LDP vs COMELEC

Facts: This case is an inter-party dispute in the LDP. In 2003, the LDP informed the COMELEC
that only the Party Chairman, then Sen. Edgardo Angara, may endorse the COC of the party’
official candidates. The same manifestation by the LDP informed the COMELEC that Angara had
placed LDP Secretary Butz Aquino on forced leave.

Meanwhile, the Secretary Butz Aquino replied that there was no basis in claiming that only
Angara can endorse the party’s official candidates.

Subsequently, Aquino had suspended Angara as well, leading to a confusing situation regarding
who gets to sign and endorse the LDP candidates’ COCs.

In 2004, the COMELEC rendered a decision to split the party into two wings: The Angara Wing
and the Aquino Wing, and devised a system in which both wings might co-exist within the party.

Issue: WON the COMELEC’s resolution was proper.

Ruling: NO. In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends
that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary
General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General
vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party
identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates
are legitimate party standard bearers or not.

The repercussions of the question of party identity and leadership do not end at the validity of
the endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be the partys standard
bearer. The law grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges,[17] which,
naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. It is also for this significant dimension that
Sinaca is not applicable in this case. As conceded in Sinaca itself, the Court will have to assume
jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party where a controlling
statute or clear legal right is involved.[18] Verily, there is more than one law, as well as a number
of clear legal rights, that are at stake in the case at bar.

The law accords special treatment to political parties. The dominant majority party, the dominant
minority party as determined by the COMELEC, for instance, is entitled to a copy of the election
returns.[19] The six (6) accredited major political parties may nominate the principal watchers to
be designated by the Commission.[20] The two principal watchers representing the ruling
coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if available, affix their
signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.[21] Three (3) of the six
accredited major political parties are entitled to receive copies of the certificate of canvass.[22]
Registered political parties whose candidates obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the total votes
cast in the next preceding senatorial election shall each have a watcher and/or representative in
the procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in the printing of election returns and
official ballots and in the printing, numbering, storage, and distribution thereof.[23] Finally, a
candidate and his political party are authorized to spend more per voter than a candidate
without a political party.[24]

It is, therefore, in the interest of every political party not to allow persons it had not chosen to
hold themselves out as representatives of the party. Corollary to the right of a political party to
identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best
represents the partys ideologies and preference[25] is the right to exclude persons in its
association and to not lend its name and prestige to those which it deems undeserving to
represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy makes known to the COMELEC that the person
therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized political group empowered to act
and that it reflects accurately the sentiment of the nominating body.[26] A candidates political
party affiliation is also printed followed by his or her name in the certified list of candidates.[27]
A candidate misrepresenting himself or herself to be a partys candidate, therefore, not only
misappropriates the partys name and prestige but foists a deception upon the electorate, who
may unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken belief that he or she stands for the
partys principles. To prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC has the power and the duty to step
in and enforce the law not only to protect the party but, more importantly, the electorate, in line
with the Commissions broad constitutional mandate to ensure orderly elections.
Svetlana Jalosjos vs COMELEC, Edwin Tumpag and Rodolfo Estrellada

Facts: Petitioner filed her COC for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 2010 Elections
on November 20, 2009. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as Barangay Tugas,
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.

Private respondents filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the COC, where in they
alleged that she falsely misrepresented her place of birth and residence because she was brn in
San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile in Dapitan City.

Petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said Barangay since December
2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there and that she had been staying in the house of
a certain Mrs. Yap while the construction of her house was still ongoing. She also asserted that
the error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary and nevertheless, in a COC, and
error in the declaration of the place of birth is not material representation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law.

On the 2010 Elections, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and won the post of
mayor, while her petition was still pending. On May 2010, the Municpal Board of Canvassers of
Baliangao proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.

On June 4, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent was disqualified for the
petition of mayor. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a resolution, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Second Division’s ruling.

Issue: WON Petitioner complied with the residency requirement for local elective officials.

Ruling: NO.

A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence.

To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of
land does not make it one's residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner
intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet
established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her
witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.

Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her witnesses
in their joint affidavit does not refer to the residential structure, but to the other structures in the
resort that petitioner was then establishing. She does not assert, however, that her residential unit
had already been completed by that time. In fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when
her claimed residential unit was completed, or when she transferred to the unit.

Approval of voter registration does not pre-suppose six-month residency in the place prior to
resignation.

The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an
affirmation of the falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy.
Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant
will be able to meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant
intends to vote.[10] It does not prove that the registrant has resided in the locality for more than
one year prior to the elections.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy after the winner is proclaimed.

Petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established
the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically
divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because
even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A.
6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
People vs Perez

Facts: Isaac Perez, municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality met on the morning of April 1, 1922. They became engaged in the administration of
Governor-General Wood which resulted in Perez shouting “The Filipinos, like myself, must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he
has killed our independence.”

He was charged with the CFI of Sorsogon with a violation of Art. 256 of the Penal Code for
having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons of authority.

Issue: WON Perez is guilty of the crime he is charged with.

Ruling: YES. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain
loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds his office at the
pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-
General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of
executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the
Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.

The SC further held: “That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be
possible. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the
United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of Porto Rico,
observed: "A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the
'exuberant expressions of meridional speech,' to use the expression of this court in a similar case
in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U. S., 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their
character that they suggest the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself
and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U. S., 298.) While our
own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the
courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of
disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers
the general public peace.”
Lagumbay vs COMELEC
Felomino Villagracia vs COMELEC and Renato de la Punta

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed as winning candidate for the position of Punong Barangay in
Barangay Caawigan, Talisay, Camarines Norte, in the July 15, 2002 barangay elections by a
margin of six (6) votes.

Private respondent filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Camarines
Norte, under Election Case No. 001-2002. After the revision of ballots, the trial court invalidated
thirty-four (34) of the ballots for being marked. All 34 marked ballots were deducted from the
votes of petitioner.

The RTC rule in favor of respondent, declared him as the true winner, and nullified the
proclamation of petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC First Division, which set aside the RTC decision for lack of
jurisdiction. The COMELEC En Banc reinstated the RTC Decision and issued a writ of execution,
ordering petitioner to vacate his post as Punong barangay of of Barangay Caawigan, Talisay,
Camarines Norte.

Issues:
1.) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2.) WON the COMELEC erred in concluding that the words “Joker”, “Queen”, “Alas” and
“Kamatis” in more than one ballot would constitute marked ballots.

Held:
1.) NO. However, Villagracia never assailed the proceedings of the trial court for lack of
jurisdiction during the proceedings therein. Instead, he filed an Answer to the Protest on 2
August 2002 and then actively participated during the hearings and revision of ballots and
subsequently filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits. The issue on the filing fees was never raised until
the Decision adverse to his interest was promulgated by the trial court and only on [a]ppeal to
the COMELEC. Necessarily, we apply the case of Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation where
the Supreme Court instructed that although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.
Villagracia is therefore estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court only on
appeal.

2.) NO. There are 34 marked ballots in the case at bar. Fourteen (14) ballots are marked with the
word Joker; six (6) ballots with the word Alas; seven (7) ballots with the word Queen; and, seven
(7) ballots with the word Kamatis. These ballots were all deducted by the trial court from the
votes of petitioner. While each of these words appears in more than one ballot and may not
identify a particular voter, it is not necessary that the marks in a ballot should be able to
specifically identify a particular voter.[13] We have ruled that the distinction should always be
between marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the
ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future
identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall be considered sufficient to invalidate
the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of
identifying it thereafter.[14]
In the case at bar, the marks indicate no other intention than to identify the ballots. The
observation of public respondent on the appearance of the marks on the questioned ballots is
apropos, viz.:

xxx. We take notice of the fact that these marks were all written in the number 7 slot of the list of
Kagawad for Sangguniang Barangay. We further take notice that all these marks appear only in
ballots wherein the Punong Barangay voted thereon is Jun Villagracia, the proclaimed winning
candidate and herein [petitioner]. It is therefore indubitable that these ballots are indeed marked
ballots.