Globalizations

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Contextualizing corporate control in the agrifood

and extractive sectors

Jennifer Clapp & Joseph Purugganan

To cite this article: Jennifer Clapp & Joseph Purugganan (2020): Contextualizing corporate control
in the agrifood and extractive sectors, Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1783814

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GLOBALIZATIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1783814

Contextualizing corporate control in the agrifood and extractive

sectors
a
Jennifer Clapp and Joseph Puruggananb
a
School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada; bFocus on the Global
South Philippine Office, Diliman Quezon City, Philippines

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Corporations have gained enormous power and influence in recent decades as Transnational corporations
mergers and acquisitions in just about every sector of the global economy have (TNCs); corporate power;
given rise to mega-sized companies that influence almost every aspect of our agriculture; mining;
resistance movements
lives. In this contribution, we examine the rise of corporate concentration and
control in two key sectors – agriculture and extractives – where in recent
years consolidation has accelerated due to a combination of technological
change, weakening state regulation and financial pressures, leaving these
sectors largely controlled by just a handful of giant players. Corporate
concentration and control in these sectors has important consequences,
contributing to heightened inequality, environmental harm, and human
rights violations. This paper reflects on the strategies of civil society and
social movements in contesting extreme consolidation and corporate power.
It calls for a multiscale approach that restores the regulatory powers of states
and reestablishes people’s sovereignty on a broader scale.

Introduction
Corporate concentration has gripped the global economy over recent decades in ways that have not
been seen since the early 1900s, when large firms controlled by J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller were
dominant. Recent media headlines have been replete with examples of high profile mergers among
some of the world’s largest firms, and the acquisition of smaller firms by larger ones takes place on a
regular basis. As a result of these corporate tie-ups, we are witnessing the rise of truly giant global
firms that pull the strings that shape a range of key economic sectors. From food and agriculture
to the extractive sector, the economic activity that these corporations control has enormous impact
on the lives and livelihoods of billions of people around the world. As these firms amass an ever
greater share of the global market in their respective sectors, there has been growing concern
about the ways in which their power contributes to widening inequality, threatens human rights
and the environment, and undermines democratic governance.
Mapping the landscape of corporate control, its consequences, and strategies for resistance was
identified by the participants of the Siena dialogue as important initial steps in the overall project,
as corporate dominance is a key feature of the global economy that the People’s Sovereignty process
seeks to dismantle. From the outset, the idea of this paper was to bring together a broader analytical
outlook on corporate power in the global economy from an academic perspective with analysis

CONTACT Jennifer Clapp jclapp@uwaterloo.ca

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 J. CLAPP AND J. PURUGGANAN

grounded in civil society and social movement struggles against corporate control on the ground.
Both authors brought insights on how corporate power can be addressed in policy and governance
from these different angles. This paper thus represents a co-creation of ideas and analysis that brings
these two perspectives together, drawing on concrete examples from our own areas of expertise,
including the agrifood and extractive sectors.
We first provide an outline of the nature of corporate dominance in society today, with specific
reference to the key sectors mentioned above: food systems and the extractive industry. We also pro-
vide an evaluation of some of the key impacts of this rising corporate concentration, in particular the
ways in which it contributes to broader trends of inequality in the global economy today, its potential
to harm human rights and environment, and its political implications that have seen growing cor-
porate capture of policy and governance processes. Finally, we consider the ways in which resistance
movements can fight against corporate power, calling for a multiscale approach that restores the
regulatory powers of states and re-establishes people’s sovereignty.

The nature of corporate dominance in society today

Ever larger corporate giants have settled in across a range of sectors in the global economy in recent
decades. The number of mergers and acquisitions globally has risen from approximately 10,000 per
year in 1992 to approximately 50,000 per year by 2018 (Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alli-
ances (IMAA), 2018). As the number of mergers has grown, so has the annual value of merger and
acquisition deals. Between 1992 and 2018, the value of these deals at the global scale has increased
from approximately US$ 500 billion to approximately US$ 4 trillion. Not surprisingly, the number of
publicly listed firms listed on the stock exchange has fallen, signalling that the economy is dominated
by fewer, larger firms. In the US, for example, the number of publicly listed companies dropped from
nearly 7000 in 1997 to approximately 3500 in 2013, and a similar pattern has occurred in Europe. As
firms consolidated and became larger, their profits and average revenues climbed by a factor of three
(Foroohar, 2018; Guinea & Erixon, 2019; The Economist, 2016a).
In the global food and agriculture sector, mergers and consolidation have been occurring on an
ever larger scale since the 1980s and 1990s. With the advent of the genetic modification of seeds,
mergers and acquisitions in the sector heated up, seeing global seed companies join in arms with
global agrochemical companies, as these industries became ever more enmeshed with one another
as genetically modified seeds were increasingly altered to be resistant to specific brands of herbicides
(Glover, 2010). In the 1990s and early 2000s, for example, Monsanto purchased over 30 firms, while
other large corporations in the sector also made similar acquisitions. By 2010, the six largest com-
panies in the sector controlled 75% of the US$ 54 billion pesticide industry, and 62% of the US$ 39
billion global seed market (ETC Group, 2015).
Starting in 2015, a new round of mergers shook up the sector, with the six leading firms eventually
being reduced to just four. In this period, Dow and DuPont announced their merger in late 2015,
quickly followed by the announcement of the purchase of Syngenta by Chinese chemical giant
ChemChina. The following year, Bayer announced its purchase of Monsanto. These deals were com-
pleted over the course of 2017 and 2018, leaving a situation where just four agrochemical giants con-
trol 70% of the global pesticide market and the top four seed firms control 67% of the global seed
market (Clapp, 2018; International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES Food),
2017; Mooney, 2018). Concentration in the food and agriculture sector goes beyond seeds and
chemicals, as we have seen growing consolidation among the top firms all along agrifood supply
chains in recent years, from the farm equipment sector, to the fertilizer industry, to commodity
 GLOBALIZATIONS 3

trading, to processing and distribution and retail. The market share of the top four firms in each of
these segments of agrifood supply chains is highly concentrated (Howard, 2016).
In the mining and extractive sector, multi-billion dollar mega deals among the biggest transna-
tional mining corporations have characterized the development of the industry for decades. One
of the most recent mergers and also one of the biggest in history was the consolidation of China’s
two largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – the Shenhua Group and the China Guodian Corpor-
ation – in November 2017. The deal, which was valued at almost US$ 273bn, created the China
Energy Investment Corporation, now one of the biggest players in coal mining, thermal power,
renewable energy, and coal-to-liquid conversion industries. This latest mega-sized mining merger
is only the latest in a broader pattern of consolidation. Just a few years earlier, the acquisition by
Glencore, for example, one of the largest mining companies (Forbes, 2019), of Anglo-Swiss mining
company Xstrata in 2013 ‘created one of the world’s largest natural resources conglomerates, with a
combined workforce of 190,000 people across 50 nations, and a portfolio of 90 commodities, includ-
ing copper, barley, oil, and vanadium’ (Husseini, 2018). In 2017, over 500 such mergers and acqui-
sitions were reported in the sector valued at around US$65.37 billion, 40 percent of which where in
the Asia-Pacific region and China (Ernst and Young, 2018).
There are number of factors that account for the surge in corporate consolidation and power in
recent years, not just in the agrifood and extractive industry, but also more broadly. One of these is
the nature and pace of technological change in the global economy. Recent research shows that
industries in which rapid technological progress is occurring tend to be correlated with larger
firm size and sector concentration (Autor et al., 2017). Technological change in recent years has
been increasingly connected to the rise of computer based digital infrastructure and intellectual
property protections. This has meant that the power of firms that rely on digital and software devel-
opments can benefit from their ability to lock others out of the marketplace as they grow in size
(Katz, 2019; Khan, 2017).
In the food and agriculture sector, technology has been important in explaining consolidation, as
technological advances are protected by intellectual property rights, enshrined in global trade rules
under the World Trade Organization (WTO), that enable the largest firms to exclude other market
players from capitalizing on technological innovations. As food and agriculture firms increasingly
dive into digital technologies to drive innovation in the sector, such as through digital farming
and genome editing, the power of these firms to exclude competitors and grow in size only increases
(Clapp & Ruder, 2020).
In the case of mining and the extractive industry, portfolio management remains the key driver of
consolidation, under a more divestment-led outlook where ‘diversified producers looked to divest
those assets no longer considered core to the business’ (Ghosh, 2018). Industry analysts, however,
have also pointed to a trend towards a return to investment-led strategy. One factor identified
with this shift is technology. For example, growing interest and demand in electric vehicles (EVs),
partly in response to environmental regulations, has ignited investments into future supply of com-
modities used in battery technology. Companies that are producing EVs are now looking to invest in
mines producing these raw materials (Ernst and Young, 2018).
But technological innovation is also a big challenge for the mining industry, one that could also
drive and define future merger & acquisition decisions. Older and more established companies that
rely on proven technologies face declining productivity and higher costs. As a 2018 report of Inter-
national Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) states: ‘Companies need to address inefficien-
cies in their operations to stay competitive, while ensuring they maintain their social license to
operate’ (Corneau, 2018). Analysts have been pointing to the need to address an ‘innovation
4 J. CLAPP AND J. PURUGGANAN

deficit’ and are looking at how consolidation could bring about ‘sharper competencies at identifying,
testing, piloting, adopting and scaling new technologies at speed’ (Bryant & Gill, 2019).
But it is not just technological change that is driving consolidation in the global economy. Since
the 1990s, states have increasingly embraced neoliberal market policies that prioritize free markets
and shareholder value. As states have embraced a neoliberal agenda, they have increasingly retreated
from their regulatory role. In this context, we have seen a weakening of antitrust policies that pre-
viously had kept corporate consolidation under check. For example, in the early 1900s, the US
enacted competition laws that sought to reign in the political power of corporations by regulating
the structure of markets in ways that maintained competition. But over the course of the 1970s
and 1980s, these laws were weakened with the rise of neoliberalism (Khan, 2017; Wu, 2018). Instead
of competition policy looking out for the interests of smaller firms, US antitrust policy began to
prioritize consumer welfare. In other words, consolidation was tolerated, so long as it led to cheaper
prices for consumers. What this approach misses, however, is that as corporations grow bigger in size
and wipe out competitors, they can increasingly raise prices over time once they have a lock on the
marketplace. Similar trends have occurred in other countries around the world (Bartalevich, 2013;
Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2017).
Financial investment patterns have also played a role in consolidation in these sectors. As the
world economy has become more ‘financialized’ – with financial motives, markets, and institutions
increasingly driving change in the global economy (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2011) – institutional
investment patterns have influenced corporate decisions on mergers. There has been a huge rise
in institutional investment, for example, in index-based funds (that track performance of firms
within a sector), which has resulted in a massive influx of capital into some of the world’s largest
firms, giving them the funding and leverage to purchase their less well financed rivals (Clapp,
2019). These trends have also resulted in what is known as ‘common ownership’, where a small
group of large asset management companies – i.e. BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard, Fidelity and
Capital Group – now collectively constitute the largest shareholder in most of the world’s largest
publicly traded firms (Azar et al., 2018; Elhauge, 2016). The resulting pattern is one of double con-
centration, where a small group of financial investment firms are significant shareholders in a small
number of giant global companies.

Why corporate dominance matters

The rise of giant megacompanies across the global economy matters for a range of reasons. We can-
not assume that there are neutral impacts from corporate consolidation, as fewer players dominating
large markets typically results in increased power for those firms. This power can take a range of
forms, from structural power in the economy, to lobby power, to the power to shape discourse
and ideas in society more broadly (Fuchs, 2007). The recent surge in corporate consolidation has
raised concerns about the impact on equity, human rights and the environment, and political
control.
With respect to inequality and wealth concentration, there is growing research that indicates that
corporate consolidation and concentration encourages anticompetitive practices among firms, which
typically includes collusion among the dominant market players to shape markets and control prices
(Azar et al., 2018; Elhauge, 2016). Even mainstream economists have warned that corporate conso-
lidation can create distortions in markets that foster inefficiencies and other harmful effects on
society (Diez et al., 2018). There is also concern that these distortions can contribute to inequality
in the economy more broadly, not just domestically, but also globally (Khan & Vaheesan, 2017;
 GLOBALIZATIONS 5

Wu, 2018). If firms are able to increase prices without an associated increase and the quality of the
product or service, then the likely outcome is a massive transfer of wealth from citizen consumers to
giant corporations. This pattern of wealth transfer from the many to the few only fuels further
inequality.
Looking more closely at consolidation in the food and agriculture sector, it’s not hard to see how
increased corporate concentration can result in greater inequalities and threats to farmer livelihoods.
With fewer giant firms controlling a larger share of the seed market, for example, there are increased
opportunities for these firms to cooperate in terms of product offerings in ways that enable these
firms to have more power over seed pricing, which affects farmers’ bottom line by raising the cost
of their inputs. Higher input prices can spill over and be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher food prices, which further drives social inequalities. Corporate power in this sector, then,
directly threatens both the livelihoods of food producers and food security for society more broadly.
Consolidation in the sector also compromises product choice and farmer autonomy. As the global
seed market became more consolidated in recent decades, for example, the number of firms selling
seeds dropped dramatically, making non-genetically modified seeds increasingly scarce and difficult
for farmers to source (Howard, 2016). As a result, farmers are increasingly finding themselves stuck
on a GM technology treadmill from which it is difficult to exit. In response to the proposed merger of
Dow and DuPont back in 2015, a coalition of farmer and civil society groups highlighted this
dynamic, stating ‘the seed companies have fostered a dependence on seed and chemical cropping
systems with declining effectiveness – and the industry’s response has been to develop newer and
more expensive traits’ (American Antitrust Institute, Food & Water Watch and National Farmers
Union, 2016).
Human rights and the environment are also at risk as a result of growing corporate consolidation
and power. Destructive industries like mining, logging and agribusiness are driving attacks against
land and environmental rights defenders. According to Global Witness, ‘more than three people
were murdered each week in 2018, with countless more criminalized, for defending their land
and our environment’. The report also found that ‘mining was the deadliest sector’, being responsible
for 43 deaths (Global Witness, 2019). Deaths and conflicts related to water sources, agribusiness, log-
ging and hydropower also continued. Rural and indigenous women in particular have borne the
brunt of the extremes of corporate power. In the Philippines, a number of human rights violations
against indigenous women linked to mining activities have been reported. These range from displa-
cement brought about by land grabbing, loss of livelihoods and impacts on culture as a result of
environmental destruction, increased vulnerabilities to disasters, prostitution, domestic violence,
increased discrimination to enforced disappearances, threats and intimidations, and killings (Pasi-
mio, 2013).
Large-scale investments by private companies as well as state-owned enterprises are also among
the main drivers of land and resource grabbing. These in turn have fuelled land and resource confl-
icts that have pitted communities of farmers and indigenous peoples against large corporations. Over
the past decade and a half we have witnessed what the Transnational Institute (TNI) has referred to
as the Global Land Grab, a new wave of large-scale land acquisitions that are changing the nature of
land governance policies and causing severe negative impacts on rural communities (Transnational
Institute, 2012). Across the globe, over 2,300 cases of large-scale land acquisitions have been reported
as of October 2019 (Land Matrix, 2019).
The Environmental Justice Atlas has documented close to 3000 environmental conflicts around
the world ranging from displacement of communities due to environmental pollution and
6 J. CLAPP AND J. PURUGGANAN

destruction, loss of livelihoods, land grabbing, enforced disappearances, militarization and killings
(EJ Atlas, 2019).
Along with concentrating market power, corporate consolidation risks enhancing the political
power of mega-sized firms because it means less competition for their lobbyists who seek to influence
government policies. It is typically easier for fewer, larger firms to work together to lobby for com-
mon interests (Khan & Vaheesan, 2017). The amount of money funneled into corporate lobbying
generally increased markedly from 1997 to 2012 (The Economist, 2016b). In the US alone, for
example, lobbyists spend approximately US$2.6 billion annually to present their views and influence
policy in Washington, DC (Drutman, 2015). These firms can influence policy and governance not
just through direct lobbying activities, but also via their structural influence in the broader economy
and their ability to tap the media and public relations campaigns to shape discourse and ideas more
generally (Fuchs, 2007; Ruggie, 2018).
Corporate players in food and agriculture and the extractive sectors are very active in the lobbying
game. In the food and agriculture sector, for example, Monsanto spent close to US$7 million in 2013
to lobby the US government. In that same year, Syngenta and Dow spent approximately US$1.5
million and US$1 million, respectively (Open Secrets, 2013). Before Bayer purchased it, Monsanto’s
lobbying activities included advocating for the approval of Roundup Ready alfalfa and sugar beets,
fighting against GM labelling, and pushing for a congressional caucus on ‘modern agriculture’
(Union of Concerned Scientists, 2013). These same firms have also lobbied at the EU. Dow spent
nearly €4 million in lobby efforts in Brussels in 2015, the year it merged with DuPont, while in
that same year BASF spent approximately €2.3 million, Bayer €2 million and Syngenta €1.5 million
(Pesticide Action Network Europe, 2016).
Mining companies have reportedly spent around US$9.5 million for their lobby efforts in the Uni-
ted States alone, pushing to influence the policy environment. According to UNCTAD, in 2018 gov-
ernments introduced a total of 112 policy measures affecting foreign investments. Of these, 66
percent are measures to liberalize, promote and facilitate new investments (UNCTAD, 2019).
Lobby groups like the Chamber of Mines in the Philippines, for example, boasts on its website
how its role was ‘instrumental in the passage of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, working closely
with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau to craft legislation that would promote and ensure respon-
sible mining in the country’ (Chamber of Mines of the Philippines, Company Profile). More recently,
the mining lobby in the Philippines was also instrumental in blocking the confirmation of the late
environmentalist Gina Lopez, as environment secretary. Lopez, in her short stint with the Depart-
ment, instituted a comprehensive audit of large mining corporations operating in the Philippines.

Strategies for resisting corporate power

As corporations consolidate and increase their power, resistance to their control over segments of the
economy that matter for everyday life becomes more complex and challenging. Resistance in such a
context needs to be multiscale and take the unique nature of corporate power into account. While the
state is in many instances captured by corporate power, in particular through lobbying, structural
influence, and discursive framing, the it remains an important actor that can shape policy and regu-
lation in ways that can restrain the power of giant firms. International agreements among states, for
example, can have stronger influence over global norms that uphold the right to livelihoods and a
clean environment than would be the case with corporate social responsibility and private govern-
ance regimes alone (McKeon, 2015). Below we briefly outline four examples of global and national
initiatives that seek to reign in the power of megacompanies. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have
 GLOBALIZATIONS 7

engaged actively with these efforts in order to extract greater corporate accountability in the wake of
human rights abuses and environmental violations linked to corporations.

United Nations guiding principle on business and human rights (UNGP)

The UNGP, or more popularly known as ‘Ruggie Framework’, named after United Nations Special
Representative and Harvard professor John Ruggie, is a set of guidelines ‘for states and companies to
prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses committed in business operations’ (Business and
Human Rights Resource Center; United Nations, 2011). The framework is anchored on three pillars
– state responsibility to protect, business responsibility to respect, and the shared responsibility of
states and businesses to remedy cases of human rights abuses. Civil society engagement on the
UNGP has focused on pushing states to implement these guidelines by ensuring that laws and pol-
icies are in place to regulate business operations and foster respect for human rights. CSOs have also
been at the forefront of pushing governments to develop their respective national action plans on
business and human rights. CSO engagement with businesses have taken various forms, from doc-
umenting and exposing cases of abuse to more cooperative engagements to pressure campaigns on
specific companies to take their responsibilities seriously. In the Philippines, for example, civil
society organizations, environmental groups and concerned individuals rallied support for a land-
mark petition that they presented to the Commission on Human Rights, calling for an investigation
of the responsibility of big oil and gas companies (Carbon Majors) regarding human rights violations
or threats of violations from the impacts of climate change. There are also initiatives to put the
UNGP to the test by examining how the guidelines could have prevented abuse in key emblematic
cases.

National action plans on business and human rights

There is a strong push for the enactment of national action plans (NAPs) on business and human
rights as a mechanism to promote the implementation of the UNGPs, specifically the duty of states
to protect human rights. To date, some 22 States have put together their NAPs, while another 23
States have already initiated processes to develop their NAPs (Office of the High Commissioner
on Human Rights (OHCHR), 2019). In some cases, the processes to develop these plans are driven
by civil society engagement. The voluntary nature of UNGP not withstanding, the NAP processes
could provide spaces for civil society to put pressure on States to examine existing regulatory mech-
anisms, hear out cases of corporate abuses, and demand stronger actions to exact corporate account-
ability. In October 2019, for example, Thailand enacted its NAP on business and human rights,
becoming the first country in Asia to do so. The Thai NAP outlines as key priority areas the follow-
ing: labour, community, land, natural resources and environment, human rights defenders, and cross
border investments and multinational enterprises. The Thai government acknowledged the urgency
and necessity of the plan as a response to ‘counter the violations of human rights as a result of
businesses’.

Extraterritorial obligations (ETO)

Civil society organizations have also pushed states to abide by their extraterritorial obligations (ETO)
to protect human rights. A group called the ETO Consortium sees ETOs as the ‘missing link in uni-
versal human rights protection system, without which human rights cannot assume their proper role
8 J. CLAPP AND J. PURUGGANAN

as the legal bases for regulating globalization and ensuring universal protection of all people and
groups’ (ETO Consortium, 2013). In Thailand, civil society groups under the ETO Watch Thailand
have used the ETO Principles as a reference point for their campaigns to demand accountability for
human rights abuses perpetrated by Thai companies in Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and
Thailand.

Legally Binding instrument on TNCs and human rights

In July 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 26/9, paving the way for
the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations (TNCs)
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. Civil society engagement has been cru-
cial not just in pushing the passage of the resolution but in sustaining and generating greater interest
among states, the academic community, civil society and social movements for the legally binding
instrument. One such group organized to put forward a global response to the broader issue of cor-
porate accountability is the Global Campaign to Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate
Power and Stop Impunity (Global Campaign, 2011a). The Global Campaign is a network of over 250
groups that include social movements, civil society organizations (CSOs), trade unions and commu-
nities affected by the activities of TNCs. These groups represent concerns about TNC activities
around the world with respect to land grabs, extractive mining, exploitative wages and environ-
mental destruction. In 2014, the Global Campaign proposed an International Peoples Treaty,
which outlines a political framework to support local, national and international movements and
communities to resist the power of TNCs and to establish alternative economic frameworks. The
Global Campaign also spearheaded efforts to establish a UN Binding Treaty to regulate TNCs,
stop human rights violations, and end impunity and ensure access to justice for affected communities
(Global Campaign, 2011b).

Conclusion
Corporations have gained increasing power in the global economy in recent years, in particular in a
context of growing consolidation among the world’s largest firms. As we have outlined in this article,
the agrifood and extractive industries have been emblematic of this growing corporate concentration
and control. Technological change, weakening state legislation in an era of neoliberalism, and chan-
ging financial investment patterns have all contributed to these patterns of increasing consolidation
in these sectors. The effects of this consolidation, as we have outlined, are concerning. As the cases of
the agrifood and mining sectors show, there has been a growing trend toward inequity, human rights
violations and environmental impacts, as well as increased corporate hold on policymaking through
lobbying and other forms of corporate influence. These trends pose enormous risks and vulnerabil-
ities not just for those who depend on the agrifood and extractive sectors for their livelihoods, but for
food systems, the environment, and the global economy more broadly.
Civil society organizations have an important role to play in efforts to expose these dynamics, and
to hold corporate actors to account. Their actions are vital to reveal the impacts of corporate power
in society through direct information campaigns that frame the consequences of corporate consoli-
dation as violations of human rights. CSOs also are vital actors in checking corporate power by call-
ing for and engaging in stronger governance initiatives that hold these firms to account. These
efforts, as we have shown, need to be multi-scalar in nature to match the growing global reach of
TNCs and their power. CSO strategies include engagement and participation in global initiatives
 GLOBALIZATIONS 9

such as the UNGP and the Legally Binding Instrument on TNCs and Human Rights, which are
important international initiatives seeking to impose rules that will strengthen accountability on a
global scale. They also include national level actions, such as national action plans on human rights
and measures to ensure states abide by their extraterritorial obligations on human rights.
The trend toward the consolidation of corporate control and power that has unfolded in recent
decades need not be the norm. As giant global corporations gain power, they work in ways to exclude
competition and gain even more power. Reining in corporate power is thus vital to clear space for a
people’s sovereignty process to begin: to reimagine and build food systems and production systems
that respect human rights and the environment, and that are participatory, culturally grounded, and
context specific.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors
Jennifer Clapp is a Canada Research Chair in Global Food Security and Sustainability and Professor in the
School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability at the University of Waterloo. Her most recent books
include Food, 3rd edition (Polity, 2020) and Speculative harvests: Financialization, food, and agriculture
(with S. Ryan Isakson, Fernwood Press, 2018). She is currently working on a book on corporate concentration
in the agricultural input industry.
Joseph Purugganan is the Head of the Philippine Office of Focus on the Global South, a progressive policy
research and campaign organization working on the themes of political economy of development, peoples’
alternatives, power and democracy, climate and gender justice. He spearheads Focus’ work on trade and invest-
ment and corporate accountability. He is one of the convenors of the Trade Justice Pilipinas campaign plat-
form, and the Asian Task Force on the Binding Treaty.

ORCID
Jennifer Clapp http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1871-8067

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