Torillos v.

Eastgate Maritime Corporation

G.R. No. 215904. January 10, 2019

FACTS:
Respondent Eastgate Maritime Corporation continuously hired, for 15 years, petitioner Edgar Torillos as
the Chief Cook of its vessel. Torillos’ last contract was duly approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). and was covered a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). While in
the performance of his duties, Torillos experienced pain in his right leg radiating to his lower extremities.
He was brought to a hospital in England, where the doctor recommended his repatriation for further
management and treatment. Upon arrival in Manila, Torillos was referred to the company-designated
physicians, headed by Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz and was found to be suffering from Lumbar Spondylosis
and degenerative changes on his left knee. Petitioner underwent physical therapy as well as occupational
therapy. However, despite continued therapy sessions, Torillos filed on May 8, 2012 a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Eastgate for payment of permanent total disability
benefits, medical expenses and sickness allowance among others. Two months after the filing of his
complaint, petitioner consulted an independent orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Marcelino T. Cadag, who
declared him unfit for sea duty. Torillos claimed for permanent total disability benefits in the sum of
US$118,800.00 under the CBA since, according to him, his illness was a result of an accident that
occurred while he was performing his duties as chief cook.
The Labor Arbiter found Torillos entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the CBA. The NLRC
agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Torillos indeed suffered an accident and that while lumbar spondylosis
may be degenerative, such illness can be aggravated by the nature of the work of the seafarer. The
NLRC then awarded Torillos permanent and total disability benefits as stipulated by the parties in the
CBA.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC. It disallowed the
award and ruled that Torillos failed to prove that his disability was caused by an accident. The CA,
nonetheless, held that Torillos can recover the maximum disability benefits under the POEA-SEC, finding
that Torillos' disability was work-related because his job as chief cook has exposed him to heavy manual
labor that caused back strain and injury to his lumbar vertebrae. The CA concluded that Torillos is
considered permanently and totally disabled since his disability incapacitated him to perform his
customary work as a cook.

ISSUE: (1) Whether Torillos suffers from a work-related and compensable illness.
(2) Whether Torillos is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under POEA-SEC.

RULING:
(1) YES. Torillos suffers from a work-related and compensable illness. The Labor Arbiter based his finding
that Torillos' illness is work-related on the PEME conducted on Torillos which found him fit to work. The
NLRC affirmed this finding by holding that his illness was aggravated by his work as chief cook whose
duties involved heavy manual labor such as carrying the heavy provisions of the ship, preparation and
serving of all meals for the entire crew of the vessel, cleaning of dining, kitchen and work areas and of
utensils. It further ruled that while Torillos' lumbar spondylosis may be degenerative, there was sufficient
basis to rule that his condition was aggravated by the nature of his work. The CA then fully concurred with
this and ultimately ruled that there was a reasonable connection between Torillos' illness and the nature
of his job, which aggravated any pre-existing condition Torillos might have.

(2) NO. Torillos' complaint for total and permanent disability benefits was premature. Torillos' entitlement
to disability benefits is governed not by the parties' CBA but by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws.
Thus, the company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to
work or degree of disability within the period of 120 days, which was further extended to 240 days. The
Court pronounced that a temporary total disability becomes permanent when so declared by the
company-designated physician within the period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day
medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or permanent disability. A seafarer
may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits in any of the following
conditions:
(a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty
or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical
treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240
days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated
physician;
(c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day
period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of
the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other
doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only
permanent but total as well;
(e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is
a dispute on the disability grading;
(f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-
related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3)
of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day
or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said
periods.
Upon his repatriation on December 19, 2011, Torillos was given medical attention by the company-
designated physicians. He was subjected to rigorous medical examinations, was prescribed medications
and was put on therapy to address his condition. On April 19, 2012, Dr. Cruz issued a medical opinion
stating, among others, that Torillos' lumbar spondylosis will require further treatment. As such, he gave an
interim assessment of Grade 8. Thereafter, Torillos continuously received medical treatment from the
company-designated physicians. However, on May 8, 2012, or 141 days since repatriation, Torillos filed a
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. Evidently, it was premature for him at this time to
invoke his claim for total and permanent disability inasmuch as the 240-day period had not yet lapsed. At
the time he filed his complaint, he was still under temporary total disability. Instead of continuing his
treatment which is still within the 240-day period allowed for the company-designated physician to
evaluate his condition, he filed a case for total and permanent disability benefits despite the absence of a
definite finding from the company-designated physician. He was armed only with the interim assessment
of the company-designated physician which did not give him the cause of action for his claim. It was only
after the filing of such complaint or on July 9, 2012 that he sought the opinion of his own physician, Dr.
Cadag. As such, the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. From the
foregoing, Torillos had no cause of action for total and permanent disability claim. At most, he is only
qualified to claim partial permanent disability benefits equivalent to Grade 8 disability rating under the
POEA-SEC, as reflected in Dr. Cruz' last assessment report.
Government Service Insurance System v. Palmiery
G.R. No. 217949. February 20, 2019
A.B. REYES, JR., J

FACTS:
Respondent Reynaldo P. Palmiery began his government service in 1961 as a Laborer in the Philippine
Veterans Administration. After more than 25 years of service, he retired as a Manager of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Respondent received gratuity benefit from DBP under
Republic Act No. 1616 and the refund of his contributions. A day after his retirement or on January 2,
1987, respondent re-entered government service when he was appointed as Manager III in the Social
Security System (SSS). He continued to work in the SSS for 7 years until his retirement as a Deputy
Administrator. Respondent then claimed retirement benefits under R.A. No. 660; pursuant to which, he
was granted a five (5)-year lump sum pension. On July 7, 1998, respondent was appointed as a member
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees. During his tenure as a member
of the board, he began to concurrently serve as the GSIS Executive Vice-President. Three years (3) after
his appointment, Reynaldo refunded to GSIS the benefits he previously received from his retirement. He
also requested for the suspension of his monthly pension and refunded the pension he received on
various dates, pending the GSIS' action on his request.
Respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age on May 28, 2005. On May 14, 2010, he
applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291. Included in his application was his request for full
credit of his government service starting on July 1, 1961 until his mandatory retirement on May 28, 2005,
or approximately 38 years.
The GSIS rejected Reynaldo's application for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, for failure to meet
the service requirement. It stated that the GSIS would only credit Reynaldo's service after his re-entry to
the government in 1998. Respondent filed a petition but the GSIS Board of Trustees ruled that their Policy
and Procedural Guidelines (PPG) No. 183-06 established a clear procedure in the processing of
retirement claims of re-employed government officials. Under these guidelines, government employees
who re-entered on or after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, or on June 24, 1997, cannot claim their
previous years of service upon retirement.
Respondent appealed with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that
under Section 12 (g) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186, a reinstated government employee may
receive full credit for the years of service, provided that the retirement and pension benefits previously
received are refunded to the GSIS. This is the applicable policy, despite the amendments enacted under
R.A. No. 660 and R.A. No. 728. Finally, as a piece of social legislation, the CA held that retirement laws
should be liberally construed in favor of their beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether the GSIS should give full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government.

RULING: YES..
The GSIS should give full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government. The current governing
law for retirees in the government service is R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997." Under this law, all government employees who have not reached
the mandatory retirement age are compulsorily required to become members of the GSIS. For retirement
benefits, in particular, R.A. No. 8291 provides the following conditions before a member may become
qualified to receive this benefit: (a) the employee must have rendered at least 15 years of service; (b) the
employee must be at least 60 years old at the time of retirement; and (c) the employee must not be
receiving a monthly pension as a result of permanent total disability.
While it is true that Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186 explicitly provides for giving full credit to the prior years
of service upon the refund of benefits previously received, the absence of a similar provision in R.A. No.
8291 does not necessarily mean that the law has abandoned this policy. A review of Section 12 of C.A.
No. 186 shows that it covered the conditions for retirement. Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186 specifically
makes reference to Section 12 (f), which disqualifies separated employees receiving the annuity under
Section 11 of C.A. No. 186, from being appointed to another appointive position, unless he or she
possesses special qualifications. During the period of new employment, the annuity payment is
suspended. Payment of the annuity resumes only after the termination of the employment.
But under Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186, the GSIS should give full credit to the services rendered prior to
the reinstatement, if such separated employee is not receiving the annuity mentioned in Section 11. The
full credit of services is conditioned upon the refund of contributions for retirement, and the benefits
previously received under any pension or retirement plan.
Thus, taken in its proper context, Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186 applies to a specific category of
employees and their corresponding benefits. The provision's subsequent absence in R.A. No. 8291 is
attributable to the revised conditions for retirement under the new law, which was streamlined to only
three (3) requirements for eligibility. The GSIS, therefore, erroneously relied on the absence of this
provision to deny the claim of Reynaldo.
More importantly, a plain reading of Section 10 (b) of R.A. No. 8291 reveals that employees who already
received the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, or the other laws, cannot credit their years of
service prior to their re-entry in the government. Conversely, this means that employees who have not
received their retirement benefits are entitled to full credit of their service. In this regard, those similarly
situated, or those who refunded their retirement benefits to the GSIS after they re-entered government
service should be allowed to include their prior years of service in the computation of their eligibility and
retirement benefits. This is consistent with the legal precept against double compensation, which prohibits
payment for the same services covering the same period. Thus, if the employee has not received his/her
retirement benefits, or has returned them to the GSIS, as the case may be, then the prohibition against
double retirement benefits cannot apply.
For this reason, giving full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government does not contravene
any existing statute or policy, especially since it is undisputed that Reynaldo refunded his previously
received benefits to the GSIS. The GSIS even suspended his monthly pension effective October 1, 2001,
pursuant to the request of Reynaldo. His re-entry into government service after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8291 is, therefore, inconsequential to the present case. The distinction that the GSIS created between
individuals who re-entered government service before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, and those who re-
entered after its effectivity, cannot supersede the unambiguous policy in Section 10 (b) of the new GSIS
Law.
Government Service Insurance System v. Palmiery
G.R. No. 217949. February 20, 2019
A.B. REYES, JR., J

FACTS:
Respondent Reynaldo P. Palmiery began his government service in 1961 as a Laborer in the Philippine
Veterans Administration. After more than 25 years of service, he retired as a Manager of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Respondent received gratuity benefit from DBP and the
refund of his contributions. On January 2, 1987, respondent re-entered government service when he was
appointed as Manager III in the Social Security System (SSS) and continued to work in the SSS for 7
years until his retirement. Respondent then claimed retirement benefits under R.A. No. 660; pursuant to
which, he was granted a five (5)-year lump sum pension. On July 7, 1998, respondent was appointed as a
member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees. Three years (3) after
his appointment, Reynaldo refunded to GSIS the benefits he previously received from his retirement. He
also requested for the suspension of his monthly pension and refunded the pension he received on
various dates, pending the GSIS' action on his request.
Respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age on May 28, 2005. On May 14, 2010, he
applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291. Included in his application was his request for full
credit of his government service starting on July 1, 1961 until his mandatory retirement on May 28, 2005,
or approximately 38 years.
The GSIS rejected Reynaldo's application for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, for failure to meet
the service requirement. It stated that the GSIS would only credit Reynaldo's service after his re-entry to
the government in 1998. Respondent filed a petition but the GSIS Board of Trustees ruled that their Policy
and Procedural Guidelines (PPG) No. 183-06 established a clear procedure in the processing of
retirement claims of re-employed government officials. Under these guidelines, government employees
who re-entered on or after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, or on June 24, 1997, cannot claim their
previous years of service upon retirement.
Respondent appealed with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that
under Section 12 (g) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186, a reinstated government employee may
receive full credit for the years of service, provided that the retirement and pension benefits previously
received are refunded to the GSIS. This is the applicable policy, despite the amendments enacted under
R.A. No. 660 and R.A. No. 728. Finally, as a piece of social legislation, the CA held that retirement laws
should be liberally construed in favor of their beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether the GSIS should give full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government.

RULING: YES..
The GSIS should give full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government. The current governing
law for retirees in the government service is R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997." Under this law, all government employees who have not reached
the mandatory retirement age are compulsorily required to become members of the GSIS. For retirement
benefits, in particular, R.A. No. 8291 provides the following conditions before a member may become
qualified to receive this benefit: (a) the employee must have rendered at least 15 years of service; (b) the
employee must be at least 60 years old at the time of retirement; and (c) the employee must not be
receiving a monthly pension as a result of permanent total disability.
While it is true that Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186 explicitly provides for giving full credit to the prior years
of service upon the refund of benefits previously received, the absence of a similar provision in R.A. No.
8291 does not necessarily mean that the law has abandoned this policy. Section 12 (g) of C.A. No. 186
applies to a specific category of employees and their corresponding benefits. The provision's subsequent
absence in R.A. No. 8291 is attributable to the revised conditions for retirement under the new law, which
was streamlined to only three (3) requirements for eligibility. The GSIS, therefore, erroneously relied on
the absence of this provision to deny the claim of Reynaldo.
More importantly, a plain reading of Section 10 (b) of R.A. No. 8291 reveals that employees who already
received the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, or the other laws, cannot credit their years of
service prior to their re-entry in the government. Conversely, this means that employees who have not
received their retirement benefits are entitled to full credit of their service. In this regard, those similarly
situated, or those who refunded their retirement benefits to the GSIS after they re-entered government
service should be allowed to include their prior years of service in the computation of their eligibility and
retirement benefits. This is consistent with the legal precept against double compensation, which prohibits
payment for the same services covering the same period. Thus, if the employee has not received his/her
retirement benefits, or has returned them to the GSIS, as the case may be, then the prohibition against
double retirement benefits cannot apply.
For this reason, giving full credit to Reynaldo's years of service in the government does not contravene
any existing statute or policy, especially since it is undisputed that Reynaldo refunded his previously
received benefits to the GSIS. His re-entry into government service after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291
is, therefore, inconsequential to the present case. The distinction that the GSIS created between
individuals who re-entered government service before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, and those who re-
entered after its effectivity, cannot supersede the unambiguous policy in Section 10 (b) of the new GSIS
Law.