[G.R. No. 169077. August 31, 2006.
] According to Sally, she just closed her eyes while appellant had his way with her. She
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICANOR
SALOME, accused-appellant.
AZCUNA, J  p:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on June 15, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CR. No.-H.C. No. 00767, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nicanor Salome,"
affirming the decision, dated April 3, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2536, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against thirteen-year old Sally Idanan, and
imposing upon him the death penalty.
The antecedents are:
On February 18, 1998, upon the complaint of Sally Idanan, an information was filed
against appellant under the name Canor Sabeniano. Appellant, however, filed a motion
for reinvestigation on the ground that his name is Nicanor Salome and not Canor
Sabeniano.
An amended information was filed on August 26, 1998 accusing CANOR
SABENIANO also known as NICANOR SALOME, of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, committed as follows:
That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997
in the morning, in [B]arangay Lourdes, [M]unicipality of Pandan, [P]rovince of
Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed weapon,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was then 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense.
That the commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime
was committed inside the house of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Sally Idanan, fifteen years old, single, and a resident of Lourdes, Pandan, Catanduanes
testified before the trial court that she personally knew appellant because they used to
be neighbors. In 1997, they transferred residence but appellant would frequently pass
by their place. 2
Sometime in July of 1997, Sally, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with her three-
year old brother inside their house when appellant entered their house. She was
awakened by the presence of the latter who, allegedly, was poking a knife at the base
of her neck. While holding the knife with one hand, appellant undressed her with his
other hand. He threatened her that he would kill her and her family if she would tell
anyone about the incident. After undressing her, appellant forced her to lie down. He
removed his shorts and underwear. He then spread her legs and inserted his penis into
her vagina.
did not call for help because she was afraid that nobody would be in the next house
which was about 800 meters away. 3
She cannot remember how long appellant remained on top of her but before he left, he
reiterated his threat to kill her and her family if she told anybody of what happened.
After that, she would frequently see appellant but the latter never spoke to her.
Fearful for her life and for her family's safety, she did not inform anyone of the incident.
Although it entered her mind that she could be pregnant, she left her province to work
as a domestic helper in the house of SPO2 Constantino B. Saret in West Crame, San
Juan, Manila.
On November 12, 1997, she had a pelvic ultrasound examination which confirmed her
pregnancy. 4 Upon learning this, she reported the rape incident to the police on
November 17, 1997. She executed a sworn statement and filed a complaint.
A criminal complaint for rape was initiated before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Pandan-Caramoran, Pandan, Catanduanes. Appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charge during the arraignment. CSTDIE
Evidence for the prosecution consisted primarily of Sally's narration of the incident, and
the testimony of Ma. Luz T. Santos, Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, on the medico-legal report issued by Dr. Anthony
Joselito Llamas 5 who examined Sally.
Ma. Luz T. Santos, while referring to the medical report, explained that the hymen has a
deep healed laceration at 6:00 o'clock position but she cannot determine as to the time
when it was inflicted. 6 Due to the fact that the vaginal canal was still narrow with
prominent rugosities, Sally has not yet given birth although she was 18 to 19 weeks
pregnant counting from the last day of her menstruation which was on July 5, 1997. On
cross-examination, Santos declared that she was uncertain as to the exact date of
sexual intercourse that caused the pregnancy of Sally, and that said act may have
occurred days before or after July 5, 1997 on account of the fact that the life span of an
average sperm cell lasts for three days. 7
Evidence for the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the testimonies of appellant,
Salvador Villarey and Manny Torralba.
Appellant denied having raped Sally and offered the defense of alibi. He claimed that in
the month of July 1997, he went fishing at the sea of Gigmoto, Catanduanes on three
different days but could not exactly remember when. Villarey and Torralba corroborated
the fact that they went fishing with appellant in July of 1997. They maintained, however,
that while they had been appellant's fishing companions, they would go their separate
ways after fishing and were not aware of appellant's activities after that.
On April 3, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime of
rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Nicanor Salome also known as Canor Sabediano
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with the use of a deadly
weapon, committed inside the dwelling of the offended party, as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to give monthly support in the
sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos to the offspring of complainant Sally Idanan
born on April 11, 1998, and to indemnify Sally Idanan in the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED. 8
Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellant, the case was directly elevated to
this Court for review. Subsequently, however, the case was referred to the Court of
Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo. 9
The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the case, rendered its Decision on June 15, 2005
affirming the conviction of appellant, with modifications:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 3, 2001 of the trial court is affirmed subject to
the following modifications:
(1) The award of civil indemnity on the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to
P75,000.00; and,
(2) Appellant is ordered to pay private complainant moral damages of P75,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to govern Death Penalty Cases) which took into effect on October 15, 2004,
this case is elevated and certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED. 10
Appellant assigns the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
UNCONVINCING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
SALLY IDANAN; AND,
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING DWELLING AS AN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally
accorded the highest degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the
trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying. 11
In giving credence to the Sally's testimony, the trial court noted that she did not have
any improper motive against appellant other than her desire to tell the truth and obtain
redress from the criminal act. 12
In the commission of rape, it is usually only the rape victim who can attest to its
occurrence, 13 and if the lone testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, it is competent to
establish the guilt of the accused. 14 This is even more so if it involves the testimony of
a rape victim of tender or immature age such as in the instant case. Thus, if the victim is
a young, immature girl, her testimony is given credence by the courts 15 because no
one would contrive a rape story, allow an examination of her private parts and subject
herself to scrutiny at a public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished. 16
Appellant asserts that the conduct of private complainant during and after the
commission of the offense militates against her credibility because it is inconsistent with
human experience. She did not shout nor offer any resistance as expected of a woman
being sexually abused. She likewise kept the incident to herself until she learned of her
pregnancy three months later. Appellant further claims that there is no evidence that he
threatened her or her family or that he prevented her from reporting the incident to
anybody. 17
The Court finds nothing incredible in Sally's behavior. She woke up with appellant
poking a knife at the base of her neck. The act of holding a knife, by itself, is strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is
sufficient to bring her to submission. The victim's failure to shout for help or resist the
sexual advances of the rapist does not negate the commission of rape. 18 As noted by
the trial court:
The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and panty were
removed because of fear (TSN, Oct. 21, 1999, p. 12) does not lessen complainant's
credibility. To an innocent girl who was then barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat
engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial
desires of the accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to
the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by
any hard and fast rule. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some
may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into sensibility; while others
may openly welcome the intrusion. (People v. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413 (1984)). The
test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it
produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to
her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of intimidation
exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with
all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless
be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape
to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be
so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force
or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
(People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 (1974)). jurcda
Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is understandable. It is
not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue
because of the threats on their lives. 19 Failure, therefore, by the victim to file a
complaint promptly to the proper authorities would not necessarily destroy the truth  per
se of the complaint nor would it impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if
such delay was satisfactorily explained. 20 As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape
case due to threats is justified. 21 As the Court held in People v. Ballester: 22
Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly report the sexual
assault to her relatives. Long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not
always been construed as an indication of a false accusation. In fact this principle
applies with greater force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years
old, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm.
Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses is expected in the
proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people
react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. 23
Appellant further denies having raped Sally, asserting that he went fishing on three
occasions in July of 1997. Denial, however, is inherently a weak defense and cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim. 24 For the defense of alibi and denial
to prosper, appellant must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
physically impossible for him to have been physically present at the scene of the crime
or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 25
Here, appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
house of Sally when the crime was committed. As the trial court aptly held:
The defense offered by the accused that he could not have raped the complainant
because he went fishing three (3) times in the month of July 1997 in Sicmil, Gigmoto,
Catanduanes (TSN, February 8, 2000, p. 3) is sorely inadequate to overcome the
evidence adduced by the prosecution relative to his guilt, considering that his absence
for only three (3) days could not prevent him from committing the offense in the
remaining twenty-eight (28) days of the month. In any event, a probe into the accused's
alibi readily yields the latter's inherent weakness. It is settled that for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must establish the physical impossibility for him to have been
present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Cristobal,
G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996) In the instant case, the accused failed to
demonstrate such impossibility.
The allegation in the Information that the offense was committed within the period
comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997, sufficiently informs the accused of
the approximate time of commission of the offense and affords him opportunity to show
that he could not have committed the crime on any of the thirty-one (31) days of July
1997 . . .
Additionally, Manny Torralba, one of the accused's fishing companions, declared that
they went home from fishing everyday (TSN, February 28, 2001, p. 6) and that every
time they went home from fishing, they parted ways as each went to his own home, and
would not know what the accused would be doing while he was at his own home (Idem,
p. 9). Thus, even in those days when the accused went to fish out at sea, the accused's
presence in the house of the complainant where the subject offense was committed
was far from impossible. 26
The Court notes that appellant does not deny the existence of the knife during the
commission of the rape. This Court sustains the finding that the trial court did not err in
convicting appellant of the crime of rape perpetrated with the use of a deadly weapon.
The presentation of the knife is not necessary to his conviction, in light of the victim's
unwavering testimony as to how appellant, armed with a knife, threatened and raped
her.
This is consistent with this Court's ruling in People v. Degamo: 27
It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is
not essential to the conviction of the accused. The testimony of the rape victim that
appellant was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the crime is sufficient to
establish the fact for so long as the victim is credible. It must be stressed that in rape, it
is usually only the victim who can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject
the testimony of the alleged victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the
conviction of the accused.
People v. Philippines Vitancur 28 also illustrates this principle:
The fact that the weapon with which complainant claimed she was intimidated by
accused-appellant could not be presented in court could not impeach private
complainant's credibility as the weapon is not essential to the prosecution of rape
cases. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, private complainant
was made to submit to the will of accused-appellant. . . . [T]he test is whether the threat
or intimidation produces in the mind of a reasonable person fear that if she persists or
does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat will be carried out.
Appellant committed the crime of rape with the use of a bladed weapon, the imposable
penalty of which is reclusion perpetua to death in accordance with Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Whenever by reason of or on occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
In addition, and in relation to the second assignment of error, the crime of rape is
aggravated by dwelling. 29 As the Court of Appeals noted:
There is no question that the amended information sufficiently alleged "that the
commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime was
committed inside the house of the offended party." Accused-appellant does not dispute
that the crime was committed inside the victim's house. However, he posits that the
prosecution must prove the absence of provocation by Sally.
It suffices to state that private complainant categorically testified that she was sleeping
inside her house when appellant came and perpetrated the crime. This is proof enough
of the absence of provocation on the part of private complainant. For a sleeping thirteen
(13) — year old barrio girl cannot possibly give any kind of provocation to appellant
under the circumstances. CTDHSE
Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon,
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified
the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. 30
The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when an aggravating
circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is present in the commission of the offense.
In People v. Alfeche, 31 wherein the complainant, employed as a domestic helper, was
inside the house of her employer when she was raped by the appellant who was armed
with a deadly weapon, the Court considered dwelling as an aggravating circumstance in
convicting the latter, and affirmed the trial court's imposition of the greater penalty,
which is death.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction of herein appellant and the imposition
of the death penalty, concluded that:
The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial court's
imposition of the death penalty. This is without prejudice, of course, to the provisions of
section 25, R.A. 7659 regarding the possible exercise of the pardoning power of the
Office of the President upon the finality of the death sentence. 32
In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death
penalty has been prohibited. 33 The law provides:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the
evidence by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the new
law, even as the Court sustains the conviction of appellant, the penalty imposed upon
him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, but appellant shall not be eligible for
parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally
in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano 34 which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000 . . . Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed
that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the
trial court's award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to
P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape. Lastly, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is also called for, by way of example, and to
protect the young from sexual abuse.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000. On the other
hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial court imposes the death penalty will
henceforth not apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need to
perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty pursuant to
the new law prohibiting its imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.-H.C. No.
00767, dated June 15, 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of
appellant and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence that shall be
imposed upon appellant, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No.
9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without parole.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 192123. March 10, 2014.]
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J  p:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year
old patient born with an imperforate anus. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an imperforate anus.
Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one
end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, 3 enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. 4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila
for a pull-through operation. 5 Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and
was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr.
Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). 6 During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, 7 and went into a coma. 8 His coma lasted for two weeks, 9 but he
regained consciousness only after a month. 10 He could no longer see, hear or
move. 11
Agitated by her son's helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz)
lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with
the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila against the attending physicians. 12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum, 13 alleging: — DICSaH
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such
was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been
born with an imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for
anal opening [pull through operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment
would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using
100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his
said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a
cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage
and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred
to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of
1997), 15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries, 16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P.
SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of arresto mayor  as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN
(10) DAYS of prision correccional  as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally
with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant
Luz Gercayo, the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby
CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED. 17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary
liability, 18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying
its decision as follows: ETDAaC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor  as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days
of prision correccional  as maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital
ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled. 19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20 pertinently
stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major
operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests
were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his
imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal
that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a
significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a
causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute
the accident to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the
charge in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos  vs. Court of Appeals,  321
SCRA 584 —
In cases where the  res ipsa loquitur  is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not
only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a  nexus  between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to  res ipsa loquitur  is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him. IaAEHD
The lower court has found that such a  nexus  exists between the act complained of and
the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the
factual findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of
arbitrariness or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the
case. People v. Paraiso, 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it
creates a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the
accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that
he has no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7,
2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE
BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A
CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO
THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS
BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST
PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT
THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO
OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY
ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN
ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES
IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE. cCTIaS
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT
JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER.
ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT
SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH,
THE AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the
doctrine of  res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum
was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
The doctrine  res ipsa loquitur  means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." 24 It is simply "a recognition of
the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature
of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some
explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the
superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or
common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the
accident itself. Hence,  res ipsa loquitur  is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of
common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People 26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie  evidence
thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. 27
The applicability of the doctrine of  res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was
significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 28 where the
Court said —
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus,  res ipsa
loquitur  has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of
that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a
question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of
circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of  res ipsa loquitur  is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides
the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of
skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or
operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not
only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to  res ipsa loquitur  is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him. cEDaTS
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of
treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended,
knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his
tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of
anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of  res ipsa loquitur  has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that
the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the
failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of  res ipsa
loquitur  can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any
particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur  is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result
of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of
the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur  may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the
matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of  res ipsa
loquitur  inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second
and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient,
being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care,
custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his
submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation,
causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of
oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically
termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through
operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone
did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him
had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been
triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the
patient. 30 STIcEA
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v.
Brigham, 31 relevant portions of the decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital
for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a
swollen throat and some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the
patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection
of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m.
Dr. Brigham received a telephone call from the hospital, advising him that the patient
was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered and
he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a
second time to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The doctor
ordered that a medicine be administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he
arrived, the physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to revive
the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25
a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air
passage. He also found that the air passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2
or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly
close.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of
infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res
ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury
was probably caused by someone's negligence.  Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298,
474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of
the doctrine.  Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S.
Speiser,  The Negligence Case — Res Ipsa Loquitur § 24:10 (1972). The evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res
ipsa loquitur  doctrine. The acute closing of the patient's air passage and his resultant
asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances it
would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was no
palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that
death would not be expected without negligence. And there is no expert medical
testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next
determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal
negligence. EASCDH
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 32 Reckless imprudence, on
the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. 33
Dr. Solidum's conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and
properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at
100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the
findings and conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and
purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece
of information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child.
He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based
on the records  it should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record — A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit
1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract —  A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked
Exhibit 3A. 3B — Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient
was noted to have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately
administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off,
and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg
was given. However, the patient did not respond until no cardiac rate can be
auscultated and the surgeons were immediately told to stop the operation. The patient
was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of
epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage — still with no cardiac
rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45 secs, patient's
vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins.
The surgeons were then told to proceed to the closure and the child's vital signs
throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-
22 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was
ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia
persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked
to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could
only sheepishly note  I can't understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical
abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information
that the  anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a
nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and
45 minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational
agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be
apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100%
halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after something went amiss in the operation
and the halothane itself was reduced or shut off. ADaSET
The key question remains — what was the quantity of halothane used before
bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido's admission is that there was no overdose of the
anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this
conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care,
never leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature
but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the
operation. He insisted that he administered only a point 1%  not 100% halothane,
receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough
to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things
that happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely monitored the
concentration of the agent during the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum's interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he
takes the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the
record,  that the quantity of halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%)
delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes.  He studiedly mentions — the concentration of
halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is
only one percent (1%) — The numbers indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane
is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo
for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only
one percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly
eliminated by the body during the entire operation.
xxx xxx xxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-
face of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child
would not really validate the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the
halothane used was not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the
implications of the change in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had
described the condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a
diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a
failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in heart
rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this
condition or syndrome. But why would there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to
1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or halothane was the
object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable, and they
can only be led to one conclusion — if the application of anesthesia was really closely
monitored, the event could not have happened. 34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable
doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr.
Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the
administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in  Cruz v.
Court of Appeals  35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed
by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. In the recent case of  Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred
L. Pacasio, et al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect
represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care
that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further,
inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. IDCHTE
xxx xxx xxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon  as well as a causal connection of
such breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's
Hospital, Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of
the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
'injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'"
An action upon medical negligence — whether criminal, civil or administrative — calls
for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements,
namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician's failing to act
in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be
a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and
the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against
unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as  standards of care, set the duty of the
physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of
a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice
cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide
guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a
result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician  must be determined from
expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an
anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and
skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner. 37 HSIaAT
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued
for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on
any individual physician's own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by
which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and
defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the
standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts. 38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses  with special medical qualifications in
anesthesia  to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was
applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself
who served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the
Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr.
Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the
investigation. 39 Even then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr.
Solidum, 40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent
a pull-thru operation and was administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia
residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-
sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The
anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal
reflex, administered atropine to block it but despite the administration of the drug in two
doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures
were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5)
minutes and that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout,
unfortunately, as later become manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain
damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of
anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the
universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or
negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony
concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had conducted on Gerald,
as borne out by the following portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON
 Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS
 General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in
this case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour
and 45 minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of
heart rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what
cause of the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo? IHcTDA
WITNESS
 Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time
because is some reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON
 What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility,
we're talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON
 Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate, now
what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS
 Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when
you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral
part of the neck, when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that
produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the
supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a
hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to
pump or to do not a bradycardia but a . . . to counter act the Hypoxia that is being
experienced by the patient (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications probably were contributory to the
production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir. 41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of
the anesthesia record and the factors that could have caused Gerald to experience
bradycardia, viz.:
ATTY. COMIA
 I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this Honorable
court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct? DAHSaT
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be
contributory to the production of Hypoxia and . . . "
ATTY. COMIA
 And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS
 Based on the records, I know the . . .
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you
kindly look at this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you
kindly look at this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and
even to this representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
 Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just call me
and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS
 Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA
 I'm asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100 figures, tell
me, yes or no?
WITNESS
 I'm trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA
 Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily, because
this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the
Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request
that this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record as our
Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as
our Exhibit "1-A".
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
 Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many factors that
contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS
 Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to
what you call hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there
are other factors that might lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that
correct?
WITNESS
 The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be
due to operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being
done might also contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COMIA
 How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor? prcd
WITNESS
 Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a
possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir. 42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald's
operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had exposed him to
the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He then corrected his earlier finding that
100% halothane had been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100%
oxygen. 44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45 However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum
had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed,
Dr. Vertido's findings did not preclude the probability that other factors related to
Gerald's major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to
experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that
"although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum's guilt, and
moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
. . . is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious
doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the
defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having
weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most
important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond
the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him
from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal
bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt.
There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been
caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum
was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced
by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on
the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on
speculation but on competent evidence. AaIDHS
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to
address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding
Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was
flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense
charged. 48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged
Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite
the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged
along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically,
which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the
CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for
the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA
should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced
by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such
a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the  Revised Penal Code. But
the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to
attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article
103 of the  Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
"engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch
of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry. 49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not
engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian
work. 50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit,
Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was
adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES
AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr.
Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit. TIAEac
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 210148. December 8, 2014.]
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA, respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J  p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated June 28,
2013 and the Resolution 3 dated November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly
liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information 4 for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death 5 of Marina Oliva.
Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was
crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and
traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. 6 While
Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually
died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported
driver of the vehicle. 7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano
(Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a
woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter
was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also
offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by
her family as a result of her mother's death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented
his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following
the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by
Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident. 8 TIDHCc
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
(demurrer) 9 asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the
prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was
no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired. 10
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order 11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya's demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in
material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the
crime imputed upon him. 12
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC
found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by her family but she
failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano
also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely
testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the
incident, likewise declared that he did not witness the same. 13
Marla moved for reconsideration, 14 which the MeTC denied in an Order 15 dated
November 4, 2010, clarifying that the grant of Daluraya's demurrer had the effect of an
acquittal and that reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya's demurrer would
violate the latter's right against double jeopardy. 16 With respect to the civil aspect of
the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be
awarded absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for
Marina Oliva's demise. 17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed 18 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76
(RTC), insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of
Daluraya, 19 which finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of
the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act from which the criminal responsibility may
spring did not at all exist." 21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration 22 which, although filed beyond the
reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found the same
without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its
Order 23 dated May 10, 2012. CAHaST
Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that
Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the
RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of PhP152,547.00 as actual
damages, PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and PhP50,000.00 as moral
damages. 25 In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's
acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. 26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that
Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by
Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina
Oliva; (b)  the conclusion derived from Serrano's testimony that the woman he saw
crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and
the victim who eventually died, are one and the same;  (c) the Philippine National Police
Referral Letter of one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as the
suspect in the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death
of Marina Oliva, and stating that he brought the victim to the Quezon City General
Hospital for treatment but was declared dead on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was
registered in the name of Daluraya's aunt, Gloria Zilmar, 27 who authorized him to claim
the vehicle from the MeTC. 28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, 29 which the CA denied in a
Resolution 30 dated November 22, 2013, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA was correct
in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death despite his acquittal in the
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an
accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability. 31 In Manantan v. CA, 32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal
recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused,
as follows: EcICSA
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no  delict, civil liability  ex
delicto  is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must
be based on grounds other than the delict  complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. 33
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 34 the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on
the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has
the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence
on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an
order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused,
and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of
rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case. 35 (Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." 36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to
establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is
clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the
accused precisely committed the crime charged against him." 37 Furthermore, when
Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said court
reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the
accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" 38 and that
"there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the
person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva." 39 ICTaEH
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by
the RTC, that Daluraya's acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would
necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo  for the reception of
Daluraya's evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was
based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the
author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be
deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the
Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
125113 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 8,
2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 163753. January 15, 2014.]
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., petitioner,vs.HANZ CALAPIZ,
REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA
CALAPIZ, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J  p:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision promulgated on February
20, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on
August 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City
ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries charged against him. 2 aSTAHD
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-
year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz),to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital,
Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no
added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents' consent, the petitioner performed
the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following day,
Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were
swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner
forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents'
protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess
formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration
was brought about by Hanz's appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go,
an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz
underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his
damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanz's
parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information 3 was filed in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which the latter pleaded
not guilty on May 22, 1998. 4 Under the order of April 30, 1999, the case was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99. 5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including Dr. Rufino Agudera
as an expert witness and as the physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair
the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to have
urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that had necessitated
the conduct of two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although
satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr.
Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury. aDSHIC
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his
examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at the
vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required immediate
surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz
with his parents' consent by using a Congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents'
claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on January
27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by Hanz's burst
appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999, 6 the RTC acquitted the petitioner of the
crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It held that the Prosecution's evidence
did not show the required standard of care to be observed by other members of the
medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the
petitioner was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of
evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders judgment acquitting the
accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz P50,000.00 as moral damages.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, 7 sustaining the award of moral damages. It
opined that even if the petitioner had been acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal
did not necessarily mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the
circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on April 28,
2004. 8
Hence, this appeal. trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with
Issue their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings a quo.The Court, by virtue of its not being a
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's civil liability despite his acquittal of the
trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that
Ruling such findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. SCaIcA

The petition for review lacks merit. TAaIDH
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. 9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In  Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court
elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz.:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict,civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must
be based on grounds other than the delict  complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist." 11 SDTIaE
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have long
advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any
part of one's body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact
monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed once that integrity has been
violated. The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one's body.
The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries sustained. 15 In
Hanz's case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner
forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair
his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages. DHTCaI
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6%  per
annum should then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting the value
of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless
we make the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal interest on the
award, his sufferings would be unduly compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of
interest should be from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the
making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE,the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 20, 2003,
with the modification that legal interest of 6% per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is
imposed on the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent
a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case
unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.

Although it found the Prosecution's evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in
determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on
mere preponderance of evidence. 12 In this connection, the Court reminds that the
acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant's recovery
of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for that
purpose. 13

The petitioner's contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no
proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to
prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him
that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly
liable. 14 With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious

[G.R. No. 183090. November 14, 2011.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner, vs. BERNABE PANGILINAN Y
CRISOSTOMO, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J  p:
Before us is an appeal filed by appellant Bernabe Pangilinan which seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision 1 dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00197. The CA decision affirmed the judgment 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63, convicting appellant of the crimes of rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 3 with modification as to the amount of
damages awarded to the offended party.
Consistent with our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, 4 we withhold the real name of the
victim and her immediate family members, as well as any information which tends to
establish or compromise her identity. The initials AAA represent the victim, the initials
BBB stand for her aunt, appellant's wife, and the initials CCC refer to one of her
relatives.
On October 3, 2001, the prosecution filed two (2) Informations charging appellant of the
crimes of Rape 5 and Child Sexual Abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610. The
Informations respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 11768
That on or about July 27, 2001, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Brgy.
Apsayan, Municipality of Gerona, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force,
threat and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with [his] stepdaughter AAA, a minor, 13 years of age, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law. 6
Criminal Case No. 11769
That on or about 1995 up to about June 2001, at Barangay Apsayan, Municipality of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a
minor subjected to sexual abuse.
That accused is the stepfather of AAA, who was born on January 29, 1988.
Contrary to law. 7
Upon his arraignment on February 21, 2002, 8 appellant, duly assisted by counsel,
entered a plea of "Not Guilty" in both cases.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. ASIETa
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Marissa M. Mascarina, the attending
physician, and the victim, AAA.
Dr. Mascarina testified that she examined AAA, as the latter was allegedly raped by
appellant. 9 She made physical as well as internal examinations on AAA. Based on her
examination, she issued a Medical Certificate, 10 which stated, among others, that
there was no hymenal laceration.
AAA testified that she was born on January 20, 1988. 11 She had lived with her Aunt
BBB, first cousin of her father, and her husband, herein appellant, since she was two
years old until July 27, 2001. 12 At around 10 p.m. of July 27, 2001, while her aunt was
working in Angeles, Pampanga, and she was watching television in their house,
appellant arrived and ordered her to cook chicken adobo which she did. Suddenly,
appellant approached her and pointed a samurai at her. Appellant then kissed her neck
and mashed her breast. 13 It was not the first time that appellant did that to her. 14
AAA further testified that she remembered three incidents wherein appellant abused
her. The first time was when appellant kissed her and touched her private parts. 15 The
second time was when appellant pointed a samurai at her, took her to a room and
removed her clothes and kissed her on her lips and touched her private organ. He then
laid on top of her and tried to insert his penis to her private organ. His organ touched
her vagina; that she felt pain in her vagina but there was no blood. 16 And the third time
was when appellant kissed her and mashed her breast. 17 She did not tell her aunt of
appellant's sexual molestations, because he threatened to kill her and her aunt. 18 She
intimated that her aunt BBB and appellant treated her like their own daughter. 19
On redirect examination, AAA testified that appellant inserted his penis to her vagina
and that it was painful when he did it. 20
On the other hand, the defense presented appellant himself, his wife, BBB, and their
two neighbors.
BBB testified that she and appellant have treated AAA as their real daughter by
providing her with all her needs for which reason her relatives envied AAA. 21 She was
able to talk with AAA while the latter was in the custody of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Tarlac City, and AAA told her that it was her cousin
CCC who molested her. 22 BBB intimated that her relatives were mad at appellant
because he was jobless and she was the one working for her family. 23
For his part, appellant denied the accusations that he raped or molested AAA. He
testified that on July 27, 2001, he was at his neighbor's house dressing chickens. When
he went home at around 10 p.m., AAA told him that CCC, a cousin, molested
her. 24 Appellant and AAA were on their way to file a complaint against CCC when they
met CCC's mother who forcibly took AAA by beating her with an umbrella. 25 Appellant
insinuated that AAA was just forced by his wife's relatives to file the charges against
him since they were against their relationship. 26
Appellant's testimony was corroborated by his two neighbors.
On February 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing evidence, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty
Beyond Reasonable Doubt on both cases (Criminal Case No. 11768 and Criminal Case
No. 11769) for Rape and Sexual Abuse, respectively, and he is hereby sentenced as
follows:
I. Under Criminal Case No. 11768
1. to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and
2. to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as fine to answer for the
private complainant's rehabilitation at the DSWD, Tarlac City.
II. Under Criminal Case No. 11769 SDTIHA
1. to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional medium, as the minimum to seven (7) years of Prision Mayor minimum, as
the maximum; and
2. to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00 as damages.
SO ORDERED. 27
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 28 dated March 19,
2003.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 29 On January 14, 2004, we accepted the
appeal. 30 However, pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Mateo, 31 we
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. 32
On January 25, 2008, the CA rendered its decision which affirmed the RTC Decision,
finding the appellant guilty of the crimes charged, but modifying the award of damages,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the appealed Decision dated 19 February 2003 of Branch 63, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Tarlac City, Third Judicial Region, in Criminal Cases Nos. 11768 and 11769,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases imposing the
sentence of Reclusion Perpetua for the crime of Rape and the penalty of imprisonment
of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium, as the minimum
to SEVEN (7) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum, as the maximum for the crime of
Sexual Abuse, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to the award of
damages:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11768, to indemnify the offended party the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; civil indemnity of
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) and moral damages of SEVENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00), instead of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00);
and
2. In Criminal Case No. 11769, to pay the offended party the amount of TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages. 33
In so ruling, the CA found unmeritorious appellant's argument that the allegation of "on
or about 1995 up to about June 2001 was unconscionably spacious which violated his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The CA
ruled that the precise time of the commission of the offense need not be alleged in the
complaint or information unless time is an essential element of the crime charged which
is not so in the crime of acts of lasciviousness; and that since appellant did not move for
a bill of particulars or quashal of the Information, he could no longer question on appeal
the alleged defect in the Information.
As to appellant's claim that there was no evidence showing that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA on July 27, 2001, the CA found that AAA was only 14 years old and
had been subjected to abuse by appellant since she was seven years old; thus, she
could not remember the details and the dates when she was abused; however, it was
established that she was raped which happened before the Information was filed. The
findings of Dr. Mascarina that there was no hymenal laceration did not categorically
discount the commission of rape and full penetration was not required to convict
appellant for rape. The CA found no reason for AAA to fabricate lies as she considered
appellant her father who treated her like his own daughter.
The CA did not give probative value to the alleged written statement of AAA filed with it
which seemed to exonerate appellant from the offense charged against him.
A Notice of Appeal 34 was subsequently filed by appellant. In a Resolution 35 dated
July 23, 2008, we accepted the appeal and ordered the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. 
Appellee filed a Manifestation 36 to be excused from filing a supplemental brief as the
brief filed with the CA had adequately addressed the issues and arguments raised in
the appellant's brief dated June 20, 2005. aHTCIc
Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief 37 wherein he alleged that assuming appellant
raped AAA, the RTC gravely erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
claims that he should have been prosecuted for rape under RA 7610 since AAA was
already more than 12 years old on that fateful day, thus, the penalty should have
been reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
In his Appellant's Brief, he presented the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE AND ESTABLISH WITH
PARTICULARITY THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 38
It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review,
and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors
or not. 39
In this case, appellant was charged under two separate Informations for rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA
No. 7610, respectively. However, we find the Information in Criminal Case No. 11769
for sexual abuse to be void for being violative of appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. We again quote the
charging part of the Information for easy reference, thus:
That on or about 1995 up to about June 2001 at Barangay Apsayan, Municipality of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a
minor subjected to sexual abuse.
That accused is the stepfather of AAA who was born on January 29, 1988.
Contrary to law.
Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
A reading of the allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the
insufficiency of the averments of the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant.
It does not contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a
conclusion of law. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such
Information.
In People v. Dela Cruz, 40 wherein the Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R read:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded
and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA
CRUZ as a human being. cAaDCE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 41
We dismissed the case after finding the Information to be void and made the following
ratiocinations:
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an
offense. The information does not cite which among the numerous sections or
subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it
does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense, or any special or
aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of criminal
procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law,
not facts. The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being
violative of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 42
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused
cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. 43 Hence, it is imperative that the
complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives.
As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed. 44
The next question to be addressed is whether the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides:
Art. 266-A Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is Committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even A. He was naked, sir.
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Q. Was he wearing a shirt?
We find that AAA remained steadfast in her assertion that appellant raped her through
force and intimidation with the use of a samurai. And even after the incident, appellant A. No, sir.
threatened AAA that he would kill her and her aunt, i.e., appellant's wife, should AAA
Q. Was he wearing pants?
report the incident. Thus, AAA's testimony on the witness stand:
A. No, sir.
Q. What did the accused do to you?
Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?
A. He aimed the samurai at me and he took me inside the room, sir.
A. He was trying to insert his penis to my vagina.
Q. And what happened when he took you inside the room?
FISCAL DAYAON:
ATTY. MARTINEZ:
Q. Was he able to insert his organ to your vagina?
Q What date are you referring to?
A. No, sir.
A. I can no longer remember, sir. aTSEcA
Q. Could you tell us if his organ touched your vagina?
FISCAL DAYAON:
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what happened when you were in the room?
Q. What part of your vagina was touched by his organ?
A. He aimed the samurai at me and directed me to remove my clothes, sir.
A. I do not know.
Q. Did you remove your clothes?
Q. How many times did [the] accused try to insert his organ to your vagina?
A. No, sir.
A. Many times, sir.
Q. Because you did not take off your clothes, what happened?
Q. Did you not tell your aunt about this incident that the accused was trying to insert his
A. He was forcing me to remove my clothes. He was able to remove my clothes, sir.
organ to your vagina?
Q. After undressing you, what happened?
A. No, sir.
A. He kissed me, sir.
Q. Why did you not tell her?
Q. Where did he [kiss] you?
A. No, sir because he was threatening to kill me and my aunt, sir.
A. On my lips, sir.
Q. How did he tell you?
Q. Where else?
A. The samurai was pointed at me, sir. EHaCTA
A. He was [mashing] my breast.
Q. Could you tell us how did he tell you [that he will kill] you and your aunt?
Q. What else?
A. Don't tell the truth or else I will kill you and your aunt. 45
A. On my genitals.
On clarification made by the Court after the direct examination, AAA testified, to wit:
Q. Aside from kissing you and mashing your breast and holding your vagina, what else
Q. Did you feel anything when he was trying to insert his penis to your private organ?
did he do?
A. There was, sir.
A. He lay on top of me.
Q. Where were you hurt?
Q. When he laid on top you, was the accused on his dress (sic) or what was his
condition then? A. My vagina, sir. 46
The Court made further clarification after the redirect examination, thus:
Q. Was there any occasion that your uncle inserted his penis to your vagina?
The witness
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What did you feel when he did that to you?
A. It was painful, sir. 47
Indeed, AAA testified in her redirect examination that appellant had inserted his organ
into her vagina and that it was painful when appellant did it. It was the penetration that
caused the pain. We held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain. 48 This, at least, could be nothing but the result of penile penetration sufficient to
constitute rape. 49 Rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the
woman's sex organ. 50
A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victim's
testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. 51 We held that no woman,
much less a child of such tender age, would willingly submit herself to the rigors, the
humiliation and the stigma attendant upon the prosecution of rape, if she were not
motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind bars. 52  
Appellant argues that he could not be convicted of rape since based on the medical
examination report, AAA's genitalia had no hymenal laceration which corroborated
AAA's testimony that appellant merely kissed her and touched her breast on July 27,
2001.
Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. 53 An intact hymen does not
negate a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips
of the vagina, even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and
even the briefest of contact is deemed rape. 54
In People v. Bohol, 55 we explained the treatment of medical evidence as not essential
in proving rape cases, thus,
There is no gainsaying that medical evidence is merely corroborative, and is even
dispensable, in proving the crime of rape. In child sexual abuse cases particularly,
normal physical findings are common due to several factors, such as delay in seeking
medical examination, the rapid healing of injuries, washing, urinating or defecating after
the sexual assault, the elasticity of the hymen, changes in the hymenal tissue due to
estrogen effect when the victim is at the pubertal stage, or the type of sexual
molestation involved, such as fondling, oral sodomy, or cunnilingus, which leaves no
physical marks. The child's disclosure is the most important evidence of the sexual
abuse she has gone through. 56 TIcAaH
While it appears from AAA's testimony that she was not raped precisely on July 27,
2001 as what appellant did was kiss her lips and mash her breast on that day, however,
her entire testimony in the witness stand positively shows that appellant with the use of
force and intimidation had carnal knowledge of her at some other time. She testified
that appellant violated her since she was seven years old. The first time was when they
were still staying in Angeles City where appellant touched her private parts; the second
time was when they were already in Gerona, Tarlac, where appellant pointed a samurai
at her and raped her; and the third time happened on July 27, 2001 when appellant
kissed her lips and mashed her breast. Indeed, appellant may be convicted for rape in
the light of AAA's testimony. For in rape cases, the date of the commission is not an
essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence. 57
Notably, the information alleges that the crime of rape was committed "on or about July
27, 2001," thus the prosecution may prove that rape was committed on or about July
27, 2001, i.e., few months or years before, and not exactly on July 27, 2001.
In People v. Lizada, 58 wherein accused-appellant averred that the prosecution failed to
adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant
precisely on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, we ruled:
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private
complainant testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998,
for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place himself on top of her and despite
her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted his finger
and penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened
to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Although private complainant did
not testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998,
nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the
testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to
have been committed "on or about September 15, 1998" and "on or about October 22,
1998." The words "on or about" envisage a period, months or even two or four years
before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove that the
crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about
October 22, 1998. 59
Appellant's main defense is denial. He claims that the charge was instigated by his
wife's relatives who are against their relationship. Such defense remains
unsubstantiated. Moreover, it would be the height of ingratitude for AAA, who was not
even shown to have any improper motive, to falsely accuse appellant of sexual abuses
especially that appellant and his wife treated her like their own daughter and the fact
that appellant might go to jail. In fact, AAA suffered in silence out of fear for her and her
aunt's lives if not for her cousin who saw appellant in the act of kissing her and touching
her private parts. It was when she was brought to the DSWD that she made known
appellant's abuses done to her.
Anent the alleged letter of AAA filed with the CA which sought to exonerate appellant
from the charges filed against him, we find the same not worthy of belief. We quote with
approval what the CA said in not giving probative value to such letter, to wit:
. . . We cannot consider the same as it has no probative value considering that it
appears not to be the genuine signature of the private complainant AAA herself as
compared to her signatures in the original complaint and her sworn statement. More so,
it also appears that the said document is not the original one as required by the best
evidence rule in criminal procedure. Lastly, it is worth noticeable that the execution of As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child
the said letter was not assisted by a counsel and it was not also notarized. 60 Abuse and be convicted therefor. The prosecution's evidence established that appellant
had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant claims that he should have been prosecuted for samurai. Thus, rape was established. Considering that in the resolution of the Assistant
rape under RA No. 7610 since AAA was already more than 12 years old when the Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved the filing of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
alleged rape was committed which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its Penal Code for which appellant was convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore,
medium period to reclusion perpetua. we merely affirm the conviction.
We do not agree. However, we need to modify the damages awarded for the crime of rape committed on
AAA. The CA awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the crime of
In People v. Dahilig, 61 wherein the question posed was whether the crime committed
rape, saying that rape was qualified by the circumstance of minority. It also awarded
was rape (Violation of Article 266-A, par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B, 1st paragraph of
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00.
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined
and penalized by Section 5, (b), RA No. 7610, we said: DcCEHI While the Information for rape mentioned AAA's minority, as well as the fact that she
was a stepdaughter of appellant, it was only AAA's minority which was proven by a
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of
copy of a birth certificate issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Angeles City.
both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay, however, is
Conformably with the ruling in People v. Esperanza, 62 when either one of the
enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is
12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
pleaded in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d] of
aggravating circumstance. As such, AAA's minority may be considered as an
the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for
aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the penalty, because in
the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
simple rape by sexual intercourse, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
single and indivisible. 63 Hence, the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the
Specifically, Abay reads:
CA must be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 each in line with prevailing
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual jurisprudence. 64 Moreover, when a crime is committed with an aggravating
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified
but for statutory rape under Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. 65 The CA's award of P50,000.00 must also
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 66 IAEcaH 
the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, finding
7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
appellant Bernabe Pangilinan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 266-
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to
of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 11768, is
criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Appellant is
violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on
ordered to pay the offended party, private complainant AAA, the amounts of P50,000.00
complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
damages, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed
The Information in Criminal Case No. 11769 is declared null and void for being violative
against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the
of the appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and
time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of
cause of the accusation against him. The case for Child Sexual Abuse under Section 5
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of
(b) of RA No. 7160 against appellant is therefore DISMISSED.
the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both
crimes, the prosecution's evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the SO ORDERED.
person of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and
be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the
accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par.
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted
therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.