SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, G.R. No.

177809  
Petitioners,  
  Present: The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie
    Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial
  CARPIO MORALES,building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenuecorner Redemptorist
  CHICO-NAZARIO, Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
  NACHURA,  
  PERALTA, and On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful
  *
ABAD,  JJ. detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera
   
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of
Promulgated:
Respondent.   lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as
  October 16, 2009 lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
 
 
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---x The contract of lease reads:
   
  CONTRACT OF LEASE
DECISION  
  KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
NACHURA, J.:  
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
 
 
  ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age,
  married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B.
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and
hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1] (1) reversing the  
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch - and -
[2]
274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;  and (2) reinstating  
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA
and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address
(MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3] at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and
  hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
 
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower
 
courts. WITNESSETH
  
 
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial
building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes
Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino
Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in
Paraaque Ctiy;
 
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located
at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56
square meters under the following terms and conditions,
to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2)
cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However,
due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES
agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent
of the monthly rental;
 
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before
the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
 
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water
and electric consumptions in the said premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make
any alteration in the cubicles without a written
permission from the LESSOR. Provided,
however, that at the termination of the Contract,
the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its
original conditions at their expenses;
 
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles
in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not
keep any kinds of flammable or combustible
materials.
 
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the
monthly rental every time it falls due or violate
any of the above conditions shall be enough
ground to terminate this Contract of
Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES
pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the
rentals for the unused month or period by way
of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
 
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs.
only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to
December ______, 2005.
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto
affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999
at City of Manila, Philippines.
 
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
L E S S O R L E S S E E
 
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
 
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
 
Republic of the Philippines)
C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
 
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City
of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
 Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706  
at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC 1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million
No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the
Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave.
11, 1999. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City.
  ROFERLAND[5] Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons  
who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is FAR EAST BANK
their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.  
  ______(sgd.)______
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have Ferdinand Chua
hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th  
day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, 2. Received cash
Philippines. P500,000.00
  From Moshiera Latip
   
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS (sgd.)
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC 12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000 Received by
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.  
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4] 3. Received cash
  P70,000.00 from
  Moshiera Latip
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip 12-11-99
already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent  
____(sgd.)___
the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should Received by:[6]
they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip  
did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.  
  Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999,
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane
that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas
evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in
of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read: Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time.
According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00
would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first
priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
 
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were
finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the
completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the
contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of
lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to
receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent
filing of a complaint against them.
 
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
[Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under
them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property
subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a
Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue
corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran,
Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to
PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent
arrearages for the period of December 1999 to
December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the
amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to
December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for
each and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated
in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until
the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased
premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses
Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as
attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as
appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
 
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
 
 
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of
Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease,
ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects,
incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of
lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband;
(2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the
specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the
lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to
December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit
the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5)
the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is
supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
 
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease
was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the
two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses
Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her
receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective
lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights,
the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare
allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim.
On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties
for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses
Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased
premises until expiration of the lease period.
 
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the
appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13,
2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the
[Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the
latter to pay the former
 
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
 
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00
per court appearance as and for attorneys
fees; and
 
(4)               costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
 
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned,
reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA
ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of
Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract.
As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in
the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the
issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted
payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this
common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around
the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this
judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money
to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on
Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24,
2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
 
SO ORDERED.[9]
 
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
 
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should
be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding
the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged
practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill
money to the lessor.
 
We disagree.
 
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare
when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the
courts, thus:
 
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court
shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
 
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
 
 
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:
 
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the
wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to
take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
 
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will
not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are commonly
known.
 
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person.[11]
 
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial
notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[12] which cited State Prosecutors:
 
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
 uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover,
a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
 
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
such of universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety
of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
 
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is
apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice
of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to
the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with
the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was
of common knowledge or notoriously known.
 
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her
bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the
amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill
money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for
review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by
other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the
reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be
proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense
with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so
notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
 
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the
necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit
of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the
alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title
itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.
 
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had
knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.
As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be
reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with
caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample
reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the
negative.
 Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be
ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the
documentary evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and
the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
 
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which
documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the
contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract
and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or
harmonized. The RTC declared:
 
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement
over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2ndfloors of
Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building
located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist
Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to
[Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6)
years commencing in December 1999 up to December
2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of
Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however,
are modified or supplemented by another agreement
between the parties executed and or entered into in or
about the time of execution of the lease contract, which
exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.[13]
 
 
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a
lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease
which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand
Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts
for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, which contained only
the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns
and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the
need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts
concur on this fact.
 
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in
December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips
admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December
1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.
 
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts
amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of
goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of
judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence
that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the
stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the
payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by
Spouses Latip.
 
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code
provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
 
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may
be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those which the
parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should
admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing
that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
   Received by:[14]
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the  
 
receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment
lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount
and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the
was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year
whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of
period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and
cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state
for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are
payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of
again reproduced:
rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that
 
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to
pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of
payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find
corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City.
ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract. that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced
  rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______ that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
year after the commencement of the lease.
FAR EAST BANK
   
______(sgd.)______ Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses
Ferdinand Chua Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to
 
2. Received cash Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in
P500,000.00 accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease.
From Moshiera Latip However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals,
 
(sgd.) must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua  
Received by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
 
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and
Moshiera Latip Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid
12-11-99
rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as
 
___(sgd.) ____ advance rentals. No costs.
  
 
 
SO ORDERED.
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated January
25, 2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision[1] dated May 7, 2015 and
Resolution[2]dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissing his appeal for failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
The facts follow.
Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the
name and mark "Lavandera Ko" in his laundry business on July
4, 1994. He then opened his laundry store at No. 119 Alfaro St.,
Salcedo St., Makati City in 1995. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997,
the National Library issued to him a certificate of copyright over
said name and mark. Over the years, the laundry business
expanded with numerous franchise outlets in Metro Manila and
other provinces. Respondent Roberto then formed a corporation
to handle the said business, hence, Laundromatic
Corporation (Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997, while
"Lavandera Ko" was registered as a business name on November
13, 1998 with the Department of Trade and Industry(DTI).
Thereafter, respondent Roberto discovered that his brother,
petitioner Fernando was able to register the name and mark
"Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on
October 18, 2001, the registration of which was filed on June 5,
1995. Respondent Roberto also alleged that a certain Juliano
Nacino(Juliano) had been writing the franchisees of the former
threatening them with criminal and civil cases if they did not
stop using the mark and name "Lavandera Ko." It was found out
by respondent Roberto that petitioner Fernando had been
selling his own franchises.
Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair
competition, infringement of copyright, cancellation of
trademark and name with/and prayer for TRO and Preliminary
Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the case was
raffled off at Branch 149, Makati City. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioner Fernando in Order
dated June 10, 2004. On July 21, 2008, due to the death of
respondent Roberto, the latter was substituted by his son,
Christian Juan (Christian). Pre-trial conference was concluded
on July 13, 2010 and after the presentation of evidence of both
parties, the RTC rendered a Resolution dated September 23,
2013, dismissing the petition and ruling that neither of the
parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation of the
mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same was the original mark
and work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez(Santiago). According
to the RTC, the mark in question was created by Suarez in 1942
in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko" and both
parties of the present case failed to prove that they were the
originators of the same mark. The dispositive portion of the
RTC's resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds both the
plaintiff-Roberto and defendant-Fernando guilty of making
misrepresentations before this court, done under oath, hence,
the Amended Petition and the Answer with their money claims
prayed for therein are hereby DISMISSED.
Therefore, the Amended Petition and the Answer are hereby
DISMISSED for no cause of action, hence, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction is hereby DENIED for utter lack
of merit; and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on June
10, 2004 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
Finally, the National Library is hereby ordered to cancel the
Certificate of Registration issued to Roberto U. Juan on March
17, 1997 over the word "Lavandera Ko," under certificate no. 97-
362. Moreover, the Intellectual Property Office is also ordered to
cancel Certificate of Registration No. 4-1995-102749, Serial No.
100556, issued on October 18, 2001, covering the work
LAVANDERA KO AND DESIGN, in favor of Fernando U. Juan.
The two aforesaid government agencies are hereby requested to
furnish this Court of the copy of their cancellation.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Herein petitioner elevated the case to the CA through a notice of
appeal. In his appeal, petitioner contended that a mark is
different from a copyright and not interchangeable. Petitioner
Fernando insisted that he is the owner of the service mark in
question as he was able to register the same with the IPO
pursuant to Section 122 of R.A. No. 8293. Furthermore,
petitioner Fernando argued that the RTC erred in giving
credence to the article of information it obtained from the
internet stating that the Filipino folk song "Lavandera Ko" was a
composition of Suarez in 1942 rather than the actual pieces of
evidence presented by the parties. As such, according to
petitioner, such information acquired by the RTC is hearsay
because no one was presented to testify on the veracity of such
article.
Respondent Roberto, on the other hand, contended that the
appeal should be dismissed outright for raising purely questions
of law. He further raised as a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal, the failure of the petitioner to cite the page references to
the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and
(f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court and petitioner's failure to
provide a statement of facts. Respondent also argued that
assuming that the Appellant's Brief complied with the formal
requirements of the Rules of Court, the RTC still did not err in
dismissing the petitioner's answer with counterclaim because he
cannot be declared as the owner of "Lavandera Ko," since there
is prior use of said mark by another person.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 7, 2015, dismissed the
petitioner's appeal based on technical grounds, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for failure to comply with the requirements of
Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Hence, the present petition after the denial of petitioner
Fernando's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Fernando
raises the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS ON PURELY TECHNICAL
GROUNDS WAS PROPER CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE
BEFORE IT CAN BE RESOLVED BASED ON THE BRIEF
ITSELF.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT A MARK IS THE SAME AS A
COPYRIGHT.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT FERNANDO U. JUAN IS THE OWNER
OF THE MARK "LAVANDERA KO."
D.
WHETHER OR NOT AN INTERNET ARTICLE IS SUPERIOR
THAN ACTUAL EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES.[5]
According to petitioner Fernando, the CA should have
considered that the rules are there to promote and not to defeat
justice, hence, it should have decided the case based on the
merits and not dismiss the same based on a mere technicality.
The rest of the issues are similar to those that were raised in
petitioner's appeal with the CA.
In his Comment[6] dated April 22, 2016, respondent Roberto
insists that the CA did not commit an error in dismissing the
appeal considering that the formal requirements violated by the
petitioner in the Appellant's Brief are basic, thus, inexcusable
and that petitioner did not proffer any valid or substantive
reason for his non-compliance with the rules. He further argues
that there was prior use of the mark "Lavandera Ko" by another,
hence, petitioner cannot be declared the owner of the said mark
despite his subsequent registration with the IPO.
The petition is meritorious.
Rules of procedure must be used to achieve speedy and efficient
administration of justice and not derail it. [7] Technicality should
not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. [8] It is, [thus]
settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. [9] In Aguam v.
CA,[10]this Court ruled that:
x x x Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not
a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be
won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal
of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where
the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on
their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only
to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better
and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, this Court finds that a liberal construction of the
rules is needed due to the novelty of the issues presented.
Besides, petitioner had a reasonable attempt at complying with
the rules. After all, the ends of justice are better served when
cases are determined on the merits, not on mere technicality. [11]
The RTC, in dismissing the petition, ruled that neither of the
parties are entitled to use the trade name "Lavandera Ko"
because the copyright of "Lavandera Ko", a song composed in
1942 by Santiago S. Suarez belongs to the latter. The following
are the RTC's reasons for such ruling:
The resolution of this Court - NO ONE OF THE HEREIN
PARTIES HAS THE RIGHT TO USE AND ENJOY
"LAVANDERA KO"!
Based on the date taken from the internet - References: CCP
encyclopedia of Philippine art, vol. 6 http://www.himig.coin.ph
(http://kahimyang.info / kauswagan/articles/1420/today - in -
philippine -history this information was gathered: "In 1948,
Cecil Lloyd established the first Filipino owned record company,
the Philippine Recording System, which featured his rendition
of Filipino folk songs among them the "Lavandera ko" (1942)
which is a composition of Santiago S. Suarez". Thus, the herein
parties had made misrepresentation before this court, to say the
least, when they declared that they had coined and created the
subject mark and name. How can the herein parties have coined
and created the subject mark and work when these parties were
not yet born; when the subject mark and work had been created
and used in 1942.
The heirs of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez are the rightful owners of
subject mark and work - "Lavandera ko".
Therefore, the writ of injunction issued in the instant case was
quite not proper, hence the same shall be lifted and revoked.
This is in consonance with the finding of this court of the origin
of the subject mark and work, e.g., a music composition of one
Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.
Moreover, Section 171.1 of R.A. 8293 states: "Author" is the
natural person who has created the work." And, Section 172.1 of
R.A. No. 8293 provides: Literary and artistic works, hereinafter
referred to as "works", are original intellectual creations in the
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation and shall include in particular:
(d) Letters;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;”
Thus, the subject mark and work was created by Mr. Santiago S.
Suarez, hence, the subject mark and work belong to him, alone.
The herein parties are just false claimants, done under oath
before this court (paragraph 4 of Roberto's affidavit, Exhibit A
TRO, page 241, Vol. I and paragraph 2 of Fernando's affidavit,
Exhibit 26 TRO, page 354, Vol. I), of the original work of Mr.
Santiago S. Suarez created in 1942.
Furthermore, Section 21 of R.A. 8293 declares: "Patentable
Inventions - any technical solution of a problem in any field of
human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is
industrially applicable shall be patentable. It may be, or may
relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the
foregoing." Thus, the herein subject mark and work can never be
patented for the simple reason that it is not an invention. It is a
title of a music composition originated from the mind of Mr.
Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.
Thus, the proper and appropriate jurisprudence applicable to
this instant case is the wisdom of the High Court in the case of
Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporation v. Shoemart, Incorporated
(G.R. No. 148222, August 15, 2003), the Supreme Court ruled:
"The scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic
works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and
artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation."
The Supreme Court concluded: "The description of the art in a
book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of
the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former
may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it
can be secured at all, by letters patent." (Pearl & Dean v.
Shoemart, supra., citing the case of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99;
1879 U.S. Lexis 1888; 25 L. Ed. 841; 11 Otto 99, October, 1879
Term).
It is noted that the subject matter of Exhibit "5" (Annex 5) Of
Fernando (IPO certificate of registration) and Exhibit B of
Roberto (Certificate of Copyright Registration) could not be
considered as a literary and artistic work emanating from the
creative mind and/or hand of the herein parties for the simple
reason that the subject work was a creation of the mind of Mr.
Santiago S. Suarez in 1942. Thus, neither of the herein parties
has an exclusive right over the subject work "Lavandera Ko" for
the simple reason that herein parties were not the maker,
creator or the original one who conceptualized it. Section 171.1
defines the author as the natural person who has created the
work. (R.A. No. 8293). Therefore, it can be said here, then and
now, that said registrations of the word "Lavandera Ko" by the
herein parties cannot be protected by the law, Republic Act No.
8293. Section 172.2 (R.A. No. 8293) is quite crystal clear on this
point, it declares: "Works are protected by the sole fact of their
creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expressions, as
well as of their content, quality and purpose." Herein parties
were not the creators of the subject word. It was a creation of
Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.
Finally, in the case of Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of
Appeals and Lorenzo Tan (G.R. No. 130360, August 15, 2001),
the Supreme Court ruled: "A person to be entitled to a copyright
must be the original creator of the work. He must have created it
by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or
evasively imitating the work of another." Again, herein parties,
both, miserably failed to prove and establish on how they have
created this alleged work before registering it with the National
Library and the Intellectual Property Office, hence their claim of
ownership of the word "Lavandera Ko" is not conclusive or
herein parties are both great pretenders and imitators.
Therefore, it is hereby declared that registration with the IPO by
Fernando is hereby cancelled, for one and many others stated
herein, because of the admission of Fernando that he coined the
name from the lyrics of a song popularized in the 1950's by for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of
singer Ruben Tagalog. Admission is admissible without need of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them.
[15]
evidence. (Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court).  Trade name, on the other hand, is any designation which (a)
is adopted and used by person to denominate goods which he
Considering that herein parties had made misrepresentations markets, or services which he renders, or business which he
before this court, hence, both the herein parties came to this conducts, or has come to be so used by other, and (b) through its
court with unclean hands. Thus, no damage could be awarded to association with such goods, services or business, has acquired a
anyone of the herein parties.[12] special significance as the name thereof, and (c) the use of which
The above ruling is erroneous as it confused trade or business for the purpose stated in (a) is prohibited neither by legislative
name with copyright. enactment nor by otherwise defined public policy.[16]
The law on trademarks, service marks and trade names are Section 172.1 of R.A. 8293 enumerates the following original
found under Part III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain that are
the Intellectual Code of the Philippines, while Part IV of the protected from the moment of their creation, thus:
same law governs copyrights.
172.1 Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as
"Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used "works", are original intellectual creations in the literary and
as a trade name or specifically, a service name since the business artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and
in which it pertains involves the rendering of laundry services. shall include in particular:
Under Section 121.1 of R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any
visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or (a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;
services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a (b) Periodicals and newspapers;
stamped or marked container of goods. As such, the basic (c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral
contention of the parties is, who has the better right to use delivery, whether or not reduced in writing or other material
"Lavandera Ko" as a service name because Section 165.2 [13] of the form; 
said law, guarantees the protection of trade names and business (d) Letters; 
names even prior to or without registration, against any (e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic
unlawful act committed by third parties. A cause of action arises works or entertainment in dumb shows; 
when the subsequent use of any third party of such trade name (f) Musical compositions, with or without words; 
or business name would likely mislead the public as such act is (g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture,
considered unlawful. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the engraving, lithography or other works of art; models or designs
parties the proper determination as to who has the ultimate for works of art; 
right to use the said trade name by ruling that neither of them (h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of
has the right or a cause of action since "Lavandera Ko" is manufacture, whether or not registrable as an industrial design,
protected by a copyright. and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-
By their very definitions, copyright and trade or service name dimensional works relative to geography, topography,
are different. Copyright is the right of literary property as architecture or science;
recognized and sanctioned by positive law. [14] An intangible, (j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator character;
of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested,
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process
analogous to photography; lantern slides;  judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works
produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audio-visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and  I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
As such, "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with
words is protected under the copyright law (Part IV, R.A. No.
8293) and not under the trademarks, service marks and trade
names law (Part III, R.A. No. 8293).
In connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article
appearing in a website,[17] in ruling that the song entitled
"Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright, cannot be
considered a subject of judicial notice that does not need further
authentication or verification. Judicial notice is the cognizance
of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them. [18] Put
differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need
of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based
on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing
evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute
and are not bona fide disputed. [19] In Spouses Latip v. Chua,
[20]
 this Court expounded on the nature of judicial notice, thus:
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when
the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the
courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized
to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly"
known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial
notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide,
a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.
The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a
requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court because such
article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or
uncertain. It must be remembered that some articles appearing
in the internet or on websites are easily edited and their sources
are unverifiable, thus, sole reliance on those articles is greatly
discouraged.
Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it
proper to remand the case to the RTC for its proper disposition
since this Court cannot, based on the records and some of the
issues raised by both parties such as the cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of registration issued by the Intellectual
Property Office, make a factual determination as to who has the
better right to use the trade/business/service name, "Lavandera
Ko."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated January 25, 2016, of
petitioner Fernando U. Juan is GRANTED. Consequently, the
Decision dated May 7, 2015 and Resolution dated December 4,
2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. This Court, however, ORDERS the REMAND of this
case to the RTC for its prompt disposition.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188706
Appellee,  
  Present:
   
  CORONA, J.,
  Chairperson,
  VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
   PERALTA, and
  MENDOZA, JJ.
  Promulgated:
OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO,  
Appellant. March 17, 2010
   
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---x
 
 
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated
August 13, 2008, affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC)
Decision[3] dated June 9, 2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape.
Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape,
as defined and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
in separate Informations, which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899
 
That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
the use of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of
age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to R.A. 7659).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900
 
That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay
Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with the use of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to R.A. 7659).[4]
Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently,
however, he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the RTC
ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellants plea of guilt to the
charges.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her mother, BBB,
and Dr. Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the following:
1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in 1989
when she was ten (10) years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant
and gave birth in 1993.
2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses of
Barsilisa Morada, Documentos relative, and Aida Documento, both
located in Butuan City. During each incident, Documento hit and hurt
AAA physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if she told anyone multiforma
 
of the rape. Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for
3. AAAs mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994 Spermatozoa. [5]

to 1996, went to Barsilisa and asked for help in locating Oscar and Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated
AAA. BBB testified that she had not seen nor heard from the two since that he pled guilty to the crime of Rape only because Prosecutor
April 7, 1994, when Documento brought their daughters AAA and Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento contended that
CCC to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual,
Documento left CCC in Tubod and brought AAA with him sexual relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen
to Santiago, Agusan del Norte. in ButuanCity, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-
  examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had
4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their
and gave birth, she suspected that Documento was the culprit. Upon forgiveness.
learning that Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to  
the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing custody The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of
of AAA. As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the Rape, to wit:
police that Documento raped her.  
  WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, this
5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on Court finds accused Oscar M. Documento GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of rape
AAA, and affirmed the medical certificate he issued with the following
and correspondingly sentences him:
findings:  
  1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the two
Physical exam: HEENT with in normal limits. (2) rape cases filed against him - Criminal Case No.
C/L with in normal limits. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;
CVB with in normal limits.  
ABD Soft; NABS 2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the amount
GU (-) KPS of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
Genitalia - Parrous damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
- Healed vaginal respectively, for each count of rape in accordance with
laceration recent jurisprudence.
- Vaginal introitus; admits 2 finger[s]  
with ease Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of
- Hymen accused Oscar M. Documento from Butuan City Jail to
with pemnants caruncula the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
  
Let the records of these cases be forwarded
immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
 
SO ORDERED.[6]
 
Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] Documentos appeal
was remanded to the CA.
 
Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction, but
changed the penalty imposed on Documento from death penalty
to reclusion  perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellant
Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of the crime of rape and ordering him to
indemnify the victim for each count of rape the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape and that
in lieu of the death penalty, appellant
Oscar Documento is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
without possibility of parole.
 
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
 
Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT FIRST
RESOLVING ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
OVER THE CRIME CHARGED AS THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE WERE
PERPETRATED IN BUTUAN CITY.
II.
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY
INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL
COMPREHENSION BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.[9]
 
We find no cogent reason to disturb Documentos conviction. We
affirm the CA, but with modification.
On the issue of the trial courts territorial jurisdiction over the
crime, we completely agree with the appellate courts ruling thereon.
Contrary to the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to
establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated
in ButuanCity, the CA pointed to specific parts of the records which
show that, although AAA did not specifically mention Butuan City in
her testimony, the incidents in the present cases transpired
in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.
First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24,
1996 answered the prosecutors question in this wise:
 
15. Q : Right after you arrived [in] Butuan City,
did your father molest you or rape
you?
A : Yes, sir.
 
Q : When was that?
A : From the month of October 15, 1995
when we stayed
[in] BarangayAntongalon, Butuan  Philippines, the official acts of the
City, and the last happened in the
evening of April 22, 1996
[on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City.
 
Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Hector
B. Salise, Second Assistant City Prosecutor, states that:
 
There were many places they stayed and
several sexual intercourse that took place
which this office has no jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation but
only on the incidents of rape that took
place [in] Antongalon, Butuan Cityon
October 15, 1995 and [on] Ochoa
Avenue, Butuan City on April 22,
1996.
Third.  The two (2) Informations dated May 8, 1996,
clearly state that the crimes charged against appellant
were perpetrated in Barangay Antongalon and Ochoa
Avenue, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and April 22,
1996, respectively.
 
Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City
of Butuan is a matter of mandatoryjudicial notice by the
trial court. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence provides
 
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when
mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the
legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.[10]
 
 
Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed
because the trial court did not properly conduct a searching inquiry on
the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilt.
 
We disagree.
 
It is true that the appellate court noted the trial courts failure to
conduct the prescribed searching inquiry into the matter of whether or
not Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it
still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition
on Documentos plea of guilt is in point.
 
Nothing in the records of the case at bench
shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines
[set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases]
after appellants re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
questions propounded to appellant during the direct and
cross-examination likewise fall short of these
requirements. x x x.
 
x x x x
 
The questions propounded were clearly not compliant
with the guidelines set forth by the High Court. The
appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of
 his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, the trial On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no reversible
court should have informed him that his plea of guilt
would not affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which error in affirming the trial courts ruling convicting Documento.
is death as he might have erroneously believed that  
under Article 63, the death penalty, being a single Lastly, on the matter of the appellate courts award of exemplary
indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court
damages, we increase the award from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line
regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might
have attended the commission of the deed. Moreover, with prevailing jurisprudence.
the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his  
right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision
 
With the trial courts failure to comply with the dated August 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00285
guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
improvidently made and thus rendered inefficacious. exemplary damages is hereby increased
 
This does not mean, however, that the case should be from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all other
remanded to the trial court. This course of action is respects.
appropriate only when the appellants guilty plea was  
the sole basis for his conviction. As held in People v.
SO ORDERED.
Mira, -
   
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that
attended appellants guilty plea, we are
not inclined to remand the case to the
trial court as suggested by appellant.
Convictions based on an improvident
plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If
the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence in finding the accused
guilty, the judgment must be sustained, [G.R. No. 117029. March 19, 1997]
because then it is predicated not merely
on the guilty plea of the accused but also
on evidence proving his commission of
PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., PATROCINIO E.
the offense charged.[11]
MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, VIRGINIA E.
  VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C.
  [1]
ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL and ALICE E.
SOTTO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
 ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN
ARAUJO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action, should the Court of Appeals invoke a Supreme Court
decision promulgated after such motion was filed by defendants
and ruled upon by the trial court? Is such invocation violative of
the rule that motions to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
should be ruled upon only on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint? Who are the real parties-in-interest in an action to
cancel a Torrens certificate of title?
Petitioners challenge the Decision[2] of public respondent[3] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 28244 promulgated on June 29, 1994, which
ruled as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated August 22, 1989 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to try the case
on plaintiffs (herein private respondents) complaint/amended
complaint against all defendants (herein petitioners).
Let the original record of the case be returned to the court of origin.
In a Resolution[5] promulgated on September 2, 1994,
Respondent Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The order reversed by public respondent had been issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil
Case No. LP-8852-P. The order in part ruled:[6]
Considering the arguments and counter-arguments urged by the parties
in this case, particularly on the nature and effect of the action filed by
plaintiffs, the Court is inclined to grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendant Peltan Development Corporation on the basis of the
Supreme Court ruling in Gabila vs. Barriga, 41 SCRA 131. The
ultimate result of the cancellation prayed for by the plaintiffs, if
B. granted by this Court, would be to revert the property in question to
the public domain. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of such
cancellation would be the Government. Since the Government can
only be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, which has
repeatedly refused to institute or join an action for cancellation of
defendants titles, then, the real party in interest cannot be said to have
instituted the present action. It is the Government, not the plaintiffs
which is the real party in interest. Plaintiffs not being the real party in
interest, they have no cause of action against the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and this case
is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiffs pursuing
administrative relief in the proper government agencies concerned.
The Facts
The facts, as found by public respondent, are undisputed by
the parties, to wit:[7]
On February 20, 1981 plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed
against eleven (11) defendants (herein petitioners) a complaint
captioned for Cancellation of Titles and Damages. On December 15,
1981, the complaint was amended by including or impleading as the
twelfth defendant the City Townhouse Development Corporation.
Omitting the jurisdictional facts, the allegations in the amended
complaint are quoted hereunder:
II
Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land
comprising an area of 197,527 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
III
Prior to the filing of their petition for free patent, plaintiffs had for
many years been occupying and cultivating the aforestated piece of
land until their crops, houses and other improvements they introduced
thereon were illegally bulldozed and destroyed by persons led by
defendant Edgardo Espinosa x x x Thereafter, the same persons
forcibly and physically drove out plaintiffs therefrom.
IV
Plaintiffs filed their petition for issuance of free patent covering the
aforesaid property with the Bureau of Lands in May 1976, as a result
of which they were issued by the Lands Bureau Survey Authority No.
54 (IV-1) on December 16, 1976.
V Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Juliana Carlos whence all the transfer
Accordingly, and on the strength of the aforesaid authority to survey,
plaintiffs had the property surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Regino L.
Sobrerinas, Jr. on December 20-21, 1976.
VI
During the years that plaintiffs were occupying, cultivating, planting
and staying on the aforestated parcel of land, neither x x x one of the
defendants was in possession thereof.
VII
The processing and eventual approval of plaintiffs free patent
application or petition over the subject piece of land have, however,
been obstructed and/or held in abeyance, despite the absence of any
opposition thereto, because of the alleged existence of several
supposed certificates of title thereon, x x x of the defendants, namely:
Peltan Development, Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992
xxx xxx xxx
VIII
The aforestated transfer certificates of title of the abovenamed
defendants, plaintiffs discovered, and therefore they hereby allege,
were all derived from an alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216
supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered in
the name of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos in
1929 allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 351823 issued by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672.
IX
Plaintiffs, however, subsequently discovered, after a thorough
research, that the alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 of the
certificates of title of the x x x abovenamed defendants originated
and/or were derived from was FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Being, thus, derived and/or having originated from a FICTITIOUS
and/or SPURIOUS original certificate of title (OCT No. 4216), as
herein above shown, ALL the aforestated transfer certificates of title of
the x x x abovenamed defendants are, logically and imperatively,
FAKE, SPURIOUS and/or NULL AND VOID as well. Hence, they all
must and should be CANCELED.
xxx xxx xxx
XIV
Before they decided to institute this action, plaintiffs informed, indeed
they warned, the defendants that their so-called titles over the parcels
of land or portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent application
and/or petition are either fake, spurious or void for reasons aforestated.
But the defendants simply ignored plaintiffs admonitions.
XV
Accordingly, plaintiffs were compelled to retain the services of the
undersigned counsel to file this complaint not only because they have
been materially and substantially prejudiced by the existence of
defendants spurious titles, but also because as citizens and taxpayers of
this country they have a legitimate interest in the disposition of
alienable lands of the State, as well as the right to question any
illegitimate, unlawful or spurious award, disposition or registration
thereof to protect not just their interest but also the public.
XVI
Because of the defendants illegal titling of the parcel of land or
portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent application, and
particularly by the unlawful disturbance of plaintiffs possession
thereof and destruction of plaintiffs plants and dwellings thereon,
which was caused and/or directed by the defendants Edgardo Espinosa
and Pat C. Margolles, said defendants should be ordered to pay
plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages in such amount as may be
proven during the trial of this case. (Original Records, Vol. I, pp. 202-
214)
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the prayer in the amended
complaint states:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing,
judgment (should) be rendered:
1. Canceling the transfer certificates of titles of the defendants as
specified in par. VII hereof and/or declaring them null and void for
having originated or being derived from a fictitious, spurious or void
original certificates of title.
2. Ordering defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles to pay
plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages as may be proven during
the trial of this case. And
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs appropriate amount of
exemplary damages and reasonable amount of attorneys fees, as well
as to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for such other reliefs just and
equitable in the premises. (Original Records, Vol. I, p. 215)
xxx xxx xxx
On April 3, 1985, defendant Peltan Development Corporation (Peltan,
for brevity) filed a Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defenses mainly on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action against defendant Peltan. It is alleged in the motion that
plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest in the action as they do not
assert any present and subsisting title of ownership over the property in
question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, L-28917,
promulgated on September 30, 1971, the defendant Peltan contends
that the action being one for cancellation of the certificates of title the
Government, through the Solicitor General not a private individual like
plaintiff Gabila was the real party in interest.
On April 27, 1989 plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendant Peltans
aforesaid motion in which plaintiffs reasserted their cause of action as
set forth in their complaint, and pointed to the trial court the pertinent
averments in their action showing their rights and interests or claims
that had been violated which thus placed them in the status of a real
party in interest. Subsequently, defendant Peltan filed its reply to
plaintiffs opposition, with plaintiffs submitting their rejoinder thereto.
Then finally defendant Peltan filed its comment on the rejoinder.
On August 22, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
Holding that the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interest,
the RTC ruled that they had no cause of action against the
defendants. The order was reversed by public respondent.
Hence, this petition for review.
In a motion filed before this Court on March 8, 1996,
petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens annotated on their titles under Entry No. 210060/T-
12473-A. The notice was caused by Private Respondent
Alejandro Rey because of the pendency of Civil Case No. LP-
8852-P, the dismissal of which is the issue at bench. [8]
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, holding that the two
elements of a cause of action were present in the complaint, to
wit: 1) the plaintiffs primary right and 2) the delict or wrongful act
of the defendant violative of that right. The CA held that private
respondents had a right over the property as shown by the
allegation that they had been occupying the landholding in
question and that they had applied for a free patent thereon; and
that petitioners committed a delict against private respondents
by forcibly driving them out of the property, and delaying the
processing and approval of their application for free patent
because of the existence of petitioners transfer certificates of
title derived from OCT No. 4126. [9] The CA further held that the
RTC should have treated the case as an accion publiciana to
determine who as between the parties plaintiffs and defendants
have a better right of possession.[10]
Stressing that only the facts alleged in the complaint should
have been considered in resolving the motion to dismiss,
Respondent CA held that the trial court had erred in accepting
the allegations of herein petitioners that private respondents
requests for the Solicitor General to file an action to annul OCT
No. 4216 had been repeatedly denied.
Public respondent also rejected the application of
the Gabila[11] ruling to the case at bar. It reasoned:[12]
True, plaintiffs in their complaint prayed inter alia for the cancellation
of the transfer certificates of title of the defendants for being derived
from a spurious or false original certificate of title. Relying on the case
of Gabila vs. Barriga, supra, defendants argued that the ultimate result
of a favorable decision on complaints of such nature is for the lands to
revert back to the ownership of the state, and hence, such actions may
only be instituted by the Government through the Solicitor Generel
(sic). This argument is misplaced. Firstly, unlike the Gabila case, the
herein plaintiffs in their complaint did not assert and pray for
reversion. Secondly, the prayer for cancellation of the defendants
Torrens titles does not negate nor eliminate the presence of the
elements of plaintiffs cause of action on the basis of the allegations in
the complaint, as already discussed. Thirdly, the prayer of a complaint
is not a material factor in determining the relief grantable, which rests
upon the facts proved (Lacson vs. Diaz, 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 377,
Aug. 4, 1950, No. L-2839). Precisely, as a matter of practice,
complaints filed in court usually contain a general prayer for other
relief which may be just and equitable in the premises like the
complaint in the case at bar. Fourthly, in the Gabila case, the Supreme
Court did not affirm the trial courts dismissal order. Instead, per
dispositive portion of the decision, it ordered the setting aside of the
appealed dismissal order and directing the return of the records of the
case to the trial court with admonition to the party interested to
formally implead the Bureau of Lands with notice to the Solicitor
General. Obviously, the posture of defendants Peltan is not entirely
supported by the Gabila case.
The Issues
Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public
respondent:[13]
a. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of
action for the nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is
fake/spurious when the Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No.
109490 and in G.R. No. 112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine and
valid -- and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the said squarely
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
b. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of
action for damages for the supposed acts of the private respondents
Margolles and Espinosa despite non-payment of the jurisdictional
docket fees when this cause of action had already prescribed -- and in
disregarding and refusing to pass upon the squarely applicable
Manchester ruling;
c. In not applying the Gabila ruling to dismiss the subject complaint
considering that respondents do not even pretend to have any title or
right to the subject property to authorize them to ask for a free patent
thereon since it is already (a) private property covered by petitioners
torrens title derived from OCT No. 4216 issued in 1929.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.
What Determines Cause of Action?
It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action
is determined by the allegations in the complaint. [14] In the
resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a
cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can
render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts
alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. [15] Hence, it has been
held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of
a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual
allegations made in a complaint.[16]
It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to
apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining
whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of
action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered
because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as
provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws
of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal
system,[17] and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute
an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with
law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an
inferior court magistrate.
In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is
well aware that a decision in Margolles vs. CA,[18] rendered on
14 February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the
certificates of title derived therefrom), the same OCT that the
present complaint seeks to nullify for being fictitious and
spurious. Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29
June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA. This we cannot
countenance.
In finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, Public
Respondent CA recognized that private respondent had a valid
right over the property in question, based on their actual
possession thereof and their pending application for a free
patent thereon. The linchpin of this right, however, is the validity
of OCT No. 4216. In other words, private respondents right is
premised on the allegation that the title of herein petitioners
originated merely from the fictitious and/or spurious OCT No.
4216.
Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs.
CA, the CA was unable to consider that the legality of OCT No.
4216. As adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the
validity of this title and the titles derived therefrom by, among
others, Petitioner Peltan Corporation. Clearly, private
respondents possession of the land, and their pending
application for a free patent thereon, did not not vest in them a
right superior to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT
No. 4216. Indeed, private respondents can invoke no right at all
against the petitioners. Accordingly, the first element of a cause
of action, i.e., plaintiffs right, is not present in the instant case.
In this light, the CAs treatment of the present suit as
an accion publiciana to determine which one among the parties
had a better right over the property is but an exercise in
redundancy. As discussed above, the same issue has been
foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Margolles.
The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the
assailed CA decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent CA to
take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case.
That the CA did not is clearly a reversible error.
Furthermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT
No. 4216, like the present case, will bring to naught the principle
of indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system of
land registration.[19] Thus, in a resolution[20] dated 10 August
1994, the First Division of this Court, applying
the Margolles ruling, dismissed a petition for review involving
herein petitioner Peltan Corporation which had raised as issue
the validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in the case at bench,
can do no less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to further scrutiny, as
proposed in the amended complaint, is no longer an available
option.
Are Private Respondents the Real Parties-in-Interest?
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the
proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying
as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of
petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a spurious
OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While
private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to
the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in
the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to
the government under the Regalian doctrine. [21] Gabila vs.
Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief.
The Court in that case held:
The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g),
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the
plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendants title, because, even if the said title were
canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or
of the portion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the
public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no
pretense at all that any part of the land covered by the defendants title
was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed,
it is admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the
public domain until December 18, 1964, when the government issued
a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or
entity to relief, it can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the existence of
such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might
have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is
captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated
therein several causes of action based on his alleged rights of
possession and ownership over the improvements, on defendant-
appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the
damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to
the improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central
issue of whether or not defendant-appellees title should be canceled or
amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a
cause of action in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal
relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or
amendment of defendant-appellees title.[22]
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
 As we have already ruled that the private respondents are
not the real parties in interest, we find no more need to pass
upon the question of nonpayment of filing fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SETASIDE. The complaint of
private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P is
DISMISSED. The notice of lis pendens, annotated in the titles of
petitioners because of Civil Case No. LP-8852-P, is ordered
CANCELED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129058. March 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. PAULINO
SEVILLENO YVILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a
death sentence would seem inevitable. But a mere plea of guilt is not
sufficient for conviction as the court must first assure itself that the
accused fully understood the consequences of his plea. In the instant
case, the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of his admission of guilt and that he fully comprehended
the implications thereof. As the court a quo inadequately discharged its
duty of conducting a searching inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital
offense therefore inevitably became null and void.[1]
On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Paulino
Sevilleno y Villanueva alias Tamayo went to Barangay Guadalupe,
San Carlos City. He brought with him bread and ice candy for his 9-
year old and 8-year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both surnamed
Baquia. He then invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-
an "to see (a) beta show."[2] To reach the place, Paulino and Virginia
passed through the sugarcane fields.
At around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, Rogelio Baquia,
father of Virginia and Norma, arrived. Not seeing Virginia in their
house, Rogelio asked Norma where her sister was. After learning from
her that Virginia had gone with accused Paulino to Sitio Guindali-an,
Rogelio immediately set out to look for them.
Rogelio failed to find his daughter upon reaching Sitio Guindali-
an; instead, he bumped into the accused.When asked about Virginia
the accused denied knowing where she was. However, Rogelio noticed
that the accused had nail scratches on his neck and a wound on his left
cheek.
Rogelio continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio
Tiongson, a relative of the accused. The next day they met the accused
at the house of the former barangay captain of Sitio Guindali-an,
Paeng Lopez.Eugenio asked Paulino where Virginia was. This time the
accused replied that she was in a sugarcane field known as "Campo
9," still a part of Guadalupe, like Sitio Guindali-an. Accompanied by
some police officers, Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to "Campo
9." There they found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress
raised to her armpits; the lower portion of her torso was naked; her
legs were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of her
body. She was dead.[3]
Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, City Health Officer of San
Carlos City, autopsied the body of
Virginia.His postmortem examination showed these findings: linear
abrasion over hematoma, 3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck;
linear abrasion over hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left superior anterior
neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0
cm., left inguinal area; superficial hymenal laceration 0.5 cm., at 12
o'clock position, with clot formation at intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm.,
left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior gluteal
area; abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal
smear showing absence of sperm cells except pus cells and epithelial
cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary to strangulation.[4] Based on
his findings, Dr. Portuguez concluded that Virginia was raped and then
strangled to death.
When news of the gruesome rape and killing spread around the
community, the local residents immediately arrested the accused
Paulino Sevilleno and turned him over to the police
authorities. Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused was charged with
rape with homicide for having carnal knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a
minor, 9 years of age, by means of force, violence and intimidation
and against her will, and after ravishing her, with intent to hide his
identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent to kill, strangled
her which directly caused her death.[5]
The arraignment where the accused was represented by Atty. Vic
Agravante of the Public Attorney's Office proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances?.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government, ready for
arraignment.
Atty. Agravante: Respectfully appearing for the accused, ready, you
Honor.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Stenographer's Observation: Accused was arraigned in a Cebuano
language duly known and understood by him, pleaded
GUILTY.
COURT (to accused): Do you understand your plea of guilty?
Accused: Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know that your plea of guilty could bring death penalty?
A. Yes, sir.
Court (to Pros. Tabinas): You still have to present your evidence.
Pros. Tabinas: Yes, your honor.[6]
The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution was scheduled on 31 August 1995. It was however reset
several times. On 10 October 1995 the accused manifested that he had
no counsel. Thus, the trial court ordered the Public Attorney's Office to
provide a counsel de oficio  for him. The next hearing was set on 21
November 1995.[7]
On 28 October 1995, taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that
struck the island of Negros, the accused escaped from detention, of
which the Presiding judge was accordingly informed.
The records show that Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused
during the arraignment only. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Danilo
Pabalinas, another lawyer of PAO, represented the accused. But after
the escape Atty. Pabalinas sought permission from the court to be
released from his duty to assist the accused. The court then directed
that the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was relieved from his
responsibility to his client and the court.[8]
The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as
Maria Lariosa and Norma Baquia. Notably, these witnesses were not
cross-examined because, as already adverted to, Atty. Pabalinas earlier
excused himself from the case. Neither did the court appoint another
counsel for the accused.
The next hearing was set on 30 January 1996. However, for
various reasons, the hearing was reset to 13 March 1996, 21 April
1996, 18 June 1996 and 17 July 1996.
Meanwhile, on 10 July 1996 the Jail Warden of San Carlos City
reported to the court that the accused had been recaptured.[9]
Atty. Florentino Saldavia, also of PAO, was appointed counsel de
oficio for the accused. On 17 July 1996 the prosecution presented
Rogelio Baquia as its last witness. Atty. Saldavia cross-examined
Rogelio but his questions were only considered token, and even
irrelevant. Then the prosecution rested.
 On 28 August 1996, the date set for the presentation of the
evidence for the defense, Atty. Saldavia moved that the hearing be
reset as he was not feeling well. On 19 November 1996, Atty. Saldavia
again moved for postponement and the hearing was reset to 3
December 1996 on which date, instead of presenting evidence,
Atty. Saldavia manifested that he was submitting the case for decision
but invoking the plea of guilt of the accused as a mitigating
circumstance. As recorded, the hearing proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government.
Atty. Saldavia: For the accused. Your honor please, this is already
the turn of the defense to present evidence. He already pleaded
GUILTY. We have no mitigating circumstance to prove except
the plea of guilty. I believe there is no need of presenting
evidence, he already pleaded guilty.
Court: (to Atty. Saldavia): You will rest the case?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes, your honor.
Pros. Tabinas: You will invoke the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes.
Pros. Tabinas: We have no objection to that.
Court: Order.
When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the
accused, counsel for the accused manifested that he had no evidence to
present in favor of the accused except the plea of GUILTY made in
open court.
In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for
decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution without
the accused presenting evidence in his behalf except the plea of
GUILTY which is admitted by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for
decision.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos
City, rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of Virginia
Baquia -P50,000.00 plus costs.[11]
This case is now on automatic review. The defense contends that
the court a quo  erred in convicting the accused and imposing upon
him the penalty of death as it failed to observe the required procedure
for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense when
arraigned.[12] The defense also argues that the arraignment conducted
by the trial court was null and void as it did not conduct a "searching
inquiry" before accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the accused
to death. It concludes that since the arraignment was fatally defective
and not in accordance with law, the case must be remanded to the
court of origin for the proper arraignment of the accused before the
capital punishment may be imposed.
We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of his culpability. If the accused so desires he may also
present evidence in his behalf.This procedure is mandatory and a judge
who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.[13]
The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment
hardly satisfied the requisite searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were
only two (2) questions propounded to the accused: First. Do you
understand your plea of guilt? Second.  Do you know that your plea of
guilt could bring death penalty? In every case where the accused enters
a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant
person with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to
follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in
support of the material allegations of the information, including the
aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the
trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining
whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the
meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.[14]
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to explain the
essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide with which the
accused was charged. On the same note, the trial judge also failed to
inform the accused the certainty by which the death penalty would be
imposed on him and the fact that he would also be made to indemnify
the heirs of his victim. As a result, the accused was not properly
accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation leveled against him.[15] Thus, it is with apprehension that
ruling for the affirmance of the decision in this case will prejudice the
due observance of the fundamental requirements of fairness and due
process.[16] The constitutional rights of the accused are for the
protection of the guilty and of the innocent alike. Only with the
assurance that even the guilty shall be given the benefit of every
constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in the same rights.
[17]
Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea of
guilty in a capital offense. Judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous
in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable conviction.
[18]
 Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment
is in its severest form - death - for the reason that the execution of such
a sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent persons
have at times pleaded guilty.[19] Only a clear, definite and
unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted by trial
courts.[20] There is no such rule which provides that simply because the
accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should
automatically follow.[21] A judge should always be an embodiment of
competence.[22] As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the
trial judge carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode
public confidence in the judiciary.
It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas
and Florentino Saldavia, all of PAO, were remiss in their duties as
defenders of the accused. Atty. Agravante did not take time to explain
to his client the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the
gravity of the consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed to
the accused pleading guilty to a capital offense. In the succeeding
hearings, Atty.Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably but
miserably failed. When the case was called and appearances noted, the
trial judge informed the parties that the accused had escaped from
detention. It was then that the prosecution and the defense, including
the trial court, agreed that the accused would be tried in
absentia. Then, at this juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved
of his responsibilities as counsel deoficio which, unfortunately, the
court also granted. The court proceeded with the presentation of three
(3) prosecution witnesses who testified but were never cross-examined
because Atty. Pabalinas already left the courtroom, apparently with the
consent of the trial court. Nobody was assigned to replace
Atty. Pabalinas.Consequently, not only was the accused tried in
absentia, he was also tried without the assistance of counsel.
When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO
asked for the postponement of the succeeding hearings not only once
but thrice allegedly because he was not feeling well. Interestingly,
when the time came for him to adduce evidence in behalf of the
accused, he manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty
he would no longer present any evidence. He only invoked the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
The plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is misplaced. Not
under any circumstance would any admission of guilt affect or reduce
the death sentence.[23] Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes
the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed. Death is a single indivisible penalty and
corollary to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which a
single indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may
have attended the commission of the offense.
The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of
Norma Baquia "for the reason that her testimony failed to establish
that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this
court."[24] The court did not consider her testimony purportedly
because she only testified that her sister Virginia went with the
accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or
city it was part of.[25] Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions
of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe,
San Carlos City (Negros Occidental).
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our
displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with
their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the
plight of their client. They lacked vigor and dedication to their
work. Atty. Agravante did not explain to the accused the nature of the
crime of which he was charged and the consequences of his
plea. Atty. Pabalinas, instead of assisting the accused, hastily left the
courtroom after obtaining leave while the prosecution was presenting
its three (3) witnesses. Resultingly, all three (3) witnesses were never
cross-examined. On the other hand, Atty.Saldavia moved for the
postponement of the scheduled hearings during which he was
supposed to present evidence for the defense; worse, on the last
scheduled hearing he submitted the case for decision without
presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever presented for the
defense. And, as if to compound his deficiency with ignorance,
Atty. Saldavia relied on his client's plea of guilt in the mistaken belief
that it would modify and reduce to reclusion perpetua the imposable
penalty of death.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence
and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.
[26]
 Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did
not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the
accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as
counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused
Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after
trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas
and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused
in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of
any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), in Crim. Case No.
129058, convicting the accused PAULINO SEVILLENO Y
VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape with Homicide and sentencing
him to DEATH is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and
trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209386               December 8, 2014
MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated
September 3, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 which affirmed the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of Qualified Theft. The Facts
In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation
(Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel (diesel fuel) allegedly
worth ₱497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a
company owned by private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao
(Lao).4 Petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria (Candelaria), a truck
driver employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel
fuel in Laon Laan, Manila.5
However, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day,
Viron informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet
received its order. Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria,
together with his helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an
employee of Unioil, left the company premises at 12:50 in the
afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate
number PTA-945 to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel order. When Lao
called Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any
response.6
Thereafter, or at around 6 o’clock inthe evening of the same
day, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and reported that
Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the
incident to the Anti Carnapping Section of the Manila Police
District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame.7
After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
agents found the abandoned lorry truck in Calamba, Laguna,
emptied of the diesel fuel.8 Under the foregoing premises, Lao
filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Candelaria,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-259004. 9 Lita Valera (Valera),
Lao’s mother, and Jimmy Magtabo10Claro (Claro), employed as
dispatcher and driver of Unioil, corroborated Lao’s allegations
on material points. More specifically, Claro verified that it was
Candelaria who was tasked todeliver the diesel fuel to Viron on
August 23, 2006, which likewise happened to be Candelaria’s
last trip.11
In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s
evidence,12 arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked
him to the commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal
knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel
fuel.13 Moreover, the information relayed by Romano is
considered hearsay due to his untimely demise.14
The RTC Ruling
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC)
convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft in a Decision 15 dated
June 21, 2011, having found a confluence of all the elements
constituting the abovesaid crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of
personal property; (b) said property belonged to another; (c) the
taking was done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was done
without the consent of the owner; (e) the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things; and (f) the theft was committed
by a domestic servant with abuse of confidence.16
In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following
circumstances into consideration: (a) on August 23, 2006,
Candelaria was the driver of the truck with plate number PTA-
945, loaded with 14,000 liters of diesel fuel valued at
₱497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b)
Viron did not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao reported the
incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the following
day, August 24, 2006, the same truck was found abandoned
and emptied of its load in Calamba, Laguna. 17 On the basis of
the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Candelaria was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered
him to indemnify Lao the amount of ₱497,000.00 as the value of
the stolen diesel fuel, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs.18
Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA. 19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed
Candelaria’s conviction, ruling that a finding of guilt need not
always be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on
circumstantial evidence, or "evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference."21 In this regard, and considering that the crime of
theft in this case was qualified due to grave abuse of
confidence, as Candelaria took advantage of his work, knowing
that Lao trusted him to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron, 22 the CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Citing jurisprudence, 23 it
observed that theft by a truck driver who takes the load of his
truck belonging to his employer is guilty of Qualified Theft. 24
However, while the CA affirmed Candelaria’s conviction as well
as the prison sentence imposed by the RTC, it modified the
amount which he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same
at ₱14,000.00 in the absence of any supporting documents to
prove that the diesel fuel was indeed worth ₱497,000.00. 25
Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration 26 which
was eventually denied in a Resolution27 dated September
3,2013, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly found Candelaria guilty of the crime of Qualified
Theft on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article
31028 in relation to Article 30929 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article
310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. 30
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements.
Through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was
sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded
into the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by
Candelaria for delivery to Viron on August 23, 2006 was taken
by him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of
the diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the confidence
reposed upon him by Lao,as his employer.
Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering
that his conviction was based merely on circumstantial
evidence, as well as on hearsay evidence, i.e., Lao’s testimony
with regard to the allegation of the deceased helper Romano
that Candelaria poked a balisongat him on August 23, 2006. 31
The Court is not convinced.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.32 Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict
an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, tothe exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each
and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. 33
Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the
attendant circumstances in this case, as duly established by the
prosecution’s evidence, amply justify the conviction of
Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on
August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from
Lao’s Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the
task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c)
Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises
on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number
PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had
not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed toreply to Lao’s
phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil
office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened
him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident tothe MPD and
Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently
found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had
not reported back to Unioil since then.34
Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a
congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been
committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be
sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that
Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had died before he could
testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had
threatened him with a balisongon August 23, 2006. It is a gaping
hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed
under Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted
for.Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason to explain
the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial,
which, as case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to
the ease by which it can be concocted. 35 With these, and,
moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or
reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court
draws no other reasonable inference other than that which
points to his guilt.Verily, while it is true that flight per seis not
synonymous with guilt,36 unexplained flight nonetheless evinces
guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, 37 especially
when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence
attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered, Candelaria’s
conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft stands.
The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends
upon the value of the thing stolen. To provethe value of the
stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty
under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court
explained in People v. Anabe38 that the prosecution must
present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate." 39 In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty
under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on
the attendant circumstances of the case.40 In Merida v. People
(Merida),41 which applied the doctrine enunciated in People v.
Dator (Dator),42 the Court deemed it improper to take judicial
notice of the selling price of narraat the time of the commission
of its theft, as such evidence would be "unreliable and
inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent
source of such information."43
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People
(Lozano),44 the Court fixed the value of the stolen magwheels at
₱12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable limit under the
circumstances,"45 notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony
of the private complainant therein. Lozanocited, among others,
the case of Francisco v. People46(Francisco) where the Court
ruled that "the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value
of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable
of unquestionable demonstration,"47 further explaining that the
value of jewelry, the stolen items in the saidcase, is neither a
matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration.48
In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel
fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the Court had no reference to
ascertain the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator,
where the Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling
price of lumber and/or narra for "lack of independent and
competent source" of the necessary information at the time of
the commission of the theft, the value of diesel fuel in this case
may be readily gathered from price lists published by the
Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel
fuel involved herein may then be considered as a matter of
public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on
discretionary judicial notice.49 To note, "judicial [notice], which is
based on considerations of expediency and convenience, case throws the entire case up for review,55 the ends of justice,
displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills both in its criminal and civil senses, demand nothing less but
the object which the evidence is intended to achieve." 50 complete and thorough adjudication in the judicial system’s
every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these cases
While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the provides a distinctive opportunity for this ideal to be subserved.
uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant, Lao, to
prove that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is ₱497,000.00, the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
Court – taking judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of January 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2013
diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e., the time of the commission of of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are hereby
the crime) is within the range of ₱37.60 to 37.86 per liter 51 – AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo
nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount must be Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
sustained. As the value of the goods may independently and perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to
competently be ascertained from the DOE’s price publication, indemnify private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the amount
adding too that the defense had not presented any evidence to of ₱497,000.00 representing the value of the stolen property.
contradict said finding nor cross examined Lao anent her
proffered valuation, the Court, notwithstanding the solitary SO ORDERED.
evidence of the prosecution, makes this determination following
the second prong set by case law – and that is, to fix the value
of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of
the case. Verily, such circumstances militate against applying
the alternative of imposing a minimum penalty and, more so, the
CA’s arbitrary valuation of ₱14,000.00, since the basis for which
was not explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the proper
penalty for Qualified Theft in thiscase, the value of the stolen
property amounting to ₱497,000.00 must be considered. [G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005]
Conformably with the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC, the proper penalty to be imposed upon Candelaria is
reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole,53 to conform
HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO,
with prevailing law and jurisprudence.54
Proprietor/Manager, petitioner, vs. DMC-URBAN
PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., respondent.
A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases,
would do well to be mindful of the significance of determining
DECISION
the value of the goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in
said cases as they do not only entail the proper resolution of the PANGANIBAN, J.:
accused’s civil liability (if the civil aspect has been so integrated)
but also delimit the proper penalty to be imposed. These Entitlement to physical or material possession of the
matters, through the trial court’s judicious direction, should be premises is the issue in an ejectment suit. The two forms of
sufficiently passed upon during trial and its finding thereon be ejectment suits -- forcible entry and unlawful detainer -- may be
amply explained in its verdict. Although an appeal of a criminal distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible
entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession
of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the
defendants; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiffs need not have
been in prior physical possession.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, challenging the April 12, 2002 Decision [2] and the
August 19, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 53524. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the
Court REVERSES the appealed Decision and renders judgment:
1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for
and in his behalf or by his authority to remove the Habagat Grill and
all improvements he has introduced into the lot in question and to
vacate said lot; and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00
monthly compensation for the occupation of the land in question until
the possession from December 1, 1993 of said property shall have
been completely restored to the [respondent]; and
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as
follows:
On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the
owner of a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and covered
by TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be called the lot in
question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred said
lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc.
(DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that
Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat
Grill in December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint
for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-D-94 in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The
Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question
from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on that day,
December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat
Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said
lot since then up to the present; that the reasonable rental value of said
lot is P10,000.00 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in
question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside
Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20)
and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital
issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members,
one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic
Engineer representing Biraogo and the third from the DENR which
was tasked with the duty of determining where precisely was Habagat
Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No.
1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team with a
copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied.
Worse, his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took
oath as such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones
who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and
Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After conducting the
relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero
submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat
Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in
question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC
appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same
was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x
26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment
affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was
filed but was denied in the courts Order dated April 21, 1999.[5]
Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for
Forcible Entry.[6] The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of
respondents real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that
Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993. [7] The
appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because
he had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to -- it
was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was
not clear in what capacity petitioners witness, Samuel Ruiz,
came to know of the facts he had testified to. [8] The CA further
held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic
Development hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the
construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as
these referred to another establishment. [9]
The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other
documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grills
construction.[10] It added that the court of origin had improperly
adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain. The
appellate court explained that the lower court could take
cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the
situational relation between the property covered by the
Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized
petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the basis of
the latters alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the
property.[11]
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for
our consideration:
1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the Honorable Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over
this case as petitioners possession and occupation of the lot where
Habagat Grill was constructed on the subject premises was yet in 1992
or for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this case on April 7,
1994 and that respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) had
not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a
matter of fact, it failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case;
and
2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the Complaint of respondents predecessor (David M.
Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to state a valid cause of action as the
lot referred to therein is not particularly described and is different from
the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed.[13]
Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had
jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether respondent alleged a
sufficient cause of action in its Complaint.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of ownership
did not, by itself, show that respondent had prior possession of
the property.[14]
 We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined
by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. [15] As long as these
allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible
entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged,
in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may
resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are
set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
reads thus:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives
or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at
any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court
on March 28, 1994, stated:
2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and
peaceful possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive,
Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T-82338 of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner
thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and
incident in the following paragraph hereof.
3. That on or about December 1, 1993,
[petitioner] by means of strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of said
residential lot and constructed what is now known as
the Habagat Grill, thereby illegally depriving
[respondent] of the possession of the premises.[16]
Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2)
deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and (3) the date
such unlawful deprivation started, which was less than one year
from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the presence in the
Complaint of all the necessary allegations, [17] the trial court
evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.
Date of Entry
Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court
of origin and the regional trial court, respondent has not
adduced preponderance of evidence to prove that this case was
filed within the one-year prescriptive period. [18] Petitioner
presented the testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered
the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning
and Economic Development (UPED) to prove that the
construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992. [19]
Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the
testimony of the formers real property manager, Bienamer
Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts. [20] On the
other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings
conducted by the UPED in resolving that petitioner had been in
possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that
those hearings referred to a restaurant located 330 meters
away, not to Habagat Grill.[21]
The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is
a question of fact. This Court has held in a long line of cases
that the review of cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the
CA are conclusive except in a number of instances, one of
which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the
courts below, as in the present case.[22]
 The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-
hearing pertained to matters relating to a different professional witness.
establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant. [23] Thus, the UPED
minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and
the present case. Consequently, the determination of the date of any other cases where a persons testimony concerning his own conduct
entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating observer or with
testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz. inconclusive inferences from facts proved, especially where the actor
witness testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
him to perform. But it said that the testimony of one who evidently
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion
weight than that of the other. [24] Where the evidence presented
will hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are
by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no
specially favored by the Actor Rule.
preponderance of evidence.[25] In criminal cases in which the
quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the
Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and
testimony of only one witness -- if credible, straightforward, and
remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the one that
worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict. [26] With more reason
had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has
then, Garcias testimony, if clear and positive, may be sufficient
effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it has been held
to establish respondents claim.
that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among traces of blood along the route through which the deceased was taken
the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not
determining which of the presented evidence has superior committed in the place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the
weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts failure of witnesses to notice whether or not there were houses at the
to which they testify.[27] place where they say the accused maltreat the offended party was
attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to
The extent of such means and opportunity are determined
what they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not
by the following considerations:
there were houses in or around the place.
First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his
his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is more definite and
observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so,
trustworthy than another persons recollection of it, especially if it was
without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was
an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the other persons
particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a vessel that
testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment.
their light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was
Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows
easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that the
better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is
light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among
generally, but not always, entitled to superior weight on that account.
them when the light was observed.
Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other legal document
may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally
transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his
incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if men perceive
the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways, even when it is
impossible that these facts should produce on the observer any
emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even
much more will their impressions be diversified under circumstances
calculated to produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and
memory of a witness.[28] (Citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia
must be given greater weight, considering that it was his task --
as the real property manager of respondent -- to know about
matters involving the latters properties. In contrast, it was not
explained how Ruiz could be deemed competent and credible in
his testimony as to those matters.
The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia --
regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was --
solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness.
True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however,
will not by itself determine the true worth of ones testimony.
[29]
 The essential test is whether such testimony is
disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human experience.
[30]
 It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the
witness relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no
reason to disagree with the CAs evaluation that, being credible,
Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondents
claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1,
1993.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by
respondent, as shown by the following circumstances: (1) the
latters property was not encroached upon by Habagat Grill,
which had allegedly been constructed on a portion of land
owned by the City Government of Davao;[31] and (2) respondent
failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior
possession of the property.[32]
On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court
indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team that had
been constituted to determine the exact location of Habagat
Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in
taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds of the property
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20. [33] Although the
lower court may take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do
so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither,
may it claim knowledge of the situational relation between the
land in question and Times Beach.
Location of the Property
We agree with respondent. Judicial notice is the cognizance
of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them. [34] Its object is to
save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing
evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or
actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be
assumed from the tribunals general knowledge or from a slight
search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the
municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they
sit.[35] Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and
what it states.[36] As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial
court took judicial notice of the existence of Presidential
Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation
center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the location of the
beach, which was from the shoreline to the road towards the
shoreline. On the basis of these premises, the trial court
resolved that the lot on which petitioners restaurant was located
should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by
the City of Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent --
that had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at this
conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the location of
the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the law. [37]
 The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely
taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such
location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case.
Moreover, considering respondents allegation that the supposed
lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by
the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known
of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice
under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the
exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter
of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Neither may these be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of
the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice
of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate
court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey team
that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the
purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation
to respondents lot.
Prior Possession
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that
the latters predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the
property.[38] Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor
was in prior physical possession of the property as the
registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981. [39]Again, we rule
for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is
entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that
is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to
the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the
action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.[40]
The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful
detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the
fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were
in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived
thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need
not have been in prior physical possession.[41]
Spouses Benitez v. CA[42] has held that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact
that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are
acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x execution
and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of
possessory information titles.[43] For one to be considered in
possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation[44] of every square inch of the property at all times. In
the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondents
predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the
execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact
that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1,
1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and
deprived the former of possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-
6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of
two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death
twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann
Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two
separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint,
docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
[1]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203,
averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded Not Guilty to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private
complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since
he and his daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly
reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home. [3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his
testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby
sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following
amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape
upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil
Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby
sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following
amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape
upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil
Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to
complainants version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the
merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a
13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an
IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living
with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue
City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she
was in the house together with her father.But before she went to sleep,
her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just
lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside
him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her
father who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing
her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a
knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he
inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell
anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her
vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina,
her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good?
And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a
woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry
with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was
humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to
pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out
when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that
she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just
stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing
the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after
she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her
father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she
placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down
with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very
sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side
of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers
place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told
her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the
matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen,
she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and
after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police and
was investigated by them.[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were
manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him
twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT
ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE
OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE
SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever
took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was
working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue
City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00
oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at
work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to
have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly
transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and
tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings. [7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant
and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the
recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex
delictobe modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous
crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in
each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone
unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence
presented by both the prosecution and the defense.Conviction
must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. [8] But
here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment
concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly
untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-
serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for
exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against
the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative
matters,[9] such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an
inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the
face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as
the violator of her honor.[10] Indeed, we find that private
complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with
ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of
was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. [11] Her testimony
never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her
father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the
court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the
single most important issue.[13] The determination of the
credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial
court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the
advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to
form an accurate impression and conclusion. [14] Absent any
showing that certain facts of value have clearly been
overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the
case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected
and the judgment rendered affirmed.[15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony
is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were
present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie
Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following
results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: do
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
 Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock
position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal
lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of
sexual congress on her part. [17] According to her, the lacerations
may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed
out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainants U-
shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not
yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped. [18] While Dr.
Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the existence
of the datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact
because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things,[19] nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations
tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped
by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape
charges against him because she had quarreled with him after
he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the
prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or
misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to
consider the charges filed against him as the result of his
frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior. [20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain
the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a
nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It
goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a
story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime
of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor.[21] More so, where her charges could mean
the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him
to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that
he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This
argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant
was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the
only child who lived with him.[22] As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, appellant was thus free to do as he wished to satisfy
his bestial lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has
some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way
favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of
her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the
victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape
charges against her own father, as shown by the following
testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be
found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced
by death?
 A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two
cases against your father and in case your father would
be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed
against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would
proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death
imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, [25]penalizes rape of a minor
daughter by her father as qualified rape [26] and a heinous
crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and
prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with
woman; (3) by force or without her consent [27] and in order to
warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional
elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time
of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. [28]
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the
offender was the victims father.[29]But the victims age was not
properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She
testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the
rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly
when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She
further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her
mother. In her own words, the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate
Your Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that
the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.[31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice
may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory
judicial notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when
courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and
judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor
necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time
or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in
places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where
there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people
inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with
the accuseds sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas
inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing
acts which blemish her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional
and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,
[34]
 the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the
attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as
premature since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7
months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are
ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to
when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the
mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take
judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is
improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof
acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3
of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is
required before courts can take judicial notice of such
fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth
or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by
other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the
victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was
statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born
on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of
the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was
presented because the victims birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence,
we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the
presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to
establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we
ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and
not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove
the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the
time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the
birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no
showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to
justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the
victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for
the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from
testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People
v. Javier,[35] we stressed that the prosecution must present
independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not
contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be
proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of
the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim
was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case
was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the
victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing
private complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of
rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was
alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the
rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the
prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than through
the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A.
No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held
in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently
establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to conviction
for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J.,
independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes
vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case
falls under the qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the
death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5,
1997 and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A.
7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its
unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The
second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for
rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded
P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However,
the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and
2230 of the Civil Code for each count is imprecise. In rape
cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral
damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis
thereof.[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of
rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in
order, but on a different basis and for a different
amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly
proved during trial, we find that the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating
circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence,
we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing
the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of
the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The
father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in
the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition
of the death penalty mandatory.[39] However, in this case, the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but
not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of
mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this
instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes
committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary
damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse
tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters.[40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and
DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas
Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for
each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 136247 & No. 138330. November 22, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MANUEL LIBAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
[1]
"He eats his own children,"  Nerissa so described her
father, accused-appellant Manuel Liban, as she tearfully
recounted before the trial court the details of her dire
experience.
At early age, Nerissa Liban and her two other sisters were
virtually left on their own. They were still little when their mother
left the sleepy town of Caricaran, Sorsogon, for what she
thought to be the green pastures of Manila to augment her
husband's measly income from selling empty bottles.Letters
from her, including some sums of money, regularly came at first
but soon dwindled. After the last letter asking them to pray for
the success of her bid to work in Japan, the family never heard
from her again. Her three daughters Leonarda, private
complainant Nerissa, and Hilda - were left to the custody of her
husband whose strange notion of discipline was to strike, pinch,
and bite his daughters. Far worse, he would turn to them to sate
the appetite of his loins whetted by his wife's absence.
The first rape occurred on 06 November 1995 when
Leonarda spent the night at the house of an aunt. The young
Nerissa and eight-year old Hilda, left behind by her, were
already in bed when their father arrived home drunk. He
demanded food but when Nerissa set the table for him, he threw
the food away and slapped her. Reeling from the blow, Nerissa
fell on her back. She was in this position when the accused
placed himself on top of her. He then removed her panty and,
pressing a knife on her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
then had her. All that Nerissa could do was to cry in pain.His lust
satisfied, he told her to put back on her clothes. The next
morning, at about seven o'clock, Nerissa left the house and
went to see her aunt with whom she stayed for a week until her
father came to fetch her. She felt that she had no choice but to
reluctantly go with him. The following night, he again raped
her. Manuel Liban would eventually continue raping his
daughter on seven different occasions within a one-year period,
the specific dates of some of which Nerissa could no longer
distinctly remember.
The last rape took place on 15 October 1996. The three
sisters were already asleep. When Nerissa awoke, she found
herself tied and naked. Her father then mounted her and
inserted his organ into her vagina. She wanted to shout but she
was gagged. When her father had left, Leonarda came and
untied her. Manuel Liban later came back and seeing Nerissa
already unbound, he lashed her to the window. Leonarda told
her that their father was also doing the same thing to her.Crying,
the two sisters made plans to escape and proceeded to the
house of their maternal aunts, remaining there for a while.
When school started, Nerissa also took Hilda away for fear
that their father would do "the same thing" to the young
sibling. Tormented by her traumatic encounters, Leonarda left
for Manila. Other than Leonarda, Nerissa never told a soul about
the rape incidents. On one occasion, while attending church
services, she met her friend Manay Luisa. Unable to contain her
pent-up anguish, Nerissa blurted out to Luisa her cruel
experience. Luisa advised her to see a doctor for check-up to
ascertain whether her frequent bouts with dizziness indicated
possible pregnancy. The medical certificate[2]issued by Dr. Ma.
Humilde Janaban attested to private complainant's non-virgin
state and the presence of vaginal lacerations caused by sexual
intercourse. The doctor told Nerissa, to her relief, that she was
not expecting.
 In December that year, Nerissa was accompanied by
her Tia Nora to the police headquarters to lodge a complaint
against her father. Informations were filed against Manuel Liban
for two counts of rape committed against Nerissa Liban, one on
06 November 1995, docketed Criminal Case No. 97-4363, and
the second on 15 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case No.
97-4362, that read:
"INFORMATION[3]
(Criminal case No. 97-4363)
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
MANUEL LIBAN, of Barangay Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, of
RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about 9:00 P.M. of November 6, 1995 at Barangay
Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, the above-named accused with
lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy over his 12-year old
daughter NERISSA P. LIBAN, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, had sexual intercourse with the said
victim against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"The offense is attended by the alternative aggravating
circumstance of relationship, the accused being the father and
direct ascendant of the victim.
"ACT CONTRARY TO LAW."
"INFORMATION[4]
(Criminal Case No. 97-4362)
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
MANUEL LIBAN, of Barangay Caricaran.Bacon, Sorsogon of
RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about 9:00 P.M. of October 15, 1996 at Barangay
Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, the above-named accused with
lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy over his 12 year old
daughter NERISSA P. LIBAN, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, had sexual intercourse with the said
victim against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"The offense is attended by the alternative aggravating
circumstance of relationship, the accused being the father and
direct ascendant of the victim.
"ACT CONTRARY TO LAW."
In his defense, appellant testified that, on both dates of 06
November 1995 and 15 October 1996, he was resting at their
house with his youngest daughter, Hilda, while Nerissa was with
her friends, Eden Desoyo and a certain Embang, both residents
of Cogon, Bacon, located about half a kilometer away from their
house. Manuel asserted that Nerissa had always spent her time
in the company of friends and that, since January 1993, Nerissa
had been living with her peers. Manuel could not think of any
reason why Nerissa would turn against him, except for the
possibility of his daughter having been brainwashed by his in-
laws. Manuel explained that the enmity between him and his in-
laws had started when he demanded, through
the barangay captain of Caricaran, the return of his daughter
Leonarda who had gone to Laguna, without his prior knowledge
and permission, to find work with the help of his in-laws. During
an ensuing confrontation, an in-law, one Winefreda Pulvorido,
accused him of raping his daughters.
In Criminal Case No. 97-4362, the trial court ruled to acquit
accused Manuel Liban; it explained:
"The matter of the feet of the complainant being tied when the
accused was on top of her was not clearly explained, thus;
creating reasonable doubt in the mind of the court that when
said accused was on top of the complainant and her feet were
tied together, it became physically impossible for a sexual
intercourse to take place. When two or more interpretations are
possible, that interpretation which is favorable or beneficial to
the accused must be adopted. In this particular instance, the
Court honestly believes that when the feet of the victim were
tied together, rape upon the victim cannot take place, hence on
reasonable doubt, the accused must necessarily be acquitted." [5]
In Criminal Case No. 97-4363, however, the court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7659, and
imposed upon him the penalty of death -
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the COURT finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
under Article 335 as amended by Sec. II, R.A. 7659 in Criminal
Case No. 97-4363 and hereby sentences him the maximum
penalty of death and to pay the offended party the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; to pay the amount of P10,000.00
as moral damages, and the amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the cost.
"As to Crim. Case No. 97-4362, on reasonable doubt, the
accused is hereby acquitted.
"With cost de oficio."[6]
The case has been forwarded to this Court for its
review. Closely examining the records, the Court finds hardly
anything of substance or significance that can warrant a reversal
of the finding of the court a quo that indeed accused-appellant
has violated his own daughter.
The testimony of private complainant was unflinching and
straightforward. With tears of anguish, she was able to
convincingly narrate the ordeal she had been through. No
nefarious motive was shown that would have impelled her to
testify falsely against her own father. She testified thusly:
"Q. When did the first time that he raped you happen?
"A. On November 6, 1995.
"Q. Where did that happen?
"A. In the house of Magno.
"Q. Who were your companions in that house?
"A. We, the siblings and our father.
"Q. Who owns that house?
"A. Magno.
"Q. And you are only renting that place?
"A. We borrowed it.
"Q. Let us go to that incident that you said that your father
raped you on November 6. What time did that rape
happen?
"A. Between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
"Q. What were you doing then?
"A. I was asleep.
"Q. Then what happened?
"A. When my father arrived, he was drunk and he asked food,
so I set the table for him, but when I set the table for him,
he threw the food away.
"Q. What happened after that?
"A. He slapped me and I fell down on my back and when I fell
down on my back, he placed himself on top of me.
"Q. What were you wearing at that precise time?
"A. I was wearing a skirt and my upper dress was a T-shirt
with red stripes.
 "Q. Now, let us go this one by one. After you fell, what did
your father do to you?
"A. When I fell on my back, he removed my panty.
"Q. What else happened after he removed your panty?
"A. He inserted his penis to my vagina.
"Q. What were you doing while your father was doing these
things to you?
"A. I was crying.
"Q. And did you not try to ward him off?
"A. I tried to move away but he poked his knife on me.
"Q. What did you feel after your father inserted his penis into
your vagina?
"A. It was very painful.
"Q. You said that you were then with your siblings. Were they
awakened?
"A. My youngest sister was with me because my elder sister
was sleeping in the house of my auntie.
"Q. How old was your youngest sister?
"A. Eight (8) years old.
"Q. Now, after your father had carnal knowledge with you,
what did he do?
"A. He told me to dress up and the following morning, I went
away."[7]
Nerissa Liban appeared to have fully understood the impact
of her decision to file the charges against her father -
"Q. Do you understand that the person you are accusing of
having raped you is your father?
"A. Yes, ma'am.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. And do you understand that if found guilty, your father
could be sentenced to death?
"A. Yes, ma'am.
"Q. Now, what do you feel about the consequences of your
filing a complaint against your father?
"A. Good for him because he is `eating his own children.'" [8]
Manuel Liban, in this appeal, no longer persists in assailing
the veracity of his daughter's account of the rape; instead, he
bewails the death sentence, his lone assignment of error being
that -
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THE REAL AGE OF THE VICTIM."[9]
Citing the cases of People vs. Ernesto Perez[10] and People vs.
Amado Sandrias Javier,[11] accused-appellant asks the Court to
reduce the penalty of death imposed upon him to reclusion
perpetua.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, has placed in the category of a
"heinous" offense punishable by death the rape of a minor by
her own father. This extreme penalty is to be imposed when the
following circumstances concur, i.e., 1) there is sexual congress
without consent; 2) the offender is the father, stepfather,
ascendant, guardian or relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree of the victim or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; and 3) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime.[12] In looking at the attendance of the above conditions the
Court has consistently taken an extremely careful stance. With
regard, particularly, to the minority of the victim, the Court has
belabored the matter on end.
 In People vs. Ernesto Perez,[13] the Court reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetuafor the failure of the
prosecution to specifically state in the information the age of the
victim. The Court deemed the omission to be constitutionally
fatal. Perez equated the imposition of the death penalty in the
face of such oversight as being a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges so as to adequately
prepare him for his defense, a flaw that could not be cured
simply by introducing evidence therefor.
In People vs. Melencio Bali-balita,[14] the victim, Ella
Magdasoc, testified that she was eleven years old, having been
born on 12 April 1987, when she was raped by the accused on
26 August 1992. Although no birth certificate or other official
document to prove the age of the victim was presented in
evidence, the testimony of the victim about her age, however,
was corroborated by her half-sister, Miriam Gozum, who
declared that, indeed, Ella was eleven years old at the time of
the rape. Bali-balita considered the testimony of the two sisters,
along with her physical appearance at the time of trial and the
fact that no conflicting piece of evidence on her actual age was
given that could place the matter in any serious doubt, to be
sufficient in establishing the minority of the victim.[15]
In People vs. Amado Sandrias Javier,[16] the lack of
objection on the part of the defense pertaining to the age of the
victim was held not to exempt the prosecution from presenting
the birth certificate of the private complainant upon the premise
that the alleged age of the private complainant, at the time of the
commission of the offense, was sixteen or just two years shy
from the majority age of eighteen. Javier explained that in an
"age of modernism," there would hardly be much difference
between a sixteen-year old lass and an eighteen-year old girl on
physical features and attributes.
People vs. Cula[17]reiterated Javier when this Court lowered
the penalty in a case of rape committed on a 16-year old victim
on the ground that the prosecution did not present any
independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate, and for the
failure by the trial court to make a categorical finding on the
matter. Cula stressed that it was the burden of the prosecution
to prove, with certainty, the fact that the victim was below
eighteen years at the time of commission of the rape to justify
the imposition of the death penalty, and that the failure of the
accused-appellant to there present testimony or proof to the
contrary did not exonerate the prosecution from its burden.
People vs. Tipay[18] held that the presentation of a birth
certificate was not indispensable to prove minority; thus, the
minority of a victim who was well below the age of ten, being
quite manifest, could enable the court to take judicial notice
thereof. Tipay thought to only be crucial years the age range of
fifteen to seventeen years where minority might not always be
"indubitable."
In People vs. Tundag,[19] the victim testified that she was
thirteen years old at the time of the rape but later admitted that
she did not know exactly when she was born. The manifestation
by the prosecution of its inability to secure a copy of the victims
birth certificate, as well as its motion that judicial notice be taken
of the fact that the victim was below eighteen years old at that
time, was not sanctioned by this Court to be sufficient in
establishing the victim's minority. Not even absence of contest
from the defense, the Court said, could exempt the prosecution
from this burden. Tundagstressed that the minority of the victim
should also be proven with equal certainty as the crime itself to
justify a conviction of rape in its qualified form. Tundag went on
to say that the age of the victim, without qualification, was not a
matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory [20] or discretionary.
[21]
Citing People vs. Rebancos,[22] and People vs. Vargas,[23] both
of which cases required the presentation of independent proof
on the age of private complainants whose ages were said to be
nine and ten years old, respectively, at the time of
rape, Tundag ruled that the evident tender age of the victim in a
crime of rape committed by a relative did not excuse the
prosecution from the need to present a birth certificate or, in its
absence, an independent piece of evidence, sufficient for the
purpose.[24]
 The Court here emphasizes that the severity, as well as the P10,000.00 as moral damages[28] but increases the exemplary
irreversible and final nature, of the penalty of death once carried damages from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 in consonance with
out makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly prevailing jurisprudence.[29]
subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. It
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a
is to be recognized that, due to variable circumstances, no two
quo finding accused-appellant Manuel Liban, guilty of rape is
cases are really ever alike that, at times, may easily mislead one
AFFIRMED but the sentence of death therein imposed by it is
to perceive the Court to be giving, albeit inaccurately, vacillating
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The awards of civil liability in
rulings. Relative particularly to the qualifying circumstance of
favor of the victim are SUSTAINED except for the exemplary
minority of the victim in incestuous rape cases, the Court has
damages of P10,000.00 which is hereby increased to
consistently adhered to the idea that the victim's minority must
P20,000.00.
not only be specifically alleged in the informationbut must
likewise be established beyond reasonable SO ORDERED.
doubt during trial. Neither the obvious minority of the victim, nor
the absence of any contrary assertion from the defense, can
exonerate the prosecution from these twin
requirements. Judicial notice of the issue of age, without the
requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, [25] Rule 129, of the
Rules of Court, would not be considered enough compliance
with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof,
any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate,
school records and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the G.R. No. 165987             March 31, 2006
victim should be presented.While the declaration of a victim as
to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S.
would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on ALFELOR, Petitioners, 
the relative weight that may be accorded to it is another vs.
matter. Corroborative evidence would be most desirable or even JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF
essential when circumstances warrant. APPEALS, Respondents.
In the instant case, save for the bare testimony of the victim
DECISION
that she was ten years old at the time of the first rape,
[26]
 nothing else could be elicited from the records to ascertain
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
the correct age of the victim.
In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the
convicting Manuel Liban of the crime of rape but must reduce, Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
on account of the insufficiency of proof on the qualifying 74757, as well as the Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying
circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of death the motion for reconsideration thereof.
to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the civil liability, the Court
sustains the award of P50,000.00 [27] as civil indemnity and of
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses
Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the
deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a
Motion for Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in
the above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs
and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary
compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children
and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose
intestate estate is subject to herein special proceedings
for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single
centavo from the share of her late husband Jose K.
Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in
this case and to submit attached Answer in Intervention. 5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in
Intervention,6 claiming that she was the surviving spouse of
Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void
ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and
Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed,
among others, for the appointment of a special administrator to
take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a
copy of the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and
Jose were married on February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion
for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as
the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased,
where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous
marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the herein
intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9However, Josefina did not
appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002. 10 She
narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil rites at
Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that
they were subsequently married in religious rites at the
Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those listed as
secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty.
Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her
father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew
that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and
that the two did not live together as husband and wife. She
knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented
to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been
no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months
after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked
for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose
failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained
unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have
his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good
faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for
more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s
sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that she met
Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been
married three times, was now happily married to an Englishman
and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an
Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling
that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court
to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented
to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had
custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative factor
in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no
knowledge that Jose had been previously married. Thus, the
evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof
required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a
machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its
identification and the accompanying testimony on its execution
and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law
could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children,
Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of
the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to
them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
among others. Moreover, the oppositor did not present evidence
to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina
(sic) Halasan through counsel, not sufficient to prove a
preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic rules
of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of
the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the deceased Jose
K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss
(sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon
Aleflor, oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the
requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly
supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita
Sorongon Alfelor and her children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria
Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the
late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the
intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all
properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or
intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to
receive such inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the
other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission
need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted in
her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she
(Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to her. Teresita also
admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven
in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to
paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that
the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present"
(thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded
that if the validity of the second marriage were to be upheld, and
at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an
absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be
survived by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 17 dated October 30,
2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to
Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and declaring
the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also
stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide
for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null
and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove
that she had been absent for seven consecutive years before
the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that
anyone who claims to be the legal wife must show proof thereof.
They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the
following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning
such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first
marriage in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999,
petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative
value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent
Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on
her own personal knowledge. They also pointed out that
Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned
Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for
the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of
the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out
that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased
Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2,
Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code,
is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to
question her claim that she had not been heard of for more than
seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the
ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted
(both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to
the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof.
Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact
that Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De
los Santos,18the appellate court ruled that an admission made in
a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary
or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the
admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by
the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of
Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed
orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit
petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith conduct the
proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition,
assailing the ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not
the CA erred in ordering the admission of private respondent’s
intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in
setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13,
2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA completely disregarded the
hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not
require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s
statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999,
admitting knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without
probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters
involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial
admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA
did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted
knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to private respondent in
the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the
hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her
by the latter, and thus should be considered hearsay. They also
point out that private respondent failed to appear and
substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and
only submitted a machine copy of a purported marriage contract
with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a
decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be
the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for
partition involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the
estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs,
petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in
their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the
herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956; 20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times
that she knew that her late husband had been previously
married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission
constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement;
made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such
statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21A party who
judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof;22production of evidence is
dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted
fact from the field of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for
intervention, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of
Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person
has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the
success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the
court or an officer thereof.27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit
or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to
make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is
sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting
the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both
of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes
a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by
leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal
proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for
the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings."28
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the
Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently
established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As
the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of Appeals: 29
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit
between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were
allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be
against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the
subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as
pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to
litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment
of which plaintiff could not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who
claimed to be the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child
of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even
after the parties had already submitted a compromise
agreement involving the properties of the decedent, upon which
the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting
aside the compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners
were indispensable parties and that "in the interest of
adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the
action for partition, given the circumstances, not only is
preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of the
case."32
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v.
Court of Appeals33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not
discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but
resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the
complaint for partition, the Court ultimately determined the
legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to
a share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and
forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131592-93. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.: JPUNO
With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6,
1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or
homicide is now considered, not as a separate crime, but
merely a special aggravating circumstance.
In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO
was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms in two (2) separate Informations, thus:
Criminal Case No. 45708:
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995
in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, armed with a handgun,
with deliberate intent and without justifiable motive,
with evident premeditation, by means of treachery
and with a decided purpose to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally shoot, hit
and wound Rogelio Abawag with the said gun,
with which herein accused was then provided at
 the time, thereby causing upon said Rogelio
Abawag bullet wounds on vital parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
Criminal Case No. 45709: HTML
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995
in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent and without justifiable motive,
have in his possession and control one (1)
Homemade .38 caliber revolver without serial
number (and) three (3) live ammunitions without
the authority and permit to possess or carry the
same.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site
of Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City. On November 14,
1995, at about 8 a.m., ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction
worker, was on the last rung of the stairs on the third floor of the
Gaisano building when he saw his co-worker ROGELIO
ABAWAG being closely pursued by accused JULIAN
CASTILLO, a lead man in the same construction site. During
the chase, the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him.
Abawag, then about a half meter away from the accused, fell on
his knees beside a pile of hollow blocks.[3]
FRANKLIN ACASO, a mason working on the third floor of the
Gaisano building, heard the first shot. Initially, he did not pay
attention to it as he thought that the sound came from one of
their construction equipments. Seconds later, he heard a
second shot and a person screaming: "Ouch, that is enough!"
When he looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw the
accused in front of Abawag, about a meter away, pointing a .38
caliber revolver at the latter. Abawag was then leaning on a pile
of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot Abawag
a third time despite the latter's imploration. The accused then
fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.[4]
The management of Gaisano reported the shooting incident to
the police authorities who immediately rushed to the scene of
the crime. JUN LIM, alias "Akoy," brother-in-law of the victim
and also a construction worker at the Gaisano, volunteered to
go with the police and assist them in locating the
accused. yacats
The police, accompanied by Akoy, proceeded to Port San Pedro
where they saw the accused on board a vessel bound for Cebu.
When they boarded the vessel, Akoy positively identified the
accused to the police as the assailant. The accused attempted
to escape when the police identified themselves but the police
caught up with him. Upon inquiry, the accused denied complicity
in the killing of Abawag. The police found in his possession a .
38 caliber handmade revolver, three (3) empty shells and three
(3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that the accused
owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police then
took the accused into custody and charged him for the murder
of Abawag and for illegal possession of firearm. [5]
The self-defense theory hoisted by the accused who testified
solely for the defense was not given credence by the trial court.
Thus, he was convicted of Homicide, as the prosecution failed
to prove the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal Possession of
Firearm, aggravated by homicide. The trial court disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding
the accused guilty of the crimes of homicide and
illegal possession of firearm aggravated by
homicide beyond the shadow of the doubt, he is
hereby sentenced as follows:
 "1) For the crime of homicide, he
is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) years
and Four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum;
"2) For illegal possession of
firearm which is aggravated by
homicide, he is sentenced to a
penalty of death;
"3) To pay the family of his victim
P50,000.00 as indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and
"4) To pay the cost.
"SO ORDERED."[6] (emphasis supplied)
On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his
conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
Prefatorily, we stress that although the appellant himself does
not refute the findings of the trial court regarding the homicide
aspect of the case, the Court nevertheless made a thorough
examination of the entire records of the case, including the
appellant's conviction for homicide, based on the settled
principle that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review. Our evaluation leads us to conclude that the trial
court's ruling on the homicide aspect is clearly supported by the
records. Thus, we shall concentrate on the appellant's lone
assignment of error with respect to his conviction for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm. olanski
P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of
firearms, was amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294.
Aside from lowering the penalty for said crime, R.A. 8294 also
provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered
as a special aggravating circumstance.[7] This amendment
has two (2) implications: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as
a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating
circumstance; second, as only a single crime (homicide or
murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession
of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty shall be
imposed on the accused.[8]
Prescinding therefrom, and considering that the provisions of
the amendatory law are favorable to herein appellant, the new
law should be retroactively applied in the case at bar. [9] It was
thus error for the trial court to convict the appellant of two (2)
separate offenses, i.e., Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearms, and punish him separately for each crime. Based on
the facts of the case, the crime for which the appellant may be
charged is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of
firearm, the correct denomination for the crime, and not illegal
possession of firearm, aggravated by homicide as ruled by
the trial court, as it is the former offense which aggravates the
crime of homicide under the amendatory law.
The appellant anchors his present appeal on the assertion that
his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the
prosecution that he was not licensed to possess the subject
firearm. In their Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee's
Brief, the Solicitor General joined cause with the appellant.
[10]
 haideem
We agree.
Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession
of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm,
and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to
carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing
these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution.[11]
The first element -- the existence of the firearm -- was
indubitably established by the prosecution. Prosecution
eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .
38 caliber revolver.[12]Appellant himself admitted that he did not
turn over the gun to the security guards in the building after the
shooting.[13] The same gun was recovered from the appellant
and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof
was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second
element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to
possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential
element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an
offense. The lack of a license or permit should have been
proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative
of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was
not a licensee of the subject firearm[14] or that the type of firearm
involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military
personnel.[15] Indeed, if the means of proving a negative fact is
equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on
the party averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged
that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the prosecution
is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the prosecution who
has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic
principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty.[16] Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is
a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to
prove this negative allegation of non-existence. [17] kirsten
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself
admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from
his possession, his admission will not relieve the
prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess
the gun. In People vs. Solayao,[18] we expounded on this
doctrine, thus:
"x x x (b)y its very nature, an 'admission is the
mere acknowledgement of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may be inferred,
tending to incriminate the speaker, but not
sufficient of itself to establish his guilt.' In other
words, it is a statement by defendant of fact or
facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection
with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove
guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize
conviction. From the above principles, this Court
can infer that an admission in criminal cases is
insufficient to prove beyond doubt the
commission of the crime charged.
"Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in
nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states:
'An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the
trial or other proceedings in the same
case does not require proof.'
"Not being a judicial admission, said statement by
accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. It does not even establish
a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for
the prosecution but does not stand as proof of
the fact of absence or lack of a
license." (emphasis supplied) CODES
Additionally, as pointed out by both the appellant and the
Solicitor General, the extrajudicial admission was made without
the benefit of counsel. Thus, we hold that the appellant may only
be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code.
We come now to the penalty. The crime of homicide is
penalized by reclusion temporal.[19] There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed in its
medium period, i.e., from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor, i.e., from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, as minimum, to
reclusion temporal in its medium period of from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is
MODIFIED. Appellant Julian Castillo y Lumayro is found guilty of
Homicide. He is sentenced to imprisonment of from nine (9)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9) days
of reclusion temporal as maximum. However, the civil indemnity
and moral damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the
victim in the total amount of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,  an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes
G.R. No. 181508               October 2, 2013
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and
CASIMIRA MATURINGAN, Petitioners, 
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by
ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31 May 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329,
which reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos City, Bulacan, in a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655,
With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.
The facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be
part of an estate which needed to be proportionally subdivided
among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners
and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is
under Tax Declaration 208143consisting of 240 square meters
situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his
death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the
respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO, who later died
without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died
without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by
his 6 children including petitioner Casimira Constantino-
Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by
his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who
was survived by his five (5) children which includes petitioner
Oscar Constantino.4
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum
(Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren
of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint 5
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and
Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the
nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992, 6Tax Declaration
Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-10022 (02655)8 and
reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 20814 9in the name of
Pedro Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in
October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over
the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr.,
to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion
thereof. Upon verification, respondents learned that a Tax
Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner
Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was
unlawfully issued, which in effect canceled Tax Declaration No.
20814 in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of
the new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a
simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro
Sr. It was further alleged that subsequently, the subject land
was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima
resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-
0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an area of 120sq m and the
other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration
No. 96-10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually
conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira in whose name a
new Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 12 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas
ngHukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued
on the basis of such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With
Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr., upon his death, left several
parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m
covered by Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of
192 sq m also situated at Sta. Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan,
previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an
agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less.
The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly
valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary
agreement between and among the descendants of the
deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause
of action against them considering that the respondents’ lawful
share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred
to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver14 dated 5 December 1968,executed by Angelo
Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent
Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all
heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated
unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of
land with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were
"the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed
that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership
over the subject 240 sq m lot without damage to the
respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of
Tax Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs
of Pedro Sr., including the petitioners, on the understanding that
the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share and
participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot
covered by the "
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted
wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as
well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon,
trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision 16 in favor of
the respondents finding that:
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
dated December 5, 1968 (Exh. "2") executed by the heirs of
Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the
subsequent execution of another deed denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated August 10, 1992
(Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno
Constantino, also other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the
exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of ANTONIA,
CLARA, and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and
defendants acted equally at fault. They are in pari delicto,
whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery
by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA
559). Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against
each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of
Article 19 of the New Civil Code whereby every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith, is the legal maxim that "he who comes to court
to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including
Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or
signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated
December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro
Constantino, Jr. They areconsidered "privies" to said deed, and
are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v.
Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN
ESTATE". (Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming
otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357). They are estopped
to share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine,
they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed
for.1âwphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA, 260
SCRA 673).
With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against
defendants in their Complaint and counterclaim for damages by
defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are
hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and
disquisition, the deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax
Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name of Casimira C.
Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C.
Maturingan) stand. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for nullification thereof
with damages is hereby DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the
erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari
delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman."
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the
respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed
covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence,
not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. The CA rationated in this
wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968
among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and
Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is
a typographical error in that the name of Pedro Jr. was
inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from
the reading of the document that a typographical error was
committed because the four (4) children of PedroJr. by Felipa
dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further, during the
presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was
rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate children namely:
Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo 19 and
Pedro Jr. had four (4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of
Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto themselves to
the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the
adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a different
property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary.
Hence, it is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in
pari delicto.
The Issue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error,
among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the existence
of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the
propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine.
Likewise assailed is the erroneous disregard by the CA of
stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on
which the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or
more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts
of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when
an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in
pari delicto.21 Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a
controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no
action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it
finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex
dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis."22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such
doctrine, courts will take a hands off stance in interpreting the
contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the
case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this
Court pronounced that:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or
respondent because we are asked to interpret and enforce an
illegal and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and
1412 of the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase
of raw materials, equipment, supplies and other needs of
offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and
pervasive that nobody seems to know how to eliminate them. x
x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari
delicto. Neither one may expect positive relief from courts of
justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave
them as they were at the time the case was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally
governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which
state that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the
cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
 xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties,
neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract,
or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
xxx xxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of
contract constituting a criminal offense under Article 1411.
Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although
such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code
speaks of contracts in general, as well as contracts which are
null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code
– such as the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative
of the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they
separately executed deprived each other of rightful shares in the
two lots subject of the separate contracts – that is, if the two (2)
parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of
the late Pedro Sr.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of
the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman" which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an
underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria
Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr. and grandmother of
respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to
recognize the 192 square meters lot subject matter of the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968 as the
share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr.,
Petitioners respected such agreement, as in fact, Maria
Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein respondents, were
not disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said
parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro Jr. were said to have
acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and
the underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse
or reason to question it taking cue from the doctrine of in
paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial court’s findings that
respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise. 27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding
the validity of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on
pari delicto, is also incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find
occasion to stress that Article 1412 of the Civil Code that
breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations
of the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object
which does not constitute a criminal offense. It applies to
contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to
contracts rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which
the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically,
in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who
are both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any
action against each other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments
unto the signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor
common to them and another set of signatories likewise
assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate. The
separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of
the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful
share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an
assignment of specific portions of the estate of Pedro Sr.,
without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of
heirs intended to exclude the other heirs.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The
inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact that two deeds, not
one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of
both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their
illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying agreement
resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void
agreement. Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from
the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law;
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being
void and in existent, it has, as a consequence, of no force and
effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into
and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. 29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of
respondents that no fault can be attributed to them or that they
are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria
Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-interest, and the other heirs,
including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding
effect to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue
during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the
contract or privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed,
however, that respondents are successors-in-interest of Maria
Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in agreement
with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are
"privies" to Maria Laquindanum. By the term "privies" is meant
those between whom an action is deemed binding although they
are not literally parties to the said action.30 This Court, in Correa
v. Pascual,31 had occasion to explain that "privity in estate
denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees,
vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A
privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to
the property in question by purchase; one who takes by
conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest,
derive their right from and are in the same position as their
predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such
successors, respondents’ situation is analogous to that of a
transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 32 reiterating
Fetalino v. Sanz33 where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in
interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings
had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is
a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any
event, have been bound by the judgment against his
predecessor.34
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement
precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria
Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely
succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, referred to a property
owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this
case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion
Laquindanums’s statement that the parcel of land subject matter
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of
the estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other
evidence was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to
the respondents’ claim, merely relied on the alleged
typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CA’s
conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of
their children, which the CA considered as proof that the
property was owned by Pedro Jr. and not part of the estate of
Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the petitioners, the mention of the
names of the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement
is not proof that the subject of the deed is the property of Pedro
Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only the
children of Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as
heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the
admissions made no less by the respondents during the pre-trial
conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro
Sr.35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties
during the pre-trial is hereunder quoted, thus:
Respondents’ admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534
previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred to
Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting
ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per
Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968 by
Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against
respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the
192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was
transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr.
Such that, in one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the
trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the
plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 – an issue earlier
mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to
be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., 37 this Court
emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties
who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position,
a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must
assume the consequences of the disadvantage.39 (Highlighting
ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the
fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of
conclusiveness of judicial admissions – for, in the interest of
justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings
but which may not have been taken up in the pre-trial can still be
taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial
shall be recorded.1awp++i1 Upon the termination thereof, the
court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters
taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or
admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall,
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of
the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides
that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of
Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it
is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that
he made such an admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While denying
ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent
Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a
vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired
by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43 is hereto reproduced as
follows:
"ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro
Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land also situated at Sta.
Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?
A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our
property owned by Pedro Constantino, Jr. that was inherited by
my mother Maria Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that
parcel of land, the one that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e
amin." (Highlighting ours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving
declarationunsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive
the stipulations made during the pre-trial conference.
Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the
contract on which they based their right over the property
subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two
deeds relate to exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heir’s
right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate our ruling in Neri
v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of spouses Uy, all
the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering
that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)
Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the
settlement of estate, the case of Segura v. Segura, 45elucidated
thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six
of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the
partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total
nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition
had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention
or the laws as contemplated by the parties in the instant case,
we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any
circumvention of the law cannot be48countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED. The
Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without
prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr.
with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.
SO ORDERED.

In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of

the law on legitimes, the pari delicto rule, expressed in the
maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto
potior est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either
party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are,
does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied) 46 As held in De
Leon v. CA:47
[G.R. No. 119053. January 23, 1997.]
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of
laws. However, the pari delicto rule expressed in the maxims
"Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est
FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to
APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC., and MICHELL
an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are does not
LHUILLIER, respondents.
apply in this case.
RESOLUTION
x x x           x x x          x x x
FRANCISCO, J.:
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose
has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws, the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 3677
positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be promulgated on August 4, 1994 affirming in toto the decision of
served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Civil Case
was before the transaction was entered into.
No. CEB-9801 entitled "Florentino L. Atillo III versusAmancor,
Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
The material antecedents are as follows:
On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as AMANCOR for brevity), a corporation then owned and controlled
by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III, contracted a loan in the amount
of P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured
by real estate properties owned by the petitioner.[1] Before the said loan
could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
dated June 14, 1988 (Annex "A" of the Complaint) with respondent
Michell Lhuillier (hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for brevity)
whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a
consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER
each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of
AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining
6%.[2]
In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support
the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER
executed another Memorandum of Agreement on February 13, 1989
(Annex "B" of the Complaint) by virtue of which LHUILLIER
undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR.[3] As an
addendum to the foregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER on
March 11, 1989.[4] Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said
Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement which provides as follows:
"4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario
St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S
mortgage loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while
AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to
him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank
rate."[5]
Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR'
s outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the amount
of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had
with AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to the
petitioner was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of
AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, the latter
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money docketed as
Civil Case No. Ceb-9801 against AMANCOR and LHUILLIER
before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
At the pre-trial conference, petitioner, AMANCOR and
LHUILLIER, assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on
the following:
"1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the
Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 June 1988 (Annex A), the
Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and
Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C);
2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted
to P199,888.89 as of October 1, 1990;"[6]
and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial
court:
"a. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C, is Michell J. Lhuillier
personally liable to the plaintiff?
b. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J.
Lhuillier, if the latter is liable, pay the plaintiff?"[7] (Underscoring
supplied.)
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written
arguments of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the
amount of P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate
prevailing as of March 11, 1989. LHUILLIER was, however,
absolved of any personal liability therefor. [8]
It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that
petitioner appealed to respondent court, arguing therein that as
LHUILLIER signed the Memorandum of Agreement without the
official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR, LHUILLIER Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission
should have been declared jointly and severally liable with of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that:
AMANCOR.[9]
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier
The respondent court found petitioner's contention bereft of
personally without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
merit and held in part that:
xxx xxx xxx
"Contrary to plaintiffs-appellants (sic) allegation, the indebtedness
of P199,888.89 was incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC., alone.
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor
A thorough study of the records shows that plaintiff's cause of action
acceded (sic) to the personal agreement between plaintiff and
for collection of a sum of money arose from "his payment of the
Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and
defendant corporation's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with
the actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company" x x x. Considering the
subject claim of plaintiff is concerned."[12]
allegations in the complaint and those contained in the Memorandum
of Agreement, the respondent court properly ruled that the liability was
And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the
incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC., singly. We grant that if
decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of
plaintiff really believes that the indebtedness was incurred by
personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law,
defendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity, he should not have
particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
offsetted (sic) some of his accounts with the defendant corporation, x x
provides that:
x. As it is, plaintiff could have ofted (sic) to sue defendant Lhuillier in
his personal capacity the whole amount of indebtedness and not
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
implead the defendant corporation as co-defendant.
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
xxx xxx xxx
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
x x x [T]he indebtedness was incurred by the defendant corporation as
Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by
a legal entity to pay the mortgage loan. Defendant Lhuillier acted only
adverting to the consistent pronouncement of this Court that: "x
as an officer/agent of the corporation by signing the said Memorandum
x x an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted
of Agreement."[10]
by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to
him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent court, petitioner
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
brought this instant petition submitting the following issue for the
interposed by the party or not x x x."[13]
resolution of this Court:
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the
"When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions
personal liability in a certain transaction, may a court rule against such enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law and
an admission despite clear indications that it was not affected by jurisprudence misplaced.
mistakes palpable or otherwise?"[11]
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of
two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no
such admission was in fact made. [14] The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such
an admission.
"For instance, if a party invokes an 'admission' by an adverse party, but
cites the admission 'out of context', then the one making the admission
may show that he made no 'such' admission, or that his admission was
taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean 'not in the sense in which the
admission is made to appear.' That is the reason for the modifier
'such'."[15] [Underscoring supplied.]
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions
made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of
context". Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court by
isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding
paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will
show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations
recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in
AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by
petitioner.[16]Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all
investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases,
only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. [17] It is
more than obvious that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with
the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of
the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations,
LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for
AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding
paragraphs of the said Answer asserted the following:
"3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable
Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and
par. 4 of the actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement
dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C), Lhuillier did not engage to
personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to
release the property to plaintiff. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in
the aforesaid par. 4 of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in
the position to repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to
him equivalent to prevailing bank rate."
"3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier x x x only agreed, for the
corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre- terminated
corporate loans with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancor's
finances, for said corporation to pay interest at prevailing bank rate. x
x x."[18] (Underscoring supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had
never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. In fact, in
delineating the issues to be resolved by the trial court, both
parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question
of whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the
obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. [19] Moreover, as correctly
observed by respondent court, if petitioner really believed that
the liability was incurred by LHUILLIER in his personal capacity,
then he should not have offset his accounts with those of
AMANCOR's. The foregoing act of petitioner is a clear indication
that he recognized AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the
obligor.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the
alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold
that such admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by
analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of
Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to
override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:
"The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his
pleadings and in his declarations in open court differed will not
militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by
respondent court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading
are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but this is
not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of
fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As
ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the
defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, The foregoing pronouncement is based on factual findings
his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial of the lower court which were upheld by the respondent court,
Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find and which are thus, conclusive upon us pursuant to the well
no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon."[20] (Underscoring established rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
supplied.) supported by substantial evidence on the record, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. [22]
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error, the decision
presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition is
court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
DENIED.
This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had
agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the SO ORDERED.
basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the
stipulation of facts entered into during the pre-trial conference,
the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability
shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as
ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial
court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said
Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of
personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.
Furthermore, on the basis of the same evidence
abovementioned, respondent court did not err when it refused to
pierce the veil of corporate fiction, thereby absolving LHUILLIER
of liability for corporate obligations and deciding the question in
this wise:

"The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the

veil of corporation fiction may be pierced and the individual
shareholder may be personally liable (sic) to the obligations of the
corporation only when the corporation is used as a cloak or cover for
fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to
achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of the creditors.
This situation does not obtain in this case. In the case at bar, plaintiff-
appellant failed to show that defendant Lhuillier acted otherwise than
what is required of him as an agent of a corporation. It does not appear
either that defendant-appellee Michel (sic) Lhuillier is jointly and
severally liable with AMANCOR INC. absent an express stipulation to
that effect and sans clear and convincing evidence as to his personal
liability."[21]