Aristotle's Use of Analogie*

Aristotle not only makes use of analogical relations, but is

explicitly aware of a logic of proportionality on which that use is founded.
The thesis of this paper is that he treated analogia as a device for the
explication of resemblances. The first portion considers his explanation
of analogia in this role; the second illustrates his use of it in a variety
of studies for this purpose. The third portion argues against those
traditional interpretations of Aristotle's use of analogia which have
obscured rather than explicated it, and the final portion notes some
discrepancies between theory and practice on Aristotle's part which arise
out of the limits of his own ontology.

I.

In contrast to Plato and the presocratics, Aristotle frequently

used the word 'analogia' and was clearly conscious of relating resemblances
in the pattern of proportionality. He early introduced proportion as a
tool for studying resemblance, the method being made explicit in the Topics,
1-17.

Likeness should be studied, f i r s t , in the case of things belonging

to d i f f e r e n t genera, the formulae being "A:B = C:D" (e.g. as knowledge
stands to the object of knowledge so is sensation related to the
object of sensation), and "As A is in B, so is C in D" (e.g. as the
sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in
the sea, so is windlessness in the a i r ) . (I86a6).

Aristotle here suggests we begin with the use of analogy the study of those
resemblances which stand at the extreme of formulatable likenesses, outside
of classification by genus and species. Just as, in the preceding chapter
of the Topics, difference is to be studied first within the genus, where
likeness is greatest, so resemblance is to be studied outside the genus
where likeness is least. This might at first glance suggest that this
peripheral likeness is the only likeness to be studied by analogy, but this
does not necessarily follow. "Practice is more especially needed in regard
to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the rest, we shall be more
easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness." (l86all). Thus
we see that analogy is applicable to all resemblance, but is the necessary
method for discovering resemblances that lie outside of common classification,
because these are not always immediately apparent.

This explication of resemblance is a means by which "we are to

become well supplied with reasonings." (I05a22). Aristotle maintains: "The
examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments
and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to the rendering of
definitions." (I08b7). As we shall see, he uses analogia for all three tasks
at various points in his inquiries. His d e f i n i t i o n by example is based on
analogy. He uses analogy to test hypotheses, in that what is true for one
similar will be true for the other (cf.114b25,f.). His inductive use in
relating the parts of animals knows almost no bounds. In these and other
uses, two things are clear: 1) the use is based upon the proportional
relation outlined in the Topics; 2) the use is for the purpose of explicating
resemblance.

Heath sees in Aristotle's use of proportion the mathematical

theory of Eudoxus which gives a basis for comparison of incotnmensurable
magnitudes in the concept of alternating proportionals. The old theory
gave a basis for comparing ratios of numbers to numbers, of planes to planes,
of lines to lines, but not of numbers to planes to lines. Aristotle sees the
new theory as a revolution in the theory of proportion.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented before the Society for
Ancient Greek Philosophy in Philadelphia, December 27, 1966. I am grateful
for the helpful criticisms of Hippocrates Apostle, Joseph Owens, Chung-Hwan
Chen and others who attended the meeting.
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2.

Alternation used to be demonstrated separately of numbers,

lines, solids, and durations, though it could have been
proved of them all by a single demonstration» Because
there was no single name to denote that in which numbers,
lengths, durations, and solids are identical, and because
they d i f f e r specifically from one another, this property
was proved of each of them separately. Today, however, the
proof is commensurately universal, for they do not possess
this attribute qua lines or qua numbers, but qua manifesting
this generic character which they are postulated as possessing
universally. (74al9)«

This would, on the basis of line 1: line 2: :number 1: number 2, imply .

line 1: number 1: j line 2: number 2. One can already see in Eudoxus 1
theory a basis for a full-fledged methodology of proportion to discover
resemblances across the generic barriers of formal classification.

Aristotle does not jump to this implication, but sees instead

many limitations for alternating proportionals. A true resemblance relies
on similarity of causes. "Likeness" can be an equivocal term. The like-
ness between figures is not the same as the likeness between colours,
because their causes are distinct« Thus proportionality is applicable
within the relations of qualities, but not in relating qualities to
magnitudes (99a8)=

Aristotle shows a similar reservation about argument by

example.

Clearly then, to argue by example is neither like reasoning

from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part,
but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars
are subordinate to the same term and one of them is unknown.(68b37).

This is neither syllogism nor induction, but requires a four term relation,
and to infer the fourth term from the three already known is not always
applicable. In his discussion of war against neighbours as evil, he makes
it clear that alternation is not justified on the basis of the single
proportion» ( i b i d ) .

In the Physics, Aristotle points out that Eudoxus 1 theory will

not serve to relate d i f f e r e n t kinds of motion. "Now an a f f e c t i o n cannot
be equal to a length. Therefore there cannot be an alteration equal to
or less than a locomotion: and consequently it is not the case that every
motion is commensurable with every other." (278al7). This reservation
leads us to question whether the impossibility of equation would apply to
proportion as well« If so, proportionality can be only proper if the terms
are commensurable. A reference back to our starting point in the Posterior
Analytics will suggest that this is the case.

We must not fail to observe that we often fall into error

because our conclusion is not in fact primarily and
commensurately universal in the sense in which we think we
prove it so. We make this mistake....when the subjects
belong to d i f f e r e n t species, and there is a higher universal,
but it has no name= (74a4).

This indicates that we always assume in an analogous statement that there

is a higher universal that makes the ratios commensurate, and that use of
analogy is always a risk, since we do not know what the uniting universal
is. The last part of the paper will deal with the problematic nature of
these limits to the use of anaiogia. It is d i f f i c u l t to see how these
limits could be met in many of the examples which follow.

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 II,

Aristotle put his analogical method to work in a number of

different contexts and in a number of d i f f e r e n t ways. One of the best
known instances is his discussion of the proportionality of justice.

For proportion is equality of ratios and involves

four terms at least.. ...and the just, too, involves
at least four terms, and the ratio between the one
pair is the same as that between the other pair;
for there is a similar distinction between the
persons and between the things. (I131a32)»

Aristotle notes that a continuous proportion is regarded as having four

terms since the middle term is assumed twice.

One might infer from this initial statement that Aristotle

regards justice as q quantitative matter. Aristotle does indeed see in
the general commonwealth and in comradeship an equality that makes this
a mere numerical proportion., But he also sets forth in the Ethica
Eudemia a qualitative proportion based upon stations in l i f e (I214b33).
This is apparent in the relationships of royal and common, aristocrat
and mediocre man, even of father and son. In all we see a higher
quality on the one hand set over against a lower on the other, and
justice must deal proportionately when there are such distinctions.
In the case of equality the proportion of justice is reducable to
1 = 1 . The proportionate approach to ethics gives us our sense of
Justice as balance and a similar rationale may even be the basis for
A r i s t o t l e ' s doctrine of the golden mean.

In his biological works, Aristotle makes extensive use of

analogy for comparative anatomy. In classification of animals, "The
method of selection consists in laying down the common genus of all
our subjects of investigationo" (98a2). Yet, it is even more evident
here than elsewhere that similarities exist that cannot be classified
by genus and species. Animals may have entirely different organs that
perform proportionally same functions. It naturally follows that
Aristotle would add analogy as a further method of selection.

We cannot find a single identical name to give to a

squid's pounce, a f i s h ' s spine, and an animal's bone,
although these too possess common qualities as if
there were a single osseous nature. (98a20).

This "as if" is quite significant, for it emphasizes once again the
assumed universal that gives a basis to the observed resemblance.
Aristotle proceeds on this "as if" principle in generally relating
all the animals. Animals are related 1) in species by identity of
form, 2) in genus by excess or defect of form, 3) beyond genus where
common forms do not exist, by analogy. (cf.486b20). The procedure in
the last case is to make inference from the blood, lung, heart, etc.,
of sanguinea to lower animals (I27b4;742b34; ad passim). On the basis
of this we find throughout the biological literature, "...and what is
analogous to the heart in the others which have no heart..." (735a26),
or some such similar phrase« The relation of this analogical insight
to the passage of the human embryo through the otages of lower life,
acquiring the corresponding organs, is significant. Whatever defects
Aristotle's method may have in this area are attributable to his desire
to see more unity in the animal kingdom than actually existed, not to
the method itself.

In a similar manner, Aristotle relates the functions of

lower life to higher, and in De Anima so relates the senses to one
another and the faculty of reason to the faculties of sensation. The
function of reason relies heavily on the function of sense for its

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definition. He explains the relation of senses and sensations
analogically. One might even go so far as to say that
is the analogical relative of the several senses in its passive nature.
(431a20). In these endeavours he achieves some success, especially in
seeing the close relationship of odours and savours. (443b7). In the
field of epistomology, we thus see that Aristotle has become more
speculative in his use of analogy, not so much relying on observed
resemblances, but seeking relations he thinks should be there.

In the Poetics, analogy becomes the basis of metaphor.

"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to some-
thing elseo" (I457b7). In order to make this transference, the
classifications of resemblances are appealed to: 1= species;
2. genus; 3. analogy. Alternating proportions can be set up if the
four terms for the ratios are available.

As old age (D) is to life ( C ) , so is evening (B) to

day ( A ) . One will accordingly describe evening (B)
as 'the old age of the day' ( D + A ) . . . a n d old age (D)
as the 'evening 1 or 'sunset of l i f e ' (B+C). (1457b23).

It is in this manner we come to describe nameless objects or acts,

e.g. the foot of the mountain, the flight of a ball. Caution, however,
must be exercised, even here, in the use of analogy. In making a
transference of words, we sometimes carry with them connotations that
extend beyond the actually existing resemblances. These improper
connotations lead to an ineffective metaphor. On the other hand, the
resemblance may be greater than at first seen, and the metaphor will
increase the observed relationship (I457b20). One might see in this
the beginnings of a science of allegory, but the caution against
improper connotations prevents it. This caution may also lead us to
qualified metaphors. Aristotle gives us the example of the cup of
Ares as "the cup that holds no wine" (I456b32). This kind of qualified
metaphor o f f e r s some of our richest metaphorical images because it
gives a finely qualified relation on a similar basis to that of genera
and differentia in definitions.

In the Physics, analogy is employed for understanding

the nature of substrata. "The underlying nature is an object knowable
by an analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue.».so is the under-
lying nature to substance." (I91a7). Here the problem is to characterize
a basic principle which is not directly knowable, not characterizable
by kind and cannot be explained in terms of other principles or of a
contrary. Having concluded that the contraries always act upon some
third thing, the problem is to characterize that "third thing". It
is characterized by its relation to the "this", to the existent, to
the substance in its primary sense. It has the particularity of the
existent, but not its actuality. It is thus related to the existent
as matter is related to form. This characterization does not f a l l
readily into any of the three uses for analogy listed in the Topics,
but it is no less clearly a device for explicating similarities. 3

This use of analogia for explicating the relation of

principles finds its fullest expression in the Metaphysics, for here
Aristotle is concerned with principles that in some sense apply to all
things.

And if we inquire what are the principles or elements

of substances and relations and qualities -- whether they are
the same or d i f f e r e n t — clearly when the names of the causes
are used in several senses the causes of each are the same,
but when the senses are distinguished the causes are nob the
same but d i f f e r e n t , except that in the following senses the
causes of all are the same. They are the same or analogous
in this sense, that matter, form, privation, and the moving
cause are common to all things; and the causes of substances
may be treated as causes of all things in this sense, that
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 when substances are removed, all things are removed;
further that which is first in respect of complete
reality is the cause of all things. (I071a30),

Thus a unified substratum and a prime mover give a basic unity to all
existing things. But we have the restriction of diversity as the contrary
of unity. Aristotle tells us that "in another sense" (he doesn't say what
this sense is except that it involves contraries) there are different first
causes and the matters of different things are different.(I071a36).
However, his contrary causes are sufficient explanations of differentiation.
What he seems to point out here is not so much an explanation of different-
iation, but that unity is not primary. If it were totally primary, there
would be no differences. There are obviously real differences, and therefore
resemblance is a contrary, and cannot according to Aristotle's analysis in
Book Λ be the first cause. On the positive side, there is ultimately a
unity of all things, though not absolute, based upon primary cause, form,
and matter. This is what gives us our ontological ground for the resemblances
and gives proportion its methodological validity. There still remains the
question of how far we can broaden universal s to account for analogical
resemblances, but the desire to do so is based upon our increasing awareness
of this unity of all things, and analogy is the methodological device for
broadening the horizons. The contrary, difference, stands as a real opposing
limit and as a guard against going beyond the reality of resemblanceo

One of the problems regarding the basic unity is that it has no

practical value; it is simply not useful to human thought. Aristotle sees
this to be the case in the basic truths that underlie the several different
sciences.

Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences,

some are peculiar to each science, and some are common,
but common only in the sense of analogous, being used
only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting
the province of the science in question. (76a35).

In this statement, Aristotle completely compartmentalizes the several sciences,

limiting them to their own particular are of inquiry. For this reason, the
common truths discovered analogically are u s e f u l only as they are applicable
to the particular science, and have no use for enlightenment between the
sciences in a lateral fashion. For this a higher science is needed to examine
the common truths. This science is the "first philosophy" which considers
the basic principles common to all sciences. It is thus through recognition
of proportional relations that we come to the endeavour of metaphysics, but
analogy is here only a method of arrival, not an object of inquiry.

This science above all sciences still regards the common

principles on the basis of proportion, since it knows no higher universals
than the other sciences. It is still limited to speaking in analogical terms
even though it is examining common truths»

The causes and the principles of different things are

in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks
universally and analogically they are the same for all.
For one might raise the question whether the principles
and elements are d i f f e r e n t or the same for substances
and for relative terms, and similarly in the case of
each of the categories. But it would be paradoxical if
they were the same for all. For then from the same
elements will proceed relative terms and substances. (I070a3l).

We are still faced with the stubborn reality that we have unity only in
diversity and diversity only in unity. The closest that we can get to an
absolute unity is analogical relation. All things may be said to have
proportionately the same elements, principles and causes.

One may say that there are three principles..»the form,

the privation, and the matter» But each of these is
d i f f e r e n t for each class; e.g. in colour they are white,
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6,

black, and surface, and in day and night they are

light, darkness, and air. (I070bl9).

Thus, even for the first philosophy, that which lies beyond the standard
lines of classification must be regarded as analogically related. At
this point, it no longer is a lack of knowledge of a higher universal
(cf.74a7) that necessitates the use of proportion, but evidently the
lack of existence of such a universal. The ultimate unity lies in a
common principle and cause which is not a universal, but an individual
(viz., the prime mover). In what sense, if any, the prime mover is a
unifying factor of the world's diversity is at this point a moot question.
The fact is that ultimately we have in Aristotle's thought multiple
universale analogically related.

These considerations lead us to Aristotle's notion of

analogical identity. The ontological unity of all things does not lie
in sameness, but in similarity. Thus we never find things actually
identical, but only proportionately.

The things that agree are all appropriate to one

another, and one by analogy. For in each category
of being an analogous term is found — as the
straight is in length, so is the level in surface,
perhaps the odd in number, and the white in colour.
(I093bl7)c

Here we see Aristotle again stretching analogy to its limits» He seeks

an analogical identity across categories in order to explain resemblances.
Also again, though his illustrations may not always serve him well, his
intentions are obvious ο The existence of mathematical forms (Plato)
are not necessary to explain relations among things, much less are they
first principles of existence. The relations involve as "appropriate-
ness" that is explained by mathematical analogy, but which is not
dependent upon it ο

In other parts of the Metaphysics, Aristotle's use of

proportion seldom takes this extreme of analogical identity. It is true
that the proportion, differentia: genus:: form: matter::the actual: the
potential, is fundamental (1043a2)» This is not, however, based upon
his principle of analogical identity, but upon definite observed
similarities» What Aristotle maintains is simply that logic is similar
to ontology is similar to motion» His definition of actuality by
analogy is the common use of analogical method for definition by example.
In many ways the uses of analogia in the Metaphysics show the greatest
departures from the limits set in tho Topics and the Physics, but the
use here as elsewhere is consistently the explicating of similarities
through proportional relations»

III.

Our discussion thus far of Aristotle's use of analogia

has taken no note of the many discussions of analogy which have appealed
to his authority as a base» Indeed, it seems singularly incongruent
with them, because no mention has been made of analogous terms* The
traditional treatment of analogy in terms of analogical names has always
carried with it two problematic issues: i) the relation of analogous
terms to univocal and equivocal terms? 2) the relation of analogy to
being, and to metaphysical considerations generally» These were issues
of concern not only for such medieval scholars as Averroes, Thomas
Aquinas and Thomas de Vio, but continue to be discussed by Gerald Phelan,
James Anderson and others in our own time» An examination of these issues
will show how they are irrelevant to Aristotle's use of analogia»

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 In his Analogy of Names, Thomas de Vio sets forth what has
come to be a standard interpretation of analogical terms. After
delineating three modes of analogy, analogy of inequality, of attribution,
of proportionality,·^ de Vio maintains that the third excels the others
by dignity, by name and by usefulness in metaphysical predication„6 He
follows Aquinas in holding that the analogical lies between the univocal
and the equivocal, that analogical predicates predicate neither the common
nature of their referents, nor the unrelated natures of their referents.
Thus, analogical terms are the key for understanding the relation of God
to the universe and the nature of being itself.7 Following this formula-
tion, Phelan concludes that not only is analogy a mean between univocity
and equivocity, but that analogous terms have meanings which are neither
same nor d i f f e r e n t . Anderson gives a similar view of analogy, lifting
it to the lofty heights of a metaphysical necessity demanded by multi-
plicity:

In general terms the upshot of the matter is this:

'Pluralism' spells equivocity; ' m o n i s m ' , univocity;
'analogism', neither equivocity nor univocity, but
a type of thought which, based on the being of things,
surmounts both these positions without partaking of
the errors of either. For although analogy is a mean
between opposing extremes, it does not bring them
together in a hybrid synthesis; it transcends them.

If one comes to Aristotle with such understandings of analogy, he has ,„

two alternatives. Either he can read this interpretation into Aristotle,
or he can lament that Aristotle failed to comprehend its metaphysical
significance. Joseph Owens has nicely avoided both alternatives,
providing a corrective for traditional interpretations of Aristotle,
Owens shows that for Aristotle Being is neither constituted by analogy
nor expressed through analogy.12 The importance of analogy for Thomas
Aquinas lies not only in his conception of the relation between Creator
and creation, but also in his understanding of essence and existence.
This distinction makes analogy necessary for thomistic metaphysics, for
it lays the foundations for a four-term relation, but no such distinction
is fundamental to Aristotle's thought. The contentions of de Vio, Anderson
and others regarding the metaphysical importance of analogy are appropriate
to thomistic metaphysics, but are misplaced when applied to Aristotle.

While Owens avoids this reading back of tradition into Aristotle,

he continues to deal with analogous terms in relation to the univocity/
equivocity distinction. Rather than placing the analogous in a mean
position, he treats it as a subclass of equivocation. His basis for this
interpretation is the juxtaposition of the discussion of 'good' in Topics
1-15 with that in Nichomachian Ethics 1-6. ^ χηΘ latter passage served
as a proof-text for Averroes, de Vio and others to show the distinction
of the analogous from the equivocal,^- 4 and neither interpretation is
very convincing unless the reader takes it to the text with him. Aristotle
is here no longer concerned with the term 'good' as he was in the earlier
discussion, but rather is pursuing some basis for a unified notion of
goodness that need not appeal to an ideal form for its basis. The concern
is with ethics, and Owen's interpretation is just as erroneous as the
traditional one in its attempt to make this passage produce a set of
logical categories.

A clear distinction of the issues involving equivocations and

those involving analogy is expressed in Aristotle's own treatment of them
in the Topics. Here, Aristotle discusses four ways in which we become
supplied with arguments: 1) the securing of propositions; 2) the dis-
tinquishing of the senses of an expression ( i c e . , showing equivocation);
3) the discovery of differences; 4) the investigation of likeness. We
have seen the way in which (4) is to be carried out with the use of analogia.
No mention of analogia is made in relation to (2) in his lengthy discussion
of the latter in 1-15. Were such indirect evidence net enough, Aristotle
makes the difference more directly clear in his treatment of (2) - (4) in
prepositional form; "The first proposition (2) depends upon the use of one
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8.

term in several senses, the second (3) unpon the d i f f e r e n c e s of things,

the third (4) upon their likenesses." (I05a32). Insofar as analogia is
concerned with terms at all, it is concerned with several terms showing
the same (or similar) sense, not with the same term showing several
senses. But where the entire tradition has gone astray is in its
failure to recognize that — properly speaking — analogia does not
directly concern itself with terms at all. Analogia is a device for
showing a relationship of similarity that exists among things ο Insofar
as the terms may be said to have a relationship by virtue of the
similarity of the things and attributes for which they stand, they could
be said to be analogous terms in some indirect sense, but this sense
would in no way be comparable to the way in which terms are said to be
— directly and properly — equivocal or univocal.

IV.

The ordinary context for Aristotle's discussion of

analogia, as we have seen, is not in conjunction with discussions of
univocity and equivocity, but in relation to classification by genus
and species. We have also seen that the commensurability of the terms
of a proportion becomes a problematic issue when one compares the guide-
lines set down by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics and Physics with his
variety of uses of analogia in other places. The relation of commensur-
ability to Aristotle's understanding of genus and species will lay a
basis for our understanding the apparent ambivalence with which he uses
analogia.
Aristotle's understanding of species and genus can be
appreciated only in the light of Plato's theory of forms as presented
in the middle dialogues. Plato's theory provides l ) a basis for a
united intelligible structure of the universe culminating in a single
all-encompassing form; 2) a basis for recognizing the same form in any
of a variety of objects, no matter what other relationship may exist
among these objects. Aristotle's theory of forms provides for neither
of these ways of relating. By restricting the use of 'eidos' to units
of actuality, and not applying it to attributes of actualities, Aristotle
limits formal classification to species and in a derivative sense to
genus. In so treating 'eidos', Aristotle virtually inverts Plato's
theory. Instead of seeing individuals "partaking" of a number of forms,
he treats each form as the nature of a number of individuals. This
inversion enables him to bypass the-one-and-the-many problem and to
treat the being-and-becoming problem in terms of actuality/potentiality.

The relating of individuals within the genus and species

was for Aristotle not only a matter of classification, but also a part
of the nature of reality. To the extent that a higher genus could be
formulated, new discovery of the nature of reality was made. So f a r ,
Aristotle is able to account within his metaphysical system for unity
and resemblance. But always over against resemblance stands its
contrary of difference, and Aristotle, unlike Plato, never claims that
the One is the source of all things. Operating within the limits of the
species/genus classification and the resemblance/difference contraries,
Aristotle has no explicit, objective basis for discussing resemblances
which go beyond his substantial classifications. Because his ontology
is limited in this way, he must resort to proportionality to deal with
the resemblances that lie beyond its structures.

This explanation accentuates his mode of speaking about

analogy in conjunction with genus and species. Things may be one jLn
number, j^n species, iri genus, but they are one by_ analogy. The related-
ness of things according to u n i t s , species and genus exists because they
are so classified according to their nature. They are related analogic-
ally by a methodological device of the inquirer. This suggests that
analogical relationships beyond genera may have only subjective value»
Yet, at points, he seems convinced that analogy is a key to the discovery
of a higher genus, and thus a new aspect of reality,, He is explicitly
convinced at times that analogy is an expression of commensurate ratios,
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 9.

and at other times acknowledges that proportionality relates those things for
which there is no common name and no common genus. Such ambivalences arise
out of his dealing with resemblances at the fringes, if not beyond the limits,
of his ontological structures.

Species is a classification for the nature of things, genus for

the kinds, hut there is no ontological correlate in Aristotle's thought for
analogia. Things are one in. genus, but are one by_ analogy. We apply the
term 'sameness'"numerically or specifically or generically," (I03a9) but
never analogically. It might seem reasonable to suppose that the relations
correspond to analogia in much the same way that nature does to species and
kind does to genus.16 Such a move finds no support from Aristotle. The
concrete thing, nature and kind are all treated by him as in some sense
substantial, but no evidence from his writings suggests that he ever enter-
tained such a status for relations. Had he done so, it would certainly have
affected his logic, and the lack of a logic of relations is a critique often
levelled against his Organon.

This understanding of reality illuminates the concern for

commensurability in analogia that we found expressed in Posterior Analytics
and the Physics. A commensurately universal attribute "belongs to every
instance of its subject, and to every instance essentially." (73b33). In
order for analogia to reveal knowledge, the terms must be commensurate in
this sense because alternation is a property of proportionality (i.e.,
A:B::C:D implies A:C::B:D). Without this base in a common nature, the first
and third terms could hot be properly related. Thus, knowledge, properly
speaking, cannot be transferred from one genus to another, not even if they
are as closely allied as arithmetic and geometry. (75bl-7). "As things
are, demonstration is not transferable to another genus." (76a23). This
limits knowledge to the scope of the ontological structures for Aristotle's
understanding of reality.

The limits of Aristotle's ontological structures are what give

analogia a problematic character. There is no problem for its use within
a particular genus, but there is a necessary ambivalence about its role
beyond. If the proportion reveals true knowledge, then it becomes the basis
for the discovery of a higher universal, and the requirement of commensura-
bility is met. If it does not show true knowledge, then there is the danger
of erroneous judgment founded upon the apparent similarities. Similarities
beyond the scope of genera cannot be properly treated as knowledge. The
neoplatonic resolve of an ultimate unity of all things cannot be applied to
Aristotle's own thought, for he is limited not only by his respect for the
sameness/difference contrarity, but also by his conception of the prime mover
as an individual and the prime matter as a non-existent. There is no onto-
logical base for similarity beyond the scope of kinds of things.

Aristotle's theory of forms, in leaving behind the-on-and-the-

many problem confronted by Plato, necessarily takes up the problem of
resemblance. This problem does not exist for him within his system of
classification, but he cannot handle resemblance beyond the scope of kinds
the way in which Plato's theory of forms did. Analogia provides a method-
ological resolve, but does not serve any ontological function. It is not a
theory of how things are related, but merely a tool by which their relation
is made known. Within the scope of a kind of things analogical relation has
ontological ground. Beyond that scope, it is at best ontologically
problematic.

University of Kentucky. Thomas M.Olshewsky.

1. All references to Aristotle are to page, column and line of the Berlin
Academy edition.
2. Thomas Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford,1949), p.43f; 223.
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10.

3. Joseph Owens, in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelean

METAPHYSICS (Toronto, 1963), p.296, erroneously treats this as
a demonstration of Being. Aristotle's restriction of demonstration
to concerns within a single genus precludes the use of analogy for
demonstrative purposes ( 7 5 b l f f . ; 76a23). The last part of this
paper deals with the problematic nature of such restrictions more
fully.
5. Thomas de Vio, The Analogy of Names (Pittsburgh, 1959), p.10.
6. de Vio, p.27=

7. de Vio, p.28.
8. Gerald Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy,(Milwaukee, 1943), pp.10,15»
9. James F.Anderson, The Bond of Being, (St.Louis,1949), p.285.
10. For discussions of those who have done so» cf. Owens, p„380n., and
Muskens, De Vocis ANALOGIAS Significatione ac Usu apud Aristotelem
(Groningaer, 1943), pp.6-11.
11 o cf. Anderson, p.324.

12. Owens, p.380.

13. Owens, p.116 and seq.

14. Cf. de Vio, pp.16,23,26,28 et passim.
15. E.g., cf. 1016b32, 76a35, 1457b, 486b20.

16. Prof. Chung-Hwan Chen has suggested such an interpretation.

17. Hippocrates Apostle, in "Methodological Superiority of Aristotle

over Euclid," Philosophy of Science, Vol.26, p.134, points out
that this understanding raises problems with the manner in which
Euclid dealt with proportionality.

The Planet Mesonux

Choiroboskos 1.82 (Bekker, Anecdota 3.1397)

Μεσόνυχος· ε ι ς των επτά πλανήτων παρά
τ ο ι ς Π υ θ α γ ό ρ ε ι ο ι ς ο ν ο μ ά ζ ε τ α ι · μεμνηται
Ετησέχορυς

The above passage, which may be of very great importance

for the history of Greek astronomy, has not, as far as I have been able
to ascertain, received the attention it merits.

If the obvious interpretation of the text is correct,

then the following conclusions may be drawn:
1) One of the three outer planets eventually known to the ancients (Mars,
Jupiter, Saturn) had been distinguished by the Greeks from the fixed
stars as early as Stesichoros (632/29 - 556/3).4 (Only the outer
planets can be observed in the middle of the night; the inner planets,
Mercury and Venus, are only visible close to sunset or sunrise).

2) When Stesichoros wrote of Mesonux the body concerned was the only
outer planet so far distinguished. A name which is equally applicable
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