ISSN 0019-5014

INDIAN
JOURNAL
OF
AGRICULTURAL
NDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
 ECONOMICS

INDIAN SOCIETY OF
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS,
BOMBAY
Ind. Jn. pi. Ecm. Vol.45.No.3,J
y. pt. 1990

Social Dynamics and Farmers' Society:

A Case Study of Pani Panchayat
RS. Deshpande and V. Ratna Reddy*
The infamous failure of the down' philosophy, over-bureaucratisation of tiE 'target
group' approæh and the semi-IErmiabi1ity of the social sUuture have all together brought
in focus the need for community participation. l Resource stnrture being the key line of
tkE village economic set-up, any such participation would always involve the key
resources of the rural econorny. Tie investment with an onslaught of natural calamity or
with certain type of 'community ripples' caused by exua-economic fætors. The policy
reaction to natural calamities always been ad hoc in nature, usually tkE relief works
designed not so much to meet problem but to compensate for the losses. These relief
works can not sustain in long run as they fail to create any productive assets in strict
'Nurksian' sense and not arrest the perpetuation of the problems. The community
participation cannot be forced from the top (with the Government intervention) and was
not evident even in the target group community progammes.
 NDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Alternatively, the voluntary organisations which are notgermane to the soil have
sporadic evidence to boost up a success and mostly failures are never made public.
Moreover, these experiments have certain fringe objectives dominating the bækyound of
the experiment. There are only a few organisational success stories in the rural areas
which can be modelled as a guideline to set a pace for group behaviour. We have
analysed elsewhere a comparative experience of three such experiments, but in present
paper we are attempting to put forth a model experiment of a farmers' organisation to
sketch a model of social dynamics and critically examine the operational aspects. For the
purpose of our analysis we have selected the 'Pani Panchayat' (water council) experiment
in the Purandar taluka of Pune district in Marnrashtra The experience of Pani Panchayat
gives enough of clues to model a group dynamics woven around resource sharing. The
paper is divided into four sections. The following section deals with the descriptive
analysis of the starting of Pani Panchayat experiment. This is followed by two sections
analysing the emergence and economic and social impact ofPani PanchayaL lhe last
section brings together the theoretical issues raised in the earlier two sections and
analyses the sustenance of the experiment.
'11--1E BEGNNNG

Maharashtra fEed one of the worst droughts of the recent past during 1972-73.
Purandar taluka of Pune was not an exception but had to suffer both for water and food.
Even farmers owning 10 hectares of land had to join the relief work camps and many
people migrated to bigger cities in search of the jobs. This was a pathetic sight and quite
a few philanthropists were moved by the impæt of calamity. An young engineer s serving
on some commiuee of the Govemment noted vividly tmt the solutions provided were
purely temporary and are not going to ameliorate tlE conditions of the rural poor but
serve purely on a patch work. He realised that the most important contributing resources
of rural India are not being used optimally and only an opümal use of the resources
would be key to success of meeting droughts. This could neither be taught nor
implemented through the usual bureaucratic framework.

• Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune.

3%

A uust (voluntary organisation) was established with the donations from different
individuals and agencies, namely, Gram Gaurav Pratishthan (GGP). ne u•ust did not Gy
to establish any farmer's co-operative or goup immediately but tlE philosophy was to
make people come together on their own to find solutions to their problems. Instead, a
patch of 16 hectares of almost degra&d temple land was leased in by GGP which was on
the hill slopes of Naygaon in Purandar taluka. The land serves as a natural watershed.
nere is a natural basin in down reaches of a capæity of one million cft., which was
repaired and it serves as a percolation tank. An amount of Rs. 1.25 lakhs was spent in
reinfcrcing and repairing the tank. An open well was dug at the down stream base of the
percolation tank with 13 diameter and about 17 of depth. A diesel pumpset of 7.5 HP was
installed initially which was replæed by an electric pump afterwards. The capital cost was
Rs. 3,181 per acre including the pipeline and field channels. The water and soil
conservation experiments (at the lowercapital cost) provided irrigation for eight months.
As a consequence of water conservation measures, water at higher elevation (through
irrigation or rainfall) would percolate down stream and enhance water table. This resulted
in 9.60 hectares of irrigated area and 2.40 hectares under tree crops (local forest species).
ne cropping pattern changed from the bajra, jowar, pulses combinatim to bajra, jowar,
cotton, groundnut, onion and grapes. The yield rates improved substantially and the net
retums were three times that of the bench mark.'
OF PAM PANCHAYAT

Culturally, enforcing a new method of work or technology does not get ready
æceptance in rural India. This is both because of the risk aversion and the scepticism
about the expected incremental retums. Tie barrier takes its own time to break and this
was demonstrated during tlE first phase of the Green Revolution. But the rural area has a
high sensitivity towards demonsu•ation effect especially when the new technology is
used by a fellow cultivator. ne farmers of Naygaon and surrounding areas realised that
there is a hope in rainfed agriculmre with a marginal supponive irrigation. fie in situ
moisture conservation can be improved by impounding water down the stream and water
conservation in the up stream ne experiment brought farmers together voluntarily and the
discussions resulted in the formation of the first Pani Panchayat. 5 Shri Salunke had taken
care not to allow the initial enthusiasm to reach very high. Instead, he preferred long run
viability to short run mushrooming of tr•æ provammes. The first Pani Panchayat (water
council) was formed keeping in view following five principles.
1. Only group schemes of minor irrigation would be taken up. This involves a group
(community) and the community involvement is essential for any developmental
process (Deshpan& and Reddy, 1990).
2. Each member of family would be entitled to get half an Ere of irrigation with an
upper ceiling of acres for a household. ms led to the nullification of the inequity
usually introdured along with the augmentation of the resource base. In other
words, this æts as a reversal of the refractory effect of irrigation on equity.
3. The water right.s are not attæhed to the land. If a member sells his/her land the
water rights are not transferred to the new owner. 'This would arrest the uansfer
of lands from the poor farmers to richer ones due to the economic compulsion.
The value of land would become a fluid concept.
 CASE OF SUCCESSFUL 357
FARbms, socm•ms

4. The total cost of scheme would be spread between the beneficiaries, GGP and
subsidy from State Government or bank loan in the ratio of 2:4:4. The
beneficiaries would be fully responsible to administer and operate tkE scheme. ms
would ensure the involvement of tlE community both because of t.tEir personal
investment and direct on the scheme.
5. Taking into consideration the paucity of water, crops like sugarcane, banarn
should not be taken on tlE benefited plot. This would enhance die spread of water
and increase labour intensity in the region, providing more employment.
6. The water rights (of half an acre per capita) are also given to the landless
agriculmral labourers, who are working with the members in the scheme. These
water rights would be transferred along with the labourer - to the cultivator -
where the labourer chooses to work, which extends the apportionment of benefits
to non-landowners. 'Ihese pinciples emerged out of the discussions with the
farmers and hence it is an ingeminated framework. A long run sustainability of
this framework is assured because the group stays the same. -men the question
arises about the impæt of the scheme on rural households. Pani Parwhayat
office has brought out a small bulletin apart from the periodic Pani Panchayat.
Both the publications give a lot of information about the experiment. Apart from
this, we supplemented informaüon gathered during our visits to Naygaon and
other regions.
n*TACT OF THE
Usually the impEt analysis in the field of empirical research deals with thw
quantitative increments in the dominant variables. These changes do not explicitly deal
with qualitative veerings of the life and culture. 'Ihe Pani Panchayat experiment has
created an in-depth community awareness, strong interdependence, collective decision-
making, resource literacy and above all an incremental income for better living
conditions. It is essential to consider the basic features of tkE schemes before we get into
the quantitative impæt. The qualification of the direct imput does not necessarily indicate
the change in the quality of life and other pammeters indicated above though it shows the
direction of such change. Hence it becomes necessary to draw insights from observations
made during field visits. Following are the broad features of Pani Panchayat experiment
1. Most of the schemes are small with less than 40 members. The average number of
beneficiaries per scheme works out to be only 30. Of the total 61 schemes, 31 belong to
the dominant community and t}Ere are three schemes specifically for the bækward
classes.7 The distribution of schemes by number of members is given in Table I. mne less
number of beneficiaries makes the operaüon of the scheme more efficient.
TABLE L NUMBER OF SCHEMES BY SIZE CLASSES OF
NUMBER OF

IAS than 10
2
11 t020 17
21 to 30 16 31 t040 15 Abwe 40 9
 NDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

Total 59

*Data pataining to two schemes were not availaHe.

358

2. The schemes are also capital efficient. Out of d'E 61 schemes, 36 have received
subsidy from Government of and the remaining 25 did not receive any subsidy. It is
interesting to compare two goups in order to locate the differenüal behaviour in the
presence of subsidy (Table Il.)
TABLE n. COMPARISON OF TWO GROUPS OF SCHEMES

Sr. No. Item %emes with subsidy %emes without sut> sidy (1) (2) (3) (4)

l. N ber of schemes 36 25
2. Number manbers 843
3. Area irrigated (ha)
(1) Designed 723.21 755.93
Acmal (ran 377.20*

4. Cost per acre beneficiary**(Rs.) 3,192 4,189

5. Cost per 2,924
6. Rates of (Beneficiary: 16:41 luntary labour. GGP Inan)

* Acmal area irrigated is low because some of une schemes were not prwided electricity conneäion by State
Board and hence they have not been operationalised. ** Cost is inclusive of subsidy from govemment.

It can be observed that both the groups show almost similar experience. The cost of
irrigation for an Ere works out to be less than Rs. 3,000 in both the groups. 'The
repayment of loans of GGP is also (Kolhe et al., 1986), unlike many other
bank financed schemes.
3. Apart from being cost effective, the schemes are managed in a better manner.
This is achieved by the overall administrative directions from GGP. Keeping in view the
experience of co-operaüve movements, it was decided not to allow the concentration of
power in the hands of wealthier and socially dominant individuals. This has led to tlE
stonage of the infamous 'refraction effect' of irrigation on equity. The Panch Committee
of each scheme would consist ofa GatPrantukh (group leader) and five members carefully
chosen. A Patkari (water dismutor) appointed by GGP would look after the of
water. A few operational rules are framed to ensure smooth working.8
4. If more than half of the members of the scheme bring in some modifications,
these would be effected with the help of GGP. Moreover, all the technical guidance is
derived from GGP. Every beneficiary has a freedom to discontinue the membership by
returning the water rights and dues.
The impæt of Pani Panchayat can not be synonymous with the impæt of an irrigation
scheme. As mentioned earlier, GGP experiment moderates the scenario of social
dynamics favouring a developmental process. It brings in a favourable change in
community participation so as to forge the developmental activities. Herre its impæt on
 CASE OF SUCCESSFUL 359
the economic charæteristics can only be taken as indicators of direction of a process
of social change. We analyse impæt of the scheme on the feamres of the agricultural
sector. We present a summary picture of the changes based on our in-depth and
tkE publicaüons brought out by GGP.
FARMERS, SOCIETIß

TABLE m. FARM LEVEL CHANGES DUE TO GROUP RRIGATION SCHEMES

Sr. Impact variable No. Before ute schanes Afær the
(2)
(3) (4)
l. pattem Mostly food crops like Maiæ, HW bajra, HW
jowar, bajra, maize, etc. jowar, wheat, onion,
grounålut, coam,
2. Crop intensity vegetablest grape wine.
Much below 100 per cent etc. Ranges fran 108 per
3. Yield rate per acre can to 283 per cent
Below 50 kg. of Betwen 2 to 3 quintals of
4. Net returns per acre foodgrains
Ran es from R'. 100 to
5. Employment Mostly used to wodc on Rs. (All together)
public relief works, (hünigration IS nopped.
migrate to citiesfrrigated Gi-farm work is
areas as fann suffiäatt for a funny.
6. Average money wage rates Rs.3/- to Rs.5/-
Rs.10/- to Rs.20/-

Ranges are give) to üldicüe variadons from scheme to scheme and drought year to nmnal year.

It can be observed that tkE on-farm changes are quite substantial and have increased
both income and employment The new technology of crop husbandry has no barriers for
üption. Cropping pattern and crop intensity have changed favourably avoiding usual
buklash effects of irrigation. High water consuming crops, resaarce illiteracy,
overexploitation of rescnrces, the inequitous distribution process and other ocial costs
which usually accompany any irigation development are conspicuous by their absence.
Other than this, the impæt can be gouped into two groups, viz., (i) the process of
community involvement and (ii) the reducdon of social and environmental costs. Tie first
grotp of variables show a positive impæt on community participation, group decision-
making process, communal harmony æross caste and class groups, awareness of rights
and dudes which led to solving of quite a few community problems. ms incidentally
increased the econMnic and political bargaining power. 'Ihe reduction of social and
environmental cost was quite evident in stoning of out-migration the disintegration of the
family; better infrasu•uctural facilities like health, educüon, etc.; improving the living
conditions in village and that of the livestock; awareness of ecological balances resulting
in better soil and moisture conservation prætices.
MODEL OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR AND rrs SUSTENANCE
Any study of a model of group behaviour involves the analyses of the linkages
between social groups - socio-economic variables - environmental impæts and the
inherent development process. Such modelling is difficult due to ttE non-quantifiability
and domilnnce of behavioural vEiables. But an analysis of the success of an experiment
can set the tone formodelling on similarpattem. We analyse below the reasons ofsuccess
ofPani Panchayat
 NDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

1. Horøgeneity
Most of the of Pani Parchayat schemes are homogenemns in regard to üEir condidors.
also, most of these schemes are læated in die erne region (Purandar taluk). The condiüons
of fanners were to each
360

other before joining the schemes. In fæt, üEir earlier plight is one of the reasons for
the success of schemes because it culminated as tlEir struggle for better existence and
quality of life which they can not risk.

2. Cost Efficiency
The low cost of lift irrigation (below Rs. 3,000) is one of the plus points as a number
of farmers can share (as üEir share is below Rs. 600) the benefits and more villages can
be covered. It fwilitated the small and marginal who are the dominant group, to
avail of the benefits and render tiEir support later.

3. Water Rights
Tie most important and interesting feamre of Pani Panchayat lies in the principles of
water rights given to the individuals on per capita basis (0.50 acre per head with a
maximum of 2.5 acres per farnily). This counteracted the 'refraction effect' which is root
cause for the failure of the co-operative system in India. The extension of this principle
even to the landless, which is alien to similar societies, helps in making them socially
responsible for the success of the schemes.

4. Convnitment
ne mandatcry share of 20 per cent collected from the farmers keeps them
economically tied to the scheme. Unless the scheme is successful ttEY would not be able
to reap the benefits. Further, every beneficiary feels that the scheme belongs to him too.
This makes the maintenance of the scheme easy and every member keeps a check on
others for misutiliation.

5. Equal Distribution
'Refrætion effects' of irrigation are avoided through the allotment of water to
members on equity basis. It is done on the basis of area and the allotted share of
beneficiaries, of crops grown. Tie quantity of water to be shared is decided on the
basis of general assessment of the availability of water in the wells in the preceding one
to two weeks. Accordingly, every member gets irrigation on a given day at a given hour
every week which changes to day and night alternately. Moreover, the water disuibution
starts from the tail end, i.e., the last plot gets the irrigation first
In the light of the reasons ofsuccess, it is common place to ask questions about
sustenance and replicability of experiment Replicability is a strong function of trE social
dynamics and a host of fætors operate in the society changing the behavioural pattems
both across a cross-secüon and over drne. Furthermore, a State level acceptance of such
 CASE OF SUCCESSFUL 361
experiment helps in multiplication of the schemes but not necessarily replication of the
schemes. Over time and space the philosophy behind the scheme un&rgoes mutation and
such changes if favourable enhance the social desirability of the scheme. However, the
basic reasons of success can serve as guidelines for the replication of the scheme but it is
essential that each of the progammes emanates out of the strong desire of community
participaüon for better living. ne sustenance argument involves the relative ocial
dominance of private vis-a-vis societal gains and hence it has the same number of pros
and cons as that of an ecological
STUDIES FARMERS, SOCIETIES

programme. The only advantage ofthis experiment would be the involvement ofan
important resource like water. Hence a cautious replicability is possible in the areas with
scarce resources.
NOTES
1. The Draft Eighth plan envisages a frontal strategy of decentralised planning with maxinunn
canmunity involvement.
2. For deails, see Deshpande and Reddy (1990).
3. Shri Vilasrao Salunke, chief promoter of Gram Gaurav Pratishthm (GGP), ure institutim båind the
Puli Panchayat movement in Purandar.
4. We have visited Naygaon and other Pmi Panchayat villages four to five tinrs and collected the
inforrnation frun the farrners.
5. A gru:p of fanners was brought together to share water from same souße of irrigation. Ihe cost
distribution is decided on community basis.
6. Qzr thanks are due to Shri V.B. Salunke, Shri Nana other enthusiastic farmers of the region.
7. For daails, see Kolhe et al.
8. (i) No new well should be dug in the canmand area of the scheme.
(ii) B&ieficiaries are joindy responsible for the maintenance of the machinery and field channels. 1%is
would be cwered by Pani Patti (water charges).
(iii) All beneficiaries should give a written cmsent to open a joint account of GGP and Gat Pram.uh.
(iv) All the beneficiaries should pay the Pani Patti (water charges) regularly. In case of default, water will
be stopped in the next season.
(v) should strialy adhere to the directions of the Panch Convnütee and its rules. The dispues would be by
Panch Comittee and GGP representatives joindy.

REFERENCES
Deshpan&, R.S. and V. Rama Reddy (1990). of National Watershed Programme:
Research Repotti Gokhale Insütute of Politics and Ecorxxnics, Pme.
Kolhe, A.K.; NR. Paranjapye. A.K. Gupte and M.D. Sathe (1986). Puli Panchayat: An Overview, Devdopment
Group, Ptme.