UP Law F2021 011 PT&T v.

NLRC
Labor 1 Art. 136 LC (Also Art. 280 LC; Art. 1306 CC; Art. II Sec. 1997 Regalado, J.
14, Art. XIII Secs. 3 & 14, 1987 Constitution)

SUMMARY
Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a reliever multiple times for different durations in 1990 and 1991. She got
married on May 26, 1991 but misrepresented herself as single in subsequent job application forms. Once this was
discovered, PT&T dismissed her. De Guzman thus filed an illegal dismissal suit against PT&T at the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, which decided in her favor. PT&T appealed to the NLRC, which however upheld the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, but imposed a 3-month suspension on De Guzman for misrepresenting her civil status.
PT&T filed a petition for certiorari at the SC, but the Court upheld the NLRC’s modified decision, reiterating that
PT&T’s policy was against not only Article 136 of the Labor Code, but also several provision of the Constitution.

FACTS1
 Grace de Guzman (“De Guzman”) was hired by Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company (“PT&T”) as a
reliever for the period from November 21, 1990 to April 20, 1991 (150 days). Again for the periods
June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 (21 days) and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991 (20 days), De Guzman
was hired as a reliever. As per their agreement, her employment was immediately terminated upon
expiration of each of the said periods.
 On September 2, 1991, De Guzman was once again hired by PT&T as a probationary employee, covering
a period of 150 days. She stated in the job application form that she was single even though she had
contracted marriage on May 26, 1991.
 PT&T discovered that De Guzman had made the same representation in the reliever contracts on June
10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Thus, Delia Oficial (“Oficial”), the branch supervisor of Baguio City, sent a
memo to De Guzman asking her to explain the concealment and reminding her of PT&T’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment.
 De Guzman replied on January 17, 1992 and stated that she was unaware of PT&T’s policy regarding
married women and that she had not concealed her true civil status. Unconvinced by the explanations,
PT&T dismissed De Guzman effective January 29, 1992 (after being employed for 149 days, which was
1 day shy of completing her probationary period). De Guzman, on the other hand, filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with a Claim for Non-Payment of Cost of Living Allowances (COLA) before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”) in Baguio City.
 Meanwhile, at the preliminary conference, De Guzman voluntarily disclosed that she failed to remit the
amount of P2,380.75 of her collections, and executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of PT&T.
 LABOR ARBITER: On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando (“Rimando”) issued a
decision declaring that PT&T illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee. Rimando ordered for her reinstatement plus payment of back wages and COLA.
Rimando was of the view that the ground relied upon by PT&T in dismissing De Guzman was insufficient
and discriminatory. PT&T thus appealed to the NLRC.
 NLRC: The NLRC, in its April 29, 1994 decision, upheld Labor Arbiter Rimando’s decision, and ruled that
De Guzman was indeed subjected to an unjust and unlawful discrimination by PT&T. However, the NLRC
modified the decision to the effect that De Guzman deserved to be suspended for 3 months due to her
dishonesty. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration by PT&T was denied by NLRC in its November
9, 1994 decision. Thus, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

RATIO
[PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION] [Because this case was assigned under “General Principles of Labor Law”, I also
included Justice Regalado’s discussion on the several pieces of legislation aimed at the protection of women in
the labor sector.]

1
Please note that I underlined each of the characters’ names at the first instance that each appeared in the facts; meanwhile, dates, periods,
and article numbers (along with some emphasized facts) are in bold letters.
Citing first and foremost the Bible2, the SC stated that it was the universal norm that women should be regarded
with love and respect. The prejudice against womankind was deemed to be most pervasive in the field of labor;
thus, several preventive and remedial social legislation had been put in place.

For instance, the 1987 Constitution, being aware of the disparity in rights between men and women, provides
for a wide array of provisions for women’s protection, such as:
1. Article II (2), Section 14: “The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.”
2. Article XIII (13), Section 14: “The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities
that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.”
3. Article XIII (13), Section 3 was also cited by the SC, as the constitutional mandate of the State to afford
full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including the assurance of entitlement to security of tenure of all workers.

Moreover, several corrective labor and social laws were enacted following the Philippines becoming a signatory
to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Examples of
such laws are:
1. RA 6727, which expressly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions
of employment, promotion, and training opportunities;
2. RA 6955, which bans the “mail-order-bride” practice and the export of female labor to countered that
cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers;
3. RA 7192, the “Women in Development and Nation-Building Act”, which affords women equal
opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training,
graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the AFP and the PNP;
4. RA 7322, which increased the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector;
5. RA 7877, which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the
education and training environment;
6. RA 8042, the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995”, which prescribes as a matter of
policy the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights
are secure;
7. Family Code, where women’s rights in the field of civil law have been enhanced and expanded; and,
8. Labor Code, specifically Articles 130 to 138, with emphasis on Article 1363, which expressly prohibits
discrimination based on the marriage of a female employee.

[NOT RELEVANT] W/N Grace de Guzman was a regular employee at the time of her dismissal (despite not
completing the 150-day probationary period)

YES. According to Article 2804 of the Labor Code, “… [A]n employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer…”

2
Which is admittedly odd.
3
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.
4
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
Thus, her earlier stints with PT&T were undoubtedly those of a regular employee as she performed activities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T.5 Further, because she was
terminated just as she was about to complete the 150-day probationary period, it is plausible to conclude that it
was done to prevent her regularization and from earning security of tenure. (See Dispositive.)

[NOT RELEVANT] W/N PT&T fired Grace de Guzman simply due to her dishonesty (and thus, loss of
confidence) and not due to her contracting marriage

NO. The SC ruled that PT&T dismissed Grace de Guzman because she had contracted marriage and not simply
because of her concealment of this fact, nor was it due to her admission that she supposedly misappropriated
company funds.

Delia Oficial’s memo to De Guzman included the words “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting
married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.” Also, in the termination letter6 to De Guzman,
PT&T explained to her that her dismissal was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status, but
more than that, was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage.

While De Guzman did conceal her true civil status from PT&T, it was not done willfully since she was practically
forced to do so because of the company policy banning married female workers [The Court even cited the legal
maxim “El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused.)”] Moreover, while loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination, it must not be simulated, but
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee, and must not be a smokescreen for illegal
causes. The SC emphatically rejected PT&T’s assertion that it had nothing against the marriage per se, and
wouldn’t have sanctioned De Guzman only by that fact alone, but that it was solely due to her dishonesty that
she was terminated.

In addition, PT&T’s reliance on De Guzman’s admission of supposedly misappropriating company funds was a
mere afterthought to bolster the case in its favor. There was no showing that De Guzman deliberately
misappropriated the said amount or whether her failure to remit was due to negligence; in fact, the matter was
deemed resolved when De Guzman executed a promissory note to refund the same.

However, the SC said that the NLRC correctly imposed a 3-month suspension due to De Guzman’s dishonesty, to
obviate the impression that such act should be condoned. (See Dispositive.)

[RELEVANT ] W/N Grace de Guzman’s dismissal was illegal

YES. The constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, as a facet of due process, is embodied in Article XIII (13),
Section 37 of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, prior to severance of the employee, an employer is required to
establish through substantial evidence the existence of a valid and just cause, with one’s labor being
constitutionally-protected property. On the other hand, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment from hiring to firing, except in cases of
5
The text of the decision did not really explain though what her job description was. Only her title, which was “Supernumerary Project
Worker”, was included.
6
Which included the words, “and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.”
7
Article XIII, Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary
modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
unlawful discrimination or those that may be provided by law.

However, in this case, PT&T’s policy of not accepting female employees who contract marriage is violative of the
right against discrimination conferred by the laws and the Constitution. Specifically, Article 136 of the Labor
Code8 proscribes an employer from:
1. Stipulating that a woman shall not get married;
2. Stipulating that upon such marriage, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or terminated; or,
3. Actually dismissing or discharging a woman employee by reason of marriage.

The Court even cited previous cases such as Zialcita v. Philippine Air Lines9, where a policy, which required flight
attendants to be single and provided that they will automatically be separated from service once they marry,
was declared void as it was in violation of Article 136 of the Labor Code, and Gualberto v. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation10, where a policy that women employees were dismissed once they get married (due to
“lack of facilities for married women”) was also declared void.

Further, the Court clarified that it is irrelevant that the rule is directed not against all women but only against
married women; it will still be unlawful discrimination if purely sex-based as when there is no policy against
married men. However, the Court conceded that there may be a “bonafide occupational qualification” or BFOQ if
the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, as when it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in a US case, a policy against marriage, even if directed against
both men and women flight attendants, was declared illegal since it was not related to their jobs as flight
attendants.

In addition, PT&T’s policy is illegal not only because it is against Article 136 of the Labor Code, but also because
it is against good morals and public policy (see Article 1306 of the Civil Code11), because such a policy
deprives a woman of the freedom to choose her status, which is an intangible and inalienable right, and
encourages illicit or common-law relations and subverts the institution of marriage. Ultimately, PT&T’s policy, in
its essence, likewise violates the constitutional provisions on marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
family as the foundation of the nation.12

DISPOSITIVE
“ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.”

(Note this paragraph tucked in the middle of the text of the decision:

“As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full
back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. However, as she
had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of
an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must
be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to
the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not
totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her
compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting
therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension.”)

8
See footnote # 3.
9
Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977 (Not a Supreme Court case, but an Office of the President case; thus, not jurisprudence.)
10
CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978. (Not jurisprudence as well)
11
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (1255a)
12
The case then cited several constitutional provisions such as Article II, Section 15; Article XV, Section 1; and Article XV, Section 2.