Pacer-Russian Foreign Policy Under Dmitry Medvedev (2016) PDF

Russian Foreign Policy under
Dmitry Medvedev, 2008–2012
Although the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev is often seen as a continuation of

Vladimir Putin’s presidency, with the same policies applied in the same way,
this book disagrees, arguing that Medvedev’s foreign policy was significantly
different from Putin’s. The book considers especially the relationship between
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security configuration, including both NATO and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a relationship of great
importance to Russia, given constant attention. It discusses a wide variety of
issues, including ‘frozen conflicts’, security co-operation and nuclear weapons
reductions, highlights the different tone and approach under Medvedev, exem-
plified especially by his draft European Security Treaty, and shows how after
Putin’s return to the presidency there has been a shift in foreign policy, with
much greater emphasis on influencing Russia’s immediate neighbours and on
Eurasian union, and less emphasis on rapprochement and co-operation.
Valerie A. Pacer completed her doctorate at the School of Slavonic and East
European Studies, University College London, UK.
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State, society and radicalism Putin’s Russia
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99 Eastern Europe and the
Challenges of Modernity, 105 Russian Foreign Policy under
1800–2000 Dmitry Medvedev, 2008–2012
Stefano Bianchini Valerie A. Pacer
Russian Foreign Policy
under Dmitry Medvedev,
2008–2012
Valerie A. Pacer
First published 2016
by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2016 Valerie A. Pacer
The right of Valerie A. Pacer to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
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without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Pacer, Valerie A.
Russian foreign policy under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008–2012 / Valerie A.
Pacer.
pages cm. – (BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East European
studies ; 105)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Medvedev, D. A. (Dmitry Anatolyevich)–Political and social views.
2. Russia (Federation)–Foreign relations–21st century. 3. National
security–Russia (Federation)–History–21st century. 4. Russia
(Federation)–Politics and government–1991– 5. Russia (Federation)–
Military policy. 6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 7. Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe. I. Title.
DK510.766.M43P33 2016
327.47009'051–dc23 2015021936
ISBN: 978-1-138-94353-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-67240-3 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents
Acknowledgements xiii
Interviews xiv
Transliteration and sources xv
Abbreviations and key terms xvi
1 From Putin to Medvedev: maintaining the status quo? 1

The presidential succession 2
Putin, Medvedev, and foreign policy schools of thought 5
Putin and Medvedev’s perspectives on Russia’s place in the
world 7
Putin, Medvedev, and style 8
Two presidents and their foreign policy advisors 9
The concept of the Euro-Atlantic region 13
Structure of the book 14
2 Russia’s Euro-Atlantic security interests: preserving and

building influence 17
Russian security documents and Russian interests 18
Russia and the areas of ‘privileged interests’ 20
3 Russia and the ‘frozen’ conflicts of the Euro-Atlantic space:

different conflicts, different roles 28
Russia and Kosovo: a new precedent? 29
Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia: recognizing new ‘states’ 32
Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh: strategic goals 36
Russia and Transdniestria: a peace-keeping exercise? 39
4 Russia and the OSCE: hard versus soft security 44

Structural issues with the OSCE 45
Russia, human rights, and democracy at the OSCE 48
Russia and the politico-military side of the OSCE 56
xii Contents
5 Russia and NATO: the limits of cooperation 62
Russia, NATO, and Soviet era promises 62
The Russian leadership’s views of NATO 64
The shape of the Russia–NATO relationship 68
NATO–Russian cooperation 74
Russia, NATO, and confrontation 78
6 Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security agreements:

compliance and controversy 84
The Vienna Document 85
The Treaty on Open Skies 94
The conventional armed forces in Europe Treaty and its adapted
version 100
7 Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty: a different

idea? 116
The Medvedev proposal 116
Responses to the Medvedev proposal 126
8 Nuclear reductions and missile defence: prospects for

cooperation between Russia, the U.S., and NATO 137
The importance of the nuclear deterrent for Russia 138
Russia and Western plans for European missile defence 146
9 The return of President Putin: a change of course 164

Russia and Ukraine: a Euro-Atlantic security crisis 165
Russia and the frozen conflicts 170
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security institutions 174
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security framework 180
Russia, nuclear arms control, and missile defence 184
10 Conclusion: Medvedev’s presidential legacy 190

A Medvedev foreign policy? 194
Bibliography 196
Index 254
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Pete Duncan for his support and guidance
while I have pursued this project. His assistance and comments on the drafts
have been invaluable.
I would also like to thank Andrew Wilson, Martyn Rady, Margot Light, and
Slava Mikhaylov for their questions and comments at various stages of this
research as their points have led to a large number of improvements.
Although I will not mention any names I would also like to extend my grati-
tude to those who took the time out of their lives and allowed me the opportunity
to interview them. The insight you provided into the issues discussed here was
essential to furthering the project.
Finally I would like to thank my family for their support and encouragement
during the whole of the research and writing period.
Interviews
This research is supported by interviews which were conducted in Brussels,

Moscow, Vienna, and Washington DC in the spring and summer of 2013. The
interviewees include a range of current and former governmental officials from
deputy foreign ministers to department directors and other mid-level Foreign
Ministry officials to ambassadors as well as individuals with previous govern-
mental experience, including in defence. As all the interviews were conducted in
confidentiality, the names of interviewees are withheld and instead their contri-
butions are recognised through the use of descriptors.
Transliteration and sources
In this work, the transliteration from Russian to English uses the American
Library Association-Library of Congress (ALA-LC) romanisation table. All
Russian words have been transliterated using this system, except in cases where
another anglicised spelling has become accepted as the norm, for example
Dmitry instead of Dmitrii.
Abbreviations and key terms
ABM Anti-ballistic missile

ACFE Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe
AIAM Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
ALTBMD Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
CAI Common Airspace Initiative
CEC Central Election Commission
CFE Treaty Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE Council of Europe
CRRF CSTO Rapid Reaction Force
CSBM Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach
EST European Security Treaty
EU European Union
FSC Forum for Security Cooperation
GID Geneva International Discussions
HDIM Human Dimension Implementation Meeting
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
INF Treaty Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPRM Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JCG Joint Consultative Group
KFOR Kosovo Force
MANPADS Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems
MAP Membership Action Plan
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow Treaty Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Abbreviations and key terms xvii
New START New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
NGC NATO–Georgia Commission
NGO Nongovernmental organisation
NRC NATO–Russia Council
NSR Northern Sea Route
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCC Open Skies Consultative Commission
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE PA Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PC Permanent Council
PfP SOFA Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement
PJC NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
SMM Special Monitoring Mission
TLE Treaty Limited Equipment
TMD Theatre Missile Defence
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
VD Plus Vienna Document Plus
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
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1 From Putin to Medvedev
Maintaining the status quo?
As President of Russia, Medvedev struggled to establish an identity distinct from

his predecessor, Prime Minister, and eventual successor, Vladimir Putin. Analysis
of Medvedev as Russia’s leader conducted by academics, diplomats, and journal-
ists means that a seemingly inevitable comparison to Putin will be made. While
Medvedev’s discussions and negotiations with the West achieved some positive
results, he was considered by some to be ‘playing the good cop to his predecessor’s
adopting the tough cop role’ (Krickus, 2009: 16). The portrayal of Medvedev as a
‘dorkish lawyer’ who occasionally ‘puts on a leather bomber jacket and talks
tough, but it doesn’t become him’ provided an image of the president in contrast to
Vladimir Putin and publicity photos released of Putin that are designed to show
him as a macho strongman (Parfitt, 2011b). The failure of Russia to follow through
on his modernisation plans has prompted a comparison between Medvedev and ‘a
student who, after getting a D on his exam, goes off on a rant asserting that he had
studied long and hard’, rather than as a strong leader of a large country (Fishman,
2011: 4). Comparisons to Putin have also come from the diplomatic community.
The most famous characterisation of the relationship between the two men was that
of ‘Batman’ and ‘Robin’, Putin and Medvedev respectively, which was introduced
via the Guardian’s publication of Wikileaks cables (Harding, 2010). A former
Western diplomat, however, explained that he preferred a comparison of the two
men whereby ‘Putin is the frat-boy to Medvedev’s nerd’.
Despite these less than flattering depictions, Medvedev’s presidency is
important to furthering our understanding of Russian foreign and security policy
in the early twenty-first century. Whether he was chosen to be the ‘good cop’ or
to balance factions inside the Kremlin or because of his loyalty to Putin, this
does not mean him he cannot have his own initiatives and policies as a president.
At the same time, it cannot be expected that there should be only dissimilarities
between the policies of Putin and Medvedev, given that Medvedev owed his
presidency to Putin and, in the eyes of many, ‘Putin was the man with the
authority, while Medvedev was the person in power’ (Sakwa, 2011: 308). By
focusing on one area of policy, foreign security policy in the Euro-Atlantic
region, an examination of the Putin and Medvedev presidencies will establish
that although the two men were largely similar in their thinking and actions,
there are important differences that should be recognised.
The presidential succession
To understand the Medvedev-Putin relationship and the dynamic that exists
between the two men, it is important to consider how and why Medvedev
became the President of Russia. Under Article 81 of the Russian Constitution,
the president is limited to being elected to two consecutive terms but is not
otherwise prevented from returning to the presidency (Russian Constitution,
1993). This meant that Putin was barred from candidacy for the 2008 presiden-
tial election unless constitutional reform was undertaken. There was some specu-
lation that a chosen candidate would contest the elections, remain in power for
an appropriate amount of time, and then resign the presidency, which would
result in an election in which Putin could stand as a candidate or that there would
be constitutional changes which would result in the transfer of presidential
powers to the position of prime minister, thus allowing Putin to retain control
from a different office (Goldman, 2008: 5–6). Despite the various theories of
events that might occur after the election, it was clear that there would still need
to be a candidate in the 2008 presidential election.
Putin’s search for a successor would result in an end to his balancing act
between the two leading factions within the Kremlin, the siloviki, or the people
with a military or security background in the government, and the economic lib-
erals, since one faction would provide the presidential candidate (White, 2006:
42). Despite choosing between the two factions, the chosen candidate would
have to appeal to both groups as an acceptable president. In a Levada Centre poll
from November 2007, Medvedev was listed as the third most likely person to be
appointed successor (17%), behind both Sergei Ivanov (19%), the First Deputy
Prime Minister from the siloviki clan, and Viktor Zubkov (32%), the Prime
Minister (Levada Centre, 2007).
For Putin, the long-standing ties that he had with Medvedev would have a
role in influencing the decision-making process. Putin and Medvedev met in
1990 while working for Anatoly Sobchak at the Leningrad (later renamed St.
Petersburg) City Council and continued working together until Sobchak lost the
mayoral election in 1996 (Medvedev D., 2012a). Roĭ Medvedev writes that by
1994, the two men ‘understood each other well’ and that their relationship was
‘trusting and friendly’ (Medvedev R., 2008: 18). After a phone call in 1999 from
Igor Sechin, the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration, Medvedev met
with Putin in Moscow and Putin offered Medvedev the position as the head of
the Federal Commission for Securities Market, which Medvedev accepted with
the understanding he would first fill the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for a
period of time (approximately two weeks to a month) so that he could gain an
understanding of the civil service (Medvedev D., 2012a). On 29 December 1999,
Putin made Medvedev the offer to remain as the Deputy Chief of Staff and
Medvedev wrote on his personal website that:
the Federal Commission for the Securities Market offered important and
interesting work overseeing a huge and fast-growing market, while staying
From Putin to Medvedev 3
in the government involved bureaucratic work of the sort I’d never aspired
to and that seemed to me boring. But some kind of instinct, something
inside made me say that yes, I’d stay on and help.
(Medvedev D., 2012a)
Two days later, shortly after being made acting president, Putin named
Medvedev as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, a posi-
tion he would hold for a year before being promoted to other positions, including
the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration (2000–2003),
the Head of the Presidential Administration (2003–2005), and the First Deputy
Prime Minister (2005–2008), as well as Chairman of Gazprom (Medvedev D.,
2012a).
From Putin’s perspective, Medvedev had showed himself to be reliable over
the years that they had known each other since Medvedev’s positions in the
Kremlin had him implementing Putin’s policies and Medvedev had not dis-
played a desire to acquire power which could provoke a conflict between Putin
and Medvedev in the future (Rogoża, 2011: 9). Medvedev, as the choice for
president, was also ‘acceptable to the maximum number of the competing
Kremlin factions, and the least threatening to the most’, thus making him the
appealing option to concerned parties inside Russia (Sakwa, 2011: 271).
Medvedev was particularly involved with the implementation of Putin’s policies
when he was in charge of overseeing national projects in 2006 and 2007 and it is
because of these projects that Medvedev gained more attention and talk began
about him as a possible ‘successor’ (Medvedev R., 2008: 29, 39). The long-
standing ties between the two men meant ‘Medvedev was one of the few indi-
viduals with detailed information about Putin’s years in the St. Petersburg
mayor’s office, around which so many allegations and insinuations swirl; while
Putin had detailed information on Medvedev’s dealings’, thus ensuring that the
fates of the two men were intertwined and neither man would act against the
other for fear of the response it would generate (Sakwa, 2011: 273). One of these
ties between the two men comes from the fact that it was Medvedev who ‘helped
to create a legal defence for Putin to refute the accusations of corruption by the
city council’ that he was facing as a result of the food scandal when working in
St. Petersburg in the 1990s (Hill & Gaddy, 2013: 174). For several reasons,
Medvedev became the presidential candidate.
Before the 2008 presidential election, Medvedev had never run as a candidate
for office since he had only held appointed positions, and, therefore, he benefited
from Putin’s support. Medvedev broke with precedent and chose to run as a
party candidate, something neither Yeltsin nor Putin had done, which provided
him with the support of United Russia voters (Hale, 2010: 97). Medvedev’s can-
didacy was also the focus of heavy media coverage in the weeks preceding the
2008 presidential election with stories about Medvedev occupying 80% of the
7–10 pm (primetime) coverage (Van den Brande, 2010: 49). The presidential
election saw Medvedev win in the first round with 70.28% of the vote, or
52,530,712 votes; the closest contender, Gennady Zyuganov, received a mere
17.72% of the cast votes (CEC, 2008). The election itself went unobserved by
organisations like the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR), which explained ‘that the Russian government was insisting
on too many restrictions on the monitoring team that observers would not be
able to do an effective job’ and thus detracts from the election’s ability to be
considered free and fair by other states (McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010: 79).
Medvedev owed his rise in Russian politics to Putin and he would need
Putin’s support to maintain his position as president. In order to get things done
as president, Medvedev needed the support of Putin because, as Prime Minister,
he was both the head of government and also the chairman of United Russia,
whose support Medvedev would need for the passing of legislation (Treisman,
2011: 144). It can be expected, therefore, that Medvedev would not act in a way
that would be contradictory to Putin’s desires since that would result in a freeze
of the government. As the president, Medvedev retained the option of dismissing
Putin from his position but given Medvedev’s lack of substantial support and
Putin’s own popularity, such an action would likely harm Medvedev’s presid-
ency and see him weakened. The Putin–Medvedev tandem and the study of so-
called ‘tandemocracy’ became a fixture of the Russian political landscape during
the Medvedev presidency.1
The return of Putin to the Russian presidency in 2012 is also important to
consider within the context of the search for an appropriate successor. Through-
out his presidency, Medvedev was faced with questions of who would be the
presidential candidate in 2012. As late as April 2011, his answer was that:
I do not rule out the possibility of my running for a second term at the pres-
idential elections. The decision will be taken very shortly since . . . the elec-
tions are less than a year away. This decision, however, should be, first,
mature and, second, it should take into account the existing social situation,
current political environment and, most importantly, the attitude of people.
Before making any such decisions, one has to weigh their chances, avoid
acting mechanically, and, instead, act with a clear understanding of the situ-
ation. I expect such understanding to form within a relatively short time.
(Medvedev D., 2011a)
A couple of weeks later, Putin was similarly asked about the 2012 election and
he responded that ‘it is too early to speak about that . . . [but] we shall make a
corresponding decision . . . [and] you will like it and be pleased’ (ITAR-TASS,
2011d). When it was announced in September 2011 that Putin would be the can-
didate, the decision was explained by Medvedev as ‘a deeply thought-out one’
which had been the product of discussions that had begun ‘as early as when our
union was being formed’ (RIA Novosti, 2011b).
In a 2012 press conference, Putin denied there were other motives for the
decision beyond him having higher public approval ratings and, therefore, the
support of the people for a presidential run (Putin, 2012c). Yet if poll results
were the entire reason behind the Medvedev-Putin job swap, the decision would
have been clear and public speculation not as high. During the entire Medvedev
presidency, there was only one month, May 2011, where Medvedev’s approval
index surpassed that of Putin’s and most months Medvedev’s was several points
lower (Levada Centre, 2012). As suggested by Mark Galeotti, it is possible that
Putin and his inner circle had concerns about Medvedev’s capabilities as pres-
ident or his desire to remain in the spotlight, which led to the ‘phenomenal
blunder’ of Putin’s return to the presidency (Whitmore, 2012). According to
Gleb Pavlovsky, a Kremlin spin doctor who was fired after supporting a 2012
presidential run for Medvedev, the public conflicts seen in the tandem in early
2011, particularly due to comments Medvedev made regarding Western involve-
ment in Libya as well as the support that Medvedev started receiving from some
of the Russian elites in 2010, led to Putin’s government having ‘a constant fear
that Medvedev would sack the government, suddenly . . . and that would create a
completely different situation’ (Hearst & Elder, 2012). If the policies and public
statements of Medvedev are the reason that Putin returned, and an issue of
foreign policy is central to the concerns Putin had, then Putin and Medvedev
could not have been completely in step on issues in this area.
Putin, Medvedev, and foreign policy schools of thought

Reasons for foreign policy differences between Medvedev and Putin lie not only
with the circumstances of the time but also on different ideological approaches
to foreign policy. Margot Light has identified three schools of thought on
Russian foreign policy: the Pragmatic Nationalist, or someone who is seen as
pursuing ‘a more independent policy vis-à-vis the West and a more integrationist
stance towards the successor states’, the Liberal Westerniser who supports ‘a
market economy and . . . pro-Western views’, and the Fundamentalist National-
ist, someone who ‘combined extreme nationalist with antipathy towards eco-
nomic reform’ (Light, 1996: 34). Andrei Tsygankov suggests a different
categorisation for Russian foreign policymakers, which includes Westernisers,
Statists, and Civilizationalists. In the post-Soviet period, the Westernisers who
emerged ‘argued for the “natural” affinity of their country with the West based
on such values as democracy, human rights, and a free market’, while the Sta-
tists who ‘are not inherently anti-Western’ focus on ‘the state’s ability to govern
and preserve the social and political order’ (Tsygankov, 2013: 5–6). The Civil-
izationalists ‘sought to challenge the Western systems of values, insisting on the
cultural distinctiveness of Russia and Russia-centered civilization’ (8). Rather
than attempting to classify just Russian foreign policy perspectives in the post-
Soviet period, Peter Duncan presented three categories for the foreign policy
trends emerging in all post-Soviet states, which consisted of Westernism, Eura-
sianism and pragmatism. Under this approach, the ‘Eurasianists tend towards
cooperation with China and certain Middle Eastern states such as Iran, rather
than the West’, the Westernists prefer to look at policies which ‘aimed at
cooperating with the United States, the European Union, NATO, and the pleth-
ora of international organisations dominated by Western states which promote
market economies and democracy’, and the pragmatists ‘avoided ideological
commitment to Westernism or Eurasianism . . . in the pursuit of state, institu-
tional or personal interest’ (Duncan, 2004: 231).
Although there is merit in categorising the various schools of thought and
these categories are useful when considering trends in a leader’s decision-
making, it is important to note that simply because a policy maker is associated
with one grouping does not mean that their foreign policy can be characterised
solely within that category or that a leader will remain consistently in one cat-
egory for the duration of their time in power. Tsygankov, the only one of the
three to consider the Medvedev period, regarded Medvedev as a Westerniser
because he ‘advocated a new era of improving relations with the Western nations
based on a common assessment of security threats and greater openness in eco-
nomic and political systems’, while Putin was seen as a Statist who ‘emphasised
bilateral relations in Russia’s periphery and was ambitious to develop a partner-
ship with the United States to deter terrorism’ (Tsygankov, 2013: 7–8). Although
neither Light nor Duncan themselves have considered the contrast between the
Putin and Medvedev presidencies in terms of their schools of thought on Russian
foreign policy, these schools can still be applied to the two men. Duncan does
look at the early years of the Putin presidency and acknowledges that although
‘Putin was initially seen as a Russian nationalist, the tactical flexibility he
demonstrated when he was given the opportunity of a coalition with the West
places him firmly in the pragmatist category’ (Duncan, 2004: 241). When apply-
ing Duncan’s schools to the two men, the later years of Putin’s presidency
appear to align more closely with the Eurasianist viewpoint, especially in light
of Putin’s promotion of Eurasian integration, while Medvedev’s presidency can
be characterised as being in line with the Westernist school of thought, particu-
larly since 2009. Using Light’s characterisations, Medvedev would be viewed as
a Liberal Westerniser, while Putin appears as a Pragmatic Nationalist who is
willing to work with the West, as was seen in Afghanistan, but also wants to
promote relations amongst the former Soviet states.
This division in the trends of foreign policy thinking of the two men has been
supported by many others. It has been argued that the two men are not entirely
similar in their worldviews and that a review of the speeches of the two men, might
see ‘Medvedev in the liberal camp and Putin in the great power balancer camp (the
latter with nods to Russian nationalists as well)’ (Kuchins & Zevelev, 2012: 158).
It has been argued that Medvedev’s liberalism was due to the fact, that unlike his
predecessor, Medvedev seemed ‘much less inclined to politicize Russian foreign
policy’ (Makarychev, 2012: 2). In foreign policy, Medvedev is seen as ‘a genuine
liberal . . . ] who thinks that foreign policy is determined by domestic policy and
should be subservient to it’, while Putin, being a realist, is more focused on ‘struc-
tural factors and the international system which determines how states behave’,
including how the external world can impact internal politics (Lukyanov, 2012).
The importance of domestic politics could be seen, according to a Central Euro-
pean ambassador, when Medvedev managed to ‘shock’ the diplomatic community
in Moscow when he spoke of ‘legal nihilism’ at his inauguration. Medvedev’s
belief that foreign policy should be influenced by domestic conditions can be seen
in the MFA’s Program on Effective Use of Foreign Policy Factors on a Systemic
Basis for the Purpose of the Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation,
which was published in Russian Newsweek in May 2010 having been leaked from
the Foreign Ministry who acknowledged the document, although it was not offi-
cially released (Programma Ėffektivnogo, 2010). The document called for Russia
to place priority on its relationships with the European Union, its Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) neighbours, and North American countries in order ‘to
secure investment, technology, and other sources of innovation to modernize its
economy’ (Danchenko et al., 2010: 4). What can be seen is that the Medvedev
presidency ‘facilitated the positive trends in Russia–West relations’ that were seen
from 2008–2012 because of the ‘increased influence of liberal ideas on Russian
foreign and domestic policies and an emphasis on improving Russia’s relations
with the US and the EU’ (Plekhanov, 2013: 144).
Putin and Medvedev’s perspectives on Russia’s place in the

world
The term ‘great power’ is one that has been disputed by academics since there is
no clear definition. Some scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, focus on the
military strength of a great power as ‘hav[ing] sufficient military assets to put up
a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in
the world’ (Mearsheimer, 1995: 5). Others, like Kenneth Waltz, argue that great
power status is the result of a state’s ability to:
use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests. The eco-
nomic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and
separately weighed. . . . Their rank depends on how they score on all of the
following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, eco-
nomic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence.
(Waltz, 1979: 131)
Hedley Bull argued that an important element of being a great power is recogni-
tion, the idea that ‘great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and
conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and
duties’ (Bull, 1977: 202) The concept of recognition is integral to achieving
great power status because in order to exert great power influence being con-
sidered a great power by other states is necessary. The status of Russia as a great
power, according to Iver Neumann, has not been achieved because if it had, the
idea of Russia as a great power would be ‘part of the horizon of the political
debate rather than its substance’ (Neumann, 2008: 129). According to Neumann:
Russia lacks the ability to project power to a degree sufficient to satisfy a

realist thinker. Its unwillingness to play according to the moral rules laid
down in the international normative regime fails the standards of liberal
internationalism. Through its aversion to changing the state to approximate
a rationality of governing by indirect means Russia fails the test of govern-
mentality. Social self-constructions of great powerhood have limited reson-
ance under these conditions.
(Neumann, 2013: 37)
Therefore, if recognition is considered to be the key to great power status, Russia

between 2000 and 2012 was not a great power.
In his article published on December 30, 1999, Russia at the Turn of the Millen-
nium, Vladimir Putin asserted that ‘Russia has been and will remain a great
country’ because of ‘the inherent characteristics of Russia’s geopolitical, economic
and cultural existence’ (Putin, 1999). Within early twenty-first century Russian
foreign and security policy thinking, there is a clear desire to see Russia achieve
the restoration of great power status. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept refers to
Russia ‘as a great power and an influential centre in the modern world’ (FPC,
2000), while in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia is considered to be ‘one
of the leading States of the world’ (FPC, 2008). Regardless of who the president of
the country was, be it Putin or Medvedev, the goal of Russian foreign policy-
makers was to see Russia be a great power, thus any foreign and security policy
decisions taken during the first three presidential terms of the new millennium need
to be considered within the framework of achieving great power status.
Despite the academic community not being convinced by the idea of Russia as
a great power, the importance of being a great power is a key part of Russia’s
self-perception under both Putin and Medvedev. It is argued that the two men
shared a common foreign policy, albeit ‘a pretty traditional and outdated one’
where great power status is central as Russia ‘must achieve the status of a “great
power”, it must maintain this status, advance it, etc’. (Trenin & Dolgin, 2010). As
the previous section shows, the difference between the two men comes from how
to achieve and maintain this status. Even if other countries do not see Russia as a
great power, Russian leaders expect the respect and consideration that is due to it
as a great power state.
Both Russian presidents sought great power status and recognition for Russia.
Putin’s presidency, particularly his second term, saw confrontations with the
West rise as Russia ‘increasingly acted on the assumption that not only was the
country a recognized Great Power but that being so recognized brought with it a
particular sphere of influence’ (Papkova, 2011: 49). The security and foreign
policy decisions that Putin and Medvedev made reflected the on-going pursuit to
raise Russia’s international standing. The selection of Medvedev as Putin’s suc-
cessor guaranteed that great power status would remain an essential part of
Russian policy and can be seen in the Euro-Atlantic security policies of both men.
Putin, Medvedev, and style

If Medvedev was selected by Putin to improve Russia’s image, it should be con-
sidered whether there are any stylistic differences in the two men’s presidencies
that would help achieve this aim. A different style could be expected given that
the two men adhere to different schools of thought on Russian foreign policy
and, indeed, one can be seen.
An April 2011 article in The Economist magazine declared that ‘the differ-
ences between the two men are mainly stylistic’ and this opinion appears to be
shared within the academic and journalistic communities (The Economist, 2011).
In 2010, Yevgeny Volk agreed that stylistic differences between the two men
existed and argued that ‘there have been some nuances and accents that have
changed since Medvedev’s arrival’ (Osipovich, 2010). In an article examining
what the return of Putin would mean for the EU, Ben Judah argued there would
be a return of Putin’s ‘inimitable personal style, sardonic commentary and fre-
quent outbursts . . . which would replace the calmer working environment of the
Medvedev presidency’ (Judah, 2011).
It would not be unexpected that the two men would have different approaches
in their dealings with other countries since their foreign policy thinking is not in
complete alignment. Style is just one of many factors recognised by Valerie
Hudson as having importance in foreign policy-making since ‘the mind of a
foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa: it contains complex and intricately
related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences,
emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions’ (Hudson, 2005:
10). Another important element that influences a leader is the people that they
surround themselves with.
Two presidents and their foreign policy advisors

As was stated by Steven Redd, ‘because advisers participate extensively in pres-
idential decision-making, any explanation of processes and outcomes should
account for their presence’ and, consequently, not only the presidents but those
in the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, and the Presidential Administra-
tion that have a role in developing Russian Euro-Atlantic foreign and security
policy need to be considered as well (Redd, 2002: 342). It is important to note
that these institutions do not ‘constitute a homogenous group’ and differences of
opinion can occur inside the bodies (Åtland, 2011: 276). The key institutions on
foreign policy issues are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Pres-
idential Administration (PA). Many of the key MFA and PA officials retained
their positions from the Putin presidency to the Medvedev presidency, although
some changes were made during Medvedev’s time in office. Since security
policy is also a consideration, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is involved in
aspects of this area of foreign policy.
Before discussing the MFA and the MoD, the role of the Presidential Admin-
istration in Russian foreign policy-making should be considered. Foreign policy
remains in the hands of the president and, thus, the president has his own advi-
sors on the issues. At the Presidential Administration, Russian foreign policy
was overseen by Sergei Prikhodko who from 1999–2004 was Deputy Chief of
Staff of the PA, Head of the Presidential Foreign Policy Directorate and who
from 2004–2012 had the title of Aide to the President of the Russian Federation
(Government of Russia, 2013). During his tenure at the PA, there was some
debate as to his level of influence, particularly to what degree he was a rival of
the Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. There has been some speculation that his
influence over Russian foreign policy ‘is much bigger’ than that of Lavrov
(Tkachenko, 2008: 174).
Within the Moscow-based diplomatic community, Prikhodko was considered
to be an important individual in Russian foreign policy. According to a Central
European ambassador, Prikhodko was considered to be ‘so influential’ that ‘he
would only honour receptions of close allies’ with his presence, mainly the CIS
countries, and that when he appeared at the receptions he would time his
entrance to match that of invited MFA officials but would remain on the opposite
side of the room from them for the duration. The ambassador emphasised that
even when mail was sent to Prikhodko directly, the response would come from
the MFA, even though it was clear Prikhodko was involved in the response. This
was because of the MFA’s role as the top interlocutor on foreign policy, despite
Prikhodko having a staff of approximately 30 working under him at the Pres-
idential Administration. The use of letters between ambassadors and the PA was
important because, as the ambassador explained, Putin had closed the Kremlin to
outsiders since there was a feeling that under Yeltsin, there had been too much
interaction with other countries on foreign policy.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the MoD initially had a great deal of
influence over the foreign policy direction of the country but Foreign Minister
Evgeny Primakov ‘helped to seize the initiative that the military had increasingly
been taking away from civilian authorities . . .] and took considerable powers
away’ from the Defence Ministry (Tsygankov, 2013: 117). Under Putin’s first
two terms as president, the role of the military continued to decline to the point
where ‘the military had little influence in foreign policy formation’ (Sakwa,
2008: 374). Part of this declining role in foreign policy can also be credited to
the fact that the MoD had many domestic priorities including the war in Chech-
nya and the military reform process (Sergunin, 2008: 67). Despite this decline of
influence in areas of foreign policy, the areas of national security and disarma-
ment, which will be discussed, still remain areas where the MoD retains influ-
ence. Within the MoD itself there are many branches that have responsibilities
towards these areas of policy, particularly because ‘to a large extent [they] domi-
nate the discourse because of their monopoly on technical expertise’ related to
the issues of arms control and disarmament (Sokov et al., 2009: 7). Areas such
as missile defence and nuclear reductions talks, as discussed in chapter eight, are
strongly influenced by the MoD because of their technical knowledge of the sub-
jects being addressed.
The MoD has long been seen in the West as a source of conservatism within
Russia. As Sven G. Simonsen points out, ‘theorists of civil-military relations
tend to describe military men – irrespective of the type of regime they serve – as
more inclined than the average towards authoritarianism, conservatism and
nationalism’, traits which are often used to describe the Russian military
(Simonsen, 2001: 44). Carolina Vendil Pallin argues that the ‘leading generals
continued to live in the realities of the Cold War and exuded “traditional anti-
Western conservatism” ’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Vendil Pallin,
2009: 11). In February 2011, Anatoly Antonov, the long-standing MFA official
who led the Russian-side of the New START negotiations, moved to the MoD
as a Deputy Minister. According to one Western diplomat, at the time that
Antonov went to the MoD, there was a sense of hope that with Antonov there,
the MoD might become less conservative but this did not occur.
Despite the roles of the PA and MoD in foreign and security policy decision-
making, the role of the MFA is quite important since many of the direct contacts
with foreign representatives and leaders come as a result of their work. In a study
of international relations students at an assortment of universities in Russia, it
became clear that there are some who perceive the MFA to be similar to the
MoD in that it is ‘an institution that is clan-like, stiff, inert, highly conservative,
insensitive to new ideas, and reproducing the Soviet-style communicative prac-
tices that only alienate Russia from the West’ (Deriglazova et al., 2012: 4).
Despite this perception, what can be seen is that the MFA’s driving influence is
not conservatism but instead Russia’s regaining ‘great power status remains the
principal objective behind Moscow’s foreign policy’ and, consequently, con-
cerns about great power status dominate Russian policy-making (Roi,
2010: 558).
Of important note when considering MFA officials in the field of Euro-
Atlantic security are the Foreign Minister, certain Deputy Foreign Ministers
(DFMs) whose portfolios deal with issue related to the region, and the Russian
ambassador to NATO. One Central European ambassador reflected that ‘Russia
has an interesting policy of leaving Deputy Foreign Ministers in their positions
for long periods of time’ and it not just the Deputies but the current Foreign
Minister himself, Sergei Lavrov, has held his position since 2004. Although
important, Mankoff regards the MFA as ‘rather peripheral in terms of setting a
strategic course’ for Russian foreign policy despite the fact that it is ‘theoretic-
ally responsible for playing the lead role in defining and implementing foreign
policy’ (Mankoff, 2012: 54). Sergei Lavrov’s background was a career spent at
the MFA and, subsequently, he ‘lack[ed] strong political connections or strongly
articulated views about the direction of Russian foreign policy’ which has meant
that there has been no clear ‘Lavrov foreign policy’ and instead, his role is that
of announcing the Kremlin’s foreign policy (55). At the same time, Lavrov’s
long tenure has seen the MFA’s position within Russia rise, particularly in the
areas of disarmament, but it should be recognised that ‘over the past ten years
high-level diplomats have been reluctant to challenge the military’s control over
that issue area’ (Sokov et al., 2009: 8).
The Deputy Foreign Ministers with responsibility for issues relating to the
Euro-Atlantic region during the Medvedev presidency were Alexander Grushko,
Grigori Karasin, and Sergei Riabkov. Alexander Grushko was DFM from
2005–2012 with a portfolio which included the European and Euro-Atlantic
organisations, and later replaced Dmitry Rogozin as Russian ambassador to
NATO in 2012 after the position sat vacant for nearly a year (NATO Mission,
2012). By the nature of his focus on regional organisations, Grushko is quite
important in the chapters discussing Russia’s relations with the organisations
themselves and also with the regional security architecture. After his appoint-
ment to NATO, a Western European ambassador stated that Grushko is
‘someone who is a very professional diplomat’ while a Central European ambas-
sador recognised his efforts dealing with the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty while DFM, calling Grushko ‘a CFE expert’. Grigori Karasin is
both State Secretary and a DFM and has overseen Russia’s bilateral relations
with the CIS countries since 2005 and also has oversight of the ‘law-drafting
activity’ of the Ministry (Russian MFA, 2013). The third DFM, Sergei Riabkov,
who is responsible for U.S.–Russian relations as well as Russian security and
arms control policy, was appointed to his office by Medvedev in August 2008
(WNC: Interfax, 2008b). While ‘the Ministry of Defence determines Russia’s
policy response to U.S. missile defence deployments . . . the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs represents the country and serves as the interlocutor with the United
States’ and, therefore, Riabkov has a key role in this area of policy, along with
the Russian ambassador to NATO (Raĭan & Saradzhian, 2012: 2).
One of the challenges facing the Russian ambassadors to NATO is that the
country is not a member of the organisation. As one Central European ambas-
sador recognised, being the Russian ambassador to the organisation must be ‘dif-
ficult’ because there are only a couple meetings a month between Russia and the
alliance. While there might be limited work for the Russian ambassadors to
NATO, a Western European ambassador explained that when it comes to the
relationship between the Russian and Western ambassadors ‘a very important
aspect here is the personalities of perm[anent] rep[resentative]s of Russia’
because the personalities have ‘contributed, not as the decisive element, but they
contributed to reinforcing the roller coaster ride in either direction’ that is
Russia–NATO relations.
Russia had three different ambassadors to NATO between 2000 and May
2012 but for the time considered here the most important ambassador is the
Russian ambassador who served under both Putin and Medvedev, Dmitry
Rogozin. When considering Russia’s relationship with the alliance, the role of
Rogozin is quite important, particularly because of the perceived importance of
the Russian ambassador to the NATO ambassadors and how the different per-
sonalities can lead to, in the words of an Eastern European ambassador, ‘dif-
ferent atmospherics’. To a Central European ambassador, Rogozin was ‘at his
heart a politician’ who, according to a different ambassador from the region,
‘always had political ambitions’ and, therefore, his behaviour towards NATO
was about appealing to the domestic audience. Also complicating this relation-
ship was a feeling, as expressed by an Eastern European ambassador, that
Rogozin was ‘outspoken and used social media, all media’ in a way that ‘did not
build a collegial atmosphere’ because he would leak discussions to the press,
which provided the press with, in the words of a Central European colleague,
‘juicy statements’. One Western European ambassador regarded Rogozin as:
a game changer but not to the better, but rather to the worse. He reinforced
the scepticism of Moscow vis-à-vis this organisation but also, like a chame-
leon, at the end of his tenure, Lisbon 2010, also contributed massively,
under the Medvedev presidency, to move from the total downward trend of
2008 to an upward trend in 2010. But his tenure basically . . . has shed a lot
of shadows on this relationship.
What can be seen from the NATO perspective, therefore, is that the Rogozin
period was not merely complicated between Russia and NATO because of the
issues that they were dealing with but also because of the personality clashes.
Rogozin’s background has been, as was emphasised by multiple officials, that
of a politician. He was appointed to NATO in January 2008, at the end of Putin’s
second term in office, and the arrival of the staunch nationalist in Brussels was
seen by Fyodor Lukyanov, and others, as ‘a signal to NATO that Russia is not at
all pleased with NATO’s actions, particularly concerning the alliance’s expan-
sion to the east’ (Bigg, 2008b). Rogozin, who had previously served as Chair-
man of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee had also been Russia’s envoy to
talks with the EU on Kaliningrad and at meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, which means he had experience promoting Russia’s
interests in a variety of fora (Bigg, 2008b). His tenure at NATO concluded
before the Medvedev presidency ended when Rogozin was named the Deputy
Prime Minister with responsibility for the defence and space industry in Decem-
ber 2011 (Government of Russia, 2011). This appointment was followed by an
announcement in February 2011 that Rogozin would also be the Special Repre-
sentative of the President of the Russian Federation responsible for cooperation
with NATO on the issue of missile defence, however, this position ceased in
April 2012 (Government of Russia, 2011).
The concept of the Euro-Atlantic region

For many, Euro-Atlanticism before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S.
meant maintaining an American role in the politics and security of Europe. The
saying of Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, that the organisation
was designed ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans
down’ emphasises the concern that Europeans had about America returning to
isolationist policies after the Second World War and shows the importance of
keeping America involved in Europe (Wheatcroft, 2011).
Despite this perception of America being integral to European security, the
only time that Article V of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document,
has been used was not in defence of Europe but rather of the other side of the
Atlantic. As Article V states, the parties to the treaty agreed:
An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America

shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.
(North Atlantic Treaty, 1949)
Although the original NATO treaty foresaw the role of both the European
members and non-European members of the alliance coming to each other’s
mutual aid, the initial concern of the treaty’s authors was the spread of com-
munism from the Eastern European countries to those in the West (NATO,
2011c). The September 11 attacks brought with them a different understanding
of how NATO’s collective defence might be used.
Over time the concept of what states make up the Euro-Atlantic region has
also been expanded. The establishment of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which spans from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’, brought
an expansion of the original idea of Euro-Atlanticism from that of the NATO
members to that of 56 countries during the first two terms of Putin’s presidency
and the Medvedev presidency but which has subsequently grown to 57 countries
with the admission of Mongolia in November 2012 (Ministerial Council, 2012a).
The organisation represents North American, European, and Central Asian
states, which, although a broad interpretation of the Euro-Atlantic region, when
considering the membership of European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions
and the region’s security framework documents, ensures all members are
included. As the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures is one of the region’s important agreements and includes all member-
states of the OSCE, the OSCE’s definition of the region will be the version of
Euro-Atlantic used.
Structure of the book

In Chapter 2, Russia’s security interests, as discussed in policy documents and
by Russian leaders, will be identified. This includes a consideration of the
Foreign Policy Concepts, Military Doctrines, and National Security documents
from both the Putin and Medvedev presidencies as well as presidential state-
ments. The chapter will also examine the identified strategic interests of Russia
within the Euro-Atlantic region and Russia’s approaches to its interests in
Ukraine and the countries of Central Asia.
Following on from the discussion in the preceding chapter regarding Russia’s
security interests, the third chapter will address Russia’s involvement in the
‘frozen’ conflicts within the Euro-Atlantic space. The chapter will begin with a
consideration of the so-called Kosovo precedent and will then move into ana-
lysis of the Russia–Georgia conflict, which resulted in the unfreezing of one of
the region’s frozen conflicts and the subsequent Russian recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as independent states. Russia’s involvement in Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transdniestria, the other two frozen conflicts, and the efforts by
Putin and Medvedev to secure conflict settlements will also be examined.
In the fourth chapter, Russia’s relationship with the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe will be considered. Russia’s conduct towards the
organisation, its institutional bodies, and the security issues under discussion at
the organisation will be examined during the two presidencies to provide an
understanding of Russia’s response to the organisation and its activities. The
work of one of the OSCE’s institutional bodies, the Office of Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR), will receive particular attention because of
its criticism of elections in Russia and other post-Soviet countries.
The fifth chapter will look at Russia’s threat perception of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, the institutional arrangements that exist between Russia
and NATO as well as areas of cooperation and contention between Russia and
the alliance. It will consider how the two presidents addressed the issues that
exist between Russia and NATO and the progress that was made during the two
presidencies to show that while some issues remain unresolved, cooperation in
some important areas has been possible.
The sixth chapter considers Russia’s compliance with and behaviour
towards the one politically-binding agreement, the Vienna Document on Con-
fidence- and Security-Building Measures, and the two legally-binding agree-
ments, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Treaty on
Open Skies, in the Euro-Atlantic region. An examination will be conducted
into Russian adherence with the existing agreements as well as Russia’s pro-
posed amendments and complaints about other states’ compliance with the
agreements under both presidents in order to understand Russia’s position on
the current security framework. The CFE Treaty is particularly important to
consider because of the 2007 ‘suspension’ of the agreement during the Putin
presidency and the negotiations during the Medvedev presidency to resolve
the crisis that ‘suspension’ created.
Chapter 7 examines Russian plans for adapting the European security
architecture and the progress these discussions have made since the CFE
Treaty entered a state of uncertainty following Russia’s ‘suspension’. It will
consider whether the draft European Security Treaty proposal introduced by
Medvedev represents a deviation from Putin-era policies. It will examine not
only the Medvedev draft itself but also the responses of both the Russians
and the Westerners to the proposal and Russian efforts to promote the
document.
The eighth chapter is focused on progress made in one important area of
security policy, strategic nuclear arms reductions, and the failure to achieve pro-
gress in another, missile defence, during both presidencies. The chapter will look
at the underlying differences between the goals of Russia, the U.S., and NATO
in these areas of policy and why reaching agreements is difficult.
Chapter 9 looks at the return of Putin to the presidency in May 2012. It will
examine the changes in Russian foreign security policy seen with Putin’s third
term and the chapter will reflect on the motivation behind this change. The crisis
over Ukraine and its impact on matters of Euro-Atlantic security will be the par-
ticular focus of the chapter.
The conclusion will offer a final assessment of Medvedev’s role in Russia’s
Euro-Atlantic security policy. It will examine the points of departure between
the two presidents and evaluate the key differences between Medvedev and
Putin’s policies.
Conclusion
Despite his importance, assuming that Putin controlled Russian foreign and
security policy during the years where he served as Prime Minister ignores the
leading role of the presidency in Russian foreign policy-making. Medvedev was
the leader who was constitutionally empowered to have control over Russian
foreign policy since under Article 86 of the Constitution, the President is given
responsibility to ‘govern the foreign policy of the Russian Federation’ (Russian
Constitution, 1993). It is believed by many, including one Russian academic,
that within the tandem there was ‘a division of labour’ where Putin’s role in the
tandem would be focused on economic and social issues, while Medvedev would
focus on foreign policy with the goal of ‘improving the image of Russia in the
world’. This planned division of policy seemed to be confirmed when Nikolaĭ
Zlobin reported that during the 2011 Valdai Group meeting with Putin, Putin
confirmed Medvedev’s control over foreign and security policy by stating that
Medvedev had ‘carte blanche’ over those policy areas (Zlobin, 2011). The
Western focus on Putin’s dominance of Russian policy-making, even during the
Medvedev presidency, limits our understanding of Russian foreign and security
policy in the twenty-first century. Despite being routinely characterised as the
‘junior partner’ in the tandem, there are some signs of Medvedev’s independ-
ence as a policymaker that should be recognised since these policies represent
deviations from those of Putin, who has since returned to the presidency. Dmitry
Medvedev was a one-term president but significant events occurred during his
presidency, which deserve consideration for their role in shaping debates about
the future of the Euro-Atlantic security system.
Regardless of questions about the fairness of the 2008 election, Medvedev
became the President of Russia on May 7, 2008. Despite being a chosen succes-
sor who owed his candidacy and presidential power to Putin, Medvedev exhib-
ited independence as a foreign and security policy actor.
Note
1 Tandemocracy is featured in Henry E. Hale and Timothy J. Colton’s Russians and the
Putin–Medvedev ‘Tandemocracy’; Andrei Ryabov’s Tandemocracy in Today’s Russia;
Richard Sakwa’s The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and
the Medvedev Succession; and Daniel Treisman’s The Return: Russia’s Journey From
Gorbachev to Medvedev, among other works.
2 Russia’s Euro-Atlantic security
interests
Preserving and building influence
To understand the importance of the Euro-Atlantic region to Russia, as well as

the ties that Russia has to the region’s security institutions and framework, it is
important to consider the development of Russian security policy and how it
influences Russian thinking about the region. Russian security policy, like that
of any state, has a direct connection to the country’s foreign and defence pol-
icies. Although the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in foreign
policy decision-making has increased from when Yeltsin was president, the
MFA has faced competition from the Ministry of Defence, the intelligence
agencies, the Presidential Administration, and even the Customs Committee
(Sergunin, 2008: 61). The security policy in the Euro-Atlantic region, therefore,
reflects the documents prepared by different branches of government. The
Russian foreign, military, and national security documents of both the Putin and
Medvedev presidencies offer largely similar views of the Euro-Atlantic space
but there are points of departure that make it important to consider the three dif-
ferent categories of documents under both presidencies in order to understand
the thinking of the Russian leadership. Each president introduced their own
Foreign Policy Concepts (2000 and 2008) and Military Doctrines (2000 and
2010). The national security document produced under Putin was the 2000
National Security Concept, while the document under Medvedev was the 2009
National Security Strategy Until 2020. While the first section of this chapter
examines Russia’s views on Euro-Atlantic security through consideration of the
three types of documents, it does not consider what the documents say about
the North Atlantic Security Organisation (NATO) since the documents and the
views of Russian leaders on the Alliance are considered more in depth in
the chapter on NATO–Russian relations.
In addition to the consideration of the security documents themselves, an
examination of Russia’s actions towards its neighbours will be made since the
documents themselves place an importance on Russia’s relations with its Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) neighbours. Since the next chapter looks
specifically at Russia’s involvement in the frozen conflicts of the Caucasus and
Eastern Europe and how Russia’s involvement in the conflicts impacts Russia’s
relations with the states involved, this chapter will look at Russia’s relations with
its neighbours in Central Asia and its relations with Ukraine. It will consider
18 Russia’s Euro-Atlantic security interests
Russian attempts to maintain influence in Ukraine, where the headquartering of
the Black Sea Fleet has important implications for Russian defence policy and
where a colour revolution led to damaged relations. It will also examine Russian
policies towards Central Asia and consider how Russia has sought to increase its
influence through the establishment of regional organisations.
Russian security documents and Russian interests

To consider the way in which policymakers from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Security Council view Russia’s inter-
ests and by what means they believe they should be promoted and protected, it is
important to look at the documents that each institution produces and that the
president gives approval to. It should be noted that for states to make assess-
ments of their own security in relation to the decisions of other countries is an
inherently complicated process. As Andrew Cottey points out ‘threat assess-
ments depend on information about the external world, yet such information is
inevitably uncertain’ and trying to figure out what other states’ intentions are is
difficult because it relies ‘on inferences drawn from material capabilities, intelli-
gence information on those intentions, past experiences and our own prejudices’
(Cottey, 2007: 8).
Both of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concepts identify that the most important
goal of the country’s policies is to protect the interests of individuals and society
and that there are several ways to achieve this goal, including by: maintaining
the country’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity; maintaining Russia’s
position in the world; creating conditions that will aid in the development of the
country’s economy, democracy, and society; supporting international law and
the UN Charter in particular; strengthening relationships with Russia’s neigh-
bours; making agreements with countries when their interests and Russia’s inter-
sect which allows for stronger relations with other states; supporting Russian
citizens and compatriots outside of Russia; and by encouraging a positive view
of Russia including through the support of Russian language and culture (FPC,
2000; FPC, 2008). Under the Putin-era document, the highest regional priority is
placed on bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) and states that integration should be pursued
through the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty (FPC, 2000). It also promotes
efforts towards conflict settlement, economic cooperation, and supporting shared
culture in the region (FPC, 2000). The Medvedev document is similar in placing
the priority on the CIS states and the importance of strengthening the CIS and
furthering conflict resolution in the region but also acknowledges the develop-
ment of other regional organisations so it also discusses promoting the Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC) with the goal of building a customs union and
increasing the Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO) security role
(FPC, 2008).
While the priority in the two documents is placed on Russia’s neighbours and
enhancing cooperation with them, the rest of the Euro-Atlantic region is not
Russia’s Euro-Atlantic security interests 19
forgotten. In the 2000 document, ties with Europe are first about building
cooperation in security and other fields, which means developing the Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an organisation, promot-
ing the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (ACFE Treaty), participating in the Council of Europe (CoE), build-
ing relations with the European Union (EU) and lastly through the strengthening
of ties with the countries of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and
the Balkans (FPC, 2000). The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept specifically men-
tions the Euro-Atlantic region and how agreement on a new European Security
Treaty would help to overcome the bloc legacy of the Cold War (FPC, 2008).
The document focuses on expanding the legal framework in Europe including
through the strengthening of the CoE, creating equality at the OSCE, developing
relations with the EU, and promoting bilateral relations with countries in
Western Europe, the Nordic states, and countries in Central, Eastern, and South-
Eastern Europe (FPC, 2008), The development of relations with the United
States is considered important for the promotion of global strategic stability
through the fields of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation in the
Putin-era document (FPC, 2000). Medvedev’s Foreign Policy Concept features
the U.S. more prominently and while it does appeal to the U.S. to comply with
international law, it also calls for the building of a partnership (FPC, 2008).
Areas of cooperation between Russia and the U.S. that are mentioned in the
Concept range from economic, trade and technology to developing confidence-
building and verification measures for space and missile defence to working
together to prevent non-proliferation, develop safe nuclear energy, combat ter-
rorism, and resolve regional conflicts (FPC, 2008).
While the Russian Foreign Ministry’s document is focused primarily on areas
of cooperation, the Ministry of Defence is focused on identifying threats and
factors that destabilise global security. In the 2000 Military Doctrine, the promo-
tion of collective security within the CIS and in particular the strengthening of
the Collective Security Treaty in addition to good neighbourly relations can be
seen as important to Russia’s security (Military Doctrine, 2000). The importance
of neighbourly relations is seen in the 2010 Doctrine which considers violations
of international law that go against the UN Charter in the military conflicts of
Russia’s neighbouring states and those occurring near its borders to be a danger
to Russia (Military Doctrine, 2010). The existence of regional conflicts on the
borders of Russia and its allies as well as interethnic and interfaith tension that
has resulted in armed radicals in areas near Russia and its friends is also identi-
fied as a concern (Military Doctrine, 2010). The 2010 Doctrine promotes the
strengthening of the CSTO’s collective security measures and building its cap-
abilities while promoting cooperation with bodies like the CIS, OSCE, and
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Putin’s National Security Concept points to several areas of concern which
are related to the Euro-Atlantic region including efforts to diminish the role of
the UN and the OSCE in international security, the basing of foreign troops near
Russia’s borders, the decline in integration efforts at the CIS, and conflicts near
Russia’s borders and the borders of CIS countries (National Security Concept,
2000). According to the Security Concept, within the CIS, Russia would seek to
create a single economic space, promote the Russian language to build ties
between Russia and the countries there, and develop relations with countries in
the CIS in accordance with international law and through integration processes
(National Security Concept, 2000). The 2009 National Security Strategy Until
2020 states that the priority of Russian foreign policy is building cooperation,
both bilateral and multilateral, with the states of the CIS (National Security
Strategy, 2009). The organisations which Russia would seek to build ties with
are the CIS itself, the CSTO which is considered the main organisation for
addressing regional security issues, EurAsEC which is considered the main
organisation for economic integration, and the SCO as a partnership building
organisation for Central Asia (National Security Strategy, 2009). The document
also calls for the creation of a Euro-Atlantic collective security system and for
agreements between Russia and the U.S. on disarmament and arms control as
well as cooperation on non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and conflict
resolution.
While the documents from the Medvedev presidency reflect the changes that
have happened in the world since 2000, they also provide more specifics about
cooperation than were presented in the Putin-era versions. A recurring Russian
foreign policy theme throughout the three categories of documents and under
both presidents is the importance of the CIS countries and the organisations that
have been established to increase cooperation and integration amongst the CIS
countries. The significance of the CIS region to Russia and its role as an area of
‘privileged interests’ is seen not just in the next section but is also seen in Rus-
sia’s policies towards the Euro-Atlantic security framework and security
organisations.
Russia and the areas of ‘privileged interests’

While the idea of spheres of influence have been part of Russian rhetoric since
Yeltsin’s presidency, under Putin the idea was not often discussed, except to
criticise it (Lo, 2003: 82). When Medvedev was president, the phrase ‘spheres of
influence’ was rebranded. In a television interview following the 2008 conflict
with Georgia, President Medvedev declared five foreign policy principles with
the fifth principle being that Russia had ‘privileged interests’ which consisted of
regions that ‘are home to countries with which we share special historical rela-
tions and are bound together as friends and good neighbours’ (Medvedev D.,
2008a). From the Russian perspective, countries that Russia has been tied to in
its history and are geographically close to are those that were part of the former
Russian Empire and Soviet Union, the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus,
and Eastern Europe.
The concept of a Russian ‘sphere of influence’ or the idea of a Russian role in
the ‘near abroad’ can be seen in connection with Russian attempts to secure its
status as a great power through its efforts to project its power. The desire to be
seen as a great power, particularly by states that have either been under Russian
control as Soviet Republics or as part of the Russian Empire, is clear in Russian
efforts to dominate its neighbours. Since 2000, there have been active conflicts,
such as the one between Russia and Georgia in 2008, but also conflicts that have
not seen military action, such as the shutting off of gas supplies. Both types of
conflicts can be seen through the lens of great power politics as Russia is again
reasserting itself and seeking recognition as a regional power.
Russia and Central Asia: influence through institutional ties

Russia’s attempts to influence its Central Asian neighbours can be seen
through Russia’s push for further regional integration. While security policy is
the focus here, Russia’s broader efforts to bring the Central Asian states and
Russia together should be considered. While there was a CIS free trade agree-
ment signed in 1994, the Eurasian Economic Community, which was created
in 2000, sought to create a common economic space with members Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which would
serve as a precursor to the Customs Union (Saivetz, 2012: 406). The Customs
Union which has been established between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia
has removed tariffs and customs barriers between the three countries and
could expand to include Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as those coun-
tries are currently in talks about membership (Krickovic, 2014: 503). After the
announcement that he would be the candidate for the Russian presidency in
2012, Putin set out his plans for a Eurasian Economic Union in an October 8,
2011 article. In the article, he talked of how the project is not about recreating
the Soviet Union but that instead the project is seeking to establish a supra-
national union with coordinated economic and monetary policies and freedom
of movement, similar to the Schengen zone, which would be a major part of
the global economic system because of its natural resources, capital, and
citizens (Putin, 2011a).
Despite Russia’s initial support for American basing in Central Asia follow-
ing the September 11, 2001 attacks, over the decade that followed Russia
became more concerned that the continued U.S. presence in the region was
‘undermin[ing] Russia’s geopolitical position in Eurasia’ (Tsygankov, 2009b:
11). Despite it being within Russia’s interests to have positive relations with the
U.S. in order to address security issues of common concern, it was argued that
the country will not conduct relations ‘at the expense of national sovereignty and
pride’ (Rukavishnikov, 2007: 67). As Medvedev stated, ‘the countries on our
borders are priorities’ and Russia’s policies towards the Central Asian states
illustrates this (Medvedev D., 2008a). There is a feeling in Russia that although
Western states have had an increased regional presence since September 11,
2001, the Western countries will leave but the relationships between Russia and
the Central Asian states will continue and be important (Barskii, 2012: 23–24).
Under Putin, even while offering support to the U.S.-led coalition in securing
access to Central Asian bases, Russia was signing agreements with Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan to enhance their military base presence in the region in order to
maintain influence (Lachowski, 2007: 44).
The establishment of organisations such as the CSTO and SCO can be seen as
part of Russia’s desire to reassert its influence in the region, while it ‘mak[es]
use of regional institutions or ad hoc agreements in order to legitimize its
actions’ (Zagorski, 2009: 46). Within the CSTO, unlike the SCO, there is no
other large and powerful state for Russia to be challenged by and, therefore,
Russia is able to dominate its fellow member-states (Mankoff, 2012: 257). The
military structure of the CSTO is focused around three separate systems with
Russia as a member of each and Armenia as Russia’s partner in the South Cau-
casus; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan working with Russia in Central
Asia; and Belarus and Russia working together in Eastern Europe (Dubnov,
2012: 3). The establishment of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force
(CRRF ), which consists of ten battalions protected by an air defence system and
is financially supported by the CSTO states, is just one of the projects under-
taken by Russia to strengthen its ties with the countries of Central Asia (Rykhtik,
2009: 4). The CRRF is designed to handle missions involving a variety of tasks
such as conflict prevention, anti-terrorism and anti-criminal activity, border pro-
tection, and humanitarian assistance during emergencies (Bordiuzha, 2009: 101).
The utility of the project is considered debateable given that it was not used
during the ethnic clashes following the 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution and no military
assistance was provided to the country during the crisis (Parker, 2011: 19). The
explanation for Russia’s non-involvement in the crisis, however, could be rooted
in domestic reasons. It has been argued by some that the CSTO was ‘not ready
to take on its first international peacekeeping mission, and in any case, Russia
kn[ew] it would have to foot the bill and provide most of the troops’, which
given the lack of support in Russia for involvement in Kyrgyzstan may not have
appealed to Medvedev and the Russian leadership (Shuster, 2010). That it was
‘an appeal by a provisional government [would mean that involvement in the
crisis] was tantamount to supporting one side in a sectarian conflict’ and such a
precedent would be met with ‘deep divisions and distrust in the organisation’,
particularly from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Allison, 2013: 143).
Despite Russia’s premier position in the organisation, Russia has not always
succeeded in having its positions accepted by the other states. An attempt to
secure recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was not
endorsed by the CSTO, although the organisation did express unease regarding
Georgia’s behaviour, but other than Russia itself, no other CSTO state has recog-
nised the two breakaway regions (Alexeeva, 2008). This is similar to the situ-
ation that arose in the CIS when Putin sought support for the recognition of the
two breakaway regions but none came since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were
‘very wary’, Belarus and Armenia chose not take a position on the issue, and
Ukraine and Azerbaijan (and Moldova more warily) gave their support to
Georgia (Nygren, 2011: 109). Russia failed to gather support from states with
whom it considers relations important and who are from an area where Russia is
a regional power. Russian attempts to have NATO acknowledge the CSTO and,
therefore, raise the prestige of the organisation have failed. An invitation from
CSTO leaders to start talks with NATO saw the alliance express a preference for
working bilaterally with the individual member-states (Liakin-Frolov, 2012: 31).
Russia’s position of power within the CSTO has expanded in recent years. In
2007, Russia agreed to provide member-states of the organisation with Russian
weapons and equipment at the internal Russian price, a decision that would not
only standardise equipment across the countries but would also tie them closer to
Russia since Russia would be their supplier (WNC: ITAR-TASS, 2007a). At the
same meeting of the organisation, an agreement established the CSTO peace-
keeping force, which will operate with or without the consent of the UN on the
territory of countries that are members of the organisation (Gabuev & Solov’ev,
2007). Yet, as was already stated, during the 2010 Kyrgyz crisis, neither the
CSTO nor Russia were involved, despite the existence of this mechanism, which
shows selectivity in its usage. To justify involvement in the internal issues of
another CSTO member-state in the future, a Russian-led process to change the
CSTO’s charter so that the organisation could respond to cases where the
‘security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty’ of its members was
challenged was undertaken in December 2010 (Cooley & Laruelle, 2013: 2). In
December 2011, a new agreement within the CSTO enhanced Russia’s regional
influence. The agreement called for a member-state to seek the agreement of the
CSTO when considering whether to let another country establish a military base
on its territory, a decision which Russia, according to the president’s press sec-
retary, considered to be a way of stabilising the security situation in Eurasia and
as a way of showing the strength of the alliance between the CSTO states (WNC:
Interfax, 2011). This decision would give Russia an effective veto over the
ability of outside states to build bases within the region and helped allay Russian
concerns that the U.S. and its Western European allies, might seek to expand
their bases in the region. In February 2012, Putin made it clear that Russia would
continue enhancing the CSTO role when, in one of his election campaign
articles, he called for the states of the organisation to continue increasing the
organisation’s capabilities since it needs ‘to fulfil its mission of guarantor of
stability in the Eurasian space’ (Putin, 2012c).
The CSTO and SCO signed an agreement in October 2007, which called for
increased cooperation in the fields of transnational crime, terrorism, and the drug
trade, including measures such as ‘information exchanges between the organisa-
tions, consultations on the regional situation and development of joint regional
security programmes’ (WNC: ITAR-TASS, 2007b). Unlike the CSTO, the SCO
does not call for collective security and is considered to be a less close partner-
ship that varies in its level of concern with security issues (Mankoff, 2012: 206).
While the concern at the CSTO is more focused on external threats, the SCO has
a ‘security focus [which] is rooted in countering the “three evils” (extremism,
separatism, and terrorism)’ and thus has an inward focus (McDermott, 2012: 61).
As a result of the internal emphasis at the SCO, the organisation is based on
‘mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in
the internal affairs of each other’, principles that Russia has long advocated
(Barskii, 2012: 13). There are no plans for the SCO to become a politico-military
alliance and instead the contacts that have been developed between the defence
ministries of the member countries have been for counter-terrorism purposes
(Barskii, 2011: 15).
With the SCO’s inclusion of China, Russia sought a counter-balance to Amer-
ican influence and hoped that a Chinese-Russian alliance would be able to lead
to an American departure from the region, would thwart colour revolutions, and
that China and Russia could be allies at the UN Security Council when choosing
to exercise their veto power (Judah et al., 2011: 34). By combining their regional
power within the SCO, China and Russia can better attempt to confront Ameri-
can influence and maintain their own importance in Central Asia. While China
and Russia are attempting to offset American influence in the region, other
members of the CSTO and SCO are seeking to counter the strong influence of
Russia in the CSTO by being members of the SCO and of countering the influ-
ence of China in the SCO with membership in the CSTO, which shows that
members of the organisations have concerns about the strong influence of
regional powers (Safranchuk, 2008).
Through not only its military presence in the region but also its ties to another
regional power, Russia has sought to counterbalance any potential influence that
America and its allies would have. Seeking to reduce the American military
presence through arrangements that allow Russia influence in decisions about
the stationing of foreign troops in the region, while simultaneously making
Russian military equipment and weapons systems more affordable, has helped
Russia retain influence in the region. The establishment of organisations through
which these relations and agreements can be brought forward shows the import-
ance that Central Asia has in Russian policy formation.
Ukraine: a colour revolution, energy cut-offs, and the Black Sea fleet
The importance that Ukraine has to Russia cannot be understated and the fact
that 17% of Ukraine’s population is ethnically Russian is vital to understanding
the degree to which Russia feels closely tied to the country (Maness & Valeri-
ano, 2012: 138). The relationship between Russia and Ukraine in the early
twenty-first century can best be described as tumultuous. The Orange Revolution
represents a particularly difficult moment in the bilateral relationship. Gas dis-
putes between the two countries led to an international outcry as Russia shut off
gas to Ukraine during the middle of winter. The stationing of Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet in Ukraine is of critical importance to Russia’s security policy and, con-
sequently, debates about the continued stationing of Russian sailors in the
country has serious implications for Russian military planning and security
policy.
Of the colour revolutions in the former Soviet Republics, none has had a
greater impact on Russia than the 2004 Orange Revolution. The revolution came
as a surprise to the Russian leadership and the events are considered by Treis-
man as a ‘humiliation for Putin and the Kremlin’ because of the voter fraud and
Yushchenko’s eventual victory and as a ‘failure’ for Medvedev in particular
because he had been in charge of the Kremlin’s support of Yanukovych, includ-
ing the provision of political technologists to Ukraine (Treisman, 2011: 136).
Sergei Markov, a member of the Duma, said that he did not think Medvedev
enjoyed the responsibility of Ukrainian elections because while Medvedev ‘pre-
ferred dealing with Russian matters and doing things legally . . . the work in
Ukraine was neither legal nor proper’ (Putin, Russia and the West, 2012a).
While the Ukrainian presidential election was portrayed by outsiders as
Ukraine’s decision between aligning the country with NATO or Russia, Ukraini-
ans typically vote based on domestic rather than foreign policy concerns
(Copsey, 2010: 35).
Even when it became clear that the second round of voting was tainted by
fraudulent activities, Putin still offered his congratulations to Yanukovych on
three occasions, showing that the Russian leadership was misreading the situ-
ation on the ground in Ukraine (37). Putin supported Yanukovych and argued
that Western governments should not involve themselves in Ukraine’s elections,
while the Western leaders called for Russia to not involve itself in internal
Ukrainian affairs and built connections with the Orange movement (Tsygankov,
2009b: 99). Some argue that although Western governments sought a reduced
role for Russia in Ukraine, the support that was given to Yushchenko ‘through
State Department statements about the “unacceptability” of the election results,
and the involvement of various non-governmental organisations, could hardly be
described as one of neutral observation’ (Tsygankov, 2009a: 200). Despite argu-
ments from both sides that the other was influencing the results of the election,
Copsey argued that the influence of outsiders on the Orange Revolution has been
overstated because of the perception that the election was a decision between
East and West and since each side wanted Ukraine as part of their community
(Copsey, 2010: 35).
For Putin, the Orange Revolution marked ‘his worst foreign policy defeat
ever’ and concerns emerged in the Russian leadership that Russia might experi-
ence its own ‘Orange’ crisis (Trenin, 2011b: 89). Subsequent domestic policy
decisions reflect concerns about a Russian ‘Orange’ Revolution. The passing of
a law on nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) operating in Russia can be
seen as directly connected to the events in Ukraine. Under the December 2005
law, the government was provided with new powers ‘to scrutinize NGO activ-
ities and finances’, which were used to delve into the affairs of ‘human rights
groups and foreign-funded NGOs’ such as the Moscow Helsinki Group (Jordan,
2010: 104–105). Nongovernmental organisations would also have to register and
the government was given a wide range of reasons to deny an organisation the
right to form (Horvath, 2011: 18). The establishment of a youth movement,
called Nashi, was the government’s way of both preventing colour revolution
activism in Russia and building youth support for the government (Finkel &
Brudny, 2012: 19).
The issue of energy security in Ukraine has had a big part in the Russian–
Ukrainian relationship since under both the Putin and Medvedev presidencies
(and the Medvedev chairmanship of Gazprom during the Putin presidency),
Russia shut off the gas supply to Ukraine. There are two arguments about the
purposes behind Russia’s energy policies. The first argument, which is that
Russia is seeking to have the former Soviet states pay market prices for gas is
weakened by the fact that the states do not all pay the same price, and the second
argument, which appears more convincing, is that Russia uses its energy
resources ‘in order to pressure former Soviet republics into not pursuing “too
close” relations with the West and into agreeing to Russian-led integration initi-
atives and otherwise following policies considered desirable by the Russian
leadership’ (Balmaceda, 2008: 8). In January 2006, a gas crisis reached its peak
when the cut-off of gas supplies not only harmed relations between the two
countries but also saw a reduction in the supplies of gas reaching other Eastern
and Western European countries which led to concerns about Russia’s reliability
as a supplier (Medvedev S., 2008: 215). The 2006 crisis came about as a result
of failed 2005 negotiations where the Ukrainians argued that there was already
an agreement in place that kept gas prices at $50 per thousand cubic metres
(tcm) until 2009 but Gazprom sought to increase the price of gas to first,
$160 tcm, and then later, $230 tcm (Nichol et al., 2006: 2). This concern was
reinforced during the 2009 gas crisis, which again saw gas supplies cut off to
Ukraine and parts of Europe, and led Vladimir Milov, a member of the Russian
opposition, to point to similarities to the Russia–Georgia conflict and how both
Georgia and Ukraine had pro-Western presidents that Russia wanted to see dis-
graced (The Economist, 2009). The 2009 crisis happened because Gazprom and
Ukraine failed to reach agreement on issues regarding ‘a debt allegedly owed by
Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for gas supplies for
2009’ (Woehrel, 2010: 11).
One of the most significant issues in the Russian–Ukrainian relationship has
proven to be the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian soil. The Black
Sea Fleet serves as ‘a means of ensuring Russia’s military security in the south’
and includes submarines, ships, aircraft, and ground troops (Russian Defence Min-
istry, 2012). Under Yushchenko, Ukraine sought to end the basing of Russian
forces on its territory when the existing basing agreement expired in 2017 because
the presence of the Black Sea Fleet was considered by Yushchenko to have a desta-
bilising impact on the Russian–Ukrainian relationship (RIA Novosti, 2009b).
Shortly after returning from a visit to Georgia, Yushchenko issued a decree on
August 13, 2008 that saw Ukraine declare that Russia had to provide three days
notice prior to moving ships, aircraft, and service members stationed in Ukraine
and this decree came only days after Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry claimed ‘the right
to prevent ships from the Black Sea Fleet returning to base in Ukraine’s Crimea
Peninsula if they had taken part in military action’ (Reuters, 2008). When Yanuko-
vych became president a new agreement was reached that allowed Russia use of
Sevastopol until 2042, which was a 25 year extension of the lease (RFE/RL,
2010b). Under the agreement, Russia would provide Ukraine with discounts on gas
until 2020 and Ukraine would be paid an increased rent for Russia’s use of the
Black Sea Fleet’s facilities (Saradzhian, 2010).
The strategic importance of the Black Sea Fleet is clear in the statements of
Medvedev and Putin after the agreement had been reached. In the press conference
following the signing of the agreement, Medvedev claimed that ‘the presence of
Russian naval forces creates the necessary balance of interests for all countries in
the Black Sea region and of course first and foremost for Russia and Ukraine’
which helps to increase the region’s security (Medvedev D., 2010e). Putin argued
that ‘not a single military base in the world is worth so much money . . . it would be
possible to build several bases with this money’ but that the cooperation that comes
from the Black Sea Fleet being stationed in Crimea ‘is the most important thing’
(Putin, 2010). From the Russian perspective, the high financial cost of the Sevas-
topol base was worth it because the base is considered critical to Russia’s security
interests, helps maintain ties with a former part of the Russian Empire and Soviet
Union, and makes Ukrainian membership in NATO less likely.
Conclusion
Both Ukraine and Central Asia represent areas where continuity between the
Medvedev and Putin presidencies is quite apparent as both presidents sought to
strengthen Russia’s influence and to undermine any potential increase in the influ-
ence of the U.S. and NATO. In Central Asia, Russia continued its efforts to build
the CSTO into a stronger and closer alliance, as can be seen with the 2011 CSTO
agreement that a member-state seek agreement from other states before allowing a
third-party state establish a military base on its territory. While the role of the
CSTO is being built up, the non-intervention in Kyrgyzstan during the 2010 crisis
shows the desire of certain countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, not
to establish a precedent of intervention in each other’s domestic affairs. The Eura-
sian Economic Union project marks a step towards a new level of integration in the
post-Soviet area. Broad membership in the Union is something that Russia is pur-
suing as part of its aim to provide the region with closer ties. While the member-
ship of the Central Asian states is key to the Eurasian Union project, the integration
that it represents is also important in building a relationship with a country that
Russia’s hope will become a member, Ukraine. It has been argued that the Eura-
sian Union project was not about tying the Central Asian states to Russia but
instead that ‘its real and overriding objective is preventing Ukraine from establish-
ing closer relations with the European Union and NATO, bringing this country
definitively and irreversibly back into the orbit of its Slavic “brother country”
Russia’ (Van Herpen, 2014: 243).
Under Medvedev, the most important development in Russian–Ukrainian rela-
tions was the agreement that the stationing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet would con-
tinue beyond 2017, which means that NATO expansion to Ukraine would also
remain a non-issue since a NATO member-state would be expected to not have a
Russian base on its territory. While this is an important development, it can be seen
in connection to the departure of Yushchenko from the presidency and the new
president, Yanukovych, assuming a more pro-Russian stance than his predecessor
rather than as the result of a strong Medvedev foreign policy effort.
3 Russia and the ‘frozen’ conflicts
of the Euro-Atlantic space
Different conflicts, different roles
For Putin and Medvedev, the regional conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Cau-
casus have posed both challenges and opportunities. Kosovo, the first conflict to
be discussed, is important because the dispute not only involves one of Russia’s
closest friends who was not part of the Soviet Union, Serbia, but also because of
the so-called Kosovo precedent, which some believe has influenced Russian
behaviour towards other regional conflicts. The frozen conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transdniestria all involve Russia, either
as a military presence or as a peacekeeping presence, depending on perspective
or nationality, or Russia serves as a mediating party.
The participation of Russia in the conflict resolution processes for the frozen
conflicts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus can be seen as both a reflection of
Russia’s effort to maintain influence over parts of the former Russian Empire
(and the former Soviet Union) and as a way of supporting the interests of its
friends, which in turn, builds the relationship between Russia and the states.
Under both Putin and Medvedev, Russia was involved in conversations to
resolve some of the conflicts but these talks ultimately were not successful. What
the talks do is provide for a good comparison of the foreign policy priorities of
the two men and an understanding of Russia’s attempts at leadership on the
frozen conflict issues. Under Putin the focus was on Kosovo and Transdniestria,
while under Medvedev a greater emphasis was on Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Kosovo was important to the Russian leadership due to the
Kosovo precedent and Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria each had
Russian troops stationed on their territory and the two Georgian regions were
also part of an active conflict in 2008. The question of why Medvedev would
show interest in Nagorno-Karabakh, an unresolved conflict which has seen little
progress towards resolution, has prompted some speculation as to whether Putin
wanted Medvedev to involve himself in the conflict resolution process as a way
of keeping him busy and to give the appearance that Medvedev was involved on
important issues. While Medvedev was active on the issue of Nagorno-
Karabakh, it is important to note that the progress towards achieving an agree-
ment between Azerbaijan and Armenia shows a sincere effort and one that,
although receiving of a great deal of Medvedev’s attention, did not prevent the
developing of other policy initiatives, such as the European Security Treaty
Russia and the ‘frozen’ conflicts 29
proposal, or negotiating major treaties, such as the New Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty (New START).
Russia and Kosovo: a new precedent?

Kosovo has proven to be a complicated issue between Russia, on one side, and the
U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the other, due to Rus-
sia’s close relationship with Serbia and dislike for interventionism. In 1999, before
the NATO bombing campaign began, Russian Prime Minister Primakov was en
route to the U.S. where he was to meet with Clinton but since the Americans had
informed Yeltsin that the bombing campaign was imminent, Primakov’s plane
turned around and he returned to Russia (Primakov, 2004: 269). The timing of the
campaign’s beginning was not only disliked by the Russians because Primakov was
to meet with Clinton but also because the first round of NATO enlargement (which
included the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) had occurred only a few weeks
earlier (Lynch, 2001: 19). Inside Russia, there was a push to support Serbia. The
Russian legislature introduced initiatives to further strengthen ties between Russia
and Serbia and the Russian population in general felt anger towards the NATO
countries, but particularly the United States. This can be seen in the attempts of the
Duma’s Communists to negotiate a ‘military strategic union’ with the Serbian
leader, Slobodan Milošević, and the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, endorsing
the protests outside the American embassy in the city (Yeltsin, 2000: 259–260).
The issue of Kosovo was consistently discussed in the statements of Putin
and other Russian leaders in the aftermath of the conflict over the region. One of
the significant concerns for the Russians proved to be the humanitarian situation
that had evolved. In 2003, Putin argued that the conflict had started with the
‘humanitarian catastrophe’ that was the ‘exodus of the Albanian population’
from the region but since the conflict, there has been a different exodus which
has seen 200,000 Serbs leave the region permanently and the response has been
a ‘silence’ that Putin deemed ‘absolutely wrong and unacceptable’ (Putin, 2003).
A year later, in a press conference with the Serbian Prime Minister, Putin con-
firmed that Russia had concerns about the regional situation, in particular the
violent extremism and the security ‘of the non-Albanian population’ (Putin,
2004b). Foreign Minister Lavrov accused Kosovo of making ‘intolerable con-
ditions’ for the minorities living in the region and declared that it would be prac-
tically impossible for the Kosovar Serbs to return (Lavrov, 2004b). Lavrov went
so far as to call the actions of the Kosovar Albanians an ‘ethnic cleansing’, a
claim that was repeated by others working within the Russian MFA (Lavrov,
2004a). Putin argued that reparations should be paid by ‘those who destroyed
facilities and infrastructure in Serbia and Montenegro’ during the bombing cam-
paign to assist with the costs associated with the rebuilding effort (Putin, 2004b).
The rights of the Serbian population of Kosovo were also a concern when Putin
argued that elections that took place in 2004 were troubled because of the large
number of Serbs who had been forced to leave their homes and, therefore, could
not participate in the voting process (Putin, 2004c).
Although the bombing campaign was carried out by NATO, the United
Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) have been involved in Kosovo since. In regards to a resolution to the
Kosovo issue, Putin argued that the Ahtisaari proposals for a solution should be
supported by Kosovo and Serbia since it would ‘not [be] in Europe’s interest for
one of the sides, Belgrade, for example, to have a solution imposed on it that
would be humiliating for the Serbian people’ (Putin, 2007f ). The Ahtisaari Plan
‘is primarily focused on protecting the rights, identity and culture of Kosovo’s
non-Albanian communities, including establishing a framework for their active
participation in public life’ but it also focuses on the distribution of powers,
called for the writing of a new Constitution, and addressed Kosovo’s status inter-
nationally (State Department, 2009). Putin also reminded people that in accord-
ance with Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, and its subsequent
resolutions, Kosovo is considered to be Serbian (Putin, 2007p). Putin supported
an approach to the Kosovo issue where it would be left to the people of both
Kosovo and Serbia to determine their future and stated that ‘there is no need to
play God and resolve all of these peoples’ problems’ but instead the role of other
countries should be to ‘create the necessary conditions and act as the guarantors
of certain agreements’ (Putin, 2007k). Within the OSCE, Russia has proven to
be a staunch supporter of Serbia and in response to an address by the Serbian
Foreign Minister in September 2008, following the announcement by Kosovo of
its independence earlier that year, the Russian representative stated that the
‘estrangement is being artificially inflamed between the Kosovo Albanians and
Serbs, the latter of whom categorically refuse to accept forcible integration into
this self-proclaimed State’ (Azimov, 2008).
Russia and the idea of a Kosovo precedent

Even before the unilateral declaration from Kosovo that the country was inde-
pendent, the Russian leadership argued that such an announcement could set a
precedent for the future. Putin argued in 2006 that a decision would have to be
made as to ‘whether protecting the territorial integrity of today’s states is a
fundamental priority or whether our priority consists in defending the concepts
of political expediency and historical justice, something that is perhaps more dif-
ficult to define’ (Putin, 2006b). In 2007, Putin began to discuss the idea of the
Kosovo precedent as a potential future scenario when he stated that ‘it is only
natural that if we find a particular solution for the situation in Kosovo, this solu-
tion should become universally applied to similar cases’ and that other groups
might decide to follow Kosovo’s path if the territorial integrity of Serbia was not
preserved (Putin, 2007f ). This argument that Kosovo could become a precedent
became a recurring theme. Putin also argued that if new international law prin-
ciples were to be introduced when resolving the status of Kosovo, the principles
‘must be universal ones and be applied just as readily in one part of the world as
in other, similar situations’ (Putin, 2007p). Lavrov argued that attempts to create
a precedent in the case of Kosovo were at complete odds with other on-going
debates about statehood and called the efforts by some countries an ‘inclination
to give way to the blackmail of violence and anarchy . . . in clear contrast with
the indifference shown in the case of Palestine’ (Lavrov, 2007c). It was also in
2007 that Putin made explicit mention of the Caucasus region in relation to
Kosovo when he argued that ‘the principle of self-determination should apply
not just to the peoples living in the former Yugoslavia, but also to peoples,
including the peoples of the Caucasus, in the post-Soviet area’ since there were
de-facto states in both areas (Putin, 2007h). Lavrov also addressed the idea of
Kosovo becoming a precedent for the post-Soviet states in November 2007 when
he argued against the idea that when Russia mentioned that Kosovo could
become a precedent it was not actually hoping such a precedent would be estab-
lished and stated that Russia considered it to be illegitimate to make decisions
which would challenge territorial integrity as a principle (Lavrov, 2007a).
Before the unilateral declaration was announced, Lavrov had predicted that
such a move would ‘lead to chaos and destabilization of the region’ and again
endorsed the importance of international law in resolving the situation (Lavrov,
2007b). A month before Kosovo announced independence, Putin spoke out
against such a decision, declaring that ‘a unilateral declaration of independence
and support for this on the part of other countries in the international community
would be both unjust and immoral’ (Putin, 2008f ). A week later, in a press con-
ference following a meeting between Putin, Medvedev, and the Serbian Pres-
ident and Prime Minister, Putin argued that Russia was vehemently opposed to a
potential unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo and said that such
a decision could have an impact on other regions of the world, although he did
not mention the Caucasus or any other region specifically (Putin, 2008g). On
February 17, 2008, the same day Kosovo made its declaration, the Russian MFA
released a statement asserting that ‘Russia fully supports the reaction of the
Serbian leadership to the events in Kosovo and its just demands to restore the
territorial integrity of the country’ and called for the UN Mission and KFOR
(Kosovo Force, the name of the NATO-led peacekeeping force) to take steps
including ‘voiding the decisions of Pristina’s self-governing institutions and
adopting severe administrative measures against them’ (Russian MFA, 2008b).
In the months after the announcement and before the decision was taken to
recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, Kosovo remained a
topic that the Russian government officials addressed. Almost a month after the
Kosovo declaration, Putin said that Russia could recognise Kosovo’s independ-
ence only within the bounds of international law and with the negotiated agree-
ment of all those states involved (Putin, 2008a). In one of his last foreign policy
statements as president, Putin would also argue that Russia will not agree with
‘the argument that this is simply some kind of fait accompli because this situ-
ation did not just develop on its own but received the active help of some of the
players in the international community’ the help being from people who pro-
vided arms and states who had said they would support Kosovar independence
(Putin, 2008c). After Medvedev became president, Russia continued to follow
the Kosovo issue. Less than a month before the Russia–Georgia conflict broke
out, Medvedev addressed the importance of Kosovo and the implications of its
newly declared independence when he argued that ‘legal decisions in such an
instance must be achieved by reaching agreement among all parties involved in
such a process and affected by these decisions’ (Medvedev D., 2008k). Mikhail
Ulyanov, who was Head of Russia’s Delegation to the Military Security and
Arms Control Talks in Vienna, argued at a meeting in July 2008 that ‘one may
keep saying indefinitely that the Kosovo case is not a precedent, but try to prove
that to the leaders of separatist regimes and movements, be it in Europe or any-
where else in the world’ (Ulyanov, 2008). In light of events a month later, the
statements of Medvedev and Ulyanov stand in stark contrast to Russian decision-
making regarding the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia: recognising new ‘states’

It has been argued that Russia’s engagement in the conflict with Georgia in
August 2008 was not the result of ‘defensive posture but part of wider long term
geopolitical strategy aimed at propelling Russia back to superpower status’
(Rich, 2010: xvii). Russia certainly increased its strategic position in the region
due not only to the presence of ground forces but also the establishment of new
bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which hosts elements of Russia’s Black
Sea Fleet and Russian aircraft and as a result, Russia’s Caucasian presence is
comparable or even stronger than when Russia had its three bases in Akhalka-
laki, Batumi, and Vaziani (Vendil Pallin & Westerlund, 2010: 153). It is
important to point out that even though Russia experienced some strategic bene-
fits from recognising the independence of the two regions, there were some costs
associated with the decision. One of the most important consequences for Russia
was a noticeable lack of support from other states, particularly from states in the
post-Soviet region where Russia’s closest partners are traditionally located,
making Russia appear quite isolated.
Russia and the road to the August 2008 conflict

The provision of arms, supplies, and equipment to the two Georgian breakaway
regions from 2006 on, saw the two areas acquire more ‘total military capacity’
than Georgia and before the August conflict broke out, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia ‘had received at no cost more than twice the military equipment pos-
sessed by Georgia’ (Illarionov, 2009: 60). In 2008, Putin, while still president,
had also extended further support to the regions including a decision that would
create links between the Russian government agencies and their counterparts in
the breakaway regions’ governments, establish trade mechanisms for Russia and
the two regions, and called for the establishment of consular relations to people
residing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Popkjanevski, 2009: 145). This third
element is important when considering the policy of passportisation that Russia
had begun with the breakaway regions, under which 90% of the South Ossetian
population acquire Russian passports before August 2008 (Green, 2010: 66).
In the Western post-2008 conflict accounts, it was stated that the decision to
use force in Georgia was made by Medvedev before the Security Council met to
discuss the events and while Putin was in Beijing for the Olympics (Smith, 2010:
47). Medvedev also made the decision without the consent of the Federation
Council, which is required by the Constitution to give consent for the use of
Russian forces outside of the country, and only consulted with the Security
Council once the air strikes against Georgian targets had begun and the Russian
ground forces had entered South Ossetia (Vendil Pallin & Westerlund, 2010:
156). When discussing the beginning of the conflict, Medvedev himself said that
when Georgian troops were heading towards South Ossetia, he refrained from
making a decision since he ‘hoped that those jerks would have the good sense to
stop at some point’ and that he ‘waited until they started firing rockets at the city
and using artillery, until they started shelling houses and firing at peacekeepers’
before making a decision on the use of force since such a decision was ‘not a
simple matter’, particularly for a president of a mere 95 days (Medvedev D.,
2008g). The period during which Medvedev admits that he did not make a deci-
sion regarding Russian involvement saw Medvedev instruct DFM Karasin to try
to speak to President Saakashvili of Georgia, which is seen by some as an
‘obvious [sign] that Russia wished to avoid a conflict at this point in time’ (Mou-
ritzen & Wivel, 2012: 82). Despite the active role that Putin had in the post-
conflict period, including travelling from Beijing to the region so that he could
meet with the refugees and talk with Russia’s generals, Medvedev, in accord-
ance with the Russian Constitution, made the decision to enter the conflict (Tre-
isman, 2011: 156).
Although there are some lingering uncertainties about what led to the August
2008 conflict, the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
the Conflict in Georgia (better known as the Tagliavini Report after its head Heidi
Tagliavini) is seen as the most authoritative source for understanding the events
that transpired but even the report admits that it ‘cannot claim veracity or com-
pleteness in an absolute sense’ (IIFFMCG, 2009: 8). According to the report, ‘on
the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the
town of Tskhinvali’ and soon the conflict expanded to a wider area and began to
involve the Abkhaz, South Ossetian, and Russian forces (10). The report credited
this shelling as the start of the major conflict but also mentioned that there had been
a history of escalating confrontational behaviour and events (11). Despite the fact
that the report places heavier blame on Georgia for the outbreak of the conflict,
Russia is not seen as blameless for the events that transpired because although
Russian actions in defence of its peacekeepers can be considered legitimate, it was
deemed ‘that much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable
limits of defence’ (23–24). The Russian argument that, because of passportisation,
Russia acted in defence of its own citizens has been disputed for similar reasons
because, although ‘it has widely been held in the international community, based
on state practice, that an attack on a state’s nationals might justify a response in the
form of a strictly localised and proportionate rescue response’ Russian actions were
not seen as proportionate (Allison, 2013: 154).
Russia and the recognition of the breakaway regions as independent states
On August 26, 2008, Medvedev announced that, in response to requests from the
people of the two breakaway regions, Russia would recognise Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as independent states (Medvedev D., 2008o). The Russian deci-
sion can be seen in direct connection to the declaration of independence, and
subsequent recognition by many states, of Kosovo. At his August 12, 2008 press
conference with President Sarkozy, Medvedev argued that in recent ‘years inter-
national law has given us numerous very complicated cases of peoples exercis-
ing their right to self-determination and the emergence of new states on the map
. . . look at the example of Kosovo’ (Medvedev D., 2008m). Even before
announcing Russia’s recognition of the regions as states, Medvedev argued that
because Kosovo had rejected an UN-led peacekeeping force in favour of one led
by the European Union (EU), the two breakaway regions should be able to
choose the peacekeepers present on their soil (Medvedev D., 2008f ). In an inter-
view that Medvedev gave days after recognising the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, he made a veiled reference to Kosovo when he said that in
such a ‘situation some countries will agree to [the] emergence of new states,
while others will consider their emergence untimely’ but that a state becomes a
state as soon as it is recognised by another country (Medvedev D., 2008a).
Medvedev also altered the Russian argument of Kosovo as a precedent for
recognition and instead argued that it was ‘up to each state to decide whether
they recognize another state’s independence or not’ (Medvedev D., 2008g).
Unlike the case of Kosovo, which had seen nearly a decade transpire between
the beginning of the conflict and the declaration of independence, Russia decided
that in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia only three weeks were necessary
to decide the fate of two regions that had been seen as having de facto independ-
ence since the early 1990s (Cheterian, 2010: 69). Despite the difference in timing
when it comes to independence declarations, Kosovo could not be made to return
to Serbia and the two breakaway regions could not be forced to return to Georgia
(Kernen & Sussex, 2012: 107).
The fact that Medvedev recognised the breakaway regions as independent
states, while Putin had not afforded them such a status when he was president,
has been identified by Richard Sakwa as a result of ‘the tension between the two
arms of the “tandem”, Putin and Medvedev, [which] encouraged a rivalry in
which both sought to assert their predominance, leading to arbitrary and ill-
thought-out decisions’ (Sakwa, 2012: 87). As Russia’s president and foreign
policy leader, Medvedev was essential to the recognition of the two states and
for Medvedev, recognition of the two regions would also distinguish Medvedev
from Putin, which when trying to show his foreign policy independence was
important.
On August 8, French President Sarkozy, who was also President of the
Council of the European Union, approached Putin at the Beijing Olympics and
requested, but was denied, two days to mediate the conflict and, when rebuffed,
suggested only one day which Putin also refused (Mouritzen & Wivel,
2012: 141). Despite this denial from Putin, the conflict between Russia and
Georgia was ended with a ceasefire negotiated by Sarkozy. Having failed to gain
Putin’s support, Sarkozy turned to Medvedev and over the course of four phone
calls between the two men, and more between their advisors, it was agreed that
Sarkozy could mediate without concerns that Medvedev was ‘inviting him to
Moscow to put him in an embarrassing situation’ (Asmus, 2010: 194). The
ceasefire agreement saw Georgia and Russia agree to:
• The non-use of force

• The definitive cessation of hostilities
• Free access for humanitarian aid
• The withdrawal of the Georgian military forces to their usual bases
• The withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before hos-
tilities broke out. While waiting for an international body, the Russian
peacekeeping forces would implement additional security measures
• The opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and
stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
(Sarkozy, 2008)
While the European Union seized the initiative and attempted to use the events
in Georgia as a way of showing the Union’s influence, the negotiations instead
exhibited the ‘EU’s ineptitude . . . as it allowed Russia to break with impunity the
terms of the truce which the EU itself had proudly negotiated’ (Blank, 2009a:
112). At the same time, the textual issues with the agreement provided Russia
with a defence in the face of criticism.
The brevity of the ceasefire agreement, although understandable due to the
desire to see the active conflict end, would be a problem. The lack of specificity
meant that there was a great deal of leeway in which Russia could act. The
clause allowing Russian peacekeeping forces to continue monitoring the situ-
ation until an international force could be assembled, despite the fact that the
peacekeepers had already far exceeded their mission when they entered Georgia
proper, can be seen as an attempt to secure Russian support for the ceasefire but
does not consider the long-term ramifications of Russia’s peacekeeping role.
Clause six, which opened the door to conversations about the stability of the
breakaway regions, made no explicit reference to the sovereignty of Georgia and
thus provided an opening for secession.
The Georgian government and the Russian government also each recognised
different versions of the text as the legitimate ceasefire agreement. Georgia
would only acknowledge the version with the signatures of the French, Georgian
and Russian leaders, while Russia’s chosen version also had the signatures of the
de facto heads of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and an introduction which was
absent from the Georgian approved agreement (WNC: Interfax, 2008a). The
Russians have recognised the difficulties tied to the agreement since ‘Saakashvili
signed off on an essentially different text’ and the absence of the introduction on
the Georgian signed agreement meant that ‘there are no joint agreements on the
non-use of force between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ (Karasin, 2012:
7). The failure to reach an agreement that was actually mutually agreed upon
was a mistake as it led to questions about which document is valid and why
Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaders (which were not recognised as inde-
pendent states by anyone at the time of signing, including Russia) were allowed
to sign the agreement.
By the end of Medvedev’s presidency, 19 rounds of the Geneva International
Discussions (GID) had been conducted and negotiations on issues such as the
‘Non-Use of Force and International Security Arrangements’ continued with no
decisions made (GID, 2012). In February 2009, the Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanism (IPRM) was created as a confidence- and security-building
mechanism with the goal of detecting possible threats, determining what hap-
pened during incidents and considering the overall problems facing the people in
the conflict areas (OSCE, 2010a). Little progress on issues, including the
‘restor[ation of] basic utilities and services to the affected communities and to
ensure freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line’ was made
(EU, 2012). Relations between Georgia and Russia have remained cool, despite
Georgia’s agreement in 2011 to a Swiss-negotiated compromise to allow Russia
to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and a decision in March 2012 by
Georgia to no longer require Russian citizens to have visas to enter Georgia
(Schwirtz, 2012). Relations continue to be complicated as Russia has signed a
string of bilateral agreements with each of the breakaway regions and continues
to support both regions, including providing funds for the majority of Abkhaz-
ia’s budget and more than 99% of South Ossetia’s (International Crisis Group,
2011: 2). Thomas de Waal has characterised Russia’s actions towards the break-
away regions as a ‘de-facto annexation’ and argued that although Russia’s recog-
nition of the regions meant that the regions were ‘rid . . . of the persistent fear of
Georgian reconquest they had harboured for many years’, it had come at the cost
of the potential sovereignty they would have as independent states (de Waal,
2010a: 215). The close ties between Russia and the breakaway regions continue
to guarantee Russia a strong role in the region and with the declaration by
Medvedev that the recognition of the two as independent countries ‘is final
and irreversible . . . irrevocable’, Russian support of the regions will continue
(Medvedev D., 2008d).
Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh: strategic goals

For Russia, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a complicating factor in
developing relations with Azerbaijan because of Russia’s ties to Armenia.
According to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, an August 2010 agreement
between Russia and Armenia would see an extension of Russian bases on Arme-
nian soil and Russia accepting ‘responsibility for jointly guaranteeing Armenia’s
security and helping to equip our armed forces with modern arms’ (Sargsyan,
2010). This agreement prompted some in Armenia to claim that the arrangement
provided stronger security guarantees in the event of an Azerbaijani attack on
Nagorno-Karabakh but Russia responded a month later when Medvedev dis-
puted the claim that the agreement was focused on Azerbaijan (Nichol, 2011: 7).
At the same time, Russia is strengthened its ties to Azerbaijan not only through
gas agreements but also through the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft systems to the
country; the sale of these was denied by Rosoboronexport, the agency that over-
sees Russian arms sales, but Foreign Minister Lavrov defended the sale by
saying that since the systems are not offensive, they do not pose a risk to other
countries (Nicoll, 2010: 2). It is also important to note that in recent years, the
ties between NATO and the U.S. on one side and Azerbaijan on the other have
grown stronger, even as Russia and Azerbaijan have a stronger relationship
(Nygren, 2008: 155). Azerbaijan has become particularly important for the U.S.
as a result of its role as the ‘main over-flight, refuelling, and landing routes for
U.S. and coalition troops bound for Afghanistan, and . . . a major land transport
route for military fuel, food, and construction supplies’ (Nichol, 2011: 5).
Increasing negotiations and attempts at conflict resolution

The OSCE Minsk Group, which has been tasked with resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, is co-chaired by the foreign ministers of France, Russia, and
the United States. Since its establishment in the 1990s, little progress has been
made on the issues and despite increased efforts by Medvedev, as discussed
below, to negotiate with both Azerbaijan and Armenia independently from the
other two co-chairs and bring the two sides together, there is still no ‘framework
for a comprehensive peace settlement’ nor an agreement on principles, such as
in the Transdniestria case (Minsk Group, 2012). The Minsk Group co-chairs pre-
pared a draft basic principles agreement in 2007 (and edited it in 2009), which
called for areas surrounding the breakaway region to be returned to Azerbaijan,
stated that Nagorno-Karabakh would have an interim status with ‘security and
self-governance guarantees’, and allowed for refugees and internally displaced
persons to return to their former homes (RIA Novosti, 2011a). The document
was not adopted by the two conflicting countries and, therefore, discussions con-
tinued. According to an Eastern European ambassador, Armenia is seeking a
‘package solution’ which would see the deployment of international peacekeep-
ers to Nagorno-Karabakh, an agreement on a corridor, the return of refugees, a
determination of permanent status under the international community (which
would include ‘CBMs [confidence-building measures], regional programmes,
and bring [the] two nations together’), a withdrawal from Azeri towns, and a ref-
erendum based on free will.
Putin attempted one meeting during his time as president to mediate with the
Azeri and Armenian presidents outside of the Minsk Group process but this
effort was unsuccessful because he became angered first by the Azeri and Arme-
nian presidents making him wait and then by their arguing in front of him, which
contrasts greatly from Medvedev’s efforts to secure an agreement. As de Waal
explains, it was Medvedev himself who ‘edited the text of drafts of the Basic
Principles document’ (de Waal, 2013: 296). Under Medvedev, Russia greatly
enhanced its involvement in negotiations with the presidents of Azerbaijan and
Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue but little progress was made. The
increased efforts were noted by an Eastern European ambassador who said that
Russia under Medvedev ‘was more active and there were more talks’ and that
with the return of Putin in 2012 there had been ‘no attempt’ to resolve the con-
flict and no new proposals.
In 2008, under Medvedev, a joint declaration agreed upon by Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Russia stated the commitment of the parties to seek an agree-
ment ‘on the basic principles for political settlement’ that should include ‘legally
binding guarantees for every aspect and stage of the settlement process’, includ-
ing the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)
(Maiendorf Declaration, 2008). The Maiendorf Declaration was significant
because since 1994 the Armenian and Azeri presidents had not signed any docu-
ments which discussed reaching a political settlement (Cherniavskiĭ, 2012: 99).
Under Medvedev, Russia assumed the status of the lead negotiator on a peace
agreement and by January 2012, ten meetings had been held between the leaders
of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia (RIA Novosti, 2012).
Other than the Maiendorf meeting, important negotiations occurred in Kazan
in 2011 and Sochi in 2012. At the Kazan discussions, it was expected that the
two sides would agree to the basic principles document but a statement released
after the meeting said that agreement had not been reached on the document but
that the issues which needed to be resolved before the basic principles could be
agreed upon had been identified (Barry, 2011a). An Eastern European ambas-
sador argued that the Kazan Summit was stalled because of disagreement over
the six principles because the Azeris declared ‘territorial integrity’ and argued
that there should be a referendum within the Azeri state over the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Sochi discussions in 2012 has been called a ‘face-saving summit’ for
Medvedev so that the two sides could recognise the work that he had done
towards resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but also acknowledge that
there were still unresolved issues that prevented agreement on the basic prin-
ciples (Danielyan, 2012). The charge that Sochi was a ‘face-saving summit’ was
disputed by the Eastern European ambassador because the meeting of foreign
ministers which occurred prior to the presidential meeting was considered prom-
ising and the Armenian Foreign Minister told his deputies that going into the
presidential meeting there was a ‘positive dynamic’ where the approach to
Nagorno-Karabakh would be finalised. The ambassador argued that there was an
agreement on principles at the ministerial level but that the proposal failed at the
presidential level.
For Russia, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation is important
because of concerns that a military conflict could occur. Under Medvedev,
Russian efforts to seek a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were
increased from that of the Putin period because ‘Putin has never displayed any
interest in the Karabakh issue’ and because he seems ‘to believe that it is not
worth wasting effort on resolving it and that the status quo is acceptable for
Russia’ (de Waal, 2011). Unlike Transdniestria, which has a low likelihood for
violence, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where conflict has recently occurred,
the unfreezing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for Russia would present prob-
lems. In an interview with the Armenian service of RFE/RL, Pavel Felgenhauer,
a Russian analyst, said there were concerns that if a war broke out over Nagorno-
Karabakh, it could become a regional conflict which would place Russia in a dif-
ficult position because the Russian government could not afford to choose a side
in a potential conflict (Babaian, 2011). Should the conflict become a regional
one, there would be the potential involvement of not just the two conflict parties
but also Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey and problems for the Caspian Sea
energy routes (de Waal, 2010b: 159). If a conflict broke out, Russia would be
expected to provide military assistance to Armenia, which would result in an end
of Azeri-Russian relations; if Russia refused to send assistance to Armenia,
Russia would not be considered a dependable ally, the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation’s (CSTO) reputation would suffer, and Russia would probably lose
its military base in Armenia, which would have implications for South Caucasus
security (Minacian, 2012: 5). It would also have strong implications for Russia’s
regional influence. Therefore, a non-military solution is in Russia’s best interests
and, under Medvedev, the country tried to work towards conflict resolution.
Russia and Transdniestria: a peace-keeping exercise?

The on-going frozen conflict in Transdniestria has been the subject of both a
Russian military presence and Russian attempts at conflict resolution. The situ-
ation surrounding Russia’s 14th Army during the war between Moldova and
Transdniestria was complicated by arguments inside the Russian leadership in
Moscow over the country’s position on Transdniestria (Selivanova, 1995: 63).
The decision in 1992 by General Lebed whereby ‘the Russian military spontan-
eously reacted to the unexpected large-scale offensive launched by Moldovan
forces’ saw the 14th Army’s actions endorsed by the Kremlin and the parliament
granting permission for the 14th Army to serve as a peacekeeping force ‘until
the presidents of Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine agreed on an inter-governmental
peacekeeping force’ (67–68). Since 1992 Russia has been acting as one of three
peacekeepers in the region, along with Moldova and Transdniestria, while the
OSCE ‘oversees the situation’ and the 5 + 2 parties (Moldova, the OSCE, Russia,
Transdniestria, and Ukraine as well as the EU and U.S. as observers) attempt to
negotiate a solution (Popescu, 2006: 2).
The Kozak Memorandum and Russian conflict resolution failure

The Kozak Memorandum, a 2003 Russian attempt at resolving the Transdnies-
trian conflict, marked a break from other proposals dealing with the conflict
because it did not include a role for the OSCE or Ukraine as ‘guarantors and
mediators in the conflict’ but maintained Russia’s position as one (Hedenskog,
2005: 144). The potential agreement between the Moldovan government and the
Transdniestrian region would have seen the creation of the Federal Republic of
Moldova (a federation state including both Moldova and Transdniestria) which
would have been established as ‘a democratic, sovereign, federal state based on
the principle of territorial unity, unified principles for building state power, and
unified defence (for the transitional period), customs and monetary-currency
spaces’. The newly formed federation, under the Memorandum, would also be a
‘neutral, demilitarised state’. Transdniestria would be its own state under the
federation which would allow it to form branches of government (executive,
judiciary, and legislative), while also giving it the rights to ‘its own constitution
and legislation, state property, independent budget and tax system, and also its
own state symbols and other attributes of state status’ (Kozak Memorandum,
2003).
Although the Kozak Memorandum represents the closest that the frozen con-
flict has come to conflict resolution, it was not widely supported by many
Western states. At the OSCE, the Chairman-in-Office Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
told President Voronin that ‘if indeed the parties come to an agreement on this
Memorandum, we shall have to take a neutral stance’ because some member-
states had concerns about ‘the absence of a satisfactory multinational guarantee
system’, issues related to divisions of power at different levels of government,
and the power that Transdniestria had in the Senate until 2015 (OSCE, 2003).
There were also concerns amongst officials at the EU, the OSCE, and in the
American government about Russia’s continued military presence in Transdni-
estria after the signing of the agreement, which was, according to William Hill,
the former head of the OSCE Mission in Chisinau, the reason that pressure was
placed on Voronin not to sign (ITAR-TASS, 2011). The Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov argued that it was because of ‘pressure from certain states
and organisations’ that the Memorandum failed (Ivanov, 2003).
At the 2004 OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, Foreign Minister Lavrov
sharply criticised the countries that did not support the document by questioning
why they did not bring their issues with the proposal to the table sooner and he
argued if the document had been approved ‘the conflict would long ago have
been settled, including the solution of the question of the withdrawal from
Transdniestria of the ammunition remaining there’ (Lavrov, 2004c). Even
without the outside pressure, Voronin had his own reasons for not signing the
agreement. Despite being told that amendments would be made to the document,
Voronin found that the clause addressing the issue of Russia’s military base had
not been changed and that within the federation that would be formed, Transdni-
estria would have excessive power and would be able to leave the federation for
minor reasons (Todua, 2007).
Within the context of the OSCE, Russia has sought to maintain the status quo
of on-going peacekeeping operations in Transdniestria by arguing that a change
in the existing peacekeeping operations would be ‘possible only after an agree-
ment has been reached in the negotiation process on the status of Transdniestria’
because a change in the current peacekeeping could lead to active conflict
(Azimov, 2010b). The prospect of a continued Russian military presence in the
country after the Kozak Memorandum was signed was particularly concerning to
countries in the West due to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
(CFE Treaty) and the 1999 Istanbul Agreement. In accordance with the Istanbul
Agreement, Russia has removed some of the equipment and weapons that it had
in Transdniestria but it has done so slowly with approximately 42 trainloads of
ammunition and ten trainloads of equipment to still be removed (Sharp, 2006:
198). There are also an estimated one thousand Russian soldiers still in the
Transdniestria region (Trenin, 2011b: 76). No Russian military equipment or
ammunition has been removed from Moldova since March 2004, despite offers
from the OSCE to pay the Russian Defence Ministry for the costs associated
with withdrawal (OSCE Mission to Moldova, 2012a). Speculation began in 2012
that Russia might be planning to place Iskander missiles in the breakaway region
or that it may use Transdniestria to host a Voronezh radar system as part of its
response to Western missile defence plans but these rumours were denied
(Gamova, 2012). In April 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin
announced that Russian peacekeepers in Transdniestria would be receiving
updated equipment and arms in line with Russian military planning (ITAR-
TASS Daily, 2012c). The delivery of new equipment and arms implies a belief
that the conflict will not be resolved in the near future despite some positive
movement in recent years.
Limited progress and engagement since 2003

Since 2003, the frozen conflict has remained largely unchanged with little progress
made toward resolving the status of Transdniestria within Moldova. Moldova and
other countries have argued over the years that the peacekeeping operations of the
three countries should be changed ‘into a civil operation with an international
mandate’ but Russia and Transdniestria have both prohibited this (RFE/RL,
2012a). A high-ranking Eastern European diplomat argued in favour of the change
from a peacekeeping operation to a civilian mission because there has been no
active conflict in 20 years and there are checkpoints already established. The likeli-
hood of this appears quite low since the statement from the former Russian repre-
sentative to the OSCE Azimov maintains that Russia sees any potential change in
peacekeeping structure as a potential security concern.
There were two meetings between Transdniestrian leader Smirnov and
Moldovan President Voronin in August 2008 and March 2009 which were seen
as being ‘forced’ by Medvedev and it has been suggested by William Hill, the
former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, ‘that their main purpose was to
burnish Moscow’s image in the West as a peacemaker, rather than to make sub-
stantive progress towards a political settlement’ (Hill, 2012: 175). Hill regarded
the resulting joint statement from Medvedev’s 2009 meeting with Voronin and
Smirnov as being ‘so self-serving with respect to the Russian troop presence in
Moldova that any short-term political advantage was probably far outweighed by
the widespread hostility the action prompted in Moldovan society and political
elites’ (180).
In September 2011, the decision was taken to resume talks because of,
according to the high-ranking Eastern European diplomat, the ‘general develop-
ments in the region’. In April 2012, progress was seen under the 5 + 2 arrange-
ments when an agreement was reached that determines the ‘principles and
procedures for future negotiations’, something that had not been agreed upon in
the past (RFE/RL, 2012b). The document also created a programme for the set-
tlement process (OSCE, 2012c). The resumption of progress on Transdniestria
as a result of the April 2012 agreement on Principles and Procedures was wel-
comed by the Russian permanent representative to the OSCE as ‘a genuine step
forward towards a sustainable, workable and just political resolution of the
Transdniestrian problem’ (Kelin, 2012c). According to the high-ranking Eastern
European diplomat, there were five meetings in 2012 with the discussions being
focused on ‘only technical issues’ but the ‘settlement of these issues is very
important to conflict resolution’.
With only limited talks since 2003 and only an agreement on how to nego-
tiate in the future reached, Russia is likely to have an important role in Moldova
for years. The Meseberg Process, which will be discussed in chapter seven, was
supposed to aid the discussions surrounding the Transdniestria conflict but the
Process has not yet been launched. As the diplomat explained, Moldovan leaders
‘don’t want to do something which moves the two banks further apart’ but the
Transdniestrian side which ‘is supported by Russia . . . only wants to discuss
small steps’. While the limited progress towards a permanent settlement has stra-
tegic implications for Russia, from the Russian perspective, the consequences
might not be negative like the ones that Russia is concerned about in regards to
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Conclusion
Although Russia has not supported Kosovar independence under either Putin or
Medvedev, Kosovo has provided arguments in favour of Russia’s actions
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
recognition of the two regions as independent countries has isolated the break-
away regions and consequently they rely on Russia for support. This has allowed
Russia to build new military bases in the South Caucasus, thus improving Rus-
sia’s strategic position and maintaining Russian influence. While strong support
for the two regions can be seen under both Russian presidents, Russian recogni-
tion of the regions, which occurred only weeks after the conflict concluded, was
the result of a hasty decision that can be seen as part of an effort by Medvedev to
bolster his foreign policy credentials.
Nagorno-Karabakh presents a challenge for Russia, in part because of the
country’s close ties to Armenia, but also due to concerns about the impact that
an active conflict could have on Russian interests, including in the energy field.
Putin did not exert much effort in attempting to reach a resolution to the conflict
nor did he seek to pressure the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to reach a set-
tlement when he was president. Medvedev, on the other hand, tried several
rounds of negotiations and, at the Kazan discussions in 2011, the parties were
close to agreeing on basic principles, although this ultimately did not happen.
Medvedev was personally involved in conflict resolution efforts, not only
because of his meetings with the two countries’ presidents, but also by editing
drafts of the basic principles document. Even though he failed to secure agree-
ment on the basic principles, Medvedev helped secure the Maiendorf Declara-
tion, which was the first document on political aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh
situation to be signed by Azeri and Armenian leaders since 1994.
Transdniestria was a frozen conflict that Putin did attempt, through the work
of Dmitry Kozak, to see resolved during his first term as president. The failure of
the Kozak Memorandum to be adopted by the Moldovans was a disappointment
for Putin and the remainder of his presidency can be seen as stepping away from
efforts to resolve the conflict. The fact that the Kozak Memorandum did not
succeed was blamed on Western interference and resulted in disengagement
from Russia in conflict resolution efforts for Transdniestria. Russian efforts
under Medvedev to promote conflict resolution were not seen as much of an
improvement and the Voronin-Smirnov-Medvedev meeting in 2009 accomp-
lished little. The agreement in April 2012, the very end of the Medvedev presid-
ency, on ‘principles and procedures for future negotiations’ marked the first real
progress on the Transdniestria issue since the attempted signing of the Kozak
Memorandum in 2003. This framework, which secured the approval of the 5 + 2
parties and was not a Russian-led effort but was a Russian-supported one, pro-
vides a path forward for future negotiations to resolve the region’s status, but
any progress will be slow.
4 Russia and the OSCE
Hard versus soft security
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Russia promoted
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – in its pre-
institutionalised form, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) – as the primary architecture in which to deal with European security
issues. The decision to turn the CSCE into the OSCE came in December 1994
and marked the ‘transition from a Conference to a fully-fledged international
organisation’ that began at a Paris meeting of Heads of State held in 1990
(OSCE, 2015b). Russia sought to make the OSCE the centre of European
security so that Russia would have ‘equal say in pan-European security matters’
because, as a member, Russia would have a strong role and the country’s posi-
tions would be taken into account (Zellner, 2005: 391). The appeal of the CSCE
or OSCE was primarily derived from the fact that it was not NATO but the
organisation also came with less than flattering comparisons to the short-lived
League of Nations since ‘no major country would have agreed to fully confide
its security to such a loose arrangement’ and because the organisation relied on
the consensus principle to make decisions (Ponsard, 2007: 66). As a security
actor, the OSCE is limited to ‘monitoring and early warning functions’ as there
is no movement among its member-states to establish a military role for the
organisation, which again distinguishes the organisation from NATO (Sharp,
1999: 32).
For both Putin and Medvedev, the OSCE represented a challenge because the
OSCE has acted in ways that Russia does not approve, but at the same time, in
order to maintain influence within the region, a degree of cooperation with the
organisation has proved necessary for Russia. Russian behaviour towards the
OSCE did change during the period from 2000–2012 and these changes can be
linked to events in the Euro-Atlantic region. The OSCE’s criticism of Russia led
to the country’s attitudes towards the organisation hardening. Criticism about
elections, the rule of law, freedom of the media and other political and human
rights issues sparked anger towards the organisation from the Russian leadership
as did the failure of the OSCE to address Russia’s concerns regarding the
politico-military aspects of the organisation’s work. When Medvedev became
president in 2008, Russia maintained many of the same opinions and policies
that had been seen under Putin but the tone in which they were expressed
Russia and the OSCE 45
softened and the differences in some policies, such as allowing OSCE election
observers back into Russia, are important.
Structural issues with the OSCE

One of the challenges facing the OSCE is that it is not a legally-binding, or
treaty, organisation but instead relies on its member-states’ goodwill to apply its
politically-binding agreements. The politically-binding nature of the OSCE is
not the only challenge confronting the organisation. The differing positions
among the OSCE member-states on the appropriate role for the organisation in
the world today has led to difficulties in the ability of the organisation to be
effective. While the Western members of the organisation emphasise the organ-
isation’s potential as a soft and human security organisation, Russia and its part-
ners are seeking to place the emphasis on hard security issues and reduce the
attention paid to issues such as elections and human rights (Nicoll, 2011: 1).
Given the non-binding nature of its decisions, hard security remains a difficult
area of work, although it is not ignored. As a consensus-based organisation in
which Russia is a member, Russia’s role at the OSCE is important as agreement
amongst all member-states is necessary in order for action to be taken and thus
examining Russia’s relationship with the organisation is important to under-
standing Russian priorities and actions within the Euro-Atlantic space.
The OSCE has a complex agenda with its multi-dimensional approach to
security. The ‘Three Baskets’ or focuses of the organisation are politico-military,
economic and environmental, and human security. This means that the organisa-
tion’s agenda covers topics as diverse as ‘arms control, confidence- and security-
building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing
strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities’ (OSCE,
2013c). This broad mission has created a situation where the OSCE’s ‘scope has
become broader and its mission has become vaguer’ leading to concerns about
effectiveness and efficiency (Mankoff, 2010: 72). Rather than focusing on a
narrow idea of security, the OSCE has taken a more expansive approach, which
means that the overall ability of the organisation to concentrate its efforts on par-
ticular issues is complicated. This has led to, in the words of one high-ranking
Russian MFA official, in a ‘very vague, amorphous’ organisation.
As the former Russian representative to the OSCE, Anvar Azimov, pointed
out in June 2010, discussions about the OSCE as ‘a “security community”
[are] impossible without strengthening the institutional basis of the OSCE and
transforming it into a fully-fledged international organisation operating on the
basis of a constituent document’ (Azimov, 2010h). Although steps were taken
to institutionalise the OSCE from its CSCE form, which consisted of meetings
and conferences but lacked permanence, the organisation was never fully
empowered, something the Russian ambassador’s statement recognises
(OSCE, 2012a). Although the OSCE has been institutionalised, there are still
some significant weaknesses facing the organisation, including that the deci-
sions of the OSCE are politically, not legally, binding for its member-states.
These weaknesses are the result of an incomplete institutionalisation process
which oversaw the shift from a conference system to an international organ-
isation but which failed to identify its overall goals and establish roles for its
institutional structures. The lack of ‘an effective financing system, a politically
empowered secretary-general, and a political and professional secretariat’ are
also challenges posed by the organisation’s current structure (Ghebali, 2009:
65). This failure to further strengthen the organisation prompted a high-
ranking Russian MFA official to claim that the countries of the West ‘won’t
allow’ the OSCE to become a ‘robust organisation’.
A consideration of the ‘Three Baskets’ themselves show some of the basic
issues that Russia has with the organisation. With the ‘First Basket’, the politico-
military dimension, Russia feels that there is not enough focus on the issues in
this category and tries to draw attention to this area. In the economic and
environmental dimension, there are similar concerns to the politico-military
dimension but unlike with the first dimension, increasing activity in this basket
does not receive the same level of support. The ‘Third Basket’ is one that Russia
claims has been the focus of too much attention and one that Russia wishes to
draw attention away from. Conversely, the Western member-states often point to
the ‘Third Basket’ as the one which should receive increased attention.
As Mankoff points out, the OSCE is seeking to expand its mandate, including
within the politico-military dimension. According to Russia’s former representa-
tive to the OSCE, NATO and the EU have increased the scope of their activities
in the region into fields that have traditionally been addressed at the OSCE, such
as regional crisis response (Azimov, 2012: 18). Another challenge facing the
politico-military side of the organisation is that the OSCE ‘cannot legislate itself
or demand legislation by its members on matters of the first importance’ such as
certain aspects of terrorism and export control policy, which other organisations
in the region can, which gives the impression that OSCE decisions matter less
(Bailes, 2006: 220). The inability to bring members into compliance with ideals
and agreements that the organisation itself promotes prevents the organisation
from being a more effective hard security actor.
The economic and environmental dimension has never been the major focus
of the OSCE’s work. The second dimension has been described as the ‘least
known of the OSCE’s three areas of activity’ (Strauss, 2008: 312). According to
a high-ranking Central European diplomat, the ‘economic dimension is almost
dead’ because the issues that it addresses are either dealt with on a bilateral basis
between states or at other organisations. The diplomat pointed out that the issues
that can be seen with the ‘Second Basket’ are directly related to the organisa-
tion’s founding when the Soviet Union sought agreement on the politico-military
issues, while the West wanted to secure agreement on human rights, so the com-
promise was that human rights could be included if economics and environ-
mental issues were also made a part of the arrangements. This meant that from
the very beginning the focus of the West was on human rights, and for the East
the focus was on politico-military issues, which left economic and environmental
issues without a strong supporter.
For Russia, the ‘Third Basket’ remains a challenge and the Russian leadership
has repeatedly tried to promote the other areas of OSCE work in an effort to
reduce the focus on human rights. A Western diplomat remarked that ‘in
response to claims that the OSCE is imbalanced we always say give us some
ideas’ for the politico-military dimension but none are offered by Russia which
would expand the organisation’s agenda. According to a high-ranking Eastern
European diplomat, in one meeting the Russian delegation counted the number
of events held involving human dimension issues and compared them to the
number of events held in the politico-military field to show that there was an
imbalance in the number of events and that this was indicative of the organisa-
tion’s over-attentiveness to human rights. What this numerical comparison failed
to consider were the actual results of the discussions, in the form of agreements
reached and overall progress on issues, in both the politico-military and human
rights fields. According to a high-ranking Central European diplomat, there are a
‘few topics [the Russians] always throw in’ but it has proven ‘very difficult to
push other topics’ in the human dimension.
Beyond concerns regarding the agenda of the organisation, the format of the
organisation’s decision-making processes has also come under scrutiny as the
organisation has struggled to move forward. Regardless of who holds the presid-
ency of Russia, there is a reluctance to see the current consensus format of the
organisation changed. The consensus principle has been accused of impeding the
organisation’s ability to approve decisions and in cases where the OSCE has
taken decisions, the result is a decision that has ambiguous and non-specific
wording, which has led to confusion and disagreements regarding the correct
interpretation of the decisions (Freire, 2003: 41). At the 1999 Istanbul Summit
an attempt was made to increase the OSCE’s efficiency through the allowance of
majority voting but this proposal was rejected by Moscow because of concerns
that coalitions within the OSCE, such as NATO, would vote as a bloc and could
muster the votes necessary to prevent Russia from blocking action that the
country disagreed with (Isakova, 2005: 77). Discussions on changing the con-
sensus rule were brought back during the 2010 Corfu Process discussions but
were again rejected by Russia on the grounds that the consensus principle ‘is
fundamental to the work of the OSCE and embodies the sovereign equality of all
the participating States’ and that to change the rule ‘may prove to be fatal for the
OSCE’ (Azimov, 2010a). Efforts to promote such a change in the overall organ-
isation have, therefore, floundered.
In recent years there have been discussions about how to best reinvigorate the
OSCE and how the organisation should move forward in the twenty-first century.
A Russian MFA official characterised the situation surrounding the OSCE today
as one where ‘everyone agrees that the OSCE is in crisis . . . but the devil is in
the details’. For Dmitry Medvedev, the OSCE’s 2010 Astana Summit ‘revealed
all of the OSCE’s current flaws and the certain helplessness of the organisation
in adopting important decisions’ (Medvedev D., 2010c). As a high-ranking
Central European diplomat explained, the OSCE has ‘not [been] fulfilling what
it should since ‘99’ and ‘the role of the OSCE is declining’ but despite this
decline, there is an institutional desire ‘not to become irrelevant’. In an effort to
move away from this ‘helplessness’ and avoid becoming ‘irrelevant’, the organ-
isation has launched rounds of discussions with the goal of reshaping the
organisation.
Although the Corfu Process will be discussed in chapter seven, as it relates
directly to President Medvedev’s European Security Treaty (EST) proposal, it is
important to note that the Corfu Process began as an effort by the organisation to
reshape itself. Per a Russian MFA official, the Corfu Process ‘started in a prom-
ising mode’ with the ‘advantage’ being the ‘informal’ format of the talks but that
the talks devolved into a ‘quarrel of polemics between different states’ over the
issues. He did not consider the conversations to be a complete loss because
although the Corfu Process ‘show[ed] the weak points of the OSCE, actually
revealing problems’, it proved to be ‘useful to understand[ing the] problems’
facing the organisation. As was explained by a high-ranking Russian MFA offi-
cial, the Corfu Process was ‘obliged to fail’ but at the same time, he acknow-
ledged that since 2010, the politico-military dimension of the OSCE has been
‘relatively revitalised’ which was a positive outcome from the Russian per-
spective. From the Western perspective, the Corfu Process also revealed some
aspects of the organisation. During the Corfu Process, according to a high-
ranking Central European diplomat, Russia took the opportunity to mention the
perceived lack of attention paid to politico-military issues but efforts to make
progress on issues in that field were stymied because discussions ‘always c[ame
back] to the frozen conflicts’ and, therefore, there was ‘not enough common
ground to move forward on anything’. One Western diplomat ‘thought a lot of
good’ came out of the Corfu Process, particularly in regards to conflict resolu-
tion and conflict prevention but, in the end, the proposals were ‘blocked mostly
by Russia’. Despite this unsuccessful effort to reform the organisation, the Corfu
Process was followed by the V to V Dialogue (Vancouver to Vladivostok via
Vienna and Vilnius), which included an agenda built around ‘the “conflict cycle”
(early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabil-
itation)’ as a way forward for the organisation (OSCE CiO, 2013).
Russia, human rights, and democracy at the OSCE

The OSCE’s work in the third dimension of security, human security, has
brought Russia into conflict with the organisation. As a member of the OSCE,
Russia has committed itself to the Helsinki Final Act, which set out the prin-
ciples for Euro-Atlantic security amongst the participating states in its Deca-
logue. During the Soviet years, the Moscow Helsinki Group (which is still in
existence today) attracted the attention of the government due to their ‘subver-
sive goal of placing in doubt the sincerity of the USSR’s efforts in implementing
. . . the Helsinki Accords’, particularly the commitments related to human rights
(Andropov, 1976). Under the Helsinki Decalogue, the principles of ‘respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief ’ and ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’
were agreed upon (Helsinki Final Act, 1975: 6–7). Despite the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation, Russia’s commitment
to the Third Basket has continued to be questioned.
Russia and the human dimension agenda at the OSCE

One of the repeated concerns of the Russian leadership during the Medvedev
presidency was the issue of duplication of humanitarian work conducted by the
Council of Europe (CoE) and the United Nations (UN) at the OSCE. In his
speech at the 2009 OSCE Ministerial Council, Lavrov argued that the human
rights work of the OSCE cannot be ‘developed as if in a vacuum, without taking
into account the activities of other international organisations’ since the OSCE
members were also members of the UN (and subject to the UN Human Rights
Council) and a majority of them were also members of the CoE, which has its
own ‘extensive system of international legal instruments operates, with efficient
mechanisms and agreed rules for monitoring and reporting’ (Lavrov, 2009e).
Two months later at the Munich Security Conference, Lavrov declared that since
the CoE, unlike the OSCE, has conventions which ‘are legally binding and thus
constitute a single, common legal humanitarian space’, it might be more benefi-
cial for OSCE member-states to become parties to the CoE conventions since the
issue of soft security has already been addressed there (Lavrov, 2010e). This
suggestion appears to have been ignored and since the Statute of the Council of
Europe states that the organisation is open to ‘any European state’ that agrees
with the aims and principles of the CoE, the likelihood of membership for
Canada, the U.S., and the OSCE’s Central Asian members seems small (CoE,
1949). Whether these states would even consider becoming members of the CoE
is another question.
Lavrov has argued that since the CoE had already seen the establishment of
legally-binding human rights norms for Europe, if other states were to adopt
them rather than have the OSCE spend its time addressing issues that have been
resolved elsewhere, work could be conducted in the ‘sphere of hard security
where we do not have such a genuinely collective organisation possessing an
international legal personality’ (Lavrov, 2010b). Therefore, the adoption of CoE
policies by all OSCE member-states could resolve another Russian concern: that
the political-military side of the organisation was being neglected. This concern
about an imbalance of the ‘Three Baskets’ is something that has been reflected
in many Russian statements about the organisation. As a high-ranking Eastern
European diplomat pointed out, Russians would claim that human rights is given
extra attention in the organisation but, given the declining commitment of certain
states to the human rights commitments of the organisation, the attention human
security issues receive is rightfully deserved.
Criticism that the OSCE did not pay enough attention to political-military
security issues can be seen under both Putin and Medvedev. At the 2006 Minis-
terial Council, Lavrov stated that the OSCE ‘should not concern itself exclu-
sively with the “human dimension” ’ (Lavrov, 2006). A year later, during his
Munich Conference speech, Putin declared that the ‘balance [between the
OSCE’s three dimensions] is clearly destroyed’ and, although the humanitarian
part of the organisation allows for member-states to be monitored with their per-
mission, this ‘does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries,
and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should
live and develop’ (Putin, 2007k). The same year, a Russian MFA spokesman
emphasised this concern when he stated that Russia wanted the OSCE not to
focus uneven attention on the human rights dimension (WNC: Interfax, 2007a).
Under Medvedev, the preference for discussing OSCE dimensions, other than
the human dimension, can be seen in Lavrov’s 2009 address to the OSCE Minis-
terial Council where he focused his speech heavily on the politico-military side
of the organisation and human rights issues warranted only limited space, with
most of the attention drawn to other organisations which conduct human rights
work; however, he did state that ‘Russia wants security-of-the-person to be the
focus of constant attention of the OSCE’ (Lavrov, 2009e). In February 2010,
Lavrov stated that the OSCE was seeking ‘a comprehensive approach to
security’ but that the current direction of the organisation did not reflect this
because the OSCE ‘is devoted to the humanitarian sphere to the detriment of
other baskets’ (Lavrov, 2010e).
Although the human rights component of the organisation was a source of
consternation under both Putin and Medvedev, there is a shift in the rhetoric
which came with the Medvedev presidency. Under Putin, the human rights com-
ponent of the OSCE was criticised by Russia for having ‘double standards, polit-
ically motivated, biased assessments and approaches towards individual
countries and regions, and the use of human rights issues to exert political pres-
sure’ (Borodavkin, 2005). Although statements continued to be made during the
Medvedev presidency about the OSCE using ‘confrontational rhetoric and
attempts to impose “democratic values” ’, they were surrounded by what Russia
believed should be the focus of human rights efforts, such as ‘ensuring freedom
of movement and the rule of law, and the provision of effective assistance to
states in areas where they really need such assistance and request it’ (Azimov,
2010g: 39). When discussing efforts to resolve regional conflicts, rather than
accuse the OSCE of double standards, Lavrov, in an article, mentioned that
Russia had drafted ‘proposals on developing uniform principles for resolving the
conflicts, which, of course, would be applied in practice taking into account the
specifics’ of the conflict which ‘would help avoid double standards in this highly
sensitive area’ (Lavrov, 2010c). The attempts to bring further attention to the
politico-military side of the OSCE under Medvedev meant that criticising the
organisation for some of its activities might not garner support for Russian ideas
and, therefore, there was a softening of Russian language.
With regards to the human rights agenda of the OSCE, a high-ranking Central
European diplomat claimed that Russia is ‘killing many or most’ of the propos-
als dealing with the third dimension. At the same time, the diplomat argued that
the country ‘is trying to pull-out a few aspects and use them to their advantage’
such as issues pertaining to free movement of people, which the Russians use to
argue in favour of visa-free travel with the EU, and the rise of neo-Nazism and
the conditions of Russians abroad, both of which highlight the Baltic region. A
Western diplomat suggested that ‘it seems their agenda is to do less in the human
dimension’. It was predicted by a high-ranking Eastern European diplomat that
the human rights ‘situation will get worse’ at the OSCE because poles have
emerged with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on one side and the U.S. and the
EU on the other. The future of the human dimension is complicated by the fact
that, as a Western diplomat explained, the member-states ‘diverge on the import-
ance of the human dimension’ but that the vast majority of countries want to see
the OSCE’s work in this area improve.
A high-ranking Russian MFA official described the OSCE as a place ‘for
mentoring countries east of Vienna’, particularly in regards to human rights,
and went on to explain that ‘usually people don’t like mentors’. It was argued
by a different Russian MFA official that ‘all institutions of the OSCE tend to
monitor towards the east of Vienna’ and Russia is ‘disregarded’ when
attempts are made to discuss human security situations in Western Europe and
the United States. Still another Russian MFA official explained that ‘in stra-
tegic terms, we seek to move from mentoring to sharing’ where the sharing
could include ‘lessons learned’, both positives and negatives, and states ‘can
give advice’. From these statements, it appears that the Russian leadership
would like to see the OSCE become more of a consultative body than an
active one.
Human rights in Russia remains a difficult area for the OSCE to influence
since the organisation relies on the consensus principle to support its work and
securing such support from Russia has become increasingly unlikely. From
2001–2003, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, which was originally
created during the First Chechen War, was called upon to assist with the
humanitarian situation in the region (OSCE, 2012g). The work of the Assist-
ance Group ended in 2003, after talks about an extension of its mandate failed
due to disagreements over what the mandate should entail since changes to the
original mandate were being sought (Lenskaya, 2003). A representative of the
OSCE claimed that the dispute was the result of Russia supporting a role for
the OSCE mission in the area of humanitarian assistance while also wanting
the OSCE to avoid politics, which not all OSCE member-states would agree to
(Abdullaev, 2003). What can be seen in regards to Russia and human rights at
the OSCE is that although the organisation itself might be unable to secure
consensus about human rights in Russia, the institutions of the organisation,
such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
have proven to be a much greater challenge for Russia to confront. Although
there were hopes that the situation surrounding Russia and human rights at the
OSCE would improve, given Medvedev’s statement that ‘we are committed
above all to the rule of law and to having all countries, above all the big
powers, respect international law’, the Medvedev presidency was not marked
by a great improvement in the field of human rights over the policies of the
Putin era (Medvedev D., 2008l).
Russia and ODIHR: addressing an OSCE body’s work on human
rights and democracy
Russia has many difficulties with the OSCE’s bodies but none presents a greater
challenge for the country than the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR). This section will consider, firstly, the issues that Russia has
with the institutions of the OSCE and, secondly, the specific challenges con-
fronting Russia in its relationship with ODIHR, an institution that as one Central
European ambassador stated, ‘Putin really dislikes’.
Within the OSCE, there are the institutional bodies, such as the Permanent
Council (PC) and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and there are other
bodies such as ODIHR, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High
Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), and the organisation’s field missions (OSCE, 2013b). A high-
ranking Central European diplomat described Russia’s behaviour towards these
bodies as ‘impertinent’ and claimed that there was a need to read documents
closely in order to make sure that no attempts were being made to bring the
bodies under the control of the PC or the Secretary General, as Russia would
prefer, because the country could then influence their operations. The diplomat
argued that it is important this does not occur because to place them under the
PC would make them ‘dependent on the situation’ there, which would include
the consensus principle. A high-ranking Eastern European diplomat agreed,
arguing that the bodies ‘have to be autonomous’ because otherwise they would
be interfered with but that the field missions faced a different situation because
they are dependent on host countries and, consequently, ‘complete autonomy’
would be ‘impossible’. The field missions are different based on the country that
they are located in. As the high-ranking diplomat explained, in countries like
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan all of the field mission projects need national gov-
ernment approval. It is also important to note, as the diplomat did, that the field
missions engage in ‘cross-dimensional’ activities, which should be expected
when the dimensions themselves are ‘interlinked’, and, therefore, are not focused
only on the human dimension.
Russian responses to election observers can be considered in the light of not
only their experiences, in particular the criticism that Russia receives and the
responses they exhibit towards the criticism, but also in Russia’s efforts to
reform election observation procedures. Russia has held a strong position against
election observation that can be clearly seen through both areas of examination.
ODIHR, which engages in election monitoring, has seen efforts by Russia to
undermine its work. Russia’s actions towards the election monitoring functions
of not only ODIHR but also the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) help the region’s authoritarian governments by smearing those
outside organisations who would argue that elections have been falsified
(Ambrosio, 2009a: 54).
Russia has targeted the work of ODIHR election observers by expressing
concern that the Western countries, and particularly the U.S., are attempting to
make the OSCE a one-sided tool that allows them to achieve their foreign policy
goals (de Haas, 2010: 102). The observers of Russian elections have been
viewed as a ‘Trojan horse, a weapon the Americans wielded in the hope of pro-
moting regime change in Russia’ and election monitors in the former Soviet
Republics were a means to influence the politics of Russia’s neighbouring states
(Krickus, 2009: 15). By portraying the election observers as pawns of Western
countries, Russian leaders sought to convince Russian citizens that the organisa-
tion’s criticism was not the result of wrongdoing by the government but instead
because ODIHR was speaking on behalf of third-party interests.
In an effort to prevent the publicity that comes with electoral criticism, a 2005
Russian proposal would have allowed only election monitoring conclusions
agreed upon by member-states to be released, which would have robbed ODIHR
of its ability to expose fraudulent elections and their practices since member-
states would be allowed to approve what was said about their own elections
(Ambrosio, 2010: 140). Russian leaders have also suggested that the PC should
select the heads of the election monitoring missions, which could lead to dif-
ficulties in approving an appropriate candidate since the PC relies on the consen-
sus principle, therefore allowing member-states to control who would be
responsible for monitoring their elections (Chizhov, 2005). The Russian frustra-
tion over the fact that both the OSCE’s ‘institutions and field missions often act
almost as supranational bodies operating according to their own “program” and
– which is utterly unacceptable – independently of member-states’ can be seen
in Russia’s efforts towards ODIHR (Azimov, 2012: 18–19). Efforts to reform
ODIHR, and its election monitoring function, were agreed to be discussed as
part of Decision 19/06 of the 2006 Ministerial Council. The decision recom-
mended expanding the ‘geographical coverage in ODIHR’s election activities’
and increasing both the representation of member-states among the election
observers and ‘increas[ing] the transparency of recruitment of members of obser-
vation teams’ (OSCE, 2006).
Funding for ODIHR has also come under scrutiny from Russia. Russian com-
ments on the proposed 2% increase in ODIHR’s 2011 budget ‘given the ques-
tions raised with regard to the transparency and effectiveness of its work in
various areas, particularly regarding elections’ show that concerns about bias in
election monitoring continued from the Putin to the Medvedev presidency
(Azimov, 2010e). Russian attempts at influencing the budget of ODIHR have
drawn criticism as a high-ranking Central European diplomat stated that Russia
‘always wants to cut’ the funding to ODIHR which has meant that ODIHR
funding has to come from extra-budgetary sources. The diplomat argued that is a
‘gain’ for Russia because not being directly funded by the OSCE could mean
that ODIHR is viewed as having ‘less legitimacy’ and that ODIHR is separate
from other OSCE achievements. According to a Western diplomat, Russian
efforts to gain control of the OSCE’s extra-budgetary spending reflects a ‘long-
standing policy of trying to get control of extra-budgetary projects’ that can be
connected with Lavrov’s accusations that the OSCE trained people for the
Orange Revolution. A high-ranking Eastern European diplomat said that the
situation surrounding the budget disputes ‘continue[s to become] even worse’
and pointed to the organisation’s budget decline of €75 million over the past ten
years. The diplomat argued that Russia wants to bring extra-budgetary activities,
which would include the bodies, into the OSCE’s unified budget without increas-
ing the money involved and that would mean there would be less funding for the
programmes that the OSCE is committed to and less funding for ODIHR.
Despite the issues surrounding the funding of the OSCE, it is important to
note that election monitors were allowed to witness the elections that occurred
under the Medvedev presidency, which represents a break from the monitoring
difficulties surrounding the elections of Putin’s second term. Before the 2011
parliamentary and the 2012 presidential elections, the last monitored ODIHR
presidential election was in 2004 and the last monitored parliamentary election
was in 2003 (ODIHR, 2012a).
The cancellation in November 2007 of the planned ODIHR monitoring
mission to the parliamentary elections in December of that year was the result of
Russia’s desire to place conditions on the observers. Russia’s OSCE representa-
tive, Aleksey Borodavkin, identified Russia’s obligation to election observation
as beginning and ending with the invitation of foreign observers (WNC: Inter-
fax, 2007c). ODIHR faced difficulties preparing for an observation mission for
the election due to a late invitation and the limiting of its mission size to 70
people, which was very different from the 2003 Duma election where ODIHR
received its invitation more than ten weeks before the election and was allowed
a delegation of 450 (The Moscow Times, 2007). DFM Grushko stated that
Russia had invited 70 ODIHR observers along with hundreds of observers from
other countries, which he argued was ‘more than hospitable’ since the 2006 U.S.
congressional elections had only 16 ODIHR observers yet America’s population
was twice that of Russia. In the same interview, he also argued that several other
OSCE member-states, including Poland, France, Canada, Italy and the Nether-
lands, each had ODIHR delegations of 12 or less observe their elections
(Grushko, 2007a). Despite ODIHR’s decision, the OSCE PA made the decision
to send 40 of its election observers, therefore, the OSCE was still represented
(ITAR-TASS Daily, 2007). In addition, the OSCE Representative on Freedom
of the Media released a report that focused on Russian violations prior to the
election including the ‘harassment of media outlets . . . lack of equal access . . .
legislative limitations . . . arbitrary applications of rules . . . and selective use of
anti-extremism and defamation legislation’ (Haraszti, 2007). Even without an
ODIHR presence, the OSCE still kept its attention on the election and the situ-
ation in Russia.
The return of ODIHR election observers to Russia in 2011 does not mean,
however, that Russian opinions regarding the issue of election observation had
greatly changed. In early September, Medvedev criticised ODIHR delegations to
the CIS countries for their large size and because the ODIHR observers ‘some-
times openly show a politicised approach to the assessment of the preparation
and holding of elections . . . and that approach – let us be honest about it – is
often based on double standards’ (Medvedev D., 2011e). In the same speech,
Medvedev suggested that CIS observations teams should have a more active role
in each other’s elections because, unlike with ODIHR, there is no imbalance
where some countries have observation missions with about a dozen observers
while others have a few hundred and because the CIS has ‘a long-established
and effective system of monitoring elections in the CIS . . . and the work of these
observers is based on a clear legal framework’ (Medvedev D., 2011e). As a
high-ranking Central European diplomat argued, from the Russian perspective
‘ODIHR decides it does not need to observe elections elsewhere’ and, con-
sequently, it can focus more on the East, despite the fact Russia would rather see
ODIHR observers sent everywhere, which would overextend the organisation.
At the OSCE’s Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM), the deputy
head of the Russian delegation Andrey Nikiforov stated that the country still
sought PC approval for the election observation process, from the establishment
of the monitoring missions to the election assessment reports (Nikiforov, 2011).
Before the parliamentary election, the Chairman of the Central Election Com-
mission (CEC), Vladimir Churov, reiterated existing rules for observers operat-
ing in Russia, including that they have to possess permits to use ‘photo or video
coverage of balloting’ and that election observers ‘are required to introduce
themselves to the local election commission and show their accreditation cards’
(ITAR-TASS Daily, 2011a).
In the period leading up to the parliamentary election, there was some dis-
agreement between ODIHR and the CEC about the size of the monitoring
mission, which could have resulted in a situation similar to 2007. On September
13, 2011, ODIHR proposed a team of 60 long-term election observers and 200
short-term observers which the Director of ODIHR, Janez Lenarčič, stated were
the numbers ‘necessary to monitor the elections comprehensively and in a
manner that is consistent with the highest standards of professionalism and integ-
rity’ (ODIHR, 2011a). The importance of CIS election monitors was emphasised
by Churov who said that the number of CIS and OSCE observers should be
equal (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2011b). CIS election observers are becoming more
important to Russia because they have knowledge of ‘the mentality of people
living in these countries, they have frank discussions with voters, political party
members, candidates, and members of district electoral commissions’ so their
input on elections is seen as better and they are considered ‘better intentioned’
than other observers, such as those from ODIHR (Gorovoi, 2006: 88). An agree-
ment between the CEC and ODIHR saw Russia consent to a total of 40 long-
term observers and 160 short-term ones as part of an observation mission headed
by Heidi Tagliavini, who had previously been in charge of the EU’s fact-finding
mission for the August 2008 conflict (ODIHR, 2011b).
Following the parliamentary elections, without naming specific groups or
individuals, Medvedev sought to downplay criticism of the election by saying
that ‘only a difference in the interpretation of individual violations – whether or
not they occurred’ could be seen in statements (Medvedev D., 2011b). This
clearly understates the preliminary joint conclusions of ODIHR, the OSCE PA,
and PACE which stated ‘the contest was also slanted in favour of the ruling
party as evidenced by the lack of independence of the election administration,
the partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state authorities at
different levels’ which ‘did not provide the necessary conditions for fair elect-
oral competition’ (International Election Observation, 2011). Although there
were discussions about not allowing OSCE observers to witness the presidential
elections in 2012 due to the critical statements made about the 2011 parlia-
mentary election, they were allowed back (Solov’ev et al., 2011). Despite the
report’s criticism of the parliamentary election and the opposition’s response to
the election, Russia still allowed an OSCE monitoring mission, again headed by
Heidi Tagliavini, to monitor the presidential election in March (ODIHR, 2012b).
The Russian decision to allow OSCE election observers did not come as a
shock to Western observers at the OSCE. As a high-ranking Central European
diplomat argued, although there were ‘hard discussions’ about the return of the
observers, it was ‘not too surprising’ that Russia invited them since ‘Russia was
confident [that] ODIHR cannot find fraud’ in the elections there. A high-ranking
Eastern European diplomat stated that to invite 200 monitors to Russia is
‘nothing’ and that because their invitation arrived late, they could not conduct all
of the pre-election monitoring that the organisation wanted.
Despite Russia’s concerns about the electoral criticism that it receives from
the CoE and OSCE, overall Russia views the organisations not having much
impact ‘on major policy decisions in Europe’ (Light & Allison, 2006: 14).
Russia has, however, expended a great deal of effort in criticising the organisa-
tions in an effort to harm their credibility but these efforts appear to have done
little damage to the reputations of the organisations. Election monitoring is an
area that the Russian government has made quite clear that criticism is not appre-
ciated in. The challenges to ODIHR funding and reform suggestions, which
would weaken monitoring mechanisms and make it difficult for election obser-
vers to go about their business, are clearly Russian efforts to prevent the organ-
isation from having the resources it needs to function.
Russia and the politico-military side of the OSCE

The OSCE’s ‘First Basket’, and the one that Russia’s leaders believe is the most
important aspect of the organisation’s work, is the politico-military dimension of
the organisation. Among the areas of concentration for the OSCE’s politico-
military dimension are non-treaty areas of arms control, the destruction of toxic
armaments, supporting UN Security Council work, and conflict resolution. When
considering the politico-military side of the OSCE, it should be noted that there
is a politically-binding confidence- and security-measure that is discussed within
the OSCE’s FSC, the Vienna Document, as well as two treaties, the Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) and the Treaty on Open
Skies, which are discussed at OSCE-related bodies that will be considered in
Chapter 6. The OSCE does have a role in dealing with issues related to the
security of arms that are not included in the major Euro-Atlantic security agree-
ments and should be considered. It should be noted that some of the areas of
concentration have proven to have greater amounts of success than others. At the
OSCE, some aspects of politico-military issues are dealt with in the PC but many
are dealt with in the FSC and within the FSC, according to a high-ranking
Russian MFA official, the biases that Russia often discusses at the PC are less
apparent ‘because the FSC has its own mandate and is less politicised’.
The OSCE has carved out for itself a role in arms control that includes small
arms, landmines, and other weapons such as MANPADS, which stands for man-
portable air-defence systems (Dunay, 2006: 44). The OSCE has also produced
numerous documents pertaining to arms control with topics including, but not
limited to, small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, a ban on antiperson-
nel landmines, and ‘principles governing conventional arms transfers’
(Evtod’eva, 2010: 85–86). The OSCE’s support for the Wassenaar Arrangement
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technolo-
gies, due to concerns about anti-aircraft missile systems or other weapons and
technological systems that could be used by terrorists, has seen the establishment
of a procedure for OSCE states to either ask for assistance or provide assistance
to other states to guarantee the safekeeping or destruction of concerning systems
(85–86). Despite these many documents and established practices, there is still
criticism from Russia over this part of the OSCE’s agenda because the decisions
taken ‘pointed to the quantitative rather than qualitative parameters of strength-
ening the arms control system’ (86).
The politico-military agenda does create some problems, particularly in the
eyes of the Russian leadership, because it is seen within an institutional East-
West divide whereby the countries of the East are receiving assistance and the
West is providing it, without similar steps taken on the territory of countries in
the West (Dunay, 2007: 275). This concern that the OSCE focuses too much on
the Eastern member-states is similar to the issues Russia has brought forward
about the ‘Third Basket’. Putin’s 2007 Munich speech reflected this when he
stated that ‘people are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries’,
ostensibly harming the interests of other member-states (Putin, 2007k). In
Russia, there is a feeling that the U.S. uses the OSCE as a way to observe
Eastern Europe and Central Asia while the EU uses the OSCE as a way to
prepare countries for potential EU membership in the future (Voronkov, 2009:
19). Through its criticism of the divide over how the OSCE operates, it is not
certain what arrangement Moscow is seeking instead, whether it want less atten-
tion on the problems of the Eastern member-states or whether it wants more
attention on what is happening in the Western part (Zagorski & Entin, 2008).
One area of OSCE activity that Russia has seen its role expanded in under
Medvedev is the destruction of mélange, a toxic rocket fuel component, found in
former Soviet states as well as with assistance in armaments destruction.
Although Russia has opted not to contribute financially to the OSCE projects,
the country does contribute services that help fulfil country requests for assist-
ance. Russia has worked in cooperation with the OSCE to help remove more
than 6,922 tonnes of mélange from Ukraine as part of an on-going project which
began in 2009 (OSCE, 2012d). The OSCE monitors the entire project ‘including
the loading, shipment and disposal of the mélange’, while ‘chemical plants in
Dzerzhinsk and Biysk in the Russian Federation have disposed of this hazard in
a process that produces chemical products for civilian use, such as paint com-
ponents’ (OSCE, 2012d). In 2011, Russia began supporting efforts in Kaza-
khstan by sending a team of Russian experts to mélange storage facilities so they
could begin to arrange for transport to Russia for future destruction, a process
similar to that used for Ukraine (OSCE, 2012b: 66). In 2010, Russia also offered
its assistance to a project that would destroy surface-to-air missiles in Moldova,
marking its first non-mélange focused contribution to the OSCE efforts (OSCE
FSC Chairperson, 2011b).
Russia’s behaviour towards the issue of trans-national threats has been char-
acterised by a former Western diplomat as ‘schizophrenic’ with Russia showing
a ‘willing[ness] to expand OSCE engagement (seminars and workshops) in the
fields of counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism provided Russia retains suffi-
cient control over how that engagement is shaped’ and since the OSCE’s head of
Transnational Threats is a Russian, this has been possible. In 2003, a Russian
MFA spokesman stated that from Russia’s perspective the OSCE should be
focused primarily on ‘countering terrorism, implementing police programmes,
and co-ordination between law enforcement bodies in dealing with terrorism,
people trafficking, illicit drugs trafficking and arms smuggling’ (Yakovenko,
2003). While Russia has declared countering terrorism one of the country’s pri-
orities at the OSCE, Russia’s complicated behaviour can be seen in how Russia
chooses to address UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), on the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), at the organisation,
despite being a co-sponsor of the resolution at the United Nations. UNSCR 1540
calls on UN member-states to prevent the ‘attempt to develop, acquire, manufac-
ture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and their means of delivery’ by individuals and groups as well as the establish-
ment of national mechanisms to prevent such events from occurring (UN
Security Council, 2004).
In 2010, Russia supported an American proposal that the OSCE hold a
meeting about UNSCR 1540 implementation within the OSCE area with Russia
hoping the meeting would be used to find ‘a “niche” for our Organisation to
assist in the implementation of the’ resolution (Azimov, 2010d). The OSCE
Workshop to Identify the Proper Role of the OSCE in Facilitation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004), which was co-
sponsored by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in January
2011, saw member-states suggest an OSCE role providing ‘tailored training
courses, assistance with the development of national action plans and improve-
ment of legislation, [and] promotion of the Handbook of Best Practices Guides’
(OSCE FSC Chairperson, 2011a). At the meeting, a Russian representative
spoke in favour of countries sharing their practices in regards to implementing
1540 in their individual countries and promoting stronger export control policies
within the CIS states through workshops (Russian Delegation, 2011).
Within the OSCE bodies, the Conflict Prevention Centre’s Borders Team has
been tasked with assisting member-states fulfil their UNSCR 1540 commitments
by offering seminars focused on SALW cooperation and the transfer of dual-use
items (OSCE, 2012b: 101). The FSC Support Section, in partnership with the
UNODA, has also organised a workshop on 1540 implementation in Kazakhstan
for the countries of Central Asia (102). The cooperation between UNODA and
the Support Section was furthered by the October 2011 entry into force of a
Memorandum of Understanding between the two bodies, which ‘will facilitate
capacity building and assistance as well as regional and country-specific events
in response to OSCE participating States’ requests’ for support in implementing
UNSCR 1540 (OSCE, 2012e). These types of activities are directly connected to
the activities endorsed by the Russian representative at the 2011 workshop.
Despite this support of the discussion of UNSCR 1540 at the OSCE and
support for a Ministerial Decision that called on the OSCE’s ‘decision-making
bodies . . . to continue to identify, and strengthen, when and as appropriate, spe-
cific forms of the OSCE’s contribution to assist participating States’ in imple-
menting 1540, such support of OSCE activities on this issue remains inconsistent
(Ministerial Council, 2011). As a former Western diplomat explained, the U.S.
and U.K. could not afford to, and did not want to, keep funding 1540 operations
between themselves as an extra-budgetary expense but when they attempted to
bring the OSCE’s 1540 efforts under the unified budget, this was blocked by
Russia. This reflects a desire not to add expenses to the OSCE budget as seen in
previous sections but also shows Russia failing to support activity which would
have further enhanced the role of the politico-military dimension something the
country has previously advocated.
For Russia, the role it sees for the OSCE in resolving the longstanding con-
flicts of the region is not one of leadership. During the visit of UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon to the OSCE, the Russian ambassador stated that ‘Russia
believes that it is imperative that crises should be resolved peacefully and
through negotiations while maintaining the leading role of the United Nations
Security Council and the auxiliary function of the OSCE as its regional mech-
anism’ (Azimov, 2010f ). The position can be clearly seen in Russia’s policies
towards an OSCE role in conflict prevention and resolution, a role that is not the
most central to conflict issues and with Russia’s continuous promotion of the
UN Security Council because of Russia’s veto there.
Although Russia has stated its support for a role for the OSCE in crisis man-
agement and conflict prevention, the Russian leadership believes there are limits
to the extent that the OSCE should be an active player in regional conflicts. At
the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, Medvedev promoted the ‘develop[ment of] a
set of common principles for conflict resolution, to be applied in all crisis situ-
ations and not just selected cases . . . which would include not resorting to force,
reaching agreements between the parties, respect for negotiation and peacekeep-
ing decisions, and protecting the rights of civilians in the conflict zone’
(Medvedev D., 2010h). In regards to active conflicts and crises, a Russian repre-
sentative stated that the OSCE’s ability to act in these areas would be improved
by ensuring that consensus is observed at all stages of the crisis cycle, by
strengthening the capabilities of the collective decision-making bodies, by
ensuring that the parties to a conflict give their clearly expressed consent to
the OSCE’s proposed measures for resolving an acute situation, and by
adapting the Organisation’s anti-crisis mechanisms and procedures to the
needs of the present day.
(Azimov, 2010c)
The challenge of consensus as a way to resolve conflicts is apparent when the

fact that the state, or states, involved can easily control the ability of the OSCE
to function as it relates to the conflict. Throughout the early twenty-first century,
the challenge of having a consensus-based decision-making process has clearly
hampered the OSCE’s ability to accomplish the goals that it has set for itself
regarding conflict resolution. One example of this is the failure of the OSCE
member-states to adopt a text on Moldova, due to differences in opinion over
Transdniestria, at the 2005 Ministerial Council, a situation that has occurred
multiple times at major OSCE meetings in regards to the various frozen conflicts
(Lavrov, 2005).
The 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan illustrates that the OSCE has failed to
develop suitable tools for dealing with such crises. In the midst of the violence,
Kyrgyzstan’s acting president, Roza Otunbayeva, requested Russian intervention
in the crisis to which Russia responded that they would consider such action
within the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)
(Schwirtz, 2010). Ultimately, the CSTO made the decision to not send peace-
keepers to the country (RFE/RL, 2010a). This decision placed the impetus for
action on the OSCE as it is the other major regional security organisation where
Kyrgyzstan is a member. The violence, which began in April, resulted in a July
Permanent Council decision on the situation, which called for ‘the deployment,
without delay, of an OSCE Police Advisory Group to assist Kyrgyzstan to
reduce inter-ethnic tensions, restore public order and strengthen the capacities of
the territorial units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic’
(OSCE Permanent Council, 2010). Despite the instructions for a quick response,
by November discussions were still on-going regarding the best format for
cooperation, which resulted in a change of plans for the OSCE to instead deliver
assistance to the Interior Ministry on issues related to ‘the rule of law, and . . .
matters related to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ that
would increase the level of trust between the population and the police (OSCE,
2010b). The shift in the mission was welcomed by Russia because by the autumn
the instructions from the July decision were not in line with the conditions on the
ground and because the initiative reflected the desires of the Kyrgyz government,
something considered important by Russia’s OSCE representative (Azimov,
2010j).
The conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia has gone from frozen to active
to resuming its frozen status again. Agreement amongst the OSCE member-
states on the status of the breakaway regions is non-existent. In 2008, Russia
used its position in the OSCE to ensure that the OSCE’s mission in Georgia
would close and, in 2009, prevented the OSCE from continuing its work with
the EU’s monitoring mission there (Waters, 2010: 16). In the aftermath of the
2008 conflict, the OSCE Chairmanship’s Special Representative for the South
Caucasus became one of the three co-chairs to the Geneva International Discus-
sions along with the EU and the UN Special Representative. Although only
limited progress in resolving the issues surrounding the breakaway regions has
been made, the two sides have agreed to some humanitarian projects, such as the
Nikosi water project (financed by the EU and carried out by the OSCE), which
will supply irrigation water to areas near the Administrative Boundary Line
between Georgia and South Ossetia (OSCE, 2011). Although the conflict is far
from resolved, projects that focus on the humanitarian situation provide a field
for cooperation and an area in which the OSCE member-states can agree to
support some activities within the region.
Conclusion
Russia’s membership in the OSCE guarantees that Russia will be involved in
conversations relating to Euro-Atlantic security but the structural weaknesses of
the organisation mean that the OSCE itself is not in a position of dominance to
handle the issues of the region. The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security
means that lots of security issues are discussed there but the need for consensus
on decisions means that it is difficult to make progress on these issues.
The Medvedev presidency showed a desire to focus on issues of hard security,
which was apparent in the Putin presidency as well. While similarities might be
seen in the concern of both Putin and Medvedev regarding the perceived over-
emphasis of the OSCE on the human rights aspects of the organisation’s work,
there were differences in how the men approached this. Under Putin, Russia
spoke of double-standards within the OSCE and unfair attention being paid to
the human dimension over the other areas of comprehensive security that the
organisation was concerned with. Although the concerns about the humanitarian
side of the OSCE existed under Medvedev, the criticism was couched in a dis-
cussion of where improvements could be made rather than focusing heavily on
criticism. The fact that Russia, under Medvedev, made the decision to allow
ODIHR election observers into Russia for the parliamentary and presidential
elections for the first time since 2004 was also an area of progress from the Putin
era. Even after the parliamentary election and the criticism of the election from
ODIHR, as well as the protests that occurred afterwards, the election observers
were still allowed to observe the March presidential election in which Putin was
the main candidate.
5 Russia and NATO
The limits of cooperation
For Russians, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remains a symbol of
the Cold War and the fact that it not only continues to exist but is also expanding to
include, first, former Warsaw Pact states, and, more recently, former Soviet Repub-
lics, is a cause for concern. The continued expansion of NATO is particularly diffi-
cult for those who believe in the existence of promises from the alliance that, after
a reunified Germany became a member, NATO would expand no further. Russian
relations with NATO are, therefore, tied to an understanding that NATO continues
to exist and that it is a dominant player on issues of international security but one
with whom Russia has had several serious disagreements.
Russia’s non-membership in NATO has allowed Russia to choose the rela-
tionship it has with the organisation while, at the same time, the NATO–Russia
Council (NRC) provides an institutionalised framework through which
cooperation and joint efforts can be made. While the NRC offers the two parties
a forum to address issues between them, the NRC has not always been available
when Russia and NATO have needed it. Even when the NRC has been available,
progress on important issues between Russia and the alliance has not always
occurred.
This chapter will consider the supposed promises between Russian and Amer-
ican officials about the future expansion of NATO and the statements of both
Putin and Medvedev regarding these promises to allow for an examination of the
two presidents’ perspectives on the alliance. It will also offer a comparison of
the security documents from both of the presidencies to see the attitude of the
Russian leadership towards NATO. By looking at the documents and the prom-
ises an understanding of the Russian view of NATO can be formed, which pro-
vides background for analysing points of cooperation and confrontation between
Russia and the alliance.
Russia, NATO, and Soviet era promises

One of the arguments that Russian leaders have used against NATO has been the
existence of promises that the West supposedly made to Soviet leaders that
NATO would not expand after the inclusion of a reunified Germany. A great
deal of uncertainty surrounds these promises since it is unclear what exactly the
Russia and NATO 63
leaders that Gorbachev was speaking to said, in particular whether what was
stated was a commitment or proposal, and also because NATO is an alliance
and, therefore, one state cannot make promises for the others without agreement
among partners, which was absent on the issue of NATO expansion (Sarotte,
2010: 138). The agreement that Russians claim was made involved promises
from NATO states that membership of a reunified Germany would be the only
expansion of the organisation, but the difficulty for the Russians, according to
former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, is that because the Western assurances
were not written in a formal treaty there is no way to prove the existence of, and,
therefore, the ability to enforce, the supposed agreement (Primakov, 2004: 130).
Gorbachev has explained the reason for not seeking written promises that expan-
sion would not occur as being due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact had not yet
collapsed and, therefore, ‘the notion that NATO might expand to include
the countries in this alliance sounded completely absurd at the time’ (Klussmann
et al., 2009).
On both the Soviet and Western sides there are conflicting reports over
whether such promises were given to the Soviet leadership. Eduard Shevard-
nadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, has denied the existence of these promises
but his account is disputed by his boss, Mikhail Gorbachev, who argues that
promises were made that NATO would not expand eastward (Klussmann et al.,
2009). Gorbachev has explained his discussions with James Baker, the American
Secretary of State, as proceeding with ‘Baker look[ing] at him directly and
sa[ying], “Look, if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in
NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east” ’ (Bradley, 2009). In his
Memoirs, Gorbachev relays a conversation he had with Baker in February 1990
where Baker asked him whether, in the event of reunification, Gorbachev would
want to see a Germany which was not tied to NATO and did not have American
troops on its soil or a Germany which was tied to NATO ‘but with the guarantee
that NATO jurisdiction or troops would not extend east of the current line’ (Gor-
bachev, 1997: 683).
According to Baker, he was not discussing Eastern Europe at the time but was
instead talking about East Germany, where Soviet troops had been since the end
of World War II, and that the idea of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe had
not been part of the conversation (Bradley, 2009). Strobe Talbott, who under
President Clinton worked as Deputy Secretary of State, did not appear to doubt
the existence of the promises and wrote that the previous American government
had provided the Soviets with promises that NATO would not expand beyond
Germany (Talbott, 2003: 93). The American ambassador to Moscow, Jack
Matlock Jr., has said that the problem for Gorbachev was ‘the image of NATO
expanding to include all of Germany while Soviet troops abandoned the area and
the other Soviet “allies” became neutral and potentially hostile suggested to the
public a Soviet defeat tantamount to losing a war’ (Matlock, 1995: 383–384).
In the twenty-first century, both Putin and Medvedev have mentioned the
existence of the supposed promises. During his 2007 speech at the Munich
Security Conference, which drew international attention for its criticism of U.S.
64 Russia and NATO
policy and prompted much to be written and discussed in the West about whether
there was or would be a new Cold War, Putin would include the promises in his
list of issues with the West (Gaddy & Kuchins, 2008: 124). During the speech,
Putin asked the audience ‘what happened to the assurances our western partners
made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact’ and quoted a speech from NATO
General Secretary Manfred Wörner delivered on May 17, 1990 where he said
“the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German ter-
ritory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee” (Putin, 2007k). The
quote from Wörner goes on to say that ‘moreover we could conceive of a trans-
itional period during which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain sta-
tioned in the present-day GDR’ (Wörner, 1990). While Putin might have thought
that the quotation from Wörner that he cited helped to strengthen his case, the
focus of the second half of the quotation on Germany supports Baker’s argument
that conversations at the time were concerned with Germany and not the future
of Eastern Europe.
Medvedev as president also referenced the assurances that Russia supposedly
received. In a 2008 meeting of the Valdai Club, Medvedev, when asked about
NATO membership, stated that it was ‘a shame that the leaders of the Soviet
Union did not sign the relevant agreements with their partners at that time’ but
that everyone was aware of what had been promised to the Soviet leaders
(Medvedev D., 2008g). His mention of the importance of a written agreement
reflects what Primakov said and can also be seen as a reflection of his career as a
lawyer. Medvedev reiterated his concerns about the non-application of the prom-
ises during a 2009 interview with Spiegel when he discussed how after the end
of the Warsaw Pact, Russia had ‘hop[ed] for a higher degree of integration’ with
Europe but instead ‘none of the things that we were assured, namely that NATO
would not expand endlessly eastwards and our interests would be continuously
taken into consideration’ happened (Medvedev D., 2009i).
Whether or not the promises ever existed has little practical impact on deci-
sions made in the present by both the Russian leadership or NATO leaders and
their member-states. At the same time, these presumed assurances have an
important impact on the perceptions of Russian leaders who see subsequent
NATO decisions, particularly in regards to expansion, through the eyes of the
aggrieved. The idea that there was a potential agreement between NATO and
Russia that could have prevented the problems that Russia has with the alliance
in the present has a strong impact on how Russians view the organisation and
relate to it.
The Russian leadership’s views of NATO

Through the statements of the Russian leadership, it becomes clear that there is a
desire to cooperate with NATO but that it is tempered with concerns about the
implications of NATO decisions. Medvedev and Putin, as well as officials in
their administrations, have spoken out about NATO and on how Russia and
NATO should interact with each other. Russian leaders vary not only in their
Russia and NATO 65
opinions of what they think of the alliance but also what kind of relationship
Russia should have with the organisation. The differences of opinion over the
organisation seen in Russia are reflected in the various statements and docu-
ments put forward by different branches of the government. Documents drafted
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Security Council
of Russia, under both Putin and Medvedev, show the differences in opinion
between the leading stakeholders in Russian policy towards NATO.
Under Putin, the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept stated that the expansion of
NATO prompted a ‘negative attitude’ from Russia (FPC, 2000). The Foreign
Policy Concept said that Russia would be willing to cooperate with NATO but
that the degree to which cooperation would occur would be based on whether
NATO adhered to the ideas of ‘non-use of force or threat of force [as well as
the] non-placement of conventional armed forces, nuclear arms and their means
of delivery on territory of new members’. The document also declared that
NATO’s failure to make clear that it will geographically limit itself to the Euro-
Atlantic region and that the alliance would not limit itself to working within UN
Security Council mandates were causes for concern. Differing from the 2000
document, the Medvedev version begins its consideration of NATO by first dis-
cussing the prospects for NATO–Russian relations, particularly within the since
created NATO–Russia Council (NRC) and how the NRC is important for
regional security and cooperation on ‘common threats – terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises, drug trafficking, natural or
manmade catastrophes’ before focusing on the factors that could negatively
impact relations (FPC, 2008). The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept is very similar
to the earlier document in that it maintains a negative response to NATO expan-
sion but it also emphasises the prospects of Ukrainian and Georgian membership
and NATO’s basing near Russia’s borders, which it considers to be against the
‘principle of equal security’ (FPC, 2008).
Scepticism from the Russian military towards furthering cooperation
between Russia and NATO can be seen in the lack of promotions for military
officials who have been assigned to NATO or who have served alongside
NATO troops in the Balkans (Stent, 2005: 275). Due to its serious implica-
tions for Russia’s security and defence, the Russian military has, historically,
been an important player in Russia’s European policy, especially in the field
of arms control (Sergunin, 2008: 67). As determined by the 2010 Military
Doctrine, the difference between a danger and a threat is that a military
danger contains numerous conditions that if they are met could become a
military threat, which is when the real possibility of a conflict emerges as a
result of the willingness of parties involved to use force (Military Doctrine,
2010). Using this document, it is clear to see that even though NATO is the
only Euro-Atlantic danger that is explicitly referenced, additionally listed
concerns including the basing of foreign troops near Russian borders and
plans for a missile defence system can also be seen in relation to NATO
(Military Doctrine, 2010). The document does not make any references to
situations within the Euro-Atlantic region that it considers being a military
66 Russia and NATO
threat but instead states the various conditions, such as foreign interference in
Russian military capabilities, which would be viewed by Russia as military
threats. While the 2010 Military Doctrine considers NATO to be a danger, in
particular because of its movement of NATO equipment and troops closer to
Russian borders, it also calls on Russia to further its security relations with
NATO. Despite calling for improved relations, in the subsection of the docu-
ment where Russia discusses political-military cooperation with other coun-
tries, only the CIS, SCO, and the CSTO are mentioned as organisations to
cooperate with. (Military Doctrine, 2010) In the 2000 Military Doctrine there
was no distinction between threats and dangers, instead Russia categorised
only threats (Military Doctrine, 2000). Although NATO is not explicitly men-
tioned in the document, references to the expansion of alliances can be seen
as a reference to NATO expansion as can the concerns that Russia has about
military forces of other countries moving closer to Russian borders, which is
a complaint about the Alliance that Russia has often voiced (Military Doc-
trine, 2010).
The 2000 National Security Concept, which emphasised domestic threats
before external, labelled NATO’s expansion, along with foreign bases close to
Russia, as a threat. From the Russian perspective, the expansion of NATO’s area
of operations and willingness to act without UN Security Council approval was
a ‘threat . . . to all strategic arrangements in the world’ (National Security
Concept, 2000). The 2009 version, like the other Medvedev-era documents, con-
siders decisions like NATO’s infrastructure moving closer to its borders and the
idea of a global NATO that is not constrained by UN mandates to be objectiona-
ble. The document also emphasises that the Euro-Atlantic security architecture is
focused on NATO and that this focus is insufficient, which creates an inter-
national security threat (National Security Strategy, 2009).
What becomes clear from reading the different policy documents is that the
main concerns that Russia has regarding NATO are related to the alliance’s
expansion and that NATO has not stated that it will always seek UN Security
Council (where Russia has a veto) approval for action, both within the Euro-
Atlantic region and outside it. The bringing of NATO infrastructure, including
bases, troops, and equipment, closer to Russian borders was also a cause of
concern for the Russian leadership. Whereas the Putin Foreign Policy Concept
focuses on the actions that could harm Russia–NATO cooperation, the
Medvedev document instead mentions the NRC as a forum for cooperation and
identifies areas where joint efforts can be made. Under Medvedev, NATO was
mentioned in the Military Doctrine, which is different from the Putin-era doc-
trine, but under neither president was the organisation mentioned in the context
of political-military cooperation. The National Security Strategy of the
Medvedev presidency reflected Medvedev’s statements about the Euro-Atlantic
system and its need for reform.
When discussing NATO as an organisation, and not focusing on the alliance’s
actions, both Putin and Medvedev found positives and negatives. From Putin’s
perspective, the alliance has been seeking ‘to justify the existence of an
Russia and NATO 67
organisation which has lost much of its relevance because the tasks for which
the organisation was created no longer exist’ (Putin, 2001k). Reflecting the
policy documents that had been produced, relations between Russia and NATO
were contingent on NATO’s compliance with international law, particularly
regarding force (Putin, 2001b). After September 11, Putin’s tone changed as he
stated ‘that NATO is transforming and is becoming more of a political organisa-
tion’, which he said reflected what people were saying and that Russia was
‘simply go[ing] along with that assessment’ but that if real progress would be
made, ‘it changes many things’ (Putin, 2001l). Despite the opening created by
September 11, during his 2007 speech in Munich, Putin made it clear that he was
concerned about NATO, particularly in relation to the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) but also because NATO ‘is first and fore-
most a military and political alliance’ which is placing its infrastructure near
Russian borders and further expanding (Putin, 2007k). Later in 2007, Putin
expanded on his Munich comments by saying that ‘we have not seen any signs
of rapid change in thinking within NATO itself, within its structure’ despite dis-
cussions about change and the collapse of both the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact (Putin, 2007a).
In his first major speech on foreign policy as a president, Medvedev argued,
similarly to Putin, that ‘NATO has . . . failed so far to give new purpose to its
existence’ and said that it is attempting to find its purpose through expansion
and the concept of a global NATO (Medvedev D., 2008l). Medvedev also used
the same speech to say that ‘Afghanistan provides one of the clearest possible
examples of how NATO and Russia share the same fundamental security
interests’ and that areas for cooperation between Russia and the alliance exist
(Medvedev D., 2008l). Following the Russia–Georgia conflict, Medvedev
stated that the Russia–NATO relationship ‘ha[d] taken a sharp turn for the
worse, and we are not to blame’ and advocated that the two sides move closer
to a full partnership where neither side antagonises the other (Medvedev D.,
2008e). The following year, Medvedev recognised NATO as ‘the strongest
military-political organisation in the world today’ but he also stated that
Russia does not agree with all of NATO’s decisions, some of which appear
‘excessive’ (Medvedev D., 2009j). Whereas Putin had argued that the way
forward for relations between Russia and NATO was NATO reforming itself,
Medvedev argued that greater partnership was needed and that the two should
build an institutional relationship (Medvedev D., 2009b). While NATO was
undergoing the drafting process for its 2010 Strategic Concept, Medvedev
stated that Russia ‘would like to see the Alliance complete its transformation
and became a modern security organisation, an organisation that is oriented
towards the twenty-first rather than the twentieth century’ and that Russia
would be interested in an ‘equal partnership’ (Medvedev D., 2010i). In one of
his final major speeches as president, Medvedev argued ‘that in our relations
with NATO it is time to free ourselves of the phantoms of the past and mis-
trustful instincts that on both sides are clearly hindering our attempts to build
a full-fledged partnership’ (Medvedev D., 2012b).
68 Russia and NATO
The shape of the Russia–NATO relationship
Since NATO represents a onetime enemy that has seen its global prestige
increase and that has expanded to include former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union
countries, Russia has many factors to consider when formulating its policy
towards the organisation. For Russia, the idea of NATO itself is complicated
because the NATO member-states choose to give up some of their national
sovereignty to fall under NATO’s protection, while in Russia, ‘the notions of
“sovereignty” and “security” traditionally (and not without reason) are of equal
priority, and Russia finds the other approach demonstrated by the European
countries as strange and bizarre’ (Kosachev, 2011: 2). At the same time, Russia
not only faces difficulty in securing agreement among elites on policies towards
NATO but among the Russian people as well. NATO is not a popular organisa-
tion among the Russian populace and when asked if rapprochement with NATO
is in Russia’s interest, only 22% agreed with the statement in 2010, which was a
significant downward shift from 2002 when 48% agreed (Levada Centre, 2010).
As Russian attitudes towards NATO have shifted in the last decade, so has
the behaviour of the country towards the organisation. The negative shift in the
minds of the Russian people towards NATO can be seen in connection with the
actions taken by both Russia and NATO and the speeches made by the involved
leaders. Cooperation has existed between Russia and NATO since the 1990s and
despite many events that could have led to a military situation, such as the Rus-
sia–Georgia conflict, this did not happen (Pouliot, 2010: 4). Though military
conflicts did not emerge between Russia and NATO, periods of discord did and
the state of relations between the two sides reflect the difficulties posed by the
issues that they were being confronted with. The cooperation that exists between
NATO and Russia today is ‘based mainly upon expedient and tactical calcula-
tions, and only really becomes operative when important interests are perceived
on both sides to coincide’ (Smith, 2006: 127). Progress can, therefore, be seen
on issues that both sides believe that progress can be made on and issues where
both sides have adopted intractable positions are not the focus of the NATO–
Russia relationship.
Russia and the NATO member-states

Important in understanding Russia’s relationship with the NATO alliance is an
understanding of the opinions of NATO member-states themselves towards
Russia and Russia’s opinions towards them. There is a division of opinion
among the NATO member-states about the relationship that the alliance should
have with Russia. Of particular importance is the difference between the states
of the eastern half of the alliance and those in the western half and what import-
ance Euro-Atlanticism has to them. Not reassuring for Russia are the different
perceptions that members of NATO itself have of the purposes of the organisa-
tion. The fact that the countries of the western half of the organisation are
viewed as considering Afghanistan to be a major part of NATO’s mission, while
Russia and NATO 69
the eastern states are viewed as using NATO as a counter-balance to Russia,
does not provide Russia with proof that the organisation is not focused on Russia
(Trenin, 2011b: 91). This divergence of opinions among the NATO member-
states has had an important role in shaping the opinion of the Russian leader-
ships on the alliance.
For the countries of Eastern Europe, membership in NATO after the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact meant that their countries were under the American security
umbrella (Lucas, 2008: 130). In her 2002 speech after Latvia was invited to join
NATO, the Latvian president, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, said that after the loss of
the country’s independence following World War II ‘being invited in[to] an Alli-
ance that will ensure our security is a momentous moment that will be writ large
in the history of our nation’ (Vike-Freiberga, 2002). Although not speaking
about concerns of any threat her country faced, the president’s statement reflects
the appeal that NATO has to the countries of Eastern Europe because of the col-
lective defence mechanism. Despite the concerns of some NATO member-states
about the risk that Russia poses to their country, for most Europeans even the
2008 Russia–Georgia conflict did not prompt concerns that Russia represents a
threat and, in fact, many countries of the region sought to further develop their
relations with Russia, particularly their economic relationships given Russia’s
plentiful natural resources (Krickus, 2009). As one Central European ambas-
sador stated, the declaration in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept that ‘NATO
poses no threat to Russia’ was a case of ‘stating the obvious’. Putin has argued
against the idea that Russia presents a threat to other countries and stated that
‘nobody is afraid of us and I don’t think it would be easy for us to scare anyone’
(Putin, 2001a).
The NATO–Russia Council

The signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
Between NATO and the Russian Federation in 1997 proclaimed that the two ‘do
not consider each other as adversaries’ and was the first major step in forming a
working relationship between the two sides, which was cemented with the estab-
lishment of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (NATO, 1997).
The PJC was created as ‘a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the
maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action
with respect to security issues of common concern’ during times of peace and
turmoil, while not allowing either side ‘a right of veto over the actions of the
other’ (NATO, 1997). The PJC offered Russia and NATO a forum for conversa-
tion rather than confrontation (Hunter et al., 2002: 11). Thus, the PJC presented
an opportunity for cooperation in fields of common interest, while not allowing
Russia or NATO to hinder the actions of the other in cases where there were
divergent interests.
Despite the importance of the signing of the Founding Act and the establishment
of the PJC which came with it, the Founding Act has been called ‘a mistake’ by
some Russians since it gave legitimacy to NATO’s further expansion (Karaganov,
70 Russia and NATO
2009). From the beginning, it has been obvious that the members of the PJC had a
different understanding of the role of the meetings since Yeltsin thought that mem-
bership in the PJC meant NATO would be consulting with Russia, while Clinton
was phrasing Russian involvement as ‘hav[ing] “a voice in” but not a veto over
NATO’s business’ (Light, 2008: 26). Meetings of the PJC were complicated by the
fact that the NATO member-states had predetermined positions that they brought to
the meetings and thus the Russian delegation to NATO adopted a policy of talking
to the countries individually outside of the PJC so as to have a dialogue about the
issues, while the meetings of the PJC were reduced to a place for discussions while
no real decisions were being made (Smith, 2003: 67). The PJC was described by a
Western European ambassador as not having the right ‘choreography’ because the
chairmanship was split between the Russian ambassador and the NATO Secretary
General, which in practice meant that one chaired one meeting and the other, the
next. The PJC faced early challenges and when NATO launched Operation Allied
Force, as a response to the crisis in Kosovo, Russia recalled its delegation to NATO
and did not participate in the PJC, even though the intention at its founding for the
PJC was dialogue (Smith, 2003: 68). When the PJC resumed meetings in July 1999,
the agenda was limited to one item, a discussion of concerns surrounding NATO’s
Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations (Smith, 2008: 5).
During the period between Putin becoming president and before September
11, 2001, a step-by-step process was undertaken to resume cooperation and
rebuild the connections with NATO that had previously been severed (Latawski
& Smith, 2003: 105). The visit of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to
Moscow in February 2000 saw agreement to ‘pursue a vigorous dialogue on a
wide range of security issues that will enable NATO and Russia to address the
challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutual cooperation a cornerstone of
European security’ within the PJC, thus opening the agenda to discussing issues
other than Kosovo (Press Statement, 2000). A month after the visit, Putin
famously answered a question about whether Russian membership in NATO was
possible by saying ‘I don’t see why not’ (Putin, 2000a). The response from Lord
Robertson and NATO to Putin’s statement was lukewarm and emphasised
improving the current mechanism for cooperation while stating that ‘at present
Russian membership of NATO is not on the agenda’ (Robertson, 2000). The
September 11 terrorist attacks served as a catalyst for change since Russia and
NATO were seeking to expand their relationship but the current mechanism for
cooperation was proving insufficient for the task. According to a Western ambas-
sador, at that time, ‘Bush had a good relationship with Russia, based on the joint
experiences with terrorism’ so the U.S. was willing to support changes.
Discussions amongst the NATO member-states and between the member-
states and Russia saw plans emerge for not only a new body for cooperation but
also agreement on areas in which cooperation could be enhanced. At a Novem-
ber 2001 meeting, the Russian and American presidents committed themselves
to ‘developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint
decision, and coordinated/joint action’ between Russia and NATO (White
House, 2001). In a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Putin
Russia and NATO 71
suggested two approaches to reforming the NATO–Russia relationship. Under
the first, the states would ‘identify the areas of interaction from which Russia
will be excluded and . . . that on all the other issues Russia will be a fully-fledged
participant’ while under the second, an agreement would be reached on ‘two,
three or four issues on which Russia will be a fully-fledged participant on the
understanding that it will not be in on all the other issues’ (Putin, 2001c). The
December Ministerial meeting of the PJC resulted in a commitment that by the
scheduled May meeting, there would be a new mechanism created for Russia–
NATO cooperation (NATO Press Statement, 2001). The day before the new
NATO–Russia forum would be announced, NATO opened its mission in
Moscow at a ceremony that was supposed to be attended by the Chief of the
General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin but instead saw his deputy attend since, it was
reported, Kvashnin was meeting with Putin at the Kremlin (Georgiyev, 2002).
The NRC, which was approved at Rome in the NATO–Russia Relations: A
New Quality agreement, was established with a mandate to increase cooperation
between Russia and NATO in the fields of anti-terrorism, conflict management,
non-proliferation, conventional and nuclear arms control, missile defence
systems, military cooperation and reform, and other areas where security
cooperation was deemed possible (NRC, 2002). Besides establishing areas for
cooperation, the NRC would resolve some of the issues that prevented the PJC
from being as efficient as it could be. A Western European ambassador explained
that at meetings of the NRC, there is only one Chairman of the NRC, who is the
Secretary General of NATO but who does not act in that capacity during the
meetings. He went on to say that the NATO countries ‘have agreed to not
precook NATO positions before we go into the NRC, so in other words, the
NRC, theoretically, is a council of equals’.
The Rome Declaration was characterised by a Central European ambassador
as ‘an extremely ambitious document’ and the ambassador argued that there are
areas today, such as crisis management, where the ‘potential is great’ for Russia
and NATO. At the meeting in Rome, Putin stated his ‘hope that our relations
with NATO will expand and the quality of these relations will improve’ and that
if ‘more common ground’ was found between the two sides, there could be more
‘joint actions’ (Putin, 2002c). The agreement was a welcomed change but the
response to it from the Russian leadership was measured and emphasised that
actions speak louder than words. In Russia, the founding of the NRC was seen as
the ‘natural result of profound changes in the geopolitical situation’ and as a sign
of recognition that there were areas where Russia and NATO working together
would be necessary (Belous, 2012: 5).
The NRC was important for not only restructuring the NATO–Russia rela-
tionship but also because of the series of enlargements that NATO was planning.
The first enlargement, which had seen the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, had already occurred in 1999 and the next enlargement, which
was to be announced at the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague would invite Bul-
garia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania) to join the alliance in 2004 (NATO, 2012d). Putin made it clear
72 Russia and NATO
before the Prague Summit that Russia was not in favour of further NATO expan-
sion, claiming that such plans ‘will set new barriers and draw new dividing lines
in Europe’ (Putin, 2001k). Putin argued that NATO’s expansion ‘can only be
justified by an alleged threat from Russia’ and that Russia had ‘concern[s] about
other statements by other Western officials, which . . . try to revive Russia’s
image as an “evil empire” which threatens somebody’ (Putin, 2001a). He did,
however, recognise that ultimately the decision regarding membership in NATO
did not belong to Russia (Putin, 2001i). Reconfiguring the Russia–NATO insti-
tutional arrangement in the face of policies by the alliance that Russia did not
want meant that NATO could argue, in the words of Secretary General Robert-
son, that the establishment of the NRC ‘draws the final curtain on half a century
of mutual fear, hostility and mistrust’ and shows that the two sides were friends
and partners (Robertson, 2002). An Eastern European ambassador explained that
although the NRC represents a ‘forum for dialogue’ and it is a ‘body to make
practical decisions’, the NRC is ‘not a body where decisions are made on our
broader security’. Although Russia may not have been able to prevent the expan-
sion of NATO to include more Central and Eastern European states, Putin could
argue, with the establishment of the NRC, that ‘twenty influential states have
become aware of their common basic security interests in the fast changing inter-
national situation’ and that Russia now had a relationship with the alliance that
no other state possessed (Putin, 2002c).
In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia,
NATO announced meetings of the NRC and certain areas of cooperation
between Russia and the alliance would be halted and the alliance would be
examining how Russia’s behaviour towards Georgia would impact the relation-
ship between Russia and NATO (NATO, 2010b). An Eastern European ambas-
sador stated that the ‘shutdown’ was an ‘immediate . . . shocked reaction’ that
came from the fact that ‘no one expected in the twenty-first century that a state
that size . . . would seek to change international borders’. He also argued that the
shutdown period was useful from a NATO perspective because it allowed for an
evaluation of the tasks that the NRC had initiated since ‘people did not really
know’ the extent of Russia–NATO projects and it allowed the states to see where
funding was going. As a Central European ambassador explained, the decision
to resume meeting came from a desire to have the ‘conduit that the NRC repres-
ents’ available. A Western European ambassador credited both the Obama
Administration’s desire to find a way out of the stalemate and the realisation of
‘the Eastern new members, that a no dialogue situation would . . . have [a] neg-
ative impact on their security’ as motivating the NATO states to resume the
meetings of the NRC. Meetings resumed, according to the Eastern European
ambassador, because there was an ‘internal understanding and consensus in the
alliance that we can and will separate the issues’ of the Russia–Georgia conflict
and unresolved issues surrounding the conflict from the other issues between the
alliance and Russia.
As meetings of the NRC resumed in spring 2009, the Russian ambassador,
Dmitry Rogozin, wrote in an article that he hoped that Russia would no longer
Russia and NATO 73
have to contend with predetermined positions from the NATO states because
that ‘would contravene the spirit and the letter of the 2002 Rome Summit Decla-
ration [which] spells out a provision about all members of the Russia–NATO
Council being equal partners and acting in their national capacities’ (Rogozin,
2009: 22–23). This assessment was shared by a Russian academic who argued
the pre-agreed upon positions still appear in the NRC and concluded that the
‘NRC did not overcome the legacy of the previous structures’. In the academic’s
opinion, a ‘significant problem is that decisions [at NATO] are created by bur-
eaucrats, not politicians’ which leads to ‘old logic’ that does not reflect current
events. Less critical was the opinion of a high-ranking Russian MFA official
who said that the ‘current model [the NRC] is more inclusive’ than the PJC and
‘in accordance with the Rome Declaration all countries act in their national capa-
city . . . but there are cases of consolidated positions’.
In late 2009, when Russia was introducing its draft European Security Treaty
(EST), which will be discussed in Chapter 7, the country also distributed a draft
Agreement on Basic Principles Governing Relations Among NATO–Russia
Council Member-States in the Security Sphere at the December NRC Ministerial
meeting. Although the NRC proposal did not receive nearly as much attention as
its EST counterpart, it is important because ‘the simultaneous tabling of a docu-
ment in the NRC in the margins of the OSCE debate on the draft EST indicated
Russia’s focus on hard security and the importance it still attached to the NRC as
it was developing the draft treaty’ (François, 2011: 3). The proposal called on
Russia and NATO to ‘exchange threat assessments’ and agree to the means by
which the threats would be answered; allowed both Russia and NATO to call for
an extraordinary meeting of the NRC if there was a threat to their security; stated
that NATO and Russia should not consider ‘each other as adversaries’; called on
both parties to conduct their defence planning through ‘agreed ways’ and without
creating a threat to the other party; for NATO not to have permanent deploy-
ments, those exceeding 42 days a year, of ‘substantial combat troops’ as defined
by ‘concrete quantitative benchmarks’ on the territory of states that joined
NATO after 1997; and stated that the NRC should provide ‘consent for any tem-
porary crisis-response deployments in these states’ (Menkiszak, 2012: 74).
The Russian proposal was criticised for both reiterating already agreed upon
measures between Russia and NATO and for seeking to give Russia input into
the decision-making of NATO, including limiting the ability of NATO to deter-
mine the stationing of troops and equipment (Nopens, 2010: 4). The need to
secure permission from the NRC before the movement of NATO forces into
Eastern Europe would have meant the NATO member-states would be, in effect,
seeking Russia’s permission for NATO action and would give Russia an
effective veto over such policies, something the alliance would never agree to
do. This element ties directly to the proposal’s effort to seek a commitment that
the NRC members would ‘commit not to view each other as opponents and to
keep their military capacity proportionate to their legitimate security require-
ments’ (Weitz, 2012: 3). The fact that Russia was seeking a statement that would
have neither NATO nor Russia consider the other to be an adversary stands in
74 Russia and NATO
contrast to Russia’s own 2010 Military Doctrine (Nopens, 2010: 4). In the docu-
ment, Russia listed NATO’s decisions to act throughout the world as being
against international law and the movement of NATO elements to areas near
Russian borders as first among the ‘main external military dangers’ facing the
country (Military Doctrine, 2010). NATO officials saw the proposal as a direct
attempt by Russia to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and the proposal saw
no movement (Neuger, 2010).
NATO–Russian cooperation
As a result of the crisis over Kosovo, Russia–NATO cooperation was limited
to issues relating to the conflict over Kosovo. In the aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO–Russia relations were enhanced
through the creation of the NRC, which laid the groundwork for future collab-
orative efforts. The signing of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces
Agreement (PfP SOFA) in 2004 and its subsequent ratification in 2007 marked
an important step in NATO–Russian relations since it establishes the policies
for joint military exercises and operations (NATO, 2007d). The PfP SOFA
lays out for both NATO and Russia ‘exactly what the status of their forces
will be and what privileges, facilities and immunities will apply to them, when
they are present on the territory of another state’ (NATO, 2010c). Con-
sequently, the agreement makes it easier for the two sides to cooperate and
formalises agreements so that in the event of future conflicts, NATO and
Russia can respond jointly. The cooling off of Russia’s relations with the West
during Putin’s second term saw a decrease in cooperation between the two
sides. Despite the August 2008 conflict, which resulted in NATO–Russian
relations reaching their lowest point in the first twelve years of the twenty-first
century, with the reset of relations between the U.S. and Russia, came a
similar effort in the Medvedev presidency between NATO and Russia to
improve relations. Within the context of the NRC, there is a preference for
focusing attention on areas of cooperation and when areas of disagreement are
being discussed, the focus is often placed on what the differences are rather
than attempts at resolving them (Sherr, 2009: 210). This section will look at
the periods of cooperation, while the next will consider the periods of turmoil
in the relationship between 2000 and 2012.
Putin’s statement after the September 11 attacks in which he, while address-
ing the American people, stated ‘we support you’ and called on the international
community to fight against terrorism, showed that the relationship between
Russia and the U.S. was changing (Putin, 2001g). Putin was the first world
leader to extend sympathy for the attacks and a moment of silence was sched-
uled in Russia for those who were killed marked a departure from the oft-
complicated and sometimes outright contentious relationship that had been seen
between Russia and the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Yablokova,
2001). In the aftermath of the September 11 attack, Putin backed up his state-
ment by pursuing policies supportive of the U.S., despite not always having the
Russia and NATO 75
approval of the Russian elites. From Putin’s perspective, cooperation between
Russia and the U.S. after September 11 would lead to a ‘general recognition of
Russia’s great power status and of its influence over the territory of the former
Soviet Union’ (Light, 2003: 80). Others in the government saw the post-
September 11 aftermath as an opportunity to not only be seen as an important
state, particularly by the U.S., when addressing global security concerns but also
as a way to prevent Russia from being alone and side-lined on challenges to
European security (Smith, 2006: 115). Despite the expectations of Putin and
others, the defence community, in particular Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov,
had concerns and were candid about their opposition to military cooperation
with the West (McFaul, 2001).
The attacks on September 11 also saw the NATO agenda and the Russian
agenda coalesce ‘largely because dominant players interpreted the events in a
way that transformed the rules of the international security game’ so there was a
desire on both sides to respond to these changes (Pouliot, 2010: 209). Putin’s
declaration that ‘Russia is supplying and intends to continue to supply the
information available to it about the infrastructure and locations of international
terrorists and about the bases training militants’, that Russia would ‘provide
additional support . . . in the form of arms and military hardware supplies’ to the
Northern Alliance, and his offer to use Russian airspace for the delivery of
humanitarian goods to the areas of operation, among other actions, showed Rus-
sia’s support for the U.S. and its allies (Putin, 2001m). What can be seen, not
only in the case of Afghanistan but also later in the case of Libya, is that, as was
suggested by one Russian MFA official, the relations between Russia and NATO
‘could develop [in times of] conflict’. The decisions from Russia also signalled
to the states of Central Asia that Russia did not object to cooperation with NATO
and the United States on the Afghanistan issue. This signal meant it was easier
to secure agreements between the Central Asian and NATO countries that pro-
vided important assistance to the US-led war and showed that when it came to
combating international terrorism, Russia was going to play an important role.
Practical cooperation between Russia and NATO in Afghanistan has been
seen in a variety of fields. As a Western European ambassador argued, ‘if Russia
understands that [its] own security interests are at stake, in this case Afghanistan,
they cooperate and this will be true for the future’ regardless of who holds the
country’s presidency. One of the major concerns for Russian leaders is the drug
trade which has increased dramatically since the war began and as a response to
the growing concern, in 2005 the NRC Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics
Training of Afghan, Central Asian and Pakistani Personnel was created in col-
laboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (NRC,
2011). The NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund programme was designed
to train approximately 30 Afghans in helicopter maintenance during a two-year
period of time at a course in Novosibirsk that focuses on ‘specialised areas such
as the maintenance of helicopter engines, armaments, avionics, instrumentation,
radio equipment and electrical equipment’ (NRC, 2012). A Central European
ambassador characterised the cooperation with Russia on the Helicopter Fund
76 Russia and NATO
and counter-narcotics as an example of the NATO–Russia relationship ‘produc-
ing something’, while an Eastern European ambassador argued that the import-
ance of the Helicopter Maintenance Fund has been ‘hyped’. Russia’s allowance
of American aircraft to use Russian airspace to bring troops to Afghanistan,
Russian approval of the Northern Distribution route being used to remove equip-
ment from Afghanistan, and discussions in 2012 about allowing NATO to use a
Russian airfield in Ulyanovsk for logistical purposes shows that the relationship
between Russia and NATO over Afghanistan is continually evolving and the
partnership is expanding (Herszenhorn, 2012). Although cooperation has
increased, this does not mean Russia acts only in regards to security interests. A
Russian academic argued that ‘Russia wanted to exploit the base at Ulyanovsk’
for financial reasons but because the Pakistan route has proven to be less expen-
sive, this has not been possible.
Russia–NATO cooperation was not limited solely to Afghanistan. Russia was
also involved in Operation Active Endeavour, which involves patrolling the Medi-
terranean and observing shipping activity to prevent terrorist activity, by having
ships deployed as part of the mission in 2006 and 2007; the country’s 2008 parti-
cipation was called off as a result of the Russia–Georgia conflict (NATO, 2012h).
At the NATO Lisbon Summit, which included a NATO–Russia Summit, discus-
sions resumed about future Russian deployments (NATO, 2012h). In addition, the
Common Airspace Initiative (CAI) establishes a system for early warning in the
case of questionable in-flight activities and created a Russia–NATO radar image
for air traffic as part of combined anti-terrorism activities (NATO, 2011b).
Although Russia was not involved in the NATO-led campaign in Libya, neither
was Russia an obstacle to NATO action. The debate among the Russian leadership
about the potential for military action was public and showed a difference of opin-
ions between Putin and Medvedev. In regards to a question about Russia choosing
not to use its veto power over UNSCR 1973, which authorised no-fly zones in
Libya, Medvedev replied that ‘Russia did not use its power of veto for the simple
reason that I do not consider the resolution in question wrong’ given ‘the Libyan
leadership’s absolutely intolerable behaviour and the crimes that they have com-
mitted against their own people’ (Medvedev D., 2011g). More importantly,
Medvedev used the opportunity to directly respond to comments that Putin had
made to the press by stating that words should be chosen carefully to describe the
situation and that phrasing ‘that could lead to a clash of civilisations, talk of ‘cru-
sades . . . is unacceptable’ (Medvedev D., 2011g). Putin had earlier stated that the
Security Council resolution was ‘flawed and inadequate’ and that ‘it reminds me of
a medieval call to crusade, when someone calls upon others to go somewhere and
free someone else’ (Putin, 2011d). The next day, Putin replied to a question from
the press by saying that he and Medvedev ‘are very close and understand each
other very well’. He also stated that ‘in Russia, the president is in charge of foreign
policy, so there can be no split’ between the two men, despite the fact that the two
men had just engaged in a public spat. In the same comments, Putin pointed out
that it is the ‘president’s task to provide the suitable phrasing for the country’s
stand’ on issues like Libya (Putin, 2011b).
Russia and NATO 77
Despite these comments from Putin, Dmitri Trenin argues that ‘it was defi-
nitely Putin who ordered the Russian delegation to abstain from voting’ on the
resolution but given the public statements afterwards such an order seems
unlikely (Trenin, 2013: 66). More likely appears to be the case suggested by
Fyodor Lukyanov that Putin had not been completely in the know on the deci-
sion and was displeased with the decision, which he viewed an erroneous foreign
policy choice (Pronina et al. 2011). Further evidence of Medvedev’s support for
the resolution can be seen in the firing of the Russian ambassador to Tripoli,
Vladimir Chamov, who declared ‘the Kremlin’s acquiescence to air strikes tar-
geting Libya a “betrayal of Russia’s interests” ’ (Parfitt, 2011a).
Medvedev did state, as criticism of NATO operations following the imple-
mentation of the Security Council resolution, that ‘the no-fly zone operation has
acquired very unusual features, because in fact it turned out to be the use of
force’ (Medvedev D., 2011a). As a Russian MFA official argued, the Security
Council resolution was ‘exploited’ but that, given what transpired in Libya,
Russia ‘hope[s] our partners have drawn good lessons from the situation’. These
concerns reflect the statements of a high-ranking Russian MFA official who
argued that issues of international law remains a challenge between Russia and
NATO and that for the two parties, the ‘point of departure in international law
should be taken into account very seriously’. Putin criticised the NATO-led
operations in one of his 2012 presidential campaign articles where he argued that
because of what had happened in Libya regarding the use of force, any solution
to the emerging Syrian crisis would have to be conducted without foreign
involvement and with respect for Syrian national sovereignty (Putin, 2012b).
In addition to regular meetings of the NRC, the NATO–Russia summits have
provided a forum for interaction and discussion between the leaders of NATO
member-states and Russia. Putin’s appearance at the 2008 NATO Summit in
Bucharest came with weeks left in his presidency. At the summit, an agreement
was signed that allowed NATO to use Russian railways to ship non-lethal goods
including ‘food products, fuel and transport vehicles’ to Afghanistan (Bucharest
Summit, 2008). The agreement itself was overshadowed by larger issues on the
summit agenda, including NATO expansion and NATO missile defence plans,
and consequently Putin’s statement during his post-meeting press conference
that NATO member-states bordering Russia represented ‘a direct threat to the
security of our country’ because of Article V commitments, did not reflect a
feeling of enhanced cooperation (Putin, 2008e).
Under Medvedev, the Russia–NATO relationship was strengthened by his
appearance at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit. At the Summit, the Joint Decla-
ration produced by NATO and Russia represented ‘the first time [where] a Joint
Declaration was agreed upon that stated that the sides pose no threat to each
other and will jointly work to create a common space of peace, security, and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’ (Lomagin, 2012: 249). Medvedev’s attend-
ance at the meeting was seen as quite important and a Central European ambas-
sador went so far as to characterise the Lisbon Summit as the high point of
NATO–Russia relations. A Western European ambassador called the Lisbon
78 Russia and NATO
Summit ‘the crowning ceremony for NATO–Russia relations under Medvedev’.
From the Russian perspective, according to a high-ranking Russian MFA offi-
cial, the Lisbon Declaration was important because there are agreed ‘areas where
we decided to develop cooperation’ and the list ‘is comprehensive’. Agreements
reached at the summit included increasing cooperation and discussions on
missile defence, the establishment of the Helicopter Maintenance Fund,
cooperation in various areas of anti-terrorism, and the combating of piracy
(NRC, 2010). At the summit, it was agreed that the deal that allowed NATO
countries to transport non-lethal goods through Russia to Afghanistan would be
expanded to include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF ) forces
who were from countries that were not NATO members (NATO, 2012f ). The
transit agreement, according to a Central European ambassador, was ‘difficult’
to reach and although some countries claim that there is ‘some indication of
Russia abusing its position’ to do so ‘would be stupid’. The same ambassador
argued that of the available transit routes, the Russian route ‘seems like the most
reliable by far’, particularly given the history of difficulties with the Pakistan
transit route. The progress at the meeting was greeted by Medvedev as a sign
‘that we have succeeded in putting the difficult period in our relations behind us
now’ (Medvedev D., 2010d). Although issues that existed under Putin continued
to exist under Medvedev, cooperation became the focus and issues where there
were disagreements did not prevent progress from being made.
Russia, NATO, and confrontation

Russia’s relations with NATO and NATO member-states have led to difficulties.
The complications have arisen for a variety of reasons, including problems with the
policies of the alliance itself, issues in the bilateral relations between Russia and
individual NATO member-states that have spilled over into NATO–Russian rela-
tions, and confrontations between Russia and potential NATO member-states.
Such situations have resulted in negative statements between both sides, the devel-
opment of defence plans for NATO states, and the temporary halting of meetings
of the NRC and other forms of cooperation. One of the most complex issues on the
Russia–NATO agenda, missile defence, will not be addressed in this chapter but
instead will be the subject of Chapter 8 because of its connection to Russian con-
cerns about the country’s nuclear deterrent and nuclear arms reductions.
The 2002 invitation to seven countries to join NATO saw Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia being offered membership
in 2004. That three of the states offered membership were former Soviet Repub-
lics was not a development welcomed by Russia but the Russian reaction to the
announcement was quite calm and measured. In a press conference with Pres-
ident Bush following the 2002 Prague Summit, Putin stated that he ‘hope[d] to
have positive development of our relations with all NATO countries’ (Putin,
2002b). In the weeks after the 2004 enlargement took place Putin again reiter-
ated that ‘every country has the right to choose the option that it considers most
effective for ensuring its own security’ and stated that Russia ‘hope[d] that the
Russia and NATO 79
expansion will help strengthen trust in Europe, and all over the world, and will
be a tool and component of international security’ (Putin, 2004a). His response
to the 2004 NATO enlargement stands in stark contrast to the concerns that
Russia had about the expansion conversation in 2008.
Before the 2008 Bucharest Summit there was growing debate over whether or
not Georgia and Ukraine would be offered Membership Action Plans which,
although not a guarantee of future alliance membership, would provide guidance
and criteria for reforms to be conducted by a country to qualify for NATO mem-
bership (Bigg, 2008a). The potential membership of these countries in NATO
was a very difficult idea for Russia, due to their location and their history.
Despite this, in the month before the summit, Putin declared that ‘each country
decides for itself how best to ensure its security’ and that if the people of the
countries approved NATO membership, Russia would accept the decision
(Putin, 2008a). Foreign Minister Lavrov did not mince words in a speech to the
Duma where he said that ‘what’s happening with this artificial – and completely
unnecessary – expansion of NATO . . . will not go unanswered, I assure you’
(Abdullaev, 2008). Contrary to his mild public statements prior to the summit,
shortly after the summit took place, Putin stated during a press conference with
President Bush that ‘if you want to improve relations with Russia, rather than
trying to draw former Soviet republics into a military-political bloc, you should
be working on improving and developing relations with the Russian Federation
itself ’ (Putin, 2008d). Russian unhappiness at the idea of more former Soviet
Republics joining NATO was reflected in Putin’s reported statement at the NRC
meeting to the American president ‘do you understand, George, that Ukraine is
not even a state!’ (The Moscow Times, 2008).
Although two other countries, Albania and Croatia, were given accession
talks at the summit, and Macedonia was told that it could become a member
when its name issue was resolved, the issues of Georgian and Ukrainian mem-
bership were far more prominent (NATO, 2008a). There were objections
amongst the NATO member-states themselves over the potential membership of
the two countries. Concerns over Ukraine were about the population’s support
for NATO membership and the location of the Russian base at Sevastopol and in
Georgia’s case there were concerns about the potential for NATO to be drawn
into a conflict with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Berryman, 2009:
179–181). As a Western European ambassador explained, when considering
Georgia’s prospective membership there was a question of whether the Alliance
was ‘credible in assuring Article V protection to Georgia’, particularly regarding
military capabilities. As the ambassador continued to explain, there was a feeling
that the alliance was not in a credible position and although NATO argues that
third-party countries do not have influence in the decision-making process, there
was the issue of ‘geopolitics’ and a desire to ‘wait until the window of oppor-
tunity opens’ before offering membership. In the Summit Declaration, NATO
members ‘agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO’ but
did not extend a MAP to the countries, thus offering a commitment without a
timeline (NATO, 2008a).
80 Russia and NATO
A Western European ambassador characterised the Russia–Georgia conflict
period as the point where the Russia–NATO ‘relationship turned completely
sour’ and NATO did not limit its reaction to the suspension of the NRC. As a
response to the conflict on August 19, 2008, NATO announced that it would be
creating a NATO–Georgia Commission (NGC) which would send a team to
Georgia to help evaluate the destruction to the national infrastructure and that
NATO would also help the country rebuild its air traffic control system and help
the Georgian government with cyber-attacks (NATO, 2008c). At the first
meeting of the NGC one month later, it was emphasised that the NGC would
‘oversee NATO’s assistance to Georgia following the conflict with Russia and
. . . play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest
Summit’ (NATO, 2012e). It would also further the military cooperation between
Georgia and NATO since Georgia has been an active participant in NATO oper-
ations including in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation Active Endeavour
(NATO, 2012e). The Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, was not
pleased with the NGC meeting and during a press conference he stated ‘this
event looks in no way as a routine one but rather as an evident demonstration of
support for Saakashvili’s regime after what happened in the Caucasus’ and said
that requests had been made to NATO asking that the meeting not go forward
(Rogozin, 2008). Since the framework document of the NGC explicitly stated
that the alliance had ‘grave concern over the military conflict in Georgia, its
genesis, and Russia’s actions, including recognition of the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia regions of Georgia’ and that its creation was agreed upon during the
crisis, the implications of the NGC are quite clear (NATO, 2008b).
Following the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the NATO member-states
in the East, in particular the Baltic countries, sought assurances from the organ-
isation that in the face of Russian aggression, the alliance would respond. There
were concerns among some of the Eastern European member-states about
whether some members of the alliance would respond in the event of an Article
V situation (Yost, 2010: 498). Despite the conflict occurring in 2008, it took
until January 2010 for NATO states to reach a decision that it would prepare
plans for the possibility that the alliance needed to defend the Baltic countries
(501). In response to the release of information that revealed NATO had
developed plans for the defence of Eastern European member-states, Lavrov said
‘this all leads to certain thoughts’ and ‘raises questions that need to be clarified’
(Lavrov, 2011a).
Concerns about the Baltic countries and about the potential for cyber-attacks
can be seen years earlier when the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia and the subsequent
harassment of Estonia’s ambassador to Russia proved an unwelcome development
in the NATO–Russia relationship. As an Eastern European ambassador argued, the
Estonian cyber-attacks marked the ‘first time cyber-war was used to pressure a
nation-state’ as well as threats on trade and other ‘methods of intimidation’. The
episode resulted from a decision by the Estonian government to remove a bronze
statue of a Soviet soldier from the centre of Tallinn. The ‘Russian-speakers . . . saw
it as an expression of the continuity between themselves, their Soviet past, and their
Russia and NATO 81
current ties to Russia; by contrast, many Estonians saw the monument as a symbol
of Soviet domination over their country’ and consequently, the decision was made
to move the statue and the graves of soldiers buried there to a cemetery (Ambrosio,
2009b: 231). From April 26–27, Tallinn saw a fatality, 100 casualties and more
than 1,000 arrests as the result of intense rioting (Rid & McBurney, 2012: 8).
The response in Russia to the moving of the statue and the rioting was quite
strong. The decision by a Kremlin-backed youth organisation, Nashi, to act
against the Estonian embassy in Moscow by vandalising the embassy’s outer
walls, playing Stalinist military music outside the embassy at all hours, as well
as obstructing the street around the embassy, performing document checks on
those passing the embassy, and conducting protests (occasionally violent ones)
outside the embassy resulted in anger from other countries (Lucas, 2008: 152).
Nashi also attempted to attack Marina Kaljurand, the Estonian ambassador, and
she needed to be protected during a news conference (Dempsey, 2007). The
cyber-attack against Estonia during the crisis saw the use of botnets, which ‘are
remotely controlled networks of computers that have been hijacked, usually by
means of virus-infected e-mails and then are used to swamp the target by delug-
ing it with internet traffic’ (Lucas, 2008: 154). It is important to note, as an
Eastern European ambassador did, that Estonia ‘did not ask for direct assistance
or action’ from NATO but the organisation did need to formulate a response. As
a result of the incident, NATO issued a statement calling on Russia ‘to imple-
ment their obligations under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations’ and
called the actions against the Estonian embassy and staff ‘unacceptable’ (NATO,
2007c). The establishment of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence in Tallinn in 2008 can be seen in light of the attack (CCDCOE,
2011). According to the ambassador, the ‘outcome was NATO quite expedi-
tiously’ decided on a cyber-defence policy that although ‘limited in scope . . . is
still intact’ today.
It was clear from the beginning that the American presence in Central Asia,
although approved by Putin, was seen by the Russians as a temporary measure.
There were concerns among the Russian elite, reflected in an interview by Sergei
Ivanov that ‘once the Americans had a presence in that region that they will
begin their “democracy promotion” ’ (Putin, Russia and the West, 2012c). In
2005, the Chinese- and Russian-dominated SCO stated that with the decline of
military activity in Afghanistan, deadlines should be set for the removal of ISAF
forces and the cessation of the use of infrastructure in the countries of the SCO
(SCO, 2005). The same year, Russia and China tried to put pressure on the
Kyrgyz government to close the Manas base due to concerns that the base was
negatively impacting their own security; in Russia, the concern about democracy
promotion and regime change as a result of the Tulip Revolution were a motivat-
ing factor (Krickus, 2011: 109). An agreement worked out in July 2006 between
the Kyrgyz and American governments saw the Americans agree to a $15.4
million per year increase in their lease payment for the base and agreement that
the U.S. would supply various forms of assistance to Kyrgyzstan with a value of
over $150 million so the base remained (Nichol, 2009: 3).
82 Russia and NATO
Russian attempts to close the American, but used by other NATO countries,
base at Manas were revived in 2009 and complicated a relationship that had just
been ‘reset’. In 2005, as a result of Western criticism of the Andijan massacre and
the SCO statement, the Uzbek government declared that NATO was not allowed to
use either Uzbek airspace or territory for its Afghanistan needs, which meant the
closure of the base at Karshi-Khanabad, and the subsequent rise in importance of
Manas (Ziegler, 2009: 197). Manas has been used by ISAF to base aircraft for
Afghan refuelling missions, transit troops to and from Afghanistan, and as a place
to transfer supplies headed for Afghanistan (Nichol, 2009: 3).
When the decision to close Manas was announced by the Kyrgyz government
in February 2009, Lavrov said that ‘the decision of Kyrgyzstan to close the US
base at Manas was taken by the leadership of the country independently, bears a
sovereign character and we consider that it should be treated with respect’
(Lavrov, 2009a). This statement reflected that of Medvedev’s a month earlier
when he stated that the ‘Kyrgyzstani leadership’s decision to close the Manas air
base in Kyrgyzstan was a sovereign one’ and that it reflected the fact that the
Kyrgyz government had initially planned ‘to host the base for a couple of years’
but that it had now been eight years (Medvedev D., 2009a). Despite these state-
ments, the Kyrgyz government had to deny that their decision was linked to an
offer made at the same time ‘under which Russia will write off Kyrgyzstan’s
$180 million debt and grant the country a $2 billion soft loan and $150 million
in financial aid’ (RIA Novosti, 2009a). Instead, President Bakiyev said the deci-
sion was based on the failure of the American and Krygyz governments to reach
an adequate deal on compensation for the base and the fact that there was
growing anger amongst the Kyrgyz people towards the American base (Pan,
2009). Under an agreement reached in June 2009, the base name was changed to
Manas Transit Centre, the Kyrgyz gained control over exterior security at the
base, limits were not placed on the types of cargo allowed through the base, and
the U.S. agreed to pay $60 million a year in rent as well as an additional $36.6
million which would go to expanding the airport and tens of millions to helping
Kyrgyzstan combat drug trafficking and develop its economy (Schwirtz & Levy,
2009). The agreement has been characterised as showing Kyrgyzstan’s exploita-
tion of both Russia and the U.S. to its own benefit and a case of Kyrgyzstan
betraying Russia (Cooley, 2010).
Conclusion
The Russian preference for hard security issues adds to the appeal of NATO but
the expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders and the fact that it is still seen as a
Cold War remnant makes for a contentious NATO–Russia relationship. Despite
the war with Georgia, which has placed the Bucharest Summit commitments for
potential membership on a hold of indeterminate length, and difficulties sur-
rounding the continued U.S. and allies use of the now-named Manas Transit
Centre, there have been positive steps in the relationship. During Medvedev’s
presidency, the Russia–NATO relationship saw further development of areas of
Russia and NATO 83
cooperation, particularly seen in the case of Afghanistan, where cooperation on
training and transit have been increased, and a shift in Russian policy that
allowed for the Libyan mission under the auspices of a United Nations mandate,
despite opposition from Russian policy-makers, including Putin, regarding inter-
ventionism. Although Russia still pursued policies it had begun under Putin
including preventing further expansion of the alliance eastward and preventing
NATO from gaining too much influence in Central Asia, cooperation increased
during the Medvedev presidency.
The expansion of cooperation between Russia and NATO during the
Medvedev presidency can be credited, in part, a changed dynamic within NATO
itself which a Western European ambassador described as the result of the arrival
of the Obama Administration and the ‘marginalis[ation] in terms of numbers but
also marginalis[ation] in terms of arguments’ of the Russia sceptics within the
alliance. The evolving relationship was capped with Medvedev’s attendance at
the Lisbon Summit, which was seen by both Russians and non-Russians as an
important point in the Russia–NATO relationship.
6 Russia and the Euro-Atlantic
security agreements
Compliance and controversy
The existing Euro-Atlantic security framework is supported by three main docu-

ments, the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Meas-
ures, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE Treaty). While all of the documents are discussed at the Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, only the Vienna Document 2011 is
considered to be of the OSCE. The CFE Treaty is discussed in the Joint Consult-
ative Group (JCG) and the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) serves
as the forum for dialogue on Open Skies, which are considered to be ‘OSCE-
related bodies’ by the organisation itself (OSCE, 2013a). The JCG and OSCC
have some overlapping membership with each other, and with the OSCE, but in
each case there are differences in member-state make-up and numbers. In many
cases a country’s delegation to the OSCE also serves as its representatives to the
JCG and the OSCC but in other cases, such as with Russia, the country’s OSCE
representatives (including the ambassador) do not serve as representatives to the
hard security organs and instead there is a different delegation with its own head.
In Russia’s case, this is called the delegation to the Military Security and Arms
Control Talks in Vienna (Ulyanov, 2008).
The role of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) has evolved
from their Cold War purpose, which ‘was to reinforce stability in a frozen status
quo and therefore lessen the risk of a surprise attack and mass-scale war in
Europe’, into its post-Cold War purpose of providing states a way to ‘manage
the changes that are occurring in Europe and to enhance cooperative relations
among its states based on partnership, mutual reassurance and transparency’
(Lachowski, 2004: 1). This evolution in the role of CSBMs can be seen as part
of a larger interest in adaptation and modernisation of the existing security
regime, which one Russian MFA official considers Russia to be the ‘main cham-
pion’ of. If the CSBMs are serving the purposes that Lachowski identifies, the
CSBMs should have a positive effect on the security of the Euro-Atlantic space.
Yet, what can be seen is that challenges to regional security and the functioning
of these agreements, exist. It is important to remember, as a high-ranking
Russian MFA official emphasised, that ‘all arms control treaties are living organ-
isms’. An arms control treaty and its status reflects not only the treaty parties but
also the times and conditions.
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic agreements 85
Accepting that arms control arrangements are contingent on the events and
personalities of those who have interests in them means considering whether the
change in a Russian president can mean different policies from Russia. In the
field of arms control, in particular, the interests of the military and the foreign
policy officials intersect. The military has a vested interest in the negotiations of
treaties and implementation of these agreements so it is visible in these discus-
sions since they directly relate to military planning and capabilities, while the
foreign policy establishment is involved because any decisions made about
negotiations and implementation has a direct impact on the relations of Russia
with other states. In the case of all three documents, presidential surrogates have
taken the lead in discussing specifics, while the presidents themselves only
discuss the agreements when a situation arises, such as the problems surrounding
the CFE Treaty in 2007, or there is a meeting where the agreements are being
publicly discussed, such as the 2010 OSCE Summit. The Treaty on Open Skies
has rarely been mentioned publicly by Russian officials during the first twelve
years of the twenty-first century and one of those mentions was a brief mention
in passing by Medvedev, in a meeting with cosmonauts and other people tied to
the Russian space programme, where he acknowledged that the programme
existed (Medvedev D., 2009c).
When it comes to addressing issues of arms control in Europe, as one Russian
MFA official explained, ‘CFE and conventional arms control are twins . . . if there
is no movement on one, it is hard to move on the other track’. While Putin had
wanted to see progress made on Vienna Document adaptation in the early part of
the decade and sought Western ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE Treaty) no such progress
was made. The Russian MFA official’s point about the two tracks is clear when we
see Russia’s ‘suspension’ of the CFE as one track and the failure to amend the
Vienna Document as the other. While under Putin there were constraints on Rus-
sia’s ability to promote Vienna Document reform, mainly the lack of a process for
such reform to be undertaken, this was not a problem under Medvedev since a pro-
cedure had been introduced. In terms of the CFE Treaty, Putin’s ‘suspension’ in
2007 of Russian participation established the policy that Medvedev would inherit.
While both Putin and Medvedev did negotiate with the U.S. on CFE after the ‘sus-
pension’ was announced, they did so with different partners and the working rela-
tionship between Medvedev and Obama was far better than the Putin–Bush
relationship was after Munich in 2007.
The Vienna Document

The 57 member-states of the OSCE are all party to the Vienna Document 2011
which, until amendments were approved in 2011, was called the Vienna Docu-
ment on the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 1999.
Unlike the other documents to be discussed, the Vienna Document is not legally-
binding for its members but like the others, any issues with document implemen-
tation are brought to the attention of the OSCE countries in an attempt to resolve
86 Russia and the Euro-Atlantic agreements
the issues. Discussions about the Vienna Document occur within the OSCE’s
Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and within its three working groups.
Working Group A was created to ‘monitor and discuss the implementation of
measures, decisions and commitments adopted by the FSC’ as well as to arrange
the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) while Working Group
B is focused on ‘future challenges and risks to military security in the OSCE
region’ with the intention of ‘develop[ing] goals and methods for building, main-
taining and improving stability and security’ (FSC, 2000). The final group, the
OSCE Communications Group, established a system for conducting information
exchanges and providing information on both military agreements and CSBMs
to the OSCE countries (OSCE CPC, 2012).
Even though the Vienna Document is not legally enforceable, it serves as an
important CSBM at a time when the fate of the legally-binding arrangements is
undetermined. As Vienna Document encompasses all of the OSCE member-
states, the Vienna Document also has the largest geographic scope of the three
framework documents. As opposed to the limited membership of the CFE Treaty
and the Open Skies regime, the Vienna Document includes a large number of
states from North America, Europe, the Caucasus, and Asia. At the same time,
the geographic application area of the agreement does not include North America
or Mongolia. The Vienna Document is only applicable on ‘the territory, sur-
rounding sea areas, and air space of all European (Russia from the western
border to the Ural Mountains) and Central Asian participating States’ so in the
cases of Canada and the U.S., only their troops stationed and military activities
within this area are considered (State Department, 2012b).
From Vienna Document 1999 to Vienna Document 2011

The Vienna Document has seen several forms since it came into existence. The ori-
ginal Vienna Document 1990 called upon states to conduct a ‘military budget
exchange, risk reduction procedures, and communication network and an annual
CSBM implementation assessment’, while the subsequent Vienna Documents
1992 and 1994 were expanded to include measures related to military activities and
contacts as well as defence planning (Bodell, 2005: 795). A former high-ranking
Russian official stated that the 1992 and 1994 Vienna Documents were ‘real
effective’ because they were in place during the collapses of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, which meant they provided OSCE states with information about
unfolding events. Vienna Document 1999 adapted the existing CSBMs, in par-
ticular those concerning ‘constraining measures’, but also established ‘measures
aimed at increasing transparency and confidence in a bilateral, multilateral, and
regional context’ (Bodell, 2005: 795). Despite these changes, a high-ranking
Russian MFA official characterised the changes that occurred to Vienna Docu-
ment, after the 1994 adaptation, as ‘cosmetic’. It is important to note that since the
Vienna Document is part of the OSCE security structure, it is subject to OSCE
consensus policy and consequently, faces many of the same challenges towards
progress that the FSC, where Vienna Document is debated, does.
The Vienna Document provisions includes an annual exchange of military
information, inspection and evaluation visits, and the ‘observation of certain
military activities’, as some of its CSBMs. The exchange of information requires
participating states to provide each other with information regarding ‘the military
organisation, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems’ located
within the area of the document’s application (VD11, 2011: 3). Defence plan-
ning is also subject to an exchange of information, but unlike in the case of other
information exchanged, this includes information for out of area planning since
the information that is exchanged includes information pertaining to a country’s
plans ‘in the medium to long term as regards size, structure, training and equip-
ment of its armed forces, as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets related
thereto’ (7).
Evaluation visits allow states to confirm that the data that they are given as
part of the annual exchange of military information is accurate and each state is
required to host a minimum of one such visit a year per 60 units they report
having up to a maximum of 15 visits a year with no more than two visits occur-
ring a month. (38). Inspections allow other countries to observe the military
activities conducted by a state and each state is required to host no more than
three visits a year, although more inspections are possible if the observed state
wishes (32–33). To provide a forum to discuss CSBM implementation, the
Vienna Document establishes the AIAM with the suggestion that the meeting be
used to discuss issues of uncertainty in implementation as well as the technical
aspects of the inspections and evaluations (46).
As a Russian MFA official stated, Russia had ‘vigorously insisted’ on Vienna
Document reform since it became apparent that Vienna Document 1999 had not
adequately addressed the existing issues. Under Putin, Russia put forward ideas
about how Vienna Document 1999 could be amended but there was no agree-
ment on the Russian ideas. The official characterised the response to the Russian
proposals on the adaptation of Vienna Document as ‘full silence’. Russian
Foreign Ministry officials repeatedly called for the adaptation of the Vienna
Document, including at the 2004 Ministerial Council where Lavrov emphasised
that conditions in Europe had changed and therefore the Vienna Document
should reflect the new circumstances (Lavrov, 2004c). In June 2006, Russia put
forward two proposals that would amend the Vienna Document 1999. One pro-
posal suggested that countries who conduct a ‘large-scale . . . trans-border rede-
ployment of manpower and equipment’ should be obligated to notify other states
prior to the redeployment occurring and also inform the other states where the
moved resources are going as well as provide a timeline for the redeployment
(Lachowski & Sjögren, 2007: 614). The other proposal suggested that the Mech-
anism for Consultation and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities
from Chapter III of Vienna Document, should be amended so that in addition to
‘using the existing (hopefully simplified) procedure applicable within national
borders, a complimentary procedure giving a more concrete meaning to “milit-
arily significant” deployments of foreign forces . . . could be applied to both
unusual and scheduled activities in the OSCE area’ (613–614).
A year later, Russia was particularly active in Vienna Document proposals.
Russia put forward reform proposals which dealt with topics including notifica-
tion prior to the ‘deployment of foreign military forces on the territory of an
OSCE participating state in the zone of application’; exchanging information
regarding multinational rapid reaction forces (jointly proposed with Belarus);
establishing a deadline for defence planning information to be submitted; creat-
ing a definition for ‘specified area’ and agreement on the length of an evaluation
visit conducted as part of Vienna Document; and prior notification of both signi-
ficant military activities that don’t reach the Vienna Document thresholds and
sizable military transits through the Vienna Document area (Lachowski, 2008:
484 [n.66]). Russia’s concerns surrounding multinational forces were discussed
as early as 2003 when Alexander Grushko, serving as the Director of the Depart-
ment of European Cooperation in the Russian MFA, addressed Working Group
B of the FSC, saying that the Vienna Document ‘continues to exist by itself, as it
were, aside from the principal trends of military construction’ and cited multi-
national forces as one such trend (Grushko, 2003). During the 2007 Ministerial
Council, Lavrov argued that while some countries were positive towards Rus-
sia’s suggestions for reform, there were other states who were adding conditions
to any potential agreement on decisions (Lavrov, 2007i). Under Putin, although
Russian ideas were not adopted, the country did actively engage with the Vienna
Document.
Medvedev’s presidency saw continued Russian efforts to amend the Vienna
Document. In 2008, Russian efforts to see the reform of the Vienna Document
CSBMs were expanded to include a proposal on naval forces (Ulyanov, 2008).
The Russian Food-for-Thought paper on the subject acknowledged that naval
forces were not responsible for increasing tensions in the region but argued that
there would be greater ‘security and stability on the European continent’ if such
CSBMs existed (Russian Delegation, 2008a). Among the naval CSBMs that the
Russian delegation proposed were information exchanges on naval forces similar
to that required of land and air forces and the establishment of rules for prior
notification of and the observation of naval activities (Russian Delegation,
2008a). Under Medvedev, the dissatisfaction with the lack of Vienna Document
reform continued. In 2009, Vladimir Chizhov, Russian Ambassador to the Euro-
pean Communities, used the lack of reform on the Vienna Document as part of a
broader argument about the failure of the OSCE to establish itself as the ‘broad-
based centrepiece of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture’ (Chizhov, 2009).
It is important to consider the Russian proposal on naval CSBMs since this is
one areas where there are no existing CSBMs and, consequently, such a proposal
would involve the establishment of new principles. A Western MFA official
identified the idea of naval CSBMs as a proposal which has been made in Vienna
since the Soviet times and that it fits with the Russian ‘history of making some
proposals over again’ but also pointed to the development of naval elements to
the American missile defence plans as to why such CSBMs are becoming more
important to the Russians. The Russian proposal did not impress a former
Western diplomat who felt that the proposal lacked seriousness due to the nature
of the proposed map of the zone of application for naval CSBMs, which included
pirate ship and whale pictures. The fact that the map also indicated that the zone
of application would span from northern Africa, despite no OSCE member-states
being in that region, to the North American coast without indicating what report-
ing requirements would be was another issue from the former diplomat’s per-
spective. As a result of the lack of specificity in the proposal, the former
diplomat explained that it was unclear whether countries’ coast guards would be
considered naval forces or, even more importantly, whether any ships a country
has that are capable of circumnavigating the globe would have to be reported,
which would result in lots of notifications.
From the Russian perspective, as argued by a Russian MFA official, the Euro-
pean continent is surrounded by water on three sides and, therefore, such CSBMs
‘cannot [be] le[ft] out of the calculations’ but that the Russian proposal crossed
an ‘American redline’ and so there was no agreement. A Western MFA official
disputed the idea that naval CSBMs are an ‘American redline’ but did state that
it was ‘certainly true’ that no indication was given to lead others to think that the
Americans want to pursue naval CSBMs and that this is a position shared by
several other countries. A high-ranking Russian MFA official characterised the
issue as ‘a matter of life or death’ for the Americans, which led to a Russian
assessment that ‘speaking realistically we cannot expect any breaks’ on the
issue. The high-ranking official argued that under the CFE Treaty, a country
would have to notify other states if they moved one piece of artillery but when it
comes to naval vessels, a country does not have to say anything, regardless of
the on-board capabilities. The same official also pointed out that the Russian
‘proposal did not go beyond information that can be easily found on the internet’
and in the case of one OSCE member-state, they already produce a book with
most of the information that would be shared included so the proposal was not
breaking new ground. Since the information already exists and is available, the
proposal does raise questions regarding the actual value that these new CSBMs
would have. Although the proposal was ill-fated from the beginning, a Russian
MFA official did note that some countries have made ‘small, symbolic steps’
towards naval CSBMs by inviting other countries to observe their exercises.
There is a feeling, reflected by a former high-ranking Russian official, that the
issue of naval transparency and CSBMs, will remain a big issue for Russia in the
future, regardless of the fact that it is believed by Russia to be an American
‘redline’.
The establishment of the Vienna Document Plus (VD Plus) procedure in May
2010 allows the FSC to adopt decisions that would amend provisions of the
Vienna Document, which would be applicable on the day the decision is
approved unless otherwise specified, by calling themselves VD Plus; the VD
Plus would then be updated and reissued as a new Vienna Document at least
every five years, if not sooner (FSC, 2010a). Among the early decisions that
were taken within the framework of VD Plus were a range of practical updates
as well as updates that dealt with the Document’s functions. One of the technical
updates removed Yugoslavia from the list of participating states and replaced it
with the successor states of Serbia and Montenegro (FSC, 2011b). Another deci-
sion that was accepted called on the participating states to consider national and
religious holidays of host countries before requesting an inspection or evaluation
visit (FSC, 2010b). The decisions that have been made were characterised by a
Russian MFA official as ‘minor VD Plus decisions but important’ ones. In
regards to the Vienna Document’s functions, the participating states agreed that
the first chapters that should be updated are Chapter V (Prior Notification of
Certain Military Activities) and Chapter IX (Compliance and Verification) (FSC,
2010c). In July 2011, Chapter IX was updated so that the topics of discussion
during briefings conducted by observed parties as part of an inspection or evalu-
ation visit are now laid out (FSC, 2011c). On November 30, 2011, the FSC
adopted a decision that saw the ‘reissuing’ of Vienna Document 1999 as Vienna
Document 2011, which included the decisions that were adopted under the VD
Plus arrangement earlier in the year (FSC, 2011a).
Russian leaders welcomed the introduction of a new procedure which allowed
for the adoption of amendments to the Vienna Document. In the months follow-
ing the adoption of the Vienna Document Plus procedure, Deputy Foreign
Minister (DFM) Grushko said that Russia had ‘note[d] with satisfaction that
there has been quite vigorous movement for the modernisation of the Vienna
Document’, which Russia had been in favour of for years (Grushko, 2010).
During the December 2010 OSCE Summit, Medvedev stated that Russia was
‘grateful for the support that many countries have given our proposals on arms
control and confidence-building measures’ and that the country was hopeful that
in 2011 a new version of the Vienna Document would be issued, which did
happen (Medvedev D., 2010h).
With the opening of Vienna Document Plus procedure as the path to Vienna
Document reform, in 2010 Russia put forward proposals that suggested that
Vienna Document’s information exchange should include naval forces (a sug-
gestion seen in 2008), that countries should inform Vienna Document parties of
one below threshold military activity a year, and that there should be a system of
prior notification in place for major military transit through Vienna Document
countries as well as when multinational rapid reaction forces are deployed
(Lachowski, 2011: 419). A Western MFA official referred to the Rapid Reaction
Forces proposal as a ‘very interesting one’ and stated that it is targeted at NATO
because Russia does not have comparable forces. This means that if the proposal
was agreed to there would be an imbalance since there would be no information
for Russia to share. Notification of a below threshold activity, under the Russian
proposal, means that a country would notify other member-states when conduct-
ing a military activity which is below the criteria for notification established
within the Vienna Document itself, which is the involvement of a minimum of
9,000 troops (VD11, 2011: 20).
Despite the opening of the Vienna Document for amendments a year earlier,
in 2011 it became clear that reform of the document was facing some challenges
within the OSCE as it was suggested that the Vienna Document does not reflect
‘military realities’ and that there was a ‘lack of political will’ among the
member-states for amending the politically-binding arrangement (Schmidt &
Zellner, 2012: 450). As efforts to revive the CFE regime floundered, which will
be discussed later in this chapter, proposals by other OSCE member-states to
lower existing thresholds for notification of military activities and to increase the
number of evaluation and inspection visits allowed under the Vienna Document
were rejected by Russia on the grounds that they did not want to see changes
made that might bypass Russia’s CFE Treaty ‘suspension’ and because the
measures would have meant increased transparency while the country continues
its modernisation and reorganisation of the military (449).
Grushko argued that while attempting to modernise the Vienna Document to
modern military conditions and the current security situation, the countries nego-
tiating should not be inclined towards ‘increasing the intrusiveness’ of the
Vienna Document since that type of thinking is associated with the Cold War
(Grushko, 2011b). While Russia has put forward new proposals for amending
the Vienna Document, Russians admit that the country’s position on Vienna
Document reform has changed. A high-ranking Russian MFA official stated that
by the time the Americans were willing to support adaptation of the Vienna
Document, the Russian position on modernisation of the document had changed
due to the country’s on-going military reform efforts and because the military
did not wish to see additional CSBMs. A former high-ranking Russian official
called the Vienna Document an example of ‘collective control of the Russian
Federation’ and stated that the Russian Ministry of Defence is ‘categorically
against this way of arms control’. A high-ranking Russian MFA official also
argued that Russia is ‘reluctant to make major changes to the Vienna Document
when we don’t know what will happen with CFE’ and stated that Russia has
actually withdrawn previous proposals, such as a joint Russian–Belarusian pro-
posal from 2003, which would see the threshold for notification be reduced by
10–15%, because the Russian military ‘is not ready to be bothered by certain
innovation’. Despite the withdrawal of that proposal and the Defence Ministry’s
opposition to Vienna Document reform, he did point to another Russian pro-
posal, on smaller military exercises, which was accepted ‘because no one con-
ducts big exercises’ now.
Russia and the application of the Vienna Document

The relative success of the Vienna Document has been recognised in reviews by
the State Department which wrote that Vienna Document compliance, ‘with a
few exceptions . . . has been good’ (State Department, 2010). Russian leaders,
however, have argued otherwise. In 2009, Lavrov claimed that ‘only about half
of the provisions of the Vienna Document are really working at present, and
even of this half not all are being fulfilled in good faith’ (Lavrov, 2009d). As a
result of Russia’s ‘suspension’ of the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document has
risen in prominence as Russia has taken advantage of Vienna Document mech-
anisms, conducting one-third of all inspections and nearly half of all evaluations
in 2010 as a way of acquiring information about other countries. (Lachowski,
2011: 416–417). This comes despite Russian concerns about adapting the docu-
ment because some countries may use Vienna Document 2011 to supplement the
CFE Treaty.
One of the concerns that Russians have regarding the Vienna Document is
that the agreement allows Canada and Mongolia to conduct inspections even
though they do not have to be inspected because they do not have forces located
in the area of application. A Russian MFA official argued that they ‘can inspect
but not be inspected’ while a different Russian MFA official pointed out that
‘Canadians are fond of inspecting Asian and Caucasus colleagues’ which made
him wonder what threat the Canadians thought they faced from those regions.
This opinion was criticised by a former Western diplomat who argued that it is
not unfair that Canada (and now Mongolia) can inspect without having to allow
inspections themselves because there is no ‘pay to play’ mentality with the
Vienna Document and that the inspections are being conducted in the name of
transparency.
Russia’s compliance with the Vienna Document during the Second Chechen
War was a source of conversation at the OSCE. Russia admitted that the
information it submitted about the conflict was inaccurate and in October 1999
and February 2000 Russia submitted corrected information but the dispute then
expanded to the type of information exchanged since Russia had provided
information ‘on the conditions of military operations’ and NATO countries
wanted ‘not only numbers but also details on the purpose, level of command,
time frame and envisaged area of the operation, and other relevant information’
(Lachowski & Rotfeld, 2002: 325). Attempts at securing an observation visit to
Chechnya were difficult but Russia eventually allowed a German delegation in
February 2000 and in June 2000, a multinational OSCE team (Lachowski &
Rotfeld, 2002). The June visit was criticised by some member-states due to ques-
tions over whether the visit was worth it because of concerns regarding the size
of the observer team, the security measures for the team, the information avail-
able regarding the military situation and other issues but the states also acknow-
ledged the unique circumstances surrounding the visit, which were not addressed
in the Vienna Document (Lachowski, 2004: 96).
In the run-up to the August 2008 war, the Vienna Document proved to be a
tool that both Russia and Georgia could use but this did not stop the conflict
from occurring. When a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was downed
over Abkhazia on April 20, 2008, Georgia worked with the United Nations
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to investigate the events and it was
determined by UNOMIG that based on witness testimony and the recordings
from the UAV camera and radar, ‘the recordings were authentic and, absent
compelling evidence to the contrary, that the UAV was downed by a Russian
aircraft’ (UN Secretary-General, 2008). Russia disputed the report and the MFA
claimed that the video data ‘evoke[d] serious doubts’ and that the radar informa-
tion presented did not match Russian information (Russian MFA, 2008a).
As part of the Vienna Document, states can use the ‘Mechanism for Consulta-
tion and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities’ which Georgia
chose to use (Georgian Delegation, 2008b). Under the mechanism, a state can
ask for an explanation of military activities that they deem a security concern
and the other state must give a response that provides ‘answers to questions
raised, as well as any other relevant information in order to explain the activity
in question and dispel the concern’ (VD99, 1999: 12). If the statements fail to
resolve issues, additional steps may be taken including meetings between the
concerned states, meetings between the concerned states and other OSCE
member-states, or a meeting of all OSCE member-states that would be held
jointly between the FSC and the PC (12–13). This is the same mechanism that a
Russian proposal under the Putin presidency would have seen amended. Despite
Russian efforts to change the mechanism in 2006, Russia under Medvedev
adhered to the Vienna Document and Russia not only responded to Georgia
under the mechanism but also raised its own concerns.
Bilateral talks between Russia and Georgia occurred within the context of the
mechanism on June 4 and were attended by other delegations (Georgian Delega-
tion, 2008c). Russia responded to the Georgian request for information with a
request of its own in which Russia sought an explanation for a number of infrac-
tions of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces and
when unsatisfied with the answer, Russia called for a Joint FSC-PC meeting
(Russian Delegation, 2008b). At the meeting, which occurred a week later, the
Russian delegation argued that Georgian UAV flights themselves ‘may be
regarded without any doubt as unusual military activities in violation of the 1994
Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces’ and paragraph 6 of
UN Security Council Resolution 1808, which addressed military activities
(Russian Delegation, 2008c). In its response to Russia at the meeting, the Geor-
gian representative accused Russia of ‘absolutely ignor[ing] our serious concern
regarding the 20 April incident’ and ended the statement with an appeal to
Russia ‘to stop being negligent, to stop turning this extremely important issue
into a comedy club, and to stop juggling with the OSCE instruments’ (Georgian
Delegation, 2008a). Despite the rhetoric and accusations that occurred through-
out the June 11, 2008 meeting, the Joint FSC-PC chairpersons expressed their
belief that the meeting showed ‘the continuing relevance of this Mechanism and
the OSCE as a forum for dialogue on the security concerns of participating
States’ (Joint FSC-PC, 2008).
After the Russia–Georgia conflict, the two sides continued to use the Vienna
Document. Russian requests for inspection and evaluation visits in January 2009
prompted the Georgian MFA to state ‘that no guarantees and assurances exist
that [the] Russian Federation will not try to carry out further aggressive actions
and the information obtained via the evaluation visit and inspection would not be
used to the detriment . . . of Georgia’ and, therefore, the country claimed force
majeure until Russia conducted a ‘full deoccupation of the occupied parts of the
territory of Georgia, including Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region’ (Georgian
MFA, 2009). The declaration of force majeure would be applicable only to
Russia and, therefore, other OSCE member-states could still conduct visits
(Georgian MFA, 2009). Russia’s arms control delegation leader, Mikhail
Ulyanov, called the Georgian grounds for declaring force majeure to be the
result of conjecture and argued that if Georgia sought to increase the confidence
and security of the region it would allow inspections because otherwise Georgia
must be hiding something regarding its troops (Ulyanov, 2009). The Vienna
Document itself does not offer a definition of the term force majeure but the
traditionally accepted standard for force majeure is ‘an unanticipated event or
effect beyond human control, including an “act of God” in the form of natural
forces’ (Boczek, 2005: xx). The declaration of force majeure by Georgia was
supported by other countries and institutions, including the Head of the Euro-
pean Commission delegation to Georgia, Per Eklund, who said ‘taking into
account the situation here with Russian troops on Georgian soil, they have a case
and I think they used the right argument’ (Kupunia, 2009).
In January 2012, Russia was reported for rejecting two Vienna Document
evaluation visits on the grounds of force majeure because ‘the legal procedures
designed to guarantee the application of the Vienna Document 2011 were in pro-
gress’ (Spanish Delegation, 2012). The declaration of force majeure was
explained by the Russian delegation as being the result of the need for the gov-
ernment to pass a decision allocating funding for Vienna Document 2011 to be
implemented, which caused doubt for some delegations as to whether Russian
bureaucratic processes were truly responsible (Zellner, 2012). The U.S. argued
that the ‘provisions for the conduct of evaluation visits in the Vienna Document
2011 are an update of the earlier provisions’ and, therefore, the reason presented
by the Russian delegation was ‘unjustified, unacceptable and undermines the
object and purpose of the Document’ (American Delegation, 2012). On February
15, 2012, the Russian delegation responded to a statement made by Denmark,
who was speaking on behalf of the European Union and supporting countries, by
saying that ‘work on the problem continues in Moscow’ before beginning to crit-
icise the countries that supported Denmark’s statement but had failed to meet all
FSC information exchange commitments and asking ‘whether they don’t feel
any moral discomfort at the fact that many co-sponsors of the statement we have
heard today, who have the same rights and obligations in the OSCE as Russia,
have for years been failing to fulfil their obligations’ (Russian Delegation,
2012a). Russian application of the Vienna Document resumed with Government
Decree No. 545, adopted in June 2012, after Medvedev left office, when Russia
authorised full implementation of the agreement (Russian Delegation, 2012b).
The Treaty on Open Skies1

The Treaty on Open Skies was signed into agreement on March 24, 1992 but
only entered into force on January 1, 2002 making it the most recent of the
region’s agreements to be discussed (OSCC, 2012b). Russia conducted the first
flight under Open Skies in August 2002 with an overflight of the United
Kingdom and during the remainder of the year would complete eleven flights,
more than any other treaty party (OSCC, 2012a). The initial idea for the treaty
came about much earlier, in 1955, with a proposal from President Eisenhower
who suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States exchange aerial
images of military facilities in each other’s countries as a way of protecting
‘against the possibility of [a] great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and
relaxing tension’ (Eisenhower, 1955). The idea of aerial photography as a confi-
dence- and security-building measure was revived by President George H.W.
Bush on May 12, 1989 as he argued that:
such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular

scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial access would show
the world the true meaning of the concept of openness. The very Soviet
willingness to embrace such a concept would reveal their commitment to
change.
(Bush, 1989)
The Soviets were more receptive to the Bush proposal than when Eisenhower
made his suggestion and negotiations were opened in February 1990 but due to
complications, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and its implications, it
took until 1992 to complete the treaty (Dunay & Spitzer, 2004).
Russian support for the Open Skies arrangement is strong and the regime is
seen as positive since, as a Russian MFA official acknowledged, it has been
‘implemented successfully’. Russia has been deeply involved with the treaty and
as of December 31, 2011, Russia has conducted 336 flights, either jointly or
solo, which accounts for 40% of the total flights that have been flown (OSCC,
2012a). The number of flights conducted over Russia during the same time
period amounts to 253, or 30% of the total flights (OSCC, 2012a). With the other
legally-binding Euro-Atlantic security treaty, the CFE Treaty, facing significant
troubles, the Treaty on Open Skies has become increasingly important.
The Open Skies Treaty and Russian concerns

Under the Treaty on Open Skies, the state parties agree to ‘the observation of
any point on the entire territory of the observed Party’ (Open Skies, 1992: 14).
Each state is allocated a certain number of flights that it can fly over the territory
of another treaty party called its ‘individual active quota’ and a state’s ‘total
active quota’ is the number of flights it can conduct over all other states added
together (Open Skies, 1992: 5). The ‘passive quota’ refers to the flights that are
conducted over a state’s territory, which means the ‘total passive quota’ is the
maximum number of flights that can be flown over a state; under the treaty, the
‘individual active quota’ is equivalent to the ‘passive quota’ so that each treaty
party ‘ha[s] the right to conduct a number of observation flights over the territory
of any other State Party equal to the number of observation flights which that
other State Party has the right to conduct over it’ (Open Skies, 1992: 5). The
treaty does permit states to transfer part of their ‘active quotas’ to other treaty
parties provided that the OSCC is informed as are all other treaty parties and that
the member-states involved in the trade do not violate the rule prohibiting 50%
or more of a state’s ‘active’ or ‘passive’ quotas from being used by one treaty
party (Open Skies, 1992: 5). The determination of how a state uses its ‘active
quota’ for a particular year would be made through ‘an annual review for the fol-
lowing calendar year within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Com-
mission’ (Open Skies, 1992: 5).
In addition to establishing how flights between states would be determined,
the treaty also establishes the rules for the conduct of flights, including flight dis-
tances, personnel allowed to participate, and the equipment allowed to be used
for Open Skies purposes. In order for aircraft to be used for Open Skies pur-
poses, ‘all Open Skies aircraft and sensors must pass specific certification and
pre-flight inspection procedures to ensure that they are compliant with Treaty
standards’ and the planes that are used can either belong to the treaty party who
is observing or being observed, with the observed party having the option to
choose (State Department, 2012a). The treaty also restricts the distance that a
flight can be conducted from an Open Skies designated airfield, which given the
size of Russia means that Russia has the largest possible distance that can be
flown of all treaty parties (Open Skies, 1992: 34).
Implementation of the treaty has been largely successful for Russia, not only
in the number of flights Russia has conducted but also in the number of flights
that have been flown over Russia. Despite the treaty’s origins as a way of
increasing trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later post-
Soviet Russia, efforts have been made to move away from that idea and increas-
ing cooperation. In March 2011, the U.S. and Russia conducted their first joint
monitoring mission as part of Open Skies when the two countries conducted a
flight over the territory of Sweden, which the Russian Foreign Ministry called ‘a
positive example of mutually beneficial cooperation’ that also showed the
improved relationship between the two countries (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2011c).
During the Medvedev presidency, there were only a few cancellations of
Open Skies flights which were to be conducted over Russian air space that could
be seen as part of wider treaty application concerns. In June 2011, a planned
flight to be conducted by Sweden, Estonia and the United States was cancelled
due to ‘airspace restrictions’ (OSCC, 2012a). Another cancellation of a planned
Norwegian flight occurred in October 2011 and was credited to a ‘disagreement
on the interpretation of Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 4(G) of the Treaty’
(OSCC, 2012a). The paragraph in question relates to the ‘the approximate obser-
vation flight distance’, which should be provided 72 hours or more before an air-
craft arrives at a point of entry (Open Skies, 1992: 11–12).
Concerns about Russia’s adherence to the treaty are derived from Russia’s
argument ‘that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are independent nations not party to
the Treaty and, therefore, flight within 10 km of their borders is prohibited’ in
accordance with Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty (State Depart-
ment, 2011a: 27). Russia defended its position on the grounds that ‘it is common
knowledge that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are sovereign, independent coun-
tries; moreover they are not parties to’ the treaty (Russian MFA, 2011a). In May
2010, Russia cited Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence as the reason to
make a joint American-Romanian observation flight change its flight path
(Lachowski, 2011: 422). In 2011, Romania suggested a flight plan which would
be close to the Russian–Georgian border, a decision considered ‘to test again
how Russia would interpret the treaty with regard to the territorial conflicts in
Georgia’, but this flight plan was ‘denied’ when Romania decided it would not
alter the flight plan (Schmidt & Zellner, 2012: 451). The situation surrounding
the breakaway regions and Russian recognition of them prompted a high-ranking
Russian MFA official to say that Open Skies shows the ‘problem of mixing up
crises and arms control’ which he felt that Western Europe and the United States
are ‘starting to understand’.
In April 2012, Georgia decided to suspend its cooperation with Russia under
Open Skies due to the flight restrictions that Russia had established over South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Georgia argued violated the Treaty’s clause about
full access to a treaty party’s airspace since Abkhazia and South Ossetia are con-
sidered part of Georgia by all treaty parties except Russia (Georgian MFA,
2012). Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Lukashevich, called the
Georgian decision a ‘blatant violation of the Treaty’ and argued that the ‘Treaty
does not envisage arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on the rights of any
party to the treaty’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2012b). Despite Russia’s response to the
suspension of cooperation, there does not appear to be great concern about the
situation as a Russian MFA official called the decision ‘a pity’ but also stated
that ‘time will pass and it will be sorted out’. Russia’s accusations that Georgia
was acting outside the limits of the treaty by not applying the treaty to Russia are
similar to the arguments that Russia was facing from the West regarding
Russia’s decision to ‘suspend’ the CFE Treaty.
A final issue surrounding Russian implementation of the treaty has come from
the ‘Russian film duplication capability and Russia’s inability to produce first
generation duplicate negatives’; while the treaty requires that an observed state
has the right to ‘either positive or negative’ film, Russia cannot provide states
with a duplicate negative and the quality of the image on positive film is con-
sidered to be of lesser quality (State Department, 2011a: 28). This does not show
a violation of the treaty, since Russia is still providing positive film, but merely
reflects a concern about technical aspects of the treaty.
For Russia, one of its on-going concerns regarding Open Skies implementa-
tion is about the way in which NATO members choose to use their quotas. As a
result of ‘a gentleman’s agreement among its members, NATO agreed not to
carry out inspections on the territory of the alliance’ which means that NATO
members are using their quotas primarily on ‘the most strategically important of
the non-members – Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine’ (Lachowski & Dunay, 2005:
667). At the 2010 Review Conference, Russia expressed its concerns that since
the NATO treaty parties do not typically conduct many flights over each other’s
territory, Russia and Belarus, which are a group under the treaty, are at a dis-
advantage since there is no opportunity to secure data from flights conducted by
other countries since the flights are not being flown (Russian Delegation, 2010c:
1–2). Russian representatives have declared that the way in which the NATO
states use their quotas ‘runs counter to the spirit of the Treaty, causing demarca-
tion lines to be drawn, and essentially creates a different status for its member-
states that brings us back to the bloc confrontation’ (Russian Delegation, 2010c:
2). A former high-ranking Russian official agreed with MFA officials that in
regard to the ‘spirit and the letter of the treaty, the letter is observed’ but that in
application, treaty implementation ‘is not fair’. According to a Russian MFA
official, although this has meant that there is no film to buy of flights over NATO
countries, this is ‘not a bias but [instead an] inequality’. Similarly, some coun-
tries choose not to use their entire available quota, while Russia argues that ‘the
desire for full implementation of active quotas is to a certain degree an indicator
of a State Party’s political responsibility’ because the flights that are conducted
are responsible for establishing
an effective information base to promote greater openness and transparency

in military activities and facilitate the observation of the implementation of
existing and future arms control agreements with a view to preventing pos-
sible crises and resolving crisis situations.
(Russian Delegation, 2010a: 2)
Therefore, Russian concerns regarding the treaty are centred not only on the lack
of NATO member-state flights over fellow NATO alliance members but also on
the lack of information that is generated when countries, for financial or other
reasons, choose not to take advantage of the flights they are allocated. These two
issues are intertwined as it is often NATO countries that do not use their full
quota.
Evolving technology and Open Skies

As technology has evolved, the Open Skies regime has been the subject of on-
going conversations about how technological developments impact the treaty.
To prevent one state from using technology that has advanced past the capabil-
ities of other treaty parties, it is required that ‘all equipment used in Open Skies
must be commercially available to all participants in the regime’ (State Depart-
ment, 2012a). The benefits of the Open Skies regime for countries that are tech-
nologically lacking, for instance in satellites that would allow for the observation
of foreign territory, is apparent since Open Skies provides the ‘means of alleviat-
ing security concerns through timely overhead imagery’ (Schultz et al., 2012).
As a result, the technology that can be used in the implementation of the treaty is
an important topic for all member-states.
The Treaty on Open Skies held its Second Review Conference (OSRC) from
June 7–9, 2010 and among the agenda items was a day-and-a-half working
session dedicated to ‘exploring the next generation of Treaty implementation’
(OSCC, 2010). Modernisation has been under discussion since the 2005 OSRC
when it was decided that the issue of sensor modernisation would not be dis-
cussed at the Conference but instead would be left to the Informal Working
Group on Sensors since the issue is technical in nature (Lachowski, 2006: 768).
At the 2010 OSRC, Russia argued that the move towards digital technology will
benefit the treaty parties because it would result in ‘the closing down of labora-
tories for the processing of film, and an end to the purchase of film and associ-
ated materials’, thus presenting an easier and less expensive way of
implementing the treaty (Russian Delegation, 2010a: 3–4). A transition to digital
technology is important to Russia and the country’s work in the area was recog-
nised by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia
Celeste Wallander, one of the co-chairs, when she said that Russia was ‘well
ahead in the process of upgrading to digital technology’ and that the U.S.
‘appreciate[d] their leadership in that area’ because ‘we will all certainly benefit
from their experience’ (Wallander, 2010).
At the Opening Session of the 2010 OSRC, the Russian representative called
the agreement ‘a unique and unparalleled multinational instrument for strength-
ening confidence and security in a huge region’ and commented that even when
difficult debates occurred, the conversation might be ‘heated but ultimately fruit-
ful’ (Russian Delegation, 2010d: 1). Some of the difficulties facing the treaty
parties mentioned by the Russian delegate were the issues surrounding sensors,
the role of ‘digital technology’, and the possession of ‘rapidly aging’ aircraft by
the member-states, all of which have cost implications at a time of global finan-
cial concern (Russian Delegation, 2010d: 3). While other member-states are dis-
cussing the replacement of their aging aircraft, the Russian delegation provided
treaty parties with a briefing on the TU-214, which is the new aircraft that Russia
will be using to conduct its Open Skies flights, and included information on both
the aircraft itself and the Open Skies technological capabilities that would be a
part of the aircraft (Russian Delegation, 2010b). A Russian MFA official pointed
out that his country has adapted to technological changes with a new aircraft,
which also has a new set of equipment, but that for all treaty parties there is
‘room for improvement’ in the transition to digital technology.
Among the prospects for Open Skies in the future, there were discussions
about allowing aircraft affiliated with the treaty to be used in humanitarian aid
missions or when an environmental disaster has struck, such as after the Haitian
earthquake in 2010 (U.S. Delegation, 2010). In support of the humanitarian and
environmental possibilities of Open Skies, Russia proposed that ‘the Open Skies
Consultative Commission (OSCC) could publish information on the capabilities
of the instruments of the Treaty on Open Skies in general so that countries or
international organisations could submit the relevant requests for the conduct of
flights’ and these requests could be met with suitable, available assistance (Fed-
eryakov, 2010: 2). As a result of the Review Conference, the Open Skies treaty
parties committed themselves to continue working towards the adoption of
digital technology as well as tasking the OSCC with examining how Open Skies
technology can be used for environmental, humanitarian, and other security
issues (OSRC, 2010: 3).
Attempts at reforming the Treaty on Open Skies, including following up on
the areas discussed in the Final Document of the OSRC, have been stymied by
the on-going issue of Cyprus’ application to join the treaty regime. In January
2011, Greece made the decision to put the question of Cypriot treaty member-
ship on the agenda of every OSCC meeting (Zellner, 2012). In response to this,
and the reference to Cyprus in the Review Conference’s Final Document, Turkey
chose to suspend its participation in OSCC formal meetings, which due to the
consensus principle, meant that from February 2011 treaty progress was limited
to informal and extraordinary meetings; however agreement was reached to
create ‘a new informal working group on sharing assets to discuss cooperation
and coordination of observation aircraft’ (Schmidt & Zellner, 2012: 451). The
Treaty on Open Skies allows for a previous year’s quota distribution to remain
in effect for the following year, which prevented the lack of meetings from inter-
fering with the conduct of overflights (Open Skies, 1992: 5). At an October 2011
Open Skies extraordinary meeting, the Greek delegation ‘agreed not to raise the
Cyprus issue’ which allowed the 2012 flight quota to be based off of the 2011
distribution (Schmidt & Zellner, 2012: 452).
A high-ranking Russian MFA official characterised the Turkish leaders as being
held ‘hostage to their political interests’ and argued that the country’s actions were
‘revenge’ for the support offered by other treaty parties to Cypriot membership.
Unfortunately the issue of Cyprus membership introduced the risk that what hap-
pened with the CFE regime could also happen with Open Skies and that ‘the Open
Skies regime could also become hostage to unresolved territorial disputes, this time
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus’ (Schmidt & Zellner, 2012: 452). One
Russian MFA official characterised the situation as one that ‘almost brought [the
treaty] to a halt’. One former Western diplomat said that the situation created by
the potential Cypriot membership is important for Russia because the country is
responsible for the committee which oversees rules and procedures and, therefore,
there was increasing pressure on Russia to find a solution to the Cyprus situation
that does not include more extraordinary meetings or silence procedure. Despite
this call for a more active Russian role, one high-ranking Russian MFA official
argued that ‘the Turks and Greeks should find a solution’.
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and its

adapted version2
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the
Agreement on Adaption of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(ACFE Treaty) present a challenge for Russia because as DFM Grushko
explained in 2007, ‘not only did the “old” Treaty come into contradiction with
the new military-political reality, but also its adapted version may become “dead
capital” ’ (Grushko, 2007b). For years, the CFE Treaty was regarded by treaty
parties ‘to be the cornerstone of post-Cold War security’ and the premier element
to the European security framework but despite its oft discussed importance, the
situation surrounding the treaty regime is not promising (de Haas, 2010: 64).
As one scholar explained, Russia’s position on the CFE Treaty can best be
understood in terms of the Russian leadership believing that Russia’s security
should be equivalent to that of the United States and all other European coun-
tries (Blank, 2009b: 44). For Russia, the country’s self-image as a great power
state plays an important role in Russia’s policy-making towards the CFE and
ACFE regime, whereby Russia seeks a position that makes it equal to many
states, as opposed to equal to one. One high-ranking Western diplomat stated
that the Russian position on the CFE Treaty is very much informed by Putin’s
own opinion of the Treaty. This opinion can be seen in the eventual ‘suspen-
sion’ of Russia’s participation in the treaty regime. The Russian arguments in
favour of ‘suspension’ were focused on how the treaty sought to undermine
Russia, while Russia itself was taking actions itself that undermined the treaty,
including ‘suspension’ itself. Russia’s decision to ‘suspend’ its participation
in the agreement has been described as ‘typify[ing] its quest for a free hand
and for unequal status and security vis-à-vis its interlocutors’ (Blank, 2009b:
45–46). Despite treaty parties responding negatively to the Russian ‘suspen-
sion’ decision, a high-ranking Russian MFA official commented that on some
issues Russian foreign policy ‘is not an ideal one . . . but on [the] CFE Treaty,
it is reasonable’.
The CFE Treaty and efforts towards adaptation

The CFE Treaty was originally agreed upon as a bloc treaty whose structure was
derived from membership in the Treaty of Warsaw, Treaty of Brussels, and
Treaty of Washington (CFE Treaty, 1990: 2–3). Despite the collapse of both the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the decision was made to maintain the treaty.
To understand Russia’s decision to ‘suspend’ participation in July 2007, it is
important to understand the security framework that the treaty establishes. From
the Russian perspective, particularly that of the military, the CFE Treaty repres-
ents, in the words of a former high-ranking Russian official, an ‘instrument of
collective control over the Russian Federation’ because the other treaty parties
are only concerned with what is happening in Russia.
The goal of the treaty was to limit the amount of conventional arms in the
area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains to ‘40,000 battle tanks,
60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat air-
craft and 4,000 attack helicopters’ (CFE Treaty, 1990: 1–3). The CFE Treaty
was designed so that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would each be allocated half
of the total, thus the two sides would have parity of treaty limited equipment
(TLE) (7). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Republics
located within the treaty area divided the Soviet quota amongst themselves under
the Tashkent Agreement, except for the Baltic States who successfully argued
that as ‘occupied territory’ they should not be included in the treaty territory
(McCausland, 2009: 2). As a high-ranking Russian MFA official acknowledged,
when the decision was made not to include the Baltic States, Russia had
‘belie[ved] at the time that the countries would be neutral’, like Switzerland. The
Treaty also divides Europe into four zones, coming from a common centre point,
which each have caps on the amount of ACVs, artillery, and tanks that can be
deployed in the zone so that limits are placed on the amount of equipment and
armaments that can be contained therein, which was designed to prevent a build-
up of equipment (ACA, 2010). An additional restriction in the Treaty limited a
treaty party to possessing no more than one-third of the arms and equipment
within the Treaty area (CFE Treaty, 1990: 11). To enforce the limits that the
treaty established, a system of inspections and exchanges of information was
created. A follow-on politically-binding agreement to the CFE Treaty, the Con-
cluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, limited the size of land and air forces within the treaty ter-
ritory to an allotted number of full-time service members or reserves who are
serving continuously in active capacity for a period in excess of 90 days for each
Treaty party, which for Russia was 1,450,000 (CFE 1-A, 1992).
One area of the CFE Treaty that proved controversial for Russia was the cre-
ation of the flank zones. The decision to establish flanks came as the result of
concern originally from Norway, and supported by Turkey, that the Soviet Union
(and later Russia) could decide to move its military equipment from Central
Europe to the far north or far south (Falkenrath, 1995: 231). In Article V of the
CFE Treaty, the areas of the then-Soviet territory that were part of the flank and,
therefore, subjected to additional TLE levels were the Leningrad, Odessa, Trans-
caucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts, which were allowed no more
than ‘4,700 battle tanks; 5,900 armoured combat vehicles; and 6,000 pieces of
artillery’ (CFE Treaty, 1990: 10). Article V of the Treaty also established equip-
ment and armament limits on temporary deployments into the military districts
and placed a maximum on the amount of equipment and armaments that could
be put in the regions by each state party (CFE Treaty, 1990). Supporters of CFE
argued that the flanks were essential and ‘that without them Europe’s security
would be undermined and new lines of division would be drawn’ (Krickus,
2009: 72). While the flank area included the territories of 12 different countries,
Russia argued that because of the security threats it faced, in particular that of
Chechnya, the flanks should either have the equipment and armaments levels
increased or they should not exist at all (Boese, 1999). To address some of Rus-
sia’s concerns regarding the flanks, under the legally-binding 1996 Flank Agree-
ment, the treaty parties agreed that the size of the flank would be decreased but
the limits placed on equipment in the zone would remain unchanged (Walkling,
1997).
Under the treaty, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna was assigned
the role of addressing issues of ‘compliance and possible circumvention, resolu-
tion of ambiguities and differences of interpretation, measures to enhance the
Treaty, the updating of lists of current equipment, resolving differences and
working methods on inspection procedures’ (Wright, 2000: 54). As a con-
sequence of the First Review Conference, where the Flank Agreement was
agreed upon, the JCG was tasked to begin ‘a thorough process aimed at improv-
ing the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the
security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico-
military alliance’ (States Parties, 1996: 5). The negotiations on the ACFE Treaty,
which began after the First Review Conference, resulted in an agreement that
saw the removal of the bloc framework that was established in the CFE Treaty
and instead established a system where limitations would be based on national
and territorial limits and there was agreement that any foreign troops on a treaty
party’s territory would need host nation consent (McCausland, 2009: 3). Under
the ACFE Treaty, the same maximum number of TLE for the treaty area that
was established under the CFE Treaty was maintained (ACFE Treaty, 1999: 1).
For Ukraine and Russia, the ACFE also maintained territorial sub-ceilings,
which limited the amount of tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery that could be
placed in parts of Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, parts of
Rostov oblast, Odessa oblast, as well as Kushchevskaya and a strip of Krasnodar
kray which leads to Kushchevskaya (22–23). Under the Adapted Treaty, it was
also agreed that any member-state of the OSCE could join the ACFE with the
approval of all existing treaty parties (17).
Russia and the adapted treaty 2000–2007

With a new treaty agreed upon, the Russian government felt that the concerns
they had were addressed. While Russia originally welcomed the new agreement,
dissatisfaction soon arose as a result of NATO expansion and the admission of
member-states that would not be subject to CFE Treaty limits, which was
deemed to be unfair by the Russians. Other issues related to compliance, in par-
ticular those connected with the 1999 Istanbul Agreement, would complicate the
ratification process and add to the concerns of both Russia and the other treaty
parties.
The expansion of NATO into former Warsaw Pact states or into states that
are not treaty parties to the CFE regime was an unwelcome development for the
Russian leadership. The admission of the Baltic States into the alliance meant
that there was no limit for foreign deployments, such as NATO’s, in those coun-
tries (Fedorov, 2010: 107). From the Russian perspective, the lack of treaty
restrictions in the Baltics created a ‘grey zone area’ where there could be uncon-
strained quantities of TLE. (Isakova, 2005: 50). Russian concerns about the lack
of restrictions increased when decisions were made, such as one in 2004 where
Belgian, Danish, and Dutch NATO aircraft began conducting patrols of the air-
space of the Baltic States with the planes stationed in Lithuania (Izvestia, 2004).
Since NATO’s commitment not to deploy large numbers of forces, equipment,
and arms in these territories was in the form of a political declaration, it meant
that from the Russian perspective there was no mechanism to prevent a military
build-up from occurring in the new member-states of the organisation (Bugajski,
2004: 137).
Ratification of the ACFE Treaty in the U.S. was initially tied to the flank issue
with calls for Russia to adhere to the CFE rules on armaments and equipment in
the flanks before the treaty would be sent to the Senate for approval (Kühn,
2009: 1). This condition was established during earlier debate over the ratifica-
tion of the legally-binding Flank Agreement, which applied 14 conditions to
CFE Treaty modification including the removal of Russian equipment and arma-
ments from former Soviet Republics and host nation consent for a foreign
military presence, among others (10). The host nation consent and stationing of
Russian equipment and armaments conditions were addressed in Annex 13 of
the Istanbul Agreement in which Moldova stated that it ‘renounces the right to
receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provi-
sions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the
territory of Moldova’ and in Annex 14, where Russia and Georgia agreed to a
timeline for the Russian withdrawal from bases in Georgia (OSCE, 1999).
In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit Declaration marked the first time that
NATO called for the ‘swift fulfilment of the outstanding Istanbul commitments
on Georgia and Moldova, which will create the conditions for Allies and other
States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty’ (NAC,
2002). Compliance with the Istanbul Agreement was reiterated by NATO
member-states as Russia began to press harder for the ratification of the ACFE,
despite the fact that within NATO itself there was debate over the existence of
this condition for ratification (Zellner, 2009). Germany, for instance, felt that
Russia should comply with the existing CFE Treaty before adopting the adapted
version but was less insistent than other states about Russia’s commitments to
withdraw from Moldova and Georgia (Sharp, 2006: 212). With calls to comply
with the Istanbul Agreement increasing, and the U.S. simultaneously planning to
station thousands of troops in Bulgaria and Romania (a development that Rus-
sians viewed as more of a threat than the five hundred troops stationed in Transd-
niestria) there was a feeling that ‘constructive interaction [wa]s hardly possible
with such logic’ (Areshev, 2007: 136). Russia argued against the Istanbul Agree-
ment as a prerequisite for ratification with a former high-ranking Russian official
arguing that the ‘agreements were made at the very last moment’ and ‘in haste’.
He argued that the Russians thought they were committing themselves to the
removal of the TLE in those regions but not everything, including Russian
troops. Beyond the issues with the Istanbul Agreement, there was a feeling,
according to a high-ranking Russian MFA official, that ‘NATO never explained
to us what Russia should do to trigger the ratification process’ and instead it
appeared that conditions were continually added to the ratification process,
despite an effort from France and Germany ‘to produce in NATO a final list of
demands but [they] failed’. A Western MFA official recognised that NATO was
‘not as clear initially’ on their position regarding the importance of the Istanbul
Agreement for ACFE Treaty ratification at the beginning, which led some to
‘think they moved the goal posts’ for ratification. A high-ranking Russian MFA
official argued that the West was in violation of the agreements made at Istanbul
because there was supposed to be an expeditious ratification process of ACFE
and there was an expectation that the ACFE Treaty would enter into force in
2002.
Issues surrounding compliance with the CFE Treaty pre-dated the adaption of
the treaty and continued during the period of non-ratification of the ACFE
Treaty. Russia argued that it was in compliance with the Istanbul Agreement
and, therefore, the NATO member-states should ratify the ACFE, yet the gov-
ernments of NATO countries did not feel Russia was complying with the Agree-
ment. A high-ranking Russian MFA official argued that his country’s actions
‘went far beyond the scope’ of the agreement. Despite this claim, there was a
feeling that Russian military officials had a tendency for ‘creative accounting’ of
TLE, which meant that situations arose where Russia ‘exclud[ed] from its report-
ing military equipment which was well within treaty definitions, but which
Russia unilaterally defined as “non-combat capable” because it was stationed at
repair facilities’ (Sharp, 2006: 207). In 2011, the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance cited Russia for 11 treaty
compliance violations since the treaty entered into force, including, but not
limited to: the ‘stationing [of] forces without the consent of the host state . . .
exceeding flank limits . . . exceeding overall limits for holdings in active units;
and . . . improperly reporting some armoured infantry fighting vehicles’ (State
Department, 2011b). In response to the previous year’s report by the same
bureau, Russia published a report specifically focused on U.S. violations of arms
agreements but that also highlighted those of NATO member-states in regards to
conventional arms. In its 2010 report, the Russian MFA reiterated Russian con-
cerns, including that the U.S. and its NATO allies were violating TLE levels
since the new NATO member-states should count under the NATO grouping,
that planned permanent bases in Bulgaria and Romania violated agreements, that
the NATO states had failed to ratify ACFE, and that the NATO allies had failed
to use the JCG to discuss bolstering the CFE regime (Russian MFA, 2010).
In 2007, Russia’s concerns surrounding the CFE Treaty and the lack of ratifi-
cation on the ACFE Treaty came to a head and Putin became quite outspoken on
CFE issues. As a high-ranking Russian MFA official stated, the situation sur-
rounding the CFE Treaty had led to a case of the countries having ‘to act in line
with the treaty when the treaty is not in line with reality’, particularly because
the new NATO countries were still being counted as part of the Eastern group of
states. During his Munich speech, Putin referred to the ‘pitiable condition of the
Treaty’ and criticised NATO member-states for the non-ratification of the ACFE
given Russian agreements with Georgia to leave the bases there and that the
troops left in Moldova were peacekeepers (Putin, 2007k). Putin’s comments
reflected not only domestic concerns regarding the CFE Treaty but also, accord-
ing to a Western MFA official, pressure from Russians and Russia-sympathetic
communities in Moldova and Georgia who did not want to see the Istanbul
Agreement applied in their regions. Putin criticised NATO expansion, which had
resulted in NATO’s ‘frontline forces on our borders’ while Russia ‘continue[s]
to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do[es] not react to these actions at all’
(Putin, 2007k). During his annual address to the Federal Assembly, Putin raised
the argument that under the agreement ‘we are essentially the only country
facing so-called “flank restrictions” in the south and north’ and that these
arrangements had been applied even during the Chechen War, so that Russia had
‘continued to observe its commitments under this treaty and coordinated its
action with its partners’ (Putin, 2007e). Due to this, Putin said that Russia should
‘declare a moratorium on its observance of this treaty until such time as all
NATO members without exception ratify the ACFE Treaty and start strictly
observing its provisions, as Russia has been doing so far on a unilateral basis’
(Putin, 2007e).
Concerns regarding the missile defence infrastructure that was being built in
Eastern Europe were often mentioned by Putin and in particular during a trip to
the Czech Republic, a country that would agree to host part of the missile
defence system, where Putin argued that ‘Russia has been disarming unilaterally
while our partners have been installing new types of weapons in central and
eastern Europe’ (Putin, 2007m). In a May press conference, Putin cited the deci-
sions of NATO members, including providing new weapons to Eastern Euro-
pean states, establishing bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and placing missile
defence components in Poland and Czech Republic as being a cause for Russian
concern and stated that Russia ‘cannot unilaterally continue to respect or to
enforce all of our agreements’ which meant that Russia was left only with the
option of leaving the treaty, unless the other state parties ratified the new
arrangement (Putin, 2007l). The linking of the CFE Treaty to missile defence
issues, which is seen in Putin’s 2007 statements, was rejected by the U.S. gov-
ernment, including by State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland who in
2011 said that the U.S. ‘d[idn’t] see a direct connection between the two’ and
that ‘we want to have both’ (Nuland, 2011a).
Foreign Minister Lavrov announced on May 22, 2007 that Russia was willing
to discuss the situation surrounding the CFE Treaty with either the NRC, the
JCG, or another CFE mechanism for dialogue but that ‘if the discussion fails to
lead to radical changes and our partners continue refusing to ratify it, then the
question of our withdrawal from the CFE Treaty will become imminent’
(Lavrov, 2007g). On May 28, 2007, the Russian government called for an Extra-
ordinary Conference of CFE Treaty state-parties, which it said was necessary for
addressing ‘the serious problems that have arisen with the NATO nations’ imple-
mentation of the Treaty as a result of its enlargement and NATO foot-dragging
on ratification of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty’ (Russian
MFA, 2007a). The issues that Russia wanted resolved at the meeting reflected
many of the treaty concerns Russia had previously discussed. In its call for the
meeting, Russia said that treaty parties should use the meeting to look for a solu-
tion to the CFE crisis (Russian MFA, 2007a). At the meeting, which was held
June 12–15, 2007, Russia put forward the circumstances that it deemed neces-
sary to ‘restor[e] the viability of the CFE’ regime, including: the Baltic countries
joining negotiations, lower levels of TLE for NATO countries as a way to
address the increasing size of the organisation, achieving an agreement on the
elimination of the flanks for Russia, agreeing on a common definition of ‘sub-
stantial combat forces’, either the entry into force or beginning of application of
the ACFE Treaty by July 1, 2008, and the establishment of an accession pro-
cedure for new members and a process for on-going treaty reform (President of
Russia, 2007). The Extraordinary Conference ultimately failed to reach agree-
ment on a Final Document, which might have provided direction for a way
forward on CFE related concerns, despite attempts by NATO treaty members to
draft one (NATO, 2007b).
The fact that the ACFE Treaty had been completed in 1999 and the ratifica-
tion process had not advanced for years leads to the question of why in 2007
‘suspension’ became the Russian policy. According to a former high-ranking
Russian official, the ‘suspension’ occurred because ‘Russian patience, [which]
people say . . . has no limits, but I say it does . . . ran out’. He said that the
announcement of ‘suspension’ could not be seen as ‘a surprise’ by the West
since Russia had been saying since 2003–2004 that it was ‘sick and tired’ of the
CFE issue being unresolved and that it was wrong for treaty parties ‘to tie up’
the ratification of the ACFE. According to a Russian MFA official, there was a
feeling among some of the NATO member-states of ‘well we shouldn’t have
done that’ regarding the linking of the ratification of the ACFE Treaty and the
Istanbul Agreement. He was clear that the ‘suspension’ was ‘not done for the
sake of suspension’ but rather it was done to make the country’s partners think
twice and exhibit the political will to move towards ratification. Russian elites
argued the timing of the announcement is important because, although the decree
was written before Putin’s meeting with Bush in Kennebunkport, it was not
signed until after the meeting occurred, which showed that Russia attempted to
use all available opportunities to prevent ‘suspension’ from occurring (Areshev,
2007: 129).
According to a former high-ranking Russian official the ‘last straw was a
report to President Putin’ about the CFE Treaty which prompted him to ask for
an explanation of how the flank regime and its limitations worked. The former
official stated that after getting an explanation from the General Staff, Putin
spoke to Bush and posited a hypothetical scenario, asking Bush what he would
do if there was an international treaty which prohibited him from moving tanks
between two U.S. states to which Bush responded by saying that he would move
the tanks anyways. Putin, according to the former official, responded to Bush’s
answer by saying ‘O.K. George, I’ll follow your advice’. Another factor, accord-
ing to a high-ranking Russian MFA official, was that by 2007 it ‘became clear
that the position of some states would not change’ but, in particular, the position
of the U.S. due to the Senate’s conditions for ratification, including compliance
with the Istanbul Agreement.
On July 13, 2007, Russia announced that it was ‘suspending’ its participation
in the CFE Treaty effective December 12, 2007 (Russian MFA, 2007b). Shortly
after the announcement that Russia would no longer apply the treaty, Putin stated
at a meeting with high-ranking officials in the military and security services that
the decision was the result of the failure of states to ratify the ACFE and that ‘it
has been delayed to such an extent that Russia has been forced to suspend its
participation in the Treaty and its associated international agreements’ (Putin,
2007j). In an effort to prove the out-datedness of the non-adapted treaty, Putin
suggested appointing one of the members of the military present as the ‘district
commander’ of the Baltic Military District because that was where the CFE
Treaty placed the Baltic countries (Putin, 2007j). While Putin and his colleagues
were saying that Russia was only ‘suspending’ its participation and not with-
drawing, Lavrov argued in an article that the out-datedness of the arrangement
and the bloc history behind it might be better resolved if the involved states
‘start[ed] creating new arms control and confidence-building structures that meet
the requirements of our time, given that we are not adversaries any longer and
do not wish to make a false impression that war is still a possibility in Europe’
(Lavrov, 2007c).
A little more than a week before the ‘suspension’ went into effect, Putin again
reiterated that Russia’s decision was the result of the failure of states to ratify the
ACFE and the expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders, thus placing the blame
for the Russian decision squarely on the other state parties for their failure to act
and that their choices made the Russian decision unavoidable (Putin, 2007c).
The idea that Russia’s ‘suspension’ was the result of the West’s actions, not Rus-
sia’s, is a recurring theme. It has been argued that the decision was necessary
because of the failed effort to have the NATO countries see that the expansion of
the alliance was impacting the strategic situation in Europe and because the CFE
Treaty did not reflect the reality of Europe (Belobrov, 2009: 71). In Russia, the
‘suspension’ was interpreted as a sign that the country was not scared of openly
opposing NATO, and in particular the U.S., on issues of national security and
when Russia feels international agreements are not being complied with
(Lebedev, 2010: 38).
Russia, the 2007 ‘suspension’ of the CFE Treaty, and the aftermath
The response to Russia’s ‘suspension’ was ‘deep disappointment and concern’
from the NATO member-states (NATO, 2007a). Despite this disappointment, a
Western European ambassador stated that the ‘suspension’ decision had ‘no
practical effects because already today the thresholds of all nations, including
Russia, are much lower than permitted by the CFE Treaty and the Adapted CFE
Treaty’. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos, called the decision ‘a matter of high concern’ and ‘urge[d] all the
States Parties to renew their efforts to examine the underlying difficulties swiftly
and earnestly and work together to overcome them’ (OSCE, 2007). Despite its
‘suspension’ of the Treaty, Russian representatives continued attending and par-
ticipating in meetings of the JCG but the information exchanges and inspection
visits were no longer relevant for Russia (Kühn, 2009: 1). The ‘suspension’
meant that ‘Russia [would] not be bound by limitations on the quantities of its
conventional armaments, including the flank limitations’ but the Russian leader-
ship did say that, at the time of ‘suspension’, plans were not in place to increase
the quantity of weapons in the flank regions but that future deployments ‘of
armaments and equipment will depend on the specific politico-military situation,
inter alia on the readiness of our partners to show restraint’ (Russian Delegation,
2007).
Russia’s decision was not without controversy as questions arose regarding
the legality of ‘suspension’ and whether such a mechanism existed within the
treaty. The U.S. argued that since the CFE Treaty and related agreements did not
provide for ‘suspension’ of the treaty, the ‘suspension is not justified under cus-
tomary international law under the circumstances cited by the Russian Federa-
tion’, which was the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (State
Department, 2008). The Treaty did allow for the withdrawal of a state party ‘if it
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have
jeopardised its supreme interests’ or if another state increases its equipment hold-
ings to such an extent that it creates ‘an obvious threat to the balance of forces
within the area of application’ (CFE Treaty, 1990: 21–22). Russia did claim
‘exceptional circumstances’ when it decided to ‘suspend’ with the circumstances
being: not changing the state groupings after the former Warsaw Pact countries
joined NATO, the members of NATO who are not subject to the CFE Treaty, the
American plans to station conventional military forces in Bulgaria and Romania,
and the failure of NATO member-states to comply with Istanbul Agreement com-
mitments involving early ratification and territorial ceilings for treaty limited
equipment (President of Russia, 2007). Russia’s actions and statements were in
compliance with the steps taken to withdraw from the treaty, rather than steps for
an undetermined (and unestablished) ‘suspension’ procedure.
Between the announcement of the ‘suspension’ and its effective date, a
Parallel Action Plan was developed by NATO that would have the Istanbul com-
mitments met and the ACFE Treaty enter into force by the following summer
(Lachowski, 2009: 5). According to a high-ranking Russian MFA official, there
were good conversations between Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Department
for Security and Disarmament at the MFA, and Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary
of State for Europe, regarding the CFE Treaty but once the Russian ‘suspension’
went into force, the conversations failed. According to a Western MFA official,
the initial Parallel Action Plan proposal was made during a 2 + 2 meeting, a
meeting between the American Secretaries of State and Defence and Russia’s
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and it would have provided a compre-
hensive solution and also would have resolved the Georgian situation ‘but the
Georgians balked’ and that is when the Russians were ‘lost’. That the meetings
were between the Americans and Russians was explained by a high-ranking
Russian MFA official as being the result of the fact that ‘the Americans ha[ve]
instructions from Washington not to allow Europeans to engage’ Russia over the
CFE and because the Europeans have a preference for delegating CFE conversa-
tions to the U.S. and Russia. The Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Depart-
ment of the MFA, Alexander Kramarenko, would question the importance of the
CFE Treaty to the other treaty parties since they did not ‘walk an extra mile to
save it’ (Kramarenko, 2008).
The change of president from Putin to Medvedev saw no reversal in Russia’s
‘suspension’ decision but Medvedev did use the situation surrounding the CFE
Treaty to argue for a new Euro-Atlantic security system. Medvedev argued, in
July 2008, that he did ‘not want to think that it would take the Treaty’s complete
and final collapse to convince everyone of the non-viability of an unfair arms-
control agreement or the need to create in [the] Euro-Atlantic area a truly open
and collective security system’ (Medvedev D., 2008k). The conflict with Georgia
and the ‘suspension’ of the CFE Treaty were both used by Medvedev to argue
that ‘European security is still far from perfect’ and that the issues that existed
needed to be addressed (Medvedev D., 2009n).
In May 2009, Russia put forward 12 points in a proposal to the JCG called
‘Restoring the Viability of the CFE Treaty: A Way Forward’ which included the
following measures: the timely ratification of the ACFE; the abolition of the
flanks for Russia but there could potentially be additional CSBMs that could be
created ‘on a reciprocal basis with other partners’; agreement that NATO would
honour TLE limits in the ACFE, if the document has not yet entered into force,
and that non-CFE members of NATO would have a path for treaty membership;
a promise that ACFE would be modernised after entry into force; agreement that
Russia’s peace-keeping mission in Moldova could continue; an understanding
that ‘depending on the situation at the time’, Russia could potentially agree to
‘transparency measures regarding Moldova and the “Trans-Caucasus” ’; and
lastly agreement that Russia would end its suspension of the CFE regime follow-
ing either the ACFE entering force or with its provisional application
(Lachowski, 2010: 431–432). Under the Russian proposal, issues with Istanbul
Agreement compliance would not be resolved and instead Russia sought
approval to continue its policies in Moldova and Georgia. While Russia had sug-
gested there could be transparency measures in Moldova and the Caucasus, the
proposal did not guarantee them and instead made their prospects conditional.
The proposed abolishment of the flanks for Russia would permit Russia to move
its equipment and people as needed throughout its territory but did not consider
eliminating the flanks for the other countries that they apply to.
The discussions between NATO and Russia, led by the State Department’s
Victoria Nuland, had succeeded, according to a high-ranking Central European
diplomat in ‘get[ting] some momentum’ but showed that there was ‘not enough
common ground and positions were too far apart’. The introduction of a proposal
by NATO member-states on June 14, 2010 for a framework in which conven-
tional arms control could be considered was based on the ACFE Treaty and other
legally- and politically-binding arrangements while suggesting ‘reciprocal trans-
parency and verification, mutual limitations and restraints, and renewed commit-
ment to the principle of host state consent’ (Lachowski, 2011: 414). An
American proposal suggested that the framework operate ‘at 36’ meaning that
all NATO member-states and CFE treaty parties would participate, thus address-
ing Russian concerns about NATO members, such as the Baltic States, which
are not a treaty parties to either the CFE or ACFE treaties (Lachowski, 2011). At
the 2010 OSCE Summit, Medvedev expressed his wish that they could ‘finally
break the deadlock on the issue of the conventional arms control regime’ and he
committed Russia to ‘actively, helping to find solutions to these issues’
(Medvedev D., 2010h). This hope was reflected in the ‘at 36’ meetings held from
November-December 2010 where ‘both Russia and the USA presented draft
framework agreements, and many Western delegations acknowledged that the
Russian text was a constructive contribution’ (Lachowski, 2011: 416).
By February 2011, there was agreement on the title ‘Framework for Negoti-
ations to Strengthen and Modernise the Conventional Arms Control Regime in
Europe’ which was meant to offer a way for any potential treaty parties to enter
into the negotiations but a month later Russia rejected a proposal that would
have seen the implementation of some CSBMs during the negotiation period
(Schmidt & Zellner, 2012: 443–444). One high-ranking Russian MFA official
criticised the talks, arguing that ‘Toria Nuland arranged negotiations in a way
that led to inevitable deadlock’ because of NATO’s preconditions. Criticism of
the discussions was not limited to the Russian side. A Western MFA official
stated that the ‘way we pursued the Framework Agreement was not designed in
a way to maximise success’ because the process was focused on NATO and
‘very conservative’. The official felt this was because the talks set out a NATO-
versus-Russian position from the beginning and that the ‘shape of the discussion
table enhanced the Russian feeling of isolation’. A high-ranking Western official
said that the Russians present at the talks did put down texts during the conver-
sations but that the texts did not include issues of host nation consent and were
‘reactive’ to the proposals of other countries rather than Russian initiated. While
discussions surrounding the CFE Treaty lasted until May 2011, by September
2010 Defence Minister Serdyukov was calling for a new treaty to be written
because the Russian leadership was willing to continue the moratorium until
NATO countries accepted their position and offered suggestions that met with
Russian approval (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2010).
The issue of host nation consent proved to be a difficult point for the two
sides to address. While talks between Russia and the NATO member-states were
conducted from June 2010 to May 2011, the lack of agreement on how to move
forward showed that despite NATO initially overcoming Russia’s resistance to
‘any preconditions for talks on a new treaty’, the issues of host nation consent
and Russia adhering to the CFE Treaty during negotiations proved impossible
for Russia to agree with (Collina, 2011). In July 2011, DFM Grushko announced
that ‘consultations within the framework of new talks on control over conven-
tional armed forces in Europe have ended in a stalemate’ because certain states
are attempting to use the talks to restore CFE and to ‘deal with political prob-
lems far removed from the sphere of disarmament’ (Grushko, 2011a). As a high-
ranking Russian MFA official explained, Russia and NATO ‘understand [the]
principle [of host nation consent] in different ways’ because from the Russian
perspective, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have given them bilateral consent, even
if NATO states don’t recognise them as countries, and because the Russian
troops in Moldova are operating as peacekeepers. The official argued that agree-
ments on ‘conventional arms control [are] not supposed to settle regional con-
flicts and issues of territorial integrity’ and that the states should ‘leave [regional
conflicts] to political experts and deal with [the] arms control issues’. Despite
arguments that conventional arms control should not resolve the regional con-
flicts, it has been recognised that the areas where these conflicts occur are the
areas where arms control is most necessary because of the potential for the con-
flicts to reignite (Shakirov, 2013: 18).
There was a feeling from a high-ranking Central European diplomat that the
frozen conflicts issue was ‘mostly about Georgia’ because ‘we could find ways
around’ the problems with Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh but with Rus-
sia’s recognition of the breakaway regions, the big question became ‘who will
be a part of a new treaty?’ Issues surrounding host nation consent and the Istan-
bul Agreements were complicated by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as independent states because as Grushko explained ‘the bases
were deployed with the consent of these states, and this was formulated in the
relevant agreements’ despite no other CFE state party recognising the two break-
away republics as countries. (WNC: Interfax, 2010). As a high-ranking Western
official argued, the U.S. could not abandon the issue of host nation consent
because to do so would mean that Russia would be able to ‘cherry pick’ its
application of the Istanbul Agreement and because countries should have a say
about what is on their territory. A high-ranking Western diplomat argued that it
is important that negotiations are conducted in a ‘status neutral way’ so that there
is no recognition of the breakaway regions as independent states. The diplomat
stated that it is ‘very important to think about [conversations on host nation
consent] as part of an organic process’ which will include Russia, Georgia, the
U.S. and other states. A compromise on the issue of the Istanbul Agreement
commitments within NATO itself seems unlikely as a high-ranking Eastern
European diplomat declared that ‘Istanbul is a flagship for’ the diplomat’s
country and although Moldova, Romania and Turkey are the only countries that
really mention Istanbul anymore, other countries, particularly France and
Germany, are ‘not so keen’ to press the issue because it is important to have
NATO unity.
The debate over the continued existence of the flank areas has also been a
complicating factor in the discussions between Russia and the West. A Western
European ambassador pointed out that with ‘Turkey and the flank regime and the
United States in regard to Georgia and the unresolved territorial conflicts’ there
were many problems with the discussions, which has meant that the ‘territorial
conflict . . . must be resolved or there will be no CFE Treaty in the future or
Adapted CFE Treaty’. From the perspective of a high-ranking Western official,
‘in the end, host nation consent [was] more important than the flanks’ because
there could have been creative ways to address the flank issues. Amongst the
NATO countries themselves there is difficulty in determining how to address
concerns about the flank areas because, as a high-ranking Central European
diplomat emphasised, the ‘flank regime is very important for some NATO allies’
and that NATO is split with ‘some allies [who] say if we are more forthcoming
and make some concessions’ progress could be made.
Besides the issue of the flanks and host nation consent, another issue remains.
As a Russian MFA official explained, the ‘five categories [of TLE seen in the
CFE Treaty] would not play in’ the creation of a new conventional arms control
regime and that what should be included in a new treaty has become ‘the
$64,000 question’. A different Russian MFA official stated that ‘technology
evolves [and this] should be taken into account’ because, for example, the
existing CFE Treaty would see the definition of ‘combat aircraft qualify[ing]
some UAVs’, or unmanned aerial vehicles. According to a former high-ranking
Russian official, the ‘five categories [of TLE] are out of date’ and ‘if anyone
wants to have a new treaty we have to have new categories’ but agreement on
these categories would be difficult to achieve because, for example, a cruise
missile could be considered a conventional weapon or a strategic one.
It became clear by the end of 2011 that progress on the CFE/ACFE treaty
regime was not going to be made and consequently, the announcement was made
by State Department spokeswoman (and former CFE Envoy) Victoria Nuland on
November 22 that the U.S. would no longer apply the CFE Treaty to Russia
(Nuland, 2011b). The decision by the other NATO state parties of the CFE
Treaty to also put a moratorium on cooperation with Russia in regards to the
CFE Treaty was confirmed at the NATO Ministerial on December 7, 2011 when
the NATO foreign ministers declared that the decision was ‘a considered
response’ and that should Russia decide to resume its treaty participation, the
moratorium would end (NATO, 2011a).
The Russian response to the announcements was muted and the MFA state-
ment on the issue said that the ‘the motives behind such actions are understand-
able to us’ and explained that the decision of the NATO states meant Russia and
the NATO states ‘are in the same position’ in regards to the application of the
treaty and that ‘the decision of the North Atlantic Alliance, without prejudice to
the interests of Russia, demonstrates the need to step up efforts of all interested
countries in determining the further fate of the conventional arms control regime
in Europe’ (Russian MFA, 2011b). DFM Riabkov pointed out that the absence
of a military data exchange under CFE was not a concern because ‘we receive
the necessary data to analyse the military-political situation through other chan-
nels, including [the] global exchange of military information and in the frame-
work of the Vienna Document’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2011e). At the OSCE
Ministerial Council two weeks later, Lavrov did not mention the CFE Treaty at
all but instead called for ‘the elaboration of a new legally binding treaty on con-
ventional arms control in Europe’ (Lavrov, 2011d). In his press conference fol-
lowing a meeting of the NRC a few days after the Ministerial, Lavrov did say
that in regards to the discussions surrounding the CFE Treaty ‘we were never
able to break the impasse that has developed as a result of the crisis in our rela-
tions due to NATO’s refusal to ratify the’ ACFE and that preconditions from
NATO, presumably regarding the recognition of territorial integrity and host
nation consent, did not provide the grounds for progress to be made (Lavrov,
2011b).
Before the return of Putin to the presidency, Lavrov reiterated that Russia
wanted negotiations on CFE and the country wanted an agreement ‘in which no
one would have any supremacy, and where the treaty would contain no restric-
tions the previous version imposed – on the deployment of the armed forces in
one’s own territory, flank restrictions’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2012a). Deputy
Defence Minister Antonov relayed an exchange he had where ‘a Deputy Defence
Minister of a leading European country told me recently that his country needed
transparency, lower thresholds in exercise notifications and a solution [to] the
Abkhaz problem for cooperation in the CFE Treaty’ (ITAR-TASS Daily,
2012d). From Antonov’s perspective, the first two issues were covered by the
Vienna Document but the issue of Abkhazia could not be solved in an arms
control agreement (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2012d). Given Lavrov’s statement and
the desire to see a lack of restrictive measures, it became clear that for some sec-
tions of the Russian elite, there is a preference for the structure of the Vienna
Document rather than another CFE-style agreement because it encompasses all
states in the region, without having an impact on a state’s military equipment or
its force strength but still includes confidence-building mechanisms (Tuzin,
2011: 54).
Conclusion
The three major Euro-Atlantic security documents have all had difficulties in the
course of the first 12 years of the twenty-first century. Despite the goal of
CSBMs being, according to Lachowski, to increase cooperation, what has
occurred is that the European CSBMs are a source of conflict between Russia
and the other states. An assessment of Russia’s commitment to the region’s
legally-binding security framework had a Western MFA official declare that ‘I
think, by and large, if you are talking about their treaty commitments they may
skate close to the edge . . . [but if issues occur, they are] misunderstandings or
problems at the margin’. He was less generous in his assessment of Russia’s
commitment to politically-binding arrangements when he said that the Russians
‘don’t do such a good job’ with those. Citing examples from his experience of
working with Russians, he pointed to Vienna Document inspections where Rus-
sians have provided field glasses which are either scratched or look ‘like
someone smeared Vasoline on the lenses’ or in the case of the Open Skies
Treaty, the housing of inspectors further from the airfield than they are supposed
to be or providing unsatisfactory de-icing equipment at an Open Skies airfield
while the Russian planes there are either covered or do not need to be de-iced.
While the Vienna Document now has a procedure that allows it to accept
amendments, there have been difficulties in securing agreements, in part because
of Russia’s military modernisation and a desire of the Ministry of Defence not to
allow for increased transparency measures. As a result, Russia has even begun to
back away from its own proposals. The Treaty on Open Skies has seen relative
success but issues surrounding how to treat Georgia’s breakaway regions under
the Treaty and the issue of Cypriot membership have led to complications.
Russia has promoted the Treaty and its level of activity, including in moving
towards new technology, shows the country’s support of it. The situation sur-
rounding the CFE Treaty prompted then-Assistant Secretary of State, Rose
Gottemoeller, who negotiated New START, to declare in January 2012 that
‘everybody knows that the CFE Treaty simply is not relevant anymore to the
current security situation in Europe’ (Gottemoeller, 2012). Her assessment is
shared by an Eastern European ambassador who said that the CFE Treaty ‘is
dead and nothing is happening there’ but that his country ‘would be interested in
active negotiations’ if such negotiations occurred. The Russian side is equally
pessimistic about the prospects of the CFE Treaty with a former high-ranking
official saying that there is ‘no prospect for legally-binding arms control in
Europe’ and that he did not ‘know how to overcome the deadlock’. As a high-
ranking Russian MFA official argued, ‘any person who thinks realistically . . .
would see that after August 2008 conditions changed’. While Lavrov said after
Russia’s ‘suspension’ went into effect that Russia had not ‘closed the door’ on
CFE and that the country was ‘keen on livening up, saving, modernising the
regime of control over conventional arms forces in Europe’, a month later, he
was calling for ‘new approaches . . . to modernize the security architecture in’ the
Euro-Atlantic space (Lavrov, 2007f, 2008e). In the next chapter on Medvedev’s
proposal for a new European Security Treaty, Russia’s proposed new approach
will be considered.
Notes
1 Treaty Parties include: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, U.K., Ukraine, and U.S. (Kyrgyzstan has signed but not yet ratified).
2 Treaty Parties include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, U.K., Ukraine and the U.S.
7 Medvedev’s draft European
Security Treaty
A different idea?
With the future of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty undeter-
mined and a new Russian president due to take office, the conversation on Euro-
Atlantic security changed in 2008. In the time before leaving office, the Putin
Administration made clear that issues of Euro-Atlantic security were going to
remain important in Russian foreign policy. With his first major speech outside
of Russia as president, Dmitry Medvedev guaranteed Euro-Atlantic security
would be a key point of his agenda with the West. The introduction of the
Medvedev draft European Security Treaty (EST) represents a major foreign
policy initiative of Medvedev and an interesting point of comparison with the
Euro-Atlantic security policies of his predecessor.
In a speech given in Berlin shortly after his inauguration, Medvedev argued that
‘we especially need to be aware of the consequences of marginalising and isolating
countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security and abandoning the
creation of general regional collective security systems’ which was the situation he
saw Europe in (Medvedev D., 2008l). Medvedev also called for the ‘drafting and
signing [of] a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisa-
tions currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties’ (Medvedev
D., 2008l). It was this speech and the subsequent Medvedev proposal that gave a
Central European ambassador the feeling that foreign policy was ‘firmly under the
MFA’, as opposed to under the Presidential Administration like it was when Putin
was president, because the speech appeared to be ‘strangely well-written’ given
Medvedev’s lack of foreign policy experience and because of the clear influence of
the MFA’s Department of European Cooperation in the speech. Medvedev’s sug-
gestion of a new treaty would result in a proposal to reshape the post-Cold War
Euro-Atlantic security system, which was designed to deal with the fact that there
were ‘different security systems for different OSCE member-states – one for
NATO members, another for EU members, a third for NATO and EU members
and a fourth for the rest’ (Klepatskii, 2010: 59).
The Medvedev proposal

At a speech to the 2007 World Economic Forum in Davos, which is regarded as
First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev’s introduction to the West, Medvedev
Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty 117
declared that ‘we are not forcing anyone to love Russia’ but that ‘we will not
allow anyone to do Russia harm’ (WNC: Interfax, 2007b). He also stated that
the country would push for its citizens and country to be respected by others
through ‘responsible behaviour and successes’, not by military force (WNC:
Interfax, 2007b). As a presidential candidate, Medvedev did not focus on issues
of Euro-Atlantic security but instead focused his campaign primarily on domestic
issues. When discussing foreign policy, he did say that Russia would continue to
pursue discussions and opportunities for cooperation as the country sought part-
ners for resolving important problems throughout the world. (WNC: ITAR-
TASS, 2008). Following the presidential election, Medvedev gave foreign policy
observers the impression that Russian foreign policy would see continuity from
the Putin presidency when he stated that he was ‘convinced that we need an
independent foreign policy, something like what it has been these last eight
years’, which would see the use of international agreements to support Russia’s
interests (Petrovskaya, 2008). This impression of continuity in policy was some-
thing Putin had promoted before the election when he spoke of Medvedev’s
foreign policy credentials, calling him ‘one of the co-authors of Russia’s foreign
policy’ during the Putin presidency and stating that Medvedev is ‘thoroughly
familiar with all the current affairs and all of our strategic plans and he will
therefore be a reliable and dependable partner, well-versed in the subject and
ready for constructive dialogue while at the same time upholding Russia’s
national interests’ (Putin, 2008d).
Despite the impression that continuity between Putin and Medvedev would
be a key element of Medvedev’s foreign policy, upon assuming office Medvedev
chose to confront the complex issue of Euro-Atlantic security in a different
manner than his predecessor. Although the CFE Treaty ‘suspension’ would
remain in effect under Medvedev, the decision to put forward a proposal to
reshape the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture shows a difference
between the two men. Until the Medvedev proposal, a major Russian security
initiative for the Euro-Atlantic space had not been proposed. Consequently, the
proposal was important because it marked the first time since the creation of the
Russian Federation that the country was advancing ‘a positive rather than neg-
ative agenda for Europe’ (Kortunov, 2009: 33). The Medvedev proposal has
been called ‘perhaps one of the most important initiatives in the international
arena by Moscow since the break-up of the Soviet Union’ (Lomagin, 2011: 182).
The proposal was considered ‘a serious and substantive attempt to modernize
and reshape European security arrangements along shared, pan-European lines
. . . in an association of countries whose sum is greater than its parts’ (Pabst,
2010: 5). It has been argued that the proposal’s position as a central element of
conversations about Europe ‘can be considered as a great achievement of Rus-
sia’s diplomacy’ (Kortunov, 2009: 16).
It has been written that Medvedev’s suggestion for a new European security
agreement ‘supplemented Putin’s policy’ because it sought to end the bloc
format of European security, a policy which Putin advocated, while also seeking
to divide the West (de Haas, 2010: 106). There are also arguments that the
118 Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty
Medvedev plan was building on Putin’s policies from 2007, which would see ‘a
return to the geopolitics and balance-of-power arrangements of the Soviet era’
(Shevtsova, 2010: 322). The proposal also demonstrated that ‘Russia prefers to
verbalize its message addressed to the West as an interest-based speech act with
obvious pragmatic overtones’ (Makarychev, 2011: 66). During his presidency,
Putin and his officials would speak about how Russia’s foreign policy decision-
making was done pragmatically. It is important, therefore, to consider not just
the proposal itself and how it developed but also whether the proposal reflects
Putin’s 2007 statements regarding Euro-Atlantic security in order to establish
whether Medvedev’s proposal differs from Putin’s ideas on how to address the
region’s security.
Putin’s 2007 statements

As there are arguments, in particular those of de Haas and Shevtsova, that the
Medvedev proposal was in line with what Putin was arguing in 2007, it is
important to look first at what Euro-Atlantic security policies Putin was promot-
ing during that year. In particular, statements made about what the security
system should look like will be important because if the Medvedev proposal is
merely a reflection of Putin’s own suggestions, it will be most apparent in these
statements. Examining the statements of not only Putin but also other top offi-
cials during the same time period will provide the background necessary to
understand the Medvedev proposal itself.
During his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, in which he
addressed Russia’s issues with the CFE Treaty, Putin also put forward some
ideas of what the security system should be. He sharply criticised the idea of a
unipolar world saying that the idea is ‘not only unacceptable but also imposs-
ible in today’s world . . . and what is even more important is that the model
itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations
for modern civilisation’ (Putin, 2007k). In October 2007, Putin would build
off his arguments from Munich and explained that uni-polarity could not actu-
ally be realised because of the demand on resources that would occur if only
one country was working to solve the problems confronting the world (Putin,
2007a). He also suggested that the idea that the unipolar power could solve
world problems is an ‘illusion’ (Putin, 2007g). Despite arguing against uni-
polarity in 2007, the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept stated that uni-polarity,
with the U.S. as the most powerful state, was not in Russia’s interest because
there was an inclination towards the dominance of western institutions, which
undermined the United Nations, and unilateralism has destabilising con-
sequences for the international systems (FPC, 2000). In 2000, Putin also said
that Russia opposed uni-polarity because it was nothing more than ‘an attempt
to establish absolute domination in international relations’ (Putin, 2000b).
While in 2000 Putin was arguing against the unipolar world that existed, in
2007 he was arguing that the ‘the unipolar world that had been proposed after
the Cold War did not take place either’ (Putin, 2007k).
Putin also used his Munich speech to support the rise of multilateral diplo-
macy with the understanding that ‘the need for principles such as openness,
transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force
should be a really exceptional measure’ (Putin, 2007k). He supported the
dominant role of the UN in the international system and argued that only the UN
should be able to authorise the use of military force and that this power could
not be allowed to be usurped by NATO or the EU (Putin, 2007k). Taking the
elements of Putin’s Munich speech into account, the speech shows that Putin
would support a European security system in which no one state leads the system
and that he would like a system in which the UN would be the determiner of
whether the use of force is appropriate.
Aside from points made during the course of the Munich speech, Putin dis-
cussed security issues in other public appearances during the course of 2007.
During a press conference, Putin summarised his position on the world system
when he said that Russia would seek a world that was multipolar, without a
leading state and has a system that considers the interests of all states (Putin,
2007g). Putin also argued that the actions that Russia takes ‘are designed to
maintain equilibrium in the world’ and that they are essential to international
peace (Putin, 2007l). In 2007, Putin sought a security system in which multi-
polarity and balance would be important and he framed Russia’s decision-
making as an attempt to seek the balance absent under the current international
system.
Putin’s concern for adherence to international law and the non-use of force
were recurring themes during 2007. Putin argued against the seeking of solutions
to international problems ‘based on the political considerations and expediency
of the moment’ and promoted the strengthening of international law as a way to
resolve conflicts (Putin, 2007f ). He also promoted the use of political tools rather
than military might as the preferred method for ending conflicts (Putin, 2007n).
To build security, Putin advocated enhancing the powers and position of the UN
to further ‘strengthen the role and importance of international law, to observe
strictly the principles of international law and state sovereignty and to strive for
consensus in our decisions’ (Putin, 2007a).
During the course of 2007, Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated and expanded
on many of the ideas that Putin had brought up at Munich or in subsequent
speeches. He stated that Russia was not seeking an international system in which
Russia secured ‘any special rights’ but declared that the country felt that ‘full
equality, particularly in threat analysis and decision making, is an indispensable
minimum’ (Lavrov, 2007h). Lavrov echoed Putin’s arguments that the world
was not unipolar, calling the idea ‘mythology’ and made similar arguments
about the capability of one state to lead a unipolar world given the demand on
their resources that would occur (Lavrov, 2007h). He also pointed out that ‘any
element of a global or European security architecture that does not rest on the
principles of equality and mutual benefit cannot be sustainable’, thus contrasting
what Russia felt was one of the key issues surrounding the CFE Treaty with
what should be part of the Euro-Atlantic security system (Lavrov, 2007e). In a
newspaper article, in which Lavrov discussed Putin’s Munich speech, Lavrov
argued that the international security system needed the leading states to work
together in observance with international law and with respect for the UN’s posi-
tion in the system (Lavrov, 2007d).
From Putin’s statements in 2007, it is apparent that Putin was not merely con-
cerned that the European security system is in need of reform but in fact he
argued that the global security system needs to be reconsidered. At a December
2007 press conference, Putin argued that ‘the system of international relations is
at a very important, transformative stage in the whole structure of global security
development’ (Putin, 2007q).) Putin’s 2007 statements show that he envisioned
reform to the global security system that would acknowledge the importance of
both international law and the UN, while allowing for multilateral diplomacy
that is on equal footing and does not allow one state a position of prominence.
While Putin’s focus was on the global security system, the Medvedev proposal
concerns itself only with the Euro-Atlantic space.
Early conversations about an agreement

Although Medvedev first introduced the idea of a new security treaty for Europe
in his June 2008 speech, there was no written proposal until November 2009.
The year and a half before the draft EST was presented has been described as
full of ‘declaratory rhetoric and aspiration’ (Herd, 2012: 129). Despite having no
formal draft, Medvedev spent the time prior to the release of the draft discussing
elements that could be included in a treaty and attempting to garner support from
European leaders for negotiations. Medvedev’s preference for negotiations on a
new security treaty has been credited to not only the Euro-Atlantic security situ-
ation that had emerged but also to his previous work as a lawyer and, therefore,
his interest in seeing any agreements be in written, not verbal, form (Lomagin,
2011: 192).
Prior to the conflict between Russia and Georgia, Medvedev did not give a
great deal of detail as to what a new treaty might include or look like. During his
June 2008 speech in Berlin, Medvedev suggested that any such agreement might
be a regional agreement that is in line with the UN Charter, that outlines the use
of force in the Euro-Atlantic space, and could also delve into arms control
(Medvedev D., 2008l). A month later, he brought the existing agreements
between Russia and the West, including the Helsinki Final Act, into considera-
tion and questioned whether they were appropriate for the present day or if they
needed to be replaced with a new document that met the realities of the present
(Medvedev D., 2008k).
In the aftermath of the Russia–Georgia conflict, Foreign Minister Lavrov sug-
gested that an ‘audit’ be conducted to determine if the existing European security
arrangements were satisfactory or if there should be a new system (Lavrov,
2008d). Only a few weeks later, Medvedev began to make the argument that as a
result of the conflict, it had become evident that ‘that the current security system
is in a state of serious breakdown, which translates into at best political clashes
and the emergence of various political problems and changing borders, and at
worst leads to bloodshed’ (Medvedev D., 2008g). It has been argued that one of
Russia’s intentions during the conflict was to show that the Euro-Atlantic
security system had failed and thus needed to be reformed, with Russia playing
an active role in the reform process (Bugajski, 2010: 4). Medvedev also used the
conflict to make the argument that the breakdown in the security system showed
that there was immediacy to the issue and that reform of the security system
could not be delayed (Medvedev D., 2008j). On the one year anniversary of the
conflict, Medvedev argued that the events of the previous year had showed that
the existing security architecture was weak and that despite Russian warnings,
no one had sought to confront the problems facing the system before conflict
broke out (Medvedev D., 2009k). In a break from Putin’s 2007 statements,
Medvedev stated that the current system, with its ‘one-sided and unipolar’
nature, failed to resolve crises and that, because of this, developing ‘a new
approach to international security’ was important (Medvedev D., 2008b).
Medvedev also declared that changes to the international security system were
important to Russia because under the existing system Russian leaders did not
see a space for the country and thus, a new system would allow Russia to have a
place (Medvedev D., 2008g). While Russian leaders used the conflict with
Georgia to further their argument about the inherent failures of the existing
security system, the conflict is regarded by some as the end to hopes of securing
an agreement and that the proposal and the conflict are related since the conflict
showed that Russia was willing to use force to resolve territorial issues (Gomar,
2010).
Medvedev’s five principles for the conduct of Russian foreign policy, which
he revealed in an interview with Russian television networks on August 31,
2008, would also be reflected in his later pronouncements over the way the Euro-
Atlantic security system should be recreated. The five principles included the
preeminent position of the basic principles of international law, that a multipolar
world should exist, that Russia does not seek conflict with other countries, that
‘protecting the lives and dignity’ of Russians is of absolute importance regard-
less of where the Russians are located, and that Russia has ‘privileged interests’
in certain areas (Medvedev D., 2008a). Several of these principles were also
those that Putin and people affiliated with his government discussed in his 2007
speeches, including those related to international law and multi-polarity. The
principle of ‘privileged interests’ proved controversial but Medvedev defended it
on the grounds that since other countries speak freely of the interests that they
have in other countries, so too should Russia (Medvedev D., 2008g).
It was not until his speech at the October 2008 World Policy Conference in
Evian that Medvedev began to present a clearer picture of what a reformed Euro-
Atlantic security system would include. Among the elements that Medvedev
deemed to be important were: establishing rules for relations within the Euro-
Atlantic space that included a promise to adhere to international law commit-
ments including those protected by the UN Charter; recognising that either using
or threatening to use force is unacceptable and there could be agreement on
conflict prevention and resolution measures; the ‘three “no’s” ’ which means ‘no
ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others’, ‘no allowing acts (by
military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security
space’ and ‘no development of military alliances that would threaten the security
of other parties to the Treaty’; that upholding the security of Europe does not
wholly fall to one organisation or country exclusively; and the creation of limita-
tions on military development and establishment of arms control restrictions
(Medvedev D., 2008i). These five elements show that Russian efforts to reshape
the Euro-Atlantic security system would be concentrated on issues of hard
security rather than human or soft security, a policy preference that has already
been discussed in regards to Russia’s relationship with the OSCE. Months later,
Lavrov elaborated on the points that Medvedev raised and discussed how a new
treaty could be developed around four areas: the first, dealing with principles for
conducting state relations; the second area would establish arms control meas-
ures and CSBMs as well as military restrictions; the third area would establish
steps for conflict resolution; and the fourth and final area would consider how to
overcome ‘new threats and challenges’, such as issues of proliferation and ter-
rorism (Lavrov, 2009d).
Medvedev’s five elements showed a move away from the structure of the
CFE Treaty. He argued that a security arrangement ‘should be equal for all states
– without isolating anyone and without zones’ of differing levels of security,
which can be seen in light of the TLE restrictions in the CFE Treaty (Medvedev
D., 2008i). Prior to Medvedev’s Evian speech, Lavrov offered a broader expla-
nation of the features of international law that should be within a new security
treaty and included respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
intervention in other state’s domestic affairs in addition to the non-use of force,
peaceful conflict resolution, and a prohibition on making security decisions that
negatively impact another state’s security as some of the proposed measures to
be included (Lavrov, 2008f ).
After his speech in Evian, Medvedev continued to argue in favour of a new
treaty and continued building on what he saw as the key elements of any poten-
tial treaty. He emphasised the importance of developing arms control mecha-
nisms and called for the establishment of a conflict resolution mechanism
(Medvedev D., 2008c). Among the measures that Medvedev promoted were the
development of CSBMs and limits on military development (Medvedev D.,
2009n). In regard to conflict prevention and resolution, Medvedev called for the
establishment of steps to solve such problems, including agreements not to use
force, agreement over CSBMs, and the development of a mechanism for discus-
sions between involved parties (Medvedev D., 2009m). Medvedev also sug-
gested that ‘there should be equal security guarantees for all people living in the
entire area of Europe, from the Atlantic, and right across the territory of our
country, the Russian Federation too’ (Medvedev D., 2009j). Similar to the call
for security guarantees was the promotion of the idea of indivisible security for
Europe (Medvedev D., 2009n). The concept of indivisible security would be
supported by an unspecified ‘enforcement mechanism’ (Medvedev D., 2009d).
Medvedev argued in favour of a new security institution that included the
countries and organisations (including the CIS, CSTO, EU, OSCE, and NATO)
from across the continent for discussing issues, which meant not dismantling the
existing organisations but instead incorporation of them (Medvedev D., 2008h).
Medvedev did acknowledge that the idea of bringing the existing security insti-
tutions into the new arrangement would be complicated because of how deci-
sions made in one would impact the others and he admitted that was something
which would need to be considered (Medvedev D., 2009j). While Medvedev
looked to preserve the existing institutions, Lavrov proved to be more critical of
the existing Euro-Atlantic security framework than the president and declared
that the region’s security organisations ‘were created either to contain Russia, of
which the creation of NATO serves as an example, or to teach Russia, in which
case I mean the OSCE’ (Lavrov, 2008b).
During this period, the lack of a formal proposal from Medvedev meant that
Euro-Atlantic countries were relying on ‘a vague statement of principles . . .
about what the security system would look like’ and thus, did not have enough
information to either endorse or reject his proposal (Krickus, 2009: 23). As a
result of the lack of available information, Medvedev’s proposal for negotiations
on a new security treaty was generally disregarded by the other countries of the
region (Roxburgh, 2012: 219). The many unanswered questions about the pro-
posal also led to speculation that the Russian proposal was an attempt to reduce
European unity on Russia policy and meant to weaken the region’s security
organisations (Mankoff, 2010: 65). It was not until the release of Medvedev’s
draft EST that answers to questions were provided and the Euro-Atlantic states
were able to understand not only what Russia was proposing but also gain an
understanding of how Russia would like to see the Euro-Atlantic security archi-
tecture changed.
Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty and Putin’s response

At the end of November 2009, a draft European Security Treaty was posted on
the Kremlin website and was sent by Medvedev to national leaders and heads of
organisations in the Euro-Atlantic region including the CIS, CSTO, EU, the
OSCE, and NATO (Medvedev D., 2009g). The development of the draft pro-
posal included unique discussions, beginning in 2008, between the Russian MFA
and outside specialists (François, 2011: 2). The short introduction to the draft
proposal, which included only 14 articles, acknowledged that the proposal was
‘based on the results of discussions that have taken place in the last year at
various venues’ (Medvedev D., 2009g). While Medvedev had spent more than a
year discussing the need for a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture and the
issues Russia has with the existing architecture, the draft document was released
with little attention brought to its contents in subsequent speeches by Medvedev.
In the preamble of the draft, the treaty parties were asked to recall a litany of
documents that the treaty parties had already agreed to, including the UN
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the 1999 Charter for European Security and
states that to use force was unacceptable in international relations (Medvedev
D., 2009g). While the preamble focused on the aforementioned documents, in
2008, Lavrov had argued that the conflict with Georgia had occurred despite the
fact that ‘European states had signed all the relevant international and regional
documents envisaging commitments to the non-use of force and to a peaceful
settlement of conflicts and the indivisibility of our common security’ (Lavrov,
2008a). The draft Medvedev proposal does not provide an explanation of how
the application of these principles, which the Russian leadership had acknow-
ledged were violated during the conflict, might be strengthened.
The first article of the proposal declared that the treaty parties would
‘cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and
undiminished security’ and that security decisions made by organisations in the
region or individual states should not impact the security interests of other states
(Medvedev D., 2009g). Indivisibility of security was something that Medvedev
had sought to have included in the treaty since his first speech on the subject in
Berlin when he said that a proposed treaty might involve indivisibility of security
and arms control and therefore, its appearance in the first article of the proposed
treaty is unsurprising (Medvedev D., 2008l).
Similar to the first article, which called on treaty members to make security
decisions with other state parties in mind, the second article prohibited a state
party or an organisation from making decisions that would meaningfully impact
the security of other treaty states (Medvedev D., 2009g). This can be seen in
direct connection with the principle of the ‘three no’s’ that Medvedev had pro-
posed in his Evian speech (Medvedev D., 2008i). The idea that one state’s
security decision-making should not result in a negative security situation for
another state is something that Lavrov stated in June 2008 was rejected at the
NATO Bucharest Summit, which took place when Putin was still president
(Lavrov, 2008b). As Lavrov acknowledged this idea pre-dates Medvedev’s pres-
idency and he also pointed out that indivisible security, upon which this idea is
premised, has already been agreed to within documents relating to NATO–
Russian relations and at the OSCE, therefore, this article can be seen as a reitera-
tion of old ideas (Lavrov, 2008c).
Article 2 also called on the parties to the treaty to adhere to UN documents
including the Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, as well as OSCE documents, such as the Helsinki
Final Act and the Charter for European Security (Medvedev D., 2009g). It was
suggested that the importance of taking the commitments in the documents and
turning them into a legally-binding form prompted questions of whether
all members of the Euro-Atlantic community still share and support these
principles? If they share and support them (and we hope that they do) why
are they reluctant to confirm, in a legally binding form, those of the political
obligations that have been already voluntarily accepted?
(Voronkov, 2009: 17)
By agreeing to convert politically-binding agreements into legally-binding docu-
ments, state parties to the Medvedev proposal would show that they were com-
mitted to the politically-binding principles (17).
Article 3 declared that a state party has the right to query other state parties
about ‘any significant legislative, administrative or organisational measures
taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might
affect its security’ (Medvedev D., 2009g). This article can be seen as establish-
ing a means for discussing the concerns states might have about compliance with
article one. Article 4 established a three-step process for dealing with disagree-
ments amongst states about ‘interpretation or application’ of the treaty, which
included consultative talks, a conference of treaty states, and an extraordinary
conference of treaty parties (Medvedev D., 2009g). Articles 5 and 6 expanded
on how the first two of the three steps would be conducted, including allowing
states that are not involved in the consultative talks to attend and establishing the
necessary quorum for the second stage (Medvedev D., 2009g). The process that
was discussed in Articles 4 through 6 can be seen as reflecting the already exist-
ing regional security framework.
The seventh article of the Medvedev draft European Security Treaty declared
that ‘every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other
Party an armed attack against itself ’ and that treaty parties can provide ‘the
attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the
military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security’, similar to NATO’s Article V col-
lective defence (Medvedev D., 2009g). The fact that the clause would remain in
effect only until the UN Security Council became involved in conflict resolution
shows Russia’s desire to secure the preeminent place for the Security Council in
resolving security issues.
In accordance with Article 8, an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties
could be used to allow states to respond to an attack on another treaty party and
the Conference may not be limited solely to treaty parties but instead could
include other countries, organisations, or other parties (Medvedev D., 2009g).
The purpose of the Conference would be ‘to decide on necessary collective
measures’ and would be conducted under ‘its own rules of procedure’ but would
need 80% of treaty parties present for quorum (Medvedev D., 2009g). Any deci-
sions made during the conference would need to be arrived at via ‘unanimous
vote’, however if one state party to the treaty is the attacker of another, they
would lose the right to vote against any of the binding decisions that the confer-
ence arrives at (Medvedev D., 2009g).
Articles 9 and 10 addressed the role of the UN in relation to the proposed
treaty and expanded on potential treaty membership. Article 9 was similar to the
preamble in that it discussed the role of the UN Security Council as the leading
organisation for security issues (Medvedev D., 2009g). It also called on states to
not agree to any international commitments that are in contradiction with the
proposed treaty (Medvedev D., 2009g). Both the importance of the United
Nations and the adherence to international law can be seen in many of Putin’s
statements from 2007 and their presence in the draft, particularly given that
Medvedev had also emphasised their significance, shows a connection between
the Putin and Medvedev presidencies. Article 10, which was a point often dis-
cussed by Medvedev during his speeches before the release of the draft, was that
treaty membership should not be limited to merely the countries of the Euro-
Atlantic space but also that organisations, including the CIS, CSTO, EU, OSCE,
and NATO should be members (Medvedev D., 2009g).
The final four articles of the treaty delved into issues of treaty ratification,
entry into force, and the withdrawal process for the treaty. The draft treaty did
not establish a process for ‘suspension’, Russia’s chosen policy towards the CFE
Treaty, but did allow a state party to leave the treaty should they determine that
the treaty ‘endangered its supreme interests’, similar to CFE (Medvedev D.,
2009g). The draft proposal also created a process whereby additional states or
organisations could join the treaty after its entry into force if all other treaty
parties agree, which can be seen in connection to the non-membership of the
Baltic States in the CFE Treaty and the absence of a mechanism that would
allow them to join (Medvedev D., 2009g).
In order to consider whether the Medvedev proposal is truly a Medvedev initi-
ative, it is also important to consider the response of Putin to the proposal. Putin
did not speak publicly a great deal on the subject of the Medvedev proposal. On
November 24, 2008, Putin declared that as a result of the fact that ‘stability and
security cannot be the privilege of a limited group of countries or specific inter-
national organisations, which aren’t universal’, Medvedev had suggested that states
agree to a new European security treaty (Putin, 2008b). Putin also argued for three
rules that should be in a potential treaty, including that ‘one nation’s security is not
ensured at the expense of another’s security . . . it should prevent any country,
military union or coalition from taking any actions that could weaken common
security and unity . . . and it should prevent development and expansion of military
unions from harming other parties in the agreement’ (Putin, 2008b). Despite being
characterised in the Russian press as being ‘new’, these three points are in fact a
reiteration of Medvedev’s ‘three no’s’ that were mentioned in his Evian speech a
month earlier (Aizenstadt & Kuklina, 2008). Putin reiterated several of the points
that he made in 2007 when speaking to members of the media in January 2009.
Without mentioning Medvedev’s proposal, Putin argued that there was excessive
importance placed on force in the international system and an abandonment of the
principles of international law (Putin, 2009b). Given the position of the president
as the formulator of Russian foreign policy, the limited statements from Putin on
the Medvedev draft are unsurprising and the only public statement he made about
the specific contents that a proposal should contain reflected elements that
Medvedev had already proposed a month earlier.
Responses to the Medvedev proposal

Medvedev admitted that, in regards to the draft European Security Treaty, ‘I do
not claim it is absolutely perfect’ (Medvedev D., 2010b). When discussing the
draft, a high-ranking Russian MFA official said that ‘I don’t want to say it is
very simple’ but the goal of the proposal was ‘to bring states more together’. He
went on to say that there must be a consideration of ensuring security for all
states in the Euro-Atlantic region and that the EST proposal was an ‘invitation to
create such a system’. According to Medvedev, the draft proposal that was
offered to the heads of organisations and states was his response to requests from
leaders in the region for particulars about what he was proposing (Medvedev D.,
2009e). According to DFM Grushko, there was undivided support from more
than twenty countries’ leaders that a European Security Treaty should be signed
(Grushko & Studneva, 2010: 9). Despite some support, the response to President
Medvedev’s proposal by other members of the Euro-Atlantic community was
cautious. Some in Russia argued that the U.S. was against the proposal because
the country did not want to see any changes to the region’s security architecture
and that due to the dependence of European countries on the U.S. for their
security, the European countries would support the American position on the
issue (Solov’ev, 2010: 51). To understand the reaction to the proposal, it is
important to consider the regional organisations that Medvedev had focused on
in his draft as being potential members as well as the individual states. Outside
of the governmental conversations between Russian officials and leaders of
Euro-Atlantic countries and organisations, the academic and nongovernmental
communities in both Russia and the West also considered the proposal.
What can be seen in the period from the proposal’s release in November 2009
to Putin’s inauguration in May 2012 is the lack of movement on the draft among
the states of the Euro-Atlantic region. Discussions of the proposal not only
included conversations about the contents of the proposal itself but also the
appropriate place for debate about the proposal to occur. The summit that
Medvedev had called for in his speech where he introduced the idea of a new
treaty, which would have been used for the drafting of an agreement, never
occurred and so conversations about a new treaty were limited to the already
existing institutions (Medvedev D., 2008l).
The response to the draft European Security Treaty

The draft proposal was prepared in time for the November OSCE Ministerial
Council and the Russia–NATO Ministerial in December. After its release,
Medvedev would mention the document as something he discussed during his
meetings with Euro-Atlantic leaders but the defence of the draft, in the face of
criticism from people inside and outside of governments, was not something in
which Medvedev had an active public role.
A Western MFA official agreed that there were a ‘variety of reactions’ to the
proposal but that in the official’s opinion not ‘very many people, very many
countries, or very many governments in NATO gave it much thought’ because
the proposal ‘was not pursued in a way that people considered it to be a serious
proposal’. Even before the written proposal was produced the alliance argued
that the appropriate institution to have discussions about the proposal at was the
OSCE but the organisation did not completely reject conversations on the issue.
One Western European ambassador said that NATO’s reluctance to support the
proposal came from the fact:
that the choreography of European institutions – not only NATO and Euro-
pean Union but OSCE, Council of Europe, regional configurations including
. . . the Nordic Group or the Arctic Council . . . were conducive to our overall
European security. And that the concept of putting all of these institutions in
question by creating a new one, was misleading.
A meeting of the NRC was scheduled for September 24, 2008 to discuss
Medvedev’s idea of a new European security architecture but after the conflict
with Georgia and the suspension of NRC operations, NATO cancelled the
meeting (RIA Novosti, 2008). In response to the cancellation, the Russian dele-
gation released a statement saying, ‘we regret yet another display of capricious
politics and call upon our partners to take this matter seriously’ since the conflict
had shown that problems existed in the current architecture (RIA Novosti, 2008).
Almost a year later, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated
that ‘I am aware that the OSCE is the primary forum for such a discussion, and I
am also aware that President Medvedev’s ideas have not yet turned into concrete
proposals’ but that there was room for talks between Russia and NATO
regarding ‘Russian concerns about being marginalised in European security’
(Rasmussen, 2009). In December, after the Medvedev draft was released, Ras-
mussen argued against a new security treaty since there is an existing framework
but again stated that the OSCE should be the site of any discussions of the
Medvedev proposal (von Twickel, 2009).
The EU agreed that the proposal should be discussed in the OSCE but main-
tained a position similar to NATO that they would be willing to discuss the pro-
posal with Russia. The EU was willing to discuss the Medvedev initiative but
the EU also said that the existing European security system did not need exten-
sive modifications and the appropriate location for conversations on security
architecture is the OSCE (Averre, 2011b: 5). In May 2009, the President of the
European Commission, Javier Solana, stated that the proposal would be con-
sidered by all the OSCE members and that the EU would be ‘ready to discuss it’
(Solana, 2009). The proposed Meseberg Process, which was agreed to by
Medvedev and German Chancellor Merkel in June 2010, can be seen as part of
the EU’s response to the proposal. It called for the creation of an EU–Russia
Political and Security Committee to be headed by the EU’s High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Russian Foreign
Minister and would ‘serve as [a] forum for the exchange of views on current
topics of international political and security agenda’, while also providing a
framework for cooperation, including for EU–Russia crisis management efforts
(Memorandum, 2010). The Meseberg Process has been called ‘symbolic, with
no clear purpose or binding effect on either party’ (Sussex, 2012: 58). The pro-
spects for the Process are not very optimistic because although the European
Council had discussed the proposal, no decision was ever made to endorse the
Meseberg Process and a year after the proposal was made, the issue was not on
the agenda of the Russia–EU Summit (European Parliament, 2011). In 2012,
after Medvedev left the presidency, Vladimir Chizhov explained the lack of pro-
gress on the Meseberg Process as being the result of the EU’s decision to tie ‘the
implementation of that idea – in my opinion, without good reason – to progress
along the Transdniestrian settlement track, and then our partners shelved it’
(Chizhov, 2012: 30).
Despite being the only institution that counts the entire Euro-Atlantic com-
munity in its membership, the OSCE was not considered by Medvedev to be the
place for discussion of his proposal because the OSCE ‘has focused on solving
partial, sometimes even peripheral security issues, and this is not enough’ and
instead a different institution would provide a better place for discussions
(Medvedev D., 2009n). At the same time, the Russian government heard from offi-
cials at NATO and the EU that the OSCE was the most appropriate place for these
conversations to occur because the OSCE is the body which handles multi-
dimensional security issues (Lavrov, 2010e). While Medvedev was reluctant to use
the OSCE as the institution for debate on his proposal, the creation of the Corfu
Process under the Greek Chairmanship made the organisation the place for conver-
sation about the draft. The Corfu Process began as an ‘informal meeting of OSCE
Foreign Ministers’ in June 2009 and the first item discussed was the Medvedev
proposal (OSCE, 2012f). The December 2009 Athens Ministerial approved a dec-
laration on the Corfu Process, stating its importance in allowing states to discuss
‘disagreements openly, honestly and in an unbiased manner, acknowledging our
diversities and concerns, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding’ (Minis-
terial Council, 2009b). A decision taken at the same meeting called for on-going
talks within the context of the Corfu Process covering all three areas of security
that the OSCE considers as well as topics such as the OSCE’s relationships with
other organisations (Ministerial Council, 2009a). While the Corfu Process was
designed to address the Russian proposal, this did not stop the Russian government
from ‘attempting to establish a parallel debate involving other security organisa-
tions in the Euro-Atlantic space’ but efforts to secure a meeting of the heads of the
organisations ultimately failed (Zagorski, 2010: 43–44).
While the Corfu Process was designed to deal with the three areas of security,
Lavrov emphasised that issues of hard security, including strengthening arms
control, establishing conflict resolution measures, and CSBMs as being what the
Corfu Process would focus on (Lavrov, 2009b). In December 2009, Lavrov com-
mented that the Corfu Process’ ‘main result so far is that [it] ha[s] revealed a
general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the Euro-Atlantic region’ and
that simply talking about the OSCE’s accomplishments would not hide the issues
anymore (Lavrov, 2009e). In July 2010, at a meeting to review the Corfu
Process’ work, the Russian ambassador to the OSCE stated ‘that the Corfu
Process has helped to restore confidence among the OSCE participating States’
and that the Corfu Process had reinforced the OSCE’s role as a place for discus-
sion (Azimov, 2010i: 2). Azimov wrote in 2012 that the Corfu Process had
‘helped shake up the organisation’ while also drawing attention to the security
matters that were important to all of the organisation’s member-states (Azimov,
2012: 19).
According to a high-ranking Western official, there were some in the Euro-
Atlantic community who felt that what Russia was attempting to do with its EST
proposal could have been achieved if Russia had allowed the OSCE to ‘function
properly’. While there was some suggestion that the Russian proposal was
designed to supplant the role of the OSCE, a high-ranking Russian MFA official
stated that the proposal was ‘not about replacing the OSCE’ and another Russian
MFA official suggested that the proposal and cooperation with other organisa-
tions through the EST ‘could breathe life into the OSCE’. The official instead
saw the proposal as a reflection of the Astana Summit where countries confirmed
the ‘goal of creating a European and Eurasian security community’ and sought
the creation of a security community as described by Deutsch et al. This defini-
tion of a security community means that the ‘individuals in a group . . . have
come to agreement on at least one point: that common social problems must and
can be resolved by the processes of “peaceful change” ’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).
As one high-ranking Russian MFA official explained, with the proposal ‘Russia
is aiming at an integration process’. Despite the Russian official’s belief that
Medvedev’s proposal was complimentary to the goals set at Astana, a high-
ranking Central European diplomat declared that it was ‘difficult to agree’ on
anything at Astana and the meeting marked the ‘formal end of the Medvedev
proposal’.
According to a high-ranking Western official, the EST proposal prompted a
‘reaction [which] was deeply suspicious . . . particularly on the part of Europe’
because of concerns about circumventing NATO. During his speech in Berlin,
Medvedev discussed the idea of Atlanticism and declared that ‘it is my convic-
tion that Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day’ and
that ‘NATO has . . . failed so far to give new purpose to its existence’ (Medvedev
D., 2008l). This statement complicated his ability to gain support from Western
states since he was arguing in favour of his proposal with arguments against
NATO and Atlanticism, which raised questions about the proposals intentions
(Federov, 2009: 6). The European-centric nature of Medvedev’s ideas ‘was
designed to appeal to th[e] “pragmatic” constituency’ of Germany and France,
amongst others, who were dissatisfied with the direction of NATO at the time,
and thus the proposal was designed to take advantage of the rifts in the alliance,
those between the U.S. and Europeans and those between the European countries
(Lo, 2009: 3). While he rejected the idea of Atlanticism, Aleksei Gromyko
argued that any new European security system would still include the U.S. but
that American participation should not be that of the ‘chief tool for the consoli-
dation of European security’ (Gromyko, 2011: 25).
The implications of the proposal for NATO prompted criticism that the
Medvedev proposal was seeking to give Russia a ‘triple veto: prevent further
NATO enlargement; block the repositioning of NATO infrastructure; and nullify
NATO’s Article V guarantees’ (Bugajski, 2010: 85). The idea that the draft
would provide Russia with a veto over NATO actions has been called ‘so unso-
phisticatedly candid that serious negotiations on this point are hardly possible’
(Baranovsky, 2010: 52). A high-ranking Central European diplomat said that
there was ‘no potential’ for the Medvedev proposal because it was similar to
previous Russian proposals with its attempt at ‘trying to get a veto . . . over trans-
atlantic security’ so there was ‘no way we/the U.S./NATO could agree’ to the
proposal. A Western European ambassador said that within the alliance there
‘was always the suspicion’ that with the proposal Russia was seeking either a
veto or the ability to prevent consensus from being reached, which would then
prevent action from being taken. The impact on NATO’s Article V when taking
EST’s Articles 7 and 9 into account raised questions of whether Article V would
be able to function as it currently does due to the obligations set forward in the
EST (François, 2011: 5). Another issue with the draft is the confusion over
phrasing, due to the vagueness of wording, which did not help to reduce con-
cerns about NATO. The idea that one state, or an organisation, cannot be
responsible for ‘significantly affecting security’ of another state, one of the
vague phrases found in the document, lead to concerns about Russia attempting
to limit NATO’s actions and capabilities and what the phrase ‘significantly
affecting’ would mean in practice (Kobrinskaya, 2010: 2).
Concerns also arose over ‘Russia’s continued intervention in affairs of its
neighbours, manipulation of energy supplies, and failure to abide by existing
agreements’, which prompted Western governments to question the sincerity of
the Russian proposal, particularly in light of the conflict with Georgia (Mankoff,
2010: 65). Georgia was described by a Western diplomat as the reason that EST
‘didn’t get much resonance’ and because the proposal failed to include any
‘human dimension or host nation consent’ clauses. The fact that the proposal
was ‘calling into question’ the basic OSCE principles, including that of host
nation consent, was seen as a cause for concern by a high-ranking Western
diplomat. As Adam Rotfeld points out, Russian actions in Georgia violated three
of the Helsinki Final Act’s basic rules including the ‘inviolability of frontiers
(III), territorial integrity (IV), and non-intervention (VI)’ but that the Russian
draft proposal clearly states the importance of complying with the Final Act
(Rotfeld, 2010: 37). While Russian leaders sought to paint the Georgian conflict
as illustrating the need for a new security system (including Lavrov who argued
that what happened in South Ossetia showed ‘an obvious, undisguised, systemic
failure in this whole [existing] architecture’), Russian actions during the conflict
prompted questions about the country’s commitment to a new security arrange-
ment (Lavrov, 2010a).
Within the non-Russian non-governmental community, the reaction to the
Medvedev proposal was negative. The document was called ‘not only unsound
but impractical’ and it was argued that the draft included all ‘that is problematic
about Russia’s relationship with Europe’ (Sherr, 2010: 177). It was argued that a
significant issue with the draft was that Russia would be in breach of the agree-
ment, were it in effect, because of the country’s actions towards the CFE Treaty,
the August 2008 conflict, and non-military activities such as energy policies
which included cut-offs, cyber activity, and trade policies (Charnysh, 2010: 39).
The absence of human rights in the draft proposal and its heavy focus on the
political-military side of security also became the sources of criticism (Averre,
2011a: 15). The omission of human rights policies was considered to be an
attempt to substitute ‘value-based institutions and security relations with those
based on power’ (Herd, 2010: 13). While much of the comments about the pro-
posal were focused on the negatives, it was acknowledged that the draft did
represent a move by the Russian leadership to ‘put forward a set of ideas that go
beyond the purely reactive’ (Lo, 2009: 1).
Although there were some positive responses to the idea of a new European
security architecture, even within Russia the response to the proposal was mostly
critical. While Fyodor Lukyanov called the Medvedev proposal ‘Moscow’s first
attempt in 20 years to formulate a coherent foreign-policy vision’ and that due to
the division between established legal principles and the current political situ-
ation, there was a need for the rethinking of the security architecture, other opin-
ions were not as encouraging (Lukyanov, 2009). A former high-ranking Russian
official stated that while the proposal came from the idea that ‘no security issue
in Europe can be solved without Russia’ and that the goal of the proposal was to
‘balance the role of Russia’ on security issues, the official ‘was rather pessim-
istic about Medvedev’s idea’. One Russian commentator claimed that the draft
proposal ‘smacks of a trap [for the West] that is thinly veiled in flowery, diplo-
matic language’ and that the proposal’s attempt to be both a collective defence
treaty and a treaty where member-states consider other treaty parties to be pos-
sible adversaries cannot be reconciled which made the whole proposed agree-
ment appear ridiculous (Golts, 2009). The proposal was compared to ‘a
propaganda exercise in a very old tradition of Soviet peace initiatives’ and did
not have good prospects (Feifer, 2009).
One of the challenges that Russian commentators focused on was that the
content of the proposal had implications for issues that are considered important
for the country. While Articles 7 and 8 of the draft addressed the issue of providing
assistance to a fellow treaty-party who is threatened or attacked, it is unclear how
much the mechanism would actually be used since most Russians feel that for the
NATO treaty-parties using the alliance’s Article V would be the chosen measure
(Smirnov, 2010: 34). From the perspective of a Russian MFA official, he did not
see the Medvedev proposal ‘as a contradiction to Article V’. The proposal was
considered ‘idealistic’ because the idea that one state’s ability to secure itself ends
when it impacts another is difficult to implement in practice (Lomagin, 2011: 189).
There were concerns amongst the Russian elite about what Article 2, paragraph 3
of the Medvedev proposal would mean for Russian forces in Transdniestria
because the proposal calls on states to not allow their territory to be used by other
treaty parties if the party is considering using the territory to attack another treaty
party or if the presence of a foreign state’s military on the territory of a treaty party
would impact the security of any state party to the EST (Oznobishcheva, 2010: 7).
In the case of Transdniestria, the Moldovans could argue that the presence of the
Russian troops in the region impacts Moldova’s security.
Russian responses to the conversations surrounding the EST
proposal
According to Russian leaders, the responses of the Euro-Atlantic states were
varied. In 2010, Medvedev described the response to his initiative as ‘initially
very cautious, then it became sceptical, and now it can be described as pessimis-
tically restrained’ (Medvedev D., 2010g). By May 2010, Lavrov said that ‘the
discussion is not going smoothly’ but that at least discussion was occurring
(Lavrov, 2010f ). In 2012, Alexander Sternik, the Deputy Director of the Russian
MFA’s Department of European Cooperation, stated that NATO and the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe ‘do not need a European security treaty’ but
that in the future the proposal ‘might find a more sympathetic audience’ or new
suggestions might be made to address concerns about the proposal (International
Affairs, 2012: 128). Konstantin Kosachev suggested that until it was clear to
NATO members that the existing issues with the security system could become
a threat to them, albeit ‘not for subjective reasons (Russia’s “malicious intent”)
but precisely for objective reasons (inefficient conflict-prevention mechanisms)’,
there would be no progress on the proposed EST or security issues of concern to
Russia (Kosachev, 2011: 3). Since the draft EST faced a great deal of criticism
for its contents, it is important to look at Russian statements in response.
The most commonly critiqued elements of the treaty appear to be focused on
concerns over the future of NATO if the treaty was agreed upon and the idea of
the indivisibility of security. These problems arose mainly from the fact that the
proposal ‘was fairly vague from the very beginning’ and that when other Euro-
Atlantic states began to be concerned that the proposal would have an impact
on NATO, it took Medvedev six months to deny that the proposal sought to end
NATO (Kortunov, 2009: 28). Medvedev confronted the issues surrounding the
impact that the draft treaty would have on NATO by saying that the proposal
was not about undermining NATO and the OSCE and that the proposal did not
have any ‘hidden agenda’ (Medvedev D., 2010f ). Lavrov argued that there were
no secret goals with the draft proposal and that Russia was not seeking to secure
a veto over NATO (Lavrov, 2009b). Concerns that the proposal was not merely
seeking to reduce NATO’s influence but instead to replace NATO itself were
responded to by Lavrov, who stated that ‘Russia does not propose that the exist-
ing European structures and institutions, whether NATO, OSCE or others,
should be destroyed’ and pointed to the fact that the draft suggests that existing
organisations become members in the new institution that the treaty would
create (Lavrov, 2009f ). Aleksei Gromyko wrote that the Russian proposal was
not seeking to eliminate existing European security organisations which deal
with politico-military affairs since each organisation is useful in its own way
(Gromyko, 2011: 25).
Article ten, which called for the inclusion of other regional organisations,
such as NATO, within the new arrangement, was deemed by one commentator
to be ‘more [like] political fiction than a realistic measure’ (Fernandes, 2012:
272). A high-ranking Russian MFA official argued that the organisations should
become members of EST but that ‘all states [should] act in their national capa-
city’, which he argued was a reflection of an idea from 1999 that the OSCE
could manage issues across organisations. The high-ranking official pointed to
anti-piracy efforts where countries are ‘working together to solve a legal issue
. . . fully aligned with international law’ and at monthly meetings, organisations
and countries meet and discuss how to ‘use all available resources . . . in a goal-
oriented approach’. The official also remarked that the EST proposal was an
‘attempt to bring the politico-military’ processes in line with current trends
because ‘sometimes outdated views exist’ and that the proposal was seeking to
‘enshrine in legally-binding form, the principle of indivisibility of security’ and
to ‘make all member-states’ equally responsible for the treaty.
Lavrov stated that, as it was Russia’s intention to see international law
enhanced under the draft proposal, one way to resolve the holes in the European
security framework would be by converting the politically-binding agreements
that had been reached since the collapse of the Soviet Union into legally-binding
documents (Lavrov, 2010d). The statement that Russia was seeking to turn
already existing commitments into legal agreements become an argument for
why a Euro-Atlantic state should be willing to sign the treaty, particularly since
they are supposed to comply with the commitments anyway (Lavrov, 2009c).
One Russian MFA official said that the challenge for the other states of the Euro-
Atlantic region was the ‘character of the obligations in the document’ because it
is ‘difficult to pass legally-binding’ agreements in some of the states but from
the Russian perspective, legally-binding arrangements are important because
although they ‘can be abandoned . . . it is difficult’. Another recommendation
regarding international law from Lavrov was that the U.S. and Canada become
members of the CoE, which would have made them legally bound to the human
and soft security elements of the CoE but such a scenario is unlikely given that
membership in the CoE is limited to European countries (Lavrov, 2010b).
Although arms control had been something that both Lavrov and Medvedev
had said could be included in the draft, when the draft was released in 2009 arms
control was not present. This was explained as being the result of ‘contacts we
had had and the opinions of our partners’, which determined that these types of
measures were best left to be debated within the Corfu Process (Lavrov, 2010b).
Despite the absence of arms control measures, hard security issues were not far
from the minds of Russian leaders and when faced with questions from the West
about the circumstances which would make a clause that does not allow one
state to make security decisions that might negatively impact the security of
another useful, Lavrov responded ‘missile defence’ (Lavrov, 2011c). While hard
security measures may not be explicitly discussed in the draft, one Western
ambassador characterised Russian efforts with the proposal to be an attempt by
Russia to secure for Russia a similar role to that of the Americans as ‘a provider
of security and a provider of institutional frameworks to security in Europe’.
Between February and December 2011, European security was not mentioned
as often publicly as it had been during the earlier years of the Medvedev presid-
ency, although it was discussed during bilateral meetings with several leaders.
The proposal was not abandoned as Medvedev’s presidency drew to a close and
during a March 2012 address to the conference Euro-Atlantic Security Com-
munity: Myth or Reality?, hosted by the Russian Council for International
Affairs, Medvedev stated that:
We have made our contribution to this competition of ideas [on ‘how to

bolster the cooperative foundations of international relations’] with our
European Security Treaty, but we are ready to discuss other ideas too on
how to ensure indivisible security. We never put on blinkers and do not take
the attitude that our idea is the best and that we should not therefore discuss
any other proposals. This is not the case. But we have yet to see and hear
these other ideas.
(Medvedev D., 2012b)
Medvedev’s public mentioning of the proposal may have declined for more than
half a year in 2011 but the Russian MFA continued to mention the draft. Lavrov
would discuss the EST proposal several times during this period, including at a
February address at the London School of Economics, a June speech to the Duma’s
Committee on International Affairs, a September speech at Moscow State Institute
of International Relations (MGIMO), and a November speech to the Free Inde-
pendent University of Moldova. At the OSCE’s Annual Security Review Confer-
ence in June, DFM Grushko said that the Medvedev proposal was ‘aimed at the
final overcoming of the dividing lines in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok’
and represents one of the goals set forward at the OSCE’s Astana Summit to estab-
lish a security community in the region (Grushko, 2011b).
The fact that the proposal was being discussed within the regional security
organisations and during Russia’s conversations with other countries was seen as
a positive step. Lavrov reiterated throughout the period following the release of
the draft proposal that it was an assessment of the sincerity of the other Euro-
Atlantic states (Lavrov, 2010d). In February 2010, Lavrov declared that ‘the test
of sincerity goes on, because no one refuses to discuss the Treaty, and this in my
view already matters a lot’ and that the document represents a ‘test’ because it is
not asking Euro-Atlantic states to agree to new ideas but instead seeking to turn
political agreements into legal commitments (Lavrov, 2010a).
Conclusion
During both the Putin and Medvedev presidencies, the issues surrounding the
existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture remained important and of concern.
Despite efforts under Medvedev, as seen in the previous chapter, to discuss a
way forward on the CFE Treaty, another conversation was occurring that sought
to reshape the security system. Given the concerns about Russia’s actions during
August 2008 and the fact that the CFE was in a state of paralysis due to Russian
decisions, the Russian proposal faced difficult prospects. Convincing other
countries that Russian intentions with the EST proposal were positive proved
difficult. The fact that a draft written proposal failed to materialise until more
than a year after the Russia–Georgia conflict meant that Russian intentions were
now being questioned and the level of trust between Russia and the West was
not at a level high enough to reach the sort of agreement being proposed.
Unlike Putin’s Munich speech, which drew lots of attention but no real action,
Medvedev’s draft can be seen as playing an important role in pulling the ‘OSCE
out of hibernation and stimulat[ing] the launch, including at its venue, of a broad
discussion on the issue of having the European architecture meet the demands of
the times and the realities of the post-Cold War world’ (Lavrov, 2010c). A high-
ranking Western diplomat declared that the proposal was a case of Russia
‘changing the conversation’. Although, as one high-ranking Russian MFA offi-
cial acknowledged, the proposal ‘failed to launch a new process’, it did spark a
dialogue. A different MFA official said that ‘we expected more’ of a response
but that the proposal had ‘helped to create a positive agenda’ and ‘show[ed]
Russia is willing to talk’ about European security issues. As a Western European
ambassador acknowledged, there is ‘no formula among NATO countries, and of
course then, no formula at all with Russia to agree on a new conventional arms
control regime’ so any conversations about the Medvedev proposal, or any other
proposal, faced a challenge from the start. It is true that the Medvedev proposal
can be seen in relation to Putin’s policies, particularly Putin’s ‘disappointment
and rejection of Western security policy’ but the proposal itself calls for meas-
ures that Putin had not previously discussed publicly as president (de Haas,
2010: 106). Although the Medvedev initiative had very little chance of ever
being agreed to by the states of the Euro-Atlantic region, it did start a dialogue
between Russia and the other countries that allowed Russia to share its issues
with the existing system and present its ideas of how the system could be
reformed.
8 Nuclear reductions and missile
defence
Prospects for cooperation between
Russia, the U.S., and NATO
One of the most challenging issues regarding Euro-Atlantic security for Russia,
which remained high on the agendas of both Russian presidents, is the issue of
American and NATO missile defence plans and how they relate to Russia’s
nuclear deterrent and national security. For Russia, the plans of the U.S. and its
NATO allies to build a missile defence system is seen as having major implica-
tions for the country’s ability to defend itself. As a result of the decline of the
country’s conventional military, Russian leaders have relied on Russia’s nuclear
arsenal as a means to deter any would-be opponents, yet the strength of the
Russian nuclear forces proves to be ‘more of an illusion than a reality’ since
Russia’s nuclear forces are also in decline (Herspring, 2011: 1). Two-thirds of
the country’s missiles are considered to be ‘obsolete’ (Lucas, 2008: 5).
The issue of missile defence in Russian foreign and security policy can be
seen in connection with the country’s position on nuclear arms control because
in both cases Russia’s position ‘is driven by politics – especially the high pol-
itics of state demands for power, prestige, and security’ (Cimbala, 2010: 94).
Russia’s nuclear weapons are an important element in the country’s case for
great power status and, therefore, any decision made in regards to nuclear arms
control not only has ramifications for national defence but also for Russia’s place
in the world. The development of a European missile defence system that does
not involve Russia is seen as a challenge to the country’s great power status and
to its national security. Nuclear negotiations with the U.S., including those that
resulted in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) and
the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), allow Russia an
opportunity to maintain its image as a power, through participation in one-on-
one negotiations with the U.S., while also reducing stocks of ‘obsolete’ weapons.
The nuclear reduction negotiations provide a challenge to Russia’s national
defence since it means reducing the stocks of nuclear weapons that the country
relies on.
In terms of nuclear negotiations, the Bush administration was reluctant to
discuss any further nuclear reductions after the Moscow Treaty and, therefore,
there was no real opening while Putin was president for further conversations.
When Medvedev did become president, the U.S. had already begun publicising
its missile defence plans and, therefore, Medvedev may have found a willing
138 Nuclear reductions and missile defence
negotiating partner in Obama but missile defence proved to complicate the idea
of reductions domestically. Putin was outspoken on the importance of including
constraining measures on missile defence during nuclear arms control negoti-
ations but when a decision needed to be made about whether the issue would
prevent an agreement from being reached, Medvedev agreed to New START.
Whether Putin was speaking out as part of a good cop-bad cop routine appears
unlikely as both Russia’s lead negotiator on the New START agreement and
Putin discussed the importance of missile defence in the context of nuclear nego-
tiations and because of the Russian argument regarding an ‘interlink’ between
offensive and defensive weapons systems.
Medvedev became president on the heels of Putin’s failure to secure support
for his missile defence cooperation proposal, which involved using a Russian
facility in Azerbaijan for radar purposes. While Medvedev was president, the
U.S., under Obama, made the decision to cancel the Bush-era missile defence
system that Putin had opposed because it would have resulted in the stationing
of radar and missiles in Eastern Europe. While the cancellation of the Bush plans
could have provided an opening for some agreement between the U.S. and
Russia on missile defence, the new plans still included facilities in Eastern
Europe and added a new sea-based component that Russia became concerned
with. The emergence of more detailed plans from NATO about the alliance’s
planned system also meant that NATO missile defence occupied a higher place
on the Medvedev agenda than it had under Putin since there was now a clearer
idea of what the system would entail.
The importance of the nuclear deterrent for Russia

With a conventional military that faces many issues, maintaining Russia’s
nuclear capabilities is of high importance to the Russian leadership. The deci-
sions to move forward on the Moscow Treaty and New START were made even
though the Russian leadership has emphasised that the country’s nuclear deter-
rent is the foundation of the country’s status as a great power and its security
(Cimbala, 2013: 191). Nuclear negotiations between the two countries occur
because compared to other countries, Russia and the U.S. still have far larger
quantities of these weapons and there are cost issues associated with the mainte-
nance of a large nuclear force. This means decisions about nuclear reductions
are made having considered both security and economic implications.
The Russian military forces, both conventional and nuclear, have been called
‘more of a background psychological factor than a physical one’ since the coun-
try’s capabilities are not what they once were (Lucas, 2008: 10). The country’s
large nuclear arsenal is considered ‘a declining instrument of war rather than a
symbol of Russia’s self-image for its place in the world’ since there is a reluct-
ance to actually use nuclear weapons amongst nuclear weapons possessing states
(Crone, 2007: 71). This reluctance to use nuclear weapons is linked to the reduc-
tion in the threat of warfare between the most powerful states because were any
type of conflict to break out, there would be the potential for a nuclear war
Nuclear reductions and missile defence 139
(Cottey, 2007: 36–37). This means that despite Russia’s relative conventional
military weakness, Russia is not necessarily less secure since rationally behaving
states would not want to risk a large, and potentially nuclear, conflict with the
country. At the same time, this thinking shows the importance of having a
nuclear arsenal to Russia.
Russia’s nuclear negotiations with the United States

Possessing one of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals has been a source of
pride for Russia and nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the U.S. have been
considered Russia’s ‘only “evidence” of its superpower status’ in the post-Soviet
world (de Haas, 2010: 123). Russians have argued that the existence of the coun-
try’s nuclear arsenal was part of the American decision not to become militarily
involved in the Russia–Georgia conflict, despite being involved in conflicts with
non-nuclear states in the early twenty-first century, because the U.S. sought to
avoid a conflict with the country (Tsypkin, 2009: 796). Despite the role that
nuclear weapons have in Russia’s projection of power, a high-ranking Russian
MFA official emphasised that ‘we are in no way considering a first-strike option’
and that nuclear weapons can only be used in two cases: one being a retaliation
strike and the other, if the country is facing a ‘massive aggression’ from conven-
tional weapons that threatens the very existence of the Russian state. Therefore,
the Russian nuclear arsenal’s role as both a status symbol and as a deterrent to
potential attacks means that it will retain an important position in Russian
national security policy, particularly due to the lack of confidence Russian
leaders have in the country’s conventional military capabilities.
While Russia has been working to modernise its military forces, the
Medvedev National Security Strategy emphasised the importance of nuclear
weapons (National Security Strategy, 2009). The Military Doctrine listed the
maintenance of the country’s nuclear capabilities above that of the maintenance
of the Armed Forces in a section concerning Russian efforts towards the ‘pre-
vention of military conflict’ (Military Doctrine, 2010). With both of the coun-
try’s key security strategy documents confirming the position of nuclear weapons
in national security, it is clear that the nuclear deterrent is relied on by the
Russian leadership. At the same time, the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is
not what it was during the Soviet era and is, like Russia’s conventional forces,
aging. The majority of the country’s delivery systems date from Soviet times
and are not modernised (Sokov, 2011: 191). Although Russia possesses reliable
ground-based nuclear forces, the continued development of submarine-based
forces has been challenged by difficulties with the Bulava missile and the
bombers that the country possesses are considered outdated, thus making two
elements of Russia’s nuclear triad ‘irrelevant’ (Herspring, 2011: 25).
Even before he was elected president, Putin supported the continued exist-
ence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and stated in February 2000 that
‘there is a real danger of a collapse of the ABM Treaty, which is the cornerstone
of all the agreements and understandings of nuclear arms reduction’ (Putin,
2000c). A former high-ranking Russian official believes that ‘we could’ve
reached an agreement with the Clinton Administration on adaptation of the ABM
but then Yugoslavia and President Bush’ coming into office prevented an agree-
ment from being reached. On April 14, 2000, Russia ratified the START II
agreement, which had been signed in 1993, but did so only with the understand-
ing that Russia would not comply with START II if the U.S. renounced its parti-
cipation in the ABM Treaty and if the Senate failed to ratify an agreement on
theatre missile defence (TMD) systems and ABM; the Senate chose not to ratify
the Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD Demarcation so START II never entered
into force and the day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001,
Russia withdrew from START II (Shoumikhin, 2011: 119–120). Putin argued in
June 2001 that there were at least 30 agreements in the field of security which
were connected to the ABM Treaty and, therefore, the abandonment of the ABM
Treaty would have implications for those agreements as well (Putin, 2001j). At a
November 2001 meeting between Bush and Putin, Putin suggested that Russia
was willing to discuss amendments to the ABM Treaty if the nuclear arsenals of
Russia and the U.S. were shrunk by two-thirds (Berryman, 2005: 35). In
response to the announcement by the U.S. in December 2001 that they would be
leaving the ABM Treaty, Putin responded calmly and said that although he
thought the American decision was a mistake, the decision would not affect the
security of Russia (Putin, 2001n). He also called for the U.S. and Russia to
secure a new nuclear agreement which would reduce each country’s stockpiles
to between 1,500 and 2,200 weapons (Putin, 2001n). The New York Times char-
acterised Putin’s response as ‘voic[ing] acceptance, albeit through gritted teeth’
since it was a situation that changed the strategic picture but one over which
Putin had no control (Wines, 2001).
On May 24, 2002, a month before the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty
took effect, the Moscow Treaty was signed, an agreement which represented a
break from previous nuclear agreements, not only in content but in length as it
consisted of fewer than 500 words and had a total of five articles (ACA, 2006).
The agreement called on the two states to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals
to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012 and declared that
‘each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its stra-
tegic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of
such warheads’ (Moscow Treaty, 2002). The Russia side was not overly
impressed with the professionalism of the negotiations with a former high-
ranking Russian official stating that ‘we had to tell the Americans not to refer-
ence the press conference [held before the treaty was agreed to] in the treaty’
itself because the Americans wanted to use a statement Bush had made about
operational deployment in the treaty itself. Despite issues during negotiations, at
the May 2002 signing of the agreement, Putin said that the new treaty was an
important step by ‘two states which are particularly responsible for international
security and strategic stability’ and that he approved of the U.S. position that
rather than negotiating new verification measures, the START I measures would
cover the Moscow Treaty implementation process (Putin, 2002a).
The newly negotiated agreement was seen as the next step in arms control at
a time when the two sides were closer than before and did not ‘need to structure
a deterrent relationship based on numbers of missiles aimed at each other’ and,
thus, each state would be able to make decisions regarding their nuclear
weapons, so long as they fell within treaty limits (Plesch & Butcher, 2002: 62).
The Moscow Treaty has been criticised for several things including the absence
of comprehensive verification and implementation measures, which had been
seen the previous START agreements, as well as the potential to someday take
the warheads out of storage and use them since they did not need to be destroyed
(Shoumikhin, 2011: 121). According to a high-ranking Russian MFA official,
the Moscow Treaty was more of a ‘statement of intent in a mutually binding
form’. Retired Russian Lieutenant-General Evgeny Buzhinskiy wrote that the
Moscow Treaty ‘does not count since it is not a full-fledged arms control treaty’
when considering the recent history of the Russian–American nuclear agenda
(Buzhinskiy, 2013: 138). The flexibility in the treaty, including the lack of speci-
fications on the different types of nuclear delivery systems or the fact that war-
heads could be stored as opposed to destroyed, reflected the American
leadership’s desire for flexibility (Cimbala, 2009: 70). The lack of destruction in
the Moscow Treaty was also considered to be concerning due to events that had
transpired not too long before at nuclear storage sites in Russia. Conditions were
so bad that in 1997, there were hunger strikes at a nuclear storage site and
although the issues that prompted the hunger strike were addressed, conditions
were still difficult with workers at nuclear storage sites not being well paid and
their spouses unable to find jobs for themselves due to the remote locations of
storage sites (Wolfsthal & Collina, 2002: 74).
After the signing of the Moscow Treaty, there were some conversations
between the Putin and Bush Administrations about another nuclear agreement
but the Russian side characterised the talks as the Americans simply listening to
the Russians without really engaging in the conversations (Antonov, 2012: 22).
With the presidencies of Medvedev and Obama, and the introduction of the
reset, Russia and the U.S. moved to a new round of nuclear reduction talks. The
securing of the New START agreement was regarded by Russia as a ‘serious
success of Russian diplomacy’ since the country had been seeking progress on
hard security issues for years (Kosachev, 2010: 4). While the Moscow Treaty
saw Russia and the U.S. not pursue additional verification measures because
there were improved relations, the New START negotiations resulted in a treaty
that returned to the model of older arms control agreements with verification
measures. A high-ranking Russian MFA official described the New START
agreement as both ‘traditional and non-traditional’ and stated that compared to
previous treaties, it is ‘leaner, more streamlined’ with less of a financial burden.
New START specified that both countries would reduce their nuclear arsenals so
that each was in possession of 1,550 ‘deployed strategic nuclear warheads and
bombs’ and limited ‘deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers assigned
to nuclear missions . . . to 700 . . . while deployed and non-deployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers are limited to 800’ (ACA, 2012a).
This was below the assessment of the Russian General Staff, according to a
former high-ranking Russian official, who had ‘after very thorough calculations
and estimations’ concluded ‘that 1,700 [strategic nuclear weapons] is enough’.
As the Moscow Treaty had a range of reduction from 1,700–2,200 warheads, if
both countries possessed 2,200 before New START took effect, each country
would be reducing their warheads by about 30% (ACA, 2012a). New START
re-established a verification regime to monitor the implementation of the treaty
that included a system of ‘on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges
and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the
Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty
monitoring’ as well as telemetric data exchanges (Office of the Press Secretary,
2010). The treaty allows for 18 inspections to be conducted each year with two
types of inspections to be conducted: the first, examining sites that have both
non-deployed and deployed delivery systems as well as deployed warheads,
while the second focuses on non-deployed delivery systems (VCI Bureau, 2010).
The New START negotiations proved to be difficult as they exceeded the
deadline that had been set by four months and included conversations in cities
throughout the world including Copenhagen, Geneva, London, Moscow, Singa-
pore, and Washington (Baker, 2010). During the negotiations over New START,
a debate emerged over the issue of missile defence with the Russian side, accord-
ing to lead negotiator Anatoly Antonov, arguing that ‘missile defence had to be
linked to the treaty’ because Russia could not reduce its nuclear arsenal while a
potential risk to Russia’s ability to defend itself was emerging (Putin, Russia and
the West, 2012b). Antonov stated that although there were no plans to restrict
missile defence in the new treaty when the two presidents originally agreed to
negotiate, with the focus instead to be solely on strategic offensive weapons,
there was a feeling on the Russian side that the issue of the abrogated ABM
Treaty should not be overlooked (Antonov, 2012: 27). The linking of nuclear
negotiations and missile defence is also one that Putin, as Prime Minister, made.
In response to a question in December 2009, Putin had stated that the problem
confronting the negotiations was that the Americans were building a missile
defence system and that Russia was not so the strategic balance would be upset
and could create a situation where Russia needs to develop further offensive
weapons systems (Putin, 2009a). A high-ranking Russian MFA official down-
played the issue of missile defence in nuclear weapons negotiations and said that
a ‘misinterpretation of some statements’ led to the belief that Russia would not
agree to New START if it did not include missile defence prohibitions but, he
argued, Russia would ‘never conditionalise’ the agreement because it would
have been a ‘complete hostage-take’. According to the official, the treaty’s pre-
amble language which mentions the association between missile defence and
nuclear weapons was ‘sufficient’ but that does not mean the issue won’t be
important in the future because ‘as the lower we come in terms of numbers, the
more . . . the interlink [between offensive weapons and missile defence] becomes
important’.
While Putin had expressed his opinion that the two issues should be linked,
the final decision remained with Medvedev. A 2010 phone call between Obama
and Medvedev directly addressed this issue. General James L. Jones Jr., then-
American National Security Advisor, reported that Obama told Medvedev,
‘Dmitry, I’ve . . . I’ve told you at every turn that this treaty will not pass if it’s
linked to missile defence, our missile defence. And you have to believe me. You
. . . you just have to understand, this is not a technique or a negotiating ploy, it’s
just, it is reality’ (Putin, Russia and the West, 2012b). Stating outright that the
treaty had no chance should the treaty delve into issues of missile defence forced
Medvedev to make a decision between securing an arms reductions treaty or not.
As a high-ranking Western diplomat identified, the Russian decision to agree to
New START came from an assessment that since New START expired in 2021,
the missile defence system which was planned by the Americans to be in place
at the time would be one in which their strategic forces could deal with the
defence implications. A high-ranking Western official also said that the agree-
ment was reached because there was a higher warhead limit than what the
Americans had originally proposed and because the Russian monitoring capabil-
ities, including satellites, were eroding.
In an April 2010 interview, Medvedev stated that due to the treaty’s preamble
there was an acknowledged connection between nuclear weapons and missile
defence but the preamble ‘does not mean that if the USA starts developing
missile defence the treaty would automatically be invalidated’, instead it meant
that Russia could ‘raise the question of whether quantitative change to missile
defence systems would affect the fundamental circumstances underlying the
treaty’ (Medvedev D., 2010a). The treaty also included a prohibition on ICBM
and SLBM launchers being used as missile interceptors, which was not a planned
element of the American missile defence plans (Pifer, 2010). Despite Putin’s
concerns, the agreement that Russia signed did not make any explicit rules about
missile defence, other than barring something that the Americans were not plan-
ning on including in their missile defence system. Medvedev’s statements after
the signing, however, did leave the door open for Russia to question its parti-
cipation in the treaty if the American plans evolved to the point of concern.
Regardless of whether or not Russia later withdraws from the agreement, the so-
called ‘reset’ is credited by a high-ranking Russian MFA official for seeing the
New START agreement reached because ‘the reset was real – it was not just a
headline, slogan of sorts’ and that ‘in the absence of [the] reset . . . he didn’t think
it would be possible’ to make such progress in Russian–American relations.
Medvedev was quite involved in the treaty negotiation process. A high-
ranking Western official stated that it was ‘Medvedev himself ’ who agreed to
moving the references to missile defence to the preamble. From the perspective
of a high-ranking Western diplomat, there was one moment in the New START
negotiations that showed that Medvedev was essential to the success of the nego-
tiations. In November and December 2009, Russia and the U.S. had reached
agreement on a package of solutions, which would resolve the final issues
remaining in the New START negotiations, and Russia’s delegation in Geneva
sent the results to Moscow expecting a positive response. On a Saturday,
Antonov called requesting a special meeting and informed the Americans that
they were ‘not going to like the answer’. The Russian delegation had several
changes that Moscow had requested be made to the proposal and these did not
reflect what had been previously been agreed to. It had been expected that at
some point in the negotiations, Putin might make a ‘public burst’ where he spoke
out against the negotiations. Before Christmas, Putin gave a press conference to
young journalists where he ‘blasted the negotiations’ and at that point the
diplomat thought ‘that was it’, there would be no treaty. After the Putin com-
ments, the diplomat thought that the story would be picked up by the press and
there would be a ‘tsunami’. The diplomat was very surprised when the next day
the only story on Putin’s remarks had been published on Interfax but that the
website was soon after displaying the message ‘this entry has been pulled down’.
This, and subsequent progress on the New START negotiations was considered
by the diplomat as Medvedev ‘successfully st[anding] up to Putin’ and that if it
were not for Medvedev, there would be no Treaty.
Although there was some talk of future nuclear arms negotiations after the
signing of New START, these did not result in an agreement. A former high-
ranking Russian official said that there would be ‘no continuation of strategic
nuclear reductions unless the U.S. stops missile defence’ developments. Anatoly
Antonov has implied that nuclear talks are unlikely because the New START
agreement is valid for several more years and because Russia needs the New
START levels so numbers would need to be reconsidered before there could be
further discussions (Antonov, 2013: 7). Although missile defence remains a
significant issue in regards to future nuclear reductions talks, other issues, such
as the inclusion of other countries in nuclear talks and the types of weapons to
be discussed, have led to little progress. A high-ranking Western diplomat was,
however, more optimistic about future talks and argued that although the Rus-
sians ‘love to pile up conditions’ until they are ready to negotiate, issues that
have been conditions in the past, such as the inclusion of the U.K. and France in
negotiations, have been conditions since the 1980s but there is a clear record of
successful negotiations since then.
During the negotiations for New START, there were concerns on the Russian
side that the U.S. would work on joint nuclear weapons programmes with the
U.K. as a way to avoid the limits set by the agreement and, consequently, the
Russians suggested that New START should include a limitation on the British
nuclear forces exceeding their 2007 quantity but the Americans would not agree
to the proposal (Fenenko, 2011: 4). According to DFM Riabkov, it was seen
during the Duma hearings that a future concern about nuclear negotiations will
be the French and British arsenals, in particular as there are less ‘warheads and
delivery vehicles permitted under the treaty, the more important the correspond-
ing capabilities of other countries are’ and, therefore, there were questions about
how the nuclear arsenals of American allies are considered (Riabkov, 2011:
7–8). A Russian academic suggested that France and the U.K. might join negoti-
ations on nuclear reductions as a result of societal pressure but the idea of China
joining the talks was ‘less likely’. Given the Russian proposal and the Duma
hearings, the issue of the American allies’ nuclear weapons will remain an issue
for the two countries. It has been suggested by Aleksei Arbatov that if Britain
and France were willing to consider some inspection and transparency measures,
similar to those in New START, then perhaps this could serve as a precedent for
other countries, such as China (Arbatov, 2013: 17).
In addition to Russian concerns about treaty membership, the U.S. has sug-
gested that future nuclear negotiations consider the issue of tactical nuclear
weapons, which Russia does not want to discuss because of concerns regarding
NATO’s superiority in conventional weapons and the potential missile defence
system (Arbatov, 2012: 14). A discussion of tactical nuclear weapons is con-
sidered by Russians to ‘inevitably mean unilateral disarmament’ since Russia
has far more tactical nuclear weapons than the United States (Suslov, 2010). The
Russian requirement that discussions of tactical reductions begin after NATO
has agreed that all of the European-based American non-strategic nuclear
weapons are returned to the U.S. proper is seen from the NATO side as requiring
the U.S. to separate its nuclear commitments from the Alliance without an equi-
valent exchange from Russia (Cimbala, 2013: 133). A high-ranking Russian
MFA official argued that in the case of tactical nuclear weapons, the ‘history of
the issue needs to be taken into consideration’ since from 1991–1992, Russia
made cuts in its deployed and non-deployed tactical nuclear weapons and has
stockpiled them in a central location. Agreement on negotiations for tactical
nuclear weapons is considered difficult to secure because Russia views these
weapons ‘as a politically realistic deterrent of extra-European threats, and as a
psychological compensation for NATO’s superiority in conventional forces in
Europe’ (Karaganov, 2010). A high-ranking Russian MFA official emphasised
that by Russia’s count, the U.S. and NATO have a ‘few hundred’ warheads close
to Russian territory and that Russia would like to see them ‘withdrawn to U.S.
national territory’ since the weapons have ‘a strategic character’. One former
high-ranking Russian official declared that the ‘absolutely different role that tac-
tical nuclear weapons play in Russian’ planning compared to that of the U.S.
should be taken into consideration since they play a ‘political role’ in the U.S.’s
Euro-Atlantic ties. The former official argued that the U.S. has an ally to its
north, good relations with its southern border state, and oceans to its east and
west but in Russia’s case ‘our neighbours have nuclear weapons or are on the
verge of getting them’ and, therefore, the situation with neighbours is ‘absolutely
different’. A Russian academic argued that American tactical weapons in Europe
‘can be easily withdrawn’ and ‘as soon as Americans take them out, Russia
would be ready to talk’ about tactical nuclear reductions.
With a lack of agreement between Russia and the U.S. about what categories
of nuclear weapons should be the focus of future reductions, who should be
involved in reductions talks, and what level weapons should be reduced to, talks
between Russia and the U.S. do not seem to be easily forthcoming. The issue of
missile defence adds another complicating factor to the future of nuclear conver-
sations because of the links that Russia sees between the two.
Russia and Western plans for European missile defence
Under both Putin and Medvedev, the issue of missile defence remained an
important part of the Euro-Atlantic security agenda. The system was seen by
some Russians as a challenge and one Russian academic stated that the U.S.
missile defence programme was an ‘attempt of the United States to ensure
dominance’ as well as ‘military superiority’. The Russian leadership, regard-
less of which man was president at the time, made it clear that the country has
strong concerns about the establishment of such a system. As one Russian
MFA official stated, missile defence will have ‘destabilising effects’ for
Europe and the world if the U.S. and NATO pursue it without Russian
cooperation but if such cooperation occurs it ‘will be a game-changer in
Europe’. Although efforts towards cooperation have been made by both sides,
neither Russia nor the U.S. and its allies have proposed a cooperation plan that
meets with the approval of the other. For both the U.S. and Russia, the issue
of missile defence is an issue addressed by multiple branches of the govern-
ment. In Russia, the Ministry of Defence handles Russian policy towards the
missile defence developments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs communic-
ates with the U.S., while on the American side, missile defence involves both
houses of Congress, the White House, and the Departments of Defence and
State (Raĭan & Saradzhian, 2012: 2).
Russia repeatedly expressed concerns that the proposed missile defence
system could lead to a weakening of the country’s nuclear deterrent, which given
the difficulties already discussed facing its conventional and nuclear forces,
would be unacceptable for the Russian leadership, both civilian and military.
From the Russian perspective, as a former high-ranking Russian official shared,
a missile defence system is not protection from a first strike, instead it is a ‘shield
against retaliatory strikes’. A high-ranking Western official denied any impact of
Russia’s strike capability saying that ‘missile defence cannot possibly negate
Russian second strike’ capability but the official did recognise that it ‘can and
would complicate [Russian] war fighting doctrine’ since the country’s doctrine
still considers limited nuclear responses.
To understand the Russian leadership’s position on the issue of missile
defence, it is important to first consider the plans that have been drafted during
the early twenty-first century, including those of Presidents Bush and Obama
as well as the plans that NATO has begun to develop. Also essential for under-
standing Russia’s position on the issue of missile defence is an examination of
the role of Eastern European countries in proposed missile defence systems
because of the concerns that Russia has about the establishment of a missile
defence system near its borders. In addition to considering the plans for the
system itself, an examination of the proposals that Russia developed
to promote missile defence cooperation must be made as should a study of
the statements of Russia’s presidents with regard to Western missile defence
system developments.
The West’s missile defence plans
To understand the issues that Russia has with Western missile defence plans, it
is important to first understand the planning and development of the missile
defence system, including the changes that have been made between the Bush
and Obama systems and the evolution of NATO’s missile defence plans.
Although Russia places its primary focus on the American system, NATO has
been planning a missile defence system as well.
Missile defence became an important security issue in the U.S. when Pres-
ident Clinton signed The National Missile Defence Act of 1999, which called for
the U.S. to establish, at the first availability of the required technology, a ballistic
missile defence (BMD) system which can protect American territory (Thiel-
mann, 2009). In September 2000, Clinton declared that he could not approve a
national BMD system because he felt that with the available information there
was not ‘enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness
of the entire system, to move forward to deployment’, and, therefore, a decision
would be made by the next president (Clinton, 2001). Consequently, it was not
until President Bush took office that the U.S. began developing its missile
defence system but before plans could move forward on missile defence, issues
with the ABM Treaty had to be resolved. The ABM Treaty was based on the
concept ‘that stable nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability depends on
constraining strategic defences’ so that an arms race does not occur (Bowen,
2001: 487). Although Bush had suggested during his run for office that the treaty
might be amended so that it could still be allowed to stand and the U.S. could
pursue missile defence, no changes were ever proposed between Russia and the
United States (ACA, 2012b).
Under Bush, U.S. plans for missile defence included placing 10 interceptor
missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic, as well as an early-
warning radar station located close to Iran (Bruno, 2009). The July 2008 agree-
ment with the Czech Republic called for the U.S. to construct a radar station in
the country, despite opposition from two-thirds of the country’s population
(Anderson, 2008). Negotiations with Poland took 18 months and the agreement,
which was reached in August 2008, only days after the Russia–Georgia conflict,
not only allowed the U.S. to place the interceptors in Poland but also increased
security cooperation between the countries with the installation of a Patriot air
defence system, which had the capability to destroy short-range missiles or
attacking aircraft (Shanker & Kulish, 2008). The contents of the deal and its
timing, which followed stories in June that the U.S. was considering Lithuania
as an alternative location to host the interceptors, can be seen as part of the
Polish response to the Russian actions towards Georgia (Dempsey, 2008).
On September 1, 2009, President Obama announced that as a result of a
review process of existing missile defence plans and due to concerns about
Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles as well as technological advancements
in ‘land- and sea-based interceptors and the sensors that support them’, the U.S.
would be changing its missile defence system plans (Obama, 2009). The new
programme, called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), would be
enacted in four stages beginning in 2011 and fully implemented in 2020 and
would include a system of radar and interceptors both land- and sea-based, with
the capability of intercepting short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2011). It is at the third and fourth stages of the
EPAA that Russia considers ‘U.S. interceptor missiles . . . a threat to Russia’s
deterrent potential’ (Trenin, 2011a: 1). As a high-ranking Russian MFA official
explained, the Russian concerns about the third and fourth phase are rooted in
concerns about the further developmental stages of the SM-3 ballistic missile
interceptor. They believe that the missiles ‘are capable if deployed rightly and
with radar’ of striking a Russian ICBM or SLBM in mid-course and for Russian
leaders, ‘when an interceptor acquires sufficient speed’ to hit a Russian missile
at mid-course, it is a ‘game-changer’.
The Czech Republic and Poland did not welcome the news that the Ameri-
cans were dismissing the original plan and adopting a new one, particularly due
to the difficulties in reaching the agreements in the first place and the implica-
tions for their own domestic situations given the lack of support they had for
BMD to begin with. Politicians and scholars expressed shock and frustration
towards the American decision as well as a desire for America to respect its
commitments to the region (Traynor, 2009). While the Bush-era plans called for
the stationing of interceptors in their country, the Obama plan saw the potential
positioning of an early warning system in the Czech Republic, which prompted
the country to announce in June 2011 that they would not be participating in
EPAA, due to the country’s dissatisfaction about their lesser role in the newly
planned missile defence system (Dempsey & Bilefsky, 2011). A high-ranking
Central European diplomat explained that there was a ‘bitter feeling’ after the
Bush plans were abandoned and that the plans for an early warning system on
Czech territory called for ‘one computer in a room’, which would not be an
essential system component. Despite this, the diplomat said that the Czech
Republic still ‘support[s] EPAA’ because it is ‘good to have a missile defence
system to defend against Iran and the Middle East’. There was also criticism in
Poland for choosing to make the announcement that the plans had been dis-
missed on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of the country (the Nazis
had already launched their invasion), a decision considered by some as lacking
awareness of the region (Kulish & Dempsey, 2009). Unlike the Czech Republic,
however, Poland chose to continue cooperation with the U.S. and its new plans.
In autumn 2011, European countries began to make arrangements to host
components of the EPAA system. On September 13, 2011, an agreement was
signed between Romania and the U.S. which would see, by 2015, the U.S. install
an SM-3 ballistic missile defence system in the country (Office of the Spokes-
person, 2011a). On September 14, 2011, it was announced that Turkey would
host a radar station for the planned missile defence system, a component that
would be introduced in the first phase of implementation and located within 450
miles of Iran (Shanker, 2011). The next day, the missile defence agreement
between Poland and the U.S., which had originally been agreed upon in 2008
and amended in 2010, entered into force, although the Polish component remains
in the 2018 implementation stage (Office of the Spokesperson, 2011b). In
October, Spain announced that the four American destroyers used for the Medi-
terranean Sea-based missile defence components would use the city of Rota as
their home port (Brunnstrom & Alexander, 2011).
Although missile defence issues remain high on the agenda of U.S.–Russian
bilateral relations, the U.S. missile defence system is not the only cause for
Russian concern. That NATO is also developing its own missile defence system
has drawn Russian attention. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO countries
agreed to launch a study to evaluate missile defence system options and, at the
2006 Riga Summit, the alliance confirmed ‘that missile defence is technically
feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study’ (NATO, 2006). The
topic was visited again in the context of the 2008 Bucharest Summit when the
countries considered the technical side of prospective BMD components as well
as the politico-military issues tied to BMD (NATO, 2006). At its 2010 Lisbon
Summit, NATO member-states agreed to develop a missile defence system as
part of its collective defence policy, which will ‘provide full coverage and pro-
tection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the
increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles’ (NATO,
2010a). The system would be developed with consideration given to cost, tech-
nical viability, and threat level (NATO, 2010a). The Summit Declaration wel-
comed the American EPAA programme as an important ‘national contribution to
the NATO missile defence architecture’, which would be called the Active
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) (NATO, 2010a). The
U.S. also viewed its system as important to the NATO programme, a fact that
was emphasised by then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose at the
2011 Multinational BMD Conference when he stated that ‘EPAA is being imple-
mented within the NATO context’ (Rose, 2011). In addition to the contributions
that the U.S. agreed to make and the bilateral agreements it had with other
NATO member-states within the context of EPAA, other NATO states provided
additional components for the NATO system (NATO, 2012c).
Missile defence plans have evolved since the ABM Treaty was abrogated, not
only in terms of the structure of the system but also with the countries involved.
Russia’s response to the plans, however, has remained largely consistent. As will
be seen in the next section, both Putin and Medvedev made some attempts at
striking a compromise on the issue but at the same time, never shied away from
expressing concerns about a European missile defence system that does not
count Russia as a partner.
The Russian response to missile defence under Putin and Medvedev

For both Medvedev and Putin, the issue of missile defence was of high import-
ance since it had implications not only for Russia’s relations with the U.S. and
NATO but also for military planning due to concerns about the impact that
missile defence would have on the ability of Russia to defend itself. Missile
defence is an issue that has had a consistent place on the bilateral Russian–
American agenda. Regardless of who was president of which country, the Amer-
icans have consistently argued in favour of the development of a BMD system
for Europe, while the Russian responses have ranged from seeking cooperation
to issuing threats. The development of the NATO missile defence system, which
was agreed to after the American one, has also become an issue between Russia
and the Alliance.
After his election to the presidency, Putin met with Clinton in June 2000 and
missile defence was one of the issues discussed. In a joint statement, the presid-
ents agreed that there was an increased threat of states using ballistic missiles
and ‘that this emerging threat to security should be addressed and resolved
through mutual cooperation and mutual respect of each other’s security interests’
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2000). A day after his meeting with Clinton, Putin
proposed that Russia, the EU, and NATO construct a European BMD system
which he argued ‘would help to avoid all the problems that may arise with the
chance for upsetting the balance of forces’ while also providing the U.S. and
Europe with a high degree of security (Putin, 2000d). The Russian proposal has
been described as ‘a clever ploy, a good example of political gamesmanship’
because it appeared as a practical solution to the issue of missile defence that
would not require the abandonment of the ABM Treaty, which was something
that European countries did not want to see happen, and the debate over missile
defence versus the ABM Treaty could lead to a division between the U.S. and its
allies (Donaldson & Nogee, 2009: 343). This Putin proposal did not result in any
progress and, in February 2001, NATO Secretary General Robertson stated
during an interview that in regards to European missile defence ‘the question of
“whether” it’s going to happen has been settled’ and that the debate for NATO
member-states was now ‘about the “how” and the “when” ’ (Fitchett, 2001).
For Russia, the continued existence of the ABM Treaty meant that its nuclear
deterrent was not threatened and that Russia would not have to develop capabil-
ities that it was not prepared for, including ‘hit-to-kill interceptors and advanced
radar and infrared detection and tracking systems, . . . which rely on advanced
microelectronics’ (Wilkening, 2000: 37). America’s decision to unilaterally
withdraw from the ABM Treaty rather than amending the agreement or having
both countries withdraw gave Russia an opportunity to present itself in a positive
light before the international community. This was furthered by the ratification
of both START II, which Putin directly lobbied for and was able to see passed
albeit with the ABM Treaty condition, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which the Americans were unable to ratify due to opposition in
the Senate, by June 30, 2000 (Donaldson & Nogee, 2009: 342). On November
13, 2000, Putin made a statement in defence of the ABM Treaty, declaring that
although the U.S. had argued that the threat of ballistic missiles had increased,
Russia did not think it has become concerning enough ‘as to warrant breaking
the existing system of strategic stability by diluting the ABM Treaty’ and Putin
called for the two countries to continue conversations on amending the agree-
ment. In the same statement, Putin also suggested further reductions to the
American and Russian nuclear arsenals to a level of 1,500 warheads each (Putin,
2000e). Russian efforts to preserve the ABM Treaty, even if America chose to
leave it, and Putin’s promotion of strategic nuclear weapons reductions would,
therefore, be seen as a continuation of Russia’s commitment to arms control at a
time when the U.S. appeared less committed. Despite the efforts to be viewed as
defenders of arms control, Putin and other Russian leaders were also arguing that
any American abrogation of the ABM Treaty would result in Russia leaving
other arms control agreements, such as START II, which Russia did, and the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF ) Treaty, which Russia did not (Boese,
2000).
In 2001, George Bush assumed the presidency of the U.S. and made clear that
the U.S. intended to move forward on missile defence and that the ABM Treaty
would not be an obstacle to these plans. At their June 2001 summit, the first
meeting of Bush and Putin, Bush announced that Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld would be working on a security
framework ‘that protects both our peoples and strengthens deterrence by
exploring and developing our new attitudes towards defence and missile
defences’ (Bush, 2001b). At a July 2001 meeting, Putin suggested that the two
countries consider the issues of offensive nuclear weapons and missile defence
systems together, a connection he would later attempt to make during the New
START negotiations (Putin, 2001f ). The U.S. tried to convince the Russians to
agree to a framework which would include getting rid of the ABM Treaty, estab-
lishing missile defence systems, and reducing nuclear forces but, by September
2001, it was clear that Russia was unwilling to discuss the elimination of the
treaty, although it did not close the door on amendments (Boese, 2001). At a
press conference after their November meeting, Putin announced that the issue
proved to be quite problematic and while Russia was open to continued discus-
sions on the issue, Russian opinion on missile defence remained the same (Putin,
2001e). A month later the U.S. announced its suspension of the ABM Treaty.
The muted response from Putin following the announcement that turned into
outrage later was credited by a former high-ranking Russian official to the fact
that Putin had been told by the Americans that ‘we won’t go beyond our national
territory’ with missile defence but as the American plans evolved so did Putin’s
response. The first year of the Bush-Putin years, therefore, was marked by on-
going conversations over the fate of the ABM Treaty and did not focus on the
idea of a particular BMD system.
While the U.S. began to develop its missile defence plans during Putin’s first
term, it was not really until his second term that the full extent of the system was
known so most of the Bush-Putin meetings focused on other issues. In May
2002, the two presidents made a joint declaration which announced that ‘the
United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at
strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile
defence’ and that the steps included exchanging relevant information, allowing
for visits to each other’s missile defence tests, creating a joint centre for
exchanging data, and conducting a study on potential areas of missile defence
cooperation (Joint Declaration, 2002). The next significant mention of missile
defence on the bilateral agenda came at their June 2003 meeting when the two
presidents released a statement that announced their ‘intention to advance con-
crete joint projects in the area of missile defence which will help deepen rela-
tions between the United States and Russia’ (Joint Statement, 2003). Although
there was a great deal of conversation about joint efforts and working together,
as well as movement towards sharing missile defence system information, little
progress was made on the development of a joint BMD system.
In 2006, Putin’s rhetoric on missile defence shifted. No longer restricting ref-
erences to the issue to meetings with U.S. or NATO leaders, Putin made missile
defence a national defence issue in his address to the Federal Assembly when he
declared that Russia was working on developing ‘unique high-precision weapons
systems and manoeuvrable combat units that will have an unpredictable flight
trajectory for the potential opponent’, which along with Russia’s anti-missile
defences will help the country ‘maintain what is definitely one of the most
important guarantees of lasting peace, namely, the strategic balance of forces’
(Putin, 2006a). At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin argued that
missile defence plans ‘cannot help but disturb us’ and could lead to an arms race
(Putin, 2007k). As the U.S. began to look for partners for hosting the proposed
missile defence system, Putin focused his attention on the potential stationing of
missile defence system components in Poland and the Czech Republic, a devel-
opment he called ‘very worrying for us’ (Putin, 2007m). One former high-
ranking Russian official stated that the Bush missile defence plan was ‘a matter
of principle, it’s a challenge’ because a response would be needed if there were
silos. Starting in his May 2007 press conferences, questions about missile
defence became more frequent and Putin’s arguments against the system focused
on the threat perception that Russia had and how Russia did not understand why
the U.S. would develop a BMD system. Prior to the G8 meeting in June 2007,
Putin stated that any decision which upset the strategic balance would be
responded to and then he announced that, the day before, Russia had conducted
a ballistic missile test with a missile which had multiple warheads and that
Russia was also testing cruise missiles with the intention of upgrading missile
capabilities (Putin, 2007l).
At the Russia–U.S. summit in June 2007, Putin proposed that the U.S. and
Russia make ‘joint use of the Gabala radar station that Russia leases from
Azerbaijan’ and develop a BMD system which would cover the whole continent
(Putin, 2007o). Putin said that the station could be modernised; however, he did
not think such a step would be needed since it had the capability ‘to transmit all
necessary data in real time’ (Putin, 2007h). He also argued that setting up the
system in Gabala meant that there would be no need to use facilities in the Czech
Republic and Poland since the radar would be in Azerbaijan and the interceptors
could be placed in the south on the territory of U.S. allies or in Iraq since ‘what
was the war for, after all’ and ‘at least some advantage could be gained from it
all’ (Putin, 2007h). Putin expanded the proposal in July 2007 when he suggested
that the countries establish information exchange centres, with one in Moscow,
which had already been planned, and one in Western Europe, perhaps Brussels
(Putin, 2007i).
While the U.S. was initially intrigued by Putin’s proposal, U.S. representa-
tives who toured the Gabala facility discovered that the equipment there was old
and needed to be updated, which would require significant spending and time, so
the U.S. team concluded the facility would only be useful in threat monitoring,
making the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic still necessary to the
Americans (Roxburgh, 2012: 204). At their meeting in April 2008, Bush and
Putin agreed to a framework document that declared that both countries were
‘interest[ed] in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in
which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal part-
ners’ but the document did not explain how this might be achieved and the docu-
ment recognised that the two sides did not agree about missile defence
components in Poland and the Czech Republic (Framework Declaration, 2008).
At the first Medvedev-Bush meeting after Medvedev became president,
Medvedev talked about the importance of political will, in regards to missile
defence and other issues, and stated that ‘we can reach agreement on these issues
if we want to’ (Medvedev D., 2008n). The announcements in July and August
that agreements had been signed with the Czech Republic and Poland to host
components of the U.S. BMD plan were met with strong words from Medvedev,
despite the fact that Russia had known about the plans for quite a while. A week
after the Czech government signed the agreement to host the radar station,
Medvedev argued that the placement of missile defence components in Eastern
European countries would cause further security issues in the Euro-Atlantic
region and that Russia’s reaction to such a development would be an ‘appropri-
ate’ response (Medvedev D., 2008k). The signing of the Polish-American agree-
ment so soon after the Russia–Georgia conflict served as further evidence to the
Russian leadership ‘that the deployment of new missile defence systems in
Europe is directed against the Russian Federation’ (Medvedev D., 2008f ). Russia
also argued that the placing of the missile defence base in Poland violated the
Founding Act between Russia and NATO which said that the alliance would not
place ‘substantial combat forces’ on its new member-states (Batiuk, 2006: 67).
In his 2008 address to the Federal Assembly, which occurred the day after
Barack Obama was elected president, Medvedev announced that Russia ‘will
deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if
necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system’ and that the Russian Navy
would also be used for neutralisation purposes in order to ensure Russia’s
security (Medvedev D., 2008c). He continued his speech by explaining that
Russia was ‘forced to take these measures’ and that Russia had sought to
cooperate on missile defence (Medvedev D., 2008c). Medvedev would later
explain that the measures that he discussed in his speech would be pursued as a
response to the actions that America and its allies take and that Russia would not
be the first country to act (Medvedev D., 2008h).
After his meeting with Obama in April 2009, Medvedev said that he felt that
dialogue on missile defence would be open and that the conversation did not
include statements that he had heard from the previous administration such as
‘what difference does it make, there are just several dozens of missiles, we have
already made the decision, come, if you want to, and see what we will be doing
there’ (Medvedev D., 2009f ). After the meeting, Medvedev repeatedly stated that
the proposal Putin made in 2007 remained on the table and that Russia was inter-
ested in dialogue on a missile defence system that would cover all of Europe. In
July 2009, the two men met again and released a statement on missile defence
issues which called for cooperation on fighting missile proliferation through a
joint analysis of ballistic missile threats (along with policy recommendations on
how to deal with them), a consideration of how a joint monitoring programme of
ballistic missile production could be conducted, and the establishment of a ‘multi-
lateral missile-launch notification regime’ at a Joint Date Exchange Centre (Joint
Statement, 2009a). During the joint press conference following the meeting,
Medvedev welcomed the decision by the Obama Administration to reconsider the
Bush plans and make its own decision regarding them (Medvedev D., 2009h).
Medvedev, therefore, was pleased with the decision in September to not move
forward on the Bush plans and said that the decision showed ‘the responsible atti-
tude of the President of the United States towards implementing our agreements’
and that with this decision, there was a positive background for progress on the
issue of missile defence (Medvedev D., 2009o).
Under Putin, NATO missile defence plans did not garner as much attention
since the U.S. system was considered more concerning but only weeks after Rob-
ertson said that NATO would be moving forward on the issue, Putin’s Defence
Minister presented NATO with a written proposal on joint missile defence, the plan
that Putin had first discussed the previous June regarding a shared system (Putin,
2001a). Under Medvedev, NATO missile defence became more of a reality and,
consequently, an important agenda item. A high-ranking Russian MFA official
expressed concerns that NATO had not placed constraints on the deployment of
naval forces and, therefore, NATO countries could place assets with missile
defence capabilities near Russia, including in the Barents, North and Baltic Seas
which ‘becomes a problem’ for the country. According to a Russian academic,
‘missile defence is the greatest’ challenge to the Russia–NATO relationship and it
is a sign of their ‘limited agenda’ that it is the ‘only issue they tend to discuss’. At
the 2010 Lisbon Summit’s NATO–Russia Council summit meeting, the countries
‘agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation’ as well as to conduct a
threat assessment on the risks posed by missiles, to restart theatre missile defence
cooperation, and to ‘develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future frame-
work for missile defence cooperation’ (NRC, 2010). Although agreement on a role
for Russia had not been reached, the NRC Missile Defence Working Group, which
was founded in December 2009, focused on what has been learned from previous
cooperative efforts in the area of missile defence and offered the opportunity to
discuss cooperation (NATO, 2012g).
At the Lisbon NATO Summit, Medvedev made his own proposal: that Russia
could be a partner in a European missile defence system that was ‘sector-based’
(Medvedev D., 2010d). A high-ranking Russian MFA official said that the
proposal was ‘offer[ed] as an alternative, different from what the U.S. and
NATO’ had proposed and that it was a ‘reflection of our desire’ for there to be
an alternative. Medvedev explained his proposal as ‘every country would
be responsible for a particular sector’ of the continent (Medvedev D., 2011f ).
While NATO found the Russian proposal impractical since Russian missile
defence technology is not as developed as the Alliance’s, and unappealing
because the Alliance would not trust another country with its defence, from the
Russian perspective, Russian concerns about NATO building missile defence
installations in Eastern or South-Eastern Europe could be reduced by assigning
Russia the south-east sector, which would handle threats from the Iran and
would mean that NATO equipment in those regions of Europe would not be
needed (Sokov, 2012).
A Russian academic stated that the sectoral approach proposal was an
‘attempt to find some compromise’ and reflected a ‘desire to overcome the dead-
lock’ surrounding the issue but that it got a ‘bad response’. A Western European
ambassador argued that, in regards to the sectoral approach, ‘we could not allow
them the sectoral approach and we could not allow them a co-decision approach
because . . . at the end of the day, missile defence is an Article V dimension
where only NATO countries can have a say’. A high-ranking Russian MFA offi-
cial argued against the concerns regarding Article V saying that the ‘sectoral
approach had nothing to do with Article V’. An Eastern European ambassador
reflected on the technological concerns saying that NATO is ‘not really sure that
the Russians have a comparable system of missile defence’ and that the sectoral
approach was ‘not the most practical way to deal with the situation’. Seemingly
confirming the NATO understanding of Russian capabilities, a high-ranking
Russian MFA official did state that the country is working on ‘mid- and short-
range system development’.
Dmitry Rogozin’s appointment by Medvedev in 2011 as the country’s missile
defence envoy was considered a helpful development by a Central European
ambassador who said Rogozin ‘tried to be more forthcoming in explaining their
technical concerns’. In May 2011, Medvedev announced that he ‘was not
entirely satisfied with the way the United States and NATO have responded to
my proposals’ because he felt the conversation was moving too slowly and the
idea that missile defence did not need to be resolved until 2020, when the fourth
stage of EPAA was completed, was wrong (Medvedev D., 2011c). The shift
from Medvedev in May 2011 has been linked by a high-ranking Western official
to the presence of Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov, as the person who
developed the technological criteria for missile defence that could not shoot
down Russian missiles, and under whom the ‘Russian position totally hardened’.
The official said that since Antonov is a ‘negotiator of treaties’, and there cannot
be a treaty on missile defence, the issue is difficult.
Conversations between the Russians and the Americans on missile defence
proved to be quite difficult. The comments from Russian officials and academics
about the impact of the missile defence programme on Russia prompted a high-
ranking Western official to question whether Russia’s response to missile
defence is a case of Russia being afraid to reveal too much about their own plans
or Russian officials not being fully informed by their military. Celeste Wallander
told of how the series of meetings on missile defence reached the point where
she jokingly ‘suggested to one of my Russian counterparts that we knew one
another’s briefings so well we could change sides of the table and give one
another’s presentations for a change’ (Wallander, 2012). According to a high-
ranking Western official, the EPAA system ‘cannot do what Russia thinks it can
do’ and the scenarios that Russian experts put forward are ‘not realistic’ and
‘based on false assumptions’, which could be because Russian analysts could be
using Russian missile defence technology for the basis of their analysis rather
than the ‘kinetic kill’ technology that the Americans are using. The official also
said that the talks reached the point where it became useless to hold the meetings
and that the American side was unsure whether the General Staff people in
attendance were just ‘not smart’ or whether they thought the Americans were
lying to them. By November 2011, it had become clear that the Medvedev pro-
posal was not going anywhere and that Russia had accepted that cooperation on
missile defence would not be happening when Medvedev stated that ‘the USA
and other NATO partners have not showed enough willingness to move in this
direction’ and that the countries were ‘simply repeat[ing] that these plans are not
directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be concerned’
(Medvedev D., 2011f ). With this acceptance of the state of talks on cooperation
came new recommendations and announcements from Russia.
Medvedev suggested that the NATO countries offer Russia ‘legal guarantees’,
which would include technical data to show that the system would not be dir-
ected at Russia and would state what the missile defence plans entail so that
Russia can verify that its interests are secure and that the nuclear stability is
maintained (Medvedev D., 2011f ). In one of his last foreign policy speeches as
president, Medvedev argued again for legal guarantees that the missile defence
system is not focused on Russia because knowing that ‘a deployed missile
defence system would not be directed against Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces’
is of the highest priority for the country as is an understanding that the system
will be looking at threats that are coming from outside of Europe, not originating
there (Medvedev D., 2012b). The idea of legal guarantees on missile defence is
considered to be Russia’s ‘fundamental condition’ and these guarantees would
include a commitment, which could be confirmed, that Russia’s nuclear deter-
rent will not be targeted (Denisov, 2012: 10). Without legal guarantees with ver-
ification measures, there were concerns that what the U.S. had announced as the
capability of the missile defence system would actually be surpassed and that
instead strike missiles would be placed in missile defence installations rather
than those used in missile defence systems (Zolotarev, 2008). As a Russian MFA
official explained, it is important that the guarantees be legally-binding because
‘politically-binding [agreements] are short-lived’, particularly when elections
can bring different parties to leadership positions. A former high-ranking
Russian official pointed out that even if Russia has assurances from Obama,
‘what happens in four years’ when he is no longer president would be a concern.
The desire for legal guarantees is also considered important because of Russian
concerns regarding what the American system might look like in the future since
there was no certainty that the system the U.S. says will exist in 2020 is the end-
point for missile defence development (Zyga, 2012: 19).
One high-ranking Russian MFA official admitted that he does not believe that
Washington would be willing to introduce legal guarantees but argued it is
important that the missile defence system meet military technology criteria,
including an agreed set of understandings which can be used by Russia to inde-
pendently confirm that there are ‘no negative effects to our strategic deterrence’.
The official also said that it was important to make sure ‘nothing infringes on
strategic deterrence’ and suggested that the guarantees would include a range of
information regarding system plans, the locations of deployments, the range of
the radar, the velocity at which the interceptors work, and potential changes that
could be made to the system. A different Russian MFA official expressed
concern that even if there was an agreement on inspections, the countries that the
installations are in, particularly Poland, may not want Russia to inspect on their
territory. Despite the desire from Russia for information and guarantees,
American officials have been outspoken in denying the establishment of legal
guarantees. Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defence Ellen
Tauscher stated that the U.S. would be unwilling to pursue a legally-binding
arrangement but that America would be open to a ‘politically binding statement
that . . . would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction
for cooperation, not limitations’ on missile defence (Tauscher, 2012). Whether
Russia truly wants legal guarantees is not certain and one Russian academic
characterised the country’s push for guarantees as a ‘tribute to Russia’s overall
commitment to international law’ and also as a tactic to delay progress on
missile defence, which failed since ‘everyone recognises there can be no legal
guarantees’ because of the difficulty of getting them approved by national legis-
latures. It has been recognised that the U.S. has no plans ‘to accept such a degree
of openness and is unlikely to agree to the Russian side inspecting its European
missile defence control system’ (Prikhodko, 2012: 81). It has also been acknow-
ledged that should the U.S. and Russia secure an agreement on legal guarantees
and verification mechanisms that would be legally-binding, the chances of the
document being ratified are ‘zero’ (Solov’ev, 2012: 56).
In addition to promoting the idea of legal guarantees, Medvedev also
announced that the country would ‘immediately put the missile attack early
warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert’, a ‘protective cover of
Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons’ would be strengthened, the country’s new
ballistic missiles would ‘be equipped with advanced missile defence penetration
systems and new highly-effective warheads’, that plans would be developed ‘for
disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems if need be’, and, if it
proves necessary, Iskander missiles would be sent to Kaliningrad (Medvedev D.,
2011f ). The MFA later released a statement saying that the measures announced
by Medvedev in November 2011 were warranted and that developments, like a
radar station located in Turkey, were ‘just another step toward the building of
[a] European missile defence architecture based on unilateral approaches and
upsetting the existing strategic balance’ (WNC: Interfax, 2012). Despite making
the announcement, a Russian MFA official said that Russians ‘don’t intend to
realise these measures’ but that the announcement was made because of the
‘unwillingness of NATO countries to take Russian concerns into account’ as
well as missile defence system developments, such as the agreements on hosting
system components and the installation of some of them. A week after his
speech, during a visit to a radar station in Kaliningrad, Medvedev remarked that
the station could be used for a joint missile defence effort but that he did not
think the political will was there to puruse a joint system (Medvedev D., 2011d).
With a little more than a month left in his presidency, Medvedev emphasised
that ‘we are not closing the door on dialogue, we are conducting talks and con-
tinuing the discussion with our partners’ but because Russia was uncertain as to
whether cooperation in the future would be possible, the country was planning
an appropriate response to the system (Medvedev D., 2012f ). During a press
conference following his meeting with Obama a week later, Medvedev said that
the conversations about missile defence would be on-going and that for the next
several months they would include people who could explain the technical
aspects of the system so that a greater understanding of EPAA might be made
(Medvedev D., 2012e).
Challenges to missile defence cooperation

Under both Putin and Medvedev, Russia’s presidents argued that the missile
defence system was about their country. This concern comes despite the fact that
American presidents from Clinton to Obama have denied that the missile defence
system would be Russia-focused. When discussing his plans, Clinton spoke of a
system that ‘protect[ed] all 50 states from the near-term missile threats we face,
those emanating from North Korea and the Middle East’ (Clinton, 2001). In his
speech announcing the U.S.’s decision to leave the ABM Treaty, Bush argued
that ‘the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other
big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue
states who seek weapons of mass destruction’ (Bush, 2001a). When Obama
announced that the Bush-era plans would be abandoned and EPAA would be
pursued, he said that ‘we’ve repeatedly made clear to Russia that its concerns
about our previous missile defence programmes were entirely unfounded’ and
that the ‘clear and consistent focus has been the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic
missile program’ (Obama, 2009). Despite these statements, Russian arguments
about Iran’s capabilities have continued.
In 2001, Putin argued that, in regards to missile defence, it should be under-
stood ‘that concerns and threats are not the same thing’ and that ‘threats must be
defined and located before deciding how to counter them’, which is something
that should be done jointly (Putin, 2001d). The gap in threat perception between
the U.S. and Russia has been a recurring point in conversations about missile
defence plans. A few months later at another Bush-Putin meeting, held a month
after the September 11 attacks, Putin expressed scepticism towards the useful-
ness of missile defence when terrorism appeared to be a major threat and despite
a suggestion from Bush that terrorists might choose to use ballistic missiles to
deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Putin argued ‘it would be difficult
for me to agree that some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental mis-
siles and will be able to use them’ (Putin, 2001h).
One of the main challenges in terms of threat perception relates to Iran.
According to a high-ranking Russian MFA official, Russia ‘truly believe[s] that
the threat assessment . . . is exaggerated’ because Russia does not see that the
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes have advanced to the point where
all of the planned capabilities of the Western missile defence system are needed.
A former high-ranking Russian official said that ‘President Bush made a mistake
in his argumentation’ for the missile defence system and that if he had claimed
that the American system was to protect the U.S. ‘from anybody and nobody’
the reaction to missile defence would be more muted because it is ‘quite difficult
to find a counter-argument’ to a system of general defence. The former official
pointed to the original argument that the planned system would protect Europe
and the U.S. from an Iranian or North Korean strike but it would be impossible
for North Korea to have a missile capable of travelling the 16,000 miles from
North Korea to the U.S. via Europe. While the former official did recognise that
this claim ‘disappeared from the argument’ for missile defence, by the time the
argument had changed, Russia was concerned about the true intentions of the
system. In his Munich speech, Putin argued that Iran possesses missiles with a
range of 1,600–1,700 kilometres and was planning to develop ones that travel
2,400 kilometres so, therefore, the missiles did not pose a threat to Europe
(Putin, 2007k). A few months later in a press conference, Putin reiterated that
Iran does not have the capability to be a threat to the U.S. and criticised the idea
of building a missile defence system against a missile which does not exist when
he asked, ‘Do you not think that is funny?’ (Putin, 2007b). Putin’s opinion of the
threat facing Europe from ballistic missiles did not change and in 2007 he stated
that Russia ‘do[es] not see any reasons at all for deploying an anti-missile
defence system in Europe’ (Putin, 2007m). When Putin argued in a meeting that
it would be many years before Iran developed a missile that would be capable of
hitting Europe, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Gates replied ‘you need a new
intelligence service’ (Putin, Russia and the West, 2012d).
Russia did not support the idea of the missile defence system being stationed
in Eastern Europe due to concerns about its implications for national security
and argued that it would make more sense if the system was established further
to the south, such as in Turkey, because the system would be more efficient
located closer to the missile launch location and, assuming a successful missile
interception, it would prevent the destroyed missiles components from landing
on European countries (Korsakov, 2009: 49). According to a Russian MFA offi-
cial, if the missiles come from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, namely Iran, it ‘is
obvious’ that the point of ‘interception would take place over Russia’. Russia
was also in favour of locating the system in Turkey because it would resolve an
issue that Russians believe exists if components of the system are in Eastern
Europe, which is that only Northern and Central Europe would be fully protected
under an Eastern European-based system and that areas in the south of Europe
would remain exposed to Middle Eastern missile threats (Prikhodko, 2008: 6).
Another point of disagreement between Russia, NATO, and the U.S. was
about the level of involvement and cooperation that they would be permitted
to have. At the Lisbon Summit meeting, Medvedev announced that Russian
cooperation on missile defence would be contingent on a series of conditions,
including ‘equality, transparency, technological involvement and responsib-
ility for particular tasks’ (Medvedev D., 2010d). One high-ranking Russian
MFA official advocated in favour of American and NATO cooperation with
Russia on missile defence because Russian satellite capabilities, as well as its
radar capabilities, would provide a ‘better and clearer picture’ of the world.
The Russians wanted ‘full-scale integration into any early-warning and
defence system – not just the provision of data, but actual involvement in
decision-making and operation of the system’ and were, therefore, looking for
dual-key level system involvement (Sokov, 2010: 128). For the Americans,
the idea of a joint missile defence system that requires ‘dual-key’ operations,
where both the Russians and Americans make decisions together about when
to act, raised concerns that decisions involving monitoring or intercepting a
possible Iranian missile might be prevented by the Russian side (Weitz, 2010:
110). As a Western European ambassador argued ‘we have done everything to
make the Russians feel comfortable with missile defence, including the pro-
posal of the Obama Administration to establish two so-called “fusion centres” ’
where one would be focused on monitoring and the other would identify
threats. The ambassador went on to state that ‘we have proposed to the Rus-
sians, to the maximum possible, their integration into this structure’. While
NATO officials feel that they have offered all they can in terms of cooperation,
Russians disagree. One Russian academic stated that the offers from NATO
would give ‘some access to control centres’ and some technical information
but that the offers were insufficient.
In order to make cooperation possible, the countries involved would need to
overcome issues created ‘by different technical standards, command-and-control
procedures and operational doctrines’ and if sensitive technology is involved in
joint missile defence efforts, the NATO countries would need to see that safe-
guards have been established that would prevent missile defence technology
from being transferred to other countries, possibly China (Fitzpatrick, 2009: 10).
The Russians themselves recognise that the sharing of technical information is
further complicated by the fact that neither the U.S. military nor corporations
involved in missile defence want to see their technology leaked to third-party
countries, which is seen as a valid concern because of Russia’s relationships
with countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea (Arbatov, 2012: 14).
Without safeguard mechanisms, there would be operational difficulties in estab-
lishing a system that works as one unit and in which the alliance members would
be comfortable with sharing their technology.
Views on the possibility of cooperation
From the NATO perspective, achieving cooperation on missile defence would
be quite complicated. While Russia was opposed to the Bush plans, it has been
argued that the ten ground-based interceptors that were planned as part of the
system were not enough to overcome a 1,500 weapon arsenal and that ‘there is
little substance to Russia’s claims that the missiles could be nuclear tipped and
aimed at Russia as medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or that the
Czech-based radars could be used for surveillance of Russia’ (Codner, 2009:
16). One Central European ambassador suggested that for true cooperation on
missile defence to occur, there ‘would have to be quite a different political atmo-
sphere’ and the ambassador stated that until Russian rhetoric and politics
changes, there is no possibility for cooperation. Attitude differences are a recur-
ring theme with one Western European ambassador saying that if there was a
compromise on missile defence, it would mean that Russia would have to agree
to sharing its security with NATO but to do so, Russia would first ‘have to admit
that NATO is not a threat, an enemy, an adversary anymore’ since a country
cannot claim to be any of those things if they were to trust each other with their
security. A high-ranking Western official said that American proposals from
2011 were aimed at ‘try[ing] to create a space for an excuse’ so that the Russians
could show that they concede to limited cooperation without appearing to lose
the point that they were making.
A Central European ambassador considered that ‘from a technical point of
view, they must know [missile defence] is not about them’ but it provides Russia
with ‘one of several good leverages or sticks’ to use for their own gains. From the
perspective of a high-ranking Central European diplomat, the Bush-era plans
were a threat to Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe, not to their
own missiles, which meant that the ‘Russians knew [missile defence] was not
about them and could not worsen their security’. Even after the introduction of
the Obama and NATO plans, the diplomat stated that, in private consultations
with the Russians, the Russians told them that missile defence was ‘not a threat’
but that the Russian leadership chose to use the issue ‘politically’ and at that
point, ‘no factual discussion’ was going to prevent missile defence from being an
issue. An Eastern European ambassador agreed that for Russians, the ‘concern
was that missile defence installations were being built in Eastern Europe’ so the
issue was a broader political complaint and not about technical concerns. A dif-
ferent Eastern European ambassador felt that it was ‘hard to tell’ how the Rus-
sians felt about missile defence but pointed out that he ‘ha[d] been sitting through
briefings . . . where the Americans explain it defies the laws of physics’ for the
system to threaten Russia and there is a limited number of interceptors used in the
system but that it seemed that the ‘Russians don’t really take that on board’ and
there have been books published and conferences held that have said the system
threatens Russia. When considering whether Russia viewed the missile defence
system as a threat, a Central European ambassador said that he ‘never really made
up my mind on this’ but that there is a ‘special subfield where interceptors’ can
work against simple technology, like that of Iran, but that more sophisticated
weapons, like those possessed by Russia ‘would be something different’.
In Russia, opinions on missile defence cooperation varied. A former high-
ranking Russian official said that he thought that NATO and the U.S. ‘want to
cooperate with Russia’ and that he ‘believe[s] the system they are creating is not
against Russia’ but that he had come to the conclusion that in regards to missile
defence, the U.S. and Russia have ‘different geometry, different mathematics, and
a different shape of the Earth’. A Russian academic said that ‘everyone here real-
ises that missile defence is not a threat’ but that there were concerns over the fourth
phase because ‘at this phase, there was a chance of an interceptor shooting down a
Russian missile’. The academic also said that, for Russia, missile defence had
become a ‘psychological issue’ and that because there had been ‘several years of
discussion in very negative’ terms, it would be difficult for the Russian government
to explain to the population that the idea of missile defence as a threat is a ‘myth’
that ‘has nothing dangerous behind it’. A high-ranking Russian MFA official
argued that for cooperation to occur, ‘absolute confidence in the result’ would be
needed, as would ‘legally-binding guarantees that the system will not intercept
what we have’ as well as certainty of what the system will be since otherwise ‘we
will be back in square one’. A different high-ranking MFA official said that the
Russian government is concerned that the EPAA system ‘may not be the endpoint’
for American missile defence plans but that further steps could be taken, so from
the Russian perspective there is no certainty about the system, particularly because
as the system advances from phase to phase, the ‘degree of strategic insecurity is
growing’. The official also suggested that proposals for a joint data fusion centre
and operations planning centre would mean cooperation but also independence,
which ‘could be useful to some extent’ and ‘it would be in our interest to receive
some information from NATO and the U.S. sensors’.
In one of his 2012 presidential campaign articles, Russia and the Changing
World, Putin argued that the West’s missile defence project was a threat to
global stability on the grounds that the U.S. appeared to be pursuing ‘absolute
invulnerability’ which is problematic since that ‘would mean absolute vulner-
ability for all of the others’ (Putin, 2012b). In a separate article, Putin said that
Russia would either need to develop its own missile defence capabilities or build
up its offensive capabilities so that it could overpower a missile defence system
but that whichever response Russia chose, it would be ‘effective and asymmetri-
cal’ (Putin, 2012c). Missile defence is a complicated issue for the U.S. and
Russia with two of the greatest difficulties being the issue of trust and stability in
relations, which are essential for the development of Russia–West cooperation
on security issues; according to some, it could take years to generate the neces-
sary conditions for a joint missile defence programme to be feasible (Savelyev,
2004: 107). Proposals made by both sides during the 2000–2012 period proved
to be inadequate and did not meet with the other’s approval. Questions remain
over how seriously a threat Russia considers the U.S. plans to be and how much
of their concern reflects wider Russian anxieties over their military and being
seen as less than a great power state and militarily weakened.
Conclusion
While Obama becoming president of the United States might have assisted
Medvedev in securing an agreement on a new strategic arms treaty, given the
reluctance seen from the Bush Administration to discuss another treaty after
SORT was agreed to, the domestic opposition in Russia, including from Putin
himself, to any agreement that did not seek to limit American missile defence
could have prevented an agreement from being reached. The fact that negoti-
ations secured the New START agreement, despite Putin’s outspokenness on the
importance of the inclusion of missile defence in any treaty, shows the import-
ance of Medvedev in securing the agreement. The agreement itself returned to a
more traditional model of arms control which included verification measures and
called for the destruction of warheads rather than leaving open the possibility of
putting the warheads into storage. It also set an exact limit on warheads rather
than declaring a range which the two countries must fall between. Although
Medvedev stated that Russia would leave the agreement should events occur
which would have an impact on the security situation for Russia, this is not an
uncommon point to make when supporting an arms control treaty since neither
side, when seeking a strategic balance, would want to see the balance upset.
Missile defence proved to be an issue that neither Russian president could
reach an agreement with the West on and as could be seen with Putin’s com-
ments during the New START negotiations, the Russian leadership sees an
‘interlink’ between missile defence and nuclear arms reductions. As a former
high-ranking Russian official stated, ‘we are not enemies . . . not even adversaries
. . . but strategic stability still exists’ so missile defence and nuclear weapons will
remain an issue. Putin offered two proposals on missile defence: one in 2000
which was a vague idea that Russia work with the Europeans and the Americans
on developing a European-wide missile defence system and the other in 2007,
which suggested joint use of an already existing Russian radar station that would
be close to Iran and would not require the hosting of missile defence components
in Eastern Europe. Medvedev attempted a different approach at achieving
cooperation in 2010 and called for different European countries to be responsible
for defending different areas of Europe from incoming ballistic missile threats.
All three of these plans were rejected for different reasons, ranging from a belief
that recommended facilities were inadequate to the fact that NATO would not
trust a non-member with defending the members of the alliance.
9 The return of President Putin
A change of course
On September 24, 2011, Putin suggested to the United Russia party conference
that Medvedev stand at the top of the party list for the parliamentary elections in
December, an offer Medvedev accepted, and then Medvedev proposed ‘that the
party congress support the candidacy of head of the government, Vladimir Putin,
in the role of the country’s president’ (Elder, 2011). With those words, the job
swap became public knowledge and Medvedev was effectively rendered a lame
duck president until Putin’s inauguration on May 7, 2012. From a diplomatic
perspective, the announcement meant preparing to work with Putin again and the
lack of influence Medvedev held over foreign policy issues after the announce-
ment was made became clear when he famously told Obama in March 2012 that
he ‘will transmit this information to Vladimir’ in response to the American pres-
ident stating that he would have ‘more flexibility’ on bilateral issues after his re-
election in November (Spetalnick & Holland, 2012).
The final few months of Medvedev’s presidency saw reduced attention paid
to issues of foreign affairs and security policy while domestic politics came to
the forefront. The protests that followed the December 2011 parliamentary elec-
tion prompted Putin to suggest that Russia’s opposition had been prompted to
take to the streets by a ‘signal’ from the U.S. and that the protests were being
supported by the U.S. Department of State (Putin, 2011c). Although domestic
issues, particularly the Russian economy and the Russian opposition, drew a
great deal of attention after Putin returned to the presidency, security issues relat-
ing to the Euro-Atlantic region remained high on the agenda. While some issues
received less attention, such as the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space,
other issues such as missile defence and nuclear arms control remained topics
for discussion as new areas of concern emerged. The crisis over Ukraine, one of
the biggest security challenges to emerge in the Euro-Atlantic region since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, would have a significant impact on the security
relationship between Russia and the West.
The return of Putin was greeted with mixed reviews in the West. One Western
official downplayed the significance of the announcement by saying that
‘everyone knows that Putin runs Russia’ (Barry, 2011b). An Obama Administra-
tion spokesman indicated that he did not foresee any dramatic changes because
‘while we have had a very strong working relationship with President
The return of President Putin 165
Medvedev’, Putin had been the country’s Prime Minister during the ‘reset’
(Grove & Bryanski, 2011). One analyst suggested that the return of Putin would
probably not lead to ‘a change in the strategic course of Russian foreign policy’
but that ‘tone and style will likely differ from that of Dmitry Medvedev’ (Pifer,
2012). He also noted that it would probably be in 2013, after the American pres-
idential election, that Putin would reveal his intentions towards the United States
(Pifer, 2012). It was suggested that the smooth nature of the transition between
the two men ‘should offer the West and the wider world some reassurance’
because even though the job swap did not appeal to the West’s idea of demo-
cracy, the ‘reset’ would not be over (Rojansky, 2011). While there was optimism
that Putin’s return would not result in a major change in the direction of the
country’s policies, it was pointed out by Fiona Hill that Putin is less inclined to
trust the Russian–American relationship than Medvedev and this could lead to
‘the atmosphere [becoming] more frosty’ (Finn, 2011).
With Putin’s return to the presidency, the experiences that Western diplomats
and officials had with their Western counterparts changed. One former Western
official described the relationship between the two presidents as a ‘very tough
relationship, Putin and Obama are not friends forever’. According to the same
official after Obama’s re-election in November 2012, ‘we could immediately see
there were going to be problems’ with the Putin–Obama relationship and this led
to ‘a lot of head scratching’ in Washington as to the next steps to take. One
Western diplomat described the conversations he had with his Russian counter-
parts after the return of Putin as being ‘louder, more strident’ which he says has
made it ‘more difficult to get things done [on security issues and this] can be
directly attributed to Putin’s return’. While there are some officials who felt that
Putin’s return complicated matters, others saw the return of Putin as not greatly
impacting the ability of their countries to work with Russia. One high-ranking
Central European diplomat stated that since the return of Putin to the presidency,
Russia ‘might have become more blunt’ but that this is not necessarily a bad
thing because ‘sometimes it might be easier to talk to Russians when they are
blunt rather than hiding behind nice words’. Reflecting on the Putin who returned
in 2012, a Central European ambassador declared that Putin ‘used to be less
harsh in the past’ but that does not take away from the fact that he is a ‘man of
his word’ and ‘a man you can work with’.
Russia and Ukraine: a Euro-Atlantic security crisis

The developments in the Russian–Ukrainian relationship that have occurred
since the return of Putin to the presidency are particularly important when con-
sidering Euro-Atlantic security. The annexation of Crimea and violence in the
eastern parts of Ukraine have been described as ‘the most serious and dangerous
challenge for European security since the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the
subsequent ethno-political conflicts in the Balkans’ and the worst dispute since
the Cold War in the Russia–West relationship (Markedonov, 2015: 2). It is,
therefore, essential to look not just at the crisis, which will be done in this
section, but also at the consequences of the crisis on other security issues in the
region, which will be done in other sections, since the impact of the crisis can be
seen throughout the Euro-Atlantic space.
To understand the crisis in Ukraine, it is important to consider The Budapest
Memorandum, which was signed on December 5, 1994 by the American,
Ukrainian, and Russian presidents and the British Prime Minister which saw
Ukraine’s ‘independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine’
confirmed by the three other countries as well as a commitment made that they
would
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be
used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.
(Budapest Memorandum, 1994)
It also confirmed that the three countries would not subject Ukraine to ‘economic
coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of
the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind’
(Budapest Memorandum, 1994). While the Memorandum is more than twenty
years old, Russia and the U.S. reaffirmed their commitment to the agreement
more recently in December 2009 when they recognised that the agreement will
continue to be observed (Joint Statement, 2009b). While the Memorandum
seems designed to prevent a situation from emerging where there is conflict in
Ukraine involving any of the three signatory states, Putin dismissed the docu-
ment by arguing that events in Ukraine are comparable to the collapse of the
Russian Empire, as a result of the 1917 revolution, and the emergence of the
new Ukraine is ‘a new state with which we have signed no binding agreements’
(Putin, 2014e). The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that what happened in
Crimea ‘was the result of complex internal processes’ that Russia could not be
held responsible for and that it was through self-determination that Crimea came
to be part of Russia so Russia was not in breach of its Memorandum commit-
ments (Russian MFA, 2014c).
On November 26, 2013 it was announced that Ukraine would not be signing
its European Union Association Agreement, a decision that Prime Minister
Azarov explained was due to financial considerations, and soon after tens of
thousands of Ukrainians began to protest in Kiev and elsewhere in the largest
governmental protests since the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Grytsenko &
Traynor, 2013). The choice between signing the Association Agreement or not is
seen as a decision between Russia and the Putin-promoted Eurasian Economic
Union on one side and the European Union on the other, which meant that there
was economic pressure on Ukraine from Russia to attempt to persuade the
country (Soldatkin & Polityuk, 2013). In mid-December, as the protests against
Yanukovych continued, it was announced that Russia would provide Ukraine
with $15 billion worth of loans, would end trade barriers that had previously
been put in place to convince the Ukrainians not to sign the Association Agree-
ment, and would cut the cost of gas temporarily by approximately one-third
(RFE/RL, 2013). It was also announced that the rules against imports that were
part of Russia’s effort to pressure the country would be lifted (Interfax-Ukraine,
2013).
With worsening violence, despite an EU-brokered peace deal, Yanukovych
fled to Russia on February 22 and the Ukrainian parliament voted that Yanuko-
vych had ended his control of the country and called for new presidential elec-
tions (Frizell, 2014). The Russian–Ukrainian crisis would soon deepen over the
events that transpired in Crimea. On February 27, in the Crimean capital city of
Simferopol, a Russian flag was placed atop the region’s parliament building and
‘a well-orchestrated power grab by pro-Russian forces played out: armed milit-
ants took control of government buildings; crowds filled the streets chanting
“Russia, Russia,” and legislators called for a vote to redefine relations with
Ukraine’ (Higgins, 2014). The Crimean parliament voted 78–0 on March 6 to
join Russia and decided that a referendum would be held on March 16, which
was almost ten weeks earlier than previously planned (RFE/RL, 2014a). The ref-
erendum saw more than 97% of a supposed 83% turn-out support becoming part
of Russia but the election was marred by the boycotting of the election of the
Crimean Tatars, 13% of the total Crimean population, and a large number of
ethnic Ukrainians, who are 25% of the population (The Economist, 2014b). The
referendum ballot itself allowed voters to choose between two options: joining
the Russian Federation or having Crimea assume the status that it held under the
1992 Constitution, which would see the region remain part of Ukraine but a part
that is all but independent from Kiev (Sneider, 2014). Putin embraced the results
of the referendum, which he claimed was conducted ‘in full compliance with
democratic procedures and international norms’, and stated that the region ‘has
always been an inseparable part of Russia’ and that it had only become part of
Ukraine because of the decisions of the Bolsheviks, ‘may God judge them’, and
Nikita Khrushchev, whose reason for the decision ‘is for historians to figure out’
(Putin, 2014a). On March 18, 2014, Putin and Crimean representatives signed
the Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Fed-
eration and per the agreement accession is considered in effect from the date of
signature (President of Russia, 2014).
A 2015 Russian newspaper report revealed a Presidential Administration
document, purportedly written between February 4–12, 2014, before the depar-
ture of Yanukovych, which provided a ‘step-by-step’ plan for separating Crimea
and Ukraine’s eastern territory from Ukraine that appears quite similar to the
actual policies that Russia followed (Lipskii, 2015). According to Putin in 2015,
at approximately 7 am on February 23, 2014 he told the security and defence
officials that he was in a meeting with that ‘we are obliged to begin working to
bring Crimea back into Russia’ and, therefore, the decision was taken shortly
after the Presidential Administration document was written and before Yanuko-
vych fled to Russia and the referendum was announced (MacFarquhar, 2015).
Putin’s statement contradicted an interview he gave in March 2014 where when
he was asked if Crimea might join Russia, he replied no and used the oppor-
tunity to explain that self-determination exists, pointing to the case of Kosovo,
and that it is ‘only the people living in a given territory [who] have the right to
determine their own future’ (Putin, 2014e).
In addition to Russia’s Crimea activity, Russia ‘demanded that Kiev initiate
new constitutional changes, guarantee protection of Russian speakers, and
conduct a decentralization reform in the country’ while also ending the energy
discount and aid that was offered in October, assembling its troops along the
Russian–Ukrainian border, and providing assistance to the rebels fighting in
Ukraine’s east (Tsygankov, 2014: 3). The initial Ukrainian military successes in
June and July 2014 saw Russia respond with ‘Russian artillery fire from within
Russian territory, targeted against advancing Ukrainian troops on their own soil,
from mid-July onwards’ and when it appeared that the rebels were going to lose
in August, the direct involvement of Russian troops in combat (Sutyagin, 2015:
1). Russia’s military involvement in eastern Ukraine has been the cause of much
speculation with Putin denying in April 2014 the presence of Russian units,
special forces, and tactical advisors in the area and instead arguing that the activ-
ity in eastern Ukraine was the result of locals but he did acknowledge that
Russian troops had supported local forces in Crimea (Putin, 2014c).
The supplying of arms and other forms of assistance to the Ukrainian rebels
spilled over from a domestic conflict to an international tragedy with the
downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) on July 17, 2014 which resulted
in the deaths of 298 individuals (Tavernise et al., 2014). According to the Dutch
Safety Board’s preliminary report, the flight ‘broke up in mid-air as a result of
structural damage caused by “a large number of high-energy objects that pene-
trated the aircraft from outside” ’ (Topham, 2014). Since the plane crash, Russia
has attempted to place blame on the Ukrainians for the downing of the flight
with the Kremlin sharing ‘supposed satellite photos that were said to implicate
the Ukrainians but were quickly identified as crude fakes and dismissed’ and
with a Russian organisation presenting a witness who claimed to work at the
Ukrainian-held airfield in Dnipropetrovsk and who says that he saw a plane
leave on the day of the crash with air-to-air missiles on-board but return to the
airfield without them (Guardian, 2014). The United States, meanwhile, has
argued that the plane was shot down by ‘a SA-11 surface-to-air missile from
separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine’ and that while both the Ukrain-
ian government forces and rebels had possessed such systems, the Americans
‘are confident no Ukrainian air defence systems were within range of the crash’
(U.S. Embassy Kiev, 2014). The U.S. also pointed to the rebel postings on social
media, including that of one of the rebel military officials Igor Strelkov who
claimed to have shot down a military plane soon after MH17 went down, and to
intercepted communications between the rebels (U.S. Embassy Kiev, 2014).
On September 5, 2014, the Minsk Protocol, an agreement created by Putin,
was signed (The Economist, 2014c). Under the Minsk Protocol, the Ukrainians
and Russian-backed rebels agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the monitoring
of the ceasefire by the OSCE; a ‘decentralization of power’; monitoring by the
OSCE and the establishment of a security zone at the Russian–Ukrainian border;
a release of hostages by both sides; the passing of a law that would protect the
rebels from ‘prosecution and punishment’ for their involvement in Donetsk and
Luhansk; the improvement of humanitarian conditions in Donbass; ‘the holding
of early local elections’; the withdrawal of ‘unlawful military formations,
military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of
Ukraine’; the creation of an economic programme to improve conditions in
Donbass; the provision of ‘personal security guarantees for the participants of
the consultations’; and the opening of a national conversation (Minsk Protocol,
2014). Following the agreement, a memorandum was signed two weeks later
which saw the Russian-supported rebels, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE agree
to establish a buffer zone of approximately 18 miles in width, to withdraw long-
range artillery back even further and bans placed on planting new landmine
fields and flying combat aircraft over the conflict zone (Associated Press, 2014c).
Unfortunately, the agreements did not produce the desired result and fighting
continued and worsened. On January 21, 2015, a document was signed by the
Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Berlin that would see the Ukrainian
and rebel forces move their artillery away from the front lines but an explosion
only hours later that killed 13 people resulted in renewed violence (Walker,
2015). With the collapse of the ceasefire, another round of talks held February
11–12, 2015 between the French, German, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders saw a
new Minsk II agreement on a ceasefire reached between the Ukrainians and
rebels that called for the removal ‘of heavy weaponry from the battle zone,
which is to be demilitarised, amnesties on both sides and exchanges of prisoners
and hostages’ while a different document ‘committed Putin to respecting
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (Traynor, 2015). The ceasefire
appeared to be in trouble soon after the signing of the document as the fighting
in Debaltseve ended with the Ukrainian military leaving the town under fire
(Kramer & Hersezenhorn, 2015). Despite the early problems implementing the
agreement, in March the OSCE reported that ‘the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine is
largely holding but there continue to be violations in and around Donetsk airport
and Shyrokyne’ (OSCE SMM, 2015b).
As a result of Russian policies, the approval rating of Russia in Ukraine plum-
meted from 43% to 5% between 2013 and 2014 (Ray & Esipova, 2014). While
Russia’s actions to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement were
designed to move Ukraine closer to Russia and not align itself with the West,
Russia’s subsequent actions have instead moved Ukraine away from Russia. On
June 27, 2014, Ukraine signed its Association Agreement with the European
Union and Ukraine’s ability to export to the European Union has been greatly
expanded (Pifer, 2014). In 2014, 43% of Ukrainians were in favour of ‘close
relations with the EU even if it hurts relations with Russia’, 37% supported
‘close relations with the U.S. even if it might hurt relations with Russia’, and
53% of Ukrainians felt it was important ‘to have a very strong position regarding
Russia’ with an additional 12% in favour of cutting off all relations with Russia
(Keating & English, 2014). The establishment of a buffer zone in the eastern part
of Ukraine and the slow movement of conflict resolution appears to have created
a new frozen conflict in Eastern Europe and one which ‘is the perfect tool for
Moscow to distract Kiev from introducing reforms and to encourage unstable
politics’ (Dempsey, 2014).
Russia and the frozen conflicts

While the crisis over Ukraine was the active conflict in the region, the frozen
conflicts of the post-Soviet area, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and Transdniestria, continued to remain unresolved. The conflict with
Georgia, which occurred while Medvedev was president was the subject of
domestic scrutiny after Putin returned to the presidency. The release of a docu-
mentary about the conflict prompted a debate over the roles of Putin and
Medvedev during the conflict. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, not much pro-
gress has been made and the violence there continues. The conflict over Trans-
dniestria has undergone several rounds of talks, some more successful than
others, and seen new agreements reached but no permanent solution.
The August 2008 conflict as a Russian domestic issue

Prior to the fourth anniversary of the Russia–Georgia conflict in 2012, a docu-
mentary called The Day That Was Lost emerged and challenged the earlier
accounts of the role Medvedev had in the decision-making process to use force
in the conflict (Ennis, 2012). The documentary argued that if Medvedev had
issued military orders in response to reports on August 7 that Georgia had plans
to launch an attack against South Ossetia, the loss of Russian peacekeepers in
the area and the local population could have been averted (Peleschuk, 2012).
One of the generals interviewed for the documentary was the former Chief of the
General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, who Medvedev had fired two months prior to
the conflict, reportedly because of his clashes with Defence Minister Serdyukov
(von Twickel, 2012). Baluyevsky argued in the documentary that ‘I am con-
vinced, until there was a kick from Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] in Beijing,
everyone here, to put it mildly, was afraid of something’ (von Twickel, 2012).
The origins of the documentary have not been confirmed but there were rumours
that the documentary was the result of filmmakers attached to either Centre TV,
which is owned by the Moscow city government, or Channel Five which is
under the control of Yuri Kovalchuk, a businessman with ties to Putin (Ennis,
2012). The style of the documentary has been compared to the ‘anti-opposition
propaganda films aired on state TV channels during the election campaign’ and
the multiple public comments from Putin about the video were considered to be
an inordinately large amount of presidential attention (Bryanski, 2012b).
Putin stated that the decision to respond militarily was taken after three days
of fighting since the Georgians ‘started their offensive somewhere around the
4th or 5th, and on the 6th mass shooting began with artillery fire, tanks, and mul-
tiple rocket launchers’, seemingly in agreement with the claims of the film that a
decision regarding the use of force was not made in a timely manner, but he also
stated that to issue a military order is a decision that must be ‘carefully’ con-
sidered (Putin, 2012e). In a press conference a day later, Putin also stated that he
‘called Mr Medvedev twice, on August 7 and 8’ and also phoned Defence
Minister Serdyukov (Putin, 2012f ). Putin was not the only leader to address the
existence of the video as Medvedev also spoke out about the claims made in
the documentary. During his meeting with South Ossetian President Tibilov on the
fourth anniversary of the conflict, Medvedev appeared to be responding to claims
that the decision to use force was not his when he stated that ‘I had to make a
number of difficult military decisions which helped to ultimately restore the
balance and, most importantly, brought peace to South Ossetia and its people’
(Medvedev D., 2012d). After the meeting, Medvedev answered a question
regarding the documentary and he stated that the decision to use force ‘could
have been taken only in case of direct aggression against Russian nationals and
Russian peacemakers’ which occurred on the night of August 7–8 and that was
why he took the decision to use force ‘two and a half hours after the Georgian
army attacked’ (Medvedev D., 2012c). In the same response, Medvedev also
stated that he and Putin ‘had a chance to speak confidentially only on August 8’
(Medvedev D., 2012c). Medvedev’s response means that although he and Putin
might have spoken before 8 August, it could have been on an unsecure line and
the topic of conversation remains uncertain as neither man addressed this
specifically.
In the days after both men’s statements and in light of reports that the film
might be tied to those who supported Putin, it was felt by some that the public
differences in the statements of the two men showed that there was a fracture at
the top which was illustrating a wider dispute between Russia’s conservative and
liberal leaders (Belton, 2012). Olga Kryshtanovskaya argued that while previ-
ously Medvedev had not been criticised because Putin protected him, Putin may
no longer be defending Medvedev (Lyauv, 2012). Nikolai Petrov argued that the
documentary and decisions taken by the legislature in Russia show ‘that a revi-
sion is going on of the already not-very-rich inheritance of the Medvedev presid-
ency’ (Coalson, 2012).
The disputes over the roles of the two men show that even four years after the
conflict occurred, it remains an important issue in Russian politics. For
Medvedev, the Georgia conflict symbolises a moment of leadership and shows
action taken, but for Putin this image of Medvedev presents a challenge to his
own strong leader image. The support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia during
the conflict and the change in conditions afterwards provided the opportunity for
Medvedev to recognise the two breakaway regions as independent states which
added to Medvedev’s presidential legacy. Conflicting reports, therefore, over the
extent of his role during the conflict can be seen as not only a way to build up
Putin’s own standing but also as a way of reducing the role of Medvedev during
his presidency. Efforts to reduce Medvedev’s role in Russian politics can be seen
in a December 2013 press conference when Putin was asked who the second
most influential politician in Russia was and he listed Medvedev fifth, despite
Medvedev being both Prime Minister and the leader of United Russia (Putin,
2013). In an assessment of Medvedev’s influence, Putin pointed to Medvedev as
the party leader and stated that the former president ‘has extensive experience in
government work’ (Putin, 2013).
The still frozen conflicts

In Abkhazia, there is a division amongst the political elites between those who
support the region ‘continu[ing] to get everything from Russia and are satisfied
by a role of an economic annex with the façade of an independent state’ and
those who support ‘independence as a historical responsibility that requires the
building of a political nation based on an identity shared by all citizens’
(O’Loughlin et al., 2015: 14). Abkhazia is quite dependent on Russia, with a
quarter of the region’s budget being supported by Russian subsidies and Russia
also paying for major infrastructure projects including the building of roads, sup-
porting education, and assisting with agriculture (Fuller, 2013). In November
2014, the Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership Between Russia and
Abkhazia was signed by Putin and the Abkhaz leader, which according to Putin
‘sets out the main priorities for Russian–Abkhazian cooperation . . . which are
the economic, social and humanitarian sectors and defence and security matters’
(Putin, 2014f ). Under the agreement, Russia and Abkhazia would consider an
attack on the other the same as an attack on themselves, the Russian government
would provide more money for Abkhazia’s military modernisation, a Russian–
Abkhaz military force would be established, Russia would provide double its
existing funding to Abkhazia, and Russia would push for more countries to
recognise the breakaway region as an independent country (RFE/RL 2014b).
South Ossetia has much closer ties to Moscow than Abkhazia and when the
presidential candidate that Russia supported did not win in November 2011, the
vote was invalidated and a new election was held in April 2012 where a new
Russian-backed candidate, a former KGB officer, won (Bryanski, 2012a). A poll
of South Ossetians showed that 81% support joining Russia, while a mere 16%
are in favour of independence, but Russia has rejected South Ossetia becoming
part of Russia and as an alternative both the Ossetian and Russian leaderships
have pushed for increased ties and cooperation through the Eurasian Economic
Union (O’Loughlin et al., 2015: 27–28). The signing of the Treaty on Alliance
and Integration signed in March 2015 was greeted by Putin as a ‘milestone
agreement . . . [that] takes our two countries to a new level of interstate dialogue
and sets the long-term directions for our bilateral relations’ (Putin, 2015). In
practice the agreement ‘gives Russia responsibility for ensuring the defense and
security of South Ossetia, including guarding its borders’ and brought the South
Ossetian security and military forces into their Russian counterparts (RFE/RL,
2015). The new agreement also provides South Ossetians with an easier path to
Russian citizenship and provides raises for state pensioners and civil servants, in
addition to other economic benefits (Associated Press, 2015). Since the conflict
with Georgia, South Ossetia has been all but completely dependent on Russia
financially and Russia has already provided the region with 43 billion roubles
(approximately $700 million) with nine billion more roubles (approximately
$147 million) to be given under the new agreement (DW, 2015).
While Lavrov told the Duma in November that ‘we are preparing a new
treaty, which will strengthen our relations with Abkhazia, we are expanding our
treaty, legal basis, with South Ossetia and we are ready to continue the normali-
zation of relations with Georgia’, relations with Georgia became more compli-
cated because of the new agreements (Lavrov, 2014). The new treaties were
criticised by Georgia who argued that the agreements were ‘directed toward the
annexation of these regions of Georgia and represents a gross violation of the
norms of international law’ (Razumovskaya, 2015). According to the Council of
Europe, in 2014 both Russia and Georgia ‘gave indications that the issue of
restoring diplomatic relations is not on the agenda at present, and recalled their
respective preconditions for such a step’ (CoE, 2014). One of the days of the
thirty-first round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) occurred the
same day as the signing of the Russian–South Ossetian agreement, which
according to the Co-Chairs of the GID resulted in ‘a difficult climate’ with the
discussions ‘turn[ing] out to be very difficult due to divergent views and
approaches of participants on various issues’ with only some progress made on a
statement on the non-use of force by all parties (GID, 2015). Since 2012, the
GID has made little progress in Working Group II, which deals with human-
itarian issues, because of ‘disagreements on certain agenda points among parti-
cipants’, while Working Group I had experienced some success with the Gali
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism but that was suspended and the
Ergneti one is still being discussed (CoE, 2014). The ‘borderisation’ process has
continued with Russia’s support along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL)
and has seen the establishment of defences and three kilometres of ditches dug at
the ABL between Abkhazia and Georgia and the installation of border signs,
cameras, fences, and motion sensors along the ABL between South Ossetia and
Georgia (CoE, 2014).
While Medvedev had been quite active in addressing the frozen conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, the fact that Putin has had problems with the leaders of
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the past that Russian engagement over the issue has
declined since Putin’s return has led some to believe ‘that conflict resolution in
Karabakh is not, you know, his highest priority, shall we say’ (de Waal, 2012).
In August 2014, Putin did host a meeting with the Armenian and Azeri leaders
in Sochi and while the meeting did lead to a reduction of fighting along the Line
of Contact, which before the meeting had gotten quite bad, the ‘meeting seemed
to confirm the basic truth of the Karabakh conflict: that it remains unresolved
because of internal dynamics, not external factors’ and little more was accomp-
lished (de Waal, 2014). Russia has used the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as
a way of ensuring that Armenia remains close while also building its ties with
the economically stronger Azerbaijan. A 2013 Armenian decision not to attend a
meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation saw a Russian response
that included a deal to sell an addition $1 billion worth of arms to Azerbaijan,
thus showing Armenia that ‘Russia may no longer support it in the framework of
the conflict’ (Babayan, 2015: 12). The West’s response to the Ukraine crisis has
also cast a shadow on Azerbaijan’s confidence in the conflict resolution process.
From the Azeri perspective, the recent crisis over Ukraine has prompted con-
cerns regarding the West’s attitude. The Azeris have watched the West punish
Russia for annexing Crimea, which they compare to Armenia’s behaviour
towards Nagorno-Karabakh, while the West has also supported Ukraine’s right
to use force to preserve its territorial integrity but the West has not responded to
Armenia’s actions in a similar manner (The Economist, 2014a).
Before Medvedev left office, it was decided that the talks conducted in the
5+2 format on Transdniestria would resume and, in 2012, there was some pro-
gress in the discussions and agreement was reached on rail services (OSCE
Mission to Moldova, 2012b). Negotiations in 2013, under the Ukrainian chair-
manship of the OSCE, saw agreement on the removal of an unused cable car
over the Dniester River, ‘a protocol decision regarding the draft joint action plan
on environmental issues and sustainable use of natural resources was agreed and
signed’, and ‘protocol decisions on freedom of movement, pensions and social
assistance for people who changed their place of residence, and on reconstruc-
tion of waste processing facilities’ (OSCE Mission to Moldova, 2013a, 2013b,
2013c). As a high-ranking Eastern European diplomat related, Russian efforts to
rearm its troops in Transdniestria resulted in damage to the credibility of Ukraine
because in order for the equipment to reach Transdniestria it ‘need[s] to transit
Ukraine’ which made them seem a biased party to the Moldovans since they
were letting their territory be used for military arming purposes. The diplomat
stated that the Ukrainians sought to reverse this damage by now requesting
Moldovan and Russian agreement on the transiting of equipment through its ter-
ritory. Despite the concerns about Ukraine’s role as a mediating party, 2013
would result in more agreements than the following year. In February 2014 an
agreement was signed that would allow for Transdniestrians who possess pass-
ports of other countries free movement (OSCE Mission to Moldova, 2014).
Negotiations between Moldova and Transdniestria were complicated in March
when, during a visit to Moscow, the speaker of Transdniestria’s parliament
argued that Transdniestria should become part of Russia (Tanas, 2014). While
Transdniestria has not been accepted into Russia, the issue has added a new level
of difficulty to the conflict resolution process.
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security institutions

With the return of Putin to the presidency, Russia’s relations with the regional
security organisations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, have experienced some changes.
While the relationships had some troubles before the beginning of the Ukrainian
crisis, the conflict there has had wide-reaching consequences at the regional
security bodies. The OSCE has become one of the leaders in addressing the con-
flict, in particular with its establishment of monitoring mechanisms. NATO’s
response to the crisis has been to pursue the same path that was used as a
response to the Georgian conflict, largely severing relations with Russia.
Russia and the OSCE

One former Western diplomat described the change in tone that could be seen at
the OSCE under Putin as ‘decisively more negative, more intolerant, and more
chest thumping than it was under Medvedev’ and the diplomat stated that there
was a hardening of positions with the country becoming ‘more rigid’. The
December 2011 parliamentary election and March 2012 presidential election,
which brought Putin back to the presidency, led to criticism of Russian election
handling from OSCE related bodies, such as the Office of Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights, and from Russia’s fellow member-states during the
organisation’s meetings. ODIHR declared in its final report, released after
Putin’s inauguration, that ‘although all contestants were able to campaign unhin-
dered, the conditions for the campaign were found to be skewed in favour of one
candidate’, Vladimir Putin, and that even though the election observers ranked
95% of the more than 1,000 polling stations that they visited to be ‘good’ or
‘very good’ in the voting stage of the election, the vote counting stage saw
nearly one-third of visited voting stations classified as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’
because of ‘procedural irregularities’ (ODIHR, 2012c: 1, 18). Accusations of
electoral fraud following the parliamentary and presidential elections saw a
response from the Russian government that included domestic policies that gar-
nered further disapproval from the organisation.
The crackdown in Russia after the protests and the laws that were passed as a
result led to some heated exchanges at the OSCE. During a Permanent Council
meeting where members raised concerns about Russia’s new law on demonstra-
tions, the Russian representative argued that the treatment of demonstrators in
Russia was comparable to that of other OSCE members and stated that with so
much attention paid to Russia’s actions, he was ‘surprised by our colleagues’
lack of interest in rule-making in the OSCE countries to the west of Vienna’
because of new laws passed in Canada and the U.S. and the decisions of coun-
tries like Britain on the handling of demonstrators (Kelin, 2012a). When criti-
cised by the EU members of the OSCE for actions during anti-Putin
demonstrations in Moscow at the beginning of May, the Russian representative
argued that those participating in the demonstrations were not ‘leaders of the
opposition . . . because they do not head political parties in an organised form’
and instead the participants were deemed ‘hooligans’ (Kelin, 2012b). The repre-
sentative went on to argue that the EU states should not criticise Russia because
within their own countries there were violations of freedoms and other actions
that were not within international human rights obligations (Kelin, 2012b).
The OSCE’s Ministerial Council meeting in Dublin in December 2012 saw
the adoption of only a few decisions but the OSCE did accept Mongolia as a new
member and tasked the future Chairs with overseeing the work of the Helsinki
+40 process (Ministerial Council, 2012b). In his statement at the opening
session, Lavrov pointed to some of the issues that Russia had with the organisa-
tion and suggestions for how to improve. Among the Russian suggestions were a
proposal to conduct ‘comparative analysis of the electoral legislation of all coun-
tries of the OSCE and develop rules for election observation’ in order to address
‘double standards’ at ODIHR, a suggestion of establishing criteria for prospec-
tive new members as a result of Mongolia’s accession, and endorsing the work
of the OSCE on CSBMs for information and communication technology
(Lavrov, 2012). The Kiev Ministerial the following year experienced some suc-
cesses with the adoption of several decisions covering different dimensions of
security, including a decision which established ‘information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) confidence-building measures [and] is the first such deci-
sion by a regional organisation and can therefore be considered as pioneering
work by the OSCE’ (Liechtenstein, 2013: 322). While there were some positive
results from the meeting, Russia’s refusal to join consensus prevented the accept-
ance of a decision addressing the protection of journalists because of a dispute
with the U.S. over who is a journalist since the U.S. wanted to include writers
for online publications and blogs, who Russia did not want to see included and
Russia blocked the establishment of a field mission to the newest OSCE state,
Mongolia, on the grounds that the country ‘still had to prove itself as a respons-
ible member of the OSCE community’ (321, 323).
Since 2014, the OSCE’s agenda has been dominated by the events unfolding
in Ukraine and, therefore, it is important to consider the impact of the Ukraine
crisis on Russia’s policies towards the organisation. While some aspects of the
OSCE’s role in addressing the Ukraine crisis have already been mentioned, it is
important to note the level of activity that has been undertaken by the OSCE to
manage the conflict and that even hard to attain consensus has been forthcoming
from the member-states. When considering the actions of the OSCE in the period
before February 19, 2015 the OSCE can be seen quite involved in the crisis,
taking actions including: the appointment of a Personal Envoy on Ukraine in
February 2014 who is responsible for coordinating all of the OSCE undertakings
in Ukraine; the May 2014 proposal by the Chairmanship of a roadmap for the
implementation of the April 17 Geneva Statement, which included roundtable
discussions led by Ukraine’s government and were held the same month; parti-
cipation in the Trilateral Contact Group with Heidi Tagliavini serving as the
OSCE Chairmanship’s representative; the March 24, 2014 decision to deploy a
Special Monitoring Mission, who were the first international representatives to
the MH17 plane crash site and who monitor the Security Zone and the work of
the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination; and the July 24, 2014 decision for
an Observer Mission to monitor two Russian checkpoints, at Gukovo and
Donetsk, at the Russia–Ukraine border (OSCE, 2015a). The activities of the
related bodies have included: the monitoring and reporting of ODIHR on the
conditions of the Roma and those displaced by the conflict; the OSCE’s High
Commissioner on National Minorities following the conditions of the Crimean
Tatars and the rights of other deported groups, the rights of the Ukrainian-
speaking population in Crimea since the annexation, and also has done human
rights assessments in multiple cities and regions and monitored both the pres-
idential and parliamentary elections; the OSCE Representative on Freedom of
the Media has held multiple roundtables on journalist safety with members of
journalist unions from Russia and Ukraine and spoken out of attacks on journal-
ists; and the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine has lead meetings meant to
train Ukrainian mediators, talked with civil society about the OSCE’s transpar-
ency in the country, and with the country’s Interior Ministry and National Union
of Journalists written a guidebook entitled ‘Interaction Between Journalists and
Police Officers During Mass Events and Crisis Situations’, which includes sug-
gestions for behaviour of both sides and advice for cooperation (OSCE, 2015a).
By February 2015, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)
would be operating in a total of ten Ukrainian cities and would consist of 412
monitors, including 23 from Russia, and 642 total mission members (OSCE
SMM, 2015a). In July 2014, the OSCE’s Observer Mission to the Two Russian
Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk was approved and their role is to monitor
the situation at the border including ‘observ[ing] activities and movements
across the border at the Donetsk and Gukovo checkpoints’ (OSCE, 2014).
The OSCE’s role as an observer and as a mediating party to the conflict has
not always gone smoothly. On April 25, a team of eight European military obser-
vers were captured by rebels in Kramatorsk and while one was released early for
health reasons, the others were held until May 3 (Oltermann, 2014). In response
to the hostage-taking Putin sent a representative, Vladimir Lukin, to negotiate
their release but at the same time his spokesman stated that ‘from now on Russia
essentially has lost its influence over these people because it will be impossible
to convince them to lay down arms when there’s a direct threat to their lives’
and, consequently, Russia should not be counted on to resolve such situations
(BBC News, 2014). At the end of May, two more teams of OSCE observers,
each consisting of four monitors, were taken by the rebels from the cities of
Donetsk and Luhansk and they were not released until late June (Associated
Press, 2014a). The release of the Donetsk team occurred a week before an EU
Summit meeting and the Luhansk team was released after a meeting where the
EU called for the observers release and gave Russia and the rebels a couple days
to release them or face consequences (Associated Press, 2014b).
Representatives of the Crimean region did invite the OSCE to observe the
region’s March 2014 referendum but the invitation was refused by the OSCE
Chairman, Swiss Foreign Minister Burkhalter, on the grounds that ‘for any refer-
endum regarding the degree of autonomy or sovereignty of the Crimea to be
legitimate, it would need to be based on the Ukrainian constitution and would
have to be in line with international law’ and that ‘in its current form the referen-
dum . . . is in contradiction with the Ukrainian constitution and must be con-
sidered illegal’ and, consequently, there would be no observation (Dahl, 2014).
Russia’s recognition of Crimea as part of Russia has led to some difficulties at
the OSCE. An attempt by Russia to appoint Olga Kovitidi as a member of the
country’s delegation to the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly was rejected in
February 2015 following a review process prompted by a Ukrainian challenge to
her appointment since Kovitidi was proposed on the grounds that she was the
Crimean representative to the Federation Council (OSCE PA, 2015b). The
OSCE PA ruled that ‘what Ms. Kovitidi represents in the Russian Federation
Council is not a Russian territorial entity, but an illegal de facto authority on
Ukrainian territory’ and, therefore, she was ineligible to represent Russia (OSCE
PA, 2015a). The Russian representative to the OSCE called the decision ‘totally
unacceptable’ and said that it was another ‘provocation’ (ITAR-TASS Daily,
2015a).
The OSCE’s search for a role has continued as a result of the failure of the
Corfu Process and the V to V Dialogue to bring new vitality to the organisation.
Problems in the organisation are now expanding beyond conflicts over human
dimension issues and prompted a high-ranking Central European diplomat to say
that ‘even the Russians have seemed to abandon progress’ on the politico-
military work, despite their long-standing efforts to draw more attention to that
area. The launch of another programme, Helsinki at 40, led one Russian MFA
official to say that his country was ‘realistic towards’ the prospects of the new
dialogue and he acknowledged that ‘expectations are not very high’. The Central
European diplomat said that they are ‘afraid . . . the result of Helsinki at 40 can
be nothing more than a reconfirmation of what has been done before’ and that
nothing new will be accomplished. While Helsinki at 40 is challenged by divi-
sions within the organisation, the crisis in Ukraine and the many activities that
the organisation has undertaken as a response, shows that the OSCE has a role
and that Russia sees value in the organisation. Deputy Foreign Minister Meshkov
compared the OSCE to Sleeping Beauty and said that ‘when it is quiet in Europe
. . . the OSCE does not attract any special attention but when there appear diffi-
cult moments it becomes one of the most important mechanisms for regulation
of crisis situations . . . the OSCE is really demanded now and does much for
normalization of the situation in Ukraine’ (Chernenko, 2014).
Russia and NATO

With Dmitry Rogozin’s departure from the position of Russia’s ambassador to
NATO in December 2011, the position remained vacant until Alexander
Grushko was appointed in October 2012 (The Moscow Times, 2012). Despite
the arrival of a new ambassador who was viewed as less political than his prede-
cessor, there was not a great deal of optimism about the relationship greatly
improving. A Central European ambassador described the future of the NATO–
Russia Council in spring 2013 as being ‘poised for unspectacular but steady
work’ so there was an assumption that there would be no significant break-
throughs on the issues which divide Russia and the alliance. One Eastern Euro-
pean ambassador stated that given the strong anti-American rhetoric that had
been seen since Putin’s return and because of the Russian concerns about being
encircled by NATO, it ‘would be quite a trick’ to reverse the current trends and
move towards increased cooperation in the near future because the Russian gov-
ernment would have a difficult time explaining such a change to the Russian
people. In February 2013 Grushko stated that the potential for NRC cooperation
in the future ‘will depend on our ability to listen to each other and act in accord-
ance with the international law’ (NRC, 2013a).
One of the most complicated issues in the NATO–Russian relationship since
the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the alliance’s continued expansion.
While Russia remains concerned about potential NATO expansion, a Central
European ambassador stated that the alliance does not ‘have too many remain-
ing countries to integrate’ but as long as Georgia and Ukraine remain open
questions, the issue will remain a concern for Russia. In April 2014, Grushko
declared that ‘the process of NATO expansion has exhausted itself long ago . . .
it proved to weaken security, not to remove dividing lines, but to move them to
the east and stir up psychology of front-line states’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2014a).
The new Russian Military Doctrine, released in December 2014, listed NATO
first among external military threats citing the alliance’s global role, violations
of international law, the placement of NATO’s military infrastructure in coun-
tries that border Russia, and the potential future expansion of NATO (Military
Doctrine, 2014). While the alliance does not have a timeline for admitting any
new members, the Wales Summit Declaration did confirm NATO’s commit-
ment to the Open Door Policy and stated that ‘all European democracies which
share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to
further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion will contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area’ are eligible under the Open Door Policy
(NATO, 2014c).
There were some positive developments in the NATO–Russian relationship
before the events in Ukraine resulted in a dramatic downturn in the relationship.
The first cargo shipment to use the Ulyanovsk transit centre occurred in Decem-
ber 2012 when the British military made use of the transit route (NRC, 2013d:
6). In September 2013, Russia and NATO conducted an exercise as part of the
Common Airspace Initiative called Vigilant Skies, which saw Poland, Russia,
and Turkey work together ‘to detect and respond to hijacked planes’ using CAI
resources ‘to share their airspace data, and determine which actions to take in
response to the renegade aircraft as they would in a real life terrorist threat from
a civilian aircraft’ (NRC, 2013c). At the NRC Ministerial in December 2013
Russia and the alliance agreed to the NATO–Russia Trust Fund on the disposal
of excess ammunition, which was a partnership expected to last for five years
and would see the NRC countries using their knowledge and means to destroy
old and excessive ammunition with the Pilot Project in Kaliningrad (NRC,
2013b).
On April 1, 2014, the NATO Foreign Ministers released a statement saying
that they ‘are united in our condemnation of Russia’s illegal military interven-
tion in Ukraine and Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity’ and that Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea is ‘illegal and
illegitimate’ (NATO Foreign Ministers, 2014). As a result of Russia’s actions,
the Ministers declared Russia to be in violation of the documents that shape the
NATO–Russia relationship, including the Founding Act and the Rome Declara-
tion, and announced that they ‘have decided to suspend all practical civilian and
military cooperation between NATO and Russia’ (NATO Foreign Ministers,
2014). When asked about the decision, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
called it ‘deja vu’ and recalled how relations were suspended six years earlier as
a result of the Russia–Georgia conflict but that the Alliance had resumed the
meetings (Lukashevich, 2014). In practice, NATO’s decision means that the
only NRC political talks that are allowed have to be at the ambassador level or
higher and as of mid-September 2014, only two meetings had taken place
(NATO, 2014b). The alliance is also considering ways to cooperate on some of
the existing projects outside of the context of the NRC (NATO, 2014b). Projects
such as the Helicopter Maintenance Fund and the Counter-Narcotics Training
Project are two programmes which could be moved to other fora (NATO,
2014b). NATO’s decision to suspend cooperation also means that the only
members of the Russian delegation who will have official access to NATO
Headquarters will be Grushko, his deputy, and two members of the Russian Mis-
sion’s support staff and that any other members of the delegation will be treated
as visitors (NATO, 2014a).
NATO leaders reiterated their position at the 2014 Wales Summit stating that
the suspension of military and civilian cooperation will remain in effect, while
the political dialogue can continue, and called for Russia to meet its international
commitments: leave Crimea; abstain from aggression towards Ukraine; have
Russian troops withdraw while also preventing the ‘flow of weapons, equipment,
people and money across the border to the separatists’; and cease provoking ten-
sions at the border and inside Ukraine (NATO, 2014c). The Russian Foreign
Ministry’s response to the Wales Summit was not focused on what the NATO
leaders said Russia should do but instead focused on the fact that NATO is still
looking for a role in the world today and stated that the decision from NATO to
place some of the Alliance’s infrastructure in the East was in accordance with
long existing plans and not the result of the Ukraine crisis (Russian MFA,
2014b). While he did not discuss the Wales Summit specifically, a week after
the Summit Putin argued that Ukraine ‘which was provoked and masterminded
by some of our Western partners in the first place, is now being used to revive
NATO’ and pointed to the recent decision by NATO, which was taken at the
Summit, to increase its support of NATO forces in Eastern Europe as a response
to on-going events (Putin, 2014d). A couple days later Putin stated that the
Western countries were using the events in Ukraine as a tool to change the inter-
national landscape by reviving NATO, not as a military alliance but instead as a
U.S. foreign policy instrument and Putin suggested that ‘no one actually cares
about Ukraine itself ’ (Putin, 2014b).
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security framework

The situation with the existing Euro-Atlantic security framework has not
changed much since Putin’s return to the presidency. There have been changes
to the Vienna Document but the Document as it currently exists has proven its
importance as it has been used during the Ukraine crisis. Open Skies has been
able to function, despite the Cypriot membership issue, and has been used quite
a bit during the Ukraine crisis but a new issue related to technology led to com-
plications. The CFE Treaty and the Medvedev proposal have both not received
much attention and instead it is a question of where conventional arms control
goes next.
The three existing framework documents

In 2012, Russian efforts were concentrated on promoting ‘the need to establish
rules for arms and other items of growing importance to armed forces that are not
currently subject to conventional arms control treaties’ which included, from the
Russian perspective, weapons that could be launched from a ship and armed drones
(Anthony & Grip, 2013: 407). In 2013, the Russia position on conventional arms
control agreements changed from saying that the security framework currently in
place, after the Adapted CFE Treaty entered into force, could be used as a starting
point for future arms control to instead arguing ‘that the prospects for developing
the existing arms control acquis had now passed the point where it could be mod-
ernized’ and the Russians have begun to refer to the ACFE in the past tense
(Anthony, 2014: 437–438). Deputy Defence Minister Antonov stated that a new
arms control framework should not use ‘area-based limits and . . . should take into
account, for example, the contribution to combat operations made by special forces
units that are rapidly deployable by relatively small in size’ (438).
On March 10, 2015, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the Military
Security and Arms Control Talks in Vienna, Anton Mazur, announced to the
Joint Consultative Group that Russia would cease attending meetings of the JCG
and asked Belarus to represent Russian interests (Russian MFA, 2015b). Mazur
also stated that Russia would continue to be open to discussions about a new
security regime but that the country’s decision to no longer attend meetings was
the conclusion of the ‘suspension’ process that began in 2007 (Russian MFA,
2015b). Deputy Defence Minister Antonov explained that Russia’s decision to
build on its ‘suspension’ does not mean that country has withdrawn from the
CFE Treaty but that it would take a new decision from the president to change
the country’s current implementation status (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2015b).
According to Mikhail Ulyanov, who is the Director for the MFA’s arms control
department, Russia’s decision to complete its ‘suspension’ is ‘by no means a
direct response to the latest actions by Western countries’ but that the policies
that the West has pursued ‘created a favourable background and made the deci-
sion easier to make’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2015c). Ulyanov also explained that
the decision has no real practical impact on conventional armed forces in Europe
(ITAR-TASS Daily, 2015c).
The Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
saw only minor changes made to it in 2013. The Forum on Security Coopera-
tion’s Decision 4/13 on the Duration of Visits to Air Bases changed the visit
duration from ‘for a minimum of 24 hours’ to ‘up to 24 hours’ and specified that
the visit would allow the observers to see ‘routine activities of a working day’
rather than just ‘routine activities’ (FSC, 2013). The Russian position on Vienna
Document modernisation is not shared with other countries as Russia argues that
the current Document ‘provides an adequate level of oversight of the state of
military infrastructure, the disposition of forces and the activity of conventional
forces in Europe’ (Anthony, 2014: 439). Aspects of the Belarussian–Russian
military exercise in September 2013, Zapad-2013, raised some concerns at the
OSCE. While Russia had explained that the military exercise would simulate a
response to ‘an incursion onto the territory of either Belarus or Russia by a ter-
rorist or illegal armed group’, some of the aspects of the response, which
included the use of tanks and aircraft, drew questions (440). The two countries
also reported the exercise on two separate notifications as a below the threshold
activity, which meant they were below the threshold for observation despite the
exercises occurring simultaneously and under joint command with more troops
total, and this has prompted consideration of the proper way to report such exer-
cises (440).
While the issues surrounding Cyprus’ prospective membership saw the Treaty
on Open Skies unable to make much progress after the 2010 Review Confer-
ence, the Treaty did see agreement on the distribution of quotas in 2012 and the
passing of ten decisions between September 16 and October 21, 2013 (State
Department, 2015). The modernisation of the Treaty on Open Skies has con-
tinued but not without controversy. Beginning in September 2013, there was a
lengthy dispute between Russia and the United States over Russia’s new digital
camera for its Open Skies aircraft. The controversy resulted in a seven month
stoppage in the work of the Informal Working Group on Sensors and a situation
where the U.S. was forced to choose between either leaving the Treaty, which
had proven to be important due to ‘the largely unimpeded continuation’ of flights
during the Ukraine crisis, or agreeing to allow the Russian sensors for the coun-
try’s flights over Europe (Spitzer, 2014: 3–4). During the September 2013 certi-
fication event for Russia’s new camera, the U.S. sought to confirm that
‘non-removable storage units of the on-board computer and the ground process-
ing station would not permit “secret” recording of data not accessible to others’
but this request was denied on the grounds that there was no agreement to do
this (3). Branches of the U.S. government were divided over whether to certify
the Russian plane with the State Department supporting certification and the
Department of Defence and intelligence agencies concerned about the extent of
the sensors’ capabilities (Kristol, 2014). In May 2014, it was announced that
‘after careful consideration the United States has decided to certify the electro-
optical sensor for the Russian Federation’s AN-30 Open Skies Treaty aircraft,
which is used in Open Skies flights over Europe’ (Gertz, 2014a).
As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, both the Vienna Document and Open Skies
received international attention. It was written that while the two ‘agreements will
not be a panacea to resolve the crisis, and Russia has been uncooperative in fully
adhering to their requirements . . . their ability to increase transparency has
nevertheless yielded some valuable benefits’ (Rowberry, 2014). In March 2014,
Ukraine made a request that representatives of the OSCE member-states, OSCE
Partners for Cooperation, and the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) come
to Ukraine from March 5–12 in accordance with the Vienna Document’s Chapter
3, which allows for the voluntary hosting of visits in order to remove worries about
unusual military activities (OSCE, 2015a). The visits actually lasted until March 20
and saw 30 OSCE member-states send 56 representatives to various parts of
Ukraine and these visits were followed by other national inspection teams of
unarmed military experts, including the team from Germany that was taken hostage
(OSCE, 2015a). Under Vienna Document procedures, 26 member-states have sent
their inspectors and observers to conduct 21 inspection and evaluation visits to
Ukraine, a total of 12 countries have combined to conduct nine inspection and
evaluation visits to Russia, and there have been 18 requests from five different
countries for consultation regarding unusual military activities, including requests
from both Russia and Ukraine, which led to three meetings in April, held jointly by
the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council (OSCE, 2015a).
While Russia did use the Vienna Document mechanisms, the Russian delegation
was not completely supportive of their use and actually decided not to attend one
of the meetings because, as the Russian representative explained, the meeting
represented ‘the third senseless attempt’ to use Chapter 3 as a way ‘to create the
atmosphere of extraordinariness and justify the inaction and incompetence of the
Kiev authorities’ (ITAR-TASS Daily, 2014b).
The Treaty on Open Skies has also had a role in furthering transparency as
part of the Ukraine crisis. At the April OSCE meetings held regarding unusual
military activities, images taken as part of Open Skies flights were shown to
provide evidence of Russian movements (Friedt, 2014). For the first time since
entering force, the Treaty’s clause allowing for Extraordinary Observation
Flights was used, which allowed for two flights to be ‘conducted over Ukrainian
territory to observe whether Russia forces had moved beyond Crimea’ on March
13 and 14, one flight was conducted by Ukraine over Russian territory near their
mutual border, and additional extraordinary flights were conducted by other
states (Friedt, 2014). While these flights were conducted without incident, there
were a few difficulties in the application of Open Skies: flights have not been
flown over Crimea since its annexation despite an invitation from Russia to do
so because of concerns it could be seen as recognition of the region as part of
Russia; Russia denied a Ukrainian request for an extraordinary flight in May
2014; and a Ukrainian Open Skies plane was shot down in June resulting in the
death of five of the eight people on board who were conducting a surveillance
flight in Ukraine’s east, and while the flight was not conducted as part of the
Treaty it illustrates the danger of flying in the area (Spitzer, 2014: 4–5). While
there have been some problems in implementing the Treaty on Open Skies, the
fact that the agreement has been used and that the measure on Extraordinary
Observation Flights has been used multiple times, in addition to the regular
quota flights, shows the Treaty’s important role in confidence-building in the
Euro-Atlantic region.
Medvedev’s European security treaty proposal
The return of Putin to the presidency has rendered Medvedev’s EST ‘effectively
dead’ as Putin announced that he is seeking to promote his Eurasian Union project
which ‘would have the opposite effect of the stated purpose of the European
Security Treaty – to eliminate dividing lines separating the former Soviet Republics
from the rest of Europe’ (Weitz, 2012: 1). Putin has paid far more attention to the
Eurasian Union project than he has the EST proposal since his return to the presid-
ency and without his support, EST has all but disappeared. As of April 2015 the
proposal is still on the MFA website, both the English and Russian language ver-
sions, but since Putin’s return it has been only briefly mentioned by Foreign
Minister Lavrov in May 2013 and this was only in reference to the proposal still
being on the security agenda (Lavrov, 2013). The proposal still exists according to
a Russian MFA official who argued that the country has reconfirmed its commit-
ment to the approach. A different Russian MFA official declared that ‘this idea
remains on the table . . . it is a living document’. Despite the claims of support for
the document, little is seen to support the document in practice.
The Russian leadership is awaiting the start of a new round of consultations with
the West, and the U.S. in particular, regarding the situation surrounding European
conventional arms control. A high-ranking Russian MFA official said that the
country had expected proposals to come from the West in January 2012 but that in
spring 2013, Russia was still waiting for the ‘NATO countries [to] come up with
new proposals’. Due to past experiences, a Russian MFA official stated that the
country is ‘cautious’ about talks. A different high-ranking Russian MFA official
declared that ‘the dividing line should be very clear from the beginning because
otherwise any arms control will fail . . . and become hostage of political crises’.
Between the lack of promotion for the EST and the waiting for NATO to put
forward proposals without suggesting their own ideas, it appears Russia has
removed itself from the agenda setting position it had claimed when it introduced
the EST proposal.
Russia, nuclear arms control, and missile defence

While the U.S. and Russia continued conversations about missile defence, there
was no agreement on cooperation or, as Russia would like to see, legal guarantees.
The U.S. did cancel one of the phases of its missile defence system, a phase Russia
was concerned about, but this has not stopped Russia from opposing the system.
While both treaty parties are complying with New START, no further nuclear arms
reductions have been agreed to. The emergence of a potentially serious compliance
issue regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) has
complicated conversations about further reductions.
No agreement on missile defence

In March 2013, the American Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, announced
the ‘restructuring’ of the fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach, which would see the U.S. relying on the first three phases to fully
protect NATO territory by 2018, and the shifting of resources to ‘further improve
our ability to counter future missile threats from Iran and North Korea’ (Hagel,
2013). According to a Russian MFA official, the announcement by the U.S.
about the ‘postponement of the fourth phase could be positive’ but cooperation
has not been reached on the issue. As Riabkov explained, there is still uncer-
tainty of what will happen in 2022 and, therefore, ‘the picture is changing all the
time, and we cannot ignore it’ (Riabkov, 2013: 10–11). When the November
2013 agreement was reached that would see the development of Iran’s nuclear
programme frozen while negotiations were conducted to reach a permanent solu-
tion, Foreign Minister Lavrov used the agreement to suggest that the ‘implemen-
tation of the Geneva agreement on Iran will remove the cause for construction of
a missile shield in Europe’ (Collina, 2014). This was rejected at the time by the
former U.S. ambassador to NATO because even if there weren’t concerns about
Iranian nuclear weapons, the country’s missiles would still be capable of hitting
Europe (Collina, 2014). While the degree to which Iran presents a threat to
Europe continues to be the subject of debate between NATO and Russia, pro-
gress on the system has continued and new concerns have been expressed by
Russia. In March 2015, the prospect of an American missile defence system
being deployed to South Korea was deemed by the Russian MFA to be a cause
for concern and an action that could be a destabilising force in the region that
could lead to an arms race in north-eastern Asia and makes it more difficult to
resolve nuclear concerns on the Korean peninsula (Russian MFA, 2015a).
While the American missile defence system continues to draw much
Russian attention, the NATO missile shield has also been the subject of
Russian consideration. At the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, it was
announced that NATO had attained Interim NATO BMD Capability, which
means that there is ‘the maximum coverage within available means, to defend
our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a
ballistic missile attack’ (NATO, 2012b). While Russia and NATO have had
some cooperation in the field of missile defence, including an April 2012 joint
‘computer-assisted missile defence exercise hosted by Germany’, Russia
decided in October 2013 that the talks on missile defence between Russia and
the alliance should be suspended and these were not resumed before the break
in Russian–NATO cooperation as a result of the events in Ukraine (NATO,
2015). In March 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, a country that had
announced the previous year it would use some of its warships to provide radar
support for the system, said that the country’s involvement in missile defence
would mean that ‘Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles’
because the country would ‘become a part of the threat against Russia’ (Jensen
& Croft, 2015). The pressure that Denmark is under was compared by General
Breedlove, the commander of NATO forces, to the pressure that Poland and
Romania have experienced and he stated that ‘now anyone else who wants to
join in to this defensive capability will come under this diplomatic and polit-
ical pressure’ (Jensen & Croft, 2015).
New complications facing nuclear arms reductions
Despite the concerns expressed by Putin during the negotiation stage about what
the new treaty would entail, the New START agreement has continued to be
effectively implemented since his return to the presidency. While the Ukraine
crisis has led to difficulties in the Russian–American relationship, the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance reported that implementation of the agreement
‘continues in a business-like manner by both sides’ (Friedt, 2015). Both Russia
and the U.S. have used their entire allotment of inspections, continued to
exchange the required information regarding numbers and force status, and con-
ducted meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission as before, which
prompted the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Policy to state that
despite the recent difficulties the Treaty has ‘proceeded with no recognizable
change in its implementation’ (McKeon, 2014). According to Sergei Riabkov,
the New START agreement is pursued with ‘great care and responsibility’ by
both the U.S. and Russia (Riabkov, 2014).
Even if the issue of missile defence is resolved, which is currently holding up
developments in the disarmament and arms control field, a former Western
diplomat recognised that the next challenge will be setting the agenda because
while the U.S. places priority on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, Russia
is expected to prioritise European conventional arms control. As has already
been discussed in the previous chapter, issues regarding treaty parties to future
agreements and the types of nuclear weapons to be covered by a new agreement
are issues that need to be resolved before any further nuclear arms reductions
talks begin. While these issues remain important, a new issue relating to com-
pliance with existing nuclear arms agreements has emerged which could impact
any future talks.
The INF Treaty, which was agreed to in 1987, called on Russia and the
United States to eliminate existing, and never again produce, nuclear and con-
ventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that have a range of 500
to 5,500 kilometres, or 300–3,400 miles (ACA, 2014). Under the Treaty, the two
countries eliminated their existing stocks of missiles in that range by June 1,
1991 and on-site inspections ceased on May 31, 2001 so compliance with the
regime is monitored by satellites (ACA, 2014). To understand how the INF
Treaty impacts potential nuclear arms reduction agreements in the future, it is
important to consider how issues with the treaty have evolved.
For more than a decade Russian officials have entertained thoughts of leaving
the INF Treaty. In meetings held in January 2005 and August 2006, Defence
Minister Sergei Ivanov suggested to the American Secretary of Defence Donald
Rumsfeld that Russia might withdraw from the agreement (Sokov, 2006: 30–31).
During his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin pointed out that
under the INF Treaty, only Russia and the U.S. agreed to eliminate the missiles
covered by the agreement and therefore ‘these documents do not have a universal
character’ (Putin, 2007k). Putin went on to argue that since the agreement has
gone into effect, many other countries have developed or are developing these
weapons so it is ‘is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensur-
ing our own security’ (Putin, 2007k). Following Putin’s speech, further public
statements were made by Ivanov and General Yuri Baluyevsky against the treaty
(Gavrilov, 2007). In October 2007, Putin argued that the treaty should be open to
other countries so that other states assume the same commitments as the U.S.
and Russia because if the treaty remains bilateral ‘it will become difficult for us
to remain bound by the terms of such agreements when other countries are act-
ively developing these kinds of weapons systems, including countries close to
our borders’ (Putin, 2007d). Less than two weeks later, a joint statement from
Russia and the U.S. called for ‘interested countries to discuss the possibility of
imparting a global character to this important regime’ (Joint Statement, 2007).
Under Medvedev, the INF Treaty was not the focus of much attention but
Medvedev did mention opening the agreement to all states in a speech to the UN
General Assembly (Medvedev D., 2009l). In June 2013, the INF Treaty again
became the subject of Russian scrutiny when Ivanov, now in the position of
Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, argued that Americans don’t
have the same need as Russia for missiles that fall in the range of the agreement
because the only states that they could attack with them would be Canada or
Mexico (RIA Novosti, 2014).
While Russia has been considering withdrawing from the Treaty, questions
have arisen over the country’s compliance with the treaty regime. One potential
compliance concern has been deemed a ‘circumvention’ of the INF Treaty
because while the RS-26 Rubezh missile has been flown at a range that qualifies
it as in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and thus subject to the New
START limits, it has been consistently tested at a shorter range, one which falls
under the INF agreement despite the treaty prohibiting the testing of medium-
range missiles (Gordon, 2014). Jeffrey Lewis argues that the way the missile has
been tested indicates that the missile’s capabilities are like those of the SS-20
Saber or ‘the weapon that was the whole reason for negotiating an INF ban in
the first place’ (Lewis, 2014). The potential violation of the INF Treaty has not
been confirmed by the State Department but speculation is that it involves
Russia’s R-500 missile. The missile, which does not have a confirmed range, has
been tested since 2007 and Russian media reports from 2008–2013 have placed
the range of the missile between 620–1,864 miles, which is within the range
banned under the INF Treaty (Payne & Schneider, 2014).
In 2014, the Department of State’s annual arms control report declared that
‘the United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of
its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to
5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles’ (State Department,
2014). While the report does not state outright what the nature of the violation,
instead mentioning only the paragraphs and articles that there were compliance
concerns about, there is mention of one of the violations being in regards to
Article 1 which calls on states not to possess missiles with a range prohibited by
the Treaty (State Department, 2014). The report also states that the U.S. has
mentioned its concerns to Russia multiple times and would continue to do so
(State Department, 2014).
It has been acknowledged by Russian analyst Pavel Felgenhauer that Russia’s
testing of the R-500 ‘is in gross violation of the 1987 Treaty’ and that with
increased tension in Europe ‘it’s a situation in which Russia can abrogate the 1987
treaty, and the possibilities are rather high’ (Luhn & Borger, 2014). After the
American report was released, the Russian MFA denied that the country is in vio-
lation of the agreement and said that such accusations are ‘unfounded’ and that
there was ‘no evidence’ to support the American claim (Russian MFA, 2014a).
The Russian response also accused the Americans of violating the agreement with
the use of drone attacks, with the target missiles that the U.S. uses because of their
similarities to short- and intermediate-range missiles, and with the launchers that
will be placed in Poland and Romania as part of the missile defence system because
of the medium-range that they are capable of (Russian MFA, 2014a). The Russian
concerns have been considered by a former State Department official who sug-
gested that the target missiles do not meet the treaty’s definition of missiles because
‘they never reach the final phase of a weapons-delivery-vehicle trajectory’ and that
drones are not covered by the definition because rather than being ‘launched’ they
‘take off’ (Thielmann, 2014). The third concern, regarding the missile interceptors
in Poland and Romania, relies on the American explanation that the missile
launchers for the interceptors uses different software and electronics than the sea-
based version on which they are based because if it is the same technology, there
could be Treaty concerns (Thielmann, 2014).
Efforts to resolve concerns about violations have been unsuccessful and a
September 2014 meeting in Moscow between American Undersecretary of State
Rose Gottemoeller and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Riabkov failed
to resolve concerns. At the meeting the Russian side, according to Mikhail
Ulyanov, accused the U.S. of ‘at least improper[ly] implementing . . . the treaty,
to put it mildly’ and committing the three violations that the Russian MFA had
mentioned in their denial of violating the Treaty (Gertz, 2014b). Ulyanov argued
that the missiles, drones, and missile interceptors all fall under the jurisdiction of
the Treaty and that drones and target missiles are ‘fully covered by the definition
of land-based cruise missiles’, a claim which was rejected by a former Principal
Director at the U.S. Department of Defence, Mark Schneider, who called the
accusations ‘completely bogus’ and who argues that the INF Treaty does not
address the issue of delivery vehicles (Gertz, 2014b). Although there are plans
for continued bilateral talks on INF Treaty concerns, there are no further meet-
ings scheduled and Riabkov stated soon after the September meeting that ‘at the
moment we have no common understanding of when and where this dialogue
may continue’ (Barnes, 2014).
It is not clear whether Russia will remain part of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty but for the past decade the long-term future of the agree-
ment has been under scrutiny. If Russia were to withdraw from the agreement, it
would be difficult to convince American legislators to approve further arms
reductions agreements. The American Senate needs to approve any new treaties
with a two-thirds majority vote and New START was passed by only 71–26
votes compared to much higher voting numbers in the past (Sheridan &
Branigin, 2010). As a result of the declaration that Russia is in violation of the
INF Treaty, some members of Congress have decided ‘that further negotiations
would be unwise at this time, but some also suggested that the United States
suspend its implementation of New START until Russia returned to compliance
with the INF Treaty’ (Woolf, 2015: 36).
Conclusion
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 saw the introduction of a less comprom-
ising Euro-Atlantic security policy and a return to tough talk. If Medvedev had
been acting solely at Putin’s behest during his time as president, such a dramatic
shift in Russian policy would not be expected. Part of the shift can be credited to
the debate over Ukraine’s Association Agreement and Russia’s attempt to main-
tain influence over the country but the hardening in Russian attitudes had already
begun before the Ukrainian crisis started. This earlier hardening can be seen in
connection to the protests that occurred in Russia following the 2011 and 2012
elections and, as Putin himself argued, the perceived involvement of the U.S. in
supporting the demonstrators.
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have greatly impacted Russia’s relations with
Euro-Atlantic states and organisations. Across all areas of regional security, the
crisis in Ukraine has made its presence known. There has been speculation that
Russia could take advantage of the frozen conflicts across Eastern Europe and
further Russia’s influence over the domestic politics of the countries involved as
a way of tying those countries to Russia. The OSCE, which has seen heightened
activity as a result of the crisis, is still unable to reach agreements in the human
dimension and it is harder to reach agreement in the politico-military one.
Russia–NATO relations are restricted to high level contacts and the cooperation
that had been promising has disappeared. The Vienna Document has not seen
great changes since the procedure for amendments was adopted but the Vienna
Document and Open Skies agreements have had important roles in confidence-
building and transparency during the crisis. The CFE Treaty is no longer serving
its purpose, which means that legally-binding conventional arms control restric-
tions are not assisting with the Ukrainian crisis. Missile defence and nuclear
arms reductions saw no agreements reached and the outbreak of the Ukrainian
conflict means that agreement on either is unlikely since countries would not be
inclined towards increased transparency on a defensive project or reducing their
nuclear arsenals further.
10 Conclusion
Medvedev’s presidential legacy
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency lasted four years and was preceded and suc-
ceeded by Vladimir Putin. While there was some early speculation that
Medvedev would not complete his term in office and would be replaced midway
with the return of Putin, Medvedev served out the entirety of his term but failed
to gain a second term as both Yeltsin and Putin had done. The 2011 decision to
‘swap’ roles and move Medvedev to Prime Minister meant that although the
tandem remained intact, the areas of policy which the men control have changed.
While Medvedev may have become president because of his connection to
Putin and Putin serving as Prime Minister meant that he executed the decisions
of Medvedev, this does not mean that differences between the two men cannot
exist. Differences in the Euro-Atlantic foreign and security policies of the two
men are apparent, although they may not always come as dramatic departures.
The points of continuity between the two men are unsurprising given that
Medvedev served in several positions that had him implementing Putin’s pol-
icies when Putin was president and because Medvedev relied on Putin as the
source of his own power since he had no real power base of his own. Points of
change between the two men can be seen in the light of their differing views of
how foreign policy should be conducted and this is seen with Medvedev seeking
to make Russia a more appealing partner for the West so that economic modern-
isation could occur.
As president, Medvedev had the constitutionally-mandated foreign policy
decision-making power and, therefore, he had control over the direction of the
country’s foreign and security policy. Although there is speculation that
Medvedev merely acted at Putin’s behest and did not initiate foreign and security
policy himself, as one Russian academic expressed and Putin speaking to the
Valdai Group appeared to confirm, Medvedev and Putin had agreed that foreign
policy would be the domain of Medvedev during his presidency. While
Medvedev’s tenure as president saw him cast in the role of the ‘junior partner’ in
the President-Prime Minister tandem, Medvedev did manage to distinguish
himself from his predecessor in some ways on issues of Russian Euro-Atlantic
foreign and security policy during his presidency. The challenges confronting
the Medvedev presidency in the region included many of the same issues that
Putin had dealt with during his first eight years as president and, therefore,
Conclusion 191
provides a good basis for comparison of policies. What this comparison reveals
is that not only were there differences in the rhetoric of the men and their gov-
ernments (despite consisting of many of the same individuals) but also that the
decisions taken by Medvedev included ones that had failed to be enacted during
Putin’s eight years in office or ideas that Putin had not proposed.
The changes that came to Russian foreign and security policy upon the return
of Putin prompted some foreign officials to reflect positively on the relations
between Russia and the West when Medvedev was president. One former U.S.
official when discussing the ‘reset’ said that ‘Medvedev turned out to be a pretty
decent partner’ in that and remarked that ‘Medvedev would come to a meeting
and put something on the table’ which, even if it wasn’t what Washington was
looking for, it would at least start a dialogue. An Eastern European ambassador
said that ‘maybe there was a different attitude coming from Moscow’ during the
Medvedev period as Medvedev ‘tried to bring something new to the table’, such
as the EST proposal, but in the end, ‘it did not matter’.
Areas of difference between the two men are particularly important because
of the expectations from the West that there would be continuity with Putin’s
return to the presidency and also because when Putin’s tenure as president is
over, his next successor might provide different opportunities from Putin to
address issues of foreign and security policy concern within the Euro-Atlantic
region since different opportunities can be seen under Medvedev. Medvedev’s
tenure as president saw several points of difference with his predecessor, which
cannot be ignored, and which shows that Medvedev did not merely follow
Putin’s chosen foreign policy course.
Under the Medvedev presidency, the wording and tone used to discuss issues
in the Euro-Atlantic region softened from that of the Putin presidency. While the
Foreign Policy Concept introduced under Medvedev focused on areas of
cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the same document
under Putin emphasised areas that could lead to trouble. While both the Military
Doctrine and National Security Strategy under Medvedev mentioned Russian
concerns over a global NATO and the stationing of equipment near Russian
borders, the Military Doctrine also mentioned that relations between Russia and
NATO should be developed. At the same time, the statements and policy docu-
ments of both presidents made it clear that NATO decisions, such as the poten-
tial building of military installations near Russia’s borders, would have an
impact on the Russia–NATO relationship. Outside of formal documents, this
shift in Russia’s rhetoric and tone was most apparent at the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe where Russia remained quite critical about
the organisation’s human rights direction, but the Russian representatives also
stated areas related to human rights that they thought the OSCE should be
addressing.
Russian engagement with NATO and the OSCE also improved in some areas
under the Medvedev presidency, despite the concerns seen in the National
Security Strategy and Military Doctrine. While Russia under Putin made the
decision to prohibit Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
192 Conclusion
election observers from monitoring after the 2004 Russian presidential election,
Russia under Medvedev was more open to ODIHR and allowed the observers to
monitor the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections. Even after the
OSCE criticised the conduct of the 2011 parliamentary election, and there were
protests in Russia because election irregularities were exposed, Medvedev did
not prohibit observers from monitoring the 2012 presidential election. The
Medvedev presidency also saw Russia increase its cooperation with the arms
control side of the organisation, particularly with regard to the destruction of
toxic rocket fuel from Ukraine and Kazakhstan as well as with the destruction of
surface-to-air missiles in Moldova. Despite the Georgian conflict being an early
complicating factor in the Russia–NATO relationship, a little more than two
years after the conflict ended, Medvedev’s presence at the Russia–NATO
meeting at the organisation’s Lisbon Summit was seen as a positive moment and
the resulting declaration that neither side was a threat to the other and committed
the two sides to working to increase Euro-Atlantic security was the first such
Joint Declaration in the Russia–NATO relationship. The agreements reached at
the meeting regarding training and transit, which were put in place to assist with
NATO efforts in Afghanistan, meant that Russia during the Medvedev period
was providing the Alliance with needed assistance there. The decision by
Medvedev for Russia to abstain, not veto, the proposed NATO-backed resolu-
tion at the United Nations Security Council regarding the establishment of no-fly
zones over Libya was a break from the non-intervention position of the Putin
presidency.
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the concern that the conflict might unfreeze
and put Russia in a difficult position resulted in a break from Putin’s disengage-
ment from the conflict and saw Medvedev take a leading role in efforts to resolve
the conflict surrounding the region. Medvedev led a series of meetings to discuss
a solution to the crisis. The most important of these meetings produced the Mai-
endorf Declaration, which committed the two countries to on-going dialogue and
discussed the importance of confidence- and security-building measures as well
as legal guarantees in the conflict settlement process. The Maiendorf Declaration
was also significant because it represented the first agreement related to
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement issues signed by both parties since 1994. Sub-
sequent summits at Kazan and Sochi saw further progress on the issues sur-
rounding Nagorno-Karabakh but these ultimately failed as the two parties were
never in complete agreement on the many issues being discussed. Although his
efforts were unsuccessful, the level of personal engagement with the conflict
parties under Medvedev was much higher than it was under Putin. Transdniestria
saw little attention from Medvedev in comparison to both Nagorno-Karabakh
and Putin’s earlier effort at conflict resolution with the Kozak Memorandum.
Medvedev’s meetings with Voronin and Smirnov were criticised as being about
Medvedev and not being about efforts to resolve the conflict. Ultimately, pro-
gress on the ‘principles and procedures for future negotiations’ over Transdnies-
tria which established the modalities for future conversations on the region
occurred within the existing 5 + 2 framework rather than through Russian
Conclusion 193
leadership. The decision to engage in a conflict with Georgia and to recognise
the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were left to Medvedev in
his capacity as the head of military and foreign policy. The decision to open
negotiations on a ceasefire, with Sarkozy as the mediator, after Sarkozy had been
turned down in Beijing by Putin, further illustrates the differences between the
two men. Medvedev’s quick decision regarding the status of the two regions has
been seen as the result of Medvedev making a choice that would distinguish him
from Putin and show his strength.
Outside of the frozen conflicts, issues regarding Russia’s influence over
Ukraine and the Central Asian neighbours were also a part of Medvedev’s
regional foreign and security policy. Ukraine and Central Asia saw the most con-
tinuity in the policies of Putin and Medvedev but there were important events
that happened while Medvedev was president. With regard to Ukraine, the fate
of the Black Sea Fleet was a particularly important issue in the relations of the
two countries and a more Russian-friendly government in Ukraine meant that
Russia was able to negotiate an extension to its lease of the Sevastopol base,
which Russia uses to host its Black Sea Fleet. In Central Asia, Russia under
Medvedev continued to strengthen its influence in the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation including through a resolution that requires the consent of the
CSTO countries before a member allows a third-party country to build a military
base on its territory. Despite Russia’s influence in the organisation, the CSTO
refrained from involvement in the 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution, despite requests
from the country’s interim leader for assistance.
Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries
has also had an impact on the already difficult situation surrounding the regional
security framework. While Putin had ‘suspended’ Russia’s participation in the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and negotiations on a resolution to
the issue were abandoned after the ‘suspension’ took effect, under Medvedev,
Russia showed a willingness to discuss the ‘suspension’ of CFE but concerns
over host party consent for military stationing and attempts to establish interim
confidence- and security-building measures ultimately meant that no progress
was made. The opening of the Vienna Document for amendments meant that
under Medvedev some of the proposals that had been suggested when Putin was
president were brought back for consideration, while a new proposal on naval
CSBMs was introduced. In the months preceding the August 2008 conflict, what
can be seen is an adherence to the ‘Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation
as Regards Unusual Military Activities’ that the Document includes and Russian
use of it, despite the fact that the mechanism had been previously criticised by
Putin. The dissatisfaction with the existing Euro-Atlantic regional security archi-
tecture seen under both Putin and Medvedev resulted in the draft European
Security Treaty, which stands as an important moment in Russian efforts to set
the regional security agenda. Under Medvedev, Russia did not merely interact
with the existing Euro-Atlantic security framework or argue about what it saw as
the issues existing with security architecture but instead Medvedev proposed an
alternative. Although the proposal would prove to be unacceptable to the NATO
194 Conclusion
countries for several reasons, including concerns that Russia was seeking the
ability to prevent NATO expansion, that the proposal would prevent NATO
from moving its equipment and armaments as the alliance saw fit and that the
EST’s collective defence clause would impact NATO collective defence, the
proposal is important because it set out elements of what Russia believes the
regional security system should look like. This proposal is also important in
understanding the differences between Putin and Medvedev because although
there are elements of the proposal which can be seen in direct connection to the
statements of Putin during his presidency, there are also elements that Putin did
not consider. Chief among the elements not suggested by Putin is the establish-
ment of a collective defence umbrella which would include both the NATO
member-states and former Soviet Republics. Although it is unclear, even to
Medvedev, how security organisations could be members within another organ-
isation alongside their constituent states, this was another element proposed by
Medvedev.
Although Medvedev attempted a new approach to missile defence,
Medvedev’s plan, which would have made individual countries responsible for
preventing missiles from crossing their territory, was a non-starter for NATO
since the alliance did not trust a non-member with the security of member-states
and Russian missile defence technology was considered to be less capable than
the technology that the U.S. and NATO member-states have access to. With
regard to missile defence, a high-ranking Russian MFA official admitted that
due to missile defence developments, the sectoral approach proposed by
Medvedev is ‘less realistic than before’. Missile defence proved an issue where
an agreement could not be reached but there was success in achieving a new
agreement on strategic offensive nuclear weapons reductions. That the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was agreed to, despite the public remarks of
Putin and Antonov about missile defence needing to be a part of the treaty, is
particularly significant in recognising Medvedev as an independent policy
maker. Although Putin had wanted restrictions on missile defence to be an
element of the New START agreement, after Obama had made it clear that
missile defence being a part of the treaty would doom the whole agreement
during Senate debate, Medvedev agreed that the link would not be needed in the
treaty, thus allowing the treaty to be finalised.
A Medvedev foreign policy?

Although some may attempt to credit the successes of Medvedev’s foreign and
security policy to other factors – such as the election of a new American president
who wanted to ‘reset’ the bilateral relationship or the idea that Putin was pulling
the strings behind the scene and Medvedev was acting on Putin’s instructions – to
do so would be to ignore Medvedev’s role in addressing important issues. Although
Barack Obama’s election did see a greater willingness on the part of the Americans
to engage with Russia, it is important to remember that it was a result of Russian
rhetoric and criticism of the United States actions – particularly after the Orange
Conclusion 195
Revolution and as Russian assertiveness increased – that speculation of ‘a new cold
war’ increased. The opening created by the election of Obama was similar to the
opening created by the election of Medvedev and, therefore, the leadership in both
countries mattered. If Putin really was pulling the strings behind the scenes, he
could have prevented the agreement on New START from being reached, which
would have denied both the American and Russian presidents a foreign policy
success. Similarly, the public spat between Putin and Medvedev over NATO action
in Libya was argued by some to be manufactured but the harshness of both men’s
public statements and Putin seeming genuinely unhappy with the decision does not
support this. Although Medvedev did involve himself in some aspects of regional
security policy which were quite time consuming and proved ultimately unsuccess-
ful – such as promoting a new European security architecture and conflict resolu-
tion in Nagorno-Karabakh – Medvedev would not be the first president who
attempted to secure agreements that ultimately resulted in failure. Putin himself
pursued the Kozak Memorandum for Transdniestria and that was not adopted.
While Putin has chosen a more outspoken and strongman approach,
Medvedev focused on legal aspects and making Russia appear as a country that
others could cooperate with. This does not mean, however, that there were times
where Medvedev did not use strong language or that Putin did not have a
strategy of making Russia an appealing ally. Despite Medvedev appearing to
some as a ‘nerd’, ‘Robin’ or ‘dorkish’, his four years of presidency saw Russia
take the initiative within the Euro-Atlantic region and set the agenda for a dis-
cussion of the security architecture in the region. Even though this effort ulti-
mately failed in generating a new document, it still had an important role in
starting the conversation. The agreement on New START, despite the issue of
missile defence being of significant concern to some in Russia, is an achieve-
ment for the Medvedev presidency that speaks to the fact that as president,
security and foreign policy within the Euro-Atlantic region were a priority.
Medvedev’s presidency showed a readiness to negotiate, including a willingness
to make concessions when necessary, and a desire to build relationships with
NATO countries, including the United States.
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Index
2003 Russian parliamentary election 54 ALTBMD see Active Layered Theatre

2004 Russian presidential election 54, 192 Ballistic Missile Defence
2007 Russian parliamentary election 54–5 America see United States
2008 Russian presidential election 2–4, 16 Andijan Massacre 82
2011 Russian parliamentary election 54–5, Andropov, Yuri 48
175, 189, 192; election criticism 55–6, Antiballistic Missile Treaty 139–40, 142,
175; protests after 164 147, 149–51; American withdrawal 140,
2012 Russian presidential election 4–5, 54, 150–1, 158
175, 189, 192; election criticism 175; Antonov, Anatoly 11, 109, 113–14, 142,
response to post-election crackdown 144, 155, 181
criticism 175 Arbatov, Aleksei 145
Arctic Council 128
Abkhazia 14, 28, 32–6, 39, 42, 60, 79–80, Armenia 21–2, 173–4; Russian military
92–3, 96, 111–12, 114, 170–2, 193; sales to 36–7; see also Nagorno-
recognition of 22, 34, 42; and so-called Karabakh
Kosovo precedent 31–2; ties with Russia arms control 10, 12, 19–20, 45, 56, 57, 65,
32, 172; see also Russia–Georgia conflict 71, 84, 85, 90–1, 97–8, 108–15, 120,
ABM Treaty see Antiballistic Missile 122, 124, 129, 134, 136–8, 141, 151,
Treaty 163–4, 181, 184, 186–7, 189, 192; see
ACFE Treaty see Agreement on also Agreement on Adaptation of the
Adaptation of the Treaty on Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in Europe; Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Forces Treaty; New Strategic Arms
Defence 149, 161, 185; exploring Reduction Treaty; Strategic Offensive
opportunities for cooperation 154; Reduction Treaty; Treaty on
Russian response 77, 154 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;
Afghanistan 67–8, 75–8, 80, 83, 192; Treaty on Open Skies; Vienna
International Security Assistance Force Document
(ISAF) 78, 81–2; see also Northern Astana Summit see Organisation for
Alliance Security and Cooperation in Europe
Africa 89 (Astana Summit)
Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Azarov, Mykola 166
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Azerbaijan 22, 138, 173–4; and Russia 37;
19, 85, 100–10, 112–13, 181; and United States 37; Gabala radar 138,
negotiations on the 102–3; ratification 152–3; see also Nagorno-Karabakh
process 103–6; see also Treaty on Azimov, Anvar 30, 41, 45–6, 129–30
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Akhalkalaki 32 Baker, James 63–4
Albania 79 Bakiyev, Kurmanbek 82
Index 255
Balkans 19, 65, 165 Clinton, William J. (Bill) 29, 63, 69, 140,
Baltic States 19, 51, 71, 80, 101, 103, 147, 150, 158
106–7, 110, 126, 154; see also Estonia; Cold War 11, 19, 62, 64, 82, 84, 91, 100,
Latvia; Lithuania 116, 118, 136, 165, 195
Baluyevsky, Yury 170, 187 Collective Security Treaty 18
Batumi 32 Collective Security Treaty Organisation
Beijing 33–4, 170, 193 18, 20, 22–3, 27, 39, 60, 66, 123, 126,
Belarus 21–2, 51, 88, 91, 97, 181–2 173, 193; cooperation with SCO 23; and
Belgium 103 NATO 23; Rapid Reaction Force 22;
Berlin 169 Russian influence in 23
Biysk 58 colour revolutions 18, 24, 81; see also
Black Sea Fleet 18, 26–7, 32, 193 Ukraine
Blair, Tony 70 Commonwealth of Independent States
Bolsheviks 167 (CIS) 17–20, 22, 54–5, 66, 123, 126
Borodavkin, Aleksey 54 Communists 29
Breedlove, Philip 185 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Bronze Soldier war memorial see Estonia 150
(Bronze Soldier war memorial) Conference on Security and Cooperation
Brussels 153 in Europe 44
Bucharest Summit see North Atlantic confidence- and security-building
Treaty Organisation (Bucharest Summit) measures 19, 36, 38, 45, 56, 84, 86–91,
Bulgaria 71, 78, 104–6, 109 95, 111, 114, 122, 129, 176, 183, 192–3;
Bull, Hedley 7 see also Treaty on Conventional Armed
Burkhalter, Didier 177 Forces in Europe; Treaty on Open Skies;
Bush, George H.W. 95 Vienna Document
Bush, George W. 70, 78–9, 85, 107, Copenhagen 142
140–1, 146–8, 151– 4, 158, 159, 161, Copsey, Nathaniel 25
163; Bush administration 137, 141, 163; Corfu Process see Organisation for
meetings with Putin 78–9, 107, 140, Security and Cooperation in Europe
151, 158; meetings with Medvedev 153 (Corfu Process)
Buzhinskiy, Evgeny 141 Cottey, Andrew 18
Council of Europe 19, 49–50, 128, 134,
Canada 86, 92, 134, 175, 187 173; Parliamentary Assembly of 52, 55–6
Caucasus 17, 20, 22, 28, 31, 49, 42, 61, 80, Crimea see Ukraine (Crimea)
86, 92, 102–3, 110 Crimean Tatars 167, 176
CEC see Central Election Commission Croatia 79
Central Asia 14, 17–18, 20–2, 24, 27, 49, CSTO see Collective Security Treaty
57, 59, 75, 81, 83, 86, 193; American Organisation
bases in Central Asia 21–2, 75; see also Customs Committee 17
Collective Security Treaty Organisation; Customs Union 21
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Cyprus 100, 114
Central Election Commission 55 Czech Republic 29, 71, 106, 147–8, 152–3
Centre TV 170
CFE Treaty see Treaty on Conventional de Haas, Marcel 118
Armed Forces in Europe de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap 40
Chamov, Vladimir 77 de Waal, Thomas 36
Channel Five 170 Debaltseve 169
Chechnya see Russia Defence Ministry see Ministry of Defence
China 81, 145, 160; membership in SCO 24 Denmark 94, 103, 185
Chizhov, Vladimir 88, 129 Dniester River 174
Churov, Vladimir 55 Dnipropetrovsk 168
CIS see Commonwealth of Independent Donbass 169
States Donetsk 169, 176–7
Civilizationist 5 Dublin 175
256 Index
Duma 13, 29, 54, 79, 135, 144–5, 173 Cooperation, and Security Between
Duncan, Peter 5–6 Russia and NATO see NATO–Russia
Dzerzhinsk 58 Relations (Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security
Eastern Europe 14, 17, 19–20, 22, 28, 57, Between Russia and NATO)
63–4, 69, 72–4, 80, 106, 133, 138, 146, France 37, 54, 104, 112, 130, 144–5, 169
153, 155, 159–61, 163, 170, 180, 189; Fried, Daniel 109
and missile defence 106, 138, 146, 153, frozen conflicts 14, 17, 28–43, 48, 60, 112,
155, 159–61, 163, 170 164, 170–4, 189, 193; see also
Eisenhower, Dwight 94–5 Abkhazia; Kosovo; Nagorno-Karabakh;
Eklund, Per 94 South Ossetia; Transdniestria
election fraud 24–5, 53, 56, 175
EPAA see European Phased Adaptive G8 152
Approach Galeotti, Mark 5
EST see European Security Treaty Gates, Robert 159
Estonia 71, 78, 96; Bronze Soldier war Gazprom 3; Ukraine gas disputes 26
memorial incident 80–1 Geneva 142–3
EU see European Union Geneva International Discussions 36, 61,
Eurasian Economic Community 18, 20–1 173; Administrative Boundary Line 173;
Eurasian Economic Union 21, 27, 166, Incident Prevention and Response
172, 175, 184 Mechanism 36, 173
Eurasianist 5–6 Georgia 22, 39, 80, 109–10, 11, 120, 147,
Euro-Atlantic region 13–14 170–3, 179; relations with Russia 173;
European Phased Adaptive Approach see also Abkhakia; European Union;
146–9, 155–6, 158, 161–2, 184–5; Geneva International Discussions;
countries hosting components 148–9; NATO–Georgia Commission, North
Russian understanding of 155–6 Atlantic Treaty Organisation; Russia–
European Security Treaty 15, 19, 28, 48, Georgia conflict; South Ossetia; Treaty
73, 115–36, 181, 184, 191, 193–4; after on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Putin’s return 184; compared to Putin’s (Istanbul Agreements); Treaty on Open
2007 statements 117–21, 136; concerns Skies (Georgian airspace); United
for NATO 133–4; draft written proposal Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
123–6; importance of 117; pre-written Germany 13, 62–4, 92, 104, 112, 130, 169,
draft statements 120–3; Putin comments 183, 185
on proposed treaty 126; response to the Gorbachev, Mikhail 63
EST proposal 126–35 Gottemoeller, Rose 114, 188
European Union 19, 27, 34–5, 40, 46, 51, great power 7–8, 11, 20–1, 75, 101, 137–8,
57, 61, 94, 116, 119, 123, 126, 128–9, 162
150, 166–7, 169, 177; Monitoring Greece 100
Mission in Georgia 61 Gromyko, Aleksei 130, 133
ground-launched cruise missile 187
Federal Assembly 105, 153 Grushko, Alexander 11–12, 54, 88, 90–1,
Felgenhauer, Pavel 39, 188 100, 111–12, 127, 135, 178–80
force majeure 93–4 Gukovo 176–7
Foreign Ministry see Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Hagel, Chuck 184
Foreign Policy Concept 14, 17, 18; 2000 Helsinki Final Act 48–9, 120, 123–4, 131
version 18–19, 65–6, 118; 2008 version Hill, Fiona 165
18–19, 65–6, 191 Hill, William 40–1
Forum for Security Cooperation see Hudson, Valerie 9
Organisation for Security and human rights see Organisation for Security
Cooperation in Europe (Forum for and Cooperation in Europe (human
Security Cooperation) rights and third dimension)
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Hungary 29, 71
Index 257
Independent International Fact-Finding Kovalchuk, Yuri 170
Mission on the Conflict In Georgia see Kovitidi, Olga 177
Tagliavini Report Kozak, Dmitry 43
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Kozak Memorandum see Transdniestria
141, 143, 148, 159, 187 (Kozak Memorandum)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Kramarenko, Alexander 109
(INF Treaty) 151, 184, 186–8; American Kremlin 1–3, 5, 10–11, 24–5, 39, 71, 77,
violation claims 187–8; Russian 81, 123, 168
discussions of withdrawing 151, 186–7; Kryshtanovskaya, Olga 171
Russian globalisation proposal 187; Kvashnin, Anatoly 71
Russian violation claims 188; treaty Kyrgyz Revolution see Kyrgyzstan
discussions 188–9; treaty provisions 186 (Kyrgyz Revolution)
International Security Assistance Force 78, Kyrgyzstan 21–2, 193; Kyrgyz Revolution
81–2 22–3, 27, 60, 193; Manas 81–2; OSCE
International system 6, 118–21, 126; assistance 60; Tulip Revolution 81
multipolar 119, 121; unipolar 118–19,
121 Lachowski, Zdzislaw 84
International recognition; see also Latvia 69, 71, 78
Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Kosovo Lavrov, Sergei 10–11, 29–31, 37, 40,
Iran 39, 147–8, 155, 158–60, 162, 185 49–50, 53, 79–80, 82, 87–8, 91, 106,
Iraq War 152 108, 113–15, 119–20, 122–4, 129, 131,
Iskander missiles 41 133–5, 173, 176, 184–5
Ismay, Lord 13 League of Nations 44
Istanbul Agreements see Treaty on Lebed, Alexander 39
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Lenarčič, Janez 55
(Istanbul Agreements) Levada Centre 2
Istanbul Summit see Organisation for Lewis, Jeffrey 187
Security and Cooperation in Europe Liberal Westernisers 5–6
(Istanbul Summit) Libya 5, 75–7, 83, 192, 195
Ivanov, Igor 40 Light, Margot 5–6
Ivanov, Sergei 2, 75, 81, 186–7 Lisbon Summit see North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (Lisbon Summit)
Joint Consultative Group see Treaty on Lithuania 71, 78, 103, 147
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe London 142
(Joint Consultative Group) Luhansk 169, 177
Jones Jr., James L. 143 Lukashevich, Alexander 97
Judah, Ben 9 Lukyanov, Fyodor 13, 77, 132
Luzhkov, Yuri 29
Kaliningrad see Russia (Kaliningrad)
Kaljurand, Marina 81 Macedonia 79
Karasin, Grigori 11–12, 33 Maiendorf Declaration see Nagorno-
Karshi-Khanabad 82 Karabakh (Maiendorf Declaration)
Kazakhstan 21–2, 27, 51, 58, 192 Mankoff, Jeffrey 11, 46
Kazan 38, 43, 192 Markov, Sergei 25
Kennebunkport 107 Matlock Jr., Jack 63
Khrushchev, Nikita 167 Mazur, Anton 181
Kiev 166–8, 170, 176, 183 Mearsheimer, John 7
Ki-moon, Ban 59 Medvedev, Dmitry; 2008 presidential
Kosachev, Konstantin 133 succession 2–4; 2012 presidential
Kosovo 28–32, 34, 42, 70, 74, 80, 168; succession 4–5, 164; and Georgia 33–6;
Ahtisaari Plan 30; Albanians population Berlin speech 116, 120, 124, 130;
of 29; Kosovo Force 31, 70; Serbian comparisons to Putin 1, 6–7, 165,
population of 29; so-called Kosovo 189–91, 194–5; Evian speech 122, 124,
precedent 14, 30–2, 34 126; foreign policy perspective 6–7;
258 Index
Medvedev, Dmitry continued Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile
foreign policy role 16; influence after Defence; European Phased Adaptive
presidency 171–2; presidential legacy Approach, Munich Security Conference
190–5; pre-presidential career 2–3, (Putin 2007 speech at)
116–17; principles of foreign policy Moldova 22, 39–43, 58, 60, 104–5,
121; and regional conflicts 28–9; style 110–12, 132, 135, 174, 192; see also
compared to Putin 8–9; ties to Putin 2–3 Transdniestria; Treaty on Conventional
Medvedev, Roĭ 2 Armed Forces in Europe (Istanbul
mélange 57–8 Agreements)
Membership Action Plans see North Mongolia 14, 86, 92, 175–6
Atlantic Treaty Organisation Montenegro 29, 89
(Membership Action Plans) Moratinos, Miguel Angel 108
Merkel, Angela 128 Moscow 2, 6, 10–11, 13, 25, 29, 35, 39,
Meseberg Process 42, 128–9; proposed 41, 47–8, 57, 63, 70–1, 81, 93–4, 117,
EU–Russia Political and Security 132, 135, 142, 144, 152, 170, 172,
Committee 128 174–5, 188, 191
Meshkov, Aleksei 178 Moscow Helsinki Group 25, 48
Mexico 187 Moscow Treaty see Strategic Offensive
Middle East 5, 148, 158, 160 Reduction Treaty
Military Doctrine 14, 17; 2000 version 19, Munich Security Conference 49; Putin
66; 2010 version 19, 65–6, 73–4, 139, 2007 speech at 50, 57, 63, 67, 85, 105,
191; 2014 version 179 118–20, 136, 152, 159, 186–7
Milošević, Slobodan 29
Milov, Vladimir 26 Nagorno-Karabakh 14, 28, 36–9, 42–3,
Ministry of Defence 9–11, 12, 17–19, 41, 112, 170, 173–4, 192, 195; and
65, 91, 114, 146; perspective on NATO Medvedev 37–8, 42–3, 192; and Putin
65; role in Russian foreign policy- 37–8; Maiendorf Declaration 38, 43,
making 9–11, 17, 18 192
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7, 9–12, Nashi 25, 81
17–18, 45, 65, 146, 166, 184; National Missile Defence Act of 1999 147
perspective on NATO 65; role in National Security Concept 14, 17, 19–20,
Russian foreign policy-making 9, 66
10–13, 17, 18, 116, 123 National Security Strategy of the Russian
Minsk Group 37 Federation Until 2020 14, 17, 20, 66,
missile defence 10, 15, 78, 88, 106, 137, 139, 191
140, 142–3, 146–63, 184–6, 189, 194; NATO–Georgia Commission 80
Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD NATO–Russia relations 62–83, 124,
Demarcation 140; amendments to 140; 174–5, 178–80, 189, 191–2; Agreement
Bush plans 138, 146–7, 153, 161; on Basic Principles Governing
cancellation of Bush plans 147, 154, Relations Among NATO–Russia Council
158; challenges to cooperation 158–62; Member-States in the Security Sphere
development of missile defence idea 73–4; Common Airspace Initiative
147; discussions of cooperation on (CAI) 76, 179; cooperation 67–8, 71,
151–2, 154; legal guarantees 156–7, 74–8, 82–3, 179; confrontation 68,
184; Medvedev comments on 153–4; 78–82, 179–80; Founding Act on
Medvedev sectoral approach proposal Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and
154–6, 163, 194; NATO perspectives on Security Between Russia and NATO 69,
cooperation 161–2; Putin comments on 153, 180; in Russian official documents
152, 162; Putin proposal in 2000 150, 65–6; Ministerials 71, 73, 127, 179;
163; Putin proposal in 2007 152–4, 163; Operation Active Endeavour 76, 80;
response to cancellation of Bush plans NATO promises to Soviet Union 62–4;
148; Russian perspective on cooperation NATO response to Russia–Georgia
162; Russian response to 146, 149–58; conflict 72; NATO–Russia Council 62,
threat perception 158–9; see also Active 65–6, 69, 71–5, 106, 113, 128, 178–9;
Index 259
NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence;
69–71; Northern Distribution route 76; NATO–Georgia Commission; NATO–
NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Russia relations; Treaty on Conventional
Fund 75–6, 78, 180; NRC Missile Armed Forces in Europe
Defence Working Group 154; NRC North Korea 158–60, 185
Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Northern Alliance 75
Training of Afghan, Central Asian and Norway 96, 102
Pakistani Personnel 75–6, 180; Novosibirsk 75
Partnership for Peace 74; Rome nuclear arms reductions 137–45, 150–1,
Declaration 71, 73, 180; Russia–NATO 184, 186–9; challenges to further
Summits 76–8; Russian ambassadors to negotiations 144–5, 186, 188–9;
NATO 11–13, 70; and Russian public potential tactical nuclear negotiations
68; Ukraine crisis 179–80; see also 145; see also New Strategic Arms
missile defence; North Atlantic Treaty Reduction Treaty; Strategic Offensive
Organisation; Treaty on Conventional Reduction Treaty
Armed Forces in Europe nuclear deterrent 137–9, 145, 157
Netherlands 103 Nuland, Victoria 106, 110–11, 113
Neumann, Iver 7
New START see New Strategic Arms Obama, Barack 72, 83, 85, 138, 141, 143,
Reduction Treaty 146–8, 153–4, 156, 158, 161, 163–5,
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 11, 194–5; Obama administration 72, 83,
29, 114, 137–8, 141–5, 163, 184, 187, 154, 160; relationship with Medvedev
189, 194–5; Bilateral Consultative 85, 137–8, 143; relationship with Putin
Commission 186; issue of missile 164–5; ‘reset’ of relations with Russia
defence in negotiations 142–3, 151, 163; 74, 82, 141, 143, 165, 191, 194
Medvedev’s role during negotiations Office of Democratic Institutions and
143–4; treaty negotiations 142; treaty Human Rights see Organisation for
provisions 141–2 Security and Cooperation in Europe
Nikiforov, Andrey 55 (Office of Democratic Institutions and
non-governmental organisations; 2005 law Human Rights)
25 Open Skies see Treaty on Open Skies
Nordic Group 128 Open Skies Consultative Commission see
North America 7, 13–14, 86, 89 Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Consultative Commission)
(NATO) 15, 17, 25, 27, 30, 37, 46–7, Operation Allied Force 70
90, 97–8, 104, 108–10, 112–13, 116, Orange Revolution see Ukraine (Orange
119, 123, 125–33, 137, 145–6, 149–50, Revolution)
152, 154–6, 158, 160–3, 174–5, 178–80, Organisation for Security and Cooperation
184–5, 193–5; 2010 Strategic Concept in Europe 14, 15, 19, 30, 39–40, 44–61,
67, 69; Article V 13, 77, 79–80, 125, 73, 84–93, 108, 110, 113, 116, 122–4,
130–2, 155; Bucharest Summit 77, 126, 128–31, 133–6, 168–9, 174–8,
79–80, 82, 124, 149; Chicago Summit 182–3, 189, 191; Annual Security
185; and the CSTO 22–3; enlargement Review Conference 135; Astana
of 29, 62, 65–6, 69, 71–2, 77–9, 105, Summit 47, 59, 85, 90, 110, 130, 135;
179, 194; Georgia and Ukraine Chairmanship 40, 61, 108, 129, 174,
prospective membership 65, 79; Lisbon 176–7; consensus principle 47, 60;
Summit 13, 76–8, 83, 149, 154, 160, Charter for European Security 123–4;
192; Membership Action Plans 79; and Chechnya 51; Conflict Prevention
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 59, 183; Corfu Process 48, 129,
Centre of Excellence 81; Prague Summit 134, 178; dimensions of ‘Three
71–2, 78, 104, 149; Secretary General Baskets’ 45–7, 61; election monitoring
70–1; Wales Summit 180; Wales 52–6, 61; field missions 51–3; Forum
Summit Declaration 179; Washington for Security Cooperation 52, 57, 59, 86,
Treaty 13–14; see also Active Layered 88, 93, 181, 183; Helsinki 40, 175, 178;
260 Index
Organisation for Security and Cooperation Putin, Vladimir: 2008 presidential
in Europe continued succession 2–4; 2012 presidential
High Commissioner on National succession 4–5, 164; articles written by
Minorities 52, 176–7; Human 8, 77, 162; comparisons to Medvedev 1,
Dimension Implementation Meeting 55; 6–7, 165, 189–91, 194–5; foreign policy
human rights and third dimension perspective 6–7; food scandal 3; and
48–56; institutionalization 44–6; regional conflicts 28–9; response to his
Istanbul Summit 47; Ministerial Council 2012 return 164–5; style compared to
40, 49–50, 53, 60, 87–8, 113, 127, 129, Medvedev 8–9; ties with Medvedev
175–6; mission to Georgia 61; Nikosi 2–3; and United Russia 4; see also
water project 61; OSCE structure 45–8; Munich Security Conference (Putin
Office of Democratic Institutions and 2007 speech at)
Human Rights 4, 15, 51–6, 61, 175–6,
191–2; Parliamentary Assembly 52, R-500 missile 187–8
54–5, 177–8; Permanent Council 52–3, Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 128
57, 60, 93, 175, 183; politico-military Redd, Steven 9
dimension 56–61; Representative on Riabkov, Sergey 11–12, 113, 144, 185–6,
Freedom of the Media 52, 54, 177; 188
Russian criticism of 44–5, 49–50, 57, Robertson, Lord 70, 72, 150, 154
61; Secretary General 46, 52; Special Rogozin, Dmitry 12–13, 41, 72, 80, 155,
Representative for the South Caucasus 178
61; V to V Dialogue 48, 178; see also 5 Roma 176
+ 2 parties; Helsinki Final Act; Minsk Romania 71, 78, 97, 104–6, 109, 112, 148,
Group, Transdniestria (5 + 2 talks); 185, 188
Security Council Resolution 1540; Rome 71
Ukraine crisis (Special Monitoring Rose, Frank 149
Mission) Rotfeld, Adam 131
Otunbayeva, Roza 60 Rosoboronexport 37
RS-26 Rubezh missile 187
Pakistan 76, 78 Rumsfeld, Donald 151, 186
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Russia 21–2; as a great power 7–8;
Europe see Council of Europe Chechnya 51, 92, 105; Constitution 2,
(Parliamentary Assembly of) 16, 33; Kaliningrad 153, 157–8, 179;
Partnership for Peace see NATO–Russia ties with China 24
relations (Partnership for Peace) Russia–Georgia conflict 14, 20–1, 26, 31–6,
Pavlovsky, Gleb 5 60, 67, 69, 74, 76, 80, 82, 110, 120–1,
Permanent Council see Organisation for 124, 128, 131, 135–6, 139, 147, 153, 170,
Security and Cooperation in Europe 173, 175, 192–3; ceasefire agreement
(Permanent Council) 35–6, 193; The Day That Was Lost 170;
Permanent Joint Council see NATO– in Russian domestic politics 170–2;
Russia relations (NATO–Russia Russian decision-making 33, 170–1;
Permanent Joint Council) Russian recognition of breakaway regions
Petrov, Nikolai 171 34, 60; see also Vienna Document
Poland 29, 71, 106, 147–8, 152–3, 185, (Russia–Georgia Conflict)
188 Russian Empire 20–1, 27–8, 166
Powell, Colin 151 Russian military forces 138, 145–6, 153,
Pragmatic Nationalist 5–6 168–9; conventional forces 138–9,
Pragmatist 5–6 145–6, 183; nuclear forces 137–9,
Prague Summit see North Atlantic Treaty 145–6, 157
Organisation (Prague Summit)
Presidential Administration 9, 17, 116, Saakashvili, Mikheil 33, 80
167, 187 Sakwa, Richard 34
Prikhodko, Sergei 9–10 Sargsyan, Serzh 36
Primakov, Evgeny 10, 29, 63–4 Sarkozy, Nicolas 34–5, 193
Index 261
Schneider, Mark 188 Sweden 96
SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Switzerland 101
Organisation Syria 77
security community 45, 130, 135
Security Council (Russia) 18, 33, 65 Tagliavini, Heidi 33, 55–6, 176
Security Council (UN) see United Nations Tagliavini Report 33
(Security Council) Tajikistan 21–2
September 11 attacks 13–14, 67, 70, 74–5, Talbott, Strobe 63
159 Talinn 80–1
Serbia 29–31, 89; Russian support of 31 tandem 16, 34, 190; tandemocracy 16n1
Serdyukov, Anatoly 111, 170–1 Tashkent Agreement 101
Sevastopol 26–7, 79, 193 Tauscher, Ellen 157
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 19–20, Tibilov, Leonid 171
22–4, 66, 81–2; cooperation with CSTO Transdniestria 14, 28, 37, 39–42, 43, 60,
23 104, 129, 132, 170, 174, 192–3, 195;
Shevardnadze, Eduard 63 5 + 2 talks 39, 42, 174, 192–3; Kozak
Shevtsova, Lilia 118 Memorandum 39–40, 192, 195; and
Shyrokyne 169 Medvedev 41, 43; and Putin 39–40, 43
siloviki 2 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Simferopol 167 Europe (CFE Treaty) 12, 15, 41, 56, 67,
Simonsen, Sven G. 10 84–5, 89, 91, 100–17, 119, 122, 126,
Singapore 142 131, 135, 181, 189, 193; adaptation
Slovakia 71, 78 process 101–3; Extraordinary
Slovenia 71, 78 Conference 106–7; First Review
Smirnov, Igor 41, 43, 192 Conference 102–3; flank zones 102–3,
Sobchak, Anatoly 2 105, 108, 112; Istanbul Agreements 41,
Sochi 38, 173, 192 103–5, 107, 109, 112; Joint Consultative
Solana, Javier 128 Group (JCG) 84, 102, 105–6, 108, 110,
South Korea 185 181; NATO moratorium on 113; Parallel
South Ossetia 14, 28, 32–6, 39, 42, 60, Action Plan 109; post-‘suspension’
79–80, 96, 111–12, 131, 170–3, 193; discussions 109–15; Russia’s
recognition of 22, 34, 42; and so-called ‘suspension’ of 15, 80, 85, 91, 101,
Kosovo precedent 31–2; support for 106–10, 115, 117, 181, 193; Russian
joining Russia 172; ties with Russia 32, compliance with 103–5; states parties to
172–3; see also Russia–Georgia conflict 115n2; Treaty Limited Equipment
Soviet Union 10–11, 20–1, 27–8, 44, 46, (TLE) 101–3, 112–13, 122; treaty
48–9, 62–4, 67–8, 74–5, 80–1, 86, 88, provisions 101–2; treaty structure 101;
95–6, 101–2, 117–18, 132, 134, 139, see also Agreement on Adaptation of
148, 164, 179 the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Spain 149 Forces in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission see Ukraine Treaty on Open Skies 15, 56, 84–6,
crisis (Special Monitoring Mission) 94–100, 114, 181–3, 189; 2005 Review
spheres of influence 20–1; ‘privileged Conference 98; 2010 Review
interests’ 20 Conference 97–9; Cyprus membership
Statist 5–6 application 99–100, 181–2; Georgian
Sternik, Alexander 133 airspace 96–7; history of 94–5; and
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 140–1; humanitarian missions 99; Open Skies
START I 140; START II 140, 150–1 Consultative Commission 84, 95–6, 99;
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty provisions 95–6; Russian aircraft
137–8, 140–2, 163; criticism of 140–1; sensors 99, 182; Russian concerns
treaty provisions 140 regarding 97–8; Russian participation in
Strelkov, Igor 168 95–7; states parties to 115n1; treaty
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile modernization 98–9; see also Ukraine
141–3, 148 crisis (and Open Skies)
262 Index
Trenin, Dmitri 77 91, 105; see also Kosovo; missile
Tskhinvali 33, 93 defence; nuclear arms reductions
Tsygankov, Andrei 5–6 unmanned aerial vehicle 92, 113
Turkey 39, 100, 102, 112, 148, 157, 159, Uzbekistan 21, 27, 52, 82
179
Turkmenistan 52 V to V Dialogues see Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (V
Ukraine 14–15, 22, 24–8, 39, 97, 164–70, to V Dialogues)
174–5, 179, 181–3, 185, 189, 192–3; Valdai Club 16, 64, 190
2013 protests 166–7; Crimea 26–7, 79, Vaziani 32
165–8, 180, 183; energy cut-offs 25–6; Vendil Pallin, Carolina 11
Foreign Ministry 26; Orange Revolution Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
24–5, 53, 166, 194–5; see also Black 109
Sea Fleet; North Atlantic Treaty Vienna Document 15, 56, 85–94, 113–14,
Organisation; Ukraine crisis 181, 183, 189, 193; 1999 version 85, 87;
Ukraine crisis 164–70, 174, 176–8, 181–3, 2011 version 14, 84–5, 90, 92, 94,
185, 189; annexation of Crimea 167–8, 181–2; other versions 86; provisions 87;
177–8; Budapest Memorandum 166; Russia–Georgia Conflict 92–3; Russian
Crimean referendum 167, 177; and compliance with 92, 94; Russian
European Union Association Agreement concerns about 92; Russian
166–7, 170, 189; kidnapping of OSCE modernization proposals 87–9, 193;
observers 177, 183; Malaysia Airlines unusual military activities 87, 92–3;
Flight 17 downing 168, 176; Minsk II Vienna Document Plus (VD Plus)
169; Minsk Protocol 168–9; and Open 89–90; see also Organisation for
Skies 183; and the OSCE 176–8; Security and Cooperation in Europe
opinion of Russia 169–70; Russian (Forum for Security Cooperation);
military activities 168–9; Special Ukraine crisis (and Vienna Document)
Monitoring Mission 176–7; and Vienna Vike-Freiberga, Vaira 69
Document 183; see also NATO–Russia Volk, Yevgeny 9
relations (Ukraine crisis) Voronezh radar 41
Ulyanov, Mikhail 32, 93–4, 145, 175, 181, Voronin, Vladimir 40–1, 43, 192
188
Wallander, Celeste 99, 156
Ulyanovsk 76, 179
Waltz, Kenneth 7
United Kingdom 144–5, 166, 175, 179
Warsaw Pact 44, 62–4, 67–9, 101, 103,
United Nations 23, 30, 34, 49, 118–20,
109
125; Charter 19, 120–1, 123–4;
Washington 142
Declaration on Principles 124; United Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 58,
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 65, 159
92; Office for Disarmament Affairs Western Europe 19, 51, 97, 153
58–9; Office on Drugs and Crime 75; Westerniser 5–6
Security Council 24, 30, 56, 59, 65–6, Wikileaks cables 1
125; Security Council Resolution 1808 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 36
93; Security Council Resolution 1244 Wörner, Manfred 64
30; Security Council Resolution 1540
58–9; Security Council Resolution Yanukovych, Viktor 25–7, 166–7
(UNSCR) 1973 76–7, 192 Yeltsin, Boris 3, 20, 29, 69, 190
United Russia 3–4, 164, 172 Yugoslavia 89, 140, 165
United States 5–6, 12–13, 19, 27, 37, 40, Yushchenko, Viktor 25–7
51–3, 75, 86, 94–7, 101, 110, 112, 118,
134, 139–66, 168–9, 175, 178, 180, 182, Zapad-2013 182
186–9, 194–5; government 146, 150, Zlobin, Nikolai 16
164, 182, 186–9, 194; military presence Zubkov, Viktor 2
in Central Asia 21, 24; State Department Zyuganov, Gennady 3

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Russian Foreign Policy under

Dmitry Medvedev, 2008–2012

Although the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev is often seen as a continuation of

Founding Editorial Committee Member:

1 Ukraine’s Foreign and Security 2 Political Parties in the Russian

6 Dostoevsky and the Idea of 15 Between Stalin and Hitler

23 The Dilemmas of Destalinisation 33 Re-constructing the Post-Soviet

24 News Media and Power in Russia 34 Chechnya – Russia’s “War on

28 Russian Constitutionalism 37 Energy Dependency, Politics

40 Political and Social Thought in 49 Local Politics and

41 The Demise of the Soviet 50 The Emancipation of the Serfs

46 Democratisation and Gender in 55 Television and Culture in

60 Critical Theory in Russia and 69 Learning to Labour in

61 Promoting Democracy and 70 Television and Presidential

64 Constitutional Bargaining in 73 Khrushchev in the Kremlin

66 Russia and Islam 75 The Decline of Regionalism in

77 Putin’s United Russia Party 86 East European Diasporas,

81 Russia – Democracy Versus 90 Soviet Consumer Culture in the

83 The Baltic States – From Soviet 92 The Politics of HIV/AIDS in

84 The EU–Russia Borderland 93 The Capitalist Transformation

1 From Putin to Medvedev: maintaining the status quo? 1

2 Russia’s Euro-Atlantic security interests: preserving and

3 Russia and the ‘frozen’ conflicts of the Euro-Atlantic space:

4 Russia and the OSCE: hard versus soft security 44

6 Russia and the Euro-Atlantic security agreements:

7 Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty: a different

8 Nuclear reductions and missile defence: prospects for

9 The return of President Putin: a change of course 164

10 Conclusion: Medvedev’s presidential legacy 190

This research is supported by interviews which were conducted in Brussels,

ABM Anti-ballistic missile

As President of Russia, Medvedev struggled to establish an identity distinct from

Putin, Medvedev, and foreign policy schools of thought

Putin and Medvedev’s perspectives on Russia’s place in the

Russia lacks the ability to project power to a degree sufficient to satisfy a

Therefore, if recognition is considered to be the key to great power status, Russia

Putin, Medvedev, and style

Two presidents and their foreign policy advisors

The concept of the Euro-Atlantic region

An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America

Structure of the book

To understand the importance of the Euro-Atlantic region to Russia, as well as

Russian security documents and Russian interests

Russia and the areas of ‘privileged interests’

Russia and Central Asia: influence through institutional ties

Russia and Kosovo: a new precedent?

Russia and the idea of a Kosovo precedent

Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia: recognising new ‘states’

Russia and the road to the August 2008 conflict

• The non-use of force

Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh: strategic goals

Increasing negotiations and attempts at conflict resolution

Russia and Transdniestria: a peace-keeping exercise?

The Kozak Memorandum and Russian conflict resolution failure

Limited progress and engagement since 2003

Structural issues with the OSCE

Russia, human rights, and democracy at the OSCE

Russia and the human dimension agenda at the OSCE

Russia and the politico-military side of the OSCE

The challenge of consensus as a way to resolve conflicts is apparent when the

Russia, NATO, and Soviet era promises

The Russian leadership’s views of NATO

Russia and the NATO member-states