Asian Education and Development Studies

Five success stories in combating corruption: lessons for policy makers

Jon S.T. Quah,
Article information:
To cite this document:
Jon S.T. Quah, (2017) "Five success stories in combating corruption: lessons for policy makers", Asian Education and
Development Studies, Vol. 6 Issue: 3, doi: 10.1108/AEDS-03-2017-0031
Permanent link to this document:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-03-2017-0031
Downloaded on: 29 May 2017, At: 12:37 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 0 other documents.
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 2 times since 2017*
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by emerald-srm:220785 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service
information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please
visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of
more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online
products and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication
Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

 Five success stories in combating corruption: lessons for policy makers

Abstract

Purpose – This paper explains why Botswana, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Rwanda and
Singapore have succeeded in combating corruption and identifies the lessons for policy
makers in other countries.

Design/methodology/approach – The five countries are compared to identify the reasons

for their success in combating corruption and the lessons that can be learnt by policy
makers elsewhere.

Findings – Political will of the five governments is critical because combating corruption
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

effectively requires them to provide the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) with the necessary
powers, budget, personnel and independence to enforce the anti-corruption laws
impartially. New Zealand has succeeded in curbing corruption without an ACA because it
relies on other institutions to maintain its good governance. Singapore’s rejection of the
ineffective British colonial government’s method of using the police to curb corruption and
its reliance on a single ACA was emulated by Hong Kong, Botswana and Rwanda. However,
having a single ACA does not guarantee success unless it has the powers, budget, personnel
and independence to perform its functions impartially as a watchdog instead of an attack
dog against the government’s political opponents. As combating corruption remains a work
in progress in the five countries, their policy makers must sustain their effective ACAs to
meet the rising threat of private sector corruption.

Originality/value – The paper will be useful to scholars and policy makers concerned with
improving the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in those countries where
corruption is rampant.

Keywords: Corruption, Botswana, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Rwanda, Singapore

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

Unlike problems in the natural sciences which are “definable and separable” and “may have
solutions that are findable,” societal problems are not tame or benign but “inherently
wicked” because they are “ill-defined” and “rely upon elusive political judgment for
resolution” (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p. 160). Indeed, corruption remains a “wicked
problem” in many countries in spite of the implementation of many anti-corruption
measures.

However, as the previous five articles have shown, some countries have succeeded in
combating corruption while many have failed. Why have Botswana, Hong Kong SAR, New
Zealand, Rwanda and Singapore succeeded in curbing corruption and what lessons can be
learnt by policy makers in those countries which have failed to do so? This article addresses
 these two questions by describing the contextual differences and perceived extent of
corruption in the five countries before comparing their effective anti-corruption strategies.

Contextual differences

There are important contextual differences between the five countries1 as shown in Table I.
First, in terms of land area, Singapore is the smallest with a land area of 719 sq. km, while
Botswana is 788 times larger with a land area of 566,730 sq. km. Hong Kong is second,
followed by Rwanda and New Zealand. Botswana and Rwanda are landlocked countries,
New Zealand consists of two main islands, and Hong Kong and Singapore are city-states.
Botswana is perhaps the most disadvantaged because, apart from being landlocked, 75 per
cent of the country consists of the Kalahari Desert with the population living on only 20 per
cent of its territory (Ayittey, 2005, p. 356).
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Second, except for Rwanda, which was a Belgian colony, Botswana2, Hong Kong, New
Zealand and Singapore were colonised by the British. Third, Rwanda has the largest
population with 11,609,666 persons with the highest population density in Africa of 471
persons per sq. km. Botswana, on the other hand, has the smallest population of 2,262,485
persons with the lowest population density of 4 persons per sq. km. Fourth, Rwanda has the
lowest GDP per capita with US$697, followed by Botswana with US$6,361, New Zealand
with US$37,808, Hong Kong with US$42,423, and Singapore with US$52,888. Finally, except
for Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China from 1 July 1997, the
other four countries are democracies, with New Zealand and Singapore being parliamentary
democracies while Botswana and Rwanda are presidential democracies.

Table I. Policy contexts of five countries

Country Land area Colonial Population GDP per Political

(sq. km) (2015) legacy (2015) capita (2015) system
Singapore 719 British 5,535,002 US$52,888 Parliamentary
democracy
Hong Kong 1,050 British 7,305,700 US$42,423 SAR, China
Rwanda 24,670 Belgian 11,609,666 US$697 Presidential
democracy
New Zealand 263,310 British 4,595,700 US$37,808 Parliamentary
democracy
Botswana 566,730 British 2,262,485 US$6,361 Presidential
democracy

Sources: World Bank (2016a, 2016b, 2016c)

Apart from the contextual differences highlighted in Table I, the five countries also
differ in terms of their performance on the World Bank’s six governance indicators of voice
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption. Table II shows that New Zealand has the highest total
percentile rank of 593.2 for the six indicators, followed by Hong Kong (532.3), Singapore
(529.9), Botswana (440.2) and Rwanda (308.6). Rwanda’s progress is the most remarkable
 as its total percentile rank for the six indicators has increased by six times from 1996-2015.
It is also significant that Hong Kong’s governance has not been adversely affected by its
handover to China in July 1997 as its total percentile rank for the six indicators has increased
from 463.9 in 1996 to 532.3 in 2015.

Table II. Governance indicators of five countries, 2015

Indicator New Zealand Hong Kong Singapore Botswana Rwanda

Voice and 1.6 (98.5) 0.5 (63.5) -0.1 (42.9) 0.4 (62.6) -1.1 (17.2)
accountability
Political 1.5 (99.0) 1.0 (83.3) 1.2 (93.3) 1.0 (86.7) -0.1 (44.3)
stability
Government 1.9 (98.6) 1.9 (99.0) 2.3 (100) 0.5 (72.1) 0.0 (51.4)
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

effectiveness
Regulatory 1.9 (99.0) 2.2 (99.5) 2.2 (100) 0.5 (68.3) 0.2 (60.6)
quality
Rule of law 2.0 (98.1) 1.8 (94.7) 1.9 (96.6) 0.6 (73.1) 0.1 (60.1)

Control of 2.3 (100) 1.7 (92.3) 2.1 (97.1) 0.8 (77.4) 0.7 (75.0)
corruption
Total 593.2 532.3 529.9 440.2 308.6
percentile
rank 2015
Total 587.9 463.9 526.4 432.4 51.2
percentile
rank 1996

Source: Compiled from World Bank (2016d)

Among the five countries, the policy context of Rwanda is perhaps the most
challenging for combating corruption because it has the largest population of 11,609,666
persons and is the poorest with the lowest GDP per capita of US$697 in 2015. On the other
hand, Singapore and Hong Kong are affluent city-states with smaller populations but higher
population densities of 7,698 persons per sq. km and 6,957 persons per sq. km, respectively.
New Zealand has a much larger land area but a smaller population than Hong Kong and
Singapore. However, the advantage of Botswana’s small population is offset by the
difficulties encountered by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in
enforcing the anti-corruption laws across the 100 cities within its vast territory.

Perceived extent of corruption

The perceived extent of corruption in the five countries is assessed by comparing their
performance in Table III on these six indicators: Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2016; World Bank’s control of corruption indicator in 2015; and
The Global Competitiveness Report’s four indicators on diversion of public funds, irregular
payments and bribes, organised crime, and ethical behaviour of firms in 2016. Using the
control of corruption in 2015 and the 2016 CPI, New Zealand is perceived to have the lowest
 extent of corruption, followed by Singapore, Hong Kong, Botswana and Rwanda in
descending order. However, if the other four indicators are considered, the overall ranking
of New Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong remains unchanged, but the fourth position is
occupied by Rwanda, which has performed better than Botswana on four of the six
indicators. However, it should be noted that according to the Ibrahim Index of African
Governance, Botswana was ranked first among 54 African countries in 2015, and Rwanda
was ranked ninth. Furthermore, for accountability, which includes six indicators on
corruption3, Botswana was ranked first and Rwanda was ranked second (Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, 2016, pp. 18, 32).

Table III. Perceived extent of corruption in five countries, 2015-2016

Country Corruption Control of Diversion Irregular Organised Ethical Rank

Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Perceptions corruption of public payments crime behaviour

Index 2016 2015 funds & bribes 2016 of firms
2016 2016 2016
st st nd th nd
New 1 (90) 2.3 (100) 1 (6.4) 2 (6.7) 11 (6.2) 2 (6.2) 1st
Zealand
Singapore 7th (84) 2.1 (97.1) 3rd (6.2) 3rd (6.7) 7th (6.4) 3rd (6.2) 2nd
Hong 15th (77) 1.7 (92.3) 12th (5.9) 12th (6.3) 18th (6.0) 17th (5.5) 3rd
Kong SAR
Rwanda 50th (54) 0.7 (75.0) 16th (5.6) 20th (5.9) 6th (6.4) 21st (5.3) 4th
Botswana 35th (60) 0.8 (77.4) 39th (4.3) 46th (4.6) 54th (5.2) 40th (4.4) 5th

Sources: Transparency International (2017); Schwab (2016, pp. 125, 197, 279, 309, 319);
World Bank (2016d)

New Zealand’s top ranking is not surprising because “hard-core” corruption involving
bribery and fraud is not common (Gregory, 2002, p. 19). However, Gregory (2002, pp. 29-30)
cautions that such cases among public sector employees appear to be increasing in New
Zealand with changing social circumstances and structural and cultural changes to the civil
service. On the other hand, corruption was widespread in Singapore, Hong Kong SAR,
Botswana and Rwanda before their respective ACAs were formed to minimise corruption.

Patterns of corruption control

There are three patterns of corruption control in the Asia-Pacific region. The first pattern of
implementing the anti-corruption laws without relying on a single anti-corruption agency
(ACA) is practised in Japan, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The second pattern of
relying on multiple ACAs to implement the anti-corruption laws applies to Afghanistan,
China, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. This pattern is ineffective because
of the lack of coordination and competition and conflict between the multiple ACAs (Quah,
2013a, p. 22). The third and most popular pattern was initiated in Singapore with the
establishment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 and
followed by the formation of similar ACAs in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Brunei and other Asian
countries (Quah, 2011, pp. 25-29). Table IV identifies the ACAs in the five countries,
including New Zealand’s SFO, which is a law enforcement agency and not an ACA.
 Table IV. Anti-corruption agencies in five countries

Country Anti-corruption agency Functions

Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
(1952) (Type A ACA)
Hong Kong SAR Independent Commission Against
Corruption (1974) (Type A ACA)
New Zealand Serious Fraud Office (1990)
(Law enforcement agency,
not an ACA)
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)
Investigation of corruption
cases, corruption prevention
and education
Investigation of corruption
cases, corruption prevention
and education
Investigation and
prosecution of serious or
complex financial crime,
including bribery and

corruption.
Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Investigation of corruption
Crime (1994) (Type A ACA) cases, corruption prevention
and education
Rwanda Office of the Ombudsman (2003) Investigation of corruption
(Type B ACA) and maladministration,
corruption prevention and
education

Source: Compiled by the author

New Zealand has relied on the Ombudsman, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Police,
and the Controller and Auditor-General (CAG) to combat corruption and ensure good
governance instead of an ACA. The Ombudsman was established on 1 October 1962 to curb
corruption indirectly by enhancing the government’s transparency and accountability by
addressing complaints about maladministration or by providing, where appropriate, official
information (Quah, 2013b, p. 230). Anand Satyanand (2005, p. 224), the Ombudsman from
1995-2005, revealed that he had recommended action if he found evidence of corruption in
performing his functions.

The SFO was formed in 1990 to investigate and prosecute complex or serious fraud
cases in both the public and private sectors because the government realised that it was
necessary to “create a new and highly efficient organisation to deal with corrupt business
practices expeditiously” after the share market collapse of October 1987. Unlike its
counterpart in the United Kingdom, the SFO’s Director is not seconded from the police and
is not responsible to the Attorney-General because it is an independent government
department that is “free from political direction or influence” (Sturt, 1996, pp. 305-307).

As the lead law enforcement agency for reducing crime, the Police conduct corruption
and bribery investigations to keep the public service “corruption free” (Transparency
International New Zealand, 2013, p. 177). The CAG was originally established in 1846 with
the appointment of Charles Knight as the first Auditor-General. It is responsible for auditing
public bodies in New Zealand, according to the Public Audit Act 2001 (Wikipedia, 2016). The
CAG is independent of the executive but answerable to parliament. It is the main agency
 responsible for “ensuring the overall ethical probity” of public sector employees in New
Zealand (Gregory and Zirker, 2013, p. 122).

The British colonial government made corruption an offence in Singapore’s Penal Code
in 1871 and established the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation
Department in the Singapore Police Force to combat corruption in Singapore in December
1937 with the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance. The discovery in
October 1951 that 1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000 were stolen by thieves including
three police detectives made the British colonial government realise their mistake in making
the ACB responsible for corruption control even though the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of
Inquiry had found that police corruption was widespread in Singapore. The British colonial
government rectified its mistake by replacing the ineffective ACB with the CPIB in October
1952. However, it made a second mistake by not providing the CPIB with adequate legal
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

powers, budget and personnel during 1952-1959. The People’s Action Party government
under the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew assumed office in June 1959 and
avoided the mistakes of the British colonial government by retaining the CPIB as the only
Type A ACA in Singapore and enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act in June 1960 to
enhance its legal powers, budget and personnel.

Similarly, the British colonial government also relied on the ACB of the Royal Hong
Kong Police Force (RHKPF) even though police corruption was also rampant in Hong Kong.
The enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) in May 1971 upgraded the
ACB into the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) but the latter’s ineffectiveness was exposed by
the escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent of Police Peter Godber, to Britain
on 8 June 1973. Godber’s escape angered the public in Hong Kong and the Blair-Kerr
Commission of Inquiry appointed by Governor Murray MacLehose to investigate the matter
recommended that the ACO be replaced by a new ACA that was independent of the RHKPF.
Governor MacLehose accepted the recommendation and the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) was formed on 15 February 1974 (Quah, 2011, pp. 251-253).

Botswana was rocked by four corruption scandals in the early 1990s, beginning with
the exposure of the US$13 million scandal involving the supply of teaching materials and
equipment for primary schools in April 1991, followed by the revelation in December 1991
of the abuse of authority by the vice president and two ministers for acquiring land
designated for community projects, the uncovering of the “web of graft” in the Botswana
Housing Corporation in February 1992, and the discovery of “bad management and
corruption” in the National Development Bank of Botswana in late 1993 (Kuris, 2013, pp. 1-
2; Sebudubudu, 2003, pp. 126-128). These corruption scandals angered the public and in
March 1992, some senior officials visited London to seek the advice of British police experts
who recommended that they consult Graham Stockwell, the then Deputy ICAC
Commissioner in Hong Kong. When Stockwell retired from the ICAC in early 1993, he was
invited by the Botswana government to evaluate its anti-corruption measures. Stockwell
recommended the establishment of an ACA modelled on the ICAC and was invited by the
government to draft the necessary legislation and lead the new agency (Kuris, 2013, p. 2).
The Corruption and Economic Crime Bill was read the second time on 11 July and passed on
25 July 1994. The DCEC was established on 5 September 1994 and adopted the ICAC’s three-
pronged strategy of focusing on the investigation, prevention and education functions.
 The genocide of 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda by members of the Hutu majority
government from 4 April to 16 July 1994 ended when the Tutsi-backed Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame took control of the country4 (Wikipedia, 2017). The legacy of
the genocide was so “traumatic” that Rwanda was viewed as “an irremediably failed state”
(Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012, pp. 66-67). Kagame served as vice president and minister for
defence until 2000, when he became president after the resignation of Pasteur Bizimungu.
Corruption was widespread in Rwanda under the late President Juvénal Habyarimana (5 July
1973 to 6 April 1994) because he favoured his fellow Hutus from Gisenyi with cabinet
positions, administrative jobs, senior positions in the army and security services, economic
opportunities, and foreign scholarships (Meredith, 2014, p. 639). Eiji Oyamada observes in
his article on Rwanda in this Asian Education and Development Studies (AEDS) special issue
that an important component of President Kagame’s Vision 2020 of transforming Rwanda
into a middle-income country is the zero tolerance policy for corruption, which is
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

implemented by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) established in 2003 as a Type B ACA
to perform both corruption and non-corruption-related functions.

Success factors

Except for New Zealand, the pervasiveness of corruption was the triggering factor that
spurred the creation of the ACAs in Singapore, Hong Kong, Botswana and Rwanda. In New
Zealand, corruption was not an important political issue because the concern was not with
bribery but with political patronage in public service appointments, which was abolished
with the passing of the Public Service Act in November 1912 (Gregory, 2017). As mentioned
earlier, the Opium Hijacking scandal of October 1951 led to the CPIB’s formation in
Singapore a year later. Godber’s escape in June 1973 to Britain triggered the ICAC’s creation
in February 1974. The spate of corruption scandals in Botswana during 1991-1993 resulted
in the DCEC’s establishment in September 1994. President Kagame established the OMB in
2003 three years after assuming office to combat the widespread corruption in Rwanda.

The first prerequisite for success is the political will of the political leaders to combat
corruption in their countries. Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, expressed his
disdain for “the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders” after assuming
office in June 1959 and promised to “establish a clean and effective government.” When Lee
and his colleagues took the oath of office, they “wore white shirts and white slacks to
symbolise purity and honesty in our personal behaviour and our public life” (Lee, 2000, pp.
182-183). Eddie Teo, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, observed that civil
servants in Singapore were motivated by the “simple, frugal and unostentatious lives” and
the dedication of their political leaders to improve the lives of Singaporeans (Quah, 2015a,
pp. 382-383). During the CPIB’s 60th anniversary celebrations on 18 September 2012, Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed his government’s policy of zero tolerance for
corruption and warned that:

We will never tolerate corruption and we will not accept any slackening.
Anyone who breaks the rules will be caught and punished – no cover
ups, no matter how senior the officer or how embarrassing it may be. It
is far better to suffer the embarrassment and keep the system clean,
 than to pretend that nothing went wrong and let the rot spread (Lee,
2012, p. A23).

The Godber corruption scandal in June 1973 in Hong Kong and the unfavourable
publicity following his escape to Britain strengthened Governor MacLehose’s resolve and
was the catalyst that made him transfer the function of investigating corruption from the
RHKPF to the independent ICAC in February 1974 (Quah, 2011, p. 253). MacLehose was the
longest serving governor of Hong Kong from 1971 to 1982 and he continued to provide
“unwavering budgetary support” to the ICAC until his retirement (Yep, 2013, p. 216). In his
article on Hong Kong in this AEDS special issue, Ian Scott contends that political support for
the ICAC’s work has been “unequivocal” and “often proactive” until the political scandals of
20125 have raised questions regarding “the ethical commitment of Hong Kong’s leaders to
the anti-corruption cause.”
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana’s first president from 1966-1980, did not tolerate
corruption and emphasised that politicians and civil servants should not view independence
as a route to their personal enrichment. Corruption was discouraged by a rigorous system of
accounting controls and the strict “enforcement of civil service codes requiring honesty”
reinforced the perception that the state was not a source of personal income” (Holm, 1988,
pp. 198, 207). Unlike other African leaders, Khama’s personal example of leading a modest
life with “limited motorcades and absent forced adulation” reinforced and made effective
the anti-corruption message in Botswana. He and his vice-president, Quett Masire,
prosecuted a few prominent cabinet ministers and officials for misappropriating funds even
though two of them were their relatives. Khama’s policy of zero tolerance for corruption
was continued by his successors and contributed to Botswana’s success in combating
corruption (Rotberg, 2012, pp. 87-89). However, in his article on Botswana in this AEDS
special issue, David Seth Jones has observed that the current President Ian Khama has not
shown the same commitment in combating corruption as his predecessors because of his
reluctance to compel ministers, Members of Parliament, and judges to declare their assets
or to suspend or dismiss those ministers charged with corruption.

After consolidating his regime in 2004, President Paul Kagame decided to transform
Rwanda into the “Singapore of Africa” by urging the population to reject corrupt practices
and report corrupt persons to the police. He enforced the anti-corruption laws by dismissing
those found guilty of corruption offences, including cabinet ministers and associates, 503
members of the judiciary in 2004, and 62 police officers in 2007. He introduced a strict code
of conduct for officials that required them to disclose their assets yearly to the OMB. He also
downsized the civil service by removing 6,500 “ghost workers” and introduced competitive
examinations (Rotberg, 2015, p. 2). In their comparative study of the implementation of
anti-corruption policy in Rwanda and South Africa, Pillay and Khan (2015, p. 226) concluded
that the key difference was the “persistent political will to uproot the scourge and dissipate
a brutal and corrupt ethos” in Rwanda and the South African government’s lack of political
will and capability to combat the “corruption epidemic successfully.”

The degree of political will of the five governments is manifested in the provision of
legal powers, financial and human resources, and operational independence to the four
ACAs and the SFO, as shown in Table V. As the number of corruption cases investigated in
 2013 is the highest in the ICAC it is not surprising that the ICAC has the largest budget of
US$117.3 million and the most personnel with 1,335 staff members. Consequently, the ICAC
has the highest per capita expenditure of US$16.29 and the most favourable staff-
population ratio of 1:5,393 in 2013. As the DCEC’s 291 personnel investigated 520
corruption cases in 2013, it has the second most favourable staff-population ratio of
1:6,942, but its budget of US$5.28 million means that its per capita expenditure of US$2.61
is ranked third after the CPIB’s per capita expenditure of US$4.26. The SFO has only 51
personnel and investigated 30 corruption cases in 2013 and is ranked fourth in terms of per
capita expenditure and staff-population ratio.

Table V. Budget, personnel and output of ACAs, 2013

ACA Budget Personnel Corruption Popula- Per capita Staff-pop-

Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

cases tion Expenditure population

investigated* Ratio
CPIB US$23.04 m 156 152 (19%) 5.41 m US$4.26 1:34,679
ICAC US$117.3 m 1,335 1,668 (62.9%) 7.20 m US$16.29 1:5,393
SFO US$8.23 m 51 30 (6.9%) 4.50 m US$1.83 1:88,235
DCEC US$5.28 m 291 520 (35.4%) 2.02 m US$2.61 1:6,942
OMB US$2.21 m 78 121 (3.0%) 11.77 m US$0.19 1:150,897

*The number of corruption cases investigated as a percentage of the total number of

complaints received in 2013 is indicated within brackets.
Sources: CPIB (2014, pp. 4-6); ICAC (2014, pp. 25, 34-35; 2015, p. 617); SFO (2013, pp. 34-35,
37, 68); DCEC (2014, pp. 9, 26, 29); OMB (2014, p. 15); Republic of Singapore (2015, p. 353);
Worldometers (2014).

The OMB’s lowest per capita expenditure of US$0.19 and most unfavourable staff-
population ratio of 1:150,897 in 2013 mean that the Rwandan government has to increase
the OMB’s budget of US$2.21 million and 78 personnel to enhance and sustain its
effectiveness. A World Bank consultant has observed that President Kagame’s strong
support for the OMB is reflected in the increase in its budget from US$1.02 million in 2003
to US$2.4 million in 2009. The increase in its budget has enabled the OMB to pay
competitive salaries to its personnel and to finance the electronic submission system for the
income and asset disclosure system in 2011. Nevertheless, the OMB still has “capacity
constraints for investigations” and its budget of US$2.4 million in 2009 with a per capita
expenditure of US$0.25 is below Slovenia’s per capita expenditure of US$1.00, Kenya’s per
capita expenditure of US$1.59, and Singapore’s per capita expenditure of US$3.63 for the
same year (Barnes, 2010, pp. 13-14).

Apart from empowering the ACA with legal powers, budget, personnel and operational
independence, the government must ensure that it enforces the anti-corruption laws
impartially, without fear or favour, by not interfering in its daily operations or using it as a
weapon against political opponents of the regime and protecting the “big fish” from
investigation and prosecution. Gregory (2015, pp. 126, 130-131) contends that political
independence is “an indispensable element” in the effectiveness of the ICAC and CPIB as
both ACAs have “high de facto independence and high operational impartiality.”
 Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, p. 174) contend that a “professional, merit-based
civil service that is paid and trained well and rewarded for competence is the bedrock on
which any anticorruption reforms must be built.” The experiences of the five countries in
combating corruption confirm their argument. In his article on New Zealand in this AEDS
special issue, Daniel Zirker has identified “a highly professional public bureaucracy with an
ethos built around secure careers and communitarian expectations” as one of the three
factors contributing to New Zealand’s success in combating corruption. The new Reform
government under William Massey actively abolished the “spoils system” in the New
Zealand public service in 1912 and established the Public Service Commission (PSC).

The British introduced meritocracy to its colonies in Asia and Africa with the
establishment of the PSCs to insulate appointments, promotions and discipline in the civil
service from politics. The PSC was introduced in Hong Kong in 1950 and retained after its
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

handover to China in July 1997. Similarly, the PSC was established in Singapore in 1951 and
also retained after its self-government in June 1959. However, the PSC was formed in
Botswana during the British colonial period and given executive powers after independence
in 1966. The PSC in Rwanda was established by Article 181 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Rwanda of 4 June 2003 but only began operating in 2007 (Hausman, 2010, p. 4).

Table VI. Government effectiveness in five countries, 1996-2015

Country 1996 2015 Difference in

percentile rank
Singapore 2.1 (100) 2.3 (100) No change
Hong Kong SAR 1.2 (86.8) 1.9 (99.0) + 12.2
New Zealand 1.9 (97.1) 1.9 (98.6) + 1.5
Botswana 0.47 (68.3) 0.51 (72.1) + 3.8
Rwanda -1.2 (11.2) 0.0 (51.4) + 40.2

Source: Compiled from World Bank (2016d)

Table VI confirms that Singapore has retained its top ranking on the World Bank’s
indicator on government effectiveness from 1996 to 2015. Hong Kong SAR’s percentile
ranking improved from 86.8 to 99.0 during the same period. New Zealand is ranked third as
its percentile ranking has increased from 97.1 to 98.6 during 1996-2015. The percentile rank
of government effectiveness in Botswana and Rwanda in 2015 is lower at 72.1 and 51.4,
respectively, but Rwanda’s 40.2 percentile rank increase is the most impressive among the
five countries.

Lessons for policy makers

1. Political will is essential for success

In her comparative study of the effectiveness of the ACAs in Latvia, Poland and Slovenia,
Batory (2012, p. 640) poses this important question: “What is the motivation for political
parties to set up agencies [ACAs] that wield the power to discredit them in the first place?”
It is thus not surprising that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China would not
 introduce an independent ACA like the CPIB or ICAC to check its power because “the
implementation of the necessary anti-corruption reforms could lead to the CCP’s demise”
(Quah, 2016, pp. 322-323). However, in non-communist countries, “an acceptable degree of
freedom from corruption” is valued as a public good like clean air or workplace health and
safety (Batory, 2012, p. 640).

Accordingly, to minimise corruption in a country, its government must be willing to

establish an independent ACA to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially, without fear
or favour. Political will or the commitment of political leaders to implement anti-corruption
measures effectively over time (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 242) is essential for success because
politicians “can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so” by enacting the laws
and allocating the funds for enforcing the laws. Unfortunately, political will is scarce,
especially in those countries where corruption is widespread because those persons “who
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

are the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest power and use the corrupt
nature of government to maintain that power” (Senior, 2006, pp. 184, 187).

Political will is also “very fragile” and Bertrand de Speville (2013, p. 19), a former ICAC
commissioner in Hong Kong, has described it as “a candle flame in the heart of a newly
elected President,” which needs to be protected “from being extinguished by any passing
political breeze” by advising him on “how to protect that little flame.” Indeed, there is no
guarantee that political will can be sustained when there is a change of political leadership.
Singapore has been fortunate that the political will to combat corruption has been sustained
when Lee Kuan Yew was succeeded by Goh Chok Tong as prime minister in November 1990,
and when the current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong took over in August 2004. On the
other hand, as observed by Jones, Botswana’s political will has wavered somewhat under
President Ian Khama, who is less committed to curbing corruption than his predecessors.

As many Asian countries have failed to minimise corruption because of their lack of
political will, they require “substantial doses of political will and capacity to implement
impartially comprehensive measures to address the causes of corruption” over a long period
(Quah, 2017a, p. 256). The experiences of Botswana, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Rwanda
and Singapore in combating corruption have confirmed the strong political will of their
political leaders as the critical ingredient for their success.

2. Establish a Type A ACA and enhance its capacity

New Zealand’s success shows that it is possible to combat corruption effectively without
relying on an ACA if there are other institutions like the Ombudsman, SFO, Police, and CAG
to ensure good governance. However, for those countries where corruption is rampant, it
would be more beneficial for policy makers to establish a single Type A ACA rather than a
Type B ACA or multiple ACAs. As combating corruption is difficult and requires extensive
human and financial resources, it would be more useful to set up a Type A ACA that is
dedicated solely to performing anti-corruption functions instead of a Type B ACA, which has
to perform both corruption and non-corruption-related functions. For example, the Office of
the Ombudsman in the Philippines and the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau in
Taiwan are ineffective as they are Type B ACAs that are not dedicated solely to combating
corruption (Quah, 2011, pp. 145, 194). This means that both ACAs do not enjoy these
 advantages of Type A ACAs, namely the “centralisation of all necessary information and
intelligence about corruption” and “the resolution of coordination problems among multiple
agencies through vertical integration” (Meagher, 2005, p. 80).

The CPIB, ICAC, and DCEC are Type A ACAs because of their dedicated focus on
performing anti-corruption functions without being distracted by other non-corruption-
related functions. By contrast, Rwanda’s OMB is a Type B ACA that devotes more attention
to its function of preventing and fighting injustice than preventing and fighting corruption.
For example, from July 2013 to June 2014, the OMB received 1,033 written injustice
complaints (25 per cent), 386 injustice complaints from the districts (9 per cent), 2,572
judgment review complaints (63 per cent) and corruption complaints (3 per cent) (OMB,
2014, p. 15). The OMB’s ability to combat corruption would be enhanced if it becomes a
Type A ACA by relinquishing its non-corruption-related functions to another agency and
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

focus instead on its anti-corruption activities. Table V shows that among the four ACAs, the
OMB had only 78 personnel and a budget of US$2.21 million in 2013, which accounts for its
lowest per capita expenditure of US$0.19 and most unfavourable staff-population ratio of
1:150,897. As mentioned above, the Rwandan government has to increase the OMB’s
budget and personnel considerably to enhance its capacity and effectiveness.

3. The Type A ACA must be a watchdog, not an attack dog or paper tiger

As the Type A ACA has enormous powers, the government must avoid the temptation to use
it as an “attack dog” against its political opponents, or to establish a “toothless” ACA or
paper tiger. The ACA becomes an attack dog when the government abuses its powers by
using corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. For example, in China, anti-
corruption campaigns are used against political enemies to undermine their power base in
the CCP. In July 2014, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) investigated
Zhou Yongkang, the Minister of Public Security from 2002-2007, for corruption and the
procuratorates confiscated US$16.05 billion worth of assets from his many residences in
seven provinces in China. Zhou was expelled from the CCP on 5 December 2014, not only
because of his corruption offences but more importantly for his conspiracy with Bo Xilai to
challenge Xi Jinping’s leadership (Quah, 2015b, pp. 79-81).

South Korea’s Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) was

established on 25 January 2002 as a “poor cousin” or weak replica of Hong Kong’s ICAC
because it could not investigate corruption cases. Similarly, its successor, the Anti-
Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) inherited not only the KICAC’s Achilles’ heel
of being unable to investigate corruption cases but its anti-corruption functions were
further diluted when the KICAC was merged in February 2008 with the Ombudsman and
Administrative Appeals Commission to form the ACRC, which became a Type B ACA. South
Korea’s inability to improve its CPI score beyond 53-56 during 2012-2016 reflects its failure
to curb corruption and an indictment of its futile strategy of relying on such paper tigers as
the KICAC and ACRC during the past 14 years (Quah, 2017b, pp. 23, 26). South Korea’s
experience confirms the futility of establishing a “toothless” ACA or paper tiger to combat
corruption.
 The remaining option is to establish Type A ACAs like the CPIB and ICAC as
independent watchdogs to minimise corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong SAR,
respectively. However, this is an expensive option for governments because they have not
only to provide the Type A ACA with the necessary legal powers, budget, personnel, but also
the operational independence to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially, without
political interference, fear or favour. In other words, the government must have the strong
political will to support fully the Type A ACA it has created and enable it to function as an
independent watchdog rather than as an attack dog against its political foes.

4. Combating corruption is a continuous work in progress

Combating corruption is a difficult, expensive, and arduous task because, apart from the
resources and expertise required by the ACA in the country, the implementation of the anti-
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

corruption laws will be strongly resisted by those intelligent and powerful corrupt
individuals and organisations with vested interests to circumvent these laws to avoid arrest
and conviction for their offences. To combat corruption effectively, the government must
identify accurately the causes of corruption in the country and recommend appropriate
measures to address these causes over a sustained period of time. However, many
governments have neglected this important task and consequently have failed to minimise
corruption in their countries.

Even though the five countries have succeeded in curbing corruption, this does not
mean that their governments can rest on their laurels because of the growing importance of
private sector corruption and other threats. Zirker contends that with growing inequality,
rising wealth gap and global change, New Zealand needs to update its archaic anti-
corruption legislation and policies to strengthen its minimal lobbying restrictions, to rectify
the lack of supervision of its foreign trust fund provisions, and reinforce its weak provisions
for foreign business transactions and anti-money laundering practices.

The investigation and conviction of four senior civil servants for corruption offences
during 2010-2013 indicates that even though corruption is not a serious problem in
Singapore, the CPIB must remain vigilant to deal not only with public sector corruption but
with the increasing number of private sector corruption cases in recent years. The revelation
that Edwin Yeo, an Assistant Director of the CPIB, was charged on 24 July 2013 with
misappropriating S$1.76 million (US$1.41 million) between 2008 and 2012 has tarnished
somewhat the CPIB’s reputation. Yeo was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and
forgery and jailed for 10 years. The Independent Review Panel (IRP) appointed by the Prime
Minister found that the CPIB’s supervisory lapses had resulted in “deficiencies in formal
controls and the loss of public funds” from Yeo’s ability to misappropriate the huge sum of
S$1.76 million. The IRP’s recommendations to strengthen the CPIB’s financial procedures
and audit system have been implemented by the CPIB (Quah, 2015c, pp. 77, 81, 85).

In the case of Hong Kong SAR, Scott (2014, pp. 966-967, 977, 983) contends that the
corruption scandals involving Chief Executive Donald Tsang in February and April 2012, and
the newly-elected Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying in December 2012 illustrate that “the
current controls on the Chief Executive designed to prevent unethical or corrupt behaviour”
are ineffective in resolving the problem (Scott, 2014, p. 986). Tsang was sentenced to 20
 months’ imprisonment on 22 February 2017 for misconduct in public office for not
disclosing his rental negotiations with property tycoon, Bill Wong, while his Cabinet was
reviewing a digital broadcasting licence by Wong’s radio company (Straits Times, 2017, p.
A3).

In spite of its success in combating corruption, Jones cautions that Botswana faces
several challenges, including the DCEC’s capacity and resource constraints and its limited
effectiveness in prosecuting and convicting “big fish” for corruption offences. Similarly, the
Rwandan government has to increase the budget and personnel of the OMB substantially as
Table V shows that it has the lowest per capita expenditure of US$0.19 and the most
unfavourable staff-population ratio of 1:150,897. Oyamada observes that the Rwandan
government has focused its attention on curbing administrative corruption and is less eager
to deal with political corruption. Furthermore, politically sensitive issues or cases involving
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

the political leaders are not reported in the press because investigative journalism is
discouraged in Rwanda.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis shows that even though corruption is a “wicked problem” in many
countries, the experiences of Botswana, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Rwanda and
Singapore illustrate that it can be minimised if the incumbent government has the political
will to curb corruption by relying on the SFO, Police, CAG, and Ombudsman in New Zealand,
or by relying on a single ACA like the CPIB in Singapore, ICAC in Hong Kong SAR, DCEC in
Botswana, and the OMB in Rwanda, to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially.

Whether the policy makers in those countries with widespread corruption can draw
lessons from these success stories to enhance the effectiveness of their anti-corruption
measures depends on their political will and capacity to establish a Type A ACA and provide
it with the necessary legal powers, budget, personnel and operational independence to
enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. This means that the ACA’s role should be an
independent watchdog that investigates all corruption complaints professionally regardless
of the status, position, or political affiliation of those being investigated instead of an attack
dog against political opponents or a paper tiger that cannot investigate corruption cases.

As combating corruption is a continuous work in progress, policy makers concerned

with improving anti-corruption efforts in their countries must be realistic as their prospects
for success also depends on their ability to overcome the constraints of their unfavourable
policy contexts, especially in those large countries with huge populations and poor
governance. As political leadership is the critical ingredient for effective corruption control,
the $64,000 question is: whether the citizens in countries with widespread corruption have
the wisdom to elect honest and competent leaders to political office to implement the
necessary anti-corruption reforms.

References

Ayittey, G.B.N. (2005), Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future, Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
 Barnes, S. (2010), “Office of the Ombudsman of Rwanda: a review of the effectiveness of
anti-corruption agencies,” Paper prepared for the World Bank, Washington, DC.

Batory, A. (2012), “Political cycles and organizational life cycles: delegation to anticorruption
agencies in Central Europe,” Governance, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 639-660.

Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2000), “Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytical
framework,” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 20, pp. 239-252.

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (2014), Annual Report 2013, CPIB, Singapore.

Crisafulli, P. and Redmond, A. (2012), Rwanda, Inc.: How a Devastated Nation became an
Economic Model for the Developing World, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

de Speville, B. (2013), “Interview by Gabriel Kuris,” Innovations for Successful Societies, 14

August, pp. 1-25, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) (2014), Annual Report 2013, DCEC,
Gaborone, Botswana.

Gregory, R. (2002), “Governmental corruption in New Zealand: a view through Nelson’s

telescope?” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 17-38.

Gregory, R. (2015), “Political independence, operational impartiality, and the effectiveness

of anti-corruption agencies,” Asian Education and Development Studies, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp.
125-142.

Gregory, R. (2017), “Personal communication with the author,” 15 January.

Gregory, R. and Zirker, D. (2013), “Clean and green with deepening shadows? A non-
complacent view of corruption in New Zealand,” in Quah, J.S.T. (Ed.), Different Paths to
Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and
Singapore, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK, pp. 109-136, Chapter 5.

Hausman, D. (2010), “Interview of Angelina Muganza, Executive Secretary, Public Service

Commission of Rwanda,” Innovations for Successful Societies, Oral History Program,
conducted on 10 March, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ.

Holm, J.D. (1988), “Botswana: a paternalistic democracy,” in Diamond, L., Linz, J.J. and
Lipset, S.M. (Eds), Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Boulder, CO, pp. 179-215, Chapter 5.

Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (2014), Annual Report 2013, ICAC, Hong
Kong.
 ICAC (2015), “Head 72 – Independent Commission Against Corruption,” pp. 607-618,
available at: http://www.budget.gov.hk/2015/eng/pdf/head072.pdf (accessed 13 January
2017).

Kuris, G. (2013), “Managing corruption risks: Botswana builds an anti-graft agency, 1994-
2012,” Innovations for Successful Societies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs and the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ.

Lee, H.L. (2012), “Incorruptibility ingrained in S’porean psyche,” Straits Times, 19

September, p. A23.

Lee, K.Y. (2000), From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000, Times Media,
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Singapore.

Meagher, P. (2005), “Anti-corruption agencies: rhetoric versus reality,” Journal of Policy

Reform, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 69-103.

Meredith, M. (2014), The Fortunes of Africa: A 5,000-Year History of Wealth, Greed and
Endeavour, Simon & Schuster UK, London.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016), A Decade of African Governance 2006-2015: 2016 Ibrahim

Index of African Governance Index Report, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London.

Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) (2014), Annual Report July 2013 – June 2014, OMB, Kigali,
Rwanda.

Pillay, P. and Khan, F. (2015), “Public policy and corruption in a globalised world: case
studies from South Africa and Rwanda,” in Goymen, K. and Lewis, R. (Eds), Public
Policymaking in a Globalized World, Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University, Istanbul, pp.
202-234.

Prunier, G. (1995), The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, Columbia University Press, New
York.

Quah, J.S.T. (2011), Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? Bingley,
UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Quah, J.S.T. (2013a), “Combating corruption in Asian countries: what lessons have we
learnt?” Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 15-34.

Quah, J.S.T. (2013b), “Different paths to curbing corruption: a comparative analysis,” in

Quah, J.S.T. (Ed.), Different Paths to Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland,
Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK, pp. 219-
255, Chapter 9.
 Quah, J.S.T. (2015a), “Lee Kuan Yew’s enduring legacy of good governance in Singapore,
1959-2015,” Asian Education and Development Studies, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 374-393.

Quah, J.S.T. (2015b), Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015), Carey School of Law,
University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD.

Quah, J.S.T. (2015c), “Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau: four suggestions
for enhancing its effectiveness,” Asian Education and Development Studies, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp.
76-100.

Quah, J.S.T. (2016), “Singapore’s success in combating corruption: four lessons for China,”
American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 301-323.
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Quah, J.S.T. (2017a), “Controlling corruption in Asian countries: the elusive search for
success,” in Gong, T. and Scott, I. (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia,
Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 241-261, Chapter 17.

Quah, J.S.T. (2017b), “Learning from Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy: policy
recommendations for South Korea,” Asian Education and Development Studies, Vol. 6 No. 1,
pp. 17-29.

Raphaeli, N., Roumani, J. and MacKellar, A.C. (1984), Public Sector Management in
Botswana: Lessons in Pragmatism, World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 709, Washington,
DC.

Republic of Singapore (2015), Singapore Budget 2015: Annex to the Expenditure Estimates,
Budget Division, Ministry of Finance, Singapore.

Rittel, H.W.J. and Webber, M.M. (1973). “Dilemmas in a general theory of planning,” Policy
Sciences, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 155-169.

Rose-Ackerman, S. and Palifka, B.J. (2016), Corruption and Government: Causes,

Consequences, and Reform, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Rotberg, R.I. (2012), Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the

Developing World, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Rotberg, R.I. (2015), “Making Africa less corrupt,” Wilson Briefs, September, Wilson Center,
Washington DC.

Satyanand, A. (2005), “The role of the Ombudsman and its connection with the control of
corruption,” in UNAFEI, Resource Materials Series, No. 65 (March), pp. 213-228.

Schwab, K. (ed.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017, World Economic Forum,
Geneva.
 Sebudubudu, D. (2003), “Corruption and its control in Botswana,” Botswana Notes and
Records, Vol. 35, pp. 125-139.

Senior, I. (2006), Corruption – the World’s Big C: Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures,
Institute of Economic Affairs, London.

Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (2013), Annual Report 2013, SFO, Wellington.

Scott, I. (2014), “Political scandals and the accountability of the Chief Executive in Hong
Kong,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54 No. 5, pp. 966-986.

Straits Times (2017), “Ex-HK chief jailed 20 months for misconduct,” 23 February, p. A3.
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Sturt, C. (1996), “The fight against corruption: New Zealand’s answer,” in Academic Office of
the Seventh International Anti-Corruption Conference Secretariat (Ed.), Anti-corruption for
Social Stability and Development, Hong Qi Publishing House, Beijing, pp. 305-311.

Transparency International (2017), “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,” Berlin, available at:
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table
(accessed 25 January 2017).

Transparency International New Zealand (2013), Integrity Plus 2013: New Zealand National
Integrity System Assessment, Transparency International New Zealand, Wellington.

Wikipedia (2016), “Controller and Auditor-General of New Zealand,” available at:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controller_and_Auditor-General_of_New_Zealand (accessed
7 January 2017).

Wikipedia (2017), “Rwandan genocide,” available at: httpS//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan

_genocide (accessed 9 January 2017).

World Bank (2016a), “Land area (sq. km),” Washington, D.C., available at: http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?view=chart (accessed 4 October 2016).

World Bank (2016b), “Population, total,” Washington, D.C., available at: http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=SP.POP.TOTL&id=af3ce82b&report_nam
e=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y (accessed 4 October 2016).

World Bank (2016c), “GDP per capita (current US$).” Washington, D.C., available at:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&id=af3ce82b&re
port_name=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y (accessed 4 October
2016).

World Bank (2016d), “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2015.” Washington, D.C.,

available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports (accessed 4 October 2016).
 Worldometers (2014), “World Population by Country (2013),” available at: http://www.
worldometers.info/world-population/world-population-countries.php (accessed 13 January
2017).

Yep, R. (2013), “The crusade against corruption in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Governor
MacLehose as a zealous reformer or reluctant hero?” China: A Journal on Contemporary
China Studies, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 197-221.

Acknowledgments:

The author would like to thank Professors Robert Gregory and David S. Jones for their useful
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Downloaded by Texas State University San Marcos At 12:37 29 May 2017 (PT)

Biographical Details:

Dr Jon S.T. Quah is a retired Professor of Political Science at the National University of
Singapore and an Anti-Corruption Consultant based in Singapore. He has published
extensively on corruption in Asian countries and he is the author of Hunting the Corrupt
“Tigers” and “Flies” in China (2015); Minimising Corruption in China: Is this an Impossible
Dream? (2013); and Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (2011,
2013). Dr Jon S.T. Quah can be contacted at: jonstquah@gmail.com.

Notes

1
Hong Kong was a British colony until its handover to China as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) in July
1997. For convenience, Hong Kong is referred as a country even though it is a SAR of China.
2
Botswana was a British protectorate with the Tswana and other indigenous people owning the land.
Consequently, unlike other African countries, Botswana was less traumatised by colonialism and independence
was achieved peacefully in 1966 (Raphaeli, Roumani and MacKellar, 1984, p. 11).
3
These six indicators are: public sector accountability and transparency; accountability of public officials;
corruption in government and public officials; corruption and bureaucracy; diversion of public funds; and
corruption investigation (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016, p. 88).
4
For more details of Rwanda’s genocide see Prunier (1995).
5
See Scott (2014) for an analysis of these scandals.