2.

APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS- The question of the

validity of an apportioment is a justiciable question

a. Gerrymandering- is a term employed to describe an apportionment of

representative district so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party
power.
- As the formation of one legislative district out of separate
territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
- The constitution does not allow the gerrymandering, as it
mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

I. Restraint (Art. VI, Sec. 5(3), 1st sentence)

“Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.”

II. Representation of Cities and Province (Art. VI, Sec. 5(3), 2nd
sentence)
“ Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”

- There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000

minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
- A city requires to have a minumum population of 250,000 does not have
to increase its population to be entitled to an additional district.
-

GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010

AQUINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
 Petitioners Sen. Benigno Aquino II and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as a public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seeks nullification of RA 9716 entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First and Second District in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Lesgialative District From Such
Reaaportionment”.
 The said law was signed by PGMA which created an additional legislative district for
the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative district.
 Petitioners pray that the respondent COMELEC be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps to the implementation.
 Petitioners claim that the reapportionment by RA 9716, is unconstitutional because
the proposed FIRST DISTRICT will end up with the population of less that 250,000
or only 176,383.
 Petitioners theorize, that each legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
 RESPONDENT deny the existence of fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in province. They argue that a plain and simple reading
 of the questioned provision will show the same has no apportionment with the
creation of legislative district.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9716 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
 NO, there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
 The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the settlement of a city to a
district or province to a district as the other.
 Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)- requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be
entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250
to be entitled to another district.

Dec. 8, 2008
BAGUBAYO vs. COMELEC
FACT:
 Congressman Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone District of the City of Cagayan de Oro.
 Eventually became law RA 9371, which increase the legislative district from one to two.
 COMELEC promulgate Reso.No. 7837 implementing RA 9371
 Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed petition against the COMELEC, argued that the
COMELEC cannot implement RA 9371 without providing rules and regulation for the
conduct of a plebiscite.
 Court did not grant the petition for TRO
 RESPONDENT comment on the petition that RA 9731 merely increased one
representative in pursuant to Art.5, Sec.5(3) of the constitution. That RA 9371 did not
bring about any change in the territory of CDO hence no plebiscite is required.
 Petitioner reply, CDO reapportionment fall within the meaning of Sec. 10, Art. X of the
constitution, thus there should be a plebiscite.

ISSUE: W/N the plebiscite is required in the implementation of RA 9731

HELD: - No, no plebiscite requirements exist under the apportionment or reapportionment

provision. A pronounced distinction between Art. VI, Sec. 5 and Art. X is on the requirement of
a plebiscite.
- The constitution and the LGU Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exist under the proportion or reapportionment provision.

SEMA vs COMELEC

FACTS:

 The ARMMs legislature the ARMM Assembly by virtue of its power to create provinces
under Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054, they enacted the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201), which separating the 11 municipalities from the province of
Maguindanao and constituted into a district and independent province, to known as
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Voters of Maguindanao ratified the creation in a
plebiscite.
 Sangguiniang Panglunsod ng Coatabato passed a Resolution to the COMELEC to clarify
the status of Cotabato City.
 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902- renaming the legislative district in question as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
 SEMA the petitioner, prayed for the nullification of Reso No. 7902 and contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.
  Petitioner, also stated that Sec. 462 of RA 7160, LGU code, affirms the apportionment
of a legislative district incident to the creation of

ISSUE: 1. W/N the Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM assembly the power to
create, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

HELD: No, the court ruled that Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional, insofar as it
grants the assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Only the Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art. VI of the
Constitution.

III. QUALIFICATION (Art. VI, Sec. 6)

“No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.”

248 SCRA 300, 1995

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
FACTS:

 Private Respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a “petition for cancellation and
disqualification” with the COMELEC alleging that the petitioner Imelda-
Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
 March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the
entry “seven” months to “since childhood”.
 The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of
Representatives for the First District of Leyte.
 In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the election for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte.

Issue: W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 election.

Held:

 Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the
purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House
of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
  An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that
an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
incurred.
 It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.
 Having determined that Marcos possess the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are
set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

3. Qualifications of a party-list Representative (Sec.9 of RA 7941)

No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless:

- he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines,

-a registered voter,

-a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election,

-able to read and write,

-bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is

-at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

-In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty during his term shall be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term.”

IV. TERM OF OFFICE ( Art.VI, Sec. 7)

“The Members of the House of Representative shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
 3. Parliamentary immunities and privileges-

The rule provides 2 kinds of immunities: 1. Privilege from arrest- intend to ensure
representation of the constituents of the member of the Congress by preventing attempts to
keep him from attending its session

2. Privilege of speech and debate- enables the legislator to express views bearing upon the
public interest without fear and accountability outside the halls of the legislature for inability to
support his statements with the usual evidence required in the court of justice.

a. FREEDOM FROM ARREST- (Art. VI, Sec. 11)

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.”
- Prision Mayor- 6yrs and 1 day to 12 yrs

324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000

People vs. JALOSJOS
FACT:
 Accused-appellant, Jalosjos is a member of the Congress who is now confined at
the National Penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
 He filed a “Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives” asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meeting despite his having been convicted in the first instance of non-bailable
offense.
 The primary argument of the movant is that, the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress and re-elected by his constituents.
 The appellant argues that a member of a Congress function attend sessions is
underscored by Sec.16(2), Art.VI.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge from the

penitentiary to mandate as member of House of Representatives.

HELD: No, because of the broad coverage of the felony and breach of peace, the
exemption is applied only to civil arrest. A congressman like the appellant-accused
who was convicted under Title 11 of RPC, could not claim parliamentary immunity from
arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried
or whose convictions were pending appeal.
  Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

 The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption
as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

 The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one.

 The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by

imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.

b. SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE- (Art. VI, Sec. 11)

109 Phil. 863 (1960)

OSMENA v PENDATUN
FACT:
 Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., submitted to the court a petition for
“declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction”
against Congressman Pendatun and 14 other congressmen, in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution
No. 59.
 He asked for the annulment of the Resolution on the ground of infringement of
his parliamentary immunity. Particularly the portion wherein the members were
authorized to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so.
 Because of the petitioner’s privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”,
which according to the Committee he charges the President of malicious or
recklessly without basis in truth and fact, that constitute assault to the dignity of
the Office of the President.
 The Court required the respondent to answer and they filed their answer
challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition.
 Petitioner contended in his petition that Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity.

ISSUE: W/N Congressman Osmena can avail parliamentary immunity in this case.
HELD: No, Parliamentary immunity of members is not absolute. While
parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside the Congressional Hall, However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conducts are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For
unparliamentarily conduct, members of the Congress can be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

AC No. 7399, August 25, 2009

POBRE v SANTIAGO
FACTS:
 A sworn letter/complaint was filed to the Court by Antero J. Pobre against
Senator Defensor-Santiago, according to the complainant the senator
disrespect Chief Justice Panganiban and other member of the Supreme Court in
her privilege speech delivered on the Senate floor.
 Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted
statement.
 She explained that those statements were covered by parliamentary immunity
and the purpose of the speech was to expose what she believed to be unjust act
of the Judicial Bar Council, which after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually
inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination.

ISSUE: W/N Senator Santiago statement against the Judicial Bar Council is valid for
parliamentary immunity under the Art. VI, Sec.11.

HELD: Yes, the court dismissed the complaint of Pobre for he failed to prove that the
senator in fact made the statements in question and that statement is conformably to
Art. VI, Sec11 of the Constitution.

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served.

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform
their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy
purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and
the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.

4. DISQUALIFICATIONS

- the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank,
composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral
Tribunals and to all administrative bodies, like SEC and National Labor Relations
Commission.

-the PURPOSE of disqualification is to prevent the legislator from exerting undue

influence, deliberately or not, upon the body where is appearing.

- the Lawyer-Legislator may still engage in the practice of his profession except that
when it comes to trials and hearings, appearance may made not by him but other
member of the law office.

a. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES- (Art. VI, Sec. 13, 1st Sentence)

“ No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat.”

- Which may not be held by the legislator during his tenure in the Congress.
- -The purpose is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another Branch of the
Government, to the detriment of the independence of the legislature and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
- Prohibition of holding of an incompatible office is not absolute; what is not
allowed is the simultaneous holding if that office and the seat in the Congress.
- Any legislator may hold another office or employment in the government
provided he forfeits , as a result, his position in the Congress

Resolution on the motion for clarification

and for Reconsideration dtd January 18, 2011
GR. No. 175352
LIBAN v GORDON

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I. THE FACTS
  Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what
they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His
Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his
incumbency as Senator.

 Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant
to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . .
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in
supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his
seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors.

 Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in
a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors;
he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-
funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled
by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals.
Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

 The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that
“[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if
it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine
National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643,
are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

 Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for

Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and
filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the
second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of
the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it
is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis
mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the
issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota.
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by
the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence
in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations
by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s
contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis
character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time
of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and
its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The
Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with
Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the

government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply
that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of
the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC
on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised
by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that
would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the
Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that
were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to
now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
 b. FORBIDDEN OFFICES- (Art. VI, Sec. 13, 2nd Sentence)

“Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been

created of the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.”

- Even if the member of the Congress is willing to forfeit his seat

therein, he may not be appointed to any office in the
government that has been created or the emoluments thereof
have been increased during his term.
- The PURPOSE is to prevent trafficking in public office.
- Were the rule otherwise, certain legislator especially those not
sure of the re-election, might be able work for the creation or
improvement of lucrative positions, in combination with the
President, arrange for their appointment thereto in order to
provide for their future security at the expense of the public
service.
- This rule does not apply to elective offices.
- The appointment however to the forbidden office is not allowed
only during the term for which a certain legislator was elected,
when such office was created or its emolument thereof. After
such term, and even if the legislator is re-elected, the
disqualification no longer applies and he may therefore be
appointed to the office.

5. Electoral Tribunals- (Art. VI, Sec. 17)-

“The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

-
GR No. 97710, September 26, 1991
BONDOC vs PINEDA
FACTS:
 In the elections held on May 11, 1987,Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining
6 are members of the House of Representatives (5members belong to the LDP
and 1 member is from the NP).

 Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

 On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman

Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party.

 On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received
a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the

dominantpolitical party therein, may change that party’srepresentation in the HRET to
thwart thepromulgation of a decision freely reached by thetribunal in an election
contest pending therein

HELD: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests
to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the
tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party
to which they belong.

Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result
of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the
Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal,formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

b. FUNCTIONS OF ET (Art. VI, Sec. 17)

 The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is an electoral tribunal that decides

election protests involving the election of the President of the Philippines and Vice
President of the Philippines. It is composed of justices of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines. The equivalent tribunals for the Congress of the Philippines are House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

It was established under Batas Pambansa Blg. 884 (National Law No. 884) on
December 3, 1985 during the term of then President Ferdinand Marcos.

Members of the Tribunal receive a monthly allowance of 100,000 Philippine pesos on

top of their regular salary.

 The present Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was constituted under Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of members of the Senate of the Philippines. It is an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal composed of nine (9) members.
Three (3) members are Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
As envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, they serve to neutralize the
partisanship that may arise from the political affiliation of the other six (6) members,
who are Senators of the Philippines chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties represented in the Senate. The Tribunal is chaired by the
most senior Justice-Member.

 The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is an electoral tribunal

that decides election protests in the House of Representatives of the Philippines. It
consists of 6 representatives and 3 justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
who are designated by the Chief Justice. The equivalent tribunals for elections to the
upper house is the Senate Electoral Tribunal and for president is the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.

Members of the Tribunal receive a monthly allowance of 100,000 Philippine pesos on

top of their regular salary.[1]
 c. JURISDICTION

GR. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Reyes vs COMELEC

FACTS:
 The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution
of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district
of Marinduque.

 On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina
Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material
representations.

 On March 27,2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the

petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en
banc denied her MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of
the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14,
2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath
of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.

 According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of
the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed
as winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of
the House of Representative of Marinduque.

Held: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins
only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as
stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

For one to be considered a Member ofthe House of Representatives, there must be a

concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not
assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid
oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.

Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. Here, this
Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse
of discretion exist

February 11, 2010

Abayon vs COMELEC

FACT:
 In the case of petitioner Abayon, who is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo Party-List that won a seat in the House of Reps during the 2007 election.
 Respondents Lucaban, et al., filed a petition with respondent HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo
doesn’t represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors and Abayon is
not qualified to be a nominee for she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and being a wife of an incumbent congressional
representative.
 Abayon countered that COMELEC already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo
as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization. She also poited out that
respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition and the matter should
fell on the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
 Respondent HRET dismissed the petition against Aangat Tayo, but upholding
its jurisdiction over the qualification of Abayon.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but denied by HRET.
 Thus, Petitioner filed a petition for special civil action of certiorari.
 In the case of petitioner Palparan, who was the first nominee of Bantay Party-
List group that won a seat in the 2007 election.
 Respondents Lesaca et al, filed with respondent HRET a petition against Bantay
and its nominee Palparan, because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector that Bantay represent.
 Palparan countered that the HREThad no jurisdiction over his person because
he is just a nominee and Bantay was the actual Party-List.

ISSUE: W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualification of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of their respective party-list.

HELD: Yes, it is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of particular qualification of an
nominee, because once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contest relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRET owns jurisdiction begins.
 6. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS-

(Art. VI, Sec. 18)

“There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.”

(Art. VI, Sec. 19)

“The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be

constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet
only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are
herein conferred upon it.”

- Revived in the 1987 Constitution, to limit once again the

President’s appointing power.
- The additional rule is the requirement that all appointments
submitted to the Commission must be acted upon within 30
session days from their submission.
- Ad Interim appointments not acted upon the time of the
adjournment of the Congress, even if the 30-day period has not
yet expired, are deemed by-passed under Art. VI, Sec. 16.
- Sec. 19- based on the need to enable the President to exercise
his appointing power with dispatch in coordination with the
Commission on Appointments.
- The rule that the Commission on Appointments can meet only
during the sessions of the Congress is the reason why ad
interim appointments are permitted under the Constitution.
- These appointments are made during the recess, subject to
consideration later by the Commission, for confirmation or
rejection.
- Ad interim appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress, referring to the adjournment of
the regular or special session immediately following the recess
when said appointments were made.
 - But where the Congress is in session, the President must clear
his nominations with the Commission on Appointments, which is
why it must be constituted as soon as possible.
- In case of Electoral Tribunals, the need for their early
organizations is obvious, considering the rash of election contest
already waiting to be filed after, and even before the
proclamation of the winners.
- This is the reason why, unlike Commission on Appointments,
the Electoral Tribunal are supposed to continue functioning
even during the recess.

a. FUNCTION of Commission of Appointment: (Art. VII, Sec. 16)

“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”

-The CA is a constitutional body under the 1987 Constitution. It is an independent

body separate and distinct from the Legislature, although its membership is confined
to members of Congress.*

The CA does not curtail the Presidents appointing authority but serves as a check
against its abuse. It assures that the President has exercised the power to appoint
wisely, by appointing only those who are fit and qualified. To this end, the Rules of the
Commission's Statement of Policy provides that, 'The Commission on Appointments
hereby declares as its policy that the powers vested in it by the Constitution shall be
discharged with only one impelling motive, which is the efficient and harmonious
functioning of the government.

'Cognizant of the fact that the power of appointment is vested in the President of the
Philippines, and that the President, in the exercise of that power, had carefully
considered the fitness and qualifications of nominees or appointees, the Commission
on Appointments shall accord the nomination or appointment weight and respect, to
the end that all doubts should be resolved in favor of approval or confirmation.

'On the other hand, the Commission, being part of our republican system of checks
and balances, shall act as a restraint against abuse of the appointing authority, to the
end that the power of disapproval should be exercised to protect and enhance the
public interest.'