has been advised by the Mauritius, the United Nations, the
African Union and the International Court of justice that its occupation of the
Chagos Islands is unlawful and must be ended immediately.

The Complainants

4. The Complainants are the Chagossians: Bernard NOURRICE and Solomon Pierre PROSPER.
They appear here in their personal capacities and as representatives of the Chagossian people.
Nourrice and Prosper were born on Diego Garcia Island and were victims of the forcible ethnic
cleansing by the Military Occupying Authority. They are both active in various roles as advocates
on behalf of the Chagossian people and their cause.

5. The Complainants are Chagossians, an African people, also known known as Ilois. The Ilois or
Chagossians have a distinct language, Chagossian Creole and culture exclusive to the Chagos
Archipelago. The Chaggosians are of primarily African descent.

6. All the Complainants have personally suffered economic and social deprivation due to their
status as a people exiled from their homeland by the Military Occupation Authority.

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The Legal Status of the Chagos Archipelago.

7. This Commission is bound by the position of the African Union and United Nations General
Assembly that the Chagos Archipelago is a territory of the Republic of Mauritius, a signatory of
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. While the legal consensus is that the United
Kingdom is an unlawful occupier of the Chagos Archipelago; the question of colonial restitution
of property and particularly the valuable digital property “ccTLD .IO” have not been decided by
any tribunal or agency.

The Occupying Authority

8. The United Kingdom is the Military Occupying Authority which has been unlawfully occupying
the Chagos Archipelago in defiance of international law. While there is a Commissioner of the
BIOT Administration who sits primarily in London, the actual military occupation is carried out
by a Royal Navy Commander, who is appointed as the Commissioner’s Representative (known
locally as “BritRep”). As well as being the highest civilian authority in the Territory, this person
is also the Officer commanding the British Forces in Diego Garcia. The post is currently held by
Commander Kay Burbidge.3

9. The United Kingdom has committed Crimes Against Humanity by forcibly deporting the
Chagossian people including two of the Complainants in an intentional campaign of ethnic and
racial cleansing 1967-1973 and denying their return as plead in detail infra.

Crimes Against Humanity by the Occupying Authority

10. Crimes Against Humanity are defined by Article 7 the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to include as follows 4:

Article 7-1:

(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,

national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law,
in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;

(j) The crime of apartheid;

Article 7-2:

3
BIOT Government: https://www.biot.gov.io/governance/
4
United Nations: https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm

5
 (d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of
the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law;

(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental

rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity;

(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those
referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime
of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial
group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;

The International Court of Justice has found the Chagossians were forcibly removed from the
Chagos Archipelago and prevented from returning by the Military Occupying Authority:

Between 1967 and 1973, the entire population of the Chagos Archipelago was
either prevented from returning or forcibly removed and prevented from returning
by the United Kingdom. The main forcible removal of Diego Garcia’s population
took place in July and September 1971. (ICJ ¶43)

11. This ethnic cleansing and persecution was conducted by the United Kingdom military. There
was no health or safety reason or any other justification. The United Kingdom sought to clear the
Chagos Archipelago in order to repurpose it as a military base primarily for the use of its leasee
the United States. As only friendly and non-aligned powers were in that sector of the globe, there
could be no immediate military necessity for defense of the United Kingdom or Mauritius.

12. There is no question the removal of the Chagossians, including two of the Complainants, was
forcible and without any justification and was based solely on their ethnicity. The Military
Occupying Authority has admitted this fact.

In the oral proceedings, the United Kingdom reiterated that it “fully accepts that the
manner in which the Chagossians were removed from the Chagos Archipelago, and
the way they were treated thereafter, was shameful and wrong, and it deeply regrets
that fact”. ( ICJ ¶116)

13. Nonetheless, the BIOT Administration justifies its military occupation by claiming their crimes
were somehow economically justified and benevolent and that compensation was paid. 5 These
statements conflict with representations made by the United Kingdom to the UN and ICJ when in
fact the BIOT Administration is unrepentant for its crimes and seeks to justify its actions even
now.

14. The crime of Apartheid is a serious allegation, yet one amply demonstrated herein. Numerous
individuals have been permitted to reside in the Chagos Archipelago since the removal of the
Chagossians: members of the UK and US armed forces, contract workers and marine biologists.
5
BIOT government website: https://www.biot.gov.io/about/history/ [Retrieved June 18, 2020)

6
Yet, the Chagossians, the original inhabitants who have the legal right of abode are currently
denied access by law to the Chagos Islands except for what are brief “Heritage Visits” at the whim
of the BIOT Administration.6

15. The Military Occupation Authority’s officials thought very little of the Chagossians. Their
contemporary racist and apartheid views are well documented in various pleadings and
publications.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth, senior official at the UK Foreign Office, wrote to a diplomat
in 1966: "We must surely be very tough about this. The object of the exercise is to
get some rocks which will remain ours... There will be no indigenous population
except seagulls..."

The UK diplomat, Dennis Greenhill, replied: "Unfortunately along with the birds
go some few Tarzans or Man Fridays whose origins are obscure and who are
hopefully being wished on to Mauritius.” In 1965, UK Colonial Secretary Anthony
Greenwood had warned that it was: "[I]mportant to present the United Nations with
a fait accompli".

16. Apartheid is a codified form of racial discrimination in which the Chagossians as an African
people have had their rights to their homes and property codified in the BIOT Constitution and
British Indian Ocean Territory (Immigration) Order 2004 which denies the right of abode or even
presence to Chagossians who lack a permit from Military Occupying Authority. Violators are
subject to removal and potential criminal sanctions.

17. The British Indian Ocean Territory Constitution Order 2004 states 7:

No right of abode in the Territory

9. — (1) Whereas the Territory was constituted and is set aside to be available for
the defence purposes of the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of the United States of America, no person has the right of abode in
the Territory.

(2) Accordingly, no person is entitled to enter or be present in the Territory

except as authorised by or under this Order or any other law for the time being in
force in the Territory.

Disposal of land

14. Subject to any law for the time being in force in the Territory and to any
instructions given to the Commissioner by Her Majesty through a Secretary of
State, the Commissioner, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty’s behalf, may

6
BIOT government website: https://www.biot.gov.io/news/planned-heritage-visits-for-chagossians-2020-21/
7
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/British_Indian_Ocean_Territory_Constitution_Order_2004

7
 make and execute grants and dispositions of any land or other immovable property
within the Territory that may lawfully be granted or disposed of by Her Majesty.

The Occupying Power therefore has not only banned the Chagossians but has permanently
confiscated their property for its own use and use by its leasee and contractors.

The Occupier has Expropriated the Economic Property and livelihood of the Chagossian
People

18. The Chagossians are also known as Ilois and as islanders are culturally attached and strongly
connected to their environment.

19. Colonial exploitation takes at least 5 known aspects in the Chagos Islands:

1. The United Kingdom Issues Fishing Permits from which it derives some income.

2. The United Kingdom derives income from yachting permits. 8

3. The United Kingdom receives tangible and in kind benefits from the United
States in exchange for a lease of the military base on Diego Garcia Island. 9

4. The United Kingdom derives income from the sale of postage stamps and coins
to collectors which often utilize images of the unique flora and fauna of the Chagos
Archipelago. 10

5. In 1997 an agreement was signed by the United Kingdom with Internet

Computer Bureau Limited or “ICB” granting ICB the administrative rights to the
ccTLD (Country Code Tope Level Domain) .IO. The ccTLD .IO rights are a
valuable property and generate millions of dollars in fees for ICB annually. The
1997 contract or agreement grants ICB exclusive rights to exploit this asset in the
same way colonial powers have delegated exclusive rights in Africa to private
companies to act on behalf of the colonizer e.g. The Tati Concessions Land
(Botswana), The Nyassa Chartered Company, and The Mozambique Company.
ICB therefore is the Occupying Power’s agent and acts in its stead in the matter of
ccTLD .IO.

20. The value of ccTLD is thought to be in the neighborhood of $50 million. ccTLD .IO generates
direct fees of $10 million year to ICB. The domain end users of ccTLD .IO include thousands of
crypto asset platforms (crypto asset exchanges, investment schemes, Initial Coin Offerings, Crypto
Miners and Bitmixers) who take advantage of the nonexistent commercial regulation in BIOT to
generate vast sums of unregulated and untaxed revenue and trade with volume of billions of dollars
per day. The BIOT Courts and Administration have been aware since 2017 that cc TLD .IO has
become the world’s largest crypto asset offshore centre.

8
https://www.biot.gov.io/visiting/mooring-permits/
9
https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/navy-support-facility-diego-garcia
10
https://www.biot.gov.io/stamps-and-coins/

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21. The Chagossians receive no income from any of these colonial activities nor have any
meaningful input in their management. The Occupying Power and its BIOT Administration has
not only stolen the entire Chagos Archipelago and everything on, under and above it but also
engages in virtual and digital exploitation and even tolerates massive criminality in order to
generate revenue.

Jurisdiction

22. Under international law and specifically Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
Article 43 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907, the United Kingdom occupies the Chagos
Archipelago, a territory of the Republic of Mauritius, by military force thus applicable law of the
legitimate power Mauritius will apply, specifically The African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights.

23. Article 43 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 states: The authority of the legitimate power
having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

24. Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The penal laws of the occupied territory
shall remain in force…11” According to the 1958 Commentary on Article 64, “penal laws” actually
include all applicable laws:

The idea of the continuity of the legal system applies to the whole of the law (civil
law and penal law) in the occupied territory. The reason for the Diplomatic
Conference making express reference only to respect for penal law was that it had
not been sufficiently observed during past conflicts; there is no reason to infer a
contrario that the occupation authorities are not also bound to respect the civil law
of the country, or even its constitution.12

The Republic of Mauritius

25. The African Charter party is the Republic of Mauritius which claims the territory of the Chagos
Archipelago. The Republic of Mauritius ratified the African Charter in 1992.

26. Complainants have reason to believe that the Republic of Mauritius if not entirely favorable to
their position, will have no objection to this Commission exercising jurisdiction and fashioning a
remedy. The Republic of Mauritius has been particularly diligent in pursuing it territorial rights
to the Chagos Archipelago at the UN, AU and elsewhere but has not sought restitution of property
for the Chagossians

27. The Occupying Power, the BIOT Administration however takes a somewhat supercilious
position:

11
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=6DB876FD94A28530C12563CD0051BEF8
12
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9DA4ED335D627BBFC12563CD0042CB83

9
 Mauritius has never held sovereignty over the Archipelago, and we do not recognise
its claim. However, we have a long-standing commitment, first made in 1965, to
cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer required for
defence purposes. We stand by that commitment. The United Kingdom is also
committed to doing more (on a voluntary basis) to address the aspirations of
Chagossians including the desire for better lives and to maintain a connection to
the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). Despite our disagreement over the
British Indian Ocean Territory, the United Kingdom and Mauritius remain close
friends and Commonwealth partners. We remain open to dialogue on all shared
issues of mutual interest, as highlighted by the friendly and constructive discussion
that took place between the UK’s Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of
Mauritius on 27 April.13

28. Thus, the Occupying Power remains contumacious in regard to the position of the UN and AU.
The Occupying Power also makes promises to Mauritius and the Chagossians which are
completely at odds with the current position. The Occupying Power recognizes that the Chagos
Islands are to be ceded at some future time to Mauritius and that the Occupying Power is
responsible to the Chagossians. This we believe indicates the Occupying Power while maintaining
its military occupation, acknowledges the superior claims of Mauritius to the territory and its
obligations to the Chagossian people and their rights under the African Charter.

ccTLD .IO

29. A country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is an Internet top-level domain generally used or
reserved for a country, sovereign state, or dependent territory identified with a country code. Some
of the world's smallest countries and non-sovereign or colonial entities with their own country
codes have opened their TLDs for worldwide commercial use in order to generate significant
revenues.

30. IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) is responsible for determining or approving an
appropriate trustee for each ccTLD. IANA is a California nonprofit corporation. Administration
and control are then delegated to that trustee, which is responsible for the policies and operation
of the domain. IANA has delegated the rights to administer ccTLD .IO to ICB. ICB maintains
an address on Diego Garcia Island, in order to satisfy IANA ccTLD delegation requirements.
IANA’s policy however is not to redelegate ccTLDs until the conflicting rights of the parties have
been adjudicated. Therefore, an appeal to IANA to redelegate ccTLD .IO would be futile and
premature. Additionally, both IANA and its sister organization ICANN are closely connected to
the US government which is the leasee of Diego Garcia Island and would be bound by US
recognition that BIOT not Mauritius is the government of the Chagos Archipelago.14

31. The ccTLD .IO is assigned to British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), the name used by the
Military Occupation Authority for the Chagos Archipelago. The .IO domain was created in 1997

13
https://www.biot.gov.io/news/uk-government-statement-on-the-united-nations-secretary-generals-report-on-
the-implementation-of-resolution-73-295/
14
http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/io.html

10
when BIOT signed an agreement with Internet Computer Bureau Limited or “ICB” to administer
ccTLD .IO. ICB was headed by an ICANN (The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers) official, Paul Kane. Kane was also chosen to look after one of seven keys to the Internet,
which will 'restart the world wide web' in the event of a catastrophic event. Counsel for
Complainants has attempted to recover a copy of the 1997 ccTLD .IO agreement from the BIOT
Administration under the UK Freedom of Information law, however the 1997 Agreement was
withheld from counsel as a “trade secret.” In 2014, Kane made a public statement that indicated a
portion of the revenue from ccTLD was returned to the BIOT Administration while the remainder
was the property of ICB. The Chagossians received no portion of this revenue stream. Since 2014
the Chagossians and/or legal representatives acting on their behalf attempted to learn from the
BIOT Administration about that status of the ccTLD .IO revenue but received no answer. [See
Exhibits at pg. 9 et seq. attached hereto.]

32. Afilias Ltd., an Irish company which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the American company,
Afilias Inc., hereafter “Afilias,” acquired Internet Computer Bureau Ltd. (ICB) and its main asset
ccTLD .IO in 2017 for a cash payment of $70 million to ICB’s shareholders, Paul Kane and his
wife. The Chagossians received nothing from this sale even though Kane had made public
statements on previous occasions to the press, that the Chagossians would share in his largesse
from ccTLD .IO. Kane in fact had no intention of compensating the Chagossians and apparently
made such statements to avoid the scrutiny of the press.

33. Afilias had actual notice of long standing claims and litigation by the Chagossians and their
descendants regarding the unlawful deportation of the Chagossian people from their homes,
confiscation and destruction of their property and the illegal occupation of the Chagos Archipelago
by the United Kingdom and its leasee, the United States military. Afilias had actual notice of the
shameful legacy of colonialism and criminal apartheid in the Chagos Archipelago yet still chose
to acquire ccTLD .IO and enrich the owners of ICB by $70 million while making no provision for
the Chagossians.

34. Afilias provided misleading information to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Delegation Record so that it appeared a Bermuda company, Sure (Diego Garcia) Limited, was the
ccTLD Manager and Administrative Contact for ccTLD .IO instead of ICB in the IANA delegation
record. This was corrected only after Complainants’ counsel complained to IANA and Sure
(Diego Garcia) Limited.

35. ICB received control of the ccTLD .IO in a 1997 agreement which the BIOT Administration
which has refused to release the Agreement despite Freedom of Information requests. All that is
known about the Agreement is that a copy resides with “SURE” on Diego Garcia Island based on
an email released by the FCO pursuant to the UK Freedom of Information Act:

From: Sure Sent: 15 May 2017 14:17

To: FCO Subject: ICB Agreement
[Redacted],
Just to confirm, I have checked and the only agreement as I advised at the meeting
is the 1997 agreement.
Best Regards,

11
 [Redacted]
Chief Executive Diego Garcia and CTO S&D

36. In February 2020, the Complainants made the following demands on Afilias/ICB 15:

1. An accounting of the funds held in constructive trust by ICB for the benefit of
the Chagossian people as promised by Paul Martyn Kane, the former CEO of ICB;

2. An accounting of payments, in kind or otherwise, made to the BIOT Colonial

Administration by ICB;

3. Payment of past due royalties;

4. A fair percentage of the acquisition price paid to Paul Martyn Kane for property
belonging to the Chagossian people;

5. An interim Agreement between ICB and the Chagossian people which sets an
annual payment schedule of royalties, a disbursement schedule of funds owed, and
provides for a Chagossian director’s seat on board of ICB.

6. And that Afilias and ICB cease and desist from enabling criminal activities that
damage the reputation and value of ccTLD .IO by immediately adopting the
suggestions of the Cryptocurrency Crime Victims and working with their counsel
to eradicate open and notorious cryptocurrency based crime in ccTLD .IO.

37. The Complainants cited as the legal basis for their claims: The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). The Charter guarantees a “people” the right to their property
(Article 14), the right of equality under the law (Article 19), the right of self-determination (Article
20), the right to their property and in particular the dispossessed people shall have the right to the
lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation (Article 21), and the right
to economic development (Article 22).

38. Afilias/ICB replied on March 20,2020 to the Complainants:

The concerns that you raise on behalf of your clients relate to geopolitical matters
which fall outside of our client’s control or involvement. As you will appreciate,
our client had no involvement in the establishment of the British Indian Ocean
Territory or the treatment of its then residents in the 1960s. Nor is our client a
party to any dispute regarding ownership of the territory.

In that context, it is not appropriate for our client to comment on the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice, the UK Government’s response to
such opinion or any subsequent action being undertaken by the United Nations
General Assembly.

15
See Exhibits beginning pg. 22.

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 The claims Your letter includes the bald assertion that “the ccTLD .io is valuable
property that belongs to the Chagossian people”. No legal argument is advanced
to support this assertion. 16

39. The response by Afilias/ICB was disingenuous in that:

1. ICB’s presence in BIOT is based on a secret agreement with the BIOT Administration.

2. ICB has acknowledged Chagossian claims and claimed they would be compensated to the press.

3. ICB’s presence in BIOT on Diego Garcia Island is with the explicit approval of the BIOT
Administration.

4. ICB is aware of the of the unlawful occupation of the Chagos Archipelago.

5. ICB is an agent of the Occupying Power.

Criminality

40. The Complainants are mindful that someday the digital patrimony and property of the Chagos
Islands will be restored to them by the Occupying Power. As ccTLD.IO is perhaps the most
valuable asset and going business in the BIOT, the Complaints are concerned with the despoilment
and criminal use of ccTLD which is tacitly condoned by Afilias/ICB and the BIOT Administration
and which will diminish its future value and a producer of revenue.

41. The Occupying Power has been made aware by Complainants’ counsel that ccTLD .IO is rife
with lawlessness and criminality. Complainants’ counsel has communicated this to the BIOT
Legal Advisor and has filed cases in the BIOT Magistrates and Supreme Courts on behalf of
victims of crypto asset crime. Counsel on behalf of other clients has notified ICB/Afilias and BIOT
Administration of just some of the many criminal organizations utilizing ccTLD to commit crime
involving crypto assets.

42. Bitblender.IO, Doubly.IO. Profitcoins.IO, and AXECC.IO like thousands of other virtual
crypto criminal entities operating in ccTLD .IO have registered their domains with false identities
and third party privacy providers or proxies. Only Afilias’ wholly owned subsidiary ICB as the
ccTLD .IO Administrator and Manager would have the ability to know or discover from its
resellers the true identities and locations of the defendants. It has chosen not to do and continues
to permit criminal entities to register domains in ccTLD .IO.

43. Complainants’ counsel had a September 2019 teleconference with Mr. Taylor, former legal
counsel for Afilias Inc. and Afilias Ltd. (“Afilias”), at which time Complainants’ counsel requested
Afilias’ cooperation in remediating the disgraceful combination of cryptocurrency fraud and
organized crime that have congregated in the ccTLD .IO. This dangerous situation is wholly due
to ICB and its resellers marketing and promoting ccTLD .IO specifically to cryptocurrency
operators without heed to even basic KYC (Know Your Client) and CTF/AML (Counter Terrorism
16
Ibid.

13
Funding and Anti Money Laundering) regimes. As a result, numerous criminal virtual entities,
dealing solely in cryptocurrency with no tangible existence other than a ccTLD .IO website and
domain, have commenced criminal activities in the ccTLD .IO sphere causing immense financial
and emotional damage to individuals and international commerce.

44. The Bitcoin Blender Organisation (“Bitblender.io’) litigation involving the criminal
organization Bitblender.io has led to discovery of similar .IO cryptocurrency laundering sites:
smartmix.io, smartmixer.io, cryptomixer.io, anonymix.io, blender.io, mixtum.io, privcoin.io,
mixm.io. Bitblending or bitmixing is considered to be money laundering as it has no legitimate
purpose except to obscure the origins of cryptocurrency. Despite our repeated warnings to BIOT
Administration, Afilias and ICB most of these bitmixing .IO sites are still active and open for
business, something that we cannot reconcile with basic anti money laundering and counter
terrorism funding (AML/CTF) protocols supposedly in effect in the British Indian Ocean Territory.
Our conservative estimate is that cryptocurrency worth hundreds of millions of dollars have been
laundered through these sites and represents the fruits of extortion, hacking, tax evasion, fraud,
Ponzi schemes, child pornography, terrorism financing, arms and drug dealing and other criminal
activity.

45. In September 2019, Mr. Taylor of Afilias/ICB was provided with information on the desperate
plight of the cryptocurrency crime victims we represent. We provided Mr. Taylor copies of some
of our communications to the European Union, previous communications with the British Indian
Ocean Territory, and alarming statistics on criminal activity in ccTLD .IO originating with the
City of London Police. [See Exhibits at pg. 8]

46. Complainants’ counsel represent victims in ccTLD .IO matters pending before several
European Union agencies and bodies and the BIOT Supreme Court:

CCRT (Crypto Currency Resolution Trust) v. THE BITCOIN BLENDER

ORGANISATION (Bitblender.io) , BIOT 2018/001 SC

JOHHANES HEYNS V. AXECC.IO, BIOT 2019/001 SC

SENERGICA srl, ROBERTO ALIMONTI, PATRIZIA FACHERIS, ALVARO

TAGLIABUE v. AXECC.IO (AXE Crypto Currency or AXECC), BIOT 2019/002
SC

ANTONIA FRANCESCO TEDESCO V. DOUBLY.IO, BIOT 2019/003 SC

PEEM LORVIDHAYA v. PROFITCOINS.IO (PROFITCOINS), BIOT 2019/004

SC

CCRT (Crypto Currency Resolution Trust) v. Bitcasino.io, Sportsbet.io,

duckdice.io, luckyfish.io, edgeless.io, truflip.io, Betking.io, duckdice.io,
bitcoinrush.io, betmatch.io, betroar.io, and coingaming.io.

Drew Jensen v. Cointeck.io

14
 Guillermo de la Hera Casado v. Bitshell.io

CCRT (Crypto Currency Resolution Trust), Estére Crisona, Steve Scriha v. One
Coin including onecoin.io
Steve Scriha, Jacqueline Scriha, Estére Crisona, Martin Braddy, Shakib Kayode
Laguda v. usitech-intl.io, tech-coin.io ,usitech.io and successor in interest
wealthboss.io (USITech)

Steve Scriha, Jacqueline Scriha, Errol Turner v. procurrency.io, procommerce.io

(ProCurrency ICO & IPro Network)

Steve Scriha v. coinmdblockchain.io, coinmdsupport.io, coinmdchoice.io,

coinmdlogin.io, coinrewards.io, coinmdwallet.io, cryptoonpoint.coinmd.io,
coinmd.io (CoinMD)

Alexandre K. v. Lifelabs.io

47. The USITech, IPro Network and Online gambling matters are of particular note because of the
amounts involved:

48. IPro Network is typical of the thousands of similar operations utilizing ccTLD.IO. According
to the US Securities Exchange Commission (US District Court for the Central District California
Case No.5:19-cv-958), this typical ICO Crypto scheme defrauded investors of at least $26 million.

49. USI Tech Limited (also known as United Software Intelligence or stylized as USI-TECH) is
perhaps the second most “successful” crypto currency Ponzi scheme, second only to the infamous
$4 billion One World One Coin Ponzi scheme. USI-TECH moved its operations to ccTLD .IO
because of the ICB marketing campaigns seeking cryptocurrency related operations and used
various ccTLD.IO online platforms to defraud investors of hundreds of millions of dollars.

50. The largest cryptocurrency Ponzi Scheme, the infamous OneCoin pyramid also utilized
ccTLD .IO using the domain onecoin.io.

51. With regard to the online casino claims of no less than €3,000,000, we advised Afilias we have
obtained reliable information that at least 1,000,000 Bitcoins were unlawfully laundered from the
ccTLD .IO crypto casinos to the crypto exchange HitBTC.

52. These claims are representative of thousands of other claims involving criminal activity in
ccTLD .IO which are known to us including numerous fraudulent crypto trading platforms, crypto
money laundering, ICOs, Ponzi, pyramid and HYIP (High Yield Investment Programs) and
unlicensed gambling operations.

15
Exhaustion of Local Remedies

53. The Complainants are required to exhaust their remedies as to the digital property known as
ccTLD .IO. ccTLD .IO is a product of BIOT and created by BIOT in 1997. The Occupying Power
remains defiant in the face international condemnation of its military occupation of the Chagos
Archipelago and does not recognize the jurisdiction of Mauritius over BIOT. The Complainants
have attempted to resolve their differences over ccTLD .IO directly with Afilias/ICB, the agent of
the BIOT Administration to no avail. As noted supra ICB maintains its official presence as the
Administrator of ccTLD .IO at its office on Diego Garcia island, BIOT and is indicated as such in
the IANA Delegation Record17:

Delegation Record for .IO

(Country-code top-level domain)

ccTLD Manager
Internet Computer Bureau Limited
c/o Sure (Diego Garcia) Limited
Diego Garcia
British Indian Ocean Territories, PSC 466 Box 59
FPO-AP 96595-0059
British Indian Ocean Territory

Administrative Contact
Internet Administrator
Internet Computer Bureau Limited
c/o Sure (Diego Garcia) Limited
Diego Garcia
British Indian Ocean Territories, PSC 466 Box 59
FPO-AP 96595-0059
British Indian Ocean Territory
Email: administrator@nic.io
Voice: +246 9398
Fax: +246 9398

54. The Occupying Authority has established a court system in the British Indian Ocean Territory
which includes two Magistrates Court, a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, with further appeals
to the UK Privy Council. Complainants’ attorney, Dr. Jonathan Levy, has rights of audience to
the BIOT Supreme Court and has engaged in related litigation involving the ccTLD .IO as noted
supra. Further Dr. Levy has sought unsuccessfully from BIOT Administration the 1997
Agreement between ICB and BIOT Administration under the UK freedom of Information Act and
on appeal has been refused by the United Kingdom Information Commissioner access to the
document on grounds of “trade secret. 18

17
https://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/io.html
18
See Exhibits at page 9 et seq.

16
55. The BIOT Constitution of 1984 denies any civil and property rights to the Chagossians. [See
Exhibits pg. 1 et seq, Articles 9 & 14].

56. The Complainants contend that bringing this matter before Occupying Authority’s court would
be unavailable, ineffective and futile as the BIOT courts would be bound by its apartheid laws and
constitution which deny all property and civil rights to the Chagossians.

The African Charter of Human & Peoples’ Right

57. Complainants’ bring this matter forward under the following Articles of the Charter:

ARTICLE 14

The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the
interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

ccTLD .IO is perhaps the most valuable property right at present in the Chagos
Archipelago. ccTLD .IO is delegated by IANA to the Chagos Archipelago and
resides according to IANA on Diego Garcia. It is therefore inseparable from the
geographic entity.

The Chagossians through their many legal struggles, too numerous to list here, have
demonstrated an ongoing attachment to their land from which they were forcibly
removed by the Occupying Power. The Occupying Power admits it was wrong yet
demonstrates hubris and not contrition for its crimes against the Chagossian people.
ICB, despite alleged promises to share revenue with the Chagossians has refused to
do so. ICB’s former stakeholder, the Kanes, have profited enormously upon sale
of property not belonging to them to Afilias. Afilias when given a chance to make
restitution has refused outright. As an African people, the Chagossians have a right
to rely on the Charter to seek restitution of ccTLD .IO.

ARTICLE 19

All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the
same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.

The Crimes against Humanity perpetrated on the Chagossian people, the facts of
which are not in dispute, amply demonstrates their status as victims of the unlawful
occupation of the Chagos Archipelago by non-African occupiers, mainly American
and British military and their contractors. As victims of domination, the
Chagossians have the right to secure the return of their property in a forum that
views them as equal to their oppressors.

17
 ARTICLE 20

1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their
political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according
to the policy they have freely chosen.

2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the
bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international
community.

3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it
political, economic or cultural.

There is no question the Chagossians are a colonized people exiled from their
homeland by overwhelming military force. Article 20(1) grants them the right to
economic and social development. They have been stripped of all property rights
and it is only logical they would seek recovery of one of their most valuable assets,
a digital asset ccTLD .IO, that does not even require their presence on the territory
from which they are exiled but which nonetheless is part and parcel of their land.

ARTICLE 21

1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people
be deprived of it
2. In case of spoilation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without
prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based
on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law.
4. State Parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise
the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to
strengthening African Unity and solidarity.
5. State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of
foreign exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies so as
to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their
national resources.

Article 21 broadly supports the right of the Chagossians to ccTLD .IO and the
restitution of the revenues therefrom. Article 21(5) is particularly apropos as
ICB/Afilias has been granted a right by Military Occupier and colonizer to exploit
ccTLD .IO even to the point of tolerating criminality. ICB is an English company
and Afilias an Irish and American one. All revenues from ccTLD .IO have enriched
non Chagossians, the shareholders of ICB and the BIOT Administration.

18
 ARTICLE 22

1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of
the right to development.

The deliberate and calculated actions of the Military Occupier sought to destroy the
very identity of the Chagossian people. The Chagossians rights to their own
property has been legislated out of existence. They have been given no say in the
economic, social, and cultural development of the Chagos Islands. They have been
denied the right to participate in ccTLD .IO.

CONCLUSION

58. The matter of ccTLD .IO is a matter of first impression and has not been decided by any other
tribunal. The Commission is particularly well suited for this purpose because the African Charter
first and foremost was designed to address the ills and crimes of colonialism. It is therefore natural
that the Chagossians as an African people would seek to deploy the African Charter against their
oppressors.

59. The Commission has jurisdiction in this matter as the Chagos Archipelago is a territory of the
Republic of Mauritius, a signatory to the African Charter and under the laws of military
occupation, the Occupying Authority must follow the laws of the occupied territory. While the
Occupying Authority may or may not directly participate herein, a finding by the Commission in
favor of the Chagossians will have wide ranging ramifications.

1. It will place the Occupying Authority and its agent, Afilias/ICB, on notice that
their actions violate the Charter;

2. It will place users of ccTLD .IO on notice that their use of ccTLD .IO is
illegitimate and in particular any criminal activity is not sanctioned by the
Chagossians.

3. It may induce Afilias/ICB to reevaluate their position as to the reasonable

demands of the Chagossians.

4. It will provide a legal basis for the Chagossians, as an African people, to pursue
their rights to ccTLD .IO in other forums and obtain eventual restitution of their
property.

The Chagossians therefore pray of the Commission the following:

1. That the Commission find this matter admissible;

19
2. A declaratory finding that the Chagossians have a property right to ccTLD .IO under the African
Charter and the right to restitution against the Occupying Power and its agent Afilias/ICB;

3. A finding that the Occupying Power and its agent Afilias/ICB have violated the applicable
articles of the Charter;

4. The legal costs of the Complainants be taxable to the Occupying Power and/or its agents.

5. That the Republic of Mauritius has been noticed and afforded the opportunity to respond to and
support the superseding economic claims of the Chagossians to digital property in BIOT, namely
ccTLD .IO.

6. Such other relief this Commission deems necessary to achieve the relief requested in order to
effect restitution of the property ccTLD .IO and disgorgement of the unjust enrichment obtained
therefrom by the Occupying Authority and its colonial agents.

Respectfully submitted this 6yth day of July, 2020,

Dr. Jonathan Levy

Attorney for Complainants

20
 EXHIBITS RE: CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO
REDACTED

At the Court at Buckingham Palace

THE 10th DAY OF JUNE 2004

PRESENT,

THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY

IN COUNCIL

Her Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of all the powers in Her Majesty vested, is pleased,
by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as
follows:-

Citation and commencement

1. This Order may be cited as the British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order
2004 and shall come into force forthwith.
Interpretation

2. - (1) The Interpretation Act 1978(a) shall apply, with the necessary modifications, for
the purpose of interpreting this Order, and otherwise in relation thereto, as it applies for
the purpose of interpreting, and otherwise in relation to, Acts of Parliament.

(2) In this Order, unless the contrary intention appears

"the Commissioner" means the Commissioner for the Territory and includes any
person for the time being lawfully performing the functions of the office of
Commissioner;

"the Gazette" means the Official Gazette of the Territory;

"the Territory" means the British Indian Ocean Territory specified in the Schedule.

Revocation

3. - (1) The British Indian Ocean Territory Orders 1976 to 1994(b) ("the existing
Orders") are revoked.

(a) 1978 c.30.

(b) S. I. 19761893; 1981 III, p.6524; see also the British Indian Ocean Territory (Amendment) Order
1994 made on 8th February 1994.
 (2) Without prejudice to the generality of sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Interpretation Act 1978 (as applied by section 2(1) of this Order)

(a) the revocation of the existing Orders does not affect the continuing operation
of any law made, or having effect as if made, under the existing Orders and
having effect as part of the law of the Territory immediately before the
commencement of this Order; but any such law shall thereafter, without
prejudice to its amendment or repeal by any authority competent in that
behalf, have effect as if made under this Order and be construed with such
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary
to bring it into conformity with this Order;

(b) the revocation of the existing Orders does not affect the continuing validity of
any appointment made, or having effect as if made, or other thing done, or
having effect as if done, under the existing Orders and having effect
immediately before the commencement of this Order; but any such
appointment made or thing done shall, without prejudice to its revocation or
variation by any authority competent in that behalf, continue to have effect
thereafter as if made or done under this Order.

Establishment of office of Commissioner

4. - (1) There shall be a Commissioner for the Territory who shall be appointed by Her
Majesty by instructions given through a Secretary of State and who shall hold office
during Her Majesty's pleasure.

(2) During any period when the office of Commissioner is vacant or the holder
thereof is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office those functions
shall, during Her Majesty's pleasure, be assumed and performed by such person as Her
Majesty may designate in that behalf by instructions given through a Secretary of State.

Powers and duties of Commissioner

5. The Commissioner shall have such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed on
him by or under this Order or any other law and such other functions as Her Majesty may
from time to time be pleased to assign to him and, subject to the provisions of this Order
and of any other law, shall do and execute all things that belong to his office according to
such instructions, if any, as Her Majesty may from time to time see fit to give him.

Official stamp

6. There shall be an Official Stamp for the Territory which the Commissioner shall keep
and use for stamping all such documents as may be required by any law to be stamped
therewith.

Constitution of offices

7. The Commissioner, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf, may constitute
such offices for the Territory as may lawfully be constituted by Her Majesty and, subject
to the provisions of any law for the time being in force in the Territory and to such
instructions as may from time to time be given to him by Her Majesty through a
Secretary of State, the Commissioner may likewise

(a) make appointments, to be held during Her Majesty's pleasure, to any office
so constituted; and

(b) terminate any such appointment, or dismiss any person so appointed or take
such other disciplinary action in relation to him as the Commissioner may think
fit.

Concurrent appointments

8. Whenever the substantive holder of any office constituted by or under this Order is on
leave of absence pending relinquishment of his office -

(a) another person may be appointed substantively to that office; and

(b) that person shall, for the purposes of any functions attaching to that office, be
deemed to be the sole holder of that office.

No right of abode in the Territory

9. - (1) Whereas the Territory was constituted and is set aside to be available for the
defence purposes of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
United States of America, no person has the right of abode in the Territory.

(2) Accordingly, no person is entitled to enter or be present in the Territory except

as authorised by or under this Order or any other law for the time being in force in the
Territory.

Commissioner's powers to make laws

10. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Commissioner may make laws for
the peace, order and good government of the Territory.
 (2) It is hereby declared, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) but for
the avoidance of doubt, that, in the exercise of his powers under subsection (1), the
Commissioner may make any such provision as he considers expedient for or in
connection with the administration of the Territory, and no such provision shall be
deemed to be invalid except to the extent that it is inconsistent with the status of the
Territory as a British overseas territory or with this Order or with any other Order of Her
Majesty in Council extending to the Territory or otherwise as provided by the Colonial
Laws Validity Act 1865(a).

(3) All laws made by the Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred by
subsection (1) shall be published in the Gazette in such manner as the Commissioner may
direct.

(4) Every law made by the Commissioner under subsection (1) shall come into force
on the date on which it is published in accordance with subsection (3) unless it is
provided, either in that law or in some other such law, that it shall come into operation on
some other date, in which case it shall come into force on that other date.

Disallowance of laws

11. - (1) Any law made by the Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him
by this Order may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State.

(2) Whenever any law has been disallowed by Her Majesty, the Commissioner shall
cause notice of the disallowance to be published in the Gazette in such manner as he may
direct, and the law shall be annulled with effect from the date of that publication.

(3) Section 16(1) of the Interpretation Act 1978 shall apply to the annulment of a
law under this section as it applies to the repeal of an Act of Parliament, save that a law
repealed or amended by or in pursuance of the annulled law shall have effect as from the
date of the annulment as if the annulled law had not been made.

Commissioner's powers of pardon, etc

12. The Commissioner may, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf

(a) grant to any person concerned in or convicted of any offence against the law
of the Territory a pardon, free or subject to lawful conditions; or

(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the
execution of any sentence passed on that person for any such offence; or

(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed by
any such sentence; or
 (d) remit the whole or any part of any such sentence or of any penalty or
forfeiture otherwise due to Her Majesty on account of any such offence.

Courts and judicial proceedings

13. - (1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 3(2), all courts established for the
Territory by or under a law made under the existing Orders and in existence immediately
before the commencement of this Order shall continue in existence thereafter as if
established by or under a law made under this Order.

(2) All proceedings that, immediately before the commencement of this Order, are
pending before any such court may be continued and concluded before that court
thereafter.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of section 3(2), the provisions of any law in
force in the Territory as from the commencement of this Order that relate to the
enforcement of decisions of courts established for the Territory or to appeals from such
decisions shall apply to such decisions given before the commencement of this Order in
the same way as they apply to such decisions given thereafter.

(4) The Supreme Court may, as the Chief Justice may direct, sit in the United
Kingdom and there exercise all or any of its powers or jurisdiction in any civil or
criminal proceedings.

(5) Subject to subsection (6), the Chief Justice may make a direction under
subsection (4) where it appears to him, having regard to all the circumstances of the
case, that to do so would be in the interests of the proper and efficient administration of
justice and would not impose an unfair burden on any party to the proceedings.

(6) A direction under subsection (4) may be made at any stage of the proceedings
or when it is sought to institute the proceedings and may be made on the application of
any party to the proceedings or of any person who seeks to be or whom it is sought to
make such a party or of the Chief Justice's own motion.

(7) Subject to any law made under section 10 (and without prejudice to the
operation of section 3(2)), the Chief Justice may make rules of court for the purpose of
regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court with respect to the exercise
of the Court's powers and jurisdiction in the United Kingdom.

(8) Without prejudice to the operation of section 3(2), a sub-registry may be

established in the United Kingdom for the filing, sealing and issue of such documents
relating to proceedings in the Supreme Court (whether or not they are proceedings in
which the Court exercises its powers and jurisdiction in the United Kingdom) as may be
prescribed by rules of court made by the Chief Justice.

(9) Anything done in the United Kingdom by virtue of subsections (4) to (8) shall
have, and have only, the same validity and effect as if done in the Territory.

(10) In this section, "the Supreme Court" means the Supreme Court of the
Territory as established by or under a law made, or having effect as if made, under
section 10 and "the Chief Justice" means the Judge (or, if there is more than one, the
presiding Judge) of that Court.

Disposal of land

14. Subject to any law for the time being in force in the Territory and to any instructions
given to the Commissioner by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, the
Commissioner, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf, may make and
execute grants and dispositions of any land or other immovable property within the
Territory that may lawfully be granted or disposed of by Her Majesty.

Powers reserved to Her Majesty

15. - (1) There is hereby reserved to Her Majesty full power to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of the Territory, and it is hereby declared, without prejudice
to the generality of that expression but for the avoidance of doubt, that -

(a) any law made by Her Majesty in the exercise of that power may make any
such provision as Her Majesty considers expedient for or in connection with
the administration of the Territory; and

(b) no such provision shall be deemed to be invalid except to the extent that it is
inconsistent with the status of the Territory as a British overseas territory or
otherwise as provided by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power to make laws reserved to Her
Majesty by subsection (1), any such law may make such provision as Her Majesty
considers expedient for the purposes for which the Territory was constituted and is set
aside, and accordingly and in particular, to give effect to section 9(1) and to secure
compliance with section 9(2), including provision for the prohibition and punishment of
unauthorised entry into, or unauthorised presence in, the Territory, for the prevention of
such unauthorised entry and the removal from the Territory of persons whose presence
in the Territory is unauthorised, and for empowering public officers to effect such
prevention or, as the case may be, such removal (including by the use of such force as is
reasonable in the circumstances).

(3) In this section -

(a) "public officer" means a person holding or acting in an office under the
Government or the Territory; and
 (b) for the avoidance of doubt, references in this section to the prevention of
unauthorised entry into the Territory include references to the prevention of
entry into the territorial sea of the Territory with a view to effecting such
unauthorised entry and references to the removal from the Territory of
persons whose presence there is unauthorised include references to the
removal from the territorial sea of the Territory of persons who either have
effected an unauthorised entry into the Territory or have entered the territorial
sea with a view to effecting such an unauthorised entry.

(4) There is hereby reserved to Her Majesty full power to amend or revoke this
Order.

A. K. Galloway

THE SCHEDULE Section 2(2)

Diego Garcia Three Brothers Islands

Egmont or Six Islands Nelson or Legour Island

Peros Banhos Eagle Islands

Salomon Islands Danger islands

EXPLANATORY NOTE

(This note is not part of the Order)

This Order makes new provision for the Constitution and administration of the
British Indian Ocean Territory.
 Bradley Skinner
Information Access Officer
Information Management Services
Jonathan Levy foi@cityoflondon.pnn.police.uk

request-488184-6249b819@whatdotheyknow.com Direct line Direct fax

020 7601 2658 020 7601 2323

Your ref: Our ref:

26 June 2018

Dear Mr Levy,

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REF: COL/18/506

I write in connection with your request for information dated 31 May 2018 in which you seek
access to the following information:

I am requesting information on how many cyber crime reports have been made to
ActionFraud specifically involving websites that end in the ccTLD ".io" for the years
2016, 2017, and 2018.

I do not want or need names of business or individuals only the number of these
crime reports.

Year No. of Reports

2016 56
2017 328
2018 (to 10 June) 193

Should you have any further questions regarding your request, please contact me via e-
mail, letter or telephone, quoting the reference number above.

Yours sincerely

Bradley Skinner

Information Access Officer

Bishopsgate Police Station

182 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 4NP
Tel 020 7601 2287 Textphone 020 7601 2906
www.cityoflondon.police.uk
Reference: FS50778427

Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)

Decision notice

Date: 31 January 2019

Public Authority: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Address: King Charles Street
London
SW1A 2AH

Complainant: Dr Jonathan Levy

Address: jonlevy@hargray.com

Decision (including any steps ordered)

1. The complainant has submitted a request to the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) for correspondence between it and the
Internet Computer Bureau about the internet domain ‘.io’. The FCO
provided the complainant with some information but sought to withhold
additional information on the basis of the exemptions contained at the
following sections of FOIA: sections 40 (personal data), 41 (information
provided in confidence) and 43 (commercial interests). The FCO also
refused to confirm or deny whether it hold any further information
falling within the scope of the request on the basis of section 23(5) of
FOIA. The Commissioner has concluded that the FCO is entitled to rely
on all of these exemptions in the manner in which it has. However, she
has also concluded that the FCO breached section 17(3) by failing to
complete its public interest considerations within a reasonable
timeframe.

Request and response

2. The complainant submitted the following request to the FCO on 15

December 2017:

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Reference: FS50778427

‘I am requesting any and all correspondence with Internet Computer

Bureau (ICB) and or Batelco Sure regarding the BIOT (British Indian
Ocean Territory) .io domain since January 1, 2014.’1

3. The FCO contacted the complainant on 15 December 2017 and

confirmed that it held information falling within the scope of his request
but it considered this to be exempt from disclosure on the basis of
section 43(2) (commercial interests) of FOIA and it needed additional
time to consider the balance of the public interest.

4. The FCO sent the complainant similar public interest extension letters on
the following dates: 14 February 2018, 14 March 2018 and 13 April
2018.

5. The FCO provided him with a substantive response on 11 May 2018. As

part of this response the FCO provided the complainant with some of the
information falling within the scope of his request but explained that
further material had been withheld on the basis of sections 40(2)
(personal data), 41 (information provided in confidence) and 43(2) of
FOIA. The FCO also refused to confirm or deny whether it held any
further information falling within the scope of the request on the basis of
section 23(5) (security bodies) of FOIA.

6. The complainant contacted the FCO on 25 May 2018 and asked it to

conduct an internal review of this response.

7. The FCO informed him of the outcome of the internal review on 18 July
2018. The review upheld the application of the exemptions cited in the
refusal notice.

Scope of the case

8. The complainant contacted the Commissioner on 19 August 2018 in

order to complain about the FCO’s handling of his request. More
specifically, the complainant explained that he disagreed with FCO’s
decision to withhold information falling within the scope of his request.
He was also dissatisfied with the time it took the FCO to initially respond
to his request.

1
ICB is a UK based company which operates several code country top-level domain
registries. This includes maintaining the .io domain which is designation for the British Indian
Ocean Territory (BIOT).

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Reference: FS50778427

Reasons for decision

Section 41 – information provided in confidence

9. The FCO applied section 41(1) of FOIA to the majority of the withheld
information.

10. This section states that:

‘(1) Information is exempt information if—

(a) it was obtained by the public authority from any other

person (including another public authority), and

(b) the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise

than under this Act) by the public authority holding it would
constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any
other person.’

11. Therefore, for this exemption to be engaged two criteria have to be met;
the public authority has to have obtained the information from a third
party and the disclosure of that information has to constitute an
actionable breach of confidence.

12. With regard to whether disclosure would constitute an actionable breach

of confidence the Commissioner follows the test of confidence set out in
Coco v A N Clark (Engineering) Ltd [1968] FSR 415. This judgment
suggested that the following three limbed test should be considered in
order to determine if information was confidential:

• Whether the information had the necessary quality of confidence;

• Whether the information was imparted in circumstances importing an
obligation of confidence; and
• Whether an unauthorised use of the information would result in
detriment to the confider.

13. However, further case law has argued that where the information is of a
personal nature it is not necessary to establish whether the confider will
suffer a detriment as a result of disclosure.

Was the information obtained from a third party?

14. The FCO explained that the information withheld on the basis of section
41(1) was provided to it by Internet Computer Bureau (ICB). Having
examined the information the Commissioner is satisfied that this is an
accurate description of the information and therefore section 41(1)(a) is
met.

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Reference: FS50778427

Does the information have the necessary quality of confidence?

15. The Commissioner considers that information will have the necessary
quality of confidence if it is not otherwise accessible and if it is more
than trivial; information which is of importance to the confider should
not be considered trivial.

16. It is clear from the information withheld on the basis of section 41(1)
that it was clearly of importance to the confider, detailing as it does
aspects of ICB’s business operations and a press story concerning ICB.

Was the information obtained in circumstances importing an obligation of

confidence?

17. The FCO noted that some of the emails from the third party were
marked ‘In Confidence/Confidential’. As part of its consideration of this
FOI request it liaised with the third party in question in order to
ascertain whether it considered only these emails to be have been
provided in confidence or all emails falling within the scope of the
request. The third party was clear all of the information should be
treated as confidential and not be disclosed.

18. In light of this explanation, and given the content of the withheld
information, the Commissioner is satisfied that this criterion is met.

Would disclosure be detrimental to the confider?

19. The FCO argued that it was clear, given the content of the information
which had been withheld, that if it was disclosed then this would be
detrimental to the confider. The Commissioner is satisfied that this is the
case. She cannot elaborate on why she has reached this conclusion in
any detail without revealing the content of the information. However,
she can confirm that disclosure of parts of the information would cause
specific personal detriment to one individual and also that disclosure of
other parts of the information would be detrimental to ICB’s commercial
interests.

20. On this latter point, the complainant argued that ICB is acting as an
agent of the BIOT Administration and is in a quasi-governmental role
rather than a purely commercial one. The complainant suggested that
ICB’s entire business appeared to be serving the country code top-level
domain (ccTLD) .io as well the ccTLD .ac and .sh for the Governor of St
Helena and Dependencies. The complainant therefore suggested that
ICB has no competitors and has served in this role since approximately
1997. Despite this the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure of the
information could be detrimental to ICB’s interests. In reaching this
finding, the Commissioner notes that ICB is part of a wider group of

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Reference: FS50778427

companies which provide a range of internet services. Furthermore,

whilst the Commissioner accepts the complainant’s point that ICB
appears to have sole control of the ccTLD he identified, in her view the
nature of the information withheld would nevertheless be of interest to
competitors who administer other ccTLD domains.

Public interest defence

21. However, although section 41 is an absolute exemption, the law of

confidence contains its own built in public interest test with one defence
to an action being that disclosure is in the public interest.

22. The complainant acknowledged that it was unclear of the exact nature of
the information being withheld. However, he alleged that recently the
ccTLD.io had become the centre of money laundering and crypto
currency criminal activity involving tens of millions of pounds. The
complainant suggested that the digest of information disclosed by the
FCO to date showed the FCO’s actual concern was about ‘bad news
stories’ arising from litigation involving this alleged criminal activity. He
therefore argued that the interest of the FCO and ICB in avoiding public
scrutiny of their relationship and/or potential embarrassment did not
outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the information. He also
argued that there was an additional public interest in these documents
because of the current controversy over the FCO administration of the
BIOT which is now the subject of pending litigation in the International
Court of Justice.2

23. The FCO argued that, given the content of the information, there was a
limited public interest in its disclosure and this did not outweigh the
need to defend an actionable breach of confidence by releasing the
information nor the public interest in ensuring that the detrimental
consequences it had identified did not occur.

24. Unlike the complainant, the Commissioner has obviously had the benefit
of reviewing the withheld information. Having done so, in her view there
is only a very small amount of information which actually relates to the
complainant’s allegations of .io being used for criminal activity.
Moreover, in the Commissioner’s opinion the degree to which disclosure
of this particular information would add to the public’s understanding of
this issue is very limited. The Commissioner acknowledges that
disclosure of other parts of the withheld information would provide the
public with a greater understanding of the FCO and ICB’s relationship
and also some insight into press coverage of ICB. However, the

2
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169

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Reference: FS50778427

Commissioner agrees with the FCO that there is a clear public interest in
ensuring that the detriment identified both to the individual in question
and the ICB’s interests does not occur. On balance the Commissioner
has therefore that concluded that the public interest in disclosing the
information does not outweigh the public interest in maintaining the
confidence.

Section 43(2) – commercial interests

25. Section 43(2) states that:

‘Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act

would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any
person (including the public authority holding it).’

26. In order for a prejudice based exemption, such as section 43(2), to be

engaged the Commissioner considers that three criteria must be met:

• Firstly, the actual harm which the public authority alleges would, or
would be likely, to occur if the withheld information was disclosed has
to relate to the applicable interests within the relevant exemption;

• Secondly, the public authority must be able to demonstrate that some

causal relationship exists between the potential disclosure of the
information being withheld and the prejudice which the exemption is
designed to protect. Furthermore, the resultant prejudice which is
alleged must be real, actual or of substance; and

• Thirdly, it is necessary to establish whether the level of likelihood of

prejudice being relied upon by the public authority is met – ie,
disclosure ‘would be likely’ to result in prejudice or disclosure ‘would’
result in prejudice. In relation to the lower threshold the Commissioner
considers that the chance of prejudice occurring must be more than a
hypothetical possibility; rather there must be a real and significant risk.
With regard to the higher threshold, in the Commissioner’s view this
places a stronger evidential burden on the public authority to
discharge.

27. The FCO argued that disclosure of the particular information withheld on
the basis of this exemption would be likely to prejudice the commercial
interests of ICB as it could be used by its competitors.

28. Having considered the information in question, the Commissioner is

satisfied that the three criteria above are met. The prejudice described
by the FCO clearly relates to the interests which the exemption
contained at section 43(2) is designed to protect. With regard to the
second criterion, the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure of the
information withheld on the basis of section 43(2) has the potential to
harm the commercial interests of ICB. With regard to the third criterion,

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Reference: FS50778427

the Commissioner is satisfied that there is clearly a more than a

hypothetical risk of prejudice occurring to ICB if the information
disclosed. In reaching this conclusion the Commissioner notes that the
withheld information relates directly to ICB activities and in her view it is
plausible to argue that this information would be of interest, and indeed
of use, to other companies which provide ccTLD services.

29. Section 43(2) is therefore engaged.

Public interest test

30. Section 43 is a qualified exemption and therefore the Commissioner

must consider the public interest test and whether in all the
circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the
exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

31. The complainant’s public interest arguments for disclosure of the

withheld information are set out above.

32. The FCO argued that there was a public interest in protecting the
commercial interests of third parties. It also argued that the BIOT
Administration needed to converge with business people and commercial
organisations without fear of disclosure of sensitive information which
could undermine its ability to engage with the private sector in the
future.

33. As with the information withheld under section 41, disclosure of the
information withheld on the basis of section 43(2) would not provide any
real insight into the complainant’s allegations of .io being used for
criminal activity. That said, the Commissioner acknowledges that there
is a public interest in the FCO being open and transparent about its
relations with commercial organisations. Disclosure of the information
withheld on the basis of section 43(2) would provide the public with
some insight into how ICB administers the domain .io and as well its
relationship with the FCO. The public interest in this information should
not therefore be dismissed. However, in the Commissioner’s opinion
there is very strong and inherent public interest in ensuring fairness of
competition and in her view it would be firmly against the public interest
if a company’s commercial interests are harmed simply because they
have a relationship with a government department. Furthermore, the
Commissioner accepts that it is in the public interest for the BIOT
Administration to be able to receive such commercially sensitive
information from companies such as ICB. Taking the weight of these
interests into account, the Commissioner has concluded that the public
interest favours maintaining the exemption and withholding the
information.

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Reference: FS50778427

Section 40 – personal data

34. The FCO has withheld the names and contact details of junior staff and
the same information about third parties on the basis of section 40(2) of
FOIA.3 This section states that personal data is exempt from disclosure
under FOIA if it is not exempt on the basis of section 40(1) of FOIA (ie if
it is the requester’s own personal data) and its disclosure would breach
any of the data protection principles contained within the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA).

35. Personal data is defined in section (1)(a) of the DPA as:

‘………data which relate to a living individual who can be identified from

those data or from those data and other information which is in the
possession of, or likely to come into the possession of, the data
controller; and includes any expression of opinion about the individual
and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any person
in respect of the individual.’

36. The Commissioner is satisfied that the information which the FCO is
seeking to withhold on the basis of section 40(2) constitutes personal
data and therefore is potentially exempt from disclosure on the basis of
section 40(2) of FOIA.

37. The FCO argued that disclosure of this personal data would breach the
first data protection principle. This states that:

‘Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular,

shall not be processed unless –

(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and

(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the

conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.’

38. The relevant Schedule 2 condition in this case is the sixth one which
states that:

‘The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests

pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom
the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in

3
On 25 May 2018 the General Data Protection Regulation and Data Protection Act 2018
came into force. However, in line with the provisions contained within the Data Protection
Act 2018 under FOIA for any request where a public authority has responded before 25 May
2018 the DPA 1998 applies.

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Reference: FS50778427

any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms

or legitimate interests of the data subject.’

39. In deciding whether disclosure of personal data would be unfair, and

thus breach the first data protection principle, the Commissioner takes
into account a range of factors including:

• The reasonable expectations of the individual in terms of what would

happen to their personal data. Such expectations could be shaped by:

o what the public authority may have told them about what would
happen to their personal data;

o their general expectations of privacy, including the effect of

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);

o the nature or content of the information itself;

o the circumstances in which the personal data was obtained;

o any particular circumstances of the case, eg established custom

or practice within the public authority; and

o whether the individual consented to their personal data being

disclosed or conversely whether they explicitly refused.

• The consequences of disclosing the information, ie what

damage or distress would the individual suffer if the
information was disclosed? In consideration of this factor the
Commissioner may take into account:

o whether information of the nature requested is already

in the public domain;

o if so the source of such a disclosure; and even if the

information has previously been in the public domain
does the passage of time mean that disclosure now
could still cause damage or distress?

40. Furthermore, notwithstanding the data subject’s reasonable

expectations or any damage or distress caused to them by disclosure, it
may still be fair to disclose the requested information if it can be argued
that there is a more compelling legitimate interest in disclosure to the
public.

41. In considering ‘legitimate interests’, in order to establish if there is a

compelling reason for disclosure, such interests can include broad
general principles of accountability and transparency for their own sake,
as well as case specific interests. In balancing these legitimate interests

9
Reference: FS50778427

with the rights of the data subject, it is also important to consider a

proportionate approach.

42. In relation to the names of the various officials contained in the withheld
information the Commissioner accepts that it is established custom and
practice for the FCO, and other public authorities, to redact the names
and contact details of junior staff and non-front line staff from any
disclosures under FOIA. In light of this, she accepts that disclosure of
such information would be against the reasonable expectations of these
individuals. Furthermore, the Commissioner is not persuaded that there
is a particularly strong or compelling legitimate interest in the disclosure
of these names. Disclosure of this category of information would
therefore breach the first data protection principle and such information
is therefore exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 40(2) of
FOIA. Similarly, the Commissioner accepts that individuals in private
sector companies would not expect their names or contact details to be
disclosed in response to an FOI request. The Commissioner notes that in
the circumstances of this case the FCO informed such individuals that
their names and contact details would not be disclosed and in light of
this, and given that there is not a compelling interest in the disclosure of
this information, the Commissioner also accepts that it is exempt from
disclosure on the basis of section 40(2) of FOIA.

Section 23(5) – security bodies

43. The FCO also sought to refuse to confirm or deny whether it held any
further information on the basis of section 23(5) of FOIA, beyond that
disclosed to the complainant or withheld on the basis of the exemptions.

44. Section 23(1) of FOIA states that:

‘Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was

directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to,
any of the bodies specified in sub-section (3).’

45. Section 23(5) of FOIA states that:

‘The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that,
compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any
information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or
indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the
bodies specified in subsection (3).’

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Reference: FS50778427

46. The full list of bodies specified in section 23(3) can be viewed online.4

47. In the Commissioner’s opinion the exemption contained at section 23(5)

should be interpreted so that it is only necessary for a public authority
to show that either a confirmation or denial of whether requested
information is held would involve the disclosure of information relating
to a security body. It is not necessary for a public authority to
demonstrate that both responses would disclose such information.
Furthermore, the Commissioner considers that the phrase ‘relates to’
should be interpreted broadly. Such an interpretation has been accepted
by the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) in a number of different
decisions.5

48. Consequently, whether or not a security body is interested or involved in

a particular issue is in itself information relating to a security body.
Therefore, in the Commissioner’s opinion section 23(5) could be used by
a public authority to avoid issuing a response to a request which
revealed either that a security body was involved in an issue or that it
was not involved in an issue.

49. The test of whether a disclosure would relate to a security body is

decided on the normal civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of
probabilities. In other words, if it is more likely than not that the
disclosure would relate to a security body then the exemption would be
engaged.

50. From the above it can be seen that section 23(5) has a very wide
application. If the information requested is within what could be
described as the ambit of security bodies’ operations, section 23(5) is
likely to apply. Factors indicating whether a request is of this nature will
include the functions of the public authority receiving the request, the
subject area to which the request relates and the actual wording of the
request.

51. The Commissioner is satisfied that on the balance of probabilities,

confirming whether or not the FCO holds further information falling
within the scope of this request would reveal something about the
security bodies. The Commissioner is not able to elaborate on her basis
for this finding without potentially revealing information which itself
could be exempt from disclosure.

4
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/23

5
See Dowling v Information Commissioner and The Police Service for Northern Ireland,
EA/2011/0118, paras 17 to 22.

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Reference: FS50778427

Section 10 and section 17

52. Section 10(1) of FOIA requires public authorities to respond to a request

promptly and in any event within 20 working days of receipt.

53. Section 17(1) of FOIA explains that if a public authority intends to refuse
to comply with a request it must provide the requestor with a refusal
notice stating that fact within the time for compliance required by
section 10(1). Section 17(3) allows a public authority to extend its
consideration of the public interest for a reasonable period of time if
necessary. The Commissioner considers that this should normally be no
more than an extra 20 working days, which is 40 working days in total
to deal with the request. Any extension beyond this time should be
exceptional and the public authority must be able to justify it.

54. In this case the complainant submitted his request on 16 December

2017 but the FCO did not inform him of the outcome of its public
interest considerations until 11 May 2018, 100 working days later.

55. The FCO acknowledged that this response took longer than the
Commissioner’s guidance recommended and that it had apologised to
the complainant about this delay. It also emphasised that it recognised
the importance of dealing with FOI requests on time but this had to be
balanced with the needs of other conflicting priorities. The Commissioner
is not unsympathetic to the competing needs which public authorities
face, however, even taking these into account she considers that the
FCO should have completed its public interest considerations in a shorter
period of time. It follows that the Commissioner has concluded that the
FCO breached section 17(3) of FOIA.

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Reference: FS50778427

Right of appeal

56. Either party has the right to appeal against this decision notice to the
First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals
process may be obtained from:

First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)

GRC & GRP Tribunals,
PO Box 9300,
LEICESTER,
LE1 8DJ

Tel: 0300 1234504

Fax: 0870 739 5836
Email: GRC@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk
Website: www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-
chamber

57. If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain
information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the
Information Tribunal website.

58. Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28

(calendar) days of the date on which this decision notice is sent.

Signed

Jonathan Slee
Senior Case Officer
Information Commissioner’s Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

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