Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Atty. Sigrid G.

Mier

EN BANC held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the respect the right of small
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 sustaining soil, and crushed him to death. landowners. The State shall further
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, provide incentives for voluntary
PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO without whose invigorating touch even the powerful land-sharing.
B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. Antaeus weakened and died. Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the
ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August
REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This
ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay was substantially superseded almost a decade later by
AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, alive. P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,  resource among our people. But it is more than a among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
vs. slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become retention limits for landowners.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent The people power revolution of 1986 did not change
REFORM, respondent. demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989 earth as their place in the sun. reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C.
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' well-being and economic security of all the and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,  new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
vs. that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM property and equitably diffuse property ownership and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
COUNCIL, respondents. profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific implementation.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989 injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,  reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power
vs. from the bondage of the soil." 3 from the President and started its own deliberations,
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. including extensive public hearings, on the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and after almost a year of spirited debate, was the
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which
AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents. These include a call in the following words for the President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law,
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989 adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
JR., petitioners,  undertake an agrarian reform insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
vs. program founded on the right of provisions. 4
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian farmers and regular farmworkers, The above-captioned cases have been consolidated
Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE who are landless, to own directly or because they involve common legal questions,
PHILIPPINES, respondents. collectively the lands they till or, in including serious challenges to the constitutionality of
the case of other farmworkers, to the several measures mentioned above. They will be
CRUZ, J.: receive a just share of the fruits the subject of one common discussion and resolution,
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who thereof. To this end, the State shall The different antecedents of each case will require
blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way encourage and undertake the just separate treatment, however, and will first be
to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The distribution of all agricultural lands, explained hereunder.
two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary subject to such priorities and G.R. No. 79777
to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose reasonable retention limits as the Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality
even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened Congress may prescribe, taking into of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No.
several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. account ecological, developmental, 6657.
Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on or equity considerations and subject The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland
Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could to the payment of just worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
never die as long as any part of his body was touching compensation. In determining Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland
his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then retention limits, the State shall worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation
of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped
legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228.
The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article
XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to
provide for retention limits for small landowners.
Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section
25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just
compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the
President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent
cases of EPZA v. Dulay  5 and Manotok v. National
Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money
or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things
of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the
land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners
of their property rights as protected by due process.
The equal protection clause is also violated because
the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No
similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the
beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the
lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the
measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their
lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that
P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier
cases of Chavez v. Zobel,  7 Gonzales v.
8
Estrella,   and Association of Rice and Corn Producers
of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform
Council.  9 The determination of just compensation by
the executive authorities conformably to the formula
prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial
or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial
intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any
rate, the challenge to the order is premature because
no valuation of their property has as yet been made by
the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners
are also not proper parties because the lands owned
by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of
7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties
because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention
limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their
petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners
with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain
that the determination of just compensation by the
administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As
for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed
in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was
the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it
is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
(except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute
should itself also be declared unconstitutional because
it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the
earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court
on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83-
hectare land, who complained that the DAR was
insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had
reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In
a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted
the allegations in the basic amended petition that the
above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is
an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members.
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed
by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the
President. Although they agree that the President
could exercise legislative power until the Congress was
convened, she could do so only to enact emergency
measures during the transition period. At that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power of the
President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for
violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131
which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a
special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform
Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from
1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts
of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust
and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government
may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be considered
automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized
in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in
futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the
cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be
raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it
is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in
full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5
of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof
provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall
compensate the landowner in an amount to be
established by the government, which shall be based
on the owner's declaration of current fair market value
as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain
controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This
compensation may not be paid fully in money but in
any of several modes that may consist of part cash and
part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or
direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually
agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or
as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the
two measures, no effort was made to make a careful
study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no
tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify
the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that
the sugar planters have been lumped in the same
legislation with other farmers, although they are a
separate group with problems exclusively their own,
their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987
by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters
(NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000
individual sugar planters all over the country. On
September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention
was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al.,
representing coconut and riceland owners. Both
motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority
to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any
event, the appropriation is invalid because of
uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of
Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229
provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos
and thus specifies the minimum rather than the
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed.
Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been
certified to by the National Treasurer as actually
available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to
wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of
eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental
right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-
registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of
the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On
the other hand, if the landowner declares his own
valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay
the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also
justifies the necessity for the expropriation as
explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation
and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility
of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion
thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause,
the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong
to a different class and should be differently treated.
The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress
first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural
lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the
constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding
appropriation. There is no rule that only money
already in existence can be the subject of an
appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty
billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although
denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply
means that additional amounts may be appropriated
later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut
planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the
arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the
measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be
included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more
than one subject which is not
expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to
legislate was terminated on July 2,
1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion
special fund from the National
Treasury did not originate from the
House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of
Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation,
placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer
were subsequently issued to the private respondents,
who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the
erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under
Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the
name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without
hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders
rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private
respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President of
the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are
violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process
or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right
of maximum retention provided for
under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos.
228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is
anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power
granted to the President under the Transitory
Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may
be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police
power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be
deprived of his property without due process of law
and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding
as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
him just compensation for his land, the provisions of
E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner
by the farmer-beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 shall be
considered as advance payment for
the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property
right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with
other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that
the petition is premature because the motion for
reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian
Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the
issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that
they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that
when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21.
1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was
deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The
leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore
be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner
maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on
December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the
President would be useless with the promulgation of
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the
validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of
retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as
they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.
Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit
but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn shall be ejected or removed
from his farmholding until such
time as the respective rights of the
tenant- farmers and the landowner
shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No.
27.
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far
not issued the implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for
a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue
the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that
P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing
any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate
area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive
adequate income for their family. And even assuming
that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10,
1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small
Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide
Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21,
1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474),
Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D.
No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing
for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for
Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their
Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from
invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the
petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the
President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of
the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet
been done, involves the exercise of discretion which
cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus.
This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as
in this case, to a separate department of the
government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-
cited measures are not applicable to them because
they do not own more than seven hectares of
agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that
the rules were intended to cover them also, the said
measures are nevertheless not in force because they
have not been published as required by law and the
ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI
474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason
that a mere letter of instruction could not have
repealed the presidential decree.
I transcendental importance to the public of these cases
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so
regarded as the weakest of the three departments of
the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested
with the power to annul the acts of either the
legislative or the executive or of both when not
conformable to the fundamental law. This is the
reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of
judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly
assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of
their respect for the other departments, in striking
down the acts of the legislative and the executive as
unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of
courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The
theory is that before the act was done or the law was
enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the
President, or both, to insure that the Constitution
would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their
session en banc.11 And as established by judge made
doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper
party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that
the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts
or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly
speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by
President Quirino although they were invoking only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public. The Court dismissed the objection that
they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied this exception
in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been
met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions
pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will
not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this
conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the
Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the
hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy
language, where the acts of these departments, or of
any public official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of
Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional
questions that this Court must categorically resolve.
And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary
issues before resolving the more serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures involved
in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos
in the exercise of his powers under martial law has
already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we
find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As
for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was
authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino
before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not "midnight"
enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature
because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987,
and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is
it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid
when she lost her legislative power for, like any
statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the
courts. A statute does not ipso facto become
inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the
legislature that enacted it. By the same token,
President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not
have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted
by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have
undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically
provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657
whenever not inconsistent with its
provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said
measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of
E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in
the CARP Law. 18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned
on the ground that it does not conform to the
requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in
the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not
an appropriation measure even if it does provide for
the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal
purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of
public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the
fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional
provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have
been complied with for the simple reason that the
House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive
power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet
been convened when the proclamation was issued. The
legislative power was then solely vested in the
President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were,
both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits as required by
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer
tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits
now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm,
such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder,
but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
Three (3) hectares may be awarded
to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that
he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose
lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder,
further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead
at the time of the approval of this
Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only
short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill
does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant
to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past
dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever
name it was called, had the force and effect of law
because it came from President Marcos. Such are the
ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the
petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could
not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was
only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that
it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was
law during that time.
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from
the President Marcos still had to comply with the
requirement for publication as this Court held
in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the
Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code, they could not have any force and effect if they
were among those enactments successfully challenged
in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the
Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public
respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of
a discretionary act, especially by a specific department
of the government. That is true as a general
proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the
rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge
of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus
can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a
public official and an unnecessary
and unreasonable delay in the
exercise of such duty occurs, if it is
a clear duty imposed by law, the
courts will intervene by the
extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the
duty is purely ministerial, the courts
will require specific action. If the
duty is purely discretionary, the
courts bymandamus will require
action only. For example, if an
inferior court, public official, or
board should, for an unreasonable
length of time, fail to decide a
particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned,
or a court should refuse to take
jurisdiction of a cause when the law
clearly gave it jurisdiction
mandamus will issue, in the first
case to require a decision, and in
the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be
proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted
if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the
NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value,
the Court held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property involved was
wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for
the public safety, or obscene materials, which should
be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable,
unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the
police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too
far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause
the subsidence of structures for human habitation
constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by
a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to
the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights
thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and
waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law
could not be sustained without compensating the
grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which
he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police
power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of
property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner
of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the State of rights in property
without making compensation. But
restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from
dangers threatened is not a taking.
The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious
use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner
from making a use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases
to be noxious — as it may because
of further changes in local or social
conditions — the restriction will
have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his
property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a
polarization but a mingling of the police power and the
power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as
an implement of the former like the power of taxation.
The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police
purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University
of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes
the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an
era when judges located the Police
and eminent domain powers on
different planets. Generally
speaking, they viewed eminent
domain as encompassing public
acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be
available for public use," literally
construed. To the police power, on
the other hand, they assigned the
less intrusive task of preventing
harmful externalities a point
reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance
law to bolster its support of zoning.
So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible
relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure
need have afforded no compensation
whatever. With the progressive
growth of government's involvement
in land use, the distance between
the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government
often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful
complement to the police power-- a
trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Berman v. Parker, which broadened
the reach of eminent domain's
"public use" test to match that of
the police power's standard of
"public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project
and the improvement of blighted areas in the District
of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power.
On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of
this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.
Once the object is within the
authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,  29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks
Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand
Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a
multi-story office building over the Terminal, which
had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation
of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the
police power. The problem, however, was that the
owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right
to use the airspace above it although other landowners
in the area could do so over their respective properties.
While insisting that there was here no taking, the
Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory
rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by
the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called
it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine
landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to
transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but
unused rights accruing to the site prior to the
Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights
which would have been exhausted by the 59-story
building that the city refused to countenance atop the
Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring
sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the
Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the
right to construct larger, hence more profitable
buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication
insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for
the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to
and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of
the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the
power of eminent domain, the several measures before
us are challenged as violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
299 on the ground that no retention limits are
prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed.
It is noted that although they excited many bitter
exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in
Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are,
curiously enough, not being questioned in these
petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The
Court will come to the other claimed violations of due
process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the
power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been
denied equal protection because of the absence of
retention limits has also become academic under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have
not questioned the area of such limits. There is also
the complaint that they should not be made to share
the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made
by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong
to a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the
Court that the requisites of a valid classification have
been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally
to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that
all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment. The argument that not only landowners but
also owners of other properties must be made to share
the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute
may be sustained under the police power only if there
is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful
method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public
generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less
important, the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to
be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian
reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself,
we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity
of the method employed to achieve the constitutional
goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is
that where the rights of the individual are concerned,
the end does not justify the means. It is not enough
that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that
the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not
even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,
will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is
no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation
who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his
property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner
enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent
power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need
to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in
which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
parties. 35 It is only where the owner
is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept
the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play
to assert the paramount authority of
the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must
then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no
power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation"
and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved
from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the
petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should
first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit
of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing
property rights by forcibly acquiring private
agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to
say that only public agricultural lands may be covered
by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just
distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in
the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of
their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has
been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the
decisions of the political departments when they
decide what is known as the political question. As
explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case
of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question"
connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has
been constricted with the enlargement of judicial
power, which now includes the authority of the courts
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this
should not be construed as a license for us to reverse
the other departments simply because their views may
not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in
their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution
of private landholdings (even as the distribution of
public agricultural lands is first provided for, while
also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and
other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to
interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we
believe that the political decision is not unwise, but
illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it
was held:
Congress having determined, as it
did by the Act of March 3,1909 that
the entire St. Mary's river between
the American bank and the
international line, as well as all of
the upland north of the present ship
canal, throughout its entire length,
was "necessary for the purpose of
navigation of said waters, and the
waters connected therewith," that
determination is conclusive in
condemnation proceedings
instituted by the United States
under that Act, and there is no room
for judicial review of the judgment of
Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has
already been settled for us by the Constitution itself
No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian
reform, which is the reason why private agricultural
lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes
specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No.
6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional
injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers
who are landless to own directly or collectively the
lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just
compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful
examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in
these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police
power. We deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of
their property and deprived them of all its beneficial
use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just
compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must
enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not
necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the
public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources
of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP
Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from
the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines.
The DAR shall thereafter proceed
with the redistribution of the land to
the qualified beneficiaries.
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing
the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted
to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial
prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section
16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or
disregard by the owner of the offer of the government
to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the
land by requiring the landowner, the
LBP and other interested parties to
submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of
the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The
DAR shall decide the case within
thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is
a function addressed to the courts of justice and may
not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to
several decrees promulgated by President Marcos
providing that the just compensation for property
under expropriation should be either the assessment
of the property by the government or the sworn
valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.
In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court
held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just
compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court inutile in a matter which
under this Constitution is reserved
to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation
proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for
the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower
value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor.
As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
property is seemingly fulfilled since
it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the
actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short
of a mere formality or charade as
the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner
and that of the assessor, and its
choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot
exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what
is just or fair. Even a grade school
pupil could substitute for the judge
insofar as the determination of
constitutional just compensation is
concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once
again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts
under P.D. No. 1533, which
contains the same provision on just
compensation as its predecessor
decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just
compensation, independent of what
is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the
affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny
the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And
it is repulsive to the basic concepts
of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely
prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed
the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been
presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily
show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that
rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally
objectionable. Although the proceedings are described
as summary, the landowner and other interested
parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to
submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the
decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right
to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the
provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in
full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of
Compensation. — The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such
amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and the
LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17,
and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in
one of the following modes, at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the
following terms and conditions
(a) For lands above fifty (50)
hectares, insofar as the excess
hectarage is concerned — Twenty-
five percent (25%) cash, the balance
to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to
fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below —
Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-
owned or controlled corporations,
LBP preferred shares, physical
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
assets or other qualified investments
in accordance with guidelines set by
the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used
against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the
following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury
bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the
bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash
portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds
may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-
interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face
value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province
or region where the lands for which the bonds were
paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned
or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by
the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial
institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be
invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium- scale industry, in the same
province or region as the land for which the bonds are
paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government:
Provided, That the use of these bonds for these
purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the
outstanding balance of the financial instruments;
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the
percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of
the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the
original bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to
time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is
that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as
it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to
accept just compensation therefor in less than money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed. In
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence
holding that:
The fundamental rule in
expropriation matters is that the
owner of the property expropriated
is entitled to a just compensation,
which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been
understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason
of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just
compensation means the equivalent
for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. Anything beyond
that is more, and anything short of
that is less, than just compensation.
It means a fair and full equivalent
for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market
value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of
condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of
money which a person desirous, but
not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing, but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be
given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence
on the subject has been derived, the weight of
authority is also to the effect that just compensation
for property expropriated is payable only in money and
not otherwise. Thus —
The medium of payment of
compensation is ready money or
cash. The condemnor cannot compel
the owner to accept anything but
money, nor can the owner compel or
require the condemnor to pay him
on any other basis than the value of
the property in money at the time
and in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution and the statutes. When
the power of eminent domain is
resorted to, there must be a
standard medium of payment,
binding upon both parties, and the
law has fixed that standard as
money in cash. 47 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments
are not and cannot, in the nature of
things, be regarded as a reliable and
constant standard of
compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property
taken by condemnation means a fair
equivalent in money, which must be
paid at least within a reasonable
time after the taking, and it is not
within the power of the Legislature
to substitute for such payment
future obligations, bonds, or other
valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the
traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the
past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal
here with the traditional excercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area
is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private
agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a
particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to
the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover
only the whole territory of this country but goes
beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this
program as we are today, although hopefully only as
beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will
guarantee to them tomorrow through our
thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself
that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling
for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams
but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos.
The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast
areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws
before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of
pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount
of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already
staggering as it is by our present standards. Such
amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were
aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is
a part of this assumption that when they envisioned
the expropriation that would be needed, they also
intended that the just compensation would have to be
paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if
more practical method. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands
they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We
may therefore assume that their intention was to allow
such manner of payment as is now provided for by the
CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if
the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed
of the entire amount of the just compensation, with
other things of value. We may also suppose that what
they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as
that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter
and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement
among the members regarding the meaning to be given
the concept of just compensation as applied to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune"
the requirement to suit the demands of the project
even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to
Congress" to determine how payment should be made
to the landowner and reimbursement required from
the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized
compensation" were also proposed. In the end,
however, no special definition of the just compensation
for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records
either that militates against the assumptions we are
making of the general sentiments and intention of the
members on the content and manner of the payment
to be made to the landowner in the light of the
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of
the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares
that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do
not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue,
but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or
oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is
as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the
goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses
during all these disappointing decades. We are aware
that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in
the restless countryside. That is not in our view the
intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we
shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully
in money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the
total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas
of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive
upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the
land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily
because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable
at any time." The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the
amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law
will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be
avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of
the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will
not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise,
our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest
for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of
the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be
viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said
Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP
Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as
embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide,
as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to
register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that
given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that
the just compensation shall be ascertained on the
basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in
the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle
is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the
judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date
on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act,
or the commissioner's report under the Local
Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land
taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title
to the property taken remains in the owner until
payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court
cited several cases holding that title to property does
not pass to the condemnor until just compensation
had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear
to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838,
in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual
payment to the owner of the condemned property was
a condition precedent to the investment of the title to
the property in the State" albeit "not to the
appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v.
Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that
the construction upon the statutes was that the fee
did not vest in the State until the payment of the
compensation although the authority to enter upon
and appropriate the land was complete prior to the
payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle
and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on
and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority
of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass
from the owner without his consent, until just
compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held
in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,  56 that:
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
If the laws which we have exhibited
or cited in the preceding discussion
are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this
jurisdiction is such as to afford
absolute reassurance that no piece
of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972
and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except
that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become
a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full
payment of the just compensation also had to be made
first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section
1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are
now deemed full owners as of
October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly
acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner
by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of
just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures
violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights
acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him
even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-
balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said
law that "the landowners whose lands have been
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees
or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not
appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the
petitioners with the Office of the President has already
been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are
factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the
petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do
not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of
their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In
any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet
exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No.
27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new
retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which
in fact are on the whole more liberal than those
granted by the decree.
V 6657 under the conditions therein
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved
in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack
from those who point to the shortcomings of these
measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To
be sure, these enactments are less than perfect;
indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and
rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the
better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to
start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we
do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain
fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is
inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested
project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's
words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot
expect perfection although we should strive for it by all
means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in
freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have
unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to
the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal
obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true
freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he
will be released not only from want but also from the
exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own
feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his
servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of 4. A petition invoking the right of retention
the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred exceeding seven hectares.
for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the ISSUE:
fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were
last can he banish from his small plot of earth his constitutional.
insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it HELD:
the music and the dream." The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6
are SUSTAINED against all the of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
constitutional objections raised in Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and
the herein petitions. Eminent Domain
2. Title to all expropriated properties RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the
shall be transferred to the State only regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
upon full payment of compensation owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
to their respective owners. the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
3. All rights previously acquired by under the power of eminent domain for which payment
the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. of just compensation is imperative. The taking
27 are retained and recognized. contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
4. Landowners who were unable to land. What is required is the surrender of the title and
exercise their rights of retention the physical possession of said excess and all
under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the
retention rights granted by R.A. No. farmer-beneficiary.
The Court declares that the content and manner of the
prescribed. just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the
5. Subject to the above-mentioned CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
rulings all the petitions are
DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Constitutional Law| Police Power| Power of Eminent
Domain
FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases:
1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD
No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of
the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland
worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full
owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27. The petitioners now contend that President
Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power.
2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters
in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against
Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is
the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial
fund of P50Billion.
3. A petition by owners of land which was
placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer.
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
[G.R. No. 86889 :  December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondent.
 
DECISION
 
PARAS, J.:
 
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for
restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without
jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background
of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines
approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p.
80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
(Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
(Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and
17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known
as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated
on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by
the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws,
guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining
public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as
they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other
livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939
resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its
Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p.
98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated
August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after
the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction
bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also
gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p.
119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6,
1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted
his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum
(Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A.
6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of
livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial
farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine
raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to
execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the authority
to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the
production-sharing plan mentioned in
Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross
sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end
of the fiscal year as compensation to regular
and other farmworkers in such lands over
and above the compensation they currently
receive: Provided, That these individuals or
entities realize gross sales in excess of five
million pesos per annum unless the DAR,
upon proper application, determine a lower
ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity
realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of
the net profit after tax shall be distributed to
said regular and other farmworkers within
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal
year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality
of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar
as the said law includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith.:-cralaw
The constitutional provision under consideration reads
as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x  x  x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES
REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject
to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the rights of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
x  x  x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek
the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety.
In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the
decision of this Court in the case of the
Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming
the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued
that Congress in enacting the said law has
transcended the mandate of the Constitution,
in including land devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
(Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is
not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is
not the primary resource in this undertaking
and represents no more than five percent
(5%) of the total investment of commercial
livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there
are many owners of residential lands all over
the country who use available space in their
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
residence for commercial livestock and
raising purposes, under "contract-growing
arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock
and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands
support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds.
The use of land is incidental to but not the
principal factor or consideration in
productivity in this industry. Including
backyard raisers, about 80% of those in
commercial livestock and poultry production
occupy five hectares or less. The remaining
20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that
livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise
under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that
Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition
(1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of
cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also,
feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying,
sugarmaking . . .
Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a
farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of
domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional
construction. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers in the
adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co.
vs.  Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]).: rd
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of
Constitution begins with the language of the document
itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co.
vs.  Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional
provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that
the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself,
but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption
by the people of the Constitution the understanding of
the convention as to what was meant by the terms of
the constitutional provision which was the subject of
the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it
(Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural
land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as
laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned
land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p.
11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the
application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner
Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such
lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties because all of them fall under
the general classification of the word "agricultural".
This proposal, however, was not considered because
the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands
are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands
and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7,
1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado
(now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several
questions, among others, quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program
founded on the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers. I wonder if it means that
leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed
under this provision because it speaks of the
primary right of farmers and farmworkers to
own directly or collectively the lands they till.
As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo,
farmworkers include those who work in
piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my
appreciation that if somebody puts up a
piggery or a poultry project and for that
purpose hires farmworkers therein, these
farmworkers will automatically have the right
to own eventually, directly or ultimately or
collectively, the land on which the piggeries
and poultry projects were constructed.
(Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).
x  x  x
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
The questions were answered and explained
in the statement of then Commissioner
Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay
medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan.
Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado
na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural
worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya
hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section
II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-
industrial activities are made to be covered by the
agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the
requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657
directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and
poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-
sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to
distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their
workers as additional compensation is unreasonable
for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due
process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry
into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to
the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R.
79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico,
G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the
Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it
will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it
is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this
conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe
its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power
of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not
hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the
acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the
people's will as expressed in the Constitution
(Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742;
Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art.
VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X,
Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was
adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and
which power this Court has exercised in many
instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated
in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null
and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 
Separate Opinions
 
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I agree that the petition be granted.
It is my opinion however that the main issue on the
validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they
include the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in
their coverage cannot be simplistically reduced to a
question of constitutional construction.
It is a well-settled rule that construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. A close reading however of
the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art.
XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof," provides a basis for the clear and possible
coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within
the ambit of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program. This accords with the principle that every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute and the court in
considering the validity of a statute should give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it
within the fundamental law.  1
The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must
say, assumes greater weight when a ruling to the
contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and
noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the
landless farmers and farmworkers in the promotion of
social justice, by the expedient conversion of
agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and swine
raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the
comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely
illusory.
The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the
question of whether or not the assailed provisions
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
(Article II, section 1) which teaches simply that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.  2
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that
substantial distinctions exist between land directed
purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops
and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and
swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:
x  x  x
No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock
and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor
landlords, only employers and employees.
Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are
they "fruits of the land."
Land is not even a primary resource in this industry.
The land input is inconsequential that all the
commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy
less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for
poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land
supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms
utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.: nad
In every respect livestock and poultry production is an
industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential
portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in
any other undertaking, business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production
as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident
when one considers that at least 95% of total
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
investment in these farms is in the form of fixed assets
which are industrial in nature.
These include (1) animal housing structures and
facilities complete with drainage, waterers, blowers,
misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2)
feedmills complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors,
exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution
equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5)
deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and
accessory facilities; (6) modern equipment such as
sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory
facilities complete with expensive tools and equipment;
and a myriad other such technologically advanced
appurtances.
How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be
arable when such are almost totally occupied by these
structures?
The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and
poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural tenants
surfaces when one considers contribution to output.
Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more
than 4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance
represents inputs not obtained from the land nor
provided by the farmworkers — inputs such as feeds
and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost,
cost of money and several others.
Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are
covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy
law. They are entitled to social security benefits where
tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages
rather than crop shares. And as in any other industry,
they receive additional benefits such as allowances,
bonuses, and other incentives such as free housing
privileges, light and water.
Equating livestock and poultry farming with other
agricultural activities is also fallacious in the sense
that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for,
rather than a source of agricultural output. At least
60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed
by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products
of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana
(banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal).  3
x  x  x
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of
lands are not similarly situated and hence, cannot be
treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which
allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry
industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform
program constitute invalid classification and must
accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.chanrobles
virtual law library
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Atty. Sigrid G. Mier

Endnotes
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990
Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the
President of the Philippines, which includes, among
others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.
Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the
livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be
adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b),
11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it
prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional.
The mentioned sections of the law provies, among
others, the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.
Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry
raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That
the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the
total investments of commercial livestock and poultry
raisers. That the land is incidental but not the
principal factor or consideration in their industry.
Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the
coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is
unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?
Ruling:
The Court held YES.
Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional
Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”,
it showed that the framers never intended to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of
the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the
reasin why they used the term “farmworkers” rather
than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because
“agricultural workers” includes the livestock and
poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to
include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have
distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that
the product-sharing plan applied to “corporate farms”
in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being
consficatory and violative of the due process of aw.
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
[G.R. No. 106593. November 16, 1999]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE MAURO T. ALLARDE,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 123, Kalookan City and
SPOUSES RUFINO AND JUANITA
MATEO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Order,[1] dated April 8, 1992, of Branch 123 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, [2] in Civil Case
No. C-15325, which granted the motion of the herein
private respondents for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and the Order [3] of August 4,
1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts that matter may be culled as follows:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, and covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627,
respectively, were acquired by the Republic on April 2,
1938 from Philippine Trust Company. [4] Said lots form
part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan
City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by
Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing
programs of the National Housing Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he
had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in
1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on a
six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his
father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of
the same lots.[5]
On September 1, 1983, the National Housing
Authority notified the respondent spouses of the
scheduled development of the Tala Estate including
the lots in question, warning them that it would not be
responsible for any damage which may be caused to
the crops planted on the said lots.[6]
In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for
the award to them of subject disputed lots under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). [7]
In January 1992, in pursuance of the
implementation of Proclamation No. 843, petitioner
caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private
respondents, damaging the dikes and irrigations
thereon, in the process.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses,
relying on their claim that subject lots are agricultural
land within the coverage of the CARP,[8] brought before
the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing
further and making constructions on the lots under
controversy. Petitioner traversed such complaint,
contending that the said lots which were previously
reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and
resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as
they are not agricultural lands within the definition
and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657. [9]
On April 8, 1992, the respondent Court issued
its assailed Order granting private respondents prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction; opining and ruling
thus:
"x x x
The Court, after considering the testimony of herein
plaintiff Rufino Mateo as well as the Agrarian Reform
Officer, Danilo San Gil, that the herein plaintiffs have
been occupying the subject property and actual
tillers/farmers of the land owned by the government
and registered in the name of, and administered by, the
NHA, the land being an agricultural land and is,
therefore, covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
reform Program (CARP), is of the opinion that in order to
maintain the status quo of the subject property that the
aforesaid prayer for the issuance of the said writ
should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, upon the filing by the herein plaintiffs of
a bond, in the amount of P5,000.00 duly approved by
this Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued restraining the defendants herein
from bulldozing and making any constructions on the
land farmed and tilled by plaintiffs located in Phase IX,
Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, designated as lot 836 of
the Tala Estate and of dispossessing them of said land,
or until further orders by this Court.
SO ORDERED[10]
Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner presented a
Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that the
preliminary injunction thus issued is a blatant
violation of P.D. No. 1818, which proscribes the
issuance of injunctive writs against the execution or
implementation of government infrastructure
projects. But on August 4, 1992, the said motion was
denied by respondent Courts second Order under
attack.
Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court
via the Petition under consideration, theorizing that:
I.
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF APRIL
8, 1992 GRANTING RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCNTION AND
ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DATED APRIL 15, 1992, BECAUSE HE HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE IT AND THEY ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO IT.
II
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF
AUGUST 4, 1992 DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ADDENDUM
THERETO ON THE FINDING THAT THE GROUNDS
RAISED THEREIN ARE EVIDENCIARY IN NATURE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE ALL SETTLED
LEGAL QUESTIONS.[11]
As a rule, direct recourse to this Court is not
allowed unless there are special or important grounds
for the issuance of extra-ordinary writs. [12] In the case
of Garcia vs. Burgos,[13] where pure questions of law
were raised, this Court, mindful of P.D. No. 1818,
entertained a direct invocation of its jurisdiction to
issue extraordinary writs, realizing the serious
consequences of delay in essential government
projects.[14] So also, in Republic vs. Silverio,[15] a similar
case involving government infrastructure projects, the
Court Took cognizance of an original action
for Certiorari against a Regional Trial Court.
In light of the foregoing, the Court believes, and
so holds, that the present case merits consideration by
the Court. To the end that the prosecution and
progress of government projects vital to the national
economy be not disrupted or hampered, this Court
should pass upon and resolve the questions of law
raised by the petitioner.
The pivotal issues for resolution here are: 1)
Whether or not the Compressive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) covers government lands reserved for specific
public purposes prior to the effectivity of said law; and
2) Whether or not housing, plants and resettlements
are "infrastructure projects" within the contemplation
of P.D. No. 1818.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian
Reform,[16] the Court succinctly held that lands
reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by
government agencies other than the Department of
Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are not considered and
treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the
ambit of said law,[17] on the basis of the following
disquisition:
"x x x Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall 'cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands.' As to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is
referred to as 'lands devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
which are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and
'do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands'
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as 'agricultural lands.' These
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to
be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x"[18]
Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala
Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved, inter
alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority,
the same has been categorized as not being devoted to
the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c)
of R.A. No. 6657,[19] and is, therefore, outside the
coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the
respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy
as "agricultural land" and restraining the petitioner
from involving the same in its housing project thereon,
are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818,
provides:
SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving
an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest
or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among others public utilities for
the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring
and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding
with, or continuing the execution or implementation of
any such project, or the operation of such public utility,
or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such
execution, implementation or operation (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the aforecited provision of law in point
prohibits the Courts of the land from issuing
injunctive writs against the implementation or
execution of government infrastructure projects. [20]
Untenable is private respondents contention that
the housing and resettlement projects at stake are not
infrastructure projects within the purview of
Presidential Decree No. 1818.[21]
As regards the definition of infrastructure
projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha
Construction:[22]
The term infrastructure projects means
construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads,
and bridges, railways, airports, seaports,
communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings, school
buildings, hospital buildings, and other related
construction projects that form part of the
government capital investment. [23]
Applying the principle ejusdem generis, the Court is of
the view, and so holds, that the government projects
involved (2) For the various plants and installations of
the National Housing Corporation, for its future
expansion and for its staff and pilot housing
development,[24] and (5) For housing, resettlement sites
and other uses necessary and related to an integrated
social and economic development of the entire estate
and environs, x x x.[25] are infrastructure projects. The
various plants and installations, staff and pilot
housing development projects, and resettlement sites
related to an integrated social and economic
development of the entire estate are construction
projects forming part of the government capital
investment, undertaken in compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution for the state to embark
upon a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing envisioned to provide at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to the unprivileged and
homeless in urban centers and resettlement areas. [26]
The questioned Orders of respondent Court
(which is bound to follow P.D. No.1818), [27] enjoining or
preventing the implementation of subject housing and
resettlement projects under the administration of the
National Housing Authority, are repugnant to
Presidential Decree No. 1818. Well-settled to the point
of being elementary is the doctrine that before a writ of
preliminary injunction may issue, there must be a
clear showing by the complaint of a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to
be directed infringe such right.[28] Here, it is decisively
clear that the private respondents have no right to the
relief sought for.
Premises studiedly viewed in proper perspective,
the Court is of the irresistible finding and conclusion
that the respondent Court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the challenged Orders in Civil
Case No. C-15325.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the
Orders, dated April 8, 1992 and August 4, 1992,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, in Civil Case No. C-15325 are hereby SET
ASIDE; and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by virtue thereof DISSOLVED. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
National Housing Authority v Allarde
Facts:
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
            Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in
the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he
started farming and working on a six-hectare portion
of said lots, after the death of his father who had
cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots.
On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority
notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled
development of the Tala Estate including the lots in
question, warning them that it would not be
responsible for any damage which may be caused to
the crops planted on the said lots. In 1989, private
respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to them of
subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In January 1992,
petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of
private respondents, damaging the dikes and
irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18,
1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their claim
that subject lots are agricultural land within the
coverage of the CARP, brought before the respondent
Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin
the petitioner from bulldozing further and making
constructions on the lots under controversy. Petitioner
contended that the said lots which were previously
reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and
resettlement purposes are not covered by the CARP as
they are not agricultural lands within the definition
and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657.
The RTC issued the writ.
Issue:
            Whether or not the disputed land is covered by
CARP
Held:
            Lands reserved for, or converted to, non-
agricultural uses by government agencies other than
the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 are not considered
and treated as agricultural lands and therefore,
outside the ambit of said law. Thus, since as early as
April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia
under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority,
the same has been categorized as not being devoted to
the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c)
of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the
coverage of the CARL.
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Atty. Sigrid G. Mier

 
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Atty. Sigrid G. Mier

L-105586 December 15, 1993
REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner,  946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH
DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD
GUTIERREZ, respondents.
Joventino A. Cornista for petitioner.
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private
respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 27
February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26671 ordering
petitioner to vacate the land in question and surrender
possession thereof to the private respondent; and its
21 May 1992 resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of
a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in
Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta
Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the
overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro
to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned
land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment
his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs.
The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject
top the condition that petitioner would vacate the land
upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without
paying any rental and converted the same into a
fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through the overseer
demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but
the latter refused to vacate and return possession of
said land, claiming that he had spent effort and
invested capital in converting the same into a
fishpond.
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private
respondent against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the
following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered
by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the
subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural
land; and (c) that lack of formal demand to vacate
exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of
cause of action.1
Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the
trial court found that the land in question is a
fishpond 2 and, thus, in a decision dated 30 May 1991,
the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute
over it is agrarian which is under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian
relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No.
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board).3
An appeal was filed by private respondent before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
docketed as Civil Case No. 889. In due course, the RTC
rendered a decision on 5 November 1991 concurring
with the findings of the MTC and affirming in toto the
trial court's decision.
The RTC decision held that:
Even conceding for the sake of
argument that the defendant-
appellee was allowed by the
plaintiff-appellant, through her
sister Aniceta Garcia (her
administratrix over the land in
question) to occupy and use the
landholding in question on
condition that the defendant would
vacate the same upon demand of
the owner or plaintiff herein,
without paying any rental either in
cash or produce, under these facts
there was a tenurial arrangement,
within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of
RA 6657, thereby placing the
dispute involved in this case within
the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Perhaps, it would be different if the
defendant was merely a trespasser,
without any right whatsoever, when
he entered and occupied the subject
landholding. The defendant, as a
matter of fact, was a legal possessor
of the land in question and therefore
to determine his rights and
obligations over the said property,
the DARAB is the proper forum for
such issue.4
Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, private
respondent appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 26671. On 27 February 1992, as earlier stated, the
respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate
the parcel of land in question and surrender
possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay
private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 5
The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:
The agrarian dispute over which the
DAR may have jurisdiction by virtue
of its quasi-judicial power is that
which involves tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture.
Tenurial arrangement is concerned
with the act or manner of putting
into proper order the rights of
holding a piece of agricultural land
between the landowner and the
farmer or farmworker.
In the case at bar, there can be no
dispute that between the parties
herein there is no tenurial
arrangement, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over the land in dispute. Other than
his bare allegation in the Answer
with Counterclaim, and his affidavit,
private respondent has not
shown prima facie that he is a
tenant of the petitioner. The
affidavits of his witnesses Antonio
Samin and Daniel Villareal attest to
the fact that they acted as mediators
in the dispute between the parties
herein sometime in October 1990,
but no settlement was arrived at,
and that the subject land is a
fishpond. To the same effect is the
affidavit of Feliciano Garcia. Absent
any prima facie proof that private
respondent has a tenancy
relationship with petitioner, the
established fact is that private
respondent is possessing the
property in dispute by mere
tolerance, and when such
possession ceased as such upon
demand to vacate by the petitioner,
private respondent became a
squatter in said land. We hold that
the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision, but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a
resolution dated 21 May 19927 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AND
WHETHER THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
EJECT THE PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:
1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A
FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS
ARE CLASSIFIED AS
AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
2. THAT BEING AN AGRICULTURAL
LAND THE SAME IS GOVERNED BY
OUR TENANCY LAWS WHERE
RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF
COURT CANNOT BE SIMPLY
APPLIED; AND
3. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,
THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER A PERSON WORKING
ON A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR
NOT IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
DARAB.8
The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private
respondent.
It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action is determined from the
allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational
Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.:9
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter
is determined upon the allegations
made in the complaint, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon the claim asserted
therein — a matter resolved only
after and as a result of the trial.
Neither can the jurisdiction of the
court be made to depend upon the
defenses made by the defendant in
his answer or motion to dismiss. If
such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant.
In her complaint before the court a quo, private
respondent stated that she is the owner of a parcel of
land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
which petitioner is illegally occupying; that petitioner
has taken advantage of the tolerance of her (private
respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land
on the condition that he (petitioner) would vacate the
land upon demand. Because of petitioner's refusal to
vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner
of said land, was to file an action for unlawful detainer
with the Municipal Trial Court.
In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged
that the land involved in the dispute is an agricultural
land and hence, the case must be filed with the Court
of Agrarian Relations (not the MTC). Moreover,
petitioner contended that it was his refusal to increase
his lease rental (implying tenancy) that prompted the
private respondent to sue him in court. 10
It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not
lose its jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by
the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense
therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. 11 The court continues to have the
authority to hear the evidence for the purpose
precisely of determining whether or not it has
jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is
shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. 12
The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint
primarily on the ground that the subject land is
agricultural and therefore the question at issue is
agrarian. In this connection, it is well to recall that
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of
Procedure, 13 provides that the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228
and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act
No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants
and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor or lessee. 14
It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land
which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted
by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that
a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land
refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural
activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or
fish, including the harvesting of such farm products,
and other farm activities, and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations
done by persons whether natural or judicial. 17
But a case involving an agricultural land does not
automatically make such case an agrarian dispute
upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact
that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make
the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can
qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only
one of
them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must
be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over
lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously
mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold,
tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their
written agreements, provided these are complied with
and are not contrary to law, are even more
important. 19
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
(6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence
of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land,
or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws (Caballes v.
DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). 20
Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec.
116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by
himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's
consent for purposes of production, for a price certain
in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor,
on the other hand, is a natural or judicial person who,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and
use of his land for a price certain. 21
Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a
lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin Atty. Sigrid G. Mier

agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between permission,

the petitioner and the private respondent. There was without any
no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner contract between
with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the them, is
private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land necessarily bound
for a price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner by an implied
has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying promise that he
rent for the use of the land. will vacate upon
Whether or not private respondent knew of the demand, failing
conversion by petitioner of the idle, swampy land into which a summary
a fishpond is immaterial in this case. The fact remains action for
that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy ejectment is the
relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in proper remedy
the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint against him (Yu
for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction vs. De
of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in Sec. 33 of Lara, supra)." 22
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The present case should be distinguished from the
Having established that the occupancy and possession recent case of Bernas vs. The Honorable Court of
by petitioner of the land in question is by mere Appeals. 23 In the Bernas case, the land occupant
tolerance, private respondent had the legal right to (Bernas) had a production-sharing agreement with the
demand upon petitioner to vacate the land. And as legal possessor (Benigno Bito-on) while the records in
correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court: this case fail to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was
. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful sharing the harvest or paying rent for his use of the
possession became illegal when the land. Moreover, the agreement between the overseer
petitioner (now private respondent) (Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to
through her sister made a demand occupy and use the land by mere tolerance of the
on him to vacate and he refused to owner. Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia
comply with such demand. Such is allowed him to use the land subject to the condition
the ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In
43 SCRA 136, 144, wherein it was the Bernas case, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to
held: establish the existence of an agricultural tenancy or
While in leasehold relationship between him and the legal
possession by possessor. The evidence in this case, on the other
tolerance is hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was an
lawful, such agricultural tenant or lessee.
possession WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned
becomes illegal decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
upon demand to hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
vacate is made by SO ORDERED.
the owner and the
possessor by
tolerance refuses
to comply with
such demand
(Prieto vs. Reyes,
14 SCRA 432; Yu
vs. De Lara, 6
SCRA 786, 788;
Amis vs. Aragon,
L-4684, April 28,
1957). A person
who occupies the
land of another at
the latter's
tolerance or
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194818               June 9, 2014
CHARLES BUMAGAT, JULIAN BACUDIO, ROSARIO
PADRE, SPOUSES ROGELIO and ZOSIMA PADRE,
and FELIPE DOMINCIL, Petitioners,  respondent – with the aid of armed goons, and through
vs.
REGALADO ARRIBAY, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A case involving agricultural land does not
immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The
mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso
facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or
tenant; there are conditions or requisites before he can
qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the
subject matter being agricultural land constitutes
simply one condition. In order to qualify as an agrarian
dispute, there must likewise exist a tenancy relation
between the parties.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set
aside the February 19, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101423, entitled
"Regalado Arribay, Petitioner, versus Charles
Bumagat, Julian Bacudio, Rosario Padre, Spouses
Rogelio and Zosima Padre, and Felipe Domincil," as
well as its November 9, 2010 Resolution 3 denying
reconsideration of the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners are the registered owners, successors-in-
interest, or possessors of agricultural land, consisting
of about eight hectares, located in Bubog, Sto. Tomas,
Isabela Province, to wit:
1. Charles Bumagat (Bumagat) – 14,585
square meters covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. (TCT) 014557;4
2. Julian Bacudio (Bacudio) – 14,797 square
meters covered by TCT 014556;5
3. Rosario Padre – 14,974 square meters
covered by TCT 0145546 in the name of
Dionicio Padre;7
4. Spouses Rogelio and Zosima Padre – 6,578
square meters covered by TCT 014561 8 in the
name of Ireneo Padre;9
5. Spouses Rogelio and Zosima Padre – 6,832
square meters covered by TCT 014560 in the
name of their predecessor-in-interest Felix
Pacis;10
6. Felipe Domincil – 14,667 square meters
covered by TCT 014558;11 and
7. Felipe Domincil – 7,319 square meters. 12
The certificates of title to the above titled properties
were issued in 1986 pursuant to emancipation
patents.13
On July 19, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint 14 for
forcible entry against respondent before the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabagan-
Delfin Albano, Isabela. The case was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 475 (SCA 475). In an Amended
Complaint,15 petitioners alleged that on May 9, 2005,
the use of intimidation and threats of physical harm –
entered the above-described parcels of land and
ousted them from their lawful possession; that
respondent then took over the physical possession and
cultivation of these parcels of land; and that
petitioners incurred losses and injuries by way of lost
harvests and other damages. Petitioners thus prayed
for injunctive relief, actual damages in the amount of
not less than ₱40,000.00 for each cropping season
lost, ₱30,000.00attorney’s fees, and costs.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, 16 claiming that
the subject properties are agricultural lands – which
thus renders the dispute an agrarian matter and
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
However, in a January 30, 2006 Order,17 the MCTC
denied the motion, finding that the pleadings failed to
show the existence of a tenancy or agrarian
relationship between the parties that would bring their
dispute within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was similarly
rebuffed.18
Respondent filed his Amended Answer with
Counterclaim,19 alleging among others that petitioners’
titles have been ordered cancelled in a December 1,
2001 Resolution20 issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Region 2 in Administrative Case No.
A0200 0028 94; that he is the absolute owner of
approximately 3.5 hectares of the subject parcels of
land, and is the administrator and overseer of the
remaining portion thereof, which belongs to his
principals Leonardo and Evangeline Taggueg (the
Tagguegs); that petitioners abandoned the subject
properties in 1993, and he planted the same with
corn; that in 2004, he planted the land to rice; that he
sued petitioners before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) for non-payment of rentals since 1995;
and that the court has no jurisdiction over the
ejectment case, which is an agrarian controversy.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers
and other evidence.21
During the proceedings before the MCTC, respondent
presented certificates of title, supposedly issued in his
name and in the name of the Tagguegs in 2001, which
came as a result of the supposed directive in
Administrative Case No. A0200 0028 94 to cancel
petitioners’ titles. As claimed by respondent, the
subject parcels of land formed part of a 23.663-hectare
property owned by one Romulo Taggueg, Sr. (Romulo
Sr.) and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
(OCT) P-4835, which was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 2722 (PD 27). Petitioners supposedly
became farmer-beneficiaries under the program, and
the parcels of land were awarded to them.
Meanwhile, Romulo Sr. died and his heirs instituted
Administrative Case No. A0200 0028 94 to cancel
petitioners’ titles. The heirs won the case, and later on
new titles over the property were issued in their favor.
In turn, one of the heirs transferred his title in favor of
respondent.
Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
On April 12, 2007, a Decision 23 was rendered by the
MCTC in SCA 475, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant or any person or
persons acting in his behalf to vacate the
entire SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY TWO (79,752)[-]SQUARE
METERS, property described under
paragraph 2 of the amended complaint and to
peacefully surrender the physical possession
thereof in favor of each of the plaintiffs;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay each of the
plaintiffs representing actual damages as
follows:
o Charles Bumagat …………………...
₱109,390.00
o Julian Bacudio ……………………....
₱110,980.00
o Rosario Padre ………………………
₱112,305.00
o Sps. Rogelio and ZosimaPadre .....
₱100,575.00
o Felipe Domincil …………………..…
₱165,429.00
3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
representing the Attorney’s fees in the
amount of ₱10,000.00.
4. Ordering the defendant to pay costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.24
Essentially, the MCTC held that based on the
evidence, petitioners were in actual possession of the
subject parcels of land, since respondent himself
admitted that he brought an action against petitioners
before the MARO to collect rentals which have
remained unpaid since 1995 – thus implying that
petitioners, and not respondent, were in actual
possession of the land, and belying respondent’s claim
that he took possession of the property in 1993 when
petitioners supposedly abandoned the same. The court
added that petitioners’ claims were corroborated by the
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
statements of other witnesses – farmers of the
adjoining lands – declaring that petitioners have been
in unmolested and peaceful possession of the subject
property until May 9, 2005,when they were
dispossessed by respondent.
The MCTC added that it had jurisdiction over the case
since there is no tenancy relationship between the
parties, and the pleadings do not allege such fact; that
respondent’s own witnesses declared that the subject
property was never tenanted nor under lease to
tenants.
Finally, the MCTC held that while respondent and his
principals, the Tagguegs, have been issued titles
covering the subject property, this cannot give
respondent "license to take the law into his own hands
and unilaterally eject the plaintiffs from the land they
have been tilling."25
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent appealed26 the MCTC Decision before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), insisting that the DARAB
has jurisdiction over the case; that he has been in
actual possession of the subject land since 2003; that
while petitioners hold certificates of title to the
property, they never acquired ownership over the same
for failure to pay just compensation therefor; that
petitioners’ titles have been ordered cancelled, and
they reverted to the status of mere tenants; and that
the MCTC erred in granting pecuniary awards to
petitioners.
On October 15, 2007, the RTC issued its
Order27 denying the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming in toto the appealed MCTC judgment. In
sum, the RTC pronouncement echoed the MCTC
findings that no tenancy or any other agrarian
relationship existed between the parties, nor do the
pleadings bear out such fact; that the evidence
preponderantly shows that petitioners were in actual
possession of the subject land; and that petitioners
were entitled to compensation as awarded by the court
a quo.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent went up to the CA by Petition for
Review,28 assailing the Decision of the RTC and
claiming that since petitioners acquired title by virtue
of PD 27, this should by itself qualify the controversy
as an agrarian dispute covered by the DARAB; that
there is no need to allege in the pleadings that he and
the heirs of Romulo Sr. acquired title to the property,
in order for the dispute to qualify as an agrarian
dispute; that petitioners’ titles were ordered cancelled
in Administrative Case No. A0200 0028 94; that he
has been in possession of the property since 2003; and
that the trial court erred in granting pecuniary awards
to petitioners.
On February 19, 2010, the CA issued the assailed
Decision, which held thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan,
Isabela, Branch 22, dated October 15, 2007, affirming
in toto the previous Decision of the MCTC of Cabagan-
Sto. Tomas, Isabela is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 475, entitled "Charles Bumagat,
Julian Bacudio, Rosario Padre, Sps. Rogelio and
Zosima Padre and Felipe Domincil versus Regalado
Arribay" is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.29
In reversing the trial court, the CA agreed that the
parties’ dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the
DARAB since petitioners’ titles were obtained pursuant
to PD 27, and under the 1994 DARAB rules of
procedure, cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which
are registered with the Land Registration Authority fall
under DARAB jurisdiction.30 The appellate court added
that the Complaint for ejectment attacked the
certificates of title issued in favor of respondent and
the Tagguegs because the complaint prayed for –
x x x the annulment of the coverage of the disputed
property within the Land Reform Law which is but an
incident involving the implementation of the CARP.
These are matters relating to terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1(f),
Rule II, DARAB New Rules of Procedure. 31
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in a
November 9, 2010 Resolution, the CA stood its ground.
Hence, the present recourse.
Issue
Petitioners raise the following issue in this Petition:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MCTC HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF THE
(PETITIONERS), INSTEAD IT IS THE DARAB THAT
HAS JURISDICTION, SINCE THE COMPLAINT
ESSENTIALLY PRAYS FOR THE ANNULMENT OFTHE
COVERAGE OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WITH
THE LAND REFORM LAW WHICH IS BUT AN
INCIDENT INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CARP.32
Petitioners’ Arguments
In their Petition and Reply,33 petitioners seek a reversal
of the assailed CA dispositions and the reinstatement
of the MCTC’s April 12, 2007 Decision, arguing that
their Complaint for ejectment simply prays for the
recovery of de facto possession from respondent, who
through force, threat and intimidation evicted them
from the property; that there is no agrarian reform
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
issue presented therein; that the fact that the
controversy involved agricultural land does not ipso
facto make it an agrarian dispute; that the parties’
dispute does not relate to any tenurial arrangement
over agricultural land; and that quite the contrary, the
parties are strangers to each other and are not bound
by any tenurial relationship, whether by tenancy,
leasehold, stewardship, or otherwise.34
Petitioners add that when certificates of title were
issued in their favor, they ceased to be tenant-tillers of
the land but became owners thereof; that full
ownership over the property was acquired when
emancipation patents were issued in their favor; 35 that
when their certificates of title were issued, the
application of the agrarian laws was consummated;
and that as owners of the subject property, they were
thus in peaceful and adverse physical possession
thereof when respondent ousted them by force, threat
and intimidation. Petitioners argue further that
respondent is not the former landowner, nor the
representative thereof; he is merely an absolute
stranger who came into the picture only later.
Finally, petitioners argue that it was erroneous for the
CA to rule that in seeking to evict respondent, they
were in effect mounting an attack on the latter’s title
and thus their Complaint in effect sought the "the
annulment of the coverage of the disputed property
within the Land Reform Law which is but an incident
involving the implementation of the CARP," 36 which
thus relates to "terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction x x x." 37
Respondent’s Arguments
Seeking the denial of the Petition, respondent in his
Comment38 insists that the ejectment case is
intertwined with the CARP Law,39 since petitioners’
titles were obtained by virtue of the agrarian laws,
which thus places the controversy within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB; that under the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, specifically Rule II, Section
1, paragraph 1.440 thereof, cases involving the
ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or
leaseholders fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB;
that under such rule, the one who ejects or
dispossesses the tenant need not be the landowner or
lessor, and could thus be anybody, including one who
has no tenurial arrangement with the
evicted/dispossessed tenant.
Respondent adds that with the cancellation of
petitioners’ titles, they were directed to enter into a
leasehold relationship with the owners of the subject
parcels of land, or the heirs of Romulo Sr. – whose
petition for exemption and application for retention
were granted and approved by the Department of
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
Agrarian Reform, Region 2 in Administrative Case No.
A0200 0028 94 – and later, with him as transferor and
purchaser of a 3.5-hectare portion thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
In declaring that the parties’ dispute fell under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, the CA held that
respondents’ titles were obtained pursuant to PD 27,
and pursuant to the 1994 DARAB rules of procedure
then applicable, cases involving the issuance,
correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which
are registered with the Land Registration Authority fall
under DARAB jurisdiction. It added that since the
Complaint prayed for the annulment of the coverage of
the disputed property under the land reform law,
which thus relates to terms and conditions of transfer
of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
beneficiaries, the DARAB exercises jurisdiction.
What the appellate court failed to realize, however, is
the fact that as between petitioners and the
respondent, there is no tenurial arrangement, not even
an implied one. As correctly argued by petitioners, a
case involving agricultural land does not immediately
qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that
the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. There are
conditions or requisites before he can qualify as an
agricultural lessee or tenant, and the subject being
agricultural land constitutes just one condition. 41 For
the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there
must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. "[I]n
order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee."42 In the present case, it is quite
evident that not all of these conditions are present. For
one, there is no tenant, as both parties claim
ownership over the property.
Besides, when petitioners obtained their emancipation
patents and subsequently their certificates of title,
they acquired vested rights of absolute ownership over
their respective landholdings. "It presupposes that the
grantee or beneficiary has, following the issuance of a
certificate of land transfer, already complied with all
the preconditions required under P.D. No. 27, and that
the landowner has been fully compensated for his
property. And upon the issuance of title, the grantee
becomes the owner of the landholding and he thereby
ceases to be a mere tenant or lessee. His right of
ownership, once vested, becomes fixed and established
and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy."43 Petitioners "became the owner[s] of the
subject property upon the issuance of the
emancipation patents and, as such, [enjoy] the right to
possess the same—a right that is an attribute of
absolute ownership."44
On the other hand, it appears that respondent
obtained title through Romulo Sr.’s heirs, whose claim
to the property is by virtue of an unregistered deed of
donation in their favor supposedly executed prior to
September 21, 1972. On this basis, the heirs filed in
1993 a petition with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, Region 2 to exempt the property from coverage
under PD 27, which was granted in a December 29,
1994 Order.45 By then, or way back in 1986 petitioners
had been issued certificates of title thus, respondent’s
acquisition of the property appears questionable,
considering the Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales v.
Court of Appeals,46 thus:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the property
subject of the deed of donation which was not
registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be
excluded from x x x Operation Land Transfer.
Petitioners insist that the deed of donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales validly transferred the ownership and
possession of Lot 551-C which comprises an area of
46.97 hectares to his 14 grandchildren. They further
assert that inasmuch as Lot 551-C had already been
donated, the same can no longer fall within the
purview of P.D.No. 27, since each donee shall have a
share of about three hectares only which is within the
exemption limit of seven hectares for each landowner
provided under P.D. No. 27.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in
order that the donation of an immovable may be valid,
it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily,
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the
titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable
property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in
the Registry of property shall not prejudice third
persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be
inferred that as between the parties to a donation of
an immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered
valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the
Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of
donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to
convey registered land or affect title thereto. Thus,
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as
amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), provides:
SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered
owner - . . . But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as
a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, . . .
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our
jurisdiction that registration in a public registry
creates constructive notice to the whole world (Olizon
vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994]). Thus,
Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52
of P.D. No. 1529, provides:
SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration - Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.
It is undisputed in this case that the donation
executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized,
has not been registered in accordance with law. For
this reason, it shall not be binding upon private
respondents who did not participate in said deed or
had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the
deed of donation is valid between the donor and the
donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-
farmers who were not parties to the donation. As
previously enunciated by this Court, non-registration
of a deed of donation does not bind other parties
ignorant of a previous transaction (Sales vs. Court of
Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]). So it is of no moment
that the right of the [tenant]-farmers in this case was
created by virtue of a decree or law. They are still
considered "third persons" contemplated in our laws
on registration, for the fact remains that these
[tenant]-farmers had no actual knowledge of the deed
of donation.
xxxx
As a final note, our laws on agrarian reform were
enacted primarily because of the realization that there
is an urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast
Jennica Gyrl G. Delfin
number of poor farmers in our country. Yet, despite
such laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a
hand-to-mouth existence. This can be attributed to the
fact that these agrarian laws have never really been
effectively implemented. Certain individuals have
continued to prey on the disadvantaged, and as a
result, the farmers who are intended to be protected
and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back in
their previous plight or even in a more distressing
situation. This Court ought to be an instrument in
achieving a dignified existence for these farmers free
from pernicious restraints and practices, and there’s
no better time to do it than now.47
When petitioners’ titles were issued in 1986, these
became indefeasible and incontrovertible. Certificates
of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents
acquire the same protection accorded to other titles,
and become indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of
the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands so titled
may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding; nor can they be decreed to other
individuals.48 "The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding
public land patents and the character of the certificate
of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that
where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the
title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In
other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in
a registration proceeding."49
For the above reasons, the Court is not inclined to
believe respondent’s contention that with the issuance
of the December 29, 1994 Order of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Region 2 in Administrative Case No.
A0200 0028 94 ordering the cancellation of petitioners’
titles, the latter were relegated to the status of mere
tenants. Nor can the Court agree with the appellate
court’s observation that through the forcible entry
case, petitioners impliedly seek to exclude the property
from land reform coverage; there is no factual or legal
basis for such conclusion, and no such inference could
be logically generated.1âwphi1 To begin with,
petitioners acknowledge nothing less than ownership
over the property.
Likewise, for the foregoing reasons, it may be
concluded that petitioners exercised prior peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the property until the
same was interrupted by respondent’s forcible
intrusion in 2005; being farmer beneficiaries under PD
Atty. Sigrid G. Mier
27 and finally having acquired title to the property in
1986, the Court is inclined to believe that petitioners
continued to till their landholdings without fail.
Indeed, the evidence on record indicates such peaceful
and undisturbed possession, while respondent’s claim
that he entered the property as early as in 1993
remains doubtful, in light of his own admission that
he sued petitioners for the collection of supposed
rentals which they owed him since 1995. Petitioners’
witnesses further corroborate their claim of prior
peaceful possession. With regard to the portion of the
property which is not titled to petitioners but over
which they exercise possessory rights, respondent has
not sufficiently shown that he has any preferential
right to the same either; the Court adheres to the
identical findings of fact of the MCTC and RTC.
Finally, respondent’s submissions are unreliable for
being contradictory. In some of his pleadings, he
claims to have acquired possession over the property
as early as in 1993; in others, he declares that he
entered the land in 2003. Notably, while he claimed in
his Answer in the MCTC that he entered the land in
1993, he declared in his appeal with the RTC and
Petition for Review in the CA that he took possession
of the property only in 2003. 50 Irreconcilable and
unexplained contradictions on vital points in
respondent’s account necessarily disclose a weakness
in his case.51
Regarding the award of actual damages, which
respondent prominently questioned all throughout the
proceedings, this Court finds that there is sufficient
basis for the MCTC to award petitioners the total
amount of ₱598,679.00 by way of actual damages. The
trial court’s findings on this score are based on the
evidence presented by the petitioners and the
respective statements of their witnesses, who
themselves are farmers cultivating lands adjacent to
the subject property. 52
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
February 19, 2010 Decision and November 9, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
101423 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 12,
2007 Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Cabagan-Delfin Albano, Isabela in Special Civil
Action No. 475 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
.