II.
SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin
Peaks Development Corporation.
COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner
sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President,
and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda
of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled
in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the
revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and
in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the
issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all
logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber
license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then
Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license
to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within
a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920
hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director
Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other
forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro
Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram
from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE
REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-
OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND
COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR
THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE
SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license
agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then
President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to
alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging
531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50
favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half
or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87
was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality
Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31,
2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas
Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister
Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying
petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was
not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution,
but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public
interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,
emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao
imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all
logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva
Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of
conservation and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great
responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the
trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the
availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also
for the future generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts
of the country are well documented. Their financial demands on
logging concessionaires are well known. The government,
therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of
funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and
the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order
reiterating, among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to
private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however
denied this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating
in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000
hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development
Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice
it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all
contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources
entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution
for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when
the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has
jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this
authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
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operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where
movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the
issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from
removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now
under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or
superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR
Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November
26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to
the Office of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the
Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of
petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been
terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied on August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13,
1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter,
public and private respondents submitted their respective
comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a
resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the
Court finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a
writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to
reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as
conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the
same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The
rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President
and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986,
respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order
issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its
timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA
No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents
in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its
remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as
amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions
until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2,
1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting
reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already
settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v.
Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v.
Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609;
Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA
374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter
dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent
to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],
seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director
Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in
this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its
letters to public respondents herein. In the letter to then President
Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its
record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the
subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear
to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that
the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as
evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area
to other entities in that year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the
benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he
failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the
instant petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by
their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling
TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent,
which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take
judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions
reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is
prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is
fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless
be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the
timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the
length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the
same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118
SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within
a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to
the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar
v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27,
1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968,
23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2,
1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the
part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right
itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who
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sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before
it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the
validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.
Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction,
was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts
which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these
orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the
issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against
public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents
the Court from departing from the general application of the rules
enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public
respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the
Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration
which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's
natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In
fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the
incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its
environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber
lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their
conservation and rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in
response to the renewed and growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial
role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of
such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this
country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of
the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the
irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has
produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social
effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a
vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the
supply of food and energy resources required by the people
seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass
profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future
generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government
to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest
lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the
clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies
[See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of
Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960);
Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461;
Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R.
No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor
General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877;
Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA
745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62
SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637,
July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present
case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against
that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of
forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of
discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege
of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No.
L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion
more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the
DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the
previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate
corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern
regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license
agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber
resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in
the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on
department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation
of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special
favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an
abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a
flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of
discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus
with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court
win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked,
in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section
1, Article VIII].
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
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herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought. persons acting in his behalf to —

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED. (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
SO ORDERED.
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur. renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Feliciano, J., is on leave. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."5

EN BANC The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
Branch 66, respondents.
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
The Solicitor General for respondents.
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
continued rape of Mother Earth."
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1
"greenhouse effect."
The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
trial.
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
rendered:

CAUSE OF ACTION

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7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some
sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly
53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0
million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors
have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will
be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade,
if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious
injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to
cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6
June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel
the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage
and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only
was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
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rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this
case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda
after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in
behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them,
do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted
in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file
an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage
of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed,
We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for
the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in
its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of
public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
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The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During
the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance
would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
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other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to
a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect
and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19
the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of
the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure
to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot
on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find
the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as
well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the
disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this
Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of
the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
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The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot
as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications,
the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,
29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-
impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
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SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the
Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the
most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to
influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection
and management of the environment, which of course embraces
the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of
our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself,
what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi
necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners'
claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the
very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in
the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency
directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in
the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and
focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as
"specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in
fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced
and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke
from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical
effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal
waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on
open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order
No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract
as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground
water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with
notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs
dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned
above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words,
appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who
are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial
court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language
of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
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failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part
of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right
or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1
of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners'
entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as
well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or
failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They
may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of
the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of
extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the
Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the
most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to
influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection
and management of the environment, which of course embraces
the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of
our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself,
what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi
necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners'
claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the
very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in
the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency
directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in
the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and
focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as
"specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in
fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced
and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke
from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical
effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal
waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on
open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
Page 11 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order
No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
— all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract
as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground
water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with
notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs
dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned
above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words,
appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who
are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section
15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial
court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language
of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part
of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right
or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1
of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced
and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result
will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners'
entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as
well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or
failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They
may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
Page 12 of 56
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I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of
the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of
extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions
and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN,
TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784,
were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the
Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the
second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos.
1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to
expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent
Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these
cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions
and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of
the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a
team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the
team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant
from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the
petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa,
and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices
covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and
origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative
seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized
articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles
requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to
produce the required documents covering the seized articles
because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber
origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied
the motion on the ground that the documents being required
from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest
products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report
recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's
Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered
Page 13 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a
banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard
including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded
herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner
fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of
said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant
for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if
and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as
well as the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using
recycled documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-
092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing
within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be
cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to
Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured
the required documents and was ready to submit them. None,
however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein,
after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April
1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law the approximately 311,000
board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks
found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case
(hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990,
without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber
consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and
dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of
Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and
hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of
P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as
amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles
and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR
agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at
No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-
dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990.
Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team
went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with
lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the
lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering
the transaction. The members of the team then introduced
themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be
the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was
able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including
newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries
and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber.
The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of
approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes
stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the
petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of
the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and general
manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed
down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that
an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting
of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277,
series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts,
trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be released to
the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on
Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June
1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-
V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of
the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully,
have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its
decision[15] in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts
and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby
set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required
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II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said
311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts
and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the
appropriate action before the proper court regarding the lauan
and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in
petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on
April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance
by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court has
taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts and
sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless
search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which
was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without
covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin
did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure
must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one
of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search
and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to
the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the
said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and
was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically
mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their
seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is
not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct
of the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3
May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor
of the Government for the reason that since the articles were
seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge
Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with
the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-
dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as
CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a
Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the
following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an
offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said
section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for
they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case
No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves
the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is
included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of
timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber
from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE,[21]
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of
lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and
regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of
18 October 1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision[24] in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit
the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to
the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since
there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and that
lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court
of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the
forest product involved has always been foisted by those who
claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when
appellant was required to present the valid documents showing
its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it
failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it.
[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.
[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2
May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed
down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner
did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was
made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell
lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure
was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d)
the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
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In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit
and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in
dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of
"lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being
prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of
the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted
for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that
since wood is included in the definition of forest product in
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily
included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or
employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of
committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said
Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the
petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424
with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an
offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion
reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other
forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
and hence, possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test
for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the
averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense,
[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the
places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But
conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of
lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of
the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It
is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession
of the private respondent, without the required legal documents,
are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not
described as lumber. They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2)
because they are separated by the words approximately 200,000
bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of.
They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically,
timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree
top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and
geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly,
even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items
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therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section,
and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his
dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of
the information for enlightenment as to whether the information
exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the
annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has
been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient
to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of
Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the
annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what the
team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately
four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a
negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000
bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics
supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution[31] of
the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the
filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that
an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and
supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of
Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics
supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion
that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this
Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber
or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing
plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.
[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning.[33] And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said
case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has
miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's
lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different
sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the
required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such
truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon
a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search
was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be
lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a
lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs
searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the
search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search
warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under
Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a
lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within
the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search
under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued
under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still
within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal
because possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in
the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion
in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case
palpably fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been
committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of
31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No.
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33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is
no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal
from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's
license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on
23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the
license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the
petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise
dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his
authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or
his Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all
cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not
penalized must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on
the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally
irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves
administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the
suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing
more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They
are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the
DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the
commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take
firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose
continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come,
if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to
protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any
person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING
ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and
18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong,
Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Ri Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal
case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor
to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No.
123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and
JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO
A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a
movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as
amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our
resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when
the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its
way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should
not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit
the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a
subsequent order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was
brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989
that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then
this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[3]
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin,
docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan[4]
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which
issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
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respondents.[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December
28, 1989.[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts
order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.
[8] Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution
dated September 27, 1993,[10] the prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this
Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the
suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand,
would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that
the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the
justification that (1) due process was violated because they were
not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of
DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products,
and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in
the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant
jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea
of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause
of action.[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less
true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an
ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when
there is a violation of due process,[13] (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question,[14] (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,[15] (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned,[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,[17] (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable,[19] (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim,[20] (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was
pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to
him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July
12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23]
private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail,
in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable
action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.[24]
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked
up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By
appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the
ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the
grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within
its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.[25] In Felipe Ismael,
Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,[26] which was
reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs.
Vasquez,[27] this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring
the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of
excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the
circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out
these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First,
they argued that there was violation of due process because they
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did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard.[28] One may be heard
, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings.[29] In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration,[31] as in
the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly
given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter
of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however,
denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of
seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative
officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these
acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized
to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of
Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent
provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with
private respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted
provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances
that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a
large extent, due to the fact that private respondents
interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of
Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His
Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the
matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary
and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to
dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of
statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General
is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more
responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the
urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct
from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended
to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of
forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-
the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and
protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation
of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize
certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court
under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all.
Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to
the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.[35]
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal
because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated
July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of
private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime.
This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the
counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :
xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her
in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the
truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a
criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx[36]
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the
aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of
petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they
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stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the
crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of
theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the
owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the
truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is,
the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In
the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further
amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the
confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may
not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the
product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a
fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx[37]
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime
defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified
theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order
that private respondents could not be charged for theft as
provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have
committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We
disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before
its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O.
No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced
herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
products without license. - Any person who shall cut , gather ,
collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or
from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified
theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705
before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277
amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending
Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of
theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but
the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the
phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and
inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the
statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[38]
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin
can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck
taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action
in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of
action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the
truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum,
being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts
and more importantly, being an element of private respondents
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded
solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the
property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.[39] To detain is
defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody,[40] and it has
been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an
unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of
dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.[41] Under the
Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the
plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained
by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same
has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution,
or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure,
and the actual value of the property.[42] Private respondents
miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention
of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted
that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the
DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision
of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention
of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention
exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural
tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued
by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as
amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by
the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review
the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :
SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall
be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed
by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its
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Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27,
1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205015 November 19, 2014
MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner)
conviction for violation of Section 681 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 705,2 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines (Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 277,3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon,
Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12,
2008.4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 01162,
dismissed the appeal in its Resolution5 dated April 15, 2011 for
failure to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated
November 19, 2012, also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution.
The Facts
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or
forest products in the vicinity of the house of the petitioner,
Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit
of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon,
Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo
Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house
at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon
arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of
the petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away from
the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate
from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber,
the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR
personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without
a search warrant.7
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is
equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered. When the DENR
personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim
of ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No.
35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly
bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel
scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the
species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in
the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10
pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with
sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in
the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of
magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces
2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12.8
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel
ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked for police
assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to
transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for
safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being
Confiscated,9 which showed the value of the lumber to be
9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and
Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s testimony.10
SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel
for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the
house of the petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was
later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the
transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon,
Bohol.11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita
Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were owned by the
petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor
Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java Marketing in Ubay,
Bohol.12 However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No.
35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not
tally with the forest products confiscated.
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13
alleged:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality
of Talibon, Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to
possess and to gain for her own benefit, without any legal
document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws and
regulations, and without any lawful authority under existing rules
and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully,
unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her custody and
control forest products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of
magsihagon lumber with a volume of 452 board feet and a total
value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the
Philippines.14
During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter, trial ensued.15
On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment16 convicting the
petitioner of the offense charged and sentenced her to
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras
minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber owned by the petitioner.17
As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.
However, in its Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the CA
dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to
furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied by the CA,in its Resolution19 dated November 19,
2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal
of the appeal due to the petitioner’s failureto serve a copy of the
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Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant
factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.
Ruling of the Court
In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of
technical procedure and submits that the CA erred in dismissing
her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the
policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the
determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with
technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when
the purpose of justice requires it.20
The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,technical sense,
for they have been adopted to help secure – not override –
substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with
caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather,
they must ensure thatall litigants are granted the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free
from the constraint of technicalities."21
It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of
the petitioner’s cause, the appellate court opted not to decide the
case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of
the RTC convicting the petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code
and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six
(6) years to eleven (11) years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any
deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to subvert and delay
the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner
learned that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to
serve a copy of her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately
confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed such
brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being
incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the
case. Thus, the petitioner submits that the outright denial of her
appeal is due to the incompetence and ignorance of her former
counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an
Appellant’s Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be
considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate
court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation
of the client’s liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of
justice so require.22
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel
to serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG is a persuasive
reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of
Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross negligence of her
counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in
the outright deprivation of her liberty.
In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a
liberal view of the rules and ruled on the meritsof the appeal,
especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner’s
liberty.
Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue,
it will still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a)
she had the supporting documents to show that she bought the
questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the
warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel
was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been
admitted in evidence against her.
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional
prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain
view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
"plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.24
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed
with a search warrant when they went to the house of the
petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s
house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the house of the
petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly
exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the
petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the
petitioner, even without a warrant. Section 8025 of the Forestry
Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or
any personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the
Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest products
gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch
lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently come
across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of
magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent failure to produce
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry
Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two
distinctand separate offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority;
and (2) possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.26
In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are legal
or not. Mere possession of forest products withoutthe proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry
Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber
or other forest products without the proper documentation as
malum prohibitum.27
In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly
owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no permit evidencing
authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the
Information correctly charged the petitioner with the second
offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest
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products without the proper documents. The prosecution
adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was
confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on
March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of the
petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso,
the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as
state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension well establishes the petitioner’s liability.
As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed
an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated
value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the
Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber
Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information.
However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this
amount is the estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in
the apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not
present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in
order to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the
penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must present more
than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under
Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.28 Hence, the lower court
erred in finding that the value of the confiscated lumber is
₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during
the trial.
Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis arresto mayorin
its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that
violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as
Qualified Theft under Article 31030 in relation to Article 309 of the
RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that
is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or
within the range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days,
considering that there are no attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the offense.
In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into
account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court finds it proper
to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances
obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-
27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma.
Mimie Crescencio is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner, vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008
Decision1 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo
R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of
Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to
2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public
officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of
regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those
present in the organizational meeting were Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio
Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and
Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government
organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar,
Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly,
the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a
permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to
the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221)
permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to
various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of
Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were
signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then
municipal administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation
of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and
Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to
0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest
product, person given the permit, and official receipt number, the
said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R.
Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then
the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of
General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position
and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring
and confederating with each other did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of
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forest product) to (person given the permit) under O.R. No.
(official receipt number) under the pretense of official position
and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority
properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The details for each Information are as follows:
(Graph removed- see attachments for reference)
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-
Trial agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial
evidence and submit the case for decision based on the
documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in
the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution
submitted their respective memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his
innocence based on following arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar,
Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest
products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only
express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied
from the powers expressly granted as well as those that are
necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and
effective governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the
inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in Section 16,
Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of
authority that enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any
power that will benefit their local constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain
functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the
permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved
function to manage and control communal forests with an area
not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the
payment of Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use
of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest products.
Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129,
Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186,
Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the
municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log,
timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or
CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for
lumber; hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his
side, a person wanting to transport the said forest products would
have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The
Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a
substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said
permits contain the annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and
regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The
Transport Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity
as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough
to impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression or
wrongdoing that may have been committed in the issuance
thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA
309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the
issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial
Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in
a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority
since they did not act "under the pretense of official position,"
accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor
and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that
he was an officer of DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on
December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding
Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases
as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is
hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of
Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him
to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be
entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M.
SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond
posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn
by said accused upon presentation of the original receipt
evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this
Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of
Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled and
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the
authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged
forest products lies with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been
devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To the graft
court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes
usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or
innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of
the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into
the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR,
and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
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The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units
(LGUs), has the authority to issue transportation permits of
salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential
Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines and in relation to Executive Order No. 192,
Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest
Management shall have jurisdiction and authority over all forest
land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including
watershed reservations presently administered by other
government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development,
management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the
regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees
and permittees for the taking or use of forest products therefrom
or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation of multiple
use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the
protection, development and preservation of national parks,
marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of
measures and programs to prevent kaingin and managed
occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other
bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of
lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of
sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and other wood processing
plants and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of
forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation
of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable
and disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process of
exercising such control the Department shall impose appropriate
payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration
and use of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development,
protection, conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for
by law, where applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation
and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and
permittees for the extraction, exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of
programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close
collaboration between the government and the private sector; the
effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of lands
of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources
laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements,
licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges
and arrangement concerning the development, exploration and
utilization of the country’s natural resources and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel or
cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon failure,
non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for
all other causes which are furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the
processing of forest products, grading and inspection of lumber
and other forest products and monitoring of the movement of
timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO
2000-78) which mandates that the permittee should secure the
necessary transport and other related documents before the
retrieved wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or
wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or
person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit
issued by the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned
logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon
damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches."11 It prescribes
that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or recover logs
or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the
Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery
Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the
authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
products.1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and
regulating salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s
functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and
shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies
and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
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necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision,
control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-
based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar
forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited
the devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following:
(1) the implementation of community-based forestry products; (2)
management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3) establishment of
tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects.13
It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of
1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management
functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had been
devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry
projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of
regular appropriations, except at least one project per province
that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified
by the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas and
critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except
those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation
projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the
DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with
DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other
guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of
financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000)
hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the
concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into
community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of
small watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as
identified or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project
areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in
Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging,
smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other
unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances,
equipment and other implements used in the commission of
offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series
of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities
outside the devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with
the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to
salvaged forest products was not included in the above
enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to
issue transport permits remains with the DENR15 and, thus,
cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting
exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under
the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment
have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government
instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules
and regulations for the protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government
instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the
environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto
the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can
never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In
fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such
authority to the exclusion of all other government
instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive
mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general
welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
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the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments
are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall
be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of
property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this
duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it
deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the
right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly,
provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation
of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be
deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in
their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this
objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by
Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the
municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and
occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the
monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest products through
the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility
which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both.
DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share
with the national government, particularly the DENR, the
responsibility in the sustainable management and development of
the environment and natural resources within their territorial
jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment
protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No.
98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-
LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management
Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the
DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA
7160 and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the
following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-
DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management
functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, protection, proper use and
sustainable development of the country’s environment and
natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the forest resources
within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and
the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and
partnership in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are
important tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest
resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with
other government agencies shall undertake forest land use
planning as an integral activity of comprehensive land use
planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural
resources to support local, regional and national growth and
development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared
responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land
resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the
capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest
management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train
the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As the
LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced, the primary
tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be
performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in
consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional
functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or
enter into agreements with them for enlarged forest management
and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help
achieve community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the
partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned
sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local
communities for forest management including enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged
forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s
authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to
complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest
resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that
instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to
reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as
the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government."21
Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between
promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different
government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to
immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.22 Accordingly,
although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is
not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its
power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders,
rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of
salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued
by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes
the nature of transport fees levied by the municipality for the use
of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been
conferred by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident
to the LGU’s power to create its own sources of revenue pursuant
to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units
may impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered.
xxxx
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Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local
government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws:
Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared
national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such
taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior
public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued
under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444
of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land,
mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality;
provide efficient and effective property and supply management
in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other
properties of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling
ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity.
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or
charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan
through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the
terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless
to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal
administration is that "local revenue is generated only from
sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that
the authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits
should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang
Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is
mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which
endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of
logs and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General
Nakar’s Revised Municipal Revenue Code27 and Municipal
Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which
the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus,
in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and
transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport
issued by Ruzol are infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s
devolved function to "manage and control communal forests"
under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious.
Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management
and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction,
We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced
in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law
for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from
the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and
control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies
and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal
forest"30 has a well-defined and technical meaning.31
Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence
and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be
discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG, on
behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01
which outlined the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by
the city and municipal governments shall be governed by the
following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall
undertake the actual identification and assessment of existing
communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability
of the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable,
then these communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval
for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation
of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and the
RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended
by the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve
their purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the
communal forest is located shall pass resolution requesting the
DENR Secretary for the turnover of said communal forest to the
city or municipality. Upon receipt of said resolution, the DENR
Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring
said communal forest to the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall
effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU within fifteen (15)
days from the issuance of the administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative
Order and turnover of said communal forest to the city or
municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was
transferred shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR
Council for approval a management plan governing the
sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management
plan, DENR shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU,
undertake a forest resource inventory and determine the
sustainable level of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU
technical assistance in all facets of forest management planning to
ensure sustainable development. The management plan should
include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs
of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by
the following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned
city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through
a forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the
DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan
shall indicate, among others, the site and location of the
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communal forests within the production forest categorized as
such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief
executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an
Administrative Order declaring the identified area as a communal
forest. The required administrative order shall be issued within
sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal
forest, the city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management
plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The management
plan shall include provision for replanting by the communities and
the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed
a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a
communal forest, the following requirements must be
accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate,
among other things, the site and location of the communal
forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an
administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the
identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that
these requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of
an established communal forest within the Municipality of General
Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport
were issued as an incident to the management and control of a
communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned
statutory requirements for the issuance of permits to transport
foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may
be issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood Recovery
Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the
regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person
seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a
Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before
obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the
LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of
Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under
Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any
person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of
the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who,
under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two
ways of committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely
representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of
any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of
usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime
of usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official
functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest
products under the alleged "pretense of official position and
without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly
belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of
the crime were attendant in the present case because the
authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must
be established by the prosecution.36 As held by this Court in
People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role
in our criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal
prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if
convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will
leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt
before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even
property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the
petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a
more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt
proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of
the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so
that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As explained by this Court in
People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact
that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the
subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its
hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and
therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not
for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by
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the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However,
contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful
scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that
Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime
of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests
principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only
government instrumentality that can issue the permits to
transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that
Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole
government agency vested with the authority to issue permits
relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs
may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and
not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In
effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under
his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official
functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of
any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses
that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an
excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol
acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this
Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal
prosecutions for usurpation of official functions.43 The term
"good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together
with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts
which render transaction unconscientious."44 Good faith is
actually a question of intention and although something internal,
it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving
protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and
outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan
reasoned as follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized
under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to
secure the approval of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations
and religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He
could very well have issued subject permits even without the
approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he
was legally empowered to do so considering that the
endorsement of these organizations is not required by law. That
Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean
that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for issuing the
said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-
up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither
legal basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that
good faith is negated when an accused sought another person’s
approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that
bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or affirmation of
others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find
that the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of
bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to
regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products
to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In
fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to
transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier
narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants
during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by
Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who agreed
that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of
General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s
authority as local chief executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is
negated by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to
issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the
presence and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado
Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend
itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately
intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by
the prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR
official who has the authority and credibility to publicly object
against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence
of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not
negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the
environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each
and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has
his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the
environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which
a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the
rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and
plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated
to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and
conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this
responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an
act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of
non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the
concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his
acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in
consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt
intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged
in for the benefit of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the
unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when
he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is
that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor
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salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to avert
the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold
him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would
be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing
advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the
protection of the environment and conservation of our natural
resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present
case and considering further that this case demands only the
determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of
official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity
of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby
resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance,
pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s
acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-
CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating
Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211356 September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON.
MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY,
AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE
PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER
GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE
OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE
GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging
the Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3,
2014, respectively. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo
Aquino's Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to
question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No.
10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel
establishment.
The Facts
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay
Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West
Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2
While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the
application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land
measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered by a Forest Land
Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the
Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on
the ground that the proposed construction site was withinthe "no
build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131
(Ordinance).3 As provided in the Ordinance:
SECTION 2. – Definition of Terms. Asused in this Ordinance, the
following words, terms and phrases shall mean as follows:
xxxx
(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the
edge of the mean high water mark measured inland;
xxxx
SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether
temporary or permanent shall be allowed to be set up, erected or
constructed on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in
its offshore waters. During the conduct of special activities or
special events, the Sangguniang Bayan may, through a Resolution,
authorize the Office of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for
construction of temporary structures on the beach for the
duration of the special activity as embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of
the Mayor on February 1, 2010. On May 13, 2010, petitioner
followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a
Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the
settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other
liabilities under pain of a recommendation for closure in view of
its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the
necessaryzoning clearance, building permit, and business and
mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle
the company’s obligations, butthe municipal treasurer refused to
accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort
hotel.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was
issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of
the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay,
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter,
two more instances followed wherein respondents demolished
the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most
recent of which was made in February 2014.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse
of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial
proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent
mayor could order the demolition of the company’s
establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by
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the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to construct
permanent improvements on the area in question; thatsince the
area is a forestland, it is the DENR—and not the municipality of
Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that
has primary jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional
Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an
opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present case;
that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and lastly, that it is the
mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary
clearances in the company’s favor.
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not
excuse the company from complying with the Ordinance and
Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also
argued that the demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed
the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the
CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial
Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA
on February 3, 2014 through the challenged Resolution. Hence,
the instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and
substance.
The Issues
Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are
as follows:
1. The propriety under the premises ofthe filing of a petition for
certiorari instead of a petition for declaratory relief;
a. Whether or not declaratory reliefis still available to petitioner;
b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent
mayor was performing neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial
function when he ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel;
2. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of
discretion when he issued EO 10;
a. Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated
when the respondent mayor ordered the closure and demolition
of Boracay West Cove’s hotel without first conducting judicial
proceedings;
b. Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the
necessary building permit and clearances was justified;
c. Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over
the municipal ordinance providing for a no-build zone; and
d. Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the
controversy, not the LGU.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in
petitioner’s contention that the special writ of certiorari, and not
declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x
x x (emphasis added)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been
no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights
arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance
therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of
the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief
is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.4
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became
unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and implementation. The
closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying outthe
directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when
it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a
situation.
b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari
On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari, Sec. 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. x x
x
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For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.5
Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari upon determining that the first element is wanting—
that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions when he issued EO 10.
We are not persuaded.
The CA fell into a trapwhen it ruled that a mayor, an officer from
the executive department, exercises an executive function
whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too
presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather
than of the office,board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of
judicial or quasijudicial functions. The first requirement for
certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public character.6
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be
strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to courts of justice, but it issufficient if they are
quasi-judicial.7 To contrast, a party is said to be exercising
ajudicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial functionis "a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from themas a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature."8
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the
respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay West Cove’s
construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel inMalay, Aklan
is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent
mayor’s exercise of quasijudicial functions, against which the
special writ of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in
City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:9
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor
is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a
ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal
or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby
needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in
the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of
these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial
powers.
With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the
respondent mayor was merely exercising his executive functions,
for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been satisfied.
Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that the third
element, i.e., the unavailability of a plain, speedy,or adequate
remedy, is also present herein. While it may be argued that, under
the LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to review
by provincial governors,10 this cannot be considered as an
adequate remedy given the exigencies of petitioner’s
predicament. In a litany of cases, We have held that it is
inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and
the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy
and adequate ifit will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not
mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in
order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently
void for failureof the trial court to comply with the Rules of
Court.11
Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in mind that
respondents in this case have already taken measures towards
implementing EO 10. In fact, substantial segments of the hotel
have already been demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive.
It is then understandable why petitioner prayed for the issuance
ofan injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would otherwise
have been unavailable had he sought a reversal from the office of
the provincial governor of Aklan. Evidently, petitioner correctly
saw the urgent need for judicial intervention via certiorari.
In light of the foregoing, the CA should have proceeded to grab
the bull by its horns and determine the existence of the second
element of certiorari––whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents.
Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
appropriate remedy, We will proceed to resolve the core issues in
view of the urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition.
Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion
a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.12
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU
effectively made a determination that constructions therein,
without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as
nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No buildzones
are intended for the protection of the public because the stability
ofthe ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby
body of water. The ever present threat of high rising storm surges
also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the
shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards
cannot be ignored and ample protection to the residents of
Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations,
petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily be abated
because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v.
People,13 petitioner also argues that respondents should have
first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Preliminarily, We agree with petitioner’s posture that the property
involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se, but not for the
reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the litmus
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test for such a determination. More controlling is the property’s
nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it
qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds:
nuisanceper se and nuisanceper accidens. The first is recognized
as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that
reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity. The second is thatwhich depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.14
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a
nuisance per sesince this type of nuisance is generally defined as
an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all
timesand under any circumstances, regardless of locationor
surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––
its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no
build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary
permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel
is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per
accidens.
b. Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of
illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a
nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se.16 So it was held
in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:17
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)
(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms
of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang
Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a
fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing,
be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, We still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless
properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,18
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawfulbusinesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.19
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function
asthe executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authorityto hear issues involving property rights of individuals and
to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing tosecure the
necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444.The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. –
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose
of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and
revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided
for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and
revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and
country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or
other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to such
fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or to
make necessary changes in the construction of the same when
said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the
demolition or removal of said house, building or structure within
the period prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis supplied)
c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present
i. Illegality of structures
In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the
necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before the
construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s
hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the
application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office
of the mayor even though construction and operation were
already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be
denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131, which provides:
SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.
(a) No building or structure shall beallowed to start construction
unless a Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the
Office of the Municipal Engineer.Once issued, the building owner
or any person in charge of the construction shall display on the lot
or on the building undergoing construction a placard containing
the Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The office of
the Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless:
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning
Clearance by the Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer;
2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the
Sangguniang Bayan through a Letter of Endorsement.
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(b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the
requirements for its construction asverified to by the Building
Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan shall be issued a Certificate
of Occupancy by the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses
being undertaken on buildings or structures which were not
issued a certificate of Occupancy beginning January 2001 and
thereafter.
xxxx
SECTION 10. – Penalties.
xxxx
(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public
place within the Municipality of Malay such as but not limited to
streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beachesor in any other
public place are hereby declared as nuisance and illegal
structure.Such building structure or contraption shall be
demolished by the owner thereof or any of his authorized
representative within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to
demolish. Failure or refusal on the part of the owner or any of his
authorized representative to demolish the illegal structure within
the period here inabove specified shall automatically authorize
the government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish the
same, gather and keep the construction materials of the
demolished structure. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto
the respondent mayor and the latter’s failure to act on his appeal
for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed
with his infrastructure projects. On the contrary,this only means
that the decision of the zoning administrator denying
theapplication still stands and that petitioner acquired no right to
construct on the no build zone. The illegality of the construction
cannot be cured by merely tendering payment for the necessary
fees and permits since the LGU’s refusal rests on valid grounds.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could
have filed, as an alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel
the respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the
controversy pending before his office. There is indeed an
exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and
discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such
writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. Whether or not the decision would be for or against
petitioner would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while
mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it
cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular
way.21 What would have been important was for the respondent
mayor to immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able to
go through the motions that the zoning clearance application
process entailed.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He
consciously chose to violate not only the Ordinance but also Sec.
301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building permits,
which provides:
Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation,
including any agency or instrumentality of the government shall
erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any
building or structure or cause the same to be done without first
obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official
assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the
building work is to be done.
This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s
invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is
separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate
nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions
are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of
due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
ii. Observance of procedural due process rights
In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to
have been sufficiently complied with. First, basic is the rule that
public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.22 The burden is on the petitioner
herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was deprived of the
opportunity to beheard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably,
copies of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of
the assailed EO 10 itself were never attached to the petition
before this Court, which documents could have readily shed light
on whether or not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace
period provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this
fact, the presumption of regularity must be sustained. Second, as
quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA, the assailed EO
10 states that petitioner received notices from the municipality
government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay West
Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do
so.23 If such was the case, the grace period can be deemed
observed and the establishment was already ripe for closure and
demolition by the time EO 10 was issued in June. Third, the
observance of the 10-day allowance for the owner to demolish
the hotel was never questioned by petitioner so there is no need
to discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds invoked by
petitioner in crying due process violation are (1) the absence of a
court order prior to demolition and (2) the municipal
government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead
of the DENR. Therefore, it can no longer be belatedly argued that
the 10-day grace period was not observed because to entertain
the same would result in the violation of the respondents’ own
due process rights. Given the presence of the requirements under
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building constituted a
nuisance per seor a nuisance per accidensbecomes immaterial.
The hotelwas demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but
because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to
construction. It justso happened that, in the case at bar, the
hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens––its
being constructed within the no build zone––further resulted in
the non-issuance of the necessary permits and clearances, which
is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a
court order that is required under normal circumstances is hereby
dispensed with.
d. The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD
1096
Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT
provision:
VII. The SECOND PARTY may construct permanent and/or
temporary improvements or infrastructure in the FLAgT Area
necessary and appropriate for its development for tourism
purposes pursuant to the approved SMP. "Permanent
Improvements" refer to access roads, and buildings or structures
which adhere to the ground in a fixed and permanent manner. On
the other hand, "Temporary Improvements" include those which
are detachablefrom the foundation or the ground introduced by
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the SECOND PARTY inthe FLAgT Area and which the SECOND
PARTY may remove or dismantle upon expiration or cancellation
of this AGREEMENT x x x.24
Taken in conjunction with the exceptions laid down in Sections 6
and 8 of the Ordinance, petitioner argues that Boracay West Cove
is exempted from securing permits from the LGU. Said exceptions
read:
SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be
constructed on a slope Twenty Five Percent (25%) or higher unless
provided with soil erosion protective structures and authorized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
xxxx
SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be
constructed on a swamp or other water-clogged areas unless
authorized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT
constitutes sufficient authorization from the DENR to proceed
with the construction of the three-storey hotel.
The argument does not persuade.
The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not
unbridled. Forestlands, although under the management of the
DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal
laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their powers
of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the
limitations circumscribed in the ordinance are not mutually
exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447 (a)
(5)(i) of the LGC:
Section 447.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipalityand
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for
under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and
facilities, shall:
(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree
parks,greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projectsx x x. (emphasis added)
Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT
granted by the DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner to likewise
comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force even before the
FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to stress that
Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from
complying with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to
grant exemptions from the ban on constructions on slopes and
swamps, not on the no build zone.
Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from
complying with PD 1096. As correctly pointed out by respondents,
the agreement cannot and will not amend or change the law
because a legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual
agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to
secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National
Building Code.
e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the
controversy
Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the
respondent mayor, petitioner argued that the hotel site is a
forestland under the primary jurisdiction of the DENR. Assuch, the
merits of the case should have been passed upon by the agency
and not by the LGU. In the alternative, petitioner explains that
even if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in favor of
the LGU, the DENR still has the power of review and supervision
over the former’s rulings. As cited by the petitioner, the LGC reads:
Section 17.Basic Services and Facilities. –
xxxx
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to,
the following:
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision,
control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-
based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar
forest development projects. (emphasis added)
Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this
provision, the DENR Region 6 had issued anopinion favourable to
petitioner.25 To petitioner, the adverted opinion effectively
reversed the findings of the respondent mayor that the structure
introduced was illegally constructed.
We disagree.
In alleging that the case concernsthe development and the proper
use of the country’s environment and natural resources, petitioner
is skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay West Cove's non-
compliance with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements
for building constructions under national and municipal laws. He
downplays Boracay West Cove's omission in a bid to justify
ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and transferring the
same to the DENR. He attempts to blow the issue out of
proportion when it all boils down to whether or not the
construction of the three-storey hotel was supported by the
necessary documentary requirements.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has
quasijudicial powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments.1âwphi1 This power granted by the LGC, as earlier
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explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of
the LGU under Sec. 17 (b )(2)(ii), as abovequoted, which is subject
to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be
demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved
herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental
protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of
the structure.1âwphi1 Rather than treating this as an
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the
root cause of this debacle-compliance.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of
the DENR over respondents' actions exercised through an
instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no
sufficient basis. At best, the legal opinion rendered, though
perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and should
be taken with a grain of salt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013
and February 3, 2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director
of Forest Development and the Director of Lands, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA
CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING
PIRASO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La
Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and
possessed by the late Salming Piraso and later by his successors-
in-interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirty
years up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title
on the property which this Court therefore confirms and affirms in
accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical
description of the survey made of the same and in accordance
with the corresponding plan be so registered. (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf
of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed with the Court of Firing Instance
of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the
following describe property:
A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the
Barrio of Ansagan Municipality of Tuba, Mountain Province.
Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino
(PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-3-4-5 by
public land, on the We, along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo.
Containing an area of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE
(2,197,879) SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor
General, filed an opposition to the application for registration
stating, among others:
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest
possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not having
been acquired by them either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the present application;
That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-14,
Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition
to the application for registration on the following grounds:
That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929;
That the area sought to be registered is neither release for
disposition nor alienation; and that the herein applicant has no
registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in
law. (p. 14, Rollo)
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court,
as earlier stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to the applicants.
The motion for reconsideration filed by Government oppositor's
having been denied, an appeal was made to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court.
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors
of the Court of Appeals:
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION
BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL
CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS—INTEREST WAS NOT
IN CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND
LAW, THE LAND BEING INALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO
SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST
PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE
DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;
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E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD
POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF THE LAND
APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION OVER THE REST OF THE (219.7879) HECTARES
APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)
The issues raised are:
1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public
forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have established
registerable title over the land in question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered
by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the public forests within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation
No. 217 of Governor General Henry Stimson dated February 16,
1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said property
was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau
of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry,
the Land Registration Court, and the applicants for registration.
During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be rolling and
stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970
stating among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes
and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agricultural
purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D.
Zapatero, submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a separate report
dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not
been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry
who had administrative jurisdiction over the same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably
part of the public forest and has not been reclassified or released
from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject of
registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner
points out that lands within the forest zone or within a duly
established reservation do not form part of the disposable portion
of the public domain nor can the same be alienated as said lands
are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same into
private property.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents
or their predecessors-in-interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired
ownership over the land prior to its classification as part of the
Cordillera Forest Reserve use there is no evidence on record that
Salming Piraso had possessed the property for any appreciable
period prior to 1929 when the land became part of the Cordillera
Forest Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals show that the land subject
of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
and the same land applied for registration is disposable and
alienable. The private respondents, as applicants, claim to have
sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land
being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming
Piraso as far back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the
arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products
and raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late
Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose
Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved
by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925,
while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February
16, 1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the
government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only
mean that said land was no longer included in the overall survey
of the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As
applicants, they contend that they have possessed the land
applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse
against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty
(30) years before they filed the application over the land which is
agricultural and separate from the public domain.
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert
them into private property (Vano vs. Government of Philippine
Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401;
Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la
Cruz 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89
SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then,
possession of the land by the applicants prior to the
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be
credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
supra). In this case, there is no showing of reclassification by the
Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or
alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals which the government
oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as
the operative act which converted the lands covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong.
The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929
proclamation. It did not ease a classification from non-forest into
forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely
declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest
lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before the
proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the
cultivation of 15 hectares out of a (219.7879) hectares claimed
area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest
land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land,
earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable
and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted
for purposes of an imperfect title.
The records positively establish that the land in question is part of
the public forest which the Executive formally proclaimed as the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its integrity
and to give it a status which is more special for certain purposes
than that of ordinary forest lands.
One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a
registerable title for the private respondents is its observation that
the Government failed to show that the disputed land is more
valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure to prove
that trees are thriving in the land.
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The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what
is forest land. There is a big difference between "forest" as defined
in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
lands of the public domain in the Constitution. (Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status a classification for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded
land with dense growths of trees and underbush. However, the
cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest and
not automatically convert the lands of the public domain from
forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classffied as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v.
Animas, (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground
that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable
public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and
title to said area is void at initio. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. (at p. 75)
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned
property was conducted by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr.,
of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D.
Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto
Gogoling as representative of the land registration court, Fiscal
Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the applicant.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated
April 17, 1970, which states, among others, that the land is
covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not
suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the
private respondents that the land has been cultivated since 1915.
More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its
status, as stated in the separate report dated April 6, 1970
submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester
Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied
for by the applicant fails within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural
purposes by the Director of Forestry who has administrative
jurisdiction over the same. This has not been successfully refuted.
It has not been proved erroneous.
Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report,
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated that:
Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?
A I know, sir.
Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are
subject matters of land registration cases, have you inspected this
land in question also?.
A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the
area if it falls within the reservation or within the alienable or
disposable area.
Q What is your finding, if any ?
A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve.
Q Was that finding reduced into writing?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of
the records which for purposes of Identification, we pray that the
same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the government oppositors,
your Honor.
COURT:
As what?
FISCAL BRAWNER:
Rather as Exhibit "1"
COURT:
Have it marked.
Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you
made?
A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the
Provincial Fiscal.
Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name "Ricardo
D. Zapatero", whose signature is that?
A That is mine, sir.
Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the
land falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you
arrive at that conclusion?
A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the
applicant and because of the Bureau of Forestry map.
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Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied
for?
A Yes, air.
Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the nature of this land applied for?
A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and
there are certain enemies of plants inside the land, in some area.
COURT:
Q What are the species of plants?
A There are species of Binayuyu.
Q That is for lumber?
A No, that is not.
FISCAL BRAWNER:
Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of
the land applied for is generally stony, and because of the
Binayuyu species, the condition of the land is not suited for
agricultural purposes?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the basis of that statement?
A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination,
we believe that is not good for agricultural purposes. The land
applied for is more suited for pasture purposes. (pp. 203-206, tsn.,
September 6,1971; Emphasis supplied)
The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and
Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner that
the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director
of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly
will be, Paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert
who speaks with authority on Forestry matters.
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court
that the property in question was no longer part of the public
land when the Government through the Director of Lands
approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan Psu-43639) for
Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property
even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of
ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of
Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has
a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which
forms part of the country's forest reserves does not convert such
land into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming
that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such
approval is nun and void. There must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified
into alienable and disposable agricultural land which may then be
acquired by private persons in accordance with the various modes
of acquiring public agricultural lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the land registration
court which granted the private respondents' application for
registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application for land registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.]
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HON.
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES,
ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, Defendants-
Appellees.
Abila, Villegas & Associates for plaintiff-appellant
The Solicitor General for Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN; HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL
RELEASED AS DISPOSABLE OR ALIENABLE. — It is elementary in
the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries
has authority to lease, grant, cell, or otherwise dispose of these
lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for granting or other
purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. The
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose
of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAVING JURISDICTION
OVER LEASES OF PUBLIC LANDS FOR DEVELOPMENT INTO
FISHPONDS; PREFERENTIAL RIGHT AMONG APPLICANTS, NOT
FEASIBLE WHERE FILING OF APPLICATIONS PREMATURE. — All
the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can
claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given
in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed
so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for
disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be
given some kind of administrative preferential treatment.
Petitioner’s application was filed almost two years before the
release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private
respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year
period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-
appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the
least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the
respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications
must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the
day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share
the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The
private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision
of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
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3. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; CHARGED WITH THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A PROVISION OF A
STATUTE; CONSTRUCTION GIVEN CONTROLLING WEIGHT. — The
Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the
provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature
application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was
released and not to grant a premature application a better right
over another of the same category. The Supreme Court finds such
an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should
not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722)
the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the construction of the
officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of
a statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v.
Echavez (79 SCRA 220) it was held that in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department
head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings
should also apply to the present case.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; ABSENCE IN
THE CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner has failed to show that the
acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in
the proper administration of justice and processes of the law
which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations
of petitioner right, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the
resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he
did, a criminal complaint or other before the courts. The Court
held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and
arrogant defiance of the court. The petitioner has failed to show a
contempt of court which the Court can take cognizance of and
punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-third’s
share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the
correct action before the proper lower court.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President
regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into
fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was
elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of
law was involved in the appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted
the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General’s brief. We do the
same:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove
swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated
in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province
of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and
possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons
filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the
same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de
Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by
Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both
applications were rejected, however, because said area were then
still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet
available for fishpond purposes.
"On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a
similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of
Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita
de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective
applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24,
1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in
the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond
purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on
January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties
were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the
whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the
claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal).
Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the
order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as
D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).
"In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the
order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the
division of the area in question into three portions giving each
party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their
respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a
petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the
same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the
Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A
motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15,
1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third
motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied
on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec.
on Appeal)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M.
Lopez.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public
respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the
Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the
petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office
of the President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH ‘CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT’ ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE
COURT.
II
Page 42 of 56
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT
ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE ‘PRIORITY RULE’ ESTABLISHED IN
PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION
OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS
AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE
APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES
LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND IN
ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE
APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-
THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of
public lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their
discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the
only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application. —In determining the
priority of application or right to a permit or lease the following
rules shall be observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same
area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant
shall have the right of preference thereto.
x x x given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether
"‘(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been
rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the
fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the
Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL
NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON,
the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as
available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one
(1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his
application, in which case, his fishpond application which was
rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due
course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area
shall be rejected.’"
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their
applications on the following dates:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953.
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for
fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore,
that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the
time all five applicants filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of
Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngson’s application and
rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason
given was Yngson’s priority of application.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The
administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of
discretion.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of
the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the
Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise
dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for
grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara
v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA
1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and
dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the
public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority
given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications
filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for
disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be
or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an
administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of
paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson
is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed
almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond
purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications
within the one year period, do not object to sharing the area with
the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has
apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of
fact, the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three
applications must be considered as having been filed at the same
time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries
and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of
them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They
pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in
toto.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose
of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature
application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was
released and not to grant a premature application a better right
over another of the same category. We find such an interpretation
as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the
rule that the construction of the officer charged with
implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be
given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA
220) we held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the
discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected.
Page 43 of 56
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The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the
present case.
During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a
motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other
respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged
that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy
and without petitioner’s consent, laid stakes on the ground
alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were
claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property
on different dates and destroyed petitioner’s hut and the
uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to
occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the
contempt motion denied petitioner’s charges. Bayoborda and
Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond
purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares allotted for the
petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the
areas they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a
copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on
Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their applications have
been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in
compliance with government regulations, they placed markers
and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise
stated that these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed
and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in
the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to
the present conflict. The resolution further prohibited Yngson
from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22
hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from
entering and making constructions in the applied for areas
pending the issuance of their permits.
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the
respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper
administration of justice and processes of the law which
constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of
petitioner’s rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the
resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he
did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The
motion also raises factual considerations including boundaries
and geographical locations more proper for a trial
court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious
and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64
SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140, 142).
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we
can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other
rights over his one-third’s share of the disputed property are
violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower
court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against Petitioner-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46048 November 29, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (now Director of Forest
Development), petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MIGUEL MARCELO, CELIA
ZURBITO, HEIRS OF JOSE ZURBITO, namely, SOLEDAD VDA.
DE ZURBITO, GASPAR, GUADALUPE, ADELAIDA, FELIPE, JOSE
and CECILIO, all surnamed ZURBITO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Antonio P. Fortuno for respondents Miguel Marcelo and Celia
Zurbito.
Melquides Paredes for respondent Heirs of Jose Zurbito.
Eduardo M. Marcaida, Jr. for respondent Soledad B. Vda. de
Zurbito.
REGALADO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49640-R 2 which affirmed, with
modifications, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Masbate in Land Registration Case No. N-9419, LRC Record
No. N-9414, thereof. The proceedings in the court a quo started
on February 8, 1955 when herein private respondent Miguel
Marcelo filed an application for the registration of two (2) parcels
of land with an aggregate area of 116.8441 hectares, situated in
Sitio Calulod Barrio Pauwa Masbate, Masbate. 3
Oppositions were filed by the Government and private parties.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry (now Forest
Development), which is the one involved in the present recourse,
was based on the ground that the 22 hectares of the aggregate
area of the two parcels of land applied for form part of
Timberland Block F, Land Classification Project No. 3, L.C. Map No.
452, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924. 4
The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court and quoted with
approval by the respondent court, are as follows:
The evidence of the herein applicant disclosed that from 1909 and
during the conjugal union of the spouses Jose Zurbito and
Soledad Zurbito, they commenced to purchase small parcels of
land from various owners adjoining the 30 hectares of land
located in Calulod Pauwa (sic), Masbate, which Jose Zurbito
inherited from his parents. The land thus acquired by the spouses
comprises the two parcels of land which (the spouses) described
in Plan Psu-104631. The parcels of land which the spouses bought
have (sic) fruit-bearing coconut trees at the time they were
purchased, some of which are estimated to be one year old. Jose
Zurbito, however, continued to plant more coconut trees and
there are now no less than 10,000 trees on the land. A small area
outside of the coconut plantations is devoted to pasture and the
marshy portion not covered by nipa palms has been converted
into a fishpond. The spouses occupied and cultivated these
properties and their possession was peaceful, adverse, public,
open, and in the concept of owners. Upon the death of Jose
Zurbito on June 22, 1955 (sic), his wife Soledad Buencamino
Zurbito and his children succeeded to his estate and continued his
possession. The estate of Jose Zurbito was placed under
administratix (sic) thereof. On April 13, 1943, Soledad vda. de
Zurbito sold, under a deed of absolute sale, her rights, title,
interest and participation in the parcels of land subject of this
Page 44 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
registration proceedings in favor of the herein applicant, Dr.
Miguel Marcelo, who is also her son-in-law, for and in
consideration of the sum of P10,000.00 (Exhibit H). Then on
October 24, 1944, Soledad vda. de Zurbito, as administratix of the
estate of the deceased Jose Zurbito and in behalf of her children,
Engracia, Gaspar and Felipe, co-signed with her other children,
namely, Guadalupe, Adelaide, Jose and Celia, a deed of sale with a
right to repurchase wherein they sold to Miguel Marcelo for and
in consideration of the sum of P12,000.00 the remaining one-half
undivided portion of the properties mentioned in the previous
deed of sale. Under the provisions of the aforementioned deed,
the vendors were given the option to repurchase the properties
within five years from the date thereof (October 24, 1944)
extendible for another period of one year at the option of
vendors. It is further stipulated that upon failure of the vendors to
redeem the properties, within the alloted (sic) time, title shall
automatically vest in the vendee, Dr. Miguel Marcelo. inasmuch as
the properties were already covered by another pacto de retro
sale in favor of one Adela Romero, part of the consideration of the
sale was paid to the said Adela Romero in order to redeem the
properties from her. When the vendors-a-retro failed to
repurchase the properties within the period agreed upon, Dr.
Marcelo consolidated ownership of the properties by executing
and registering in 1954 an affidavit of consolidation dated
December 2,1953 in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Masbate (Exhibits M, M-1 and M-2).<äre||anº•1àw> The evidence
of the applicant shows that after Dr. Marcelo consolidated
ownership of the properties in 1954 and paid the delinquent taxes
in the sum of P2,691.21, he allowed his mother-in-law, Soledad
vda. de Zurbito, to continue managing the properties because he
and his wife are living in Manila where he is engaged in the
practice of medicine. Soledad vda. de Zurbito attended to the
affairs of the hacienda, paid the taxes due thereon, deducted from
the income whatever expenses she might have incurred including
her subsistence and remitted to Dr. Marcelo in Manila the excess,
if any. This arrangement was made in consideration of the
personal relationship between the applicant and Soledad vda. de
Zurbito. 5
With respect to the opposition of the Government, said decision
states, inter alia:
The Director of Lands did not adduce evidence to show that the
land is part of the public domain and left to the applicant the
burden of proving that in the absence of any form of grant from
the state, he acquired an imperfect or incomplete title thereto,
and has all the qualifications and perfumed (sic) all the conditions
prescribed by law to justify the registration of the land in his
name.
The Opposition of the Director of Forestry is centered on the
claim that approximately 22 hectares of the land is within the
forest zone indicated in the sketch (Exhibit 22-government) as
Exh. 22-B. In his report, Forester Anacleto B. Espinas stated that
the area is a portion of Block F, Timber Land, Land Classification
project No. 3, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924,
L.C. Map No. 452. Inside this portion is a fishpond containing an
area of 15 hectares covered by fishpond lease agreement of
Leocadio Guzon with the Bureau of Fisheries. After the expiration
of the fishpond permit granted to Leocadio Guzon, the Director of
Lands refused to approve the private land survey of the fishpond
as a prerequisite to the renewal of the lease agreement with the
Bureau of Fisheries on the ground that the land in question is
under litigation. The authentic document evidencing the
classification of the land applied for registration as a forest zone
has (sic) been presented. Neither the order setting aside the said
portion as timber land by the Director of Forestry nor the original
plan nor a certified copy thereof showing the segregation from
which the sketch (Exhibit 22-government) has been traced or
copied, was introduced. Without these proofs, the testimony
alone of a forester will not be considered sufficient and
convincing for the Court to adjudge the area in question as timber
land (Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA G.R. No. 177-R; 45 O.G.
2128). It has been held that this will not convert ipso facto the
land into a forest land. (vigor vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No.
24582- R, October 21, 196 —; 57 O.G. 5888). ... 6
After trial, the Court a quo promulgated its decision the decretal
portion whereof provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Confirming and ordering the registration of the title over the
property described in Plan Psu-104631 (Exhibit A) and its technical
descriptions (Exhibits B and C) in the name of Miguel Marcelo,
married to Celia Zurbito, Filipino, of legal age and residing at 687
General Geronimo, Sampaloc, Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let a decree of
confirmation be issued in favor of the applicant. 7
The Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development)
and the Heirs of Jose Zurbito, as oppositors, appealed the
aforequoted decision to respondent Court of Appeals.
On January 26, 1977, respondent court rendered judgment
declaring the applicant and the private oppositors, now the
private respondents herein, as co-owners, in stated shares, of the
entire property involved. A motion for reconsideration filed by
oppositor-appellant Director of Forestry was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The decisive issue for resolution is whether the 22 hectares area
which forms part of the land applied for registration by and
decreed in favor of herein private respondents is disposable
agricultural land. Petitioner relies mainly upon the testimony of
District Forester Anacleto Espinas who submitted a report that the
land in dispute is within a forestal zone and cannot, therefore, be
awarded to private respondents in land registration proceedings.
A careful perusal of his testimony, 8 however, reveals that, insofar
as relevant to this issue, said witness merely Identified and
described the condition of the area claimed by the Government
and verified the location thereof as stated in Plan Psu-104631
which, as heretofore stated, is covered by Land Classification
Project No. 3 under LC Map No. 452, Masbate, Masbate, certified
on December 22, 1924. 9 As correctly observed by the trial court,
supra, no authentic document evidencing the classification of the
land applied for registration as a forest zone was ever presented
by the oppositor Director of Forestry.
Furthermore, said forester admitted that the subject area is
planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees and nipa palms, and that
it is only partly covered by mangroves. 10 Petitioner would,
however, insist that since the contested area has manglares or
mangrove swamps, then, pursuant to Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, such swamplands with nipa and mangrove
growth are distinctly classified as forestal areas.
It has, however, been held that said statutory provision does not
warrant the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom, thus:
Page 45 of 56
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... For instance, section 1820 of the administrative Code of 1917
provides: "For the purpose of this chapter, "public forest" includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character. This definition of public forest", it will be
noted, is merely "for the purpose of this chapter". A little further
on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including
forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the
Department Head to be agricultural lands. ..."
xxx xxx xxx
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty.
Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources
of the Philippines. x x x On the other hand, the presumption
should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in
nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the
Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under
private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious
citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it
be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its
remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of
the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a
forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may
be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on
forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to
the claimant. 11
Furthermore, in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera vs. Obias, et. al.,
12 in disposing of the opposition of the Director of Forestry to an
application for land registration, it was explicity held that:
This opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land
covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in
this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the
Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the
sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress
(Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; and Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560).
It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No.
3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by
the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the
possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-
in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government
has the right to classify portions of Public land, the primary right
of a private individual who Possessed and cultivated the land in
good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized
and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not
have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government,
in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.
13
On the matter of classification of the land into either agricultural
or forestal area, petitioner's invocation of Section 1838 of the
Revised Administrative Code is not in point since said provision is
merely a general conferment of authority and administrative
control on the Director of Forestry to lease or grant to qualified
persons, under the conditions therein stated, permits for the use
of forest lands or vacant non-agricultural public lands. However,
as to whether the particular land in question is forestry or any
other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof
in each particular case. 14
Regarding the contention that the controverted lot has been the
subject of a fishpond lease agreement between the Bureau of
Fisheries and one of the private respondents and is, therefore,
incapable of registration, even under considerations of only the
res inter alios rule the act of that party cannot bind the applicant
in the land registration proceeding. Furthermore, the Bureau of
Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer or dispose of
swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain until such lands have been released for fishery or other
purposes. 15
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.,
respondents-appellants.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now
RTC) Laguna dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for
declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines
vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
petitioner and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the
University of the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the
timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in
said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed
by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
Page 46 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of
Appeals (Sixth Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a
resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire case
hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act
3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the
parties and therefore, is a legal question.1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the
trial court on 28 June 1966.2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration
that respondent University of the Philippines (hereafter referred to
as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the
cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges,
reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any
other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1
February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act
No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the
acts complained of and prays that respondents be required to pay
petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the
suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having
been unfavorably acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the
trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on
13 September 1987,3 wherein they interpose the affirmative
defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition
states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for
the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest
products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A.
No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as
provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for Judgment,5 which
reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the
undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE
FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of
evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture,
processing and exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose,
granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of 25
years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove
timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of
Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite
and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government
through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A
(Amendment) is a renewal of the Timber License Agreement No.
27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff on
June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the
present, has been in peaceful possession of said timber
concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber
therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement
executed by the Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement
No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment)
of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other
improvements and installations of the aforementioned area
subject to the grant and purchased equipment in implementation
of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity
of License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960,
the President of the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No.
791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED
DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS
COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND
PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF
LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for
the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this
College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated
partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna,
and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon,
Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to
the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest
products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of
the aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of
July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress
of the Philippines and approved by the President of the
Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:
Page 47 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University of the Philippines
in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain
consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the
Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries
of which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961,
is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University
of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central
experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June
18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3990, and prior to the institution of the present suit,
defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to
plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff
under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in
paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the Philippines,
instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff
within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as
defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel of
the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the
defendants was fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of
plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of the University of
the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A"
hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph
thereof, plaintiff has refused to allow entry to personnel of the
University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment Station
area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling
cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber
cut and felled prior to removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in
Relation to the implemetation of Republic Act No. 3990 the
defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest
land approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full
ownership by the government to the University of the Philippines.
This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is
presently issued in the name of the University of the Philippines.
The law transferring the ownership to the University of the
Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and
ownership, subject to the existing concession of International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the
terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire
should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The
purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us
to generate income out of the land grant and establish a research
and experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry,
Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval
of the following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District
Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be
remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall
hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive
all forest charges and royalties due from any logging concession
at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district
Forester of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.
Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business
Executive dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
Page 48 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by
Section 15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products
Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and removed from
registered private woodlands are not subject to forest charges,
but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality
or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the
regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P.
in full private ownership and as the grant is manifestly to be
considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest
charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any
licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are,
therefore, to be considered not as the charges contemplated by
the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties
payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber
resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest
charges payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided
that a formal claim for the refund thereof is made within two
years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be
International Hardwood and not the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent
the letter quoted below to the District Forester of the province of
Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue concerning the right of the University of the Philippines
to collect forest charges from the existing logging concessionaire
at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract
of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the
University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No.
3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of
the Philippines requested that its authority over said land be
recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its
forest charges directly to the University instead of to the national
government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following points raised by the
University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to
the University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, it is understood that forest charges on timber cut from
the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of the University of the
Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the
Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is
exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business
Executive dated April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District
Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of
Forestry addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which
states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment
on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the
University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the
area covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law
upon the Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and
disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and
scaling of the logs and the collection of the corresponding forest
charges and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim
of the University of the Philippines to have acquired the above
rights. We believe that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue
of number License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize
the timber inside subject area is still binding and should therefore,
be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we
sent your client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to
comment on the application of the State University for a Special
Timber License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in
paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter
ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
Page 49 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your
letter dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or
not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area
of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of
the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
the Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of the
International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is
considered a registered private woodland of the University of the
Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view
further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charged contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the
scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing
agreements entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means
of smuggling forest products from the neighboring public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the
pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may
be presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel,
jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following
issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was
filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its timber
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in
paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the
University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court
that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the
Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered
its judgment on 3 June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this
decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner
has no legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership
of the tract of land referred to in the Act was expressly made
'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of
the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over
the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until
February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will acquire full
ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the
property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property
to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a
parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At
the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires is the
'naked' ownership of the property donated. In the second place,
the respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of
Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code regarding
the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of
the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the
respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such
amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to
convince the Court, not only because of the first reason above
stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is
not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain
even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory
provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No.
3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract
of land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein expressly
provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the Philippines
in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the
expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of
the Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber
concession over the whole tract of land or over portions thereof
to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and
measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from
them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A
DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT
EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU
OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT
BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO
IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE.
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1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint
Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move and pray that the trial
court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on
the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was
filed, should pay forest charges due and payable under its Timber
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in
paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the
University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court
that said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the
Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for
declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in
Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.6 that declaratory relief cannot
be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal
intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the
Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both
pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently
provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence.— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial by these
issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues
unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. (a)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial
determination.7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual
controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists between the
parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt
becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a
claim of right which is actually contested.8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that:
(a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic of the Philippines may effect
collection of forest charges through the University of the
Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly
provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual
provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest
charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection
through another agency. (b) Having been vested with
administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract
of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the
timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within
the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can
be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas
within the ceded property but covered by the concession of
petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties)
may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license.
To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty
and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from
the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment
station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis
supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to
operate and maintain a central experiment station; since this law
does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly
the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance
thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the
area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or
charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the general
principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all
incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over which
jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement
in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f)
Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990
have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to
collect royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner's logging
operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by
asserting that: (a) The UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990
the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to
supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession
affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed
strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the
grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that
which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section
262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the
measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges
thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The
reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry.9 The
supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of
the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the
Bureau of Forestry.10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even
impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from the holders
of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due
and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce
its provisions relating to charges on forest products or to
supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders
thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in question
was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that
petitioner's concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the
UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to
control and administer the property only after 1 February 1985.
The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land
subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are
patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not have the power
to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary.
(d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber
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concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of
Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel
of land of the public domain described therein, with an area of
3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A. No.
3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for
the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research
and production studies of said college, subject however to private
rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber
and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to
forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's
timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central
experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts
and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of
the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain
and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a
public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full"
to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all
particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality.11 The proviso
regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of
petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner
as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished;
it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license
were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is
further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides,
inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall
pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is
obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971
to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to
forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990.
The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the
conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law.12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or
the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus
abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use.13 As
provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs
the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are,
however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject
to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.14 In
the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as
licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the
license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until I February 1985.1âwphi1 However, it has
the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided
for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to
the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal
Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated.
Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically
lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from
the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due
thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A.
No. 3990 does not grant the UP the authority to collect forest
charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar
as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that
it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous.
The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound
under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is
there force to its contention that legislative grants must be
construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against
the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute,
full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict
interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein
made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which
is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the
petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered REVERSING the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that forest
charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within
the area ceded and transferred to the University of the Philippine
pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the
Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 52 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B.
QUE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter
Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging,
received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass
through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the
Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the
vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy
Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area.
At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty
minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number
PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at
the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo
Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person.
The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck
and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained
coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1
Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the
coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting
documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2)
certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt
from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant
failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to
facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to
San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the
Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-
appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force
that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.[9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial
Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel examined the
cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of
coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were
piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber.[10]
When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized
forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces
of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79
cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten
Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of
Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a
total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters
valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft.,
necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper
authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed
that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal
source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber
permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.
[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose
timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that
the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by
Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258
pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they
were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled
extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the
seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-
appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused
Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The
bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is
CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile
specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548
which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of
in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of
errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68,
PD705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is
only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of
Page 53 of 56
II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession
of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and
seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot
be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O.
277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to
make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and
regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of
P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other
Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and
regulations to refer to those laws and regulations which were
already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law
inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other
forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and
other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs,
lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-
based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered
with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR
officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of
lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER
ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized
representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant
producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal
in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be
supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in
case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to
present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused
admittedly could not present a single document to justify his
possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the
police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his
possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification
issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the
original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the
coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994
states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to
be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate
No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered
inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-
11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson
Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said
coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon
discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes
first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by
the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only
between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on
March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548
which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn
lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from
the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible
unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and
rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the
accused was very much aware that he needed documents to
possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and,
therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a
manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by
merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter
dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer,
CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he
would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was
returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to
transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
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II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by
CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly
filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed
the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the
afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee
of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a
permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for
personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-
request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates
doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other papers,
i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are
not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any
document to a government agency, the agency gets the original
copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed
such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as
regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly
returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his
stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked
about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned
the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the
person x x but they were already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8,
1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not
know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph
of this letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in
view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own
lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his
certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the
truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the
lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a
polluted source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any
documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of
P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes
possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor
cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are
two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68
of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the
acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other
forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the
DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether
the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether
or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial
because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or
other forest products without the proper legal documents as
malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends
that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being
fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of
lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to
counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle
was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in
this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his
person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by
virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained
in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident
to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases
of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes
it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable
cause to search appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task
Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-
wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal
lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while
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II. SALIENT PROVISION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAWS │COMPILED BY: SANTOALLA
members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along
General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the
cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the
coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumbers
supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any.
The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence
of probable cause which justified the extensive search of
appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly
admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of

whether appellants right to counsel under custodial investigation
was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding
of guilt of appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision

appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

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