1.

Cayetano v. Monsod (1991)

G.R. No. 100113 | 1991-09-03

Subject:   
Commission on Elections, Practice of Law, Qualifications of an Appointive Official

Facts:

President Corazon Aquino nominated Atty. Christian Monsod to the position of Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

This petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Cayetano prays that the Commission on
Election’s confirmation and subsequent appointment of Monsod be declared null and void
because the latter fails to meet the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.

Held:

Modern Definition of the Practice of Law

1. The practice of lawmeans any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience .

2. In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, it was stated:

“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions”

 
3. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”

4. Atty. Monsod has been a member of the Philippine Bar since 1960, and has been a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972. He has also been paying his
professional fees as a lawyer for more than ten years.

5. Atty. Monsod’s past work as a lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur,

lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.

6. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).

7. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. This no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse has
been shown. 

2.

3.

4.

Conrado N. Que, Complainant, v. Atty Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Respondent

A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014

Facts:
 Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final judgment of the lower court against his
client. Respondent successfully filed a petition of certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two
petitions of annulment of title and a petition for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial
Court, and a petition for declaratory execution of the lower court’s decision against his client.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated various canons and provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:

Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple actions praying for the same cause
delayed the execution of the final judgment of the court. The respondent’s willful and revolting
falsehood is also alleged by the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the good
name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the previous counsel of the
respondent’s clients. The respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond legitimate means allowed
by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his clients. The respondent violated his
duty as an attorney “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.”

Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR, and is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10;
Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law.

5.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO RE: PETITION

(FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO. Adm. Case No. 6148.
January 22, 2013

Facts:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macaru
bbo who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court disbarred him for having contracted a bigamous marriage with the complainant and a 
third marriage with another while his first marriage was still subsisting, which acts constituted gr
oss immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of P
rofessional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Respondent had sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal p
rofession and in his personal life. He had asked forgiveness from his children by complainant an
d maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records 
also showed that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown and devoted his ti
me tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. He was appointed as 
Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Oper
ations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to 
date. Moreover, he became a part-time instructor in a University. Respondent likewise took an a
ctive part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement was duly supported by the Integrated Bar of th
e Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest cert
ified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He was 
also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further revealed that respondent had already 
settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered 
by complainant. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Court’s directive
.

While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, conc
omitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this ca
se.

6.

Sebastian vs. Calis (1999)

A.C. No. 5118 | 1999-09-09

Subject: A lawyer’s gross misconduct puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of
the bar; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege

Facts:

Marilou Sebastian alleged that sometime in 1992, she was referred to Atty. Dorotheo Calis who
promised to process all necessary documents required for the Sebastian’s trip to the USA for a
fee of Php150,000.00 She made a partial payment of the required fee, which was received by
Ester Calis, wife of Atty. Calis for which a receipt was issued. For several months, they had
several conferences with Atty. Calis for the processing of her travel documents. An additional
amount of P65,000.00 was demanded. After such payment, Atty. Calis furnished copies of
Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application and a list of questions which would be
asked during interviews. She was also asked to assume the name of Lizette P. Ferrer, married
to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. Documents were
issued to support her identity.

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, Sebastian demanded the return of
her money. She was however assured by Atty. Calis that there was nothing to worry about.
Weeks, before her departure, she paid the required fee to which no receipt was issued.

Upon arrival at the Singapore Airport, Sebastian, along with other recruits were apprehended for
carrying spurious travel documents. Because of this, they were detained at Changi Prisons in
Singapore and were deported back to the Philippines.

Upon arrival, Atty. Calis promised to secure new travel documents for them but Sebastian opted
not to pursue with her travel and merely demanded for the return of her money totaling
P150,000.00. Atty. Calis made partial refunds but the remaining balance of P114,000.00 was
ignored. She tried to see him several times but she found out that he transferred to an unknown
residence. An administrative case was filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Commission issued a report saying that the alleged
proposal to secure U.S.A Visa under an assumed name was accepted by Sebastian, negating
deceit on Atty. Calis’ part. It stated however that the transfer of residence without a forwarding
address indicated his attempt to escape responsibility. He was thus found guilty of gross
misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct
and was suspended until he effects the return of the balance due Sebastian. When the case
was elevated to the IBP Board of Governors, the latter called for his disbarment for having been
found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Held:

A lawyer’s gross misconduct puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of
the bar

1. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not
mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable

2. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

 3. Atty. Calis jeopardized the life and liberty of Sebastian when he made her travel with
spurious documents. Not only are his acts illegal, they were also detestable from the moral point
of view.

Practice of law is not a right but a privilege

4. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be
deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
giving him the opportunity to be heard.

5. Because of his acts and for his refusal to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total
disregard of the summon issued to him, Atty. Calis was removed from the Roll of Attorneys for
his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward Sebastian.

7.

In Re Tagorda (1929)
G.R. No. 32329 | 1929-03-23

Subject: Solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension

Facts:

Luis Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano,
stating in essence that he can execute a deed of sale for the purchase of land, can renew lost
documents for animals, can execute any kind of affidavit, etc. He further admits that he is the
author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano
stating that despite his membership in the Board of Isabela, he will still have his residence in
Echague in order to live and serve the people there as a lawyer and notary public. In the letter,
he also offered three pesos for land title registration.

Held:

Solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension

1. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper.
But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to
procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer.

2. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation
is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law.

3. In this case, he clearly violated the law when he printed a card stating his expertise and
announcing his services as a lawyer. He also violated the same when he wrote a letter to the
lieutenant stating his desire to serve the people of Echague and asking the lieutenant to express
this to his people. The court then suspended him from the practice of law for the period of one
month.

8.

9.
10.

Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc. (1993)

G.R. No. 553 | 1993-06-17

Subject: The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; Advertisements induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy; Lawyers cannot
advertise in the manner a merchant advertise his goods

Facts:

Mauricio Ulep, as a member of the bar, seeks to prevent The Legal Clinic, Inc. from publishing
any more of its advertisements for legal services (for obtaining secret marriages, Guam divorce,
annulment, etc). Ulep asserts that such advertisements are unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members
of the bar. Legal Clinic on the other hand claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines and should not therefore be banned from advertising its
services.

Held:

The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law

1. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law,
therefore, covers a wide range of activities.

2. While some of the services being offered by The Legal Clinic merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, it is clear that
it nonetheless gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption with its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise
him or her on the proper course of action to be taken.

Advertisements induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy
2. Under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and
that is the situation provided under Art. 26.

3. By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with Philippine law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least,
this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws
are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. It violates Rule 1.02 of
the of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of law or lessening confidence in the legal system.

Lawyers cannot advertise in the manner a merchant advertise his goods

4. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. Advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession.

5. Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc., was reprimanded by the Court, with a warning that running more
advertisements similar to the ones above will be dealt with more severely. The Legal Clinic is
prohibited from further advertising its services.

11.

Dacanay vs. Baker & Mckenzie (1985)

A.C. No. 2131 | 1985-05-10

Subject: An alien law firm cannot practice law in the Philippines

Facts:

Adriano Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr., Vicente Torres and eight other lawyers
from practicing law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In a
letter, Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International,
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Dacanay, replying for his client, denied the liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie,
and if not, the purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Not having received any
reply, he filed the instant complaint.

Held:

An alien law firm cannot practice law in the Philippines

1. Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court provides that an alien law firm cannot practice law in the
Philippines. The use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment". This is unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

2. As admitted by Torres, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in

Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. He also admitted
that aside from being a member of the firm name Guerrero & Torres, they are members or
associates of Baker & Mckenzie. The court then enjoined them from practicing law under the
latter firm name. 

12.

Regala v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

Facts: A complaint was filed before the Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against Eduardo
Cojuangco for recovery of illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks. Among the
defendants in this complaint are Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta,
and Hayudini who are all partners of ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA law performed legal services
for clients. More specifically, the members of the law firm delivered to its client stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of this, ACCRA law came to know the
assets of their clients as well as personal and business circumstances. They also assisted in the
organization and acquisition of companies and they also acted as nominees-stockholders of the
said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. (coco levy scandal) The PCGG said
that they would drop the ACCRA law partners from the complaint if they comply with the
following conditions:

1. Disclosure of identity of its clients 2. Submission of documents substantiating lawyer-client

relationship 3. Submission of the deeds of assignments the ACCRA law partners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Sandiganbayan promulgated a
resolution that basically said that until ACCRA lawyers prove the existence and identity of their
clients, they cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts. So they are still
impleaded in the complaint. (So names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint)

Issues: 1. W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be subjected to the strict application of the law of
agency 2. (ETHICS RELATED) W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits ACCRA lawyers from
revealing identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG
Held/Ratio:

1. NO. The ACCRA lawyers are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. They are being impleaded in the complaint
so it can be used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable
the PCGG to nail these clients. PCGG has NO valid cause of action against the ACCRA lawyers
and should exclude them. A lawyer-client relationship is MORE than a principal-agent
relationship because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by
his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith.

2. YES. While the general rule is that a lawyer should name his client (Just in case Sir asks:
Reasons on naming client 1. Court has right to know, 2. Attorney-client relationship does not
exist if there is no client, 3. Privilege pertains to the subject matter of the relationship, 4. Due
process – right to know), the general rule DOES not apply in this case.

The general rule is qualified by some exceptions. Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity
for which he sought the lawyer’s advice. So basically, when disclosure would open the client to
liability, his identity is privileged. The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions
to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information,
because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship). The preparation of the deed of assignment
was part of their service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. If ACCRA lawyers will identify their clients, they would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

13.

14.

ENGEL PAUL ACA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, RESPONDENT.

A.C. No. 10952 | 2016-01-26

FACTS:

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty.
Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a
lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the
lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in
his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every
month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter
had various clients and investors.

As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the
total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. All checks were
drawn from PSBank.

Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned
checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado. As time went by,
however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant’s calls and text messages. This prompted
complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.

Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle his
total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00. Atty. Salvado refused to receive the said notice.

Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to personally serve the demand letter. A certain
“Mark” who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there
and had been staying in the province already.

As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly
alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of the house.
Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his debt. During this
conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on “something” to pay his
obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.

Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.

Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had previously entered into various
government contracts and that he was previously engaged in some other businesses prior to
engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never
enticed complainant to invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of good interest
that attracted him into making an investment.

The checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence of investment.

Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request
complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This
arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his house
and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.

Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension

from the practice of law for six (6) months.

IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification – increased the period
of suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.

ISSUE:WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he violated CPR and the Lawyer’s
Oath

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a
lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man,
learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when dealing
with persons, clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed,
complainant’s being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer and
businessman was typical human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that
a person like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose businesses
he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado’s stature as a member of the
Bar had, in one way or another, influenced complainant’s decision to invest.
The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence” deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado
is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary
obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession
and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used,
bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote that
the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer’s
moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado’s business relationship with
complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the
court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado’s deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations.

15.

CAROLINE CASTAÑEDA JIMENEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO,

RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 10548 | 2014-12-10
Facts: Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed
by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the
trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

Issue: Whether respondent’s actively and passively allowing Clarion to make untruthful
representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney.

Held: Yes, While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion
to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months is warranted. Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and
candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have been staunch
in reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion
and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from
finding that the totality of evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge
the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal
counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say,
complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of
interests.

16.

ERLINDA FOSTER, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, RESPONDENT.

A.C. No. 10579 | 2014-12-10
Facts:

Complainant Erlinda Foster had a legal problem over a deed of sale she entered with Tierra
Realty. Atty. Jaime Agtang agreed to represent her as her counsel for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, even though he was the one who notarized the deed of sale. In the
course of being Foster’s lawyer, Agtang committed the following acts: (1) Borrowed money from
Foster in the amount of P100,000 anp P220,000; (2) Misrepresented the amount (P150,000) of
filing fee; (3) Asked for P50,000 purportedly to be given to the judge as a bribe; and (4) Failed to
notify Foster that the case was dismissed in September 2010. Foster found out when he
checked it herself in December of that same year. Also, it turned out that Agtang had legal
relationships with Tierrar Realty. Hence, Foster filed a complaint against Agtang with the
Commission of Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Agtang guilty of ethical impropriety and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. The IBP-BOG reduced
the one-year suspension to three months.

Issue: Whether or not Agtang violated the CPR.

Held:

Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not
confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” In this case, respondent
is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as
the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In
other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only
to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no
iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with
the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her financial
resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant
amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have
accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in
the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount
due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession. Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer
shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one,
but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to
him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only
given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer.

17.

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO And HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, Vs. ATTY. IV AN M.

SOLID UM, .JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 9872 | 2014-01-28

FACTS: In April 2006, Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in
the quieting of her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Atty. Solidum P50,000.00 as
acceptance fee. In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the
services of Solidum for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her
sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for
the registration expenses. Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2
million from Navarro. The loan was covered by two MOAs. The MOA was prepared by Solidum.
The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall be 10%. Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million
from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a MOA containing the same terms
and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum mortgaged his 263-
hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero. Nothing happened in the quieting of title case
field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving the acceptance fee. In the land
registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land was already
registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she should not have financed the case if only
Solidum advised her of the status of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3
million from Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by Solidum merited his disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan
agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later,
using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. In the
case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that
Navarro is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case. In
Presbitero’s case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbitero’s
interest was not fully protected because the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He
claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only
P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidum’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law as
well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. Solidum was disbarred by the
Supreme Court.

18.

HEINZ R. HECK v. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS

401 SCRA 46 (2003)

Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it
verbatim reflect blatant judicial sloth.

Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the Regional Trial presided by
Judge Anthony E. Santos. Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the order
to schedule the

trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently, they and their counsel failed to appear therein.
Since only the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that hearing, Judge Santos
considered the non-attendance of Heck and his co-defendant as waiver of their right to present
evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case to be submitted for decision. He
therefore authorized Atty. Singson to prepare the draft of the decision.

The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from the draft which Atty. Singson
prepared. Hence, Heck filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with violation of
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
found Judge Santos guilty for adopting Singson’s work as his own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD:

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for the counsel of one of the
parties to draft the decision and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read: Canon 2, a Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should perform
official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities.

By such order, Judge Santos abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. It is axiomatic that decision-making, among other duties, is the
primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench. He must use his own
perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence presented before him and his own
discernment when determining the proper action, resolution or decision. Delegating to
a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect
blatant judicial sloth.

Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It bears emphasis that a judge must not only render
a just, correct and impartial decision. He should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
19.

TABANG v. GACOTT
A.C. No. 6490
July 9, 2013

FACTS: Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land
as she already owned other parcels. Hence, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the
parcels under the names of fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice.

Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty.
Glenn Gaccot offered the parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from
Tabang the TCTs.

Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven
parcels and caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the
parcels and announced that these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He
received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.

Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit
filed a case before the IBP.

Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded
a balato of 20% from the proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and
disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his
disbarment.

RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the
complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of
respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is
held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is
expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the
law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he
instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, the Court imposes
upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and
skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for
himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a
sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more
detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in
these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’
plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly
absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court
to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to
him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity,
respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

20.

De Jesus vs Sanchez-Malit (2014)

FACTS In the Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on
23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real
Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that
the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with
a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated. In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer.
The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorney in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent. With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the AffidavitComplaint was actually new. She gave the
court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra
copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance
that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the
court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

ISSUE Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined. Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this
case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall.
That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not
make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a
wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s explanation about the
unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September 1999 is
incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could
have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease
agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on
various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either
unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for
disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in
his or her presence. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her

21.

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO. A.C.
No. 5816, March 10, 2015

FACTS: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16,
1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27,
1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First
Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-infact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the
State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001.
Their union produced one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce
decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo,
and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty.
Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed”. On October 31, 2001, Atty.
Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo
Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY. BAYDO SHOULD BE

DISBARRED.

HELD: Only Atty. Catindig should be disbarred. The facts gathered from the evidence adduced
by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of
conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a
high degree.From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained
from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to
Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and
moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. With regards to
Atty. Baydo, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between
her and Atty. Catindig. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim
were mere allegations, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath
and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

22.

1. Pangalangan v.Ecraela GR. No. 10676

Facts:
The complainant was Atty. Roy B. Ecraela and the respondent was Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan. The complainant and the respondent were best friends and both graduated from
UP College of Law in 1990. The respondent was formerly married to Shiela P. Jardiolin. The
complainant stated that while the respondent had series of adulterous and illicit relations with
married and unmarried women from 1990 to 2007, including the complainant’s wife. The
complainant also said that the Respondent attempted to bribe the MIAA and received the car as
a gift. The Respondent also abused his authority as an educator in some schools where he
induced his male students to engage in nocturnal preoccupation and entertained romance with
female students for passing grades. Furthermore, the respondent did not attend his hearings.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed gross immoral conduct which would warrant his
disbarment.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the respondent to be guilty of gross immorality and violating the
Section 2 of Article XV of 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and also
the Lawyer’s Oath. He is hereby disbarred from the practice of Law and his name is ordered
stricken from the Rolls of Attorney effective immediately.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage,
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

23.

MELVYN G. GARCIA, v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
February 03, 2015

FACTS: Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño. Garcia alleged that he
married Virginia Alcantara and they had two children. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. Garcia
alleged while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing complainant’s children, filed an action
for support against him and his sister. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was
already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño, alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his
previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has
not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Sesbreño alleged that, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him
before the IBP and Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge
because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. Sesbreño alleged
that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not
deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED IN A CONVICTION FOR

HOMICIDE.

HELD: YES, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys. We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This
Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. xxx Moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion
as the cases are reached. We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency
restored his full civil and political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was
absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights. There are
four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbreño.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability. The penalty for Sesbreño’s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that “[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of
the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist.” Hence, the Parcasio case has
no application here. Even if Sesbreño has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records
that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. A violation of
the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

24.

25.

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN,

RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 10576 | 2015-01-14
FACTS: Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post. Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card,
Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for
“updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD)
and President. Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI
applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the
Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. Atty. Limpin
admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the
BOD and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and
that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
HELD: YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Members
of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has
performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.” Grounds for such
administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin
committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

26.

JOSE ALLAN TAN v. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, AC. No. 7766, 2014-08-05

Facts:
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.[2] After accepting the engagement,
respondent filed the corresponding complaint[3] before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually
dismissed by the RTC in an
Order[4] dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence.[5] While
respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,[6] complainant learned
of the same only on
August 24, 2007 when he visited the former's office.[7] On such occasion, respondent allegedly
asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since
complainant could not produce the said amount at that time,... respondent, instead, asked and
was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of
a notice of appeal before the RTC.[8] On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of
P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date,... filed a notice of appeal[9] before the RTC.
It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by
the RTC's Clerk of Court.[13]
Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had
long been dismissed.[14] Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
respondent alleged that it was complainant's failure to timely produce the amount of P1,400.00
to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he
informed... complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted
in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice"
but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court's unfavorable decision.
In a Report and Recommendation[17] dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1)... year be
meted out against him.[
Issues:
whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
Ruling:
the Court concurs with the IBP's findings, subject to the modification of the recommended
penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly
updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter's confidence, to
wit:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate... review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding
and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the
dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests.[22] In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of
law and legal procedure, and a client who deals... with him has the right to expect not just a
good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client's cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainant's partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to
inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24,... 2007
when he visited the former's office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably
negligent in filing complainant's appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the
reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed...
to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.[
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant's appeal by fabricating
the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainant's appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been
denied. In... so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that
caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly,
respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,[25] failing in which whether
in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to... continue his practice of law.[26] A
lawyer's inexcusable neglect to serve his client's interests with utmost diligence and
competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to
conceal such neglect should never be... countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent's conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to
keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case's true status through the use of a falsified
court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.[27] His acts... should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In
Brennisen v. Contawi,[33] the Court disbarred the lawyer who... falsified a special power of
attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client's property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,[34] the
penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an inexistent court
decision for a fee
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his
client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his
case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus,... causing undue
prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations
of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as
a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the... public perception of the legal
profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and
prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment

27.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J,
2014-03-11
Facts:
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along Epifanio
Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.[1] Due to the
project's location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road... and staging
area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack
Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which
ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham
Street that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office
and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI's construction workers, which prompted AMALI to
file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed
as Civil Case No. 65668.[2] On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI's prayer... for the WPMI.
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed
use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI's petition for corporate rehabilitation
was approved.
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing
its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer.
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting
the petition of WWRAI.[
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra
Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of
the CA... had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor
WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 1,... Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.[9] Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint
for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative... charge against any official of the
Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204,
Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor and... perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown
to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or
taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.[12] The term knowingly means "sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice."[13] Thus, the complainant
must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or
not supported by the... evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.[14]
In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive
in issuing the judgment.[15] Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.[16] The failure of the
judge to correctly... interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable.
Moreover, AMALI's allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA
through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice
by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against... sitting
judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re:
Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-
Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,... Hon. Ramon
M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,[18] we
emphatically held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in
its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis. The complaint herein is actually the
second one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the...
performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified
Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and
Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,[19] AMALI accused
respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross
misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of... the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety of the
interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also
an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative
charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due...
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in
the first administrative case AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the
unfounded charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative...
to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself,
and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their
penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not... stopped
doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its
representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong
attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI's authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its
Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had
authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be...
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against
respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless
administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt... under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court