G.R. No.
190846 forging Jose’s signature making it appear that Jose had
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the
August 28, 2009 decision2 and November 17, 2009
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645.
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C.
Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4 During their marriage,
Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago,
Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 21229.5
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P.
Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed
of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of
Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed
by Jose in her favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase
price for the lot was P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No.
21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the
name of Tomas.8
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against
Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City.9 The
complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while
he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by
authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.10
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good
faith and for value.11 Before he paid the full consideration of the
sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend
who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in
order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing
Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the
title.13
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed
compensatory and moral damages, attorney’s fees, and
expenses for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in
favor of Jose.14
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her
answer to Jose’s complaint and Tomas’ cross-claim.15On the
other hand, it dismissed Tomas’ complaint against the Register
of Deeds since it was only a nominal party.16
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.17
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as
sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the
subject property from Milagros’ son.18 When Bonifacio
confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the
sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she
needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who
was then in Japan, of the sale.19
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to
the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of
Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed
property had been transferred to Tomas.20
Bonifacio further testified that Jose’s signature in the SPA was
forged.21 Bonifacio presented documents containing the
signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport,
complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February
2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter’s
affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten letter.22
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events
as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter.
Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to
the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale
transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana
was able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the
sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale.
Rosana informed Tomas of Jose’s confirmation.23
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas
made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another
P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration
written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00;
he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the
actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to
save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she
needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose
had stopped sending her money.24
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in
favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to
Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996,
wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-
fact, was actually null and void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages.26
The CA Ruling
Tomas appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA.
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However,
the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the
award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose
and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of
P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust
enrichment. Despite Tomas’ allegation that he paid P700,000.00
for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing
evidence that established this claim.28
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision
on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was
insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally offered
before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the
actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was
P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC.29
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit"
in a resolution dated November 17, 2009.30
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to
challenge the CA ruling which ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid
in the amount of P700,000.00.31
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of
sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be used as
evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed
of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale;32 third, his testimony establishing the
actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was
uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount
actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.34
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from
questioning the purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for
failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms
of an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to include all
the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted
other than the terms of the agreement itself.35
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used
as the basis for the amount of consideration paid; and (2)
whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the
actual purchase price of the sale.
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a
question of fact not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the
appellate court's factual findings are not the functions of this
Court, as we are not a trier of facts.36
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us
to rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,"37except in the
following cases:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.38
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for
the subject property is a factual question that the CA had
already resolved in the negative.39 The CA found Tomas’ claim
of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence
to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA’s finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of
their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent.41
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence"
or "greater weight of the credible evidence."42 Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability
of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as
it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.43
We agree with the CA that Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid
Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof
of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish
this claim. Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does
not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has
the burden of proving it;44 the burden rests on the defendant to
prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment.45 A mere allegation is not evidence,46and the person
who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with
the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished
from its admissibility as evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly
ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle
of unjust enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the
consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the
reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot
be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner’s argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the
very beginning.47 This rule applies to contracts that are declared
void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent.48 A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting
in civil effects.49 It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of a void
contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been
given under it.51
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed,
the restoration of what has been given is in order."52This
principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
states that "every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what
each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be
enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that
occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.53 The purpose of introducing documentary
evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in
the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a
means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated
and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of
sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid
contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to
determine matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given
under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust
enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law of these rules.54 There is no
provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the
evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility.55
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the
purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the
document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence
which appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.56
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void
by positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal
property without the spouse’s consent.1âwphi1 It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale
as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to
admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an
issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale
is basis for the court to determine the presence of the
essential elements of the sale, including the consideration
paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered
to prove the actual consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot
be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by
both parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for
the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the
sale.58
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily
allowed the lower courts to consider the terms written therein to
determine whether all the essential elements59 for a valid
contract of sale are present, including the consideration of the
sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not
prevent the court from relying on consideration stated in the
deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid by the
petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual
consideration of the sale is not necessary since it is necessarily
included in determining the regular execution of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale
is prima facie evidence of the amount paid by the
petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein.60
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient
on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party’s claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.61
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale
constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas
for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to
adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the
consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount
paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive
provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses for the
sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the
presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to
the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and
effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the
actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that
he paid to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the
amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No
documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the
higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas’ sole
testimony. Tomas’ sole testimony of payment is self-serving and
insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains
sufficient evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid and
the same amount which should be returned under the principle
of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity, and good conscience."62 The prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is
based on Article 22 of the Civil Code. 63
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what
he or Milagros received under the void contract which
presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount
of P,200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the Deed
of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even
Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to
recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as
appearing in the contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review
on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and the
resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.
LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR.,
and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY.
NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo
M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista,
Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza
for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that
respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned
his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour,
Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G.
Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been
cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two
children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and
Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two
daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it
appear that their two children are legitimate, while in
respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC
during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that his wife is
Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for
the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated;
such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in
his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of
public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good
moral character and constitute grounds for his removal as a
member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that
complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on
him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants
illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are
inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in the
preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject
birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two
wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact
from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used
this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence,
respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo
M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and
were subjected to cross-examination by respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as
follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer
and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been
cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their
cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar)
received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing him that
respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael,
Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his
wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter
was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register
attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas
Valderia. He also received information from concerned citizens
that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G.
Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the
Civil Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy
filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to
Felicitas Valderia. In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed
with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as
separated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married
to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper
where respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board
of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said
newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of
Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows:
He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent
belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who
told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the
present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned
citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back
as 1995, he did not immediately file a case for disbarment
against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal
case for falsification against him that he decided to file an
administrative case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there
were people who were against the open relationship between
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been
publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that
they are both still legally married to other persons, and so
someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of
the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra
Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as
his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of witness
Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he
was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the
birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as
somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was
a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned
citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent to Melgar,
but he did not take any action against respondent at that time.[3]
 Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence
consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondents
counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified
true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez
informing Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral acts,[4] the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan,
attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent
and one Felicitas Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate
of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995,
[8]
 the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25,
1998,[9] Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the
marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon
Marcos,[10] and the editorial page of the Naujanews(February-
March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was stated that respondent has
two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any
evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on
his arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses
are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary
evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until
he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a
woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of
conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted
Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality
consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo
given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before the
Commission and b) their documentary evidence consisting of their
Exhibits A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally
present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his
evidence anymore because according to him there is none to rebut vis--
vis the evidence presented by the private complainants. Respondent
instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue his
position. As can be seen from the comment and memorandum
submitted, respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically
motivated since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that
the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1 which were offered to show
that respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza
out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible
because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay
or self-serving according to respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the
other hand, categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B]
particularly in paragraph 2 that Respondent has been cohabiting openly
and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be
husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also
categorically state that respondent has even represented to all and
sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical
statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and
remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows
that respondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by
Exhibit H, a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to
one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have
been presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are
competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings.
The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained
evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to
an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of
Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks
the penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make
the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in
proceedings like the present case. Exhibits D and D-1 which are duly
certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show
paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and
corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed
respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la
Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent
sired two children. These facts we repeat have not been denied by
respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the
improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving
nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented
evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has
been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The
evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of
good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath
the grave and serious allegations made against him is to our mind his
undoing and his silence has not helped his position before the
Commission. As between the documents and positive statements of
complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified
under oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so give weight
to the evidence of complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies
and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent
was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay. The
witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell
them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why
would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did
state clearly in their affidavits under oath that respondent was
cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondents wife.
Again their categorical statements taken together with the other
documents, are enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is
not of good moral character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of
good moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law
[Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179
SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage [Mijares vs.
Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of
the fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so
stated in Exhibit F that he is separated from his wife. This fact and
statement without any further explanation from respondent only
contributes to the blot in his moral character which good moral
character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain
in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against
engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in
Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be
used by private persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their
rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded
accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be
considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented.
The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic)
that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a
member of the Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to
continue to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be
fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and,
hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that
quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings
which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been
publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is
corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews,
introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and
stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two
beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It should
be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent,
he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be
reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the
contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish
to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could
have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to
be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of
witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they
are motivated by revenge for respondents filing of criminal
cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and
Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies
cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and
corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for
themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente;
and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of
a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia
celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and
are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as
provided for under Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988
and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and
Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly
confidential and no information relating thereto shall
be issued except on the request of any of the
following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person
authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely
necessary in administrative, judicial or other official
proceedings to determine the identity of the childs
parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth;
and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of at least two months or a
fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos,
or both in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D.
603)
 Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There could properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to administrative case against respondent.
the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara
rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never
1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally
render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal
thus:
searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that
said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
only to protect a person from interference by the government or
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him,
the state.[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers
governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of
and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its
immoral conduct, to wit:
agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of
in this case. The alleged warrantless search made by Roque, a co-
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
employee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly fall within
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
and seizures.
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private
or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence
shock the common sense of decency.
against respondent, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not apply.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards and,
thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is
a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The
fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit
with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by
her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should
keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but
is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing
in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of
conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on
respondent at his last known address and entered in his record
as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court
Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their
information and guidance as well as for circularization to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124514. July 6, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. VICTORIANO GARCIA[1] and BERNARDINO
CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN, accused.
BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y PINAPIN, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No.
2022, convicting appellant of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the costs.
The facts, based on the records, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, at around 7:30 A.M., Civilian
Volunteer Organization (CVO) members Ben Lumboy
and William Capili informed PO3 Edwin Birung,
Detachment Commander at Barangay La Suerte, that
they sighted two (2) former Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) agents at nearby Barangay
Catarauan, in Amulung, Cagayan. Acting on the
information, PO3 Birung formed a team to track down the
two former CAFGUs.
Composed of PO3 Birung, Lumboy, Capili, Cesar de los
Santos, Carlito Ramirez, Guillermo Mauricio, and
Reynaldo Agpalza, the team proceeded to Barangay
Catarauan. In single file, with Capili and Lumboy in the
lead, they crossed an improvised wooden bridge over a
creek. Suddenly Capili and Lumboy came under gunfire.
The team members immediately returned fire. An
exchange of gunfire ensued. After about thirty (30)
minutes, the firing ceased. The gunmen withdrew in the
direction of Barangay Baccring.
PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue Lumboy and
Capili. Capili was still alive and was rushed to the
Cagayan Provincial Hospital at Tuguegarao, Cagayan for
treatment. Unfortunately, Lumboy was already dead. His
body was brought to his house. The following day, a
civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung that
the two former CAFGUs the CVOs sighted were
Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia, herein
appellant and co-accused.[2]
After preliminary investigation,[3] both Caranguian and
Garcia were charged with the crime of murder in Criminal
Case No. 2022, for the killing of Lumboy. They were also
charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No.
2008, for the wounding of Capili. Appellant was acquitted
of frustrated murder but convicted of murder. Only the
murder case is now before us.
The Information for murder states:[4]
"I N F O R M A T I O N
"The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses
Victoriano Garcia and Bernardino Caranguian of
the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:
That on or about August 1, 1991, in the
Municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, Victoriano Garcia and
Bernardino Caranguian y Pinapin, both armed with
guns, conspiring together and helping each other,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
with treachery did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one, Ben Lumboy inflicting upon him
gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, February 5, 1992."
Only appellant, Caranguian, was arrested. Co-accused
Garcia remains at-large to date. Upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5] Trial ensued.[6]
During trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: (1) Dr. Cirilo Pintucan, resident physician at
the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital, who treated the
gunshot wound of Capili; (2) Dra. Dulce Donato-Baculi,
retired Municipal Health Officer of Amulung, Cagayan,
who conducted the autopsy on the exhumed body of
Lumboy; and (3) PO3 Edwin Birung, eyewitness to the
shooting incident.
Dr. Pintucan testified that Capili sustained a gunshot
wound on the right side of the abdomen, the point of
entry of which was 0.5 cm and the point of exit 4 cm..
Without immediate medical treatment, this tangent wound
would have caused a tetanus infection which could lead
to death.[7]
Dra. Donato-Baculi conducted a post-mortem
examination on the exhumed cadaver of Lumboy on
September 2, 1991, a month after the incident. She
testified that the cause of death was shock due to
massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds.[8]
For his defense, appellant invoked denial and alibi. He
testified that he was a CAFGU member assigned in
Tabang, Sto. Nino, Cagayan. To prove his membership in
the CAFGU, he presented the memorandum receipt
issued for his gun. He claims that on the day of the
shooting incident, he was at his post the whole day. He
knows accused Garcia as a fellow CAFGU, but they were
not together on the day of the incident. He was surprised
to find himself arrested on February 1, 1992, for the
shooting incident.[9]
On August 11, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision,
[10]
 the pertinent dispositive portion of which states:
"2. Sentencing Bernardino Caranguian in Criminal
Case No. 2022 for Murder to a prison term of
reclusion perpetua.
3. Ordering said accused to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief, appellant raises the sole issue that the lower
court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime of
murder in connection with the death of Ben Lumboy.[11]He
claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of
prosecution witness Birung since the latter did not even
know the names of appellant and co-accused at the time
of the incident. Further, the testimony of Birung lacks
corroboration. Lastly, appellant claims an alibi, that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis since he was about 15 kilometers away at the
time of the shooting incident.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that the sole
eyewitness testified in clear and unequivocal terms as to
the identity of the assailants. It is well-settled that
between a positive and categorical testimony and a
denial, the former should prevail. Hence, appellant's bare
denials and alibi cannot prevail over his positive
identification, according to the Solicitor General.
The crucial issue in this appeal pertains to the sufficiency
of evidence to convict appellant. More particularly, we
have to inquire whether there has been sufficient
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
offense.
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof
as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to
prove that a crime was committed, and second, that
accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution
must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the
conviction of the accused.[12] The reason for requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt is simply this -
"In a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed
against the subject; it enters the contest with a
prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited
command of means; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public
officers, and therefore speaking semi-judicially,
 and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in
striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a
perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not
for life. These inequalities of position the law
strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no
conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of
guilt." [13]
In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof
that Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident on
August 1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was
appellant who perpetrated the killing.
On direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy
and Capili informed him that they sighted two former
CAFGUs in Catarauan.[14] On cross-examination, PO3
Birung testified, however, that Lumboy did not actually
see the two former CAFGUs but merely heard the news
from his place.[15] Further, Lumboy did not categorically
tell PO3 Birung that the two persons sighted were former
CAFGUs, only that said persons were armed.[16] PO3
Birung testified that he merely heard from the people of
Barangay Catarauan that there were two dismissed
CAFGUs in the vicinity.[17]Further, PO3 Birung testified
that he was not even authorized by the army to catch the
dismissed CAFGUs, and that Catarauan was not part of
his jurisdiction.[18] PO3 Birung testified that the day after
the incident, a civilian informer named Palos told him the
names of appellant and accused.[19] But Palos did not
even witness the shooting incident. He merely executed
an affidavit during preliminary investigation but did not
testify in court. Hence, his affidavit is hearsay and has no
probative value.[20]
Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos
to PO3 Birung as to the identity of appellant is hearsay.
The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who
merely recites what someone else has told him, whether
orally or in writing.[21]Section 36 of Rule 130[22] provides
that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is
even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon
"third-hand" information related to the witness by
someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no
more competent than single hearsay.[23]
PO3 Birung insists that he saw the appellant and
accused "walking" during the incident.[24] After the initial
shots rang out, however, the team members immediately
sought cover. Thus, it is highly unlikely that PO3 Birung
was able to sufficiently recognize the gunmen. Further,
the other members of the team, including the injured
Capili, did not testify as to the identity of the appellant.
The trial court even observed in its decision that Capili
"deliberately chose not to appear in court for 18 times
when cited to appear during the hearing."
While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole
eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction,[25] it bears stressing that such
testimony must be clear, positive, and credible. Hence,
an identification of the appellant as the gunman based on
hearsay does not suffice for conviction.
Further, it does not appear appellant has a motive for
killing the victim. While generally, the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not
have to be proven, proof of the same becomes relevant
and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the
assailant is in question.[26] A finding of guilt must rest on
the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or
even absence of evidence for the defense.[27] It is
precisely when the prosecution's case is weak, as in this
instance, that the defense of alibi assumes importance
and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.
 [28]
 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
consideration is not whether the court doubts the - - -x
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a  
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[29] Here, doubt as to the  
identification of appellant as the guilty person has not DECISION
been overcome.  
 
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant  
BERNARDINO Y PINAPIN CARANGUIAN is  
ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
that he committed the crime of murder. The Director of
Prisons is hereby directed to cause forthwith the release CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with
of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for another modification the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
cause, and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02,
days from notice. No costs.
finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of
SO ORDERED. violation of Section 5,[3] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No. 179940 known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Plaintiff-Appellee,   accusatory portion of the information reads:
  Present:
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, 
  Chairperson. That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the
  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
- versus  - CHICO-NAZARIO, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
  NACHURA and Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
  REYES, JJ. authority of law and legal justification, did then and
    there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade,
  Promulgated: deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport
NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @   dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed
OBET, April 23, 2008 transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine
Accused-Appellant. Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.[4]
 
 
 The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
 
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded Not Guilty to the charge.[5] On 17 February
2003, the pre-trial conference was concluded.[6] Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
 
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio
M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
conducted against appellant, and a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed
at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
 
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
 
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon,
a confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in
Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant was
selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-
bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team was
composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio
Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-
up operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the
confidential informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution
of the buy-bust operation.
 
When the team arrived at appellants place, they saw the
appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1
Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1
Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying Barkada ko, user. PO1
Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100
bills.[7]The bills were marked with GT JR, PO1 Tolentinos
initials. Upon receiving theP300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet
from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-
arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale
had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and
recovered from the latter the marked money.
 
The white crystalline substance[8] in the plastic sachet which
was sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to
determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request for
laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. [9] Per Chemistry
Report No. D-728-2002,[10] the substance bought from appellant was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
 
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical
Officer who examined the substance bought from appellant, was
dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the
witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject matter of
this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory examination and
that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]
 
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together
with his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro
Lim.
 
 From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like
this:
 
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sisters
house in Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His
nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter, together with
appellants common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was
being punched and kicked by several police officers. When appellant
tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they were beating up
his common-law wife and other relatives, the policemen arrested him,
mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with
a palo-palo. He sustained swollen face, lips and tooth.His common-
law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
 
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife
to a house located in the middle of a field where the former
demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant was
brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras
as the police officers who manhandled them and who
demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant could go home. The
following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin arrived with
the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was detained. She does
not know why the police officers filed this case against
appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of
appellant and Amelia Mendoza.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision
convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court
hereby finds accused Norberto del Monte y Gapay @
Obet GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With
cost.
 
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch of this
Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous
Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof
for proper disposal thereof.[12]
 
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M.
Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward. It established the fact
that appellant was caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation
conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant was identified as the
person from whom PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabu as
confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand,
the trial court was not convinced by appellants defense of frame-up
and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was
merely sleeping and was awakened by the screams of his relatives who
were being mauled by the police officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With
the filing thereof, the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of
the entire records of the case to us. [14] However, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo,[15] the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action and disposition.[16]
 
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision but reduced the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and
the decision dated March 8, 2004 of the RTC, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-
02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine imposed upon him is reduced
from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.[17]
 
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of
Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.[18]
 
In our Resolution[19] dated 10 December 2007, the parties were
notified that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they
so desired, within 30 days from notice. Both appellant and appellee
opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground they had
exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their respective briefs and
the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a repetition of the
arguments already discussed therein.
 
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF
R.A. 9165.[20]
 
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemens failure to
strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims
that pictures of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were
not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1
Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the
drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical
inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit
of arrest. Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his
arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him.
 
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers
alleged non-compliance with Section 21[21] of Republic Act No. 9165
for the first time on appeal.This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day
for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria[22]in which the very same
issue was raised, we ruled:
 
The law excuses non-compliance under
justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the
buy-bust operation in this case from complying with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did
not question during trial the safekeeping of the items
seized from him.Indeed, the police officers alleged
 violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 were not raised before the trial court but were
instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no
instance did appellant least intimate at the trial
court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
 
In People v. Pringas,[23] we explained that non-compliance with
Section 21 will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at
bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug
that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject
matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which
examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised.
 
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the
drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible
in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court,
evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible,
there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no
such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is
that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein
a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so
shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly
provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or
probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.[24] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.[25]
 
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The
prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened
and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in
court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of
the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic
Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing
0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in
consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
 
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-
buyer, together with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more
than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this Court
has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings,
it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the
distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is
in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard
their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[26]
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [27] Finding no
compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.
 
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting
that he was framed, the evidence against him being planted, and that
the police officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was
the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be
doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any
credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[28] Frame-up, like
alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy
to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and
standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.[29] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a regular and
proper manner.[30] This, appellant failed to do. The presumption
remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform
their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza,
and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to
sway. We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are
suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and convincing
evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that they were
maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by
the trial court:
 
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to
exculpate himself from liability raised the defense of
frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the alleged buy
bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his
sister. That he was awakened by the yells and screams
of his relatives as they were being mauled by the police
officers. However, this Court is not convinced. Accused
 failed to substantiate these claims of maltreatment even
in the face of his wifes and nephews testimony. No
evidence was presented to prove the same other than
their self-serving claims.[31]
 
 
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what
time the arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It
explained:
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 oclock in
the afternoon of December 10, 2002 when he was
roused from his sleep by the policemen who barged into
the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His
common-law wife, however, testified that it was 10-11
oclock in the morning when the policemen came to the
house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand,
Alejandro Lim testified that he went to sleep at 11
oclock in the morning and it was 10 oclock in the
morning when the policemen arrived (TSN, Feb.2,
2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation
that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep
with appellant.[32]
 
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold
appellants conviction.
 
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:
 
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of
its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and
a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram
of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance
alleged in the information, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in
accordance with Article 63(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court
pegged the fine at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced
to P500,000.00. Both amounts are within the range provided for by
law but the amount imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering the
quantity of the drugs involved, is more appropriate.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the conviction of
appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
 
 denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the
SO ORDERED.
suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
 
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, G.R. No. 168644
Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN,    
Petitioner,   Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic
  Present: corporation presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan
   
(Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia
  CORONA, J., Chairperson
  VELASCO, JR., Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in
-versus- NACHURA, the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive
  PERALTA, and and account for the payments made by the various customers of the
  MENDOZA, JJ. company.
   
 
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN,  
Respondent. Promulgated: In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a
  complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft[5] against respondent,
February 16, 2010 alleging that several checks[6]representing the aggregate amount
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in payment of
 
  their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the companys
DECISION coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her
  personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust
 
Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.[7] Upon a finding
PERALTA, J.:
  that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city
  prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of theft against respondent.[8]
Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.  
87600[1] dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial
September 13, 2004[2] and November 5, 2004[3]Orders issued by the Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36[4] in Criminal Case No. 02- of which reads:
202158 for qualified theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively  
 That in or about or sometime during the period
comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and] October
1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away cash money in the total amount
of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF
COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to
the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine
currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said
accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, being
then employed as cashier by said complainant at the
time of the commission of the said offense and as such
she was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Contrary to law.[9]
 
 
 
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.[10] The trial
ensued. On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the
subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to
her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the
issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the
respective managers or records custodians of Security Banks Divisoria
Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.
[11]
 The trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding
subpoena.[12]
 
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated
November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that
in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no
mention made of the said bank account, to which respondent, in
addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-
14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks.
Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank account
as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security
Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as
she was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect
thereto.[13]
 
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the
relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the
complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. [14]To
this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the
absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.[15] The trial court did not
sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of
merit.[16]
 
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the
testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of
Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to prove
that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier
at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to
the company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the
corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security
Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were
presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same
checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her
personal account with Security Bank.[17] But before the testimony
could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,
[18]
 seeking the exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying
documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank
account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
 
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its
September 13, 2004 Order.[19] A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated
November 5, 2004.[20] These two orders are the subject of the instant
case.
 
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in acting the way it did, respondent elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005
Decision.[21]The decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13,
2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is
ordered stricken from the records.
 
SO ORDERED.[22]
 
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[23] petitioner is now
before the Court pleading the same issues as those raised before the
lower courts.
 
In this Petition[24] under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main
that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in reversing the assailed
orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out Marasigans
testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security
Bank.[25] It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had
a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft
and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the
coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.[26] Petitioner believed
that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect,
it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court,
which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry
merely to what was contained in the information.[27]
 
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented
by the Security Bank account was neither relevant nor material to the
case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested that the
money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. She
invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information
which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the
total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the
term cash money stated in the Information was not synonymous with
the checks she was purported to have stolen from petitioner and
deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which
the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself
of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for
violating respondents right to due process.[28] More in point,
respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well
as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would
violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.[29]
 
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the
criminal Information for qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently
alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through
Marasigans testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the
checks involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-
affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by
respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to
her personal account with Security Bank.Petitioner held that the
checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent and, hence,
the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount
represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also
the checks themselves.[30]
 
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue
for resolution is whether the testimony of Marasigan and the
accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether
they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The
question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And
the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to
be indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal
prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because
this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. [31]Theft is
present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the
personal property of another without the latters consent. It is
qualified when, among others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is
committed with abuse of confidence.[32] The prosecution of this
offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following
elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to
another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking
was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. [33] In turn,
whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the
presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of
relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 3[34] Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court.
 
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be
suppressed in this case  the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the
checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondents
Security Bank account  are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they
relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an
inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the
fact in issue.[35]
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken
away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of
petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish
the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that
respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited
some of its checks to her personal account with Security
Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation
of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence
that respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in
her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the
Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check for
purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is
mistaken.
 
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of
personal property of one by another with intent to gain, and it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended
party has already ensued from such act of execution.[36] The allegation
of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must
have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken
money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains
in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of
the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by
claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in
her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than
favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of
theft, but rather of some other crime  probably estafa.
 
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check
is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance,
whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation
to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check,
after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted
under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it
represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does
with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes
material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.[37] In other
words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may
establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These
checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their
contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of
the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his
own name.[38]
 
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our
purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent of
having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing
the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only
irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in
evidence.
 
We now address the issue of whether the admission of
Marasigans testimony on the particulars of respondents account with
Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks
allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable
inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with
the triviality of specifically addressing privacy rights relative to
banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction
a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts.The
source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A.
No. 1405,[39] otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. [40]
 
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage
private hoarding and at the same time encourage the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be utilized
by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic
development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality
of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines.
[42]
 Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by characterizing as
absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with
banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:
 
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with
banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of
an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or in cases where the money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation.
Subsequent statutory enactments[43] have expanded the list of
exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as
the general rule, falling as it does within the legally recognized zones
of privacy.[44] There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these
primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would
authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise,
in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into
bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal order is
obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.[45]
 
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been
explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega.[46] That case
principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an
examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of
a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found
guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the
Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in
R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or
investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely
to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the
deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
 
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of
or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or
not the defendant B&B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment
issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the discussion of the
conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351
and House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic
Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the
lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach
of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
 
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of
the record, I should like the Chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further.Suppose an individual
has a tax case. He is being held liable by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)]
or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability,
and because of this the deposit of this
individual [has been] attached by the
[BIR].
 
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will
only apply after the court has
pronounced sentence declaring the
liability of such person. But where the
primary aim is to determine whether
he has a bank deposit in order to bring
about a proper assessment by the
[BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by
this proposed law.
 
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules
of procedure and under the Civil Code,
the attachment or garnishment of
money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume for instance that there is a
preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all
moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment
or garnishment will bring out into the
open the value of such deposit. Is that
prohibited by... the law?
 
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited
to the extent that the inquiry... is made
only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the
government; but when the object is
merely to inquire whether he has a
deposit or not for purposes of taxation,
then this is fully covered by the law. x x
x
 
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a
mere investigation into the existence
and the amount of the deposit.
 
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature
of such deposit. x x x[47]
 
 
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality
rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account maintained
by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks
that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls
under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405  that the
money kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To
highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Co.,[48] that the subject matter of the action refers to
the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands,
chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which
in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the
Security Bank account.[49] On the surface, however, it seems that
petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to
show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because,
while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it
nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class suit in that
case was properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in
relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply
addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [50] in
which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable
under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money
deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.[51] Given
this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in
the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges
respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by
the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal
Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in
plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners
trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation
that in some material way involves the checks subject of the
testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed.
Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the
supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks
have allegedly been kept.
 
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment
itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject of the
prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of
what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the
action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged
to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of
the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is
that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and
no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and
documentary evidence relative to respondents Security Bank account
serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such
account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an
attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank
deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected
by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her
motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy
at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.
 
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the
particulars of respondents supposed bank account with Security Bank
and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in
support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case,
inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable
connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We
find full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of
the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
 
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy
extends its scope to include an individuals financial privacy rights and
personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or heightened
scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing such rights.
[52]
 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into
such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the
former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse
the general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential nature
of bank deposits.[53]
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005,
reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-
202158, is AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY
MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by
Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty.
Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the
following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of
the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before
the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted
and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market
stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued
complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of
money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant
of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
and was therefore aware that the market stall was
government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two
contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement
notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
without the signature of the lessees. However,
complainant only found out that the agreement had not
been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and
she asked for another copy from respondent. The other
contract was a sale agreement over a property covered
by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which
complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala
(Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still covered by the
period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and
an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not
signed by the principals named therein and bore only
the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme
Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to
submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the
mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before
affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently
needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily
done. It was only copied from a similar file in
respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and
registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still,
it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because
complainant constructed the subject public market stall
under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the
local government unit and, technically, she could be
considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior
mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute
owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause
of the perjury charge against complainant was not the
representation of herself as owner of the mortgaged
property, but her guarantee that it was free from all
liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even
dismissed, because the prosecutor found that
complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt
secured with the previous mortgage contract over the
same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy
of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent
prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it
and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy
for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her
promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property
covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and,
therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of
that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not present
the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that
the property was the subject of a case pending before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of
the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained
that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional
evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily
gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact
personally appeared before respondent; hence, the
notarization was limited to the former’s participation in
the execution of the document. Moreover, the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must
be notarized in the principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent
submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto
were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of
Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as
attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the
signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact;
(3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the
parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5)
a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor;
(6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance
claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an
unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in
Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an
unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the
parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not
tackle the additional documents attached to
complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as notary public for
two years for her violation of her oath as such by
notarizing documents without the signatures of the
parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the
lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs
pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the
inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract
was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for
violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she be suspended from the practice
of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional
documents submitted by complainant were
inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing
the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of
Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of
complainant was actually a supplemental pleading,
which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of
the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not
the proper party to question those documents. Hence,
the investigating commissioner should have expunged
the documents from the records, instead of giving them
due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating
circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of
dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional
problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or
to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and
free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative
attitude toward the proceedings; character or
reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-
2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason
to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director
for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago – through a
letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T.
Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint
against respondent and the parties’ submissions in this
case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some
procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible
for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable
argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which
the respondent therein opposed the admission of the
birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence
of his grossly immoral conduct, because those
documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting
his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules.” There could be no dispute that the subject birth
certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question,
therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for
the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records
in violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches
and seizures is meant only to protect a person from
interference by the government or the state. In People
vs. Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between
a private individual and another individual. It governs
the relationship between the individual and the State
and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers
governmental power and protects the individual against
any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless
search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at
the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of
the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches
and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into
consideration in the resolution of this administrative
case against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no
provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents
submitted by complainant as additional evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading
must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a
supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to
set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the
kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as
the controversy referred to in the original
complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a
supplemental pleading. One of her charges against
respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete
documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not
legally barred from submitting additional evidence to
strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court finds that she committed
misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary
public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act, but one invested with substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the
public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized
document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained
in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix
the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the
integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may
be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully
knew that complainant was not the owner of the
mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and
1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she
could have given complainant a certified photocopy
thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is
not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to
2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that
were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the
parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for
disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer
to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence.26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that
the parties personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that
she shall do no falsehood.29
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the
solemn office of a notary public. In several instances,
the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were
found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant
disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary
public warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public.
Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the
personal records of respondent as a member of the bar
and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134530. December 4, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROBERTO SAMONTAEZ y DELA VEGA, accused-
appellant.
 DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated
May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the
appellant, Roberto V. Samontaez, of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.
In the early morning of November 25, 1995, Corazon delas
Alas saw her daughter, eighteen (18) year-old Lolita delas Alas,
off to school from their residence in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. That was the last time Corazon
had seen her alive because at 8:00 oclock in the evening of the
same day Lolitas lifeless and naked body was found in the
middle of a sugar cane plantation in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Lolita was apparently raped
before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the grisly
crime. However, police investigation reveals that Roberto
Samontaez was seen at around 6:30 oclock in the evening on
November 25, 1995 while he was in the act of coming out of the
sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya,
Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas near the place where
the dead body of Lolita delas Alas was later found. It also
appears that earlier, at around 5:30 oclock in the afternoon,
Roberto passed by the house of Melecio Mendoza in Sitio
Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and he headed eastward to
the direction of the sugar cane plantation of Desacola. Thirty
(30) minutes later, Lolita was also spotted, and she was likewise
heading eastward to her house in Sitio Ilaya. At around 7:00
oclock in the evening, Roberto returned heading westward and
he passed through the same path along the cane field.
On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police
authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas from his workplace at
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. During the investigation at the Nasugbu Police
Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas, Roberto admitted to the
police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas
were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez,
Cavite. A follow-up investigation conducted by the Nasugbu
police authorities at Hermogenes Trading in Mendez, Cavite led
to the recovery of the said personal belongings of the victim.
On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontaez was formally
charged in court with the crime of rape with homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995, at about 6:30
oclock in the evening, at Sitio Ilaya, Brgy. Bunducan,
Municipality of Nasugbu, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
Lolita delas Alas y Andino against her will and consent and by
reason or on occasion of the said rape accused with intent to
kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangled the said Lolita
delas Alas y Andino with the use of the latters T-shirt which
directly caused her instantaneous death. Further, the personal
properties of Lolita delas Alas y Andino consisting of a gold ring
and a wrist watch in an undetermined amount were taken by the
accused.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon being arraigned on February 1, 1996, accused
Roberto Samontaez, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered the
plea of Not guilty to the Information in this case.
Pre-trial was scheduled and terminated on March 14,
1996. Before trial on the merits could ensue the accused,
through counsel, manifested his intention of changing his earlier
plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Accordingly, the trial court
ordered that the accused be re-arraigned in Tagalog, a dialect
which he understood, and the said accused then pleaded guilty
to the charge of rape with homicide as stated in the instant
information. After being satisfied that the accused entered a
voluntary and informed plea by asking some questions, the trial
court required the prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability
pursuant to Article 116, Section 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[3]
The evidence of the prosecution shows that on November
26, 1995, the victim, Lolita delas Alas alias Betia, left their house
in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at
around 6:00 oclock in the morning to attend her classes at Kim
Harold Computer School in Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas. She
was expected to return home at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of
the same day. Having failed to come home on time, the victims
mother, Corazon delas Alas, decided to meet Lolita in Barangay
Pantalan which was her usual route in going home from
school. Upon her arrival in Barangay Pantalan however,
Corazon was informed that Lolita had already passed by, and
that by then she must have reached their home. Corazon
returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that Lolita was not yet
home. Filled with apprehension, Corazon sought the assistance
of her neighbors, Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio Salao, to locate
her daughters whereabouts. At 8:00 oclock in the evening
Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that
the dead body of Lolita was found in the sugar cane plantation
of Perino Desacola. The body of her dead daughter was already
inside the house when she regained consciousness.[4]
Corazon gave her sworn statement[5] to the police on
December 8, 1995 in connection with the rape-slay case of her
daughter Lolita delas Alas. She knew accused-appellant
Roberto Samontaez for the reason that he was a resident of
Sitio Balanggutan, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The death of her daughter was very painful to
Corazon and that she spent about P40,000.00 in connection
with her wake and funeral.[6]
It appears that on November 26, 1995, Carlito Samontaez,
who is a first cousin of both the accused-appellant and the
victim, was on his way home after gathering fodder for his
animals when, at a distance of twenty (20) arms length, he
chanced upon Roberto at around 6:30 oclock in the evening
while the latter was coming out of the sugar cane plantation of
Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu,
Batangas. Carlito and Roberto were coming from opposite
directions. However, when they came close to two (2) arms
length with each other, Carlito observed that Roberto, who was
naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder, was
perspiring, somewhat surprised and looked pale (medyo po
namumutla). Carlito greeted Roberto and asked him where he
just came from, but the latter did not answer and left
hurriedly. Carlito dismissed his cousins reaction, thinking that he
(Roberto) may have been merely drunk.[7]
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for
Lolita upon learning that she was missing. At 8:00 oclock in the
evening, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane plantation
of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya. Lolita was lying on her
stomach, naked and a black T-shirt was tied around her neck.[8]
Another prosecution witness, Melecio Mendoza, who is an
uncle of Roberto Samontaez by affinity, saw Roberto walking
eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30
oclock in the afternoon on November 26, 1995. Melecio also
saw Lolita at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day
walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at 7:00 oclock in the
evening, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his house, this
time heading westward to Sitio Balanggutan in Barangay
Bunducan. Roberto was naked from waist up with his T-shirt
placed on his shoulder.[9]
Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been
requested by Renato Bauyon. Lolita was totally naked and
already dead when they found her in the sugar cane plantation
of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya which was approximately one
hundred (100) meters away from his house in Sitio Balanggutan.
[10]
Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in
Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, SPO2 Buenaventura
Masikat and other police officers of Nasugbu, Batangas,
together with Dra. Estela Hizon, proceeded to the crime scene
in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas where
the victim, Lolita delas Alas, was found dead and lying on her
stomach totally naked with a black T-shirt tied around her
neck. A panty was stuffed in her anal area. Her hands were
stretched upward and her bra was half removed.[11]
Dra. Estela Hizon, M.D., Municipal Health Officer of
Nasugbu, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on
the cadaver of Lolita delas Alas which was already in a state
of rigor mortis. Her findings are contained in her post mortem
certification[12] dated November 26, 1995, thus:
1. Contusion around the left eye.
2. Contused wounds at the upper and lower lips.
3. Presence of mark of strangulation around the neck.
4. Multiple contusions at the anterior aspect of the
chest.
5. Multiple laceration of the hymen.
Cause of death: Asphyxia by Strangulation.
Dra. Hizon also prepared an anatomical sketch of the
human body[13] showing the location of the injuries indicated in
her post-mortem report and another anatomical sketch showing
the hymenal lacerations[14] in the vaginal canal of the victim. She
explained that the contusion on the left eye, the contused
wounds on the upper and lower lips with swelling and blackish
discoloration as well as the multiple contusions at the anterior
aspect of the chest of the victim may have been caused by fist
blows. The horizontal skin depressions around the victims neck
was caused by ligature possibly with the use of a piece of cloth
or a rope. The protruding tongue of the victim may have been
caused by constriction around her neck. The multiple fresh
lacerations of the hymen may have been caused by forcible
penetration of the victims vaginal canal. There was watery
bloodied fluid coming out of the victims vagina. Finally, the
cause of death of the victim was asphyxia by strangulation.[15]
Meanwhile, SPO2 Masikat found two (2) short pants and
one (1) piece of slipper that belonged to Lolita delas Alas.[16] On
the other hand, SPO2 Dionisio Calara took pictures[17] of the
deceased victim and the scene of the crime on the same
evening. On November 27, 1995, police officers Masikat and
Calara returned to the crime scene and found the black bag of
the victim containing a lotion, a pair of maong pants and a pair
of shoes.[18] They also found the brown bag of the victim which
contained her Kim Harold identification card, coin purse, hair
pin, powder kit and powder puff.[19] In addition, they prepared a
sketch of the scene of the crime[20] and its vicinity. Thereafter,
SPO2 Masikat conducted interviews of the persons in the
vicinity among whom were the prosecution witnesses, Carlito
Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza. During the interview, SPO2
Masikat learned, among others, that the suspect, Roberto
Samontaez, could possibly be located at Hermogenes Trading
in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite where he worked.[21]
On November 28, 1995, SPO2 Masikat, together with police
officers Ramos, Malinay, Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao, all of the
Nasugbu, Batangas police found Roberto Samontaez at the
Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. After talking to his employer, they invited Roberto to the
Nasugbu Police Headquarters. During the interrogation at the
police headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2 Masikat and
SPO2 Calara that some of the personal belongings of Lolita
delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in
Mendez, Cavite.[22]
On December 4, 1995 SPO2 Masikat and his group
returned to Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III,
Mendez, Cavite and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes
about the bag of Roberto. Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes
produced a black bag purportedly belonging to Roberto
containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne and a
pawnshop receipt for a gold ring that was subsequently
redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for P500.00. The three (3) articles
were positively identified during the trial of the case by Corazon
delas Alas as belonging to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas. The
police also found a fan knife (balisong) and a Barangay
Clearance inside the black bag of Roberto Samontaez.[23]
 The prosecution rested its case on November 30,
1997. During the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29,
1998 for the presentation of evidence of the defense, the
accused took the witness stand and reiterated his previous plea
of guilty to the crime charged in the information.Thereafter, the
trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused
Roberto Samontaez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal, of the crime of Rape with Homicide as thus penalized
and is hereby sentenced to DEATH, together with the accessory
penalties provided for in Article 40 of the same code. The
accused is further condemned to pay to the heirs of the victim
the amount of P40,000.00 by way of compensatory or actual
damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death; and
P100,000.00 as and for moral damages, The accused should
pay costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
In his Brief, appellant Roberto Samontaez assails the
validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in the information in
this case for having been improvidently made. On the other
hand, the People belie the claim of the appellant by citing
portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
hearing during the appellants re-arraignment on March 14, 1996
and that of the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998
to show that he voluntarily entered the plea of guilty to the crime
of rape with homicide as charged in the information and with full
knowledge of the consequences of his plea of guilty. It averred
that the guilt of the appellant was also established beyond
reasonable doubt by independent evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant case.
The record shows that the trial court relied on a) the
appellants plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as
charged in the information and b) the evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial of the instant case.
Section 3 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure specifically mandates the course that trial courts
should follow in case where the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, as follows:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.-
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of
the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered
by the accused: 1. The trial court must conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea; 2. The trial court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the
requisite quantum of evidence; and 3. The trial court must ask
the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.[25] It must be emphasized that
the said procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to
observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.[26]
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namelydeath, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is
to avoid improvident pleas of guilty on the part of an accused
where grave crimes are involved since by admitting his guilt
before the court, he would forfeit his life and liberty without
having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.[27]
The Court notes the trial courts efforts to ensure the
propriety of appellants plea of guilty to the crime of rape with
homicide as evidenced by its lengthy inquiries to the appellant in
separate hearings, the transcript of which were reproduced in its
assailed Decision. Hence, during the scheduled hearing on
March 14, 1996, the following proceedings transpired, to wit:
Court:
Ready?
Atty. Exchaure:
Your honor, just a moment ago I informed the accused the
fact that we will now proceed with the trial on the merits
of the case, but as usual, the accused intimated to this
representation that he will be pleading guilty to the
offense charged against him. I informed him the gravity of
the offense as well as the corresponding severe penalty
attached to the offense which is death, considering that
there is a new law. But the accused insists on his desire
to plead guilty, in fact I brought that desire of his to the
attention of his mother who is present, as well as his
aunt, and grandmother, and according to them, that is the
wish of the accused to plead guilty to the charge against
him.
Court:
The Court is asking the accused.
Q: Is the manifestation of your counsel, Atty. Exchaure true
and correct that you have now made up your mind to
plead guilty to the offense as charged?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are doing that with your clear mind, nobody
forced you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you reveal before to your counsel your decision to
plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir.
accused.)
Q: Where is the mother of the accused?
Atty. Exchaure:
She is here, your honor.
Court: (To the mother Teresita Samontaez)
Q: Are you related to the accused?
A: He is my son, your honor.
Q: Now, is it true that your son has decided to plead guilty?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: And as mother, did you counsel your son that pleading
guilty will mean his guilt as charged?
A: Yes, your honor.
Court:
The accused can now be re-arraigned, but after his plea of
guilty, the prosecution still has to present evidence as
required by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Prosecutor Marajas:
Yes, your honor.
Court:
Make your motion, Mr. defense counsel.
Atty. Exchaure:
Your honor, the accused, a moment ago, intimated to this
representation that he is changing his former Plea of Not
Guilty to that of Guilty, for which reason, your honor, I
move that the accused be re- arraigned so that he could
properly enter his Plea of Guilty.
Court:
Re-arraign the accused.
(The Court Interpreter read the information in Pilipino to the
Court Interpreter: Q: Did your mother tell you to plead guilty?
(After reading the Information in Pilipino.) A: No, sir.
Your honor, the accused entered a Plea of Not Guilty. Q: Did your counsel, Atty. Exchaure tell you to plead guilty?
Court: A: No, sir.
Place the accused on the witness stand. I want to clear this Q: Did the prosecutor tell you to plead guilty?
matter very well, because of the gravity of the offense.
A: No, sir.
Court: (To the accused)
Q: Did anybody for that matter tell you to plead guilty?
Q: Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in
A: None, sir.
this case?
Q: When you pleaded guilty, you were in your right senses?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please state your name and other personal
circumstances. Q: What grade did you finish in school or what is your
educational attainment?
A: ROBERTO SAMONTANEZ, 26 years old, single, laborer in
a construction, and a resident of Barangay Bunducan, A: Grade IV, sir.
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Q: But you can read and write?
Q: You were re-arraigned this morning by reading to you an
A: Yes, sir.
information in Pilipino, did you understand the information
as read to you? Q: As in fact, you are a registered voter, as you did vote in
the last election?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are a Tagalog speaking because you were born
and grew up in Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas? Q: Where did you vote?
A: Yes, sir. A: Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas, sir.
Q: Do you know that by pleading guilty as you did awhile ago, Q: In other words, you are admitting to have raped and killed
the Court will impose on you the death penalty as the victim in this case, Lolita delas Alas on that date in
provided for by law for this offense? question and as charged in the information?
A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your pleading guilty was nobodys liking but of your Q: Nobody gave or promised you any reward for your act of
own volition and spontaneous decision? pleading guilty?
A: Yes, sir. A: None, sir.
Q: Did anybody threaten or coerce or cajole you to do so? circumstances, if any, why he pleaded guilty when he
was re-arraigned.
A: None, sir.
Court:
Q: When you pleaded guilty awhile ago, whose decision is
that? Proceed.
A: Its my own decision, sir. Atty. Exchaure:
Q: Do you know the consequences of your pleading guilty? Q: Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that when you were re-
arraigned, you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the consequence of your pleading guilty?
Q: And in fact, you were asked by the Honorable Court if your
A: I will be punished with a grave penalty, sir.
having pleaded guilty is of your own voluntary act?
Q: Do you have an idea as to the grave penalty that the Court
A: Yes, sir.
may impose on you?
Q: Now, up to the present time, do you confirm the fact that
A: None, sir.
you pleaded guilty to the charge against you?
Q: Now, I am sternly and emphatically reminding you that the
A: Yes, sir.
Court may impose on you the severe penalty of death if
you still maintain your plea of guilty? Q: At the time you pleaded guilty, nobody forced or coerced
you to plead guilty?
A: Yes, sir, despite that I am not changing my plea of guilty,
sir. My conscience is bothering me, for what I did to the A: Yes, sir.
victim, sir.
Court:
Q: Alright, you sign on the notes together with the assistance
Q: And even now, nobody is threatening you?
of your counsel?
A: Nobody, sir.
A: (The accused affixed his signature on the notes together
with his counsel.)[28] Atty. Exchaure:
During the scheduled hearing on January 14, 1998 for the Q: Are you aware of the consequences of your having
presentation of evidence of the defense, the following pleaded guilty?
proceedings were duly recorded, to wit:
A: No, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Court:
The witness, your honor, is the accused himself. Although he
Q: Why do you say you dont know the consequences?
pleaded guilty to the crime imputed against him, he will
explain to the Honorable Court the reasons and A: I dont know what will happen to me, sir.
 Q: Dont you understand that by pleading guilty, the Court will
just penalize you for the crime that you admitted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in fact, the charge to which you pleaded guilty calls
for the supreme penalty of death?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And still you insist on or maintain your plea of guilty made
before and you are confirming the same this morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Exchaure:
Q: And you are willing to accept whatever will be the penalty
will be imposed by the Honorable Court for having
pleaded guilty, which you still maintain up to now?
A: Yes. Sir.
Court:
Are you remorseful for the crime imputed to you and which
you admitted to have committed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You just pray to God that in the final day of reckoning, God
will still forgive you?
A: Yes, sir.[29]
Also, on January 29, 1998, the following verbal exchange
were recorded, thus:
Court: (To the accused)
Q: Roberto Samontaez, your counsel this morning
manifested that you cannot furnish him any evidence at
least to mitigate the imposable penalty, now under your
same oath, do you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, you have nothing more to say regarding
your plea of guilty?
A: None, sir.
Q: You have nothing more to present at least to mitigate your
liability for the offense which you admitted to have
committed?
A: I was then high on marijuana, sir.
Q: Were you a user of marijuana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were repentant of what you did to the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that your repentance cannot bring back the
life of the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you leave your fate to this Court?
A: Yes, sir.[30]
Nevertheless, We are not convinced that such lengthy
inquiries conducted by the trial court during the re-arraignment
of the appellant as well as during the subsequent hearings for
the presentation of evidence of both the prosecution and the
defense sufficiently established voluntariness and full
comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. It may be noted that the appellant
earlier entered the plea of Not guilty to the Information in this
case during his arraignment on February 1,
1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his
counsel de officio, his intention to change his previous plea to
that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. After having entered the plea of guilty on re-
arraignment, the trial court proceeded to propound questions on
the appellant during which affirmative responses were elicited
from the appellant apparently to show that his subsequent plea
of guilty was his own voluntary decision. The trial court per its
Decision under review, however, failed to dwell on a significant
development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on
November 13, 1997 when the appellant revealed in open court,
through counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was
prompted by pressure from a certain policeman so that he
(appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense
charged. The pertinent portion of the transcript is quoted
hereunder, to wit:
Court:
The prosecution having rested, the Court wants to hear from
the defense what it has to offer.
Atty. Exchaure:
I am now in dilemma, your honor, considering that the
accused has already pleaded guilty to the charge against
him and the accused intimated to me this morning that he
is changing his plea of guilty because according to him
when he testified before this Honorable Court admitted
and pleaded guilty (sic), he was under pressure by a
certain policeman to admit the commission of the offense.
Court:
Well, that is your point, you have to present your evidence.
Atty. Exchaure:
In that case, your honor, considering the recent development
on the intention of the accused, may I be allowed to
confer first with the accused and ask the Honorable Court
to have this case to move for continuance to give us time
to present the accused himself at the next schedule
hearing.
Court:
Granted.
Prosecutor Marajas:
I just manifest for the record that the accused is a detention
prisoner if what the defense counsel stated were true and
correct that Mr. Roberto Samontaez was just pressured,
the more he should present the. . .
Court:
Precisely, thats why he is asking for postponement.[31]
The trial court perfunctorily brushed aside the aforesaid
disclosure from the appellant that he was pressured by a
policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty
to the charge in the information. It did not propound any
clarificatory questions about the matter on the same occasion
such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the nature of
the pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged
pressure was applied on the appellant. Although further inquiries
were undertaken by the trial court in the subsequent hearings on
January 14 and 29, 1998, the questions addressed to the
appellant were primarily aimed at eliciting affirmative responses
or confirmations of his plea of guilty. The statement of the
appellant that he was pressured by a certain policeman
apparently escaped the memory or concern of the trial court as
it did not crop up in its inquiry during those subsequent
hearings. Left unventilated, the appellants allegation of pressure
generates doubt on the voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a
capital offense.
Certain other considerations pose nagging doubts on the
clarity of appellants grasp of the true meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea of guilty. The trial court failed to
mention and explain clearly to the appellant the elements of the
crime of rape with homicide as charged in the Information. [32] As
a result, appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental
right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process
clause under the Constitution.
Notably, the appellant who reached grade IV only stated
that he did not know the consequences of his plea of guilty
during the hearing on February 14, 1996 and again, during the
hearing on January 14, 1998. While the trial court informed the
appellant that his plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability
for the crime of rape with homicide, as charged in the
information, which carries the penalty of death, it failed to
emphasize that his said plea of guilty would not, under any
circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition
of which is mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659.[33] In which event, the appellant must be made to
understand in plain and simple language the precise meaning of
the term mandatory.[34] Additionally, the trial court failed to
apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g. indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages) arising from the crime of
rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as
perpetrator of the crime.[35] Despite appellants apparent
willingness to accept the penalty for his crime, it is not farfetched
to say that appellant was actually led to believe that the penalty
for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea of guilty thereto
especially when the trial court informed the appellant, through
counsel, that he should adduce evidence.
Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent
of securing every material detail of the crime in its lengthy
inquiries to the appellant subsequent to his re-
arraignment. Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have
been asked of the appellant. Although there is no definite and
concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of
a proper searching inquiry, it would be well for the trial court, for
instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that
spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-enact
the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him
to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance
in order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime.
[36]
 As it is, the Decision of the trial court is devoid of any factual
finding relative to the actual commission of the crime of rape
with homicide by the appellant. In the final analysis, it is the
quality rather than the number of questions propounded during
the inquiry that serves the task of ascertaining the voluntariness
and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of
his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
Lastly, the trial court lamentably considered pieces of
evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The facts show that the
appellant Roberto Samontaez was actually arrested by police
authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his
workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not
appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his
constitutional rights during the police custodial investigation
which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution.[37] It also does not appear that he was assisted by
counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence
of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant
during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime,
including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said
confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not
objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant.Thus,
the personal belongings of the victim namely: Omax wristwatch,
gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside the
bag of the appellant when the police authorities returned to the
appellants place of work at the Hermogenes Trading in
Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained
a confession from the appellant. In the case of People vs.
Alicando,[38] the Court had opportunity to reiterate the rule that
evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is
inadmissible, thus:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our
jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary
rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone
vs. United States. According to this rule, once the primary
source ( the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is
also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the fruit of
the poisonous tree is the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once removed
from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the
testimonies of Carlito Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza, both of
which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant
near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time when
the crime took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant
for the crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his
plea of guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made
and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Court, supra.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated May 15, 1998 in
Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V.
Samontaez, of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the
accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999]
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated
July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but
increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim,
Enrique Ike Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the
City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are
supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing the
said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when
the said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete
pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of
February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were
reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one
Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it
was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a
table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and
began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena
brought out his camera and took a picture.[2]
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security
guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why
he took a picture.[3]Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this
is my job.[4] Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the
latter that he would kill him.[5]When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was
about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions.[6]
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report
the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner
Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they
asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined
and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a
while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.[7]
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with
them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. [8] Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to
him: Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo
Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?[9] Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his
firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena,
said, Ano, uutasin na kita?[10]
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner
Navarro: Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-blotter,
I am here to mediate.[11]Petitioner Navarro replied: Walang press,
press, mag-sampu pa kayo.[12] He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told
him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.[13]
This angered Lingan, who said: O, di ilagay mo diyan.
[14]
 Petitioner Navarro retorted: Talagang ilalagay ko.[15] The two then
had a heated exchange.[16]Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang
abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo.
[17]
 Petitioner Navarro replied: Ah, ganoon?[18]
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with
the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the
floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.[19]
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha,
buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.[20] He said to Sgt.
Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante
Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.[21] He then poked his gun at
the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter.[22] Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was
trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.[23]
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro
to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and,
learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded
there. But Lingan died from his injuries.[24]
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.[25] The
following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: Im here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. Im
out of the problem.
....
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa
kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin
things. Do not say bad things against me.Im the number one
loko sa media. Im the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong
mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: Im brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka
namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon
sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito
sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka
Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
 Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang
ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan
tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare
hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril
ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa
harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo
eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni
Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako,
kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital
yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who
tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times,
and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time
hitting his head on the concrete.[26]
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial
court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for
the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create
that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is
criminally responsible.
The defenses evidence which consists of outright denial could not
under the circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecutions
evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly
Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort
the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither
brought him harm or injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by
Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley
Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena
sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of
deceased Lingan were caused by the latters falling down on the
concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellants aforesaid
disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of
the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial courts
factual conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of
appellants aggression does not impair the probative worth of his
positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far
from proving his innocence, appellants unwarranted assault upon
Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his
violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm
others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing
Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had
interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged him
to a fist fight.
....
On the other hand, appellants explanation as to how Lingan was
injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact
contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingans injuries as
shown in the post-mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense,
Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the course of
boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his
left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and
contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E). Certainly,
these injuries could not have resulted from Lingans accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE
CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS
CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION,
SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS
JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony
of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a
grudge against him.The testimony of a witness who has an interest in
the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.
[27]
 Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial
expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying,
are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be
given credence.[28] In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown
that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of
Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording
he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of
R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the
affirmative. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
....
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording
of private communications.[29] Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice
recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court
was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those
of the persons such are claimed to belong.[30] In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; [31] that
the tape played in court was the one he recorded;[32] and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. [33] A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1)
that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and
Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on
the body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate, [34] dated February 5,
1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral, eyebrow, Left
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left &
right eyebrow
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamoto testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this
findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the
forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard
object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on
a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.
FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling
under your findings No. 2 doctor?
WITNESS:
It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a
gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
Q How about this findings No. 4?
A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
A Same cause, sir.
Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
A Same thing, sir.
Q How about this last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes,
what could have caused it doctor?
WITNESS:
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
FISCAL: WITNESS:
In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of Possible, sir.
death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock,
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?
will you explain it?
A Possible, sir.[35]
A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog naalog ang utak or jarring
of the brain, sir. The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that
petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the
Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.
A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
Q What about the shock, what could have caused it? provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner
A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct
Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim? or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
anyone.[36] The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately
A Yes, sir. precede the act.[37] People v. Paga, 79 SCRA 570 (1977).37 To be
Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
deceased? which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. [38] And it must
immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval
A May be, sir. between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of
Q How about shock? the crime by the accused.[39]
A Yes, sir. In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately
preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
FISCAL: [40]
provocation. In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this mitigating
Which of these two more likely to cause death? circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist
after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence,
WITNESS: this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of
Shock, sir. petitioner Navarro.

Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock? Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be
A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier, appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of
sir. petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked
.... him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty
FISCAL: that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this
Could a bumping or pushing of ones head against a concrete floor mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal
have caused shock? liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
[41]
 In People v. Castro,[42] the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in
favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime
in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The
offense in this case was committed right in the police station where
policemen were discharging their public functions.[43]
The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two
mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.[44]Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the
maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.[45]
The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with current
jurisprudence.[46]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.