Chapter 14 Interpretation of Words and Phrases

Yu Cong Eng et al vs. Trinidad

GR No. L-20479 Feb. 6, 1925

FACTS:
      
On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the account
books should not be in any other language exc. English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a
penalty of fine of not more than 10K or imprisonment for not more than 2 years will be
imposed fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government agents and to prevent
fraud in the returns of merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income tax
On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out
that it is not in accordance with Act 2972

A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of
account in Chinese

Yu’s defense:  Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that they represent the other
12K filed a petition for prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning the
constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law

ISSUE: 

WON Act No. 2972 is constitutional?

HELD:

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised in the lower court and that
court must be given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be presented to the
appellate court for resolution. Power of taxation is strongest of all the powers of government,
practically absolute and unlimited. It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the
control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which must questions of state necessarily involved
in ordering a tax, which must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be
observed in order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies by
means of which collections shall be made  

The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case is required for the judiciary to
declare a law relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy
natural and fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act
unconstitutional.
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation. Their
constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property
of these persons cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the
equal protection of the laws, without regard to their race.

Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants
of whatever nationality from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to
inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than either the English or Spanish
language or a local dialect the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were
necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes.

The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation
since there are other aliens doing business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of
liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal discrimination
between persons in similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax
laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation.

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in
commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall
keep its account books, consisting of sales books and other records and returns required for
taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action
was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus valid and constitutional.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than
one offense. Same was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc., vs. Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996

FACTS:

Milagros Matuguina, a sole proprietor, has a timber business named Matuguina Logging
Enterprises in Davao under the Provisional Timber License No. 30 for a certain area. During the
same time, Milagros became the majority stockholder of MIWP (Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products) by buying 70% of stock ownership. Milagros requested to the director of Forest
Development to transfer the management of the timber license no. 30, granted for MLE, to
MIWP.

Pending the approval of the transfer of the license, DAVENCOR (private respondent) submitted
a complaint regarding the encroachment of MLE in the concession area of DAVENCOR. , The
Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his decision against MLE for
illegal logging operations on the portion of the land under the concession of DAVENCOR.
DAVENCOR then requested the issuance of writ of execution for MLE and/or MIWP. MIWP, as
a defense, filed for prohibition, damages and injunction, with prayer for restraining order on the
grounds that they are a separate entity from MLE and, therefore, not a party to the complaint by
DAVENCOR. Trial Court granted the TRO. RTC ruled in favor of MIWP which was reversed
by the Court of Appeals; hence, this petition on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the corporate veil of MIWP shall be pierced to be held liable for the acts of MLE

RULING

NO, MIWP cannot be held liable. A corporation has a separate personality. . It may not generally
be held liable for that of the persons composing it unless when the juridical personality of the
corporation is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime,
the corporation shall be considered as a mere association of persons. But for the separate
juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.

It is likewise improper to state that the MIWPI is the privy or the successor-in-interest of MLE,
as the liability for the encroachment over DAVENCOR's timber concession is concerned, by
reason of the transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI. The transfer has never
become effective. More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was a valid change of name
and transfer of interest in the PTL No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of authority, from MLE to
MIWPI, to conduct logging operations in the area covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show
indubitable proof that MIWPI was a mere conduit or successor of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, as
far the latter's liability for the encroachment upon DAVENCOR's concession is concerned.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Naga Plant v. Gomez

G.R. No. 154491

FACTS:

Petitioner Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding empty Coke bottles
in Pepsi’s yard, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. MTC issued
the search warrants and the local police seized the goods. Later, a complaint against respondents
was filed for violation of the IP Code. Respondent contended that the hoarding of empty Coke
bottles did not involve fraud and deceit for them to be liable for unfair competition. MTC upheld
the validity of the warrants. RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause of the
commission of unfair competition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s hoarding of Coke bottles constitute unfair competition.

HELD:

NO, from jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off)
or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one person as the goods or
business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. One of the essential
requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must
be shown before the right to recover can exist. The advent of the IP Code has not significantly
changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its entirety
provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements that must be
present for unfair competition to exist.

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person who has
earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the
Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously discussed, refers to the
general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific
instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.3(a) referring to the sale of goods given the
appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.3(b), to the inducement of belief that his or her
goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section
168.3(c) being a “catch all” clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the “hoarding” – as defined and charged by the
petitioner – does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It
does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the respondents have
invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner. Nor are the
respondents alleged to be fraudulently “passing off” their products or services as those of the
petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or
misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of
the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to
the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by
seeking to limit the opposition’s sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use for these sales. In
this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law, R.A. No. 623
covers.
Francisco I. Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council,

G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends
that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
“congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: 
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419 12 April 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her
active participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to
act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and
that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when
Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was
affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first
paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the
crime charged.

A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person
from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of
this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended
to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in
the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section
189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of
associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it
is associated. 

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contract by
the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and
having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. vs Hon. Martin Villarama, Jr. and Adonis
Limjuco

G.R. No. 112940 November 21, 1994

FACTS:

July 1993, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with RTC Pasig against Limjuco, a former
employee. Dai-Chi alleged that Limjuco violated their contract of employment. Dai-Chi claimed
that Limjuco became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corp. engaged in the same
business as Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi alleged also that Limjuco was the head of material management
control department at the competing corporation while employed in Dai-Chi.

Dai-Chi sought to recover liquidated damages in the amount of 100,000 as provided in their
contract. Then Judge Villarama, ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy because the complaint is arising from employer-employee relations. Dai-Chi
contends that the action did not arise from employer-employee relations, even though the claim
is based on the employment contract.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-employee relations?

HELD:

No. Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code, it seeks to recover damages
agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent’s breach of his contractual
obligation to its "damage and prejudice".

On appeal to this court, we held that jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the civil courts.
We stated that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil
dispute. We further stated that while seemingly the cause of action arose from employer-
employee relations, the employer's claim for damages is grounded on "wanton failure and
refusal" without just cause to report to duty coupled with the averment that the employee
"maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the contract to the damage
of the employer. Such averments removed the controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code
of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of Civil Law.

Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to
be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can
the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.

Trial Court is ordered to continue with the proceedings.

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of
Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit
to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO.
3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only
delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers
higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be
amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality
of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and
executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their
own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.

Philippine Basketball Association vs. Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000

FACTS:
The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for the
payment of deficiency amusement tax.
The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied the same. The
PBA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they held
against the PBA.
The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.
2. Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc.
subject to amusement tax.

HELD:
(1) YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but rather
in PD 1959. It is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball
games" is required to pay an amusement tax of 15% of their gross receipts to the BIR,
which payment is a national tax. 

(2) YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of
advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor,
lessee or operator of the amusement place. The law being clear, there is no need for an
extended interpretation. 

Ma. Luisa G. Dazon vs. Kenneth Y. Yap

G.R. No. 157095, January 15, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Kenneth Y. Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc the developer
of Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project.
Petitioner Ma. Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown for the purchase of Unit
No. C-108 of the condominium project. Petitioner made a down payment and several installment
payments, totaling P1,114,274.30.
Prime town, however, failed to finish the condominium project. Thus petitioner demanded for
the refund of her payments from Primetown, pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 957 (1976), otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree". Primetown failed to refund petitioner's payments.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City
against respondent as president of Primetown.
Subsequently, Information was filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City respondent, in connection
with the resolution finding probable cause filed a Petition for Review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the trial prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the
Information. Hence, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation
of PD 957

HELD:

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had
ruled that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957.
Jurisdiction is" conferred by law and determined by the material averments in the complaint as
well as the character of the relief sought.
The scope and limitation of the jurisdiction of the HLURB are well-defined. Its precursor, the
National Housing Authority (NHA) was vested under PD 957 with exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business. Its jurisdiction was later expanded under PD 1344
(1978) to include adjudication of certain cases, to wit:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices; b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
Noticeably, cases that are criminal in nature are not mentioned in the enumeration quoted above. 
The primordial function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade and
business and not the conviction and punishment of criminals.
Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only wield such powers as are
specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. PD 957 makes the following specific
grant of powers to the NHA (now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative fines, and it also
mentions penalties for criminal cases.
Having limited, under Section 38 of PD 957, the grant of power to the former NHA, now
HLURB, over the imposition of fines to those which do not exceed ten thousand pesos, it is clear
that the power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately succeeding
provision, to impose, upon conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos and/or imprisonment, was
not conferred on it.
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal
in nature, as well as to impose penalties therefore, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction
over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957.
However, BP Bilang. 129 states:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Based on the above-quoted provision, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over criminal cases
arising from violations of PD 957.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

Sterling Selections Corporation, vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LIDA) And
Joaquin G. Mendoza

G.R. No. 171427 March 30, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are
manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis
Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City.

For creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant, one of
petitioner’s neighbors filed a complaint with the Barangay. During conciliation proceedings,
petitioner’s management undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed
an Agreement to that effect. However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and
continued to manufacture its products in its Brgy.

Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor filed a complaint before the barangay and a formal
complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of Violation and a Cease and Desist
Order (CDO) were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA
Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850.

Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to
secure a permit from the LLDA. The RTC denied the petition. Upon denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appeals to the CA. The CA however dismissed the appeal. Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from
the LLDA to operate its business.

HELD:

No. CA Decision Affirmed.Political Law- Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and
personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of
action which belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent.

In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is crystal
clear that the same is a defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage industry.

Petitioner argues that its assets amount to onlyP312, 500.00, representing its paid-up capital at
the time of its SEC registration. The law then in force was R.A. No. 6977, which, to recapitulate,
states:
SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. "Small and medium enterprise" shall be
defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry, agribusiness and/or services,
whether single proprietorship, cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets,
inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business
entity's office, plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under the following
categories:  cottage:P50,001 P500,000

Accordingly, it should be considered as a cottage industry, petitioner insists.

The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already subscribed and paid up
by the company's stockholders. It does not, however, represent the totality of its assets, even at
the time of its registration. By the expert opinion of petitioners own consultant, independent CPA
Maximiano P. Sorongon, Jr., it does not mean that the paid-up capital is the only source of funds
of the corporation for it to support its recurring operational requirements, as well as its increased
financial requirements later on, as and when the business grows and expands.

In other words, its paid-up capital is not the only asset of the company. Under R.A. No. 6977, the
term total assets was understood to mean "inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of
the land on which the particular business entity's office, plant, and equipment are situated."

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter
alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a
corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is the entire property of a person, association,
corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or its debts.

Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets. The
law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it
commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital. According to the
Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80 by
the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the
maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry.
Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.

DENIED.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092                    September 1, 1994

FACTS:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for
the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund
drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay,
a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose.

HELD:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately
and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was
not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The
world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.
The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
acquitted of the offense charged.
Sario Malinias vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 146943

FACTS:
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for
congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P.
Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose
Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez ("Dominguez" for brevity) was then the incumbent
Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz ("Corpuz" for
brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province
while Anacleto Tangilag ("Tangilag" for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the
Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented
them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged
that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless
eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds.
In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to
investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts.
After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELEC's Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable
cause.

ISSUES:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilando's
complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of
Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.

HELD:
We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficient
evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents
denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that
Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even
participated actively in the canvassing. Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial
candidate were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing.
Malinias claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only
able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance of the
Provincial Capitol Building. This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and
convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from
entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the same
self-serving and baseless.
Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant violation of
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his supporters
who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the canvassing room.
Malinias likewise contends that "Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were inside
or at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they were able to mention
the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their Counter-Affidavit.
The COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one
of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While
Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections
261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty
for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation
in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section
232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections 261
and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a
strict interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation
of Section 232.
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions
with grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited power to review findings of
fact made by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute
actions for election offenses. Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual findings of the
COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. CIR

G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006

FACTS:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed
and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller’s tax and manufacturer’s
sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of
crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was
applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.

SPMC opposed the assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the
denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review. docketed
as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of
the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it
sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and
glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since
UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC
should be exempted from the miller’s tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s
task.

HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil,
copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the
miller himself.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning
that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its
application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these
established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
Philippine Amusement vs. BIR
G.R. No. 172087

FACTS:
Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 were amended.
Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods
and properties 10% VAT on importation of goods 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease
of properties the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9337.
On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005,  specifically
identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337.
Furthermore, according to the OSG public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when
it enacted RR No. 16-2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D.
No. 1869 in relation to R.A. No. 9337.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt.
2. Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from VAT with the enactment of R.A. No.
9337.

HELD:
Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting PAGCOR to
10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337.  Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it
provided that petitioner can be subjected to VAT.  R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the removal
of petitioner's exemption from the payment of corporate income tax, which was already
addressed above by this Court.
As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant to
Section 7 (k) thereof the following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
Transactions which are exempt under international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory or under special laws.
Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a
special law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes.
Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No. 9337
The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject
to zero percent (0%) rate;
Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws subjects the supply
of such services to zero percent (0%) rate although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to
Section 108 of R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did
not amend the portion of Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed
by VAT-registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of
such services to 0% rate.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Seagate Technology (Philippines)

G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005

FACTS:

A VAT-registered enterprise, STP has principal office address at the new Cebu Township One,
Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. STP is registered with the Philippine
Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and certified to engage in the manufacture of recording
components primarily used in computers for export. VAT returns were filed for the period 1
April 1998 to 30 June 1999. With supporting documents, a claim for refund of VAT input taxes
in the amount of 28 million pesos (inclusive of the 12-million VAT input taxes subject of this
Petition for Review) was filed on 4 October 1999.

CIR did not act promptly upon STP's claim so the latter elevated the case to the CTA for review
in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period.

On appeal, CIR asserted that by virtue of the PEZA registration alone of STP, the latter is not
subject to the VAT. According to CIR, STP's sales transactions intended for export are not
exempt.

ISSUE:

WON STP entitled to refund or tax credit for puchases?

HELD:
Yes, STP is entitled to refund or tax credit. As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special
economic zone, STP is entitled to the fiscal incentives and benefit provided for in either PD 66 or
EO 226. It shall, moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both
Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227 and 7844.

Its sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions,
they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero rating of its transactions is
necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all the requisites for
claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, STP is
entitled to such VAT refund or credit.

STP, which as an entity is exempt, is different from its transactions which are not exempt. The
end result, however, is that it is not subject to the VAT. The non-taxability of transactions that
are otherwise taxable is merely a necessary incident to the tax exemption conferred by law upon
it as an entity, not upon the transactions themselves.

Garvida vs Sales
G.R. No. 124893

FACTS:

Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of
respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the
SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3
[b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” with
the MCTC. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.

On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos
Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner,
however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of
respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run.

On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility
and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.

Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G.
Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy”
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of
candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent Rios issued the memorandum
to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s votes
of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was
“without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
party.”

On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for
the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the
elected officials of the Pederasyon.

ISSUES: 
 1. WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her
certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)
2. WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the
age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid

HELD:
(1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the
SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the
Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be
filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and
evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall
be decided by the COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc.

Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in
the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is
therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions
upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not
comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings
must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by
registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the
petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.

(2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who
were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang
Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the
members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old.
The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years,
unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns
from office.

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least
six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of
the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code
requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino
citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not
have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter
must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the
foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter
in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No.
2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the
voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she did
not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day
and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.

Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other
hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years
old “on the day of his election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election” is
an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election
day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.

The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election.
The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are
facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not
months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365
days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year
old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the
first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first
day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age”
means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not
mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more
than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22
years old,” contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be
less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the age
qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the
election, he can be declared ineligible.

Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the
grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that
the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves.
The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of
the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges
appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is

declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996
elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman
of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the
incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
People vs. Guillermo Manantan

G.R. No L-14129 July 31, 1962

FACTS:

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion.

A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the
Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion
alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of
the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits.

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law
reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a
policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are
not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude
a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged.

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72005 May 29, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the
properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in
turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the
decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition
of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was
issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond of the petitioner.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs
against petitioner.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a
corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase
should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its
exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish
where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any
judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also
the execution of a judgment pending appeal.

Pilar vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995

FACTS:

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992,
petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively,
the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure
to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24,
1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R.
Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040),
which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was
subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy
three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A.
7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their
candidacy for election.

HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. 

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer
not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy
shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have
incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.

People vs. Evaristo

GR No. 93828

FACTS:

Peace officers while patrol, heard burst of gunfire and proceeded to investigate in the house of
appellant where they were given permission to enter accidentally discovering the firearms in the
latter’s possession. Accused-appellant found guilty of illegal possession of firearms contends that
the seizure of the evidence is inadmissible because it was not authorized by a valid warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in an accidental discovery of the evidence
is admissible.

HELD:
Yes, the firearms seized were valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense
was committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant.

Ramirez vs. CA

G.R. No. 93833  September 28, 1995

FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging
that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the
instant petition.
 
ISSUE:
WON the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
 
HELD:

Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication”
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation,  or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private
communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and
“communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
Bill.

Dabalos vs. RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City, Pampanga

G.R. No. 193960

FACTS:

Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling of
hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have demeaning and
degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation
of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the relationship
had already ceased at the time of the alleged incident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate cause
of the violence?

HELD:
Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of violence
should be a consequence of such relationship.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

GR No. 155282

FACTS:
Respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The
Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda.  It depicted female students
moonlighting as... prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.  In the course of the
program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed.
The Philippine Women's University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students
involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the
background of the episode caused uproar in the PWU community.
Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-
complaints with petitioner MTRCB alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU
and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.
the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating
Committee, alleging among others, that respondent did not submit "The Inside Story" to
petitioner for its review and exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 and Section 3 Chapter III and Section 7, Chapter IV of
the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
Respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press.  Accordingly, petitioner has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision the respondents are ordered to pay the
sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program review
and approval Chairman of the MTRCB affirming the above ruling of its Investigating
Committee.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents all television programs, including "public
affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioner's
power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court's ruling in
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals. Television programs are more accessible to the public than
newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former.
Petitioner's power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not
amount to "prior restraint;" Section 3(b) of  P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents'
constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the "The Inside Story" prior to
its exhibition or broadcast by television.
2. Whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations
specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.

HELD:

It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction
of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.
Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of speech and of the press.  However, there has been no declaration at all
by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and
review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt there
from "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly mentioned in
Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as... television programs imprinted or exhibited by the
Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies newsreels. Newsreels as short
motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events.
Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be considered a newsreel.  It is more of a public affairs
program which is described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news
and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Certainly, such kind of
program is within petitioner's review power.
Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner "The Inside Story"
for its review and approval.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 119673

FACTS: 
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV
Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro
A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent
Board.
According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech
and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner
also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program
and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible.
The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE: 
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.

HELD: 
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act
of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
“attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board
cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions,
even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and
the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established.
The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or
fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a
judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board
of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left
to administrative agencies.

RUBBERWORLD vs. NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioner xxx is a domestic corporation which used to be in the business of manufacturing

footwear, bags and garments. It filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 24, 1994 a petition for suspension of payments praying that it be declared in a state of
suspension of payments and that the SEC accordingly issue an order restraining its creditors from
enforcing their claims against petitioner corporation. It further prayed for the creation of a
management committee as well as for the approval of the proposed rehabilitation plan and
memorandum of agreement between petitioner corporation and its creditors.
In an order dated December 28, 1994, the SEC favorably ruled on the petition for suspension of
payments thusly:
Accordingly, with the creation of the Management Committee, all actions for claims against
Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body
Commission of Sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.
Consequently, all pending incidents for preliminary injunctions, writ of attachments (sic),
foreclosures' and the like are hereby rendered moot and academic.'
Private respondents, who claim to be employees of Petitioner Corporation, filed against
petitioners [from] April to July 1995 their respective complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice, damages and payment of separation pay, retirement benefits, 13th month pay and
service incentive pay.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings in the above labor cases on the strength of the SEC
Order dated December 28, 1994. Likewise, petitioners cited the rulings of BF Homes vs. Court
of Appeals (190 SCRA 262), Alemar's Sibal & Sons, Inc. vs. Elbinias (186 SCRA 94) and Bank
of Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals (229 SCRA 223) to support their motion to suspend
the proceedings in the labor cases.
In an Order dated September 25, 1995, the Labor Arbiter denied the aforesaid motion holding
that the Injunction contained in the SEC Order applied only to the enforcement of established
rights and did not include the suspension of proceedings involving claims against petitioner
which have yet to be ascertained. The Labor Arbiter further held that the order of the SEC
suspending all actions for claims against petitioners does not cover the claims of private
respondents in the labor cases because said claims and the concomitant liability of petitioners
still had to be determined, thus carrying no dissipation of the assets of petitioners.

Petitioners appealed the adverse order of the Labor Arbiter to public respondent which, in a
Resolution dated April 26, 1996, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and, instead, sustained
the rulings of the Labor Arbiter.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioners fared no better and was denied by public
respondent in a Resolution dated June 20, 1996.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of Jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the order of Labor Arbiter
Voltaire A. Balitaan denying petitioners' motion to suspend proceedings despite the Order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission under Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A directing the suspension of
all actions against a company under the first stages of insolvency proceedings.

HELD:

Where the petition filed is one for declaration of a state of suspension of payments due to a
recognition of the inability to pay one's debts and liabilities, and where the petitioning
corporation either: (a) has sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility
of meeting them when they fall due (solvent but illiquid) or (b) has no sufficient property
(insolvent) but is under the management of a rehabilitation receiver or a management committee,
the applicable law is P.D. 902-A pursuant to Sec. 5 par. (d) thereof. However, if the petitioning
corporation has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities and is not under a rehabilitation
receiver or a management committee created under P.D. 902-A and does not seek merely to have
the payments of its debts suspended, but seeks a declaration of insolvency xxx the applicable law
is Act 1956 [The Insolvency Law] on voluntary insolvency.
In the case at bar, Petitioner Rubberworld filed before the SEC a Petition for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments, as well as a propose rehabilitation plan. On December 28, 1994, the
SEC ordered the creation of a management committee and the suspension of all actions for claim
against Rubberworld. Clearly, the applicable law is PD 902-A, as amended, the relevant
provision of which read:
"SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered
with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
x x x x x x x x x
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension
of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient
property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no
sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a rehabilitation receiver or
management committee created pursuant to this Decree.
SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall
possess the following powers:

x x x x x x x x x
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the
action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-
litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x x x Provided
finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or
body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or
associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body
shall be suspended accordingly."
It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the appointment [by, the SEC] of a
management committee or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for claims against the
corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall Ipso Jure be suspended.The
justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims "is to enable the management
committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any
judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the
debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be
wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its
restructuring and rehabilitation."
Parenthetically, the rehabilitation of a financially distressed corporation benefits its employees,
creditors, stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public. And in considering whether to
rehabilitate or not, the SEC gives preference to the interest of creditors, including employees.
The reason that shareholders can recover their investments only upon liquidation of' the
corporation, and only if there are assets remaining after all corporate creditors ire paid.
The solicitor general, representing Public Respondent NLRC, argues that the rationale for an
automatic stay will not be frustrated even if the NLRC proceeds with the disposition of these
labor cases, because any favorable judgment obtained by the private respondents would only
establish their rights as creditors. The solicitor general also contends that the assailed Resolutions
of the NLRC will not result in an undue preference for the assets of Rubberworld, as the private
respondents will still present their claims before the management committee.

We disagree. The lawisclear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment
of rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception
in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or
exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and
severely encumbers the management committee's time and resources. The said committee would
need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work
towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise would open
the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts.
Besides, even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could
not be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee.

In Chua v. National Labor Relation Commission, we ruled that labor claims cannot proceed
independently of a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding, since these claims "would spawn needless
controversy, delays, and confusion." With more reason, allowing labor claims to continue in spite
of a SEC suspension order in rehabilitation case would merely lead to such results.

The solicitor general insists that since Article 217 of the Labor Code vested public respondent
with jurisdiction to hear and decide these labor cases, the NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction
when it refused to suspend the proceedings therein. The Court is not persuaded.

Article 217 of the Labor Code should be construed not in isolation but in harmony with PD 902-
A, according to the basic rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored. Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every statute must be construed in a way that would
avoid conflict with existing laws. True, the NLRC has the power to hear and decide labor
disputes, but such authority is deemed suspended when PD 902-A is put into effect by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The private respondents contend that automatic stay under PD 902-A is not applicable to the
instant case; otherwise, the preference granted to workers by Article 110 of the Labor Code
would be rendered ineffective. This contention is misleading.
The preferential right of workers and employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code may be
invoked only upon the institution of insolvency or judicial liquidation proceeding. Indeed, it is
well-settled that "a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be present before
preferences over various money claims may be enforced."But debtors resort to preference of
credit -- giving preferred creditors the right to have their claims paid ahead of those of other
claimants -- only when their assets are insufficient to pay their debts fully. The purpose of
rehabilitation proceedings is precisely to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and
thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. In insolvency proceedings, on
the other hand, the company stops operating, and the claims of creditors are satisfied from the
assets of the insolvent corporation. The present case involves the rehabilitation, not the
liquidation, of petitioner-corporation. Hence, the preference of credit granted to workers or
employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code is not applicable.
Finally, private respondents posit that under Section 6 of the Insolvency Law, the December 28,
1994 Order of the SEC suspending all actions for claims against Rubberworld should have
expired after three months, in the absence of an agreement between the company and the
corporate creditors. Private respondents also accuse the SEC of abusing its power by "allowing
said suspension order to remain pending for many years without resolving and approving any
rehabilitation plan."They contend that "[t]his is fatal to the instant petition for it had been a party
to the abuse by the SEC of its suspension order."
This Court notes that PD 902-A itself does not provide for the duration of the automatic stay.
Neither does the Order of the SEC. Hence, the suspensive effect has no time limit and remains in
force as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Order. On the other hand,
the attack against the SEC's alleged "abuse of power" is misplaced. Under review in this Petition
for Certiorari are Resolutions of the NLRC, not of the SEC. The scope of this review is thus
limited to whether the NLRC gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction in refusing to heed the
SEC Order of Suspension and in issuing its challenged Resolutions. In any event,
the bare allegation of inaction is insufficient to condemn the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the management committee where, it should be noted, all affected parties,
including, the labor union in the company, are represented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the NLRC dated
April 26, 1996, and June 20, 1996, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the
establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day
clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or
convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided
that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar
as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power
and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

HELD:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means
employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert
said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking
and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation
provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to
all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting
the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it
likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

SABINA EXCONDE v. DELFIN CAPUNO

GR No. L-10134

FACTS:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double  homicide  through reckless 
imprudence  for the death of Isidoro  Caperina and Amado Ticzon. After trial,  Dante Capuno
was found guilty of the crime charged Dante Capuno was  only fifteen (15)  years old when he
committed the crime.
Sabina Exconde filed action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for 
damages for the death of her son Isidoro Caperina.   Defendants set up the defense that if any one
should be held liable for the death of  Isidoro, he  is Dante Capuno  and not his father Delfin 
because  at the time of the accident, the former was  not under the control, supervision and
custody of the latter.
Defense was sustained by the lower court, as a consequence, it only convicted  Dante Capuno to
pay the damages claimed in the complaint.
It appears that Dante was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Balintawak Elementary  School he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction
of the city school's supervisor.  From the school Dante, with other students,  boarded a  jeep  and
when the  same started to  run,  he took hold  of the wheel  and drove it while  the  driver  sat on 
his  left  side.
The jeep  turned  turtle  and  two of  its passengers, Amado Ticzon  and Isidoro Caperiiia, died as
a consequence.
ISSUES:
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be  held civilly liable,  jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages caused by  the negligent  act of  minor Dante  Capuno.

HELD:
The case comes under Article  1903  of  the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,  which
provides:
"Art. 1903. The1 obligation imposed by the next preceding1 articles is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for  any damages
caused  by the minor children who live  with them.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable  for any  damages caused  by their
pupils or  apprentices while they are under  their custody."
It is true that  under the law above quoted, "teachers  or directors of arts  and trades are liable for 
any damages  caused  by their  pupils or apprentices while  they arc under their custody",  but
this  provision only applies to an institution of arts  and trades and not to any  academic 
educational  institution
Here Dante was then a student of  the Balintawak Elementary School  and as part of his extra-
curricular activity, he attended  the parade in honor of Dr.  Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor.
The  civil  liability which  the law  impose  upon  the father for any damages that may be caused
by the minor children who  live  with  them, is  obvious.  
This  is  a necessary consequence  of the parental authority  they  exercise over them which 
imposes  upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on  the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and  punish them  in  moderation."
Amadora vs. CA

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, seventeen years old was about to graduate, however while in the school,
Colegion de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Damon was convicted of homicide thru
reckless imprudence.Herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Damon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped

The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent
court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. The
petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents.
The private respondents submit that Alfredo had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not school of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be in its custody.

HELD:

The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils
and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles
herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon
on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos. While the court deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son
under the tragic circumstances here related, the court nevertheless are unable to extend them the
material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked. Wherefore,
the petition is denied.
Chua vs. CSC and NIA

G.R. No. 88979 February 07, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua
believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead,
she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of
service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.

A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her
position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded
by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way
of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:
YES. Petition was granted. Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-
career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are
not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement
to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine
of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof
as that which is expressed”.

The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable
period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her
application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the
minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.

Sugbuanon vs. Laguesma

G.R. No. 116194 February 2, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking
institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent
SRBI Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union
(APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP).

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration
No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.

On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory
employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor
organization duly-registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more
supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was
no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5) no
certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the petition.

On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification
election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition. It sought to prevent
the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-
TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or
highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor
organizations and engaging in union activities.
2. Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election
upon the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the
petitioner’s appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the
union’s registration.

HELD:

(1) Petitioner’s explanation does not state who among the employees has access to
information specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia
Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the bank’s Board of Directors may not be so
classified.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in
regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
[specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both
must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer; and
that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from
engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The
confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the
normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to
confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential
employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor
Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with
the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor
union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall
automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a
legitimate labor organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic
conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity
of the union’s registration. On this score, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed.
NATU v Republic

G. R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
agent of its supervisory employees.  The bank (Private respondent) moved to dismiss the petition
alleging that the supervisory employees are actually managerial employees hence prohibited
from joining unions.  The Med Arbiter granted the petition but the decision was modified by the
Sec. of Labor on the ground that the ff employees are deemed as managerial and/or confidential
employees and are therefore ineligible to join or form labor unions (Dept. Managers,  Asst.
Managers,  branch Cashiers and Controllers).

ISSUE:  

WON the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to
join or assist the union of petitioner.

HELD:
The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial.  As provided under 212 of the
Philippine Labor Code,  a Managerial employee is;

a)   One vested with power to lay down and execute management policies,  or to hire,                  
transfer,  suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,  assign or discipline employees, and 
b)  One vested with both the power or prerogative.
Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the
power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others to
"recommend proposals to improve and streamline operations.

On one hand, a confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or
with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.

Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent bank who are
deemed as confidential employees are ineligible to join or assist petitioner NATU-Republic
Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor organization

Fortunato Mercado v. NLRC,

G.R. No. 79869

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private
respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of rice land and 10
hectares of sugar land owned by the latter.
Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said
petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services,
through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their "mandarols", that is, persons
who take charge in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms, but
only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane
production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need
their services
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to the
benefits which they pray for
HELD:
The sworn statement of one of the petitioners Fortunato Mercado Jr., the son of spouses
Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, indubitably shows that said petitioners were only
hired as casuals, on-and-off basis.  With this kind of relationship between the petitioners and the
respondent Aurora Cruz, we feel that there is no basis in law upon which the claims of the
petitioners should be sustained, more specially their complaint for illegal dismissal.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal
employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season.  The
termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.

Roberto S. Benedicto v. CA
G.R. No. 125359

FACTS:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same
offense, but involving different accounts, On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations
accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different accounts,
were filed with the same court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central Bank
issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange
transactions.  It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to
the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them,
including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty
to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a
similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners' motion and set the
consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-
101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against
petitioners.
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 on the condition that he face
the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-
petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting
bail in the above-mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation
because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked
their right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigation
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice respondent
Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of
the prosecution.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-
trade foreign exchange transactions.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-
trade foreign exchange transactions. Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing
circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation
of the latter Circular.
ISSUES:
1. WON the filing of the cases for violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila
constitutes forum shopping.
2. WON the petitioners are being prosecuted for acts punishable under laws that have
already been repealed.
3. WON the dollar interest earnings subject of the criminal cases instituted against them
were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987.
4. WON the petitioners incurred no criminal liability for violations of Circular No. 960
since they were exempted from its coverage
5. WON the government granted the petitioners absolute immunity under the Compromise
Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.

HELD:
(1) As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
 (2) Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the
accused. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any
indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
(3) The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by
imprisonment of not more than five years."
(4) During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S. Benedicto gave
formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000.  The death of an
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the... civil
liability based solely thereon.
Joeseph Ejercito Estrada, Petitioner vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), assailed the constitutionality
of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law suffers from vagueness; (2) it
dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and (3) it abolishes the
element of mens rea or criminal intent in the crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. The foregoing, according to Estrada, violated his fundamental rights to due process and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:

WON Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:

No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.  Republic Act 7080 also known as
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for comprehensive guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ in application.
However, the questioned law is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein or because of the employment of terms without defining them. The petitioner’s
reliance on “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is clearly misplaced. It can only be invoked against the
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction. Being one of the senators who voted for its passage, petitioner
must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its
legal implications and due observance to the constitution.
NPC v. City of Cabanatuan

G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003

FACTS:

NPC, a GOCC, created under CA 120 as amended, selling electric power, was assessed by the
City of Cabanatuan for franchise tax pursuant to sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92. NPC refused
to pay the tax assessment on the grounds that the City of Cabanatuan has no authority to impose
tax on government entities and also that it is exempted as a non-profit organization. For its part,
the City government alleged that NPC’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by sec.
193 of RA 7160.
ISSUE:

Whether NPC is liable to pay an annual franchise tax to the City government

HELD:

One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of
instrumentalities and agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation.
Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception, i.e.,
when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the
aforementioned entities.
As commonly used, a franchise tax is "a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state
and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state." It is not levied on the corporation
simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the
rights or privileges granted to it by the government. Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise
tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise. It is within this context that
the phrase "tax on businesses enjoying a franchise" in section 137 of the LGC should be
interpreted and understood. Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by the
franchise tax in question, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a
"franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights
or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government.

NPC fulfills both requisites. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but
on the exercise by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the
corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its
charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government. It
can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Code.
We also do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that its tax exemptions under its charter
subsist despite the passage of the LGC.
As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be
shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at
bar, the petitioner's sole refuge is section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting from, among
others, "all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government,
its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities."
It is worth mentioning that section 192 of the LGC empowers the LGUs, through ordinances
duly approved, to grant tax exemptions, initiatives or reliefs.77 But in enacting section 37 of
Ordinance No. 165-92 which imposes an annual franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption
granted by law or other special law," the respondent city government clearly did not intend to
exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof.
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance
and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, "the original reasons for the
withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations
and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion
and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises." With the added burden of
devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of
development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated March 12, 2001 and July 10, 2001, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED."

Chapter 20 Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal

Palanca v CA
G.R. No. 106685 December 2, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Palanca, as vendor, and Jose Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a Contract to Sell on
Installment of a parcel of land. Under the terms of the contract, Jose agreed to pay Palanca the
amount of P9,851.00 as downpayment and the balance of P88,659.00 in 120 monthly
installments with 14% interest per annum on the outstanding balance. Jose further agreed to pay
the annual real property taxes, and that should he fail to pay the said taxes, he would have to pay
a yearly surcharge or penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus 12% compounded interest per annum.

Respondent Edgardo later assumed the account of his brother Jose and he designated the latter as
his authorized representative in dealing with petitioner.

Paragraph 11 of the contract contained escalator clause: That it is further agreed and understood
by the VENDEE that in the event of monetary fluctuation, the unpaid balance account of the
herein VENDEE on the aforecited subdivision lot shall be increased proportionately on the basis
of the present value of P6.72 to $1.00 US dollar.

Respondent tendered supposed balance payment (44k), but petitioner rejected it, which prompted
the former make a judicial consignment of the amount. 

Petitioner justified his refusal by asserting the escalator clause in paragraph 11 of the contract
(155k).

ISSUE:

WON the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as to trigger the operation of
Article 1250.

HELD:

 No, the Court holds that while the contract may contain an "escalator clause” still the autonomy
of the parties to provide such escalator clauses may be limited by law. Article 1250 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines is not the basis herein, but R.A. No. 529, as amended, as a ground for
violation of said clause.

In the case at bench, the clear understanding of the parties is that there should be an upward
adjustment of the purchase price the moment there is a deterioration of the Philippine
peso with the U.S. dollar. This is the "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as would
justify the adjustment, and not "extraordinary inflation" described in Art.1250. Thus, the petition
is DENIED.

Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. vs. BSP, et. al.

G.R. No. 192986 / January 15, 2013              

FACTS:
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and its President, Eduardo Olaguer claim that they are
raising issues of transcendental importance to the public and so they filed Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 ROC seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board
(BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of R.A. No. 7653,
has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-MB in
1982, which "suspended" the Usury Law of 1916 (Act No. 2655).

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB
to, among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans
and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.

In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982. Section 1 of
the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits.

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which
removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious
interest rates.
2. Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No.
905. YES

HELD:

(1) NO, the CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued CB
Circular No. 905. The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to
P.D. No. 1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court
explained in the landmark case of Medel v. CA, citing several cases, CB Circular No. 905
"did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s
effectivity;" that "a CB Circular cannot repeal a law, [for] only a law can repeal another
law;" that "by virtue of CB Circular No. 905, the Usury Law has been rendered
ineffective;" and "Usury has been legally non-existent in our jurisdiction. Interest can
now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon."

By lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’ freedom of
contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil
Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

(2) Yes, the BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905.
 Section 1 of CB Circular No. 905 provides that, "The rate of interest, including
commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be
charged or collected by any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to
any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended." It does not
purport to suspend the Usury Law only as it applies to banks, but to all lenders.

Petitioners contend that, granting that the CB had power to "suspend" the Usury Law, the
new BSP-MB did not retain this power of its predecessor, in view of Section 135 of R.A.
No. 7653, which expressly repealed R.A. No. 265. The petitioners point out that R.A. No.
7653 did not reenact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265.

A closer perusal shows that Section 109 of R.A. No. 265 covered only loans extended by
banks, whereas under Section 1-a of the Usury Law, as amended, the BSP-MB may
prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such
as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and
similar credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum
rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes,
or loans of financial intermediaries. Act No. 2655, an earlier law, is much broader in
scope, whereas R.A. No. 265, now R.A. No. 7653, merely supplemented it as it concerns
loans by banks and other financial institutions. Had R.A. No. 7653 been intended to
repeal Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms.

Further, the lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations
charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest. It is settled that nothing in
CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to
levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably
struck down for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.

AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA NICOL, SONNY NICOL, TERESA

ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA, ROLANDO
ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA, MICHELLE ZAMORA AND RODRIGO ZAMORA
vs. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO
G R NO. 146195, November 18, 2004

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
There was a complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for
conciliation.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under
Section 19 0f the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The case was referred to the Lupon
Chairman for conciliation. Petitioner’s motion to discuss even if allowed is bereft of merit.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the issue or the motion to dismiss since controversy was not referred to the
barangay for conciliation.
2. Whether or not motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information
except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD:

 Judgment is rendered a favor of the plaintiff and against the dependent. Petitioners’ motion to
dismiss is bereft of merit and is Denied. Assailed judgment is affirmed.

Mecano vs. COA

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on
Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the  Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order
No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by
Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the
part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act
is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so
far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 112099 February 21,1995

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent
incumbent Mayor  and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor
appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and  at the same time prayed for
the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The
Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave
abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6
of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There
is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a
stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict
must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

FACTS:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in
Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos
will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his
contract without availing his vacation or home leave his contract was approved by the Ministry
of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that
the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed
another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an
allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex
project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210.
Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in the said contract and the
amount paid to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established  Sec 4(a) of
E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money
claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgment in favor of
Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC
dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint
filed by Burgos.

HELD:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the
time of the commencement of the action.  On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent
filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691
and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor
and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving
employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint,
the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, et al. vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V.
REYES

G.R. No. 127708. March 25, 1999

FACTS:

After the Escudero franchise under Act No. 3648 was transferred to MERALCO, PD. 551 was 
enacted and provides that the franchise tax shall be 2% of the gross receipts  in lieu of all taxes a
ndassessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipt
s, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.

Pursuant to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San 
Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San 
Pablo imposing  a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of 50% of 1% of the gross 
annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the
preceding calendar year within the city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of nonimpairment clause when the City of San Pablo imposed
a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGCupon MERALCO considering that under PD 551 the 
tax paid is in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or 
local authority on savings or income

HELD:

No. The phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local 
Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges, and 
that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as provided 
therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.

There is further basis for the conclusion that the nonimpairment of contract clause cannot be 
invoked to uphold Meralco’s exemption from the local tax. Legislative franchise under Act No. 
3648 provided that the franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to 
amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States. Also, under the 1935, the 1973 and 
the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it 
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly when the public 
interest so requires. With or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations 
through a reasonable exercise of the police power; they are also subject to alteration by the 
power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted away.

Rogelio Juan, Pedro De Jesus, Delfin Carreon and Antonio Galguerra vs People of the
Philippines

G.R. No. 132378 January 18, 2000

FACTS: 

Rogelio Juan, Barangay Chairman and Barangay Kagawads Pedro de Jesus, Delfin Carreon, and
Antonio Galguerra (Juan et. al.), were separately accused criminally for violation of Section 261-
(o) of the Omnibus Election Code, before the Regional Trial Court. They were charged with
willful and unlawful use of VHF radio transceiver and a tricycle owned by the barangay for
election campaign or for partisan political activity. Private complainants assisted by Atty.
Leonides S. Bernabe, Jr., representing himself as “Private Prosecutor,” filed a “Motion for
Removal from Office,” for the removal of said local elective officials, to which Juan et.al. filed
their comment, on the ground that movants have no legal standing in court, and neither was the
COMELEC prosecutor notified of the motion to which he did not conform, and therefore, said
motion should be expunged or stricken out from the records, or peremptorily denied.

In a Manifestation and Comment to Juan et. al.’s comment, the COMELEC prosecutor stated
that he “conforms” with the subject motion of private complainants, hence, respectfully submits
the same for the ruling of the court, followed by a Supplement to Motion for Removal from
Office to which Juan et. al. also filed their opposition.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order, directing the immediate suspension from office of all
the accused  (Juan et. al.) for a period of sixty (60) days.

The CA affirmed the RTC.

Juan et. al. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court raising the following
arguments:

a) The RTC lacks jurisdiction because the penalty for the offenses charged did not exceed six
years. They claim that the authority to hear the cases is vested by RA 7691 in the first-level
courts. Section 32 of RA 7691 provides:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — xxxx
(1) xxx

(2)  Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof; Provided, however, that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
b) Their cases are not subject to Section 13 of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which mandates the preventive suspension of indicted public officials because they were
charged of violation of Elections Laws.

c) The “Motion for Removal From Office” filed by the private complainant is a pro forma
motion because it did not comply with the notice requirements provided under Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
2. Whether the election cases filed against Juan et. al. are subject to Section 13 of RA 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which mandates the preventive suspension of
indicted public officials.
3. Whether the “Motion for Removal From Office” filed by the private complainants is a
pro forma motion.
4. Is the order of preventive suspension issued by the RTC valid despite the lack of pre-
suspension hearing for the determination of the validity of the Information as mandated
by R.A. 3019?

HELD:

(1) The RTC has jurisdiction. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2
of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts does not cover those criminal cases
which by specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts. Section 32
provides:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts  and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof; Provided, however, that in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
Juan et. al. were charged with violating Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code. Under
Section 268 of the said Code, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code, “except those relating to the offense
of failure to register or failure to vote.” The said provision reads:

Sec. 268.  Jurisdiction of courts. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote, which shall be
under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
By virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of first level courts (MTC etc.) does not cover criminal cases which by
specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, (i.e., prison correccional, arresto
mayor or arresto menor) jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts.
Clearly then, regional trial courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, such as those filed against Juan et. al..

(2)        Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended, provides:

Sec. 13.  Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. xxxx
True, the cases against Juan et. al. involve violations of the Election Code; however, the charges
are not unidimensional. Every law must be read together with the provisions of any other
complementing law, unless both are otherwise irreconcilable. It must be emphasized that Juan et.
al. were incumbent public officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful use of
government property in their custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being
imputed to them is akin to that committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal
Code. Certainly, Juan et. al.’s acts constitute fraud against the government; thus, the present case
is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.
Unlawful and unauthorized use of government property by incumbent public officers constitutes
fraud. Thus, the provision on preventive suspension in the Anti-Graft Law applies to such
officers even if the alleged violations are primarily considered as election offenses.

(3) The Court has held time and again that a motion that does not meet the notice
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is pro forma, and that
the trial court has no authority to act on it.

The Rules mandate the service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of time and
place of hearing, in order to afford the adverse party time to study and answer the
arguments in the said motion before its resolution by the court.

Considering the circumstances of the present Petition, however, we believe that the
requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that such
compliance justifies a liberal interpretation of the above-mentioned rules.

In his “Manifestation on Comment of the Accused,” the COMELEC prosecutor adopted

the assailed Motion as well as the “Supplement to Motion for Removal from Office.”
This action should be considered to have thus cured the procedural defect pointed out by
Juan et. al. More important, however, is the fact that the trial court heard Juan et. al.
and considered their arguments. In their six-page Memorandum filed pursuant to the
directive of the trial court, Juan et. al. were able to ventilate their arguments against the
Motion for Removal from Office. They contended that neither RA 3019 nor Section 60 of
the Local Government Code justified their suspension from office. Indeed, the purpose of
a notice of hearing was served. The pleadings that were filed for and against them
negated their allegations of procedural prejudice.

(4) Under Section 13 of RA 3019, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the
validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This
pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
 proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter
and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against Juan et. al., we believe that the numerous pleadings filed
for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is
satisfied by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda
and other position papers.

Henry R. Giron vs. Commission On Elections, Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr.,

and Ricardo L. Baes Jr.

G.R. No. 188179 January 22, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality of
Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No.
(R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.

Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. He avers
that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the
political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective
officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title rule?

HELD: 

The petition must fail. It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in
favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid,
sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a
law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution;
otherwise, the petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would surpass the
strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the public.

Petition DISMISSED.
 Chapter 21 Memorandum of Law

YAMBOT V. TUQUERO
G.R. No. 169895 : March 23, 2011

FACTS:
An article from the Philippine Daily inquirer headlined a report written by Contreras, herein
referred to as the petitioner regarding the mauling incident that happened between RTC Judge
Cruz and Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at Makati RTC. Such article was referred
to by Judge Cruz as false and malicious so the latter filed a libel case against the writer,
particularly the line that states that the said judge still has a pending sexual harassment case filed
at the SC. It appeared that the sexual harassment being referred to by the Petitioner was based
from a Court Petition for cancellation of contempt order by one Paredes- Garcia. She appended
an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for
seducing women who became objects of his fancy, stating that she also suffered the same
infirmities. The SC later on granted the petition for cancellation of contempt order but the
administrative case against the Judge was not passed upon.

Subsequently, the RTC of Makati approved a resolution finding probable cause against the PDI
employees hence an information was filed them. The petitioners appealed to the DOJ and the CA
who dismissed the same hence the said Petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecutor erred in finding probable cause to charge the PDI employees with
libel

HELD:

Yes, Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. The elements of libel are (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The glaring absence of maliciousness in the news article negates the existence of probable cause
that the PDI staff has committed libel.

The article in question merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a
pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz, the said article did not report the
existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged,
much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.

The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is
insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. The Court held that malice connotes
ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when
it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. The pointed the absence of
malice on the part of the PDI employees.