ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS

(Notes and Reviewer)

I. Concept of Administrative Law

1. Administrative Law – a branch of public law which deals with the administration of various
government agencies, entities, and instrumentalities; regulates the activities of such administrative
bodies; and, indicates to the individual, remedies for the violation of his rights.
As stated above, it belongs to the field of public law which includes constitutional law, criminal law,
and international law. For comparison, public law regulates the relations of the state with its subjects
while private law regulates the relations of individuals with one another, without regard to their relation
to their government.
2. Scope
Administrative law embraces not only the law that governs administrative authorities, i.e., Constitution,
statutes, and judicial decisions that construe and apply them as well as appropriate principles of justice
and equity in particular cases, but also the law made by administrative authorities, i.e., rules,
regulations, orders, and decisions, whether of general or particular applicability.
3. Concerns:
a) Protection of private rights
b) The exercise of delegated powers by the public or administrative officers and agencies.
4. Administrative Authority – an administrative power being exercised by the public officers and organs
of the government in the performance of their functions relative to the amplification, application, and
execution of the law, excluding Congress and regular courts by virtue of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
5. Distinguished from Other Laws
Other Laws Administrative Law
A. International Law
1) It is not binding upon the officers of any 1) It lays down the rules which shall guide the
government, unless it has been adopted into officers of the administration in their actions as
its administrative law. agents of the government.
B. Constitutional Law
1) It prescribes the general plan or framework of 1) It gives and carries out such plan in its minutest
governmental organization; details;
2) It treats of the rights of the individual, and 2) It treats such rights from the standpoint of the
lays stress upon rights; powers of the government, and emphasizes the
powers of government and duties of the citizens;
3) It prescribes limitations on the powers of the 3) It indicates to individuals, remedies for the
government to protect the rights of individuals violation of their rights.
against abuse in their exercise.
C. Criminal law
1) It consists of a body of penal sanctions which 1) It is a rule of administrative law protected or
are applied to all branches of the law, enforced by a penal sanction as the most
including administrative law. common and efficient means of enforcing it,
and the mere affixing of a penalty for the
violation thereof does not deprive such rule of
its administrative character.
6. Principal Subdivisions:
a) The law of internal administration – it treats of the legal relations between the government and its
administrative officers, and of the legal relations that of one administrative officer or organ bears to
another.
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 b) The law of external administration – it is concerned with the legal relations between administrative
authorities and private interests.
7. Classification of Admin Law
1) As to its source:
a. The law that controls administrative authorities
b. The law made by administrative agencies
2) As to its purpose:
a. Adjective or procedural administrative law
b. Substantive administrative law
3) As to its applicability:
a. General administrative law
b. Special or particular administrative law
8. Scope of Administrative Process
The process includes the whole of the series of acts of an administrative agency whereby the legislative
delegation of a function is made effectual in particular situations. It embraces matters concerning the
procedure in the disposition of both routine and contested matters.
9. Relation between Administrative Agencies and Courts
Both the administrative and judicial processes are deemed to be collaborative instrumentalities of
justice. Collaboration of judicial power and function with the administrative process is a necessary part
of the legal system, and the independence of each should be respected by the other. The relation
between courts and administrative agencies is not that between upper and lower courts nor is it the
function of the courts to act as a super commission.
10. Administration of Government Distinguished from that of Justice
Administration of Government Administration of Justice
1. Those charged therewith are known as 1. As to this are known as judicial officers.
administrative officers.
2. Their work is not necessarily the result of any 2. Their work consists in the decision of
controversy and is not merely dependent on controversies between individuals and
the solution of the question “what is the law” government officers, as to the applicability in
but made also as a result of consideration of the cases in question of a particular rule of law.
expediency.
3. In such kind of work, the administrative 3. As to this case, all that the judicial officers
officers must ascertain the applicable law in have to do is to determine what law is
order to determine whether they are applicable to the facts brought before them.
competent to act, and if so, they must decide
whether it is wise for them to act.
11. Administration as a Separate Power
Administration may be viewed in two (2) senses, to wit:
1) As a function – it is the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or will of the State as
expressed by the competent authority.
2) As an organization – the term “the administration” means popularly the most important
administrative authorities. It is that group or aggregate of persons in whose hands the reigns of the
government are entrusted by the people for the time being.
Note: In short, administration, is both the function of execution of the law (or management of
government affairs) and the totality of the executive and administrative authorities.

12. Administration as an Organization Distinguished from Government

Administration as an Organization Government
The term administration refers to the The term government refers to that “institution or aggregate of

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 aggregate of those persons in whose
hands the reigns of government are
entrusted by the people for the time
being.
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries
out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to
live in a civilized state, or which are imposed upon the people
forming that society by those who possess the power or
authority of prescribing them. It is the aggregate of authorities
which rule a society.”

II. Nature and Organization of Administrative Agencies (Bodies)

1. How these Agencies or Bodies Created:
1) by constitutional provision;
2) by legislative enactment; and
3) by authority of law through the delegated power of the Executive.
2. Reorganization and Abolition
These activities are made through legislative enactment. The Congress, however, may authorize the
President to reorganize, create, abolish, or merge offices in the executive department.
3. Administrative Body or Agency - A body, other than the courts and the legislature, endowed with
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it
for enforcement or execution.
 An agency exercising some significant combination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. It
is a government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation.
 Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the term agency of the Government refers to any of the
various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a district unit therein. It may
be “local or national agency.”
 It also covers boards, commissions, divisions, and “administrative tribunals.”
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES:
1. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power;
2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power; and
3. Determinative powers.
A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER
An exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what law shall be, but merely
authority to fix details in execution or enforcement of a policy set out in law itself.
Legislative power - power to make, alter, and repeal laws.
Doctrine of Separation of Powers - a constitutional law doctrine whereby the three branches of the
government are kept separate to prevent abuse of power through the system of checks and balances
wherein each branch is given certain powers so as to check and balance the other branches.
Non-delegation of legislative power
Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other
body or authority.
Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power
a. Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (tariff rates), Art. IV, Constitution)
b. Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Government Code)
c. Delegation to the people
d. Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution)
e. Delegation to Administrative Agencies.

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 Kinds of administrative legislation:
1. Legislative regulation
a. Supplementary or detailed legislation, e.g. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code;
b. Contingent regulation
2. Interpretative legislation, e.g. BIR Circulars
Requisites for valid exercise:
1. Issued under authority of law;
2. Within the scope and purview of the law;
3. Promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure:
a. notice and hearing – generally, not required; only when:
i. the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on
certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation;
ii. the regulation is a settlement of a controversy between specific parties; considered as an
administrative adjudication (Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, p.42 - 43); or
iii. the administrative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation designed to implement
a law by providing its details (CIR v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236).
b. publication
4. Reasonable
Requisites for Validity of Administrative Rules with Penal Sanctions:
1. law itself must declare as punishable the violation of administrative rule or regulation;
2. law should define or fix penalty therefor; and
3. rule/regulation must be published.

 Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation –power of administrative agency to promulgate rules and

regulations on matters of their own specialization.

 Doctrine of Legislative Approval by Re-enactment - the rules and regulations promulgated by the
proper administrative agency implementing the law are deemed confirmed and approved by the
Legislature when said law was re-enacted by later legislation or through codification. The
Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of the contents of the regulations then at the time of
re-enactment.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS QUASI-

JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

1. consists of issuance of rules and 1. refers to its end product called order,
regulations reward or decision

2. general applicability 2. applies to a specific situation

3. prospective; it envisages the 3. present determination of rights, privileges

promulgation of a rule or regulation or duties as of previous or present time or
generally applicable in the future occurrence

B. QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADJUDICATORY POWER

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  Proceedings partake of nature of judicial proceedings. Administrative body granted authority to
promulgate its own rules of procedure.
Two necessary conditions:
1. due process; and
2. jurisdiction
Includes the following powers:
1. Prescribe rules of procedure
2. Subpoena power
3. Contempt Power
Administrative Due Process:
1. right to a hearing;
2. tribunal must consider evidence presented;
3. decision must have something to support itself;
4. evidence must be substantial;
5. decision must be based on evidence adduced at hearing or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to parties;
6. board of judges must act on its independent consideration of facts and law of the case, and not
simply accept view of subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. decision must be rendered in such a manner that parties to controversy can know various issues
involved and reason for decision rendered.(Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635)
Substantial Evidence – relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Administrative Determinations Where Notice and Hearing Not Necessary:
1. summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon property of delinquent taxpayer;
2. grant of provisional authority for increase of rates, or to engage in particular line of business;
3. cancellation of passport where no abuse of discretion is committed;
4. summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects safety of persons or property;
5. preventive suspension of officer or employee pending investigation; and
6. grant or revocation of licenses for permits to operate certain businesses affecting public order or
morals.
Administrative Appeal or Review
1. Where provided by law, appeal from administrative determination may be made to higher or
superior administrative officer or body.
2. By virtue of power of control of President, President himself or through Department Head may
affirm, modify, alter, or reverse administrative decision of subordinate.
3. Appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearing in appealed case, if deemed
necessary.
Res judicata effect of Administrative Decisions

- has the force and binding effect of a final judgment (note: applies only to judicial and quasi judicial
proceedings not to exercise of administrative functions, Brillantes vs. Castro 99 Phil. 497)
C. DETERMINATIVE POWERS
1. enabling – permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate;
2. directing – order the doing or performance of particular acts to ensure compliance with the law
and are often exercised for corrective purposes

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 3. dispensing – to relax the general operation of a law or to exempt from general prohibition, or
relieve an individual or a corporation from an affirmative duty;
4. examining - also called investigatory power;
5. summary – power to apply compulsion or force against persons or property to effectuate a legal
purpose without judicial warrants to authorize such actions.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
 Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be
made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted.
1. Doctrine of Prior Resort or (Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction) – where there is
competence or jurisdiction vested upon administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to courts
may be made before such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.
2. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action – no resort to courts will be allowed unless
administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative
structure.
3. Judicial Relief from Threatened Administrative Action – courts will not render a decree in
advance of administrative action and thereby render such action nugatory. It is not for the court to
stop an administrative officer from performing his statutory duty for fear he will perform it
wrongly.
Effect of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: as a general rule, jurisdiction of the court is
not affected but the complaint is vulnerable to dismissal due to lack of cause of action.
Exceptions to the Doctrine:
1. doctrine of qualified political agency (when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter); except where
law expressly provides exhaustion;
2. administrative remedy is fruitless;
3. where there is estoppel on part of administrative agency;
4. issue involved is purely legal;
5. administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
6. where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction;
7. where there is irreparable injury or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made;
8. in land case, subject matter is private land;
9. where law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse;
10. where observance of the doctrine will result in nullification of claim;
11. where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action; and
12. when due process of law is clearly violated.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
When made:
1. to determine constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, or regulation;
2. to determine jurisdiction of any administrative board, commission or officer;
3. to determine any other questions of law; and
4. to determine questions of facts when necessary to determine either:
a. constitutional or jurisdictional issue;
b. commission of abuse of authority; and
c. when administrative fact finding body is unduly restricted by an error of law.
Modes of review:
1. Statutory;
2. Non-statutory – inherent power of the court to review such proceedings upon questions of
jurisdiction and questions of law;

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 3. Direct proceeding;
4. Collateral attack.
General Rule: Findings of facts of Administrative Agencies accorded great weight by the Courts.
Exceptions to the Rule:
1. factual findings not supported by evidence;
2. findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
3. procedure which led to factual findings is irregular;
4. palpable errors are committed; and
5. grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

 Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts – one purports to be finding of fact but is so involved
with and dependent upon a question of latter, courts will review the entire case including the latter.
law as to be in substance and effect a decision on the .
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I. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER (RULE MAKING POWER)
Legislative power - power to make, alter, and repeal laws.
Doctrine of Separation of Powers - a constitutional law doctrine whereby the three branches of the
government are kept separate to prevent abuse of power through the system of checks and balances wherein
each branch is given certain powers so as to check and balance the other branches.
Non-delegation of legislative power
Power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body
or authority.
Exception to the doctrine of Non-delegation of legislative power
f. Delegation to the President (e.g. Sec. 23(2) (war) and 28(2) (tariff rates), Art. IV, Constitution)
g. Delegation to the local governments (e.g. Sec. 48, Local Government Code)
h. Delegation to the people
i. Delegation to the Supreme Court (e.g. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution)
j. Delegation to Administrative Agencies.
Cases:
1) US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908)
Lesson: Fixing of penalties for violation of laws is a matter purely within the hands of the legislature.
SC’s words: The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and
319 [19 and 311] of Act No. 355, of the Philippine Customs Administrative Act, as amended by Acts Nos.
1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but
also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This provision of the statute does,
indeed, present a serious question.
In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company
(88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners cannot impose a penalty under statutes authorizing
them to do so, the court saying: "Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to
make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of
such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature."
Notes:
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that “the power conferred upon the legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.” Where the sovereign power of

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the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must
be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this
high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any
other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
2) People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
Lesson: Old Probation Law violated the doctrine of non-delegation when it placed the discretion to the local
governments the decision to allocate for the salary of the probation officer.
3) Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991)
Lesson: Executive Order No. 93 is complete and it also provided sufficient standard. A reading of Section 3
of said law shows that it set the policy to be the greater national interest. Also, delegation of legislative
power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
SC’s words: The standards of the delegated power are also clearly provided for. The required "standard"
need not be expressed. In Edu vs. Ericta and in De la Llana vs. Alba, this Court held: "The standard may be
either express or implied. In the former, the non-delegated objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole."
In People vs. Rosenthal the broad standard of "public interest" was deemed sufficient. In Calalang vs.
Williams, it was "public welfare" and in Cervantes vs. Auditor General, it was the purpose of promotion of
"simplicity, economy and efficiency." And, implied from the purpose of the law as a whole, "national
security" was considered sufficient standard and so was "protection of fish-fry or fish eggs."
The observation of petitioner that the approval of the President was not even required in said Executive
Order of the tax exemption privilege approved by the FIRB, unlike in previous similar issuances, is not well-
taken. On the contrary, under Section 1 (f) of Executive Order No. 93, afore-stated, such tax and duty
exemptions extended by the FIRB must be approved by the President. In this case, FIRB Resolution No. 17-
87 was approved by the respondent Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, on October 15, 1987.
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz commenting on the delegation of legislative power stated "The latest in our
jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental
functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the
interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions."
Thus, in the case of Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 51 this Court enunciated the rationale in favor of delegation of
legislative functions –
"One thing however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that
the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice
(Delegibus et Consuetudiniis, Anglia edited by G.E. Woodline, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167)
but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the
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complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
subordinate legislation, not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
(People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, 68 Phil 318, 1939). Accordingly, with the growing complexities of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the
legislative, and toward the approval of the practice by the Courts." (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative authority could not or is not expected to state all the detailed situations wherein the tax
exemption privileges of persons or entities would be restored. The task may be assigned to an administrative
body like the FIRB.
Moreover, all presumptions are indulged in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the statute. Such
presumption can be overturned if its invalidity is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, a liberal
interpretation in favor of constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
E.O. No. 93 is complete in itself and constitutes a valid delegation of legislative power to the FIRB. And as
above discussed, the tax exemption privilege that was restored to NPC by FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 of
June 1987 includes exemption from indirect taxes and duties on petroleum products used in its operation.
4) Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
Lesson: 2 tests explained. Also, the reason for the delegation.
SC’’s words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but
is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation
is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative
power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably
to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct
and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
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issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of
law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby
has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the
POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is
a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
5) Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995)
Lesson: High degree of detail not necessary in a law that delegates power to administrative agencies to
exercise “subordinate legislation.”
SC’s words: Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to
be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is
quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing
administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or
many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may
be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations
are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is
appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this
test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in the present Civil Service law -
found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-
five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
Delegation of legislative power to Administrative Agencies
a. Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers of administrative agencies
b. Kinds of rule-making power
1. Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate legislation)
2. Rule-making by the construction and interpretation of a statute being administered (interpretative
legislation)
3 kinds:
 Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law
 Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a
government agency or official
 Interpretation in adversary proceedings
3. Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall go into effect
(contingent legislation)
c. Reasons for delegation of legislative power
Delegation of legislative power has become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception.
The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
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 sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.

d. What can and cannot be delegated

What can be delegated – Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency any legislative
power other than the making, altering or repealing of a law, the determination of legislative policies
and objectives to be achieved, and the formulation and promulgation of a defined and binding rule of
conduct. It can delegate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in
details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise police power, and to fix rates. To
be valid, however, the delegation has to pass the competence and sufficiency of standard tests.
What cannot be delegated – Doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of that which
is purely legislative in nature. This consists of the power to make the law, or to determine what the
law shall be, and to alter or repeal it.
e. Test to determine validity of delegation
1. Completeness test – The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it.
2. Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Case:
1) ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise veto on the IRRs of an
administrative agency.
SC’s words: On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing” the delegated power to the President to fix
revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund,
is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective
revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Percent of the Excess Collection to

11
 Excess the Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for
a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by
the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’
revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in
the case of the BOC.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and
the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President
to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be
removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural
due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (e) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three
categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other
12
branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency
involved.

b. Congressional investigation - While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at

the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The
power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI.

c. Legislative supervision - The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight
power is thru legislative supervision. “Supervision” connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the
part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to
influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the
exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.
In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake
of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of
an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing
the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA
9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
2) Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010 (and other allied cases)
Lesson: If the law is clear, no need for IRR to be implemented. In this case, no need for publication of the
IRR.
SC’s words: As will be noted from the first sentence above, “all allowances” were deemed integrated into
the standardized salary rates except the following:
(1) representation and transportation allowances;
(2) clothing and laundry allowances;
(3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
(4) subsistence allowances of hospital personnel;
(5) hazard pay;
(6) allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be determined by
the DBM.
But, while the provision enumerated certain exclusions, it also authorized the DBM to identify such other
additional compensation that may be granted over and above the standardized salary rates. In Philippine
Ports Authority Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, the Court has ruled that while
Section 12 could be considered self-executing in regard to items (1) to (6), it was not so in regard to item (7).

13
The DBM still needed to amplify item (7) since one cannot simply assume what other allowances were
excluded from the standardized salary rates. It was only upon the issuance and effectivity of the
corresponding implementing rules and regulations that item (7) could be deemed legally completed.
Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance because of the increasing complexity
and variety of public functions. Congress has endowed administrative agencies like respondent DBM with
the power to make rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. Such
power is, however, necessarily limited to what the law provides. Implementing rules and regulations cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute belongs to the legislature.
Administrative agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law by “filling in” only its details. The
regulations must be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law and must conform to the standards
prescribed by law.
On publication: It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a
law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the same.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not
dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in the standardized
salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of integration—“all allowances.”
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually integrated into the
employees’ salaries. Records show that the government employees were informed by their respective offices
of their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices
of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of the
employee’s gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his standardized pay under R.A.
6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the employee’s monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the consolidation of
COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of a
back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of
R.A. 6758. As the Court has said in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
the validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
3) BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003
Lesson: Subordinate and interpretative legislation distinguished. General rule is prospective application of
administrative rules.
SC’s words: Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance:
legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue
Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277
(now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries Corporation
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court recognized that the application of Section 277 calls for none
other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that
Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus
14
making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.
BLC further posits that, assuming the revenue regulation is legislative in nature, it is invalid
After upholding the validity of Revenue Regulation 19-86, the Court now resolves whether its application
should be prospective or retroactive.
On non-retroactivity: The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express
terms or by necessary implication. In the present case, there is no indication that the revenue regulation may
operate retroactively.
Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it “shall take effect on January 1, 1987,” and that it
“shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date.” Being clear on its prospective application,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without further interpretation. Thus, BLC is not in a position
to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
It is also apt to add that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these are regarded as in
derogation of sovereign authority and are to be strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption and he must be able to justify his
claim by the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon
vague implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.
4) Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011
Lesson: Internal rules do not need publication.

SC’s words: Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP
Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law
Center’s guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, “interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not
the public,” need not be filed with the UP Law Center.
Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to
pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion
plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the
GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.
f. Requisites for validity of administrative rules and regulations
1. Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
2. Conform to the standards that the law prescribes
3. Must be reasonable
4. Must be related solely to carrying into effects the general provisions of the law.
Cases:
1) Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009
Lesson: Requisites, explained.
SC’s words: The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on
compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.

15
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom’s authority is drawn
from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its
authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable. Xxx
P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1 which is “to promote
and direct the accelerated development and continued growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the
sports development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of
revenue and employment.” Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every
aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction and
safety of race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.
Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to Philracom. Clearly too, for its part
Philracom has exercised its rule-making power in a proper and reasonable manner. More specifically, its
discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the
security and integrity of horse races.
Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making powers to MJCI and PRCI.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as
delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and
MJCI to “immediately come up with Club’s House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of
horses infected with EIA.” PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit
blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing. Compliance with the Philracom’s directive is
part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections 11 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.
As correctly preferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority of Philracom but arises
from the franchise granted to them by Congress allowing MJCI “to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and
things as may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing.” As justified by PRCI, “obeying the terms of the
franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty.”
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philracom’s guidelines. They
question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines, that is, only after the collection of blood samples
for the Coggins Test was ordered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after
Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor the guidelines void. The
directive’s validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines. Philracom has every
right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without
implementing guidelines.
On publication: Petitioners also argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no force and effect for lack of
publication and failure to file copies with the University of the Philippines Law Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-
legislative power does not require notice and hearing, In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court
had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations
issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that
have to be established or ascertained.
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must be within the limits of the
powers granted to it. The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent
with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating EIA. These guidelines are in
16
accord with Philracom’s mandate under the law to regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreasonable or discriminatory. In
fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI’s premises underwent the same procedure. The guidelines
implemented were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.
It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse owners before the test was
conducted. Those who failed to comply were repeatedly warned of certain consequences and sanctions.
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents to determine from time to
time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lease contract executed between petitioner and MJC
contains a proviso reserving the right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a
particular horse is a qualified horse. In addition, Philracom’s rules and regulations on horse racing provide
that horses must be free from any contagious disease or illness in order to be eligible as race entries.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the contested guidelines and
on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracom’s directive.
2) Smart Communications Inc., v. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003
Lesson: Rule-making and Adjudication distinguished.
SC’s words: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body,
as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of
conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a
party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the
act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine
17
Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held: The rule of requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor
General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by
the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions
of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine.
3) Conte v. Commission on Audit, 76 SCAD 16 or 264 SCRA 19 (1996)
Lesson: Administrative issuances should adhere to the statutes that they are supposed to implement.
SC’s words: It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as
with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Though well-settled is the
rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing
to interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires
nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against petitioners.
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute abuse of discretion of any sort
to respondent Commission for denying petitioners’ request for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July
10, 1989. On the contrary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision acted with circumspection
in denying petitioners’ claim. It reasoned thus: “After a careful evaluation of the facts herein obtaining, this
Commission finds the instant request to be devoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial assistance
contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under R.A. No.
660. In fact, by the aggrieved parties’ own admission (page 2 of the request for reconsideration dated January
12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted by the SSS management to its employees, in addition to the
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660.” (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefore no
question, that the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that has the effect of
modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660.
g. Penal rules and regulations
Cases:

1) People v. Santos, 63 Phil. 300 (1936)

Lesson: Effect when administrative agency issue orders that are beyond its authority.
SC’s words: The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his
fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in his name and
to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, which reads as follows:
"Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas
mentioned above (within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving

18
written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned."
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within three
kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and
military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only
authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue
from time to time such instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising
under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to those
contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional
clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a
power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then
Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the
Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore
said conditional clause is null and void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board
of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28
of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and
without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No.
4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.
2) People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. (1954)
Lesson: Necessity of publication.
SC’s words: But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular
No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
3) People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)
Lesson: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted.
SC’s words: The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere
executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46.
As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer,
78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers.
Section 4 of the Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders,
and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof. That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by section 7 of the Revised Fisheries
19
Law, Presidential Decree No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Commissioner of Fisheries "to prepare and execute
upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms, instructions, rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to
enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d 534; See
2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,
which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a
valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate
(State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd 322; 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which
falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles, supra).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES DOCTRINE
Peralta vs. CSC
When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means. It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not
be published.
Javellana vs. DILG
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction.
Notice and Hearing or Publication

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, CTA, Fortune Tobacco

An administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon
the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it
was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an
interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a
matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the

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rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter
2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any
party of persons.
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Victoria Milling vs. SSS
There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a
law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in
the law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.
NFA vs. Masada Security
The general rule is that construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting or applying the same is entitled to great weight and respect. The Court, however, is not bound to
apply said rule where such executive interpretation, is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the
law interpreted, or when the language of the words used is clear and plain, as in the case at bar. Besides,
administrative interpretations are at best advisory for it is the Court that finally determines what the law
means. Hence, the interpretation given by the labor agencies in the instant case which went as far as
supplementing what is otherwise not stated in the law cannot bind this Court.
SGMC Realty Corp. vs. Office of the President
Administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of
the enabling law.
For it is axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are intended to
implement. Any rule which is not consistent with statute itself is null and void.
Prospective or retroactive operation
CIR vs. Azucena
An administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not declarative of certain rights and corresponding
obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute.
Dadulo vs. CA

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Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
San Miguel vs. Inciong
The Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in
declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in
the computation of the 13th-month pay.
Asturias vs. Commissioner of Custom
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling
weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often
refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give
the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors
are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret;
that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences
for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
Carino vs. CHR
The CHR has the power to investigate but not to adjudicate alleged human right violation.
Investigate – means to examine, inquire, explore.
Adjudicate – to resolve, rule, settle, decide.
Megaworld Globus Asia vs. DSM Construction
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
NAPOCOR vs. Leasto
Arbitral decision accords respect and finality by the Court
Exemption to the rule :
1. on the ground of promissory estoppel; and
2. involving a legal issue and not a factual finding.
Lupangco vs. CA
Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation . This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions
like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.
Jurisdiction - the competence of an office or body to act on a given matter or decide a certain question.
Chin vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition.

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Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan
The court has no jurisdiction over the person of Azarcon.
Due Process
Santiago vs. Alikpala
First requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with
judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it.
There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not
convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or
tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed
authority to try petitioner.
NDC vs. Collector of Customs
Even in admin proceeding due process must be observed.
We find this action proper for it really appears that petitioner Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove
that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be
considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that
there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among
which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed by
the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still
necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what
petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector
immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of
due process.

Fabella vs. CA
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against
private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Lupo vs. Administrative Action Board
The requirements of due process in administrative proceedings and these are:
(1) the right to a hearing which includes, the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to support itself,
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 (4) the evidence must be substantial, and substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind
must accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
Madenilla vs. CSC
No denial of due process.
"Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which
pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be
heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which
bears on the question of the light in the matter involved."
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the
cornerstone of due process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
Kanlaon Construction vs. NLRC
Gen. Rule : Only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter
Exemption:
Non-lawyer member of the organization
Non-lawyer representing himself as party to the case
Member of the legal aid duly recognized by IBP or DOJ

Engineer Estacio can appear however his appearance on behalf of Kanlaon required written proof of
authorization. Absent this authority whatever statement and declaration made before the arbiter is not
binding to the petitioner.
First Lepanto vs. CA
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of
the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be
brought to the Court of Appeals.
Manuel vs. Villena
Technical rule of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not
indispensable. It is sufficient that substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be
observed.
Res Judicata
Judge Basilla vs. Becamon
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.
The Court held that applied the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the said doctrine, a
matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same
cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former
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action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle
frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the
same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law.”
NHA vs. Almeida
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power—
that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an
administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." This function applies to the actions, discretion
and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts, or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and
to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in
their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3)
branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the
judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Abelita vs. Doria
While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential facts and circumstances,
the doctrine of res judicata will not apply.
There is no identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the
application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always
be identity of parties in the first and second cases.
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause
of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially the same between the same
parties.
SEC vs. Interport Services
SEC retains jurisdiction to investigate. Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that
criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be
referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains
limited investigatory powers. Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.
SEC vs. GMA Network, Inc.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and
other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation
issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when
it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right to property.
Vigan Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission
Partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and
hearing said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.
QJ – notice and hearing requirement.

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Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Bagonghasa vs. DAR
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The Office of the DAR
Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance of a notice of coverage.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Uniwide Sales
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the
issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before
resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Exemption to Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
GSIS, petitioner, vs. COA
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would ordinarily preclude us from resolving the matter, which calls for a
ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter that is vested by law with exclusive and original
jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto.
However, both the GSIS and respondents have extensively discussed the merits of the case in their respective
pleadings and did not confine their arguments to the issue of jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that
we should resolve the main issue on the ground that it is a purely legal question. Respondents further state
that a remand of the case to the Board would merely result in unnecessary delay and needless expense for the
parties.
Gregorio Vigilar, DPWH Secretary vs. Arnulfo Aquino
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only
tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the
courts of justice.
Geraldine Gaw Guy vs. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct in deportation proceeding.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association vs. SB Brgy. Sun Valley, Paranaque
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of
the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.

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Arlin Obiasca vs. Jeane Basallote
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity
to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. In Orosa v. Roa, the Court ruled that if
an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before resort can be made to the courts. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
subject to certain exceptions, these are not present in this case.
Exemption
Republic vs. Carlito Lacap
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings. Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.
Khristine Rea Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to
take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts
complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not
have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and
well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the
application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

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