Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471

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Annals of Nuclear Energy

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Technical note

HAZOP application for the nuclear power plants decommissioning

projects
Sigitas Rimkevičius, Mindaugas Vaišnoras ⇑, Egidijus Babilas, Eugenijus Ušpuras
Lithuanian Energy Institute, Breslaujos 3, LT-44403 Kaunas, Lithuania

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Decommissioning of nuclear facilities involves different types of activities, tools, equipment and systems.
Received 9 October 2015 There is a potential for a wide range of radiological and industrial accidents during various stages of a
Received in revised form 11 April 2016 decommissioning project creating risk for workers and the environment. The occurrence of accidents is
Accepted 17 April 2016
possible due to many different operations involving movement and handling of large pieces of equipment
Available online 23 April 2016
and contaminated items. In addition, size reduction and decontamination processes are capable of
producing hazards. One of the first steps in developing a safety assessment for decommissioning activi-
Keywords:
ties is the identification of hazards that can affect workers, members of the public and the environment
Decommissioning
NPP
during decommissioning activities, and then to identify engineered and administrative control measures
HAZOP to prevent, eliminate or mitigate the hazards and their consequences. Fault and hazard identification can
ALARA be undertaken in several ways using a range of tools and techniques, including Hazard and Operability
Study (HAZOP).
The paper will mainly focus on the application of HAZOP technique for identification of the hazards
raised due to dismantling and decontamination activities at the Ignalina NPP, as well as at feasibility
study for the management of Bohunice V1 NPP primary circuit components.
Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction nationally prescribed safety criteria. Dismantling and decontami-

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities requires adequate
planning and demonstration that dismantling and decontamina-
tion activities can be conducted safely. Existing safety standards
require that an appropriate safety assessment be performed to
support any activities related to the sitting, operation, modifica-
tions and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The main purpose
of the safety assessment is to demonstrate that residual risks have
been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and to
Abbreviations: ALARA, As Low As Reasonably Achievable; AWT, annular water
tank; D & D, dismantling and decontamination; ECCS, Emergency Core Cooling
System; EU, European Union; FEU, fume extract unit; HAZOP, hazards and
operability assessment procedure; HEPA, high efficiency particulate air filtration
system; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; INPP, Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant; LEI, Lithuanian Energy Institute; MFU, mobile filtering unit; MLW, medium
level waste; NPP, nuclear power plant; PCC, primary circuit components; PPE,
personal protection equipment; RIS, reactor internal structures; RPV, reactor
pressure vessel; SG, steam generator; SJR, Safety Justification Report; SQEP, suitably
qualified and experienced personnel; VVER, from Russian: water–water energetic
reactor.
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mindaugas.vaisnoras@lei.lt (M. Vaišnoras).
nation activities at any nuclear facilities significantly increase
radiological and non-radiological hazards to workers, public and
the environment.
All relevant hazards (e.g., sources of harm) to workers, the
public and the environment should be considered in the decom-
missioning safety assessment, including (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2009):
s Radiation exposures, for example, external exposure from direct
radiation and other radiation sources (including criticality),
internal exposure due to inhalation, ingestion or cuts and
abrasions, and loss of containment leading to the uncontrolled
release of radionuclides.
s Toxic and other dangerous materials, for example, asbestos,
flammable materials, carcinogens, chemicals used for decon-
tamination purposes.
s Industrial hazards, for example, dropped loads, work at heights,
fires, high temperatures, high pressures, noise, dust and
asbestos.
According to IAEA safety guide WS-G-5.2 (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2009), a systematic approach should be taken for

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2016.04.027
0306-4549/Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
462 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
the identification of hazards on the basis of the description of the
facility and decommissioning activities. The following steps should
be applied in an iterative manner to identify accident scenarios
that could lead to the exposure of workers and members of the
public or could have adverse consequences for the environment
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2009):
 Identification of hazards and initiating events: The activity and
location of the radioactive source term at the facility should be
considered together with any additional hazards, arising from
decommissioning activities or processes, and initiating events
that create the potential for causing harmful consequences for
workers, the public or the environment should be identified.
 Hazard screening: The hazards identified should be quantified
and screened for in order to direct the safety efforts towards
all the significant and relevant hazards and initiating events
for a facility.
 Identification of scenarios: The safety analysis should identify
all relevant scenarios arising either from decommissioning
activities or accident situations, in which the screened hazards
could be realized.
The identification of initiating events and the analysis of their
evolution should be carried out using an appropriate technique.
A wide range of different methods, such as Hazards and Operability
Study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault
Tree Analysis, are used for the hazards identification and analysis
(Hashemi-Tilehnoee et al., 2010). In the nuclear industry HAZOP
method is used rather often (Jeong et al., 2008; John, 1988). The
HAZOP method is a formal, systematic, and critical approach to
identifying the qualitative potential of hazards and operating prob-
lems associated with an existing or new system or piece of equip-
ment, caused by deviations from the design intent, and their
resulting consequential effects (Kletz, 1997; Hyatt, 2004).
The paper discusses hazard identification approach (HAZOP)
used for decontamination and dismantling (D & D) projects at
the Ignalina NPP related to the dismantling and decontamination
of the equipment located in buildings 117/1 and V1. Also, the
same HAZOP method was employed for hazard identification in
feasibility study for management of Bohunice V1 NPP primary
circuit components. The HAZOP study considered and reviewed
the available potential hazard management strategies for satisfy-
ing the ALARA principle. Accumulated experience of the Lithua-
nian Energy Institute experts in preparation of safety analysis for
operating NPP (Ušpuras et al., 2010) was successfully adopted
for the development of D & D works safety assessment for NPP
decommissioning.
Table 1
List of nodes for HAZOP study for Ignalina NPP D & D projects.
Node Title
1 Plant and building preparatory work (e.g., install barriers and transfer
systems, remove cladding and insulation)
2 Remove small items and small bore pipe-work from accessible areas,
drives/motors
3 Remove large items (vessels) and pipe-work, remove valves from
pipe-work
4 Remove filter medium
5 Size reduce large pipe-work and vessels
6 Decontamination and monitoring of cut segments and pipe-work
7 Place all waste in containers/trolleys for removal
8 Remove steel platforms, redundant electrical cabinets and cables
9 Transfer waste from building
10 Clean/decontaminate room
11 Monitor room
Further Ignalina NPP D & D HAZOP studies considered each element or sequence
(‘‘node”) of the design and involved the application of Keywords.
2. Hazard identification methodology used in NPP D & D
projects
The safety assessment process for decommissioning provides a
basis, on which the safety of workers and the public can be ensured
through the evaluation of the consequences of potential hazards
and the identification of the ways they can be mitigated, so that
the associated residual risks are ALARA. The safety assessment
should identify necessary preventive, protective and mitigating
measures and should justify that these will be suitable and suffi-
cient to ensure safety during decommissioning, in compliance with
the relevant safety requirements and criteria (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2009). The main steps of the harmonized safety
assessment methodology for decommissioning are listed below:
(1) Safety assessment framework.
(2) Description of facility and decommissioning activities.
(3) Hazard analysis: identification and screening.
(4) Hazard analysis: evaluation.
(5) Evaluation of results and identification of safety control
measures.
One of the first steps in developing a safety assessment for
decommissioning activities is the identification of existing and
future hazards (both radiological and non-radiological) that can
affect workers, members of the public and the environment during
decommissioning activities, and then to identify engineered and
administrative control measures to prevent, eliminate or mitigate
the hazards and their consequences. It is critical to the safety
assessment that all reasonably foreseeable initiating events and
accident scenarios are identified (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2013).
Analysis of the possible hazards, raised by the proposed D & D
technology, starts before safety case development. A nuclear safety
case is a set of documents that describe the radiological and non-
radiological hazards in terms of a facility or site and modes of oper-
ation (including potential undesired modes) and the measures that
prevent or mitigate the harm being incurred. The safety case
should provide a coherent demonstration that relevant standards
have been met and that risks to persons have been reduced to As
Low As Reasonably Achievable. Safety assessment, an integral part
of the safety case, is driven by a systematic assessment of these
hazards and is an important component of the safety case
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012). The safety analysis
should identify all relevant scenarios arising either from decom-
missioning activities or accident situations, in which the screened
hazards could be realized. It is a fundamental requirement that all
reasonably foreseeable faults are identified as a part of safety case
development. Hazard identification is a ‘‘comprehensive process to
be applied systematically to the identification and review of the
hazards presented by a facility or operation and a consideration
of the ways in which risk to workers, the public and the environ-
ment due to these hazards might be realized”.
Fault and hazard identification can be undertaken in several
ways using a range of tools and techniques (including Hazard
and Operability [HAZOP]), and it is this technique, which was
applied for D & D projects at the Ignalina NPP, as well as at feasi-
bility study for management of Bohunice V1 NPP primary circuit
components.
2.1. HAZOP procedure
A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) can be used at varying
times during the life cycle of the process, from process develop-
ment through to the closure of the plant, including hazard
 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
assessment of any modifications proposed during its operational
life span (Schlechter, 1995).
The HAZOP objectives are to identify, as far as reasonably prac-
ticable, all accidents of safety significance, which could occur, i.e.,
to produce a comprehensive fault set. The HAZOP process aims
to produce a comprehensive fault set that will allow the develop-
ment of a fault and hazard schedule to demonstrate that the iden-
tified hazards are controlled. The procedure identifies:
s Possible initiating events.
s Nature of accident consequences.
s Existing Engineered Safety Systems currently included within
the design.
s Existing Operational Safety Systems, which are a current normal
practice.
s Requirement for additional safety systems (engineered or
managerial).
s Operability or functionality issues.
The HAZOP technique is normally a team based structured
method of identifying hazards, contributory causes and operability
problems in plant and procedures. HAZOP is an effectively struc-
tured brainstorming workshop, i.e., a series of meetings involving
interested parties and relevant technical specialists to give differ-
ent viewpoints working as a group to stimulate creativity and
generate ideas. The advantages of this technique are that:
s It is a comprehensive and systematic process.
s It is recognized and able to receive regulator acceptance.
s It covers hazards and operability.
s The use of brainstorming encourages lateral thinking and
‘thinking outside the box’.
In order that the HAZOP process delivers its objective of a
systematic evaluation of the design from a safety and operability
Divide plant into nodes
Choose a node
Choose a keyword
Apply keyword to node
Identify hazards
Identify protection/
mitigation measures
Choose next keyword
Choose next node
End HAZOP Follow up and Review
Fig. 1. HAZOP study.
463
stand-point, there are a number of organizational requirements,
which need to be built into the process to ensure consistency. The
procedure for performing the HAZOP study is presented in Fig. 1.
The discussion is oriented by a Record Sheet, where every point
of every discussed item is recorded by the Team’s Secretary. It is
essential that detailed records of the HAZOP study are made.
Record tables are used for recording the following for each
keyword:
s Contributory causes,
s Consequences,
s Comments recorded,
s Possible indications and protection/mitigation measures,
s Recommendations, actions placed on team members.
2.1.1. Nodes
In order to carry out a systematic study, it is necessary to divide
the plant, modification design or procedure into individual items,
operational steps, or areas having a single functional intent. These
may be plant items or steps in procedures and are referred to as
nodes. Each node is given a unique identifying number during
the course of the study. The examples of nodes are as follows:
 Lines between major pieces of equipment.
 Equipment items (tanks/vessels, columns, reactors).
 Packages (compressors, chemical injection).
 Utilities/services (Air, N2, steam, drains, vents, sewers, etc.).
2.1.2. Keywords
Keywords are words, which are hazard based or fault initiating
events which should stimulate identification of hazards when
applied to nodes. The hazard-based keywords are used as the basis
for discussing the following:
s Credibility or possible cause of the hazard.
s Qualitative consequences to operators, on-site workers and the
general public.
s Protection/mitigation measures, which could be provided to
either reduce the frequency of the hazardous event, mitigate
the consequences or manage the hazard.
s Once the full list of keywords has been examined for a particu-
lar node, the study proceeds to the next node, repeating the pro-
cess until all relevant nodes have been examined.
Many companies have modified the keywords and parameters
they use during HAZOP to better define the process that is to be
investigated. This is especially true in the nuclear industry, where
additional terms are required to evaluate the specific hazards due
to radiation (Gould et al., 2005). Examples of Hazard based
standard keywords:
s Fire/explosion
s Radiation/loss of shielding
s Airborne/surface contamination
s Loss of containment
s Wounding
s Impact/dropped loads
s Loss of services – power, air, ventilation
s etc.
2.1.3. Protection/mitigation measures
During the HAZOP study, the team will identify and record
those protection/mitigation measures, which are currently built
into the design or form normal practice at the NPP. The protec-
tion/mitigation measures will be divided into engineered
(e.g., structural, containment, shielding, cladding, glove boxes,
464 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
secondary containment, control and instrumentation, alarms and
trips, suppression systems, etc.) and operational/managerial
protection/mitigation measures (e.g., procedures, training, supervi-
sion, etc.).
The HAZOP team identifies engineered safety features, safety-
related equipment and safety management provisions for the plant
or modification. Recommendations are made to design or plant/
decommissioning management to prevent or mitigate the conse-
quences of a deviation through either design or procedural
changes. Actions may also be placed to ask for further information
or separate assessments.
After completion of the HAZOP study, a list of the identified
potential initiating events will be generated, and their outcome
will be summarized in the Fault Schedule (Fig. 2).
A Fault Schedule should be included of all the hazards and fault/
accident conditions that are applicable to the decommissioning
activities; these may be grouped appropriately to reduce the num-
ber of scenarios that require analysis. The Fault Schedule will be an
input for accident analysis of selected design option during prepa-
ration of safety assessment report.
3. HAZOP application for the Ignalina NPP decommissioning
and dismantling projects
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) was an important part of
Lithuania’s Energy Sector since 1983 (Unit 1 – started operation
in 1983, Unit 2 – in 1987, design lifetime was envisage up to
2013 for Unit 1 and up to 2017 for Unit 2). The Ignalina NPP Unit
1 was shutdown at the end of 2004, while Unit 2 was shut down
at the end of 2009. As a result of the political dialog leading up
to EU enlargement, Lithuania agreed to the early decommissioning
of its reactors.
According to the INPP Final Decommissioning Plan, the INPP
decommissioning process is split into several dismantling and
decontamination (D & D) projects. Each of these D & D projects cov-
ers a particular field of activity, for example, initial primary circuit
decontamination or dismantling of equipment using ‘‘room by
room” or ‘‘system by system” approach (Babilas et al., 2015).
HAZOP
Record hazard/ YES
consequences, suggest
mitigation measures
NOT SURE
FAULT SCHEDULE
Fig. 2. HAZOP approach.
Lithuanian Energy Institute participated in two projects
devoted to decontamination and dismantling (D & D) of the Igna-
lina NPP equipment:
s INPP building 117/1 decontamination and dismantling project
development.
s INPP building V1 equipment decontamination and dismantling
design development.
The objective of Ignalina NPP D & D Engineering Projects was
the development of an optimal dismantling and decontamination
strategy of the equipment and preparation of all documentation
required for implementation of this strategy.
3.1. Ignalina NPP building 117/1 decontamination and dismantling
The function of building 117/1 is to house the Pressurized Tanks
of the Emergency Core Cooling System, Helium Storage Facility and
auxiliary systems and equipment. After shutdown of the reactor of
Ignalina NPP Unit 1, the high pressure part of the Emergency Core
Cooling System (ECCS) and the Helium Make-up Station, located in
building 117/1, have become redundant and are no longer needed,
neither for safety nor for operational purposes; therefore, they
were dismantled.
The dismantling and decontamination of the equipment within
building 117/1 was heavily based on the experience in similar pro-
jects throughout Europe. For implementing the entire building
117/1 dismantling and decontamination process, the following
tools and installations were required:
s Workshop facility.
s Equipment for decontamination.
s Electric overhead crane.
s Vessel cutting equipment.
s Pipe cutting equipment.
s Handling equipment.
s Ventilation equipment & mobile filter unit.
s Monitoring equipment.
Divide system into nodes
Select the node
Apply all keywords in NO
turn. Any hazards/
operational problems
occurs?
 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
In order to allow the final size reduction and decontamination
processes to be carried out with minimal risk of airborne activity
release and spread of contamination, a new containment structure
within building 117/1 was constructed to house the size reduction,
decontamination workshop and monitoring area.
According to the building 117/1 D & D Basic Design, the main
characteristics of the preferred D & D Strategy were identified as
below:
s In-situ size reduction followed by decontamination.
s ECCS vessel cutting by oxy-acetylene.
s Large pipe/valve cutting by ‘tool kit’ of techniques.
s Small pipes/fabrications cutting by ‘tool kit’ of techniques.
s Decontamination by manually deployed vacuum abrasive
blasting.
Details of the cutting process of ECCS vessels are shown in
Fig. 3.
Whereas upper and lower dished end sections of the ECCS
vessels were cut manually and removed piece by piece, the cutting
of the cylindrical tank section was carried out using the remotely
controlled torch/tractor system. Several ring sections were cut-off
sequentially in the same order.
3.2. Ignalina NPP building V1 decontamination and dismantling
One of the first buildings to undergo decommissioning was
Ignalina NPP building V1 (Fig. 4). Building V1 is dedicated to the
location of significant sections of the reactor auxiliary systems
including: the Reactor Gas Circuit, the Off-gas Clean-up System,
the Main Circulation Circuit Maintenance Cooling Tank System,
different elements of the Ventilation Systems and part of the Emer-
gency Core Cooling System as well as related auxiliary equipment.
Fig. 3. ECCS vessel dismantling.
465
Most of building V1 equipment and components were not needed
following the Reactor Final Shutdown and after Reactor Defuelling.
For building V1 D & D, the preference was for manual cutting
techniques that minimize secondary waste. The cold-cutting tech-
niques were favoured where appropriate to reduce the need for
Mobile filtration units and ventilation modifications as required
by hot cutting techniques. Combination of plasma arc and cold cut-
ting techniques were used to cut the large items (tanks, vessels,
etc.). For dismantling and subsequent size reduction of large
(thicker walled) plant items (including vessels), a number of tech-
niques have been considered in the development of options,
namely plasma cutting, flame cutting, shears, diamond wire saws,
circular saws and band saws. In line with previous building 117/1
D & D project, a ‘toolbox’ of standard techniques was used for some
items such as small pipes. Such a ‘toolbox’ would typically contain
the following techniques, e.g., hydraulic shears, reciprocating saws,
electric nibblers, angle grinders, etc. Hot cutting was generally pre-
ferred for thick-walled materials, such as vessels, tanks and filters.
3.3. Identifying and analyzing the hazards for D & D tasks of Ignalina
NPP buildings 117/1 and V1
Decommissioning of INPP buildings involved different types of
activities, tools, equipment and systems. There was a potential
for a wide range of radiological and industrial hazards during
various stages of these buildings decommissioning projects creat-
ing risk for workers and environment. The occurrence of hazards
was possible due to many different operations involving move-
ment and handling of large pieces of equipment and contaminated
items. In addition, size reduction and decontamination processes
are capable of producing hazards. The main difference was that
the main part of the equipment to be dismantled belonged to the
ECCS vessels and was located almost in one area of building
466 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471

Fig. 4. Panorama of the Ignalina NPP site and location of building V1.

117/1, while building V1 of INPP was a complex facility with over 3.4. INPP buildings D & D HAZOP steps (nodes)
200 rooms housing several auxiliary systems for Unit 1.
Accumulated experience of the Lithuanian Energy Institute The buildings V1 and 117/1 were assessed by separating the
experts in preparation of safety analysis for operating the NPP plant and equipment into functional nodes, each of which cover
was successfully adopted for the development of D & D works a subset of common issues and D & D strategy. These nodes were
safety assessment at the Ignalina NPP. In addition to the existing then analyzed in turn by the application of a set of keywords to
safety assessment practice, HAZOP method for the identification each node.
and evaluation of potential hazards, raised due to proposed D & The nodes considered in the INPP D & D HAZOP studies are
D activities in INPP buildings, was used. listed in Table 1.
It shall be justified that all worst emergency cases raised by the
proposed D & D technology are identified, and possible conse- 3.5. INPP buildings D & D HAZOP keywords
quences are analyzed. The HAZOP procedure was applied for this
purpose for the Ignalina NPP building 117/1 and V1 D & D projects. HAZOP studies for Ignalina NPP buildings D & D projects
HAZOP for Ignalina NPP D & D projects was organized in a series involved the application of defined keywords to the design in order
of meetings involving different experts related to the planned to prompt a discussion that identified principal hazards (initiating
activities and responsible for the radiation and industrial protec- events) and operability issues. This enabled their elimination and
tion, operational activities, etc. The basic concepts were relayed the specification of protective measures. The standard HAZOP
to the HAZOP team as presentations, supported by original system keywords conventionally used for decommissioning operating
drawings from the Ignalina NPP. tasks were used and are listed in Table 2.
The main objectives of these HAZOP Studies for Ignalina NPP D
& D projects were as follows:
3.6. INPP buildings D & D hazards identified at HAZOP studies
s Provide an identification of principal hazards.
The following main hazards with potentially significant conse-
s Identify potential hazard management strategies for addressing
quences associated with the Ignalina NPP building 117/1 and V1
the principal hazards.
D & D activities were identified by means of hazard and operability
s Identify operability issues, which need to be resolved.
(HAZOP) studies:
Buildings of Ignalina NPP are complex facilities with many
s Dropped heavy loads creating a risk of structural damage,
rooms housing several auxiliary systems for Unit 1. Therefore, it
airborne activity releases, worker injury or fatality, damage to
was proposed that the HAZOP studies would examine generic
live essential services.
aspects of the INPP buildings decontamination and dismantling,
s Dropped highly contaminated items, i.e., filters, waste drums
which are applicable to all the systems and to most of the rooms,
resulting in release of airborne contamination.
and specific aspects only relevant to certain systems. It was consid-
s Loss of ventilation. Mobile filtering units (MFUs) and fume
ered impractical to apply a HAZOP study to every room, as there
extract units (FEUs) are intended to maintain a safe working
are many common features both between the rooms and between
environment in localized containment areas during D & D oper-
the auxiliary systems. It is clearly impractical and unnecessary to
ations, removing combustion gases and minimizing the spread
consider operations in each individual room in the building, as this
of airborne contamination. Loss of ventilation can lead to oper-
would involve considerable time and much repetition.
ator asphyxiation, exceeding safe concentration limits for
The studies were carried out as a desk top by the HAZOP task
airborne toxic material, increased radiological internal dose
leader. The HAZOP studies have allowed performing a systematic,
and potential for spread of contamination.
comprehensive examination of potential hazards that may repre-
s Loss of containment, damage to local containment tenting,
sent risks to personnel and equipment. Reasonably foreseeable
failure to deploy temporary covers on pipe-work and vessels
hazards, initiating events and scenarios associated with planned
during cutting.
Ignalina NPP D & D activities were considered and identified.
 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
Table 2
Ignalina NPP D & D projects, HAZOP study keywords.
1. External dose 14. Wastes
2. Internal dose 15. Corrosion and erosion
3. Shielding 16. Associated facilities
4. Containment 17. Extreme weather, wind,
temperature, flooding
5. Ventilation 18. Seismic
6. Fire 19. Toxicity
7. Explosion and overpressure 20. Dropped loads, impacts
8. Chemical reaction 21. Conventional hazards
9. Maintainability 22. Access
10. Remote handling 23. Environmental impact
11. Loss of services: power, steam, 24. Control and instrumentation
water, compressed air
12. Operator error 25. Communications
13. Effluents: gaseous, liquid 26. Domino effects
The HAZOP team considered the issues and consequences in turn as appropriate. All
protection/mitigation measures required to prevent the hazard or mitigate the
consequences were recorded during INPP buildings D & D HAZOP meetings.
s Failure/malfunction of building ventilation system can lead to
overpressure of building and potential uncontrolled release of
airborne activity through building structural leakages into
adjoining facilities and to the environment.
s Fire/explosion. Use of hot cutting technique potentially intro-
duces fire/explosion hazards.
Hazards arising from industrial accidents, loss of operational
services, human error and organisational failures not resulting in
radiological consequences are controlled and mitigated by Ignalina
NPP site procedures and adequate work planning.
3.7. INPP buildings D & D safety measures
The emphasis of Ignalina NPP D & D HAZOP studies was on
consideration of practical measures to prevent, protect from and
mitigate hazards identified in the study while addressing the exist-
ing protection/mitigation measures and potential for additional
safety measures.
A number of safety measures have been identified in order to
satisfy the ALARA principle throughout the D & D operations in
buildings 117/1 and V1:
s The caps were welded on the open pipelines to avoid any
possibly of contaminated water leaking from the pipe-work.
s Improved sealing of existing bulkhead in the pipe tunnel in
order to minimize the concentration of airborne activity and
control spread of contamination.
s Polyethylene sheet and adhesive tape was used to seal openings
into components to avoid contamination spread (e.g., floor
cleaning after dismantling work, use of tacky mats in entry
tents, etc.).
s Ventilation systems were provided the necessary air changes to
reduce the risk of high concentrations of toxic gases, metallic
fume and airborne activity. Localized mobile ventilation
systems with HEPA filtration were used to supplement the
existing buildings 117/1 and V1 ventilation system.
s Catch pot at the bottom of the vessel to catch the hot cutting slag
and particulate falling inside the vessel and thus avoid blockage
of the ventilation flow route from the vessel were used.
s Personal dosimeters, portable area gamma alarms and portable air
monitoring units for continuous monitoring of gas and airborne
activity at occupied work areas with alarm function were used.
s Appropriate use of personal protection equipment (respiratory
protection and safety measures to protect the face and hands).
s Emergency access and egress routes (including revised signage,
emergency lighting, crash bar fire exit door to external area).
467
s Protection of live cables and operational systems in cutting
areas to prevent damage.
s Control of equipment, tools and waste containers to ensure that
they are certified, tested and adequately identified.
s All activities were done according to approved procedures,
under direct management of work supervisor.
Also, it was assumed that the managerial protection and mitiga-
tion will include, but not be confined to, the following generic
requirements:
s Operator training.
s Use of suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP).
s Use of approved procedures and site instructions.
s Compliance with Lithuanian regulations.
The purpose of the HAZOP studies was to identify faults and
consequent hazards in support of the Ignalina NPP buildings
117/1 and V1 equipment Decontamination and Dismantling
Design Development and Safety Justification Reports; therefore,
the identified potential initiating events and their outcome were
qualitatively presented in the Fault Schedule of SJR. The Fault
Schedule also includes events and faults having non-radiological
consequences, e.g., the release of toxic fume, and identifies the
safety measures to be provided. From the findings of the fault iden-
tification study, it was possible to identify the bounding case fault
sequences, which can potentially lead to the worst case radiologi-
cal consequences.
4. HAZOP application in feasibility study for the management of
Bohunice V1 NPP primary circuit components
The obtained experience of LEI experts in conduction of HAZOP
studies for the assessment of the proposed D & D methods for Igna-
lina NPP building decommissioning was successfully adopted for
the development of Feasibility Study for the Management of Bohu-
nice V1 NPP primary circuit components.
Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant with two reactor units
(type VVER 440/V 230) (see Fig. 5) was constructed according to
a Russian design in the period from 1973 to 1977. Initial criticality
at Units 1 and 2 was reached in 1978 and 1980, respectively. In the
90-s, an extensive reconstruction of the plant was performed
aimed at increasing its nuclear and radiation safety with the
objective to reach the worldwide acceptable level of nuclear safety
at the time. Nevertheless, afterwards in relation to Slovakia’s
access to the EU, the government of the Slovak Republic in its
resolution decided on the premature shutdown of the V1 NPP
and approved the dates for Units 1 and 2 shutdown (2006 and
2008, respectively).
The objective of Feasibility Study for the Management of V1 NPP
primary circuit components was to identify, analyze, justify and
rank alternative solutions towards the dismantling and manage-
ment of the large components of the two units of Bohunice V1
NPP Primary Circuit included in the following list:
s Reactor pressure vessel (RPV)
s Reactor internal structures (RIS)
s Main circulation pipelines and main circulation pumps
s Steam generators
s Main gate valves
s Pressurizer and pressurized tank
s Annular water tank (AWT)
s Mogilnik, etc.
This Feasibility Study included the development and screening
of alternatives, and a detailed evaluation of alternative actions
468 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
Fig. 5. The view on objects at Bohunice site.
towards the dismantling and waste management of V1 large
components. Description of V1 NPP primary circuit equipment
management alternatives is presented in Section 4.1.
Application of HAZOP study to the management of Bohunice V1
NPP primary circuit components was used in assessment of each
alternative with respect to overall protection of human health
and the environment criterion. Methods of alternatives assessment
and results of HAZOP Study formed the framework for alternatives
analysis.
4.1. Identifying and analyzing the hazards for decommissioning tasks
of Bohunice V1 NPP
A detailed analysis of V1 NPP primary circuit equipment man-
agement alternatives was performed, which comprised individual
and comparative analysis of the alternatives. Highly activated
and contaminated waste requires completely different treatment
and final disposal (storage); therefore, its management alternatives
are developed separately. V1 NPP primary circuit includes the
following activated equipment, such as RPV, reactor internals,
shielding assemblies, annular water tank. Contaminated equip-
ment consists of steam generators, main circulation pumps, main
circulation circuit pipes, etc. This kind of equipment does not con-
tain activated metal but only surface contamination.
Alternatives for management of primary circuit components
were developed based on high-level scenarios and technical
options. Alternatives were compiled using uniform approach to
combination of feasible options and scenarios for different kind
of equipment. After screening, three alternatives remained for
activated equipment. Four alternatives developed for contami-
nated equipment cover full range of feasible waste management
possibilities. These three alternatives for activated equipment
management (Alternatives A) and four alternatives for contami-
nated waste management (Alternatives C) were analyzed:
 Alternative A1: Dismantling of whole activated equipment,
placement of the RIS into the RPV, decay storage.
 Alternative A2: Dismantling of whole activated equipment,
placement of the RIS partly into the RPV, partly into shielding
containers, decay storage.
 Alternative A3: Fragmentation of activated equipment, separa-
tion and decay storage of MLW.
 Alternative C1: Dismantling of whole contaminated equipment
and disposal in whole.
 Alternative C2: Dismantling of whole contaminated equipment
with subsequent fragmentation and decontamination in a sepa-
rate facility.
 Alternative C3: Dismantling of contaminated equipment in
large fragments with subsequent fragmentation and decontam-
ination in a separate facility.
 Alternative C4: Complete in-situ fragmentation of contami-
nated equipment and decontamination using other facilities.
Individual analysis included evaluation of each alternative
against a set of criteria. The following criteria for alternatives
assessment have been identified:Criterion 1. Short and long-term
Client’s Policy and Criteria.Criterion 2. Overall Protection of Human
Health and the Environment.Criterion 3. Compliance with Applica-
ble or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements.Criterion 4. Long-
term effectiveness and permanence.Criterion 5. Reduction of
volume.Criterion 6. Short-term effectiveness.Criterion 7. Technical
and administrative implementability.Criterion 8. Cost.
The alternatives have been individually analyzed against each
criterion and then compared against one another to determine
their respective strengths and weaknesses and to identify the key
trade-offs that must be balanced for the site. For each criterion,
an evaluation method including qualitative and quantitative
parameters was developed. The evaluation was performed using
the developed method. Evaluation results included both numerical
values, like volume, dose, cost, and qualitative estimates using five-
grade ‘‘low–fair–medium–good–excellent” scale. Comparative
analysis included mapping scores of the alternatives to the numer-
ical 1–100 scale, weighting the criteria and final calculation. The
results of final calculation are provided in Table 3 and Fig. 6 below.
Detailed analysis of alternatives was a final step in developing
of alternative solutions for the management of Large Components
of Primary Circuits of two Units of V1 NPP and providing the
decision-makers with sufficient information on high ranked alter-
native solutions, resulting from their comparative analysis, in order
to justify their acceptance for implementation.
 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
Table 3
Results of comparative analysis.
Alternative A1 A2 A3 C1 C2 C3
Total benefit 65.7 63.5 81.3 57.9 73.4 84.8
Fig. 6. Results of comparative analysis.
HAZOP study in Feasibility Study for the Management of V1 NPP
primary circuit components (PCC) was applied in the assessment
and ranking of individual alternatives with respect to overall pro-
tection of human health and the environment criterion. Overall
protection of human health and the environment addresses
whether the alternative provides adequate protection and this
criterion describes how risks are eliminated, reduced, or controlled
through treatment, engineering controls, or institutional controls.
HAZOP workshop with a team consisting of consortium experts,
plant operators, engineers, managers and others, some of whom
were familiar with the facilities, was prepared and conducted in
the initial assessment phase of the Feasibility Study. The main
hazards, their contributory causes and appropriate safety measures
were identified by means of HAZOP studies during INPP buildings
D & D projects.
HAZOP study considered each element or sequence (‘‘Node”) of
the alternative and involved the application of Keywords in order
to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to per-
sonnel or equipment. List of nodes for each alternative in HAZOP
study for the Management of V1 NPP PCC is provided in Table 4.
For each Node under consideration, the appropriate keyword
(Table 5) was applied to prompt discussion of the alternative
intent. The team considered the issues and consequences in turn
as appropriate.
A summary of Individual Analysis results was developed based
on the performed assessments and the results of HAZOP study. The
acceptability and performance of each node against the Overall
protection of human health and the environment criterion were
evaluated individually so that relative strengths and weaknesses
are identified. Any protection/mitigation measures required to
prevent the hazard or mitigate the consequences were recorded.
4.1.1. Hazards and Safety Measures from ‘‘Nodes” of the alternatives
with respect to overall protection of human health and the
environment criterion
Individual Evaluation of Nodes of the alternatives against
overall protection of human health and the environment criterion
is presented in this chapter. Assessment against the criterion of
Overall Protection of Human Health is categorized as a threshold
criterion. This threshold criterion must be satisfied in order for
an alternative to be eligible for selection.
469
There is a risk of external and internal exposures for the opera-
tion personnel when handling the radioactive materials; therefore,
C4 non-presence of personnel at the reactor hall during activated
90.7 equipment (e.g., RPV, RIS) handling and transfer is required. Spread
of contamination, asphyxiation, drop of loads, pipe whip, heat and
sparks, both of which are potential fire or burn hazards during acet-
ylene cutting, structural failures are additional potential hazards.
As barriers for preventing human exposure and/or spread of
radioactive materials to the environment under management of
V1 NPP PCC protective shields with varying wall thickness (depends
on the dose rate), portable screens, heavy protective containers,
weld-on metal stoppers (plugs), double protective lids, etc. are
employed.
Other precautions for mitigating the hazards associated with a
PCC dismantling operations are listed below:
s Crane, hoisting units and a special lifting traverse to be
employed for lifting heavy components (e.g., RPV) and for open-
ing apertures. Remote control for crane for exact positioning as
well as additional crane load capacity check are needed to
decrease the risk of working environment hazards.
s Lifting systems must have auxiliary power or protections in
case of power loss.
s Remotely controlled mechanical cutting to be used to avoid
high dose rate.
s Use of high-resolution cameras for remote monitoring of dis-
mantling operations shall be required. Visual system of position-
ing, visual control of stropping after cutting, visual control on the
work with manipulator decrease working environment hazards.
s The welding operation must be carried out in accordance with
safety procedures. The work must be carried out under close
supervision.
s Fire alarms and firefighting equipment are fully operational.
s Fume extraction unit with spark arrester shall be employed for
extraction and filtration of welding fume.
s HEPA filtered vacuum cleaners were used to collect cutting
waste, dust and dirt.
s As a result of building ventilation system with additional MFU,
suitable conditions were created for work of operational
personnel and equipment, prevention of contamination spread-
ing, provision of air filtration, check-up and organized discharge
of air, which could be contaminated by radioactive aerosols.
s Protective tent connected to the ventilation system was
arranged to prevent concrete dust from spreading.
s Temporary coverings (tents) for building door opening were
employed to reduce spread of airborne contamination.
s Proper personnel protective equipment (eye protection; long-
sleeved clothing; sturdy, full length pants; steel-toed boots or
shoes; hearing protection; and safety gloves) must be used to
avoid exposure to workers during the handling of impacted
materials.
s Personal air samplers were issued to personnel working on dust
producing tasks.
Conventional safety is highly significant during PCC dismantling
operations, e.g., apertures in walls have to be closed; fixing pipes to
prevent their inadvertent shifting; marking cutting lines; checking
welding points; no people in cutting area during tank cutting into
fragments using a cable saw (entering the shaft only when cutting
is stopped); no work underneath suspended loads; collection of
asbestos in a special box, etc.
Specific precautionary measures for working at height must be
ensured, e.g., workers shall be required to wear suitably anchored
lanyards with harnesses and fall arrestors. Double- checking work
operations will be used as a proactive principle for decreasing the
risk of human errors.
470 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471

Table 4
List of nodes for each alternative in HAZOP study for the management of V1 NPP PCC.

Alternative Node Node short description

Alternative A1 – Dismantling of whole activated equipment, RPV-1 Disconnection of the RPV from all process communications
placement of the RIS into the RPV, decay storage RPV-2 The RPV is slung and transferred to the transport corridor and anchored in the
vertical position on the platform
RPV-3 Cutting upper part of Protective Tube Unit
RPV-4 The RIS are emplaced inside the RPV
RPV-5 The RPV is lowered onto the platform with the aid of additional hoisting
mechanisms
AWT-1 Fixation of the AWT
AWT-2 In-situ fragmentation of the AWT
Alternative A2 – Dismantling of whole activated equipment, RPV-1 Disconnection of the RPV from all process communications
placement of the RIS partly into the RPV, partly into shielding RPV-2 The RPV is slung and transferred to the transport corridor and anchored in the
containers, decay storage vertical position on the platform
RPV-4 The RIS are emplaced inside the RPV
AWT-1 Fixation of the AWT
AWT-2 In-situ fragmentation of the AWT
Alternative A3 – Fragmentation of activated equipment, separation RPV-1 Disconnection of the RPV from all process communications
and decay storage of MLW RPV-2* The RPV is slung and transferred into the SG-MCP bay
RPV-6 RPV and RIS fragmentation into fragments
AWT-1 Fixation of the AWT
AWT-2 In-situ fragmentation of the AWT
Alternative C1 – Dismantling of whole contaminated equipment and SG-1 Disconnection of SG from process communications
disposal in whole SG-2 SG is dragged under the aperture
SG-3 SG is removed through an aperture and transferred to the transport corridor and
anchored on the platform
MG-1 Demolishing of concrete
MG-2 Dismantling of pipes
Alternative C2 – Dismantling of whole contaminated equipment with SG-1 Disconnection of SG from process communications
subsequent fragmentation and decontamination in a separate SG-2 SG is dragged under the aperture
facility SG-3 SG is removed through an aperture and transferred to the transport corridor and
anchored on the platform
Alternative C3 – Dismantling of contaminated equipment in large SG-1 Disconnection of SG from process communications
fragments with subsequent fragmentation and decontamination in SG-5 Cutting SG at their regular position into large fragments
a separate facility
Alternative C4 – Complete in-situ fragmentation of contaminated SG-1 Disconnection of SG from process communications
equipment and decontamination using other facilities SG-6 Cutting SG at their regular position into small fragments
*
Difference for node RPV-2 in Alternative A3 is that in case of A3, the RPV is transferred into the SG-MCP bay instead of the transport corridor (Alternatives A1 and A2).

Table 5
D7.1 project, HAZOP study keywords.
decommissioning project, creating risk for workers and environ-
ment. The identification of the hazards and the analysis of their
Direct radiation Contamination evolution should be carried out using an appropriate technique.
Dispersion Fire
Explosion Gas generation
In the nuclear industry, HAZOP method is used rather often.
Flooding Handling The paper presented the application of HAZOP technique at two
Missiles Chemical/toxic different decommissioning stages:
Utilities Degradation/aging
Maintenance faults Operational faults
- for identification of the hazards raised due to dismantling and
Interfacing (Domino effect) Extreme weather
External fire Seismic decontamination activities in Ignalina NPP buildings after justi-
Communication – fication of the preferred D & D Strategy and
- in feasibility study for the management of Bohunice V1 NPP
primary circuit components.

The purpose of the INPP building D & D HAZOP studies was to

The adherence to the ALARA principles of restricted time for
operation; distance and shielding will underpin dismantling oper-
ations of V1 NPP primary circuit components and will protect
workers (PPE, monitoring of activity levels). Environmental
impacts, which may result in the uncontrolled release of radioac-
tive material to the environment, are not expected under V1 NPP
PCC dismantling operations. There is no evidence of contaminated
effluents or leakage of radioactive material.
5. Conclusions
Decommissioning of NPPs involves different types of activities,
tools, equipment and systems. There is a potential for a wide range
of radiological and industrial hazards during various stages of NPPs
identify faults and consequent hazards in support of the SJR devel-
opment. Identified potential initiating events and their outcome
were qualitatively presented in the Fault Schedules of SJR. Poten-
tial hazard management strategies have been determined. A num-
ber of safety measures have been identified in order to prevent
undue routine radiation exposures to the facility staff, public and
the environment according to the ALARA principle throughout
the INPP building D & D operations. These safety measures are
largely of a passive nature, i.e., controlled access, reduced exposure
times, provision of localized ventilated containments with HEPA
filters, continuous gas and airborne activity monitoring, shielding,
operational measures to reduce operator error and personal pro-
tection equipment, decontamination equipment preventing spread
of contaminated dust, etc.
 S. Rimkevičius et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 94 (2016) 461–471
Application of HAZOP study to the management of Bohunice V1
NPP primary circuit components was used in assessment of each
alternative with respect to overall protection of human health
and the environment criterion. Methods of alternatives assessment
and results of HAZOP Study formed the framework for alternatives
analysis. According to HAZOP study, the major risks to come are
those resulting from the activities of dismantling and removal of
large-size and highly activated and contaminated primary circuit
components from their current protective structures, the relevant
doses and potential releases to the environment, as well as indus-
trial hazards related to the operations with the heavy components,
including their handling and transportation.
The adherence to the ALARA principles of time, distance and
shielding underpins operations of V1 NPP primary circuit equip-
ment management alternatives and protects workers (PPE, moni-
toring of activity levels, etc.). Environmental impacts, which may
result in the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the
environment, are not expected under these operations. There is
no evidence of contaminated effluents or leakage of radioactive
material.
Individual and comparative analysis of alternatives for manage-
ment of Bohunice V1 NPP primary circuit components provided a
well-grounded basis for decision makers to choose the best
solution for decommissioning of V1 NPP.
Acknowledgement
Dismantling and Decontamination projects B9-0 and B9-2 at
the Ignalina NPP referred to in the paper were grant funded by
471
the EBRD-managed Ignalina International Decommissioning Sup-
port Fund (IIDSF).
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