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Olicy Rief: The Nagoya ABS Protocol and Pathogens
Olicy Rief: The Nagoya ABS Protocol and Pathogens
Contents
I. Introduction ······································································································································· 1
II. The Proposals by Developed Countries in the Negotiations of the NP ··························································· 2
III. The Provisions of the NP ····················································································································· 2
IV. Interpretations··································································································································· 2
IV.1 A Consideration of the US Interpretation ····························································································· 3
IV. 2 A Consideration of the European Union (EU) Interpretation ···································································· 5
V. Summary and Conclusion····················································································································· 6
The Nagoya ABS Protocol and Pathogens
ture. Developing countries are now pressing for a nent emergencies that threaten or damage human,
standard agreement in the WHO forum that animal or plant health, as determined nationally or
would ensure that fair and equitable benefits flow internationally.
to the country providing the virus on the basis of
their sovereign right over the genetic resource. Parties may take into consideration the need for
expeditious access to genetic resources and expedi-
tious fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
II. The Proposals by Developed Coun-
out of the use of such genetic resources, including
tries in the Negotiations of the NP access to affordable treatments by those in need, es-
pecially developing countries.
In the negotiations in March 2010, a proposal
was put forward to exclude human pathogens
Article 4.3
from the scope of the Protocol (see UNEP/
This Protocol shall be implemented in a mutu-
CBD/WG-ABS/9/ING/1). This was resisted by
ally supportive manner with other international in-
developing countries who argued that there
struments relevant to this Protocol. Due regard
was no basis to exclude any genetic resource
should be paid to useful and relevant ongoing work
from the Protocol when it was clearly within the
or practices under such international instruments
scope of the CBD. Then the EU proposed a
and relevant international organizations, provided
clause on “ special consideration relevant to
that they are supportive of and do not run counter
emergency situation”. The proposal required
to the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol.
countries to provide immediate access to
pathogens which also fall under the scope of
Article 4.4
relevant international organizations such as the
This Protocol is the instrument for the imple-
WHO; these pathogens were those of particular
mentation of the access and benefit-sharing provi-
public concern for the health of humans, ani-
sions of the Convention. Where a specialized inter-
mals, or plants; in ways and for uses provided
national access and benefit-sharing instrument ap-
for in existing and future rules, procedures or
plies that is consistent with, and does not run
practices on the sharing of pathogens; and
counter to the objectives of the Convention and this
related benefits established under these in-
Protocol, this Protocol does not apply for the Party
ternational organizations and conventions. In
or Parties to the specialized instrument in respect of
sum, the proposal was to exclude pathogens
the specific genetic resource covered by and for the
from the access and benefit sharing require-
purpose of the specialized instrument.
ments of the Protocol altogether and to forever
place them under the jurisdiction of other inter-
national organizations and subject them to the
IV. Interpretations
rules and practices of these organizations - in par-
ticular the WHO.
Various interpretations have emerged that suggest
either that the NP does not cover pathogens, or that
there is an obligation by countries when enacting
III. The Provisions in the NP their domestic law to pay regard to the WHO deci-
sions establishing different levels of pandemic
The provisions that were finally agreed upon are
threats and the national and international responses.
set out in Articles 8 (headed as “Special Consid-
And further that benefit sharing provisions for
erations”) and Article 4 paragraphs 3 and 4 (
pathogens are to be those as established by the deci-
headed as “Relationship with International
sions of the WHO.
Agreements and Instruments”).
The first interpretation - advanced by the US in
These read as follows:
a “USA Non-Paper” implies that none of the provi-
Article 8
sions on ABS would apply to pathogens. The second
In the development and implementation of
interpretation - advanced by the Council of the
its access and benefit-sharing legislation or regu-
European Union in a Commission Report (DS
latory requirements, each Party shall:
1803/10, 12 Nov 2010) -implies that the WHO's
work and decisions (including present and future
(b) Pay due regard to cases of present or immi-
work and decisions) could supplant the NP as
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The Nagoya ABS Protocol and Pathogens
b. In the present case, the preamble itself f. The NP confirms these provisions in its Arti-
makes an explicit reference to “pathogens”. This cle 5 - on benefit sharing; and Article 6 - on access.
makes clear that the Protocol includes such ge-
netic resources within its scope, otherwise there g. The US also argues that human genetic re-
would be no need to refer to such a genetic re- sources are excluded from the framework of the
source. CBD vide its Decision II/11 as also confirmed by the
decision adopting the NP. The response is that
c. Article 8(b)of the NP that deals with patho- pathogens, including human pathogens, are genetic
gens states that Parties in the development and materials that are replicable. These materials occur
implementation of their national access AND and may replicate within a host such as humans,
benefit sharing regulatory laws or requirements, animals or plants. They are not part of the genome
may take into consideration the need for expedi- of these hosts.
tious access to the genetic resources AND expedi-
tious fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising US argument 3
out of their utilization. The Article is clear and Even if the CBD and the NP were interpreted to
unambiguous. The US submission ignores this cover pathogens, the NP expressly contemplates that
clear reference to both elements in this operative its provisions may not apply where there is a spe-
article. As stated earlier the interpretation of the cialized instrument. The World Health Assembly
US limiting the effect of this clear provision by (WHA) resolutions concerning the Pandemic Influ-
reference to a preamble not only violates the role enza Preparedness (PIP) Framework constitute such
of a preamble but more importantly flies in the a specialized instrument under 3 bis (now Article
face of the express provisions of the article. 4.4) of the NP. These also fulfil the further require-
ment in the Article of “being consistent with and not
d. The term "ensuring access" in the preamble run counter to the objectives of the CBD and the
is not different from the establishment of prior NP”.
informed consent (PIC) for other genetic re-
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access and transfer of technologies. Any practice and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the
that does not provide for such benefit sharing will use of such resources. This allows Parties to consider
run foul of the NP. whether or not to establish different procedures for
access.
On Article 8(b) This of course allows Parties to the NP to arrive
The EU states that when developing and im- at solutions within the WHO on issues relating to
plementing national ABS legislation the first sen- ABS for pathogens. However, as this brief shows,
tence of Article 8(b) requiring that due regard be these must be consistent with and not run counter to
paid to cases of present or imminent emergencies the objectives of the NP, in particular those relating
that threaten or damage human, animal or plant to the fair and equitable sharing of benefits, includ-
health as determined nationally or internationally ing by appropriate access and by appropriate trans-
- gives explicit support to WHO decisions estab- fer of relevant technologies and affordable access to
lishing different levels of pandemic threats and the vaccines.
related national and international responses.
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