VICTORIA, KIM PATRICK C.

BA 503 – Economic Analysis

Master in Business Administration Dr. Jose Antonio Lee

IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES OF THE PHILIPPINE RICE TARIFFICATION LAW

Introduction

Rice is considered as the staple food for most Filipinos. It is deemed to be an integral part of
Filipino history and culture. In every festivity celebrated by Filipinos, rice is always present in all forms,
taste and presentation. Apart from being the primary source of carbohydrates, rice creates what
anthropologists described as “the psychological sensation of satiety”. Dawe, et.al. (2005) said that, for
most Filipinos, no meal is complete without rice. In fact, the Food and Agriculture Organization reported
that in 2018, around 106.5 million Filipinos each person consumes 110 kg of rice every year (Philippine
Statistics Authority, 2018).

Although rice is the main agricultural produce in the country, it is also considered as a socially-
and politically-sensitive commodity, and securing supply at whatever cost is paramount. This has always
been the focus of the government’s agricultural policies. The salient points of these policies include
promoting self-sufficiency and providing high income to farmers while making prices affordable to the
general public (Tobias et al., 2011). Every political dispensation in the past decades has taken the view,
that the country has to be able to feed itself. For our political leaders and the Agriculture Department,
this means that rice has to be produced locally and sufficient enough to meet the consumption of the
growing population. Yet, self-sufficiency is still far from reality. The population is far from being food-
secure now than a decade or two ago. Over the years, rice has become more expensive in the
Philippines than in most developing countries in Asia. This, in effect, has caused the diminishing
purchasing power of the poor, which includes landless farmers and urban poor workers whose spending
on rice constitutes about 22% of their total household expenditures (Balisacan, 2003).

In the 1970s, the Philippines became self-sufficient in rice production and was in fact a rice
exporter to its neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, China and Myanmar. However, with the rapid
increase in population and lack of technological advancement and resources needed to produce the
total rice requirement, the country slowly turned into a net rice importer.
 Figure 1: Principal Rice Importing Countries

At present, the Philippines is the second largest rice importer in the world (230, 000 metric
tons), only next to China. (Simeon, 2019) (Figure 1). In 2017, the country imports rice mainly from
Vietnam (52%) and Thailand (29%) (Santiago, 2019).

The major rice-producing regions of the country are Central Luzon (18.7%), Western Visayas
(11.3%), Cagayan Valley (11.3%), Ilocos (9.8%), Central Mindanao or SOCCSKSARGEN (7.5%) and Bicol
(6.8%) with almost 70% of the total rice area is irrigated and the remaining is rainfed and upland
(Ricepedia, 2013). Majority of the country’s irrigated rice is harvested on the central plain of Luzon, the
ricebowl of the Philippines. Rainfed rice is harvested in Cagayan Valley in northern Luzon, in Iloilo
Province, and on the coastal plains of Visayas and Ilocos in northern Luzon. Upland rice is cultivated in
both permanent and shifting systems scattered throughout the archipelago on rolling to steep lands. For
a country teeming with agricultural land, the Philippines continue to suffer from rice crises every few
years.

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Rice Policy Framework and the World Tariff Organization (WTO)

As mentioned above, the government intervened heavily in the rice sector in achieving stable
and high prices for farmers and at the same time attaining stable and low prices for consumers. It has
employed a variety of instruments – output procurement, credit subsidies, tariffs and quantitative trade
restrictions, provision of rice subsidy to consumers, and public spending in research, irrigation,
infrastructures, technological advancements, extension, land reform, and other support services – to
affect these objectives.

The National Food Authority (NFA), the government’s price and supply stabilization arm in the
rice sector, is mandated to have the monopoly over international trade of rice, the discretion to issue
import licenses and to operate the marketing and price support operations of rice and corn. Its
interventions have been justified on the grounds that the world price is highly volatile and that private
traders extract monopoly profits from farmers during harvest season and from consumers during rice
scarcity (Balicasan, 2003).

In 1996, the Philippines, in accession with the World Tariff Organization, passed the Republic Act
8178, which lifted all quantitative import restrictions in agricultural produce except rice. In lieu of the
said restrictions, their tariff equivalents were put in place. The Philippines opened up imports on rice
under a minimum access volume (MAV) which is in operation equivalent to Quantitative Restrictions
(QRs). The QR regime of the Philippines was directed for conversion into tariff protection. The country
obtained a special treatment for rise up to 2005, which was later on extended until 2012. The
Philippines has been applying for extensions of QR on rice since 1996. Eventually, the Philippines
acquired a waiver to maintain QR until June 30, 2017 (Tobias, 2019).

The Philippines’ membership to WTO for years aimed to counter the impact of the expected
influx of cheap rice imports. The country apparently has been extending protection primarily to
safeguard the local rice farmers from increased competition of imported rice. Another reason the
Philippines had been pushing for a two-year extension of the restriction is to achieve rice self-sufficiency
by the year 2020. However, given the QR on rice shall be retained, consumers shall continue to bear the
weight of overpriced rice, with the poorest households bearing the burden. According on the 2012

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Family Income and Expenditure Survey, the richest 20% of households only allocate 3% of their spending
on rice while poorer income groups tend to allocate greater share for rice (Philippine Institute of
Development Studies, 2012).

The Rice Tariffication Law

The Rice Tariffication Law entitled “An Act Liberalizing the Importation, Exportation and Trading
of Rice, Lifting on Purpose the Quantitative Import Restriction on Rice, and for other purposes” was
signed into law by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on February 14, 2019. This is also known as the Rice
Liberalization Act or Republic Act No. 11203, which amends the two-decade-old Agricultural Tariffication
Act of 1996 that imposed tariff to agricultural imports except for rice. Primarily, the law aims to lift the
quantitative restriction (QR) on rice imports and replace it with a general tariff. The Agricultural
Tariffication Act of 1996 served as the Philippine government’s compliance to our obligation to WTO,
lifting QRs and imposing tariff to agricultural product. The law aims to protect local farmers from the
entry of more imported rice into the country through the imposition of 35% tariff on rice coming from
member-countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) like Thailand and Vietnam and
50% for non-ASEAN countries. Proceeds from the collection of tariffs will be used to fund mass
irrigation, warehousing, and rice research.

Tobias, 2019 stated that the objectives of the tariffication law are as follows:

 Fulfill the international commitment as member of the World Trade Organization in 1996.
Replace the QR on rice with another form of protection that is more transparent and generate
revenues to support the sector – a tariff.

 Ensure the availability of rice in the domestic market for the utilization of greater majority of
population by allowing more big or small private traders to participate in importing rice.

 Lower locally-produced rice prices to levels that would be affordable to greater majority of the
population.

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  Make local market function effectively and efficiently with much reduced or no government
intervention.

 Provide farmers equivalent protection with the imposition of 35% or higher tariff rates on rice
imports and preferential assistance to rice farmers, especially those who are adversely affected
by tariffication.

 Provide opportunity for farmers to earn more in the world market. The law also lifted the
restriction on rice imports to encourage farmers to produce much better-quality
heirloom/traditional rice geared to exports.

Furthermore, Tobias, 2019 specified the key provisions of the Rice Tariffication Act

 Tariffication. Tariffs are set at 35% tariff rate on all rice imports from ASEAN countries, and
40% tariff on imports from non-ASEAN countries.

 Lifting of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. Removal of the QR will also increase
imports and depress “palay” prices.

 Powers of the President. Upon the recommendation of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) and as advised by the National Food Authority Council (NFAC), the President
“may increase, reduce, revise or adjust existing rates of import duty up to the bound rate” of
rice tariffs. In case of “imminent or forecasted shortage,” the draft IRR provides that the
President may allow the importation of rice at a lower applied tariff “for a limited period
and/or specified volume” to address the situation.

 Creation of the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund  (RCEF). A fund that will be created
from tariff revenues of rice imports and will be used to directly support rice farmers and fund
innovative undertakings of the government to further strengthen the rice industry.  It aims to
provide key interventions to support farmers and enhance their competitiveness and
profitability, including farm machinery and equipment to improve farm operations, rice seed

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 development, propagation, and promotion, expanded rice credit, and extension services. The
RCEF will be allocated to rice producing areas and earmarked as follows:

 Fifty percent (50%) will go to the Philippine Center for Postharvest Development and
Modernization (PhilMech) to provide farmers with rice farm machineries and
equipment;

 Thirty percent (30%) will be released to the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice)
to be used for the development, propagation and promotion of inbred rice seeds to
rice farmers and the organization of rice farmers into seed growers’ associations
engaged in seed production and trade;

 Ten percent (10%) will be made available in the form of credit facility with minimal
interest rates and with minimum collateral requirements to rice farmers and
cooperatives to be managed by the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development
Bank of the Philippines; and

 Ten percent (10%) will be set aside to fund extension services by PhilMech, Agricultural
Training Institute (ATI), and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) for teaching skills on rice crop production, modern rice farming techniques,
seed production, farm mechanization, and knowledge/ technology transfer through
farm schools nationwide.

 Rice industry road map. The Department of Agriculture (DA), together with relevant
agencies, will have to formulate a Rice Industry Roadmap to spell out the critical interventions
that need to be put in place to assist the small rice farmers, especially those that will be most
affected by the tariffication. DA Secretary Emmanuel Piñol issued Special Order No. 358 which
created a National Rice Roadmap Team.

 Issuance of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearance for Rice for the Sole Purpose
(SPSIC). The law allows unlimited importation of rice as long as private sector traders secure a
phytosanitary permit from the Bureau of Plant Industry and pay the 35% tariff for shipments

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 from neighbors in Southeast Asia. This covers even rice importation for the purposes of
donation during calamities and emergency situations. In these instances, the
agency/office/organization or private entities, if they are based in the Philippines, will be
required to secure phytosanitary import clearances (SPSIC).

 National Single Window Program. A proposed measure the setting up of a single

window system for rice by the Bureau of Customs to address rice smuggling.

 Exclusion and transfer of the regulatory function of the National Food Authority (NFA) to
the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). NFA will retain its power to maintain a rice buffer stock
which will be used in emergency situations and to sustain the government's disaster relief
programs. Rice for this purpose will be sourced solely from local farmers.

 Special Rice Safeguard. The Implementing Rules and Guidelines (IRR) provides for a
Special Rice Safeguard to help protect local rice farmers from sudden or extreme price
volatilities. These will be imposed in accordance with RA 8800 or the Safeguard Measures Act
and its IRR.

 Priority beneficiaries of mechanization. There are 1,100 producing towns that have been
identified as priority beneficiaries of mechanization in the form of tractors, transplanters,
harvesters, dryers, and rice milling equipment.

 Rice Farmer Financial Assistance program. Focuses on rice farmers, cooperatives, and
associations adversely affected by rice tariffication. Also allocates tariff revenues in excess of
Php10 billion to the Rice Farmer Financial Assistance program to compensate rice farmers who
will lose income as a result of the measure. A portion of the excess tariff will be allocated to
titling rice lands, expanded crop insurance, and crop diversification program.

Rice Tariffication and Inflation

The newly approved Rice Tariffication Law, approved by Congress on November 2018, will
remove the National Food Authority’s (NFA) power to import and distribute cheaper rice. With Senator

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Cynthia Villar as the principal author, the measure was prepared jointly by the Committees on
Agriculture and Food, on Ways and Means, and on Finance. It is in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1476,
1689, 1839, taking into consideration Proposed Senate Resolution Nos. 143, 146 and House Bill No.
7735, with Senators Ralph Recto, Leila De Lima, Joel Villanueva, Risa Hontiveros, Grace Poe, Sherwin
Gatchalian and Cynthia Villar as authors.              

Pres. Rodrigo Duterte signed into law the Rice Tariffication Bill which was imposed recently on
March 5, 2019. The law was prompted because of the surging inflation of rice price during the last
quarter of 2018 after the rice stocks of NFA ran out. Further, according to Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) data, rice was the number one contributor to inflation in September 2018, while food items in the
consumption basket accounted for more than half of the inflation rate in the same month.  Consumers
bought regular-milled rice at an average price of Php 37.89/kg (US$ 0.72/kg) and well-milled rice at Php
41.93/kg (US$ 0.80/kg). Prices of rice have continued to rise since then. Farmers enjoyed the highest
buying price for “palay” which was recorded at Php 22.00/kg. The rise in rice prices, both at the farm-
gate and retail levels, contributed significantly to inflation. As Filipinos continue to struggle with
inflation, the government found ways to temper rising inflation. One way of doing it is by passing the
Rice Tariffication Bill.

On the other hand, according to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), rice
tariffication will directly benefit farmers and the poor through lower rice prices and increased
government assistance to the agricultural sector. The newly-signed law provides for the establishment
of the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF), which will pipe in Php10 billion (US$ 190.84)
annually to the rice sector for the next six years. The RCEF is allocated for the procurement of farm
machinery and equipment, rice development, propagation and promotion, as well as expanded rice
credit and extension services.

Effects of Rice Tariffication

Positive
 Lower retail prices for consumers. Possible savings for the consumers as it allows no limit in
terms of the volume of imports which will eventually stabilize prices. However, in the long run,

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 the economy could benefit more from the adoption of import tariffs than implementation of
QRS which limit the entry of commodities and may lead to unstable prices.

Figure 2. Farmgate VS Retail Rice Prices

Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (Figure 2) showed that regular milled rice retails at
P 38.40 per kilo, while well milled rice is priced at P 43.50 per kilo, as of 2 nd week of August.
This is a significant drop from last year’s prices, but not enough according to what the
Socioeconomic Team suggests that retail price will drop to P 27.00.

 Address the rice shortage. Would address the urgent need to improve availability of rice in the
country, prevent artificial rice shortages, reduce the prices of rice in the market, and curtail
corruption and cartel domination in the rice industry.

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 Figure 3. Inventory of Rice Stocks Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

During the earlier parts of 2018, the National Food Authority announced that there is a
shortage in the rice supply, forcing the majority of the Filipinos who rely on government-
subsidized rice would then have to buy commercial rice, the price of which has already
increased due the lack of supply.

Months after the implementation of the Rice Tariffication Law, the total rice stocks inventory
as of September 1, 2019 was 1,842.37 metric tons (Figure 3). This was 57.9 percent higher than
the 1,167.03 thousand metric tons level in September 2018 and 13.7 percent lower than the
previous months inventory level of 2,133.84. It is also noted that rice stocks were higher in all
sectors in comparison to previous year’s levels. Stocks in households and commercial
warehouses increased by 10.3 percent and 70.5 percent respectively. Stocks in NFA
depositories continued to show a significant increase of 268.6 percent.

 Lower inflation rates. The law will also reduce government's role in rice importation and lead to
more rice imports by the private sector, thus, lowering rice prices and help tame inflation.

The National Economic Development Authority expects inflation to further ease in the near
term due to higher supply of rice in the country allowed by the Rice Tariffication Law. The PSA

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 reported that the inflation rate slowed further to 0.9 percent last September 2019 (Figure 4),
the lowest rate in 40 months. This can be attributed to softer price adjustments observed in
nearly all commodities and base effects, coming from 6.7 percent in same period in 2018.
Consequently, this brings the year-to-date inflation to 2.8 percent, which is well within the
government’s full year 2019 target of 2.0 to 4.0 percent. Moreover, rice deflation was
observed for the fifth consecutive month, reaching an 8.9 percent decline in September 2019
from a 5.2 percent drop in the previous months.

Figure 4. Inflation rate of the Philippines Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

 Interventions to support rice farmers. RCEF will provide key interventions to support farmers and
enhance their competitiveness and profitability, including farm machinery and equipment to
improve farm operations, rice seed development, propagation, and promotion, expanded rice
credit, and extension services. Likewise, it will open up a window for farmers to export and
contribute to the world market.

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 The government has released P2.462 billion for the credit and seed distribution components of
the Rice Competitive Enhancement Fund (RCEF). The Department of Agriculture noted that the
Department of Budget Management (DBM) allotted to the Philippine Rice Research Institute
P2.038 billion to fund promotion, acquiring, and distribution of certified seed to farmers listed
in the Registry System for Basic Sectors for Agriculture (RSBSA).

The distribution started this October for dry-season planting, covering 57 provinces, and 747
cities and municipalities, with a total land area of more than one million hectares. Each farmer
will receive a maximum of 80 kilograms of certified rice seed, which include RC 222, RC 160, RC
216, and 16 other location-specific varieties, for two consecutive seasons.

In addition, the DBM, through the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) gave P244 million
to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and P180 million to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) for lending to individual farmers and accredited cooperatives and
associations.

Negative                                       
 New law lacks safety nets for Filipino farmers. Farmer groups clamor that the
new law will make them compete with cheap rice imports, making them more penniless.
Measures should be in place to ensure that Filipino farmers will not suffer with the rice
tariffication law and that "safety nets" are available for farmers.  While it has its good points,
the lack of government regulation worries stakeholders.

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 Figure 5. Farmgate VS Retail Rice Prices as of 2 nd week of August, 2019

With the drastic changes of farmgate rice as compared to its retail price (Figure 5), farmers are
calling out for the abolition of law and the government is now burdened to create safety nets
to ensure the welfare of the farmers. Some safety nets suggested is the vigorous expansion of
modern agribusiness farms which will take in the displaced rice farmers as agricultural
workers. However, for this to happen, the government must remove the five-hectare retention
limit on farmlands that is mandated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The other
safety net suggested is the promotion of labor-intensive light manufacturing and cottage
industries. Employment in this sector is not only a safety net for the displaced farmers or their
children, but is also a progression from low-income, low-productivity farming (Calixto
Chikiamco, 2019).

 Potential displacement of farmers, NFA employees, accredited NFA retailers, rice

millers and rice by-product producers.  Aside from the obvious displacement of rice farmers,
NFA employees, and some 90,000 accredited NFA rice retailers nationwide, the deregulation of

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rice imports goes beyond the industry. Some of the businesses and industries that will be
affected by liberalized rice importation includes the following:   
                                                  
 Millers. There are around 6,600 registered rice millers all over the country, employing
55,000 workers. Industry stakeholders, in a position paper, said that a complete milling
facility costs from Php 30 million (US$572,519.08) to Php 50 million (US$954,198.47).
This would place the value of the whole industry itself at Php200 billion (US$ 3.82
billion) to Php300 billion (US$ 5.73) (Orly Manuntag, Confederation of Grains Retailers
Association of the Philippines).

 Animal feeds and beer industry. A by-product of the rice milling process, the rice bran
is used for making animal and aquaculture feeds. A shortage in local unhusked rice
production would also mean there would be a drop in its by-product.  If feed mills
produce less, it would cause a possible increase in the prices of pork and chicken which
use rice bran as major ingredient for its feeds. Another by-product which comes from
the milling process is the brewer's rice or “binlid” which is used in manufacturing
alcoholic drinks, particularly beer.

 Biomass, construction industry. A drop in local rice output will also mean a decrease in
rice hull, which is used as fuel for biomass furnaces used in the provinces to provide
electricity. Rice hulls are also used as a binder for cement and land fillers (Orly
Manuntag, Confederation of Grains Retailers Association of the Philippines).

 Enable cartels of the rice trade and will throw poor sectors into a worsened state of
hunger. There is no guarantee that retail rice prices will be lower in the long run with
unhampered importation. Relying on rice imports makes the country vulnerable to
higher world market prices as well as to rice production and export decisions of other
countries. In 2008, for instance, Vietnam, India and Pakistan restricted their rice
exports amid rising global rice prices. Thailand also raised the idea of creating a global
rice cartel similar to that for oil exporting countries.

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Salient Issues on Rice Tariffication

 Rice imports are cheaper than locally produced rice. Under a free market, the market price will
decline with the influx of cheaper rice imports

 Liberalizing rice imports will alleviate, but will not solve the Philippines’ inflation problem.

 A number of rice farmers will never be competitive. The difference in average cost of palay
between Vietnamese and Thai rice farmers and Filipino rice farmers is P4 to P5 per kilo, a huge
gap showing the difference in productivity and average cost reflect differences in irrigation, the
use of farm machinery, farming methods and average farm size between Filipino rice farmers
and our ASEAN neighbors.

 Tariff are set at 35% tariff rate on all rice imports from ASEAN countries, and a 40% tariff on all
imports from non-ASEAN countries. However, some experts claim these tariff rates are still too
high, and lower rates (10% to 20%) might be more feasible in keeping with the central goal of
making rice more affordable for Filipinos. While this will result in imported rice becoming more
expensive, the flood of imported grains will still threaten local produce and worse, affects the
farmers.

 Increasing or even doubling tariff rates is not a safety net. It will incentivize smuggling and
increase rice prices for 105 million consumers. It will send confusing signals to rice farmers and
cannot be sustained without an impact on inflation

 To ensure that the rice to be imported will not be infested by pathogens or pests
like bukbok (weevils), the new law requires that all private players secure “sanitary and
phytosanitary import clearances” from BPI before they can import. Past experience tells us that
this could be prone to abuse (Dr. Ramon Clarete, University of the Philippines School of
Economics).

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  The Rice Fund will be put to better use if it were focused instead on improving rice farmers’
access to credit and crop insurance (Dr. Emil Q.  Javier, National Academy of Science and
Technology).

 There is no denying that a number of rice farmers will lose their present livelihood, especially
those at the margins. No amount in a rice competitiveness fund can sugarcoat this reality.

Conclusion

Much has been said on the ratification of the Rice Tariffication Act. However, the main concern
is the negative impact of the rice tariffication law on local farmers, saying that the “over supply” of
cheap rice could adversely affect them following its implementation. On the other hand, the law is seen
to help expand the access of Filipinos to cheap rice that in return will prevent inflation pitch brought in
large part by the supply. Nevertheless, the core concern of the government should be on how to
prevent 2.4 million rice farmers and farm workers from getting poorer because of the implementation of
the new law. Although special key provisions are already laid out to protect the farmers and the
consumers, the focus is on the proper implementation so that everyone should benefit from the law. 

The newly-signed law provides for the establishment of the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement
Fund (RCEF), which will pipe in Php10 billion (US$ 190.84 million) annually to the rice sector for the next
six years. The RCEF is allocated for the procurement of farm machinery and equipment, rice
development, propagation and promotion, as well as expanded rice credit and extension services. RCEF
is a package of support programs to help the farmers and serve as safeguard to cushion the sudden
effects of inflation. However, it is imperative that the Department of Agriculture should strongly support
the local rice industry and diligently perform its mandated functions in identifying eligible beneficiaries
which include farmers, other farm workers, rice cooperatives and associations. Most importantly, in
crafting the IRR, research and development should be highlighted since it has been proven to help
develop improved technologies and increase farmers’ income.

Long-term food security will need a holistic approach in the agricultural sector, both across
commodity sectors and institutions. To date, agriculture expenditure is only about 4.75 percent of the
total National Expenditure Program annually. This is compared to 9 percent in Thailand and 11 percent
in Indonesia. Furthermore, allocations do not necessarily flow to regions with the lowest productivity.

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And finally, and perhaps most important, agricultural spending and investments are still hounded by
inefficiency and corruption issues, based on longstanding evidence on this sector.

The long history of our farmers being left behind despite the country’s economic progress has
created significant distrust with strategies to promote more economic openness. This is understandable
given the failure to capacitate the agricultural sector to compete in the international arena. Rice
tariffication— which is again a de facto form of trade liberalization—is an opportunity to break from this
past. 

Lifting the QR on rice breaks long-established corruption-prone structures, and it could serve as
a prelude to a more comprehensive reform of the rice and agricultural sector writ large. And because
their very livelihoods are again at stake, and they are expected to take risks to build a stronger
agricultural sector, it is only fair (and probably more effective) that farmers should be given a stronger
voice in this entire structural adjustment process.

References

Balisacan A. et al (2003), The Rice Problem in the Philippines: Trends, Constraints, and Policy
Imperatives

Chikiamco C. (2019). The real safety net for rice farmers. Retrieved from
https://www.bworldonline.com/the-real-safety-net-for-rice-farmers/

Galang, V. (2019). RCEF credit, seed funding worth P2.4 billion release. Retrieved from
https://www.bworldonline.com/rcef-credit-seed-funding-worth-p2-4-billion-released/

House of Representatives (2019). An Act liberalizing the importation, exportation, and trading of rice,
lifting for the purpose the quantitative import restriction on rice, and for other purposes. Retrieved
from  http://www.congress.gov.ph/legisdocs/ra_17/RA11203.pdf

National Economic Development Authority (2019). Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Rice
Liberalization Act - AmBisyon Natin 2040. Retrieved from http://2040.neda.gov.ph/public-

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consultation-for-the-drafting-of-the-implementing-rules-and-regulations-irr-of-the-rice-liberalization-
act/

Philippine Institute of Development Studies (2019). Rice Tariffication, Good Governance and Real
Food Security. Retrieved from https://www.pids.gov.ph/pids-in-the-news/2767

Punongbayan, JC (2019). “[ANALYSIS] Will Rice Tariffication Live up to Its Promise?” Rappler.
Retrieved from www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/218393-analysis-will-rice-tariffication-live-up-to-
promise.

Ricepedia (2013). Retrieved from http://ricepedia.org/philippines

Santiago, D (2019). Philippines Rice Imports by Country. Retrieved from

http://www.philippinesaroundtheworld.com/philippines-rice-imports-by-country/

Tobias A, Molina I, Valera HG, Mottaleb KA, Mohanty S. (2012). Handbook on rice policy for Asia. Los
Baños (Philippines): International Rice Research Institute. 47 p.

Tobias L. (2019). The Philippine Rice Tariffication Law: Implications and Issues. Retrieved from
http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_db.php?id=960

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