EN BANC bus caught his attention.
He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its
APRIL 3, 2018
G.R. No. 215305
MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution dated, 15 October
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence dated 15 September
2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in
Criminal CaseNo. 65, 734-09, finding petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday
(petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high-
powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended (PD 1866).
The Antecedent Facts
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by
Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco
Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of
the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the
vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then
boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any
contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the
small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside
and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept
peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards,
SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus
conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated
at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and
open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following
contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number
64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type
hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives.
Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of
his rights by SCAA Buco.
Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City
Prosecutor for Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009, 5 the latter
found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-
powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD l 866. The
Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:
That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with intent to possess, had in his
possession and under his custody an improvised high powered firearm
caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1)
magazine loaded with three (3) live ammunitions and one (1) "'cacao" type
hand grenade explosive, without first securing the necessary license to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP
Daniel Tabura (Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives
Division of the Philippine National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura
identified the Certification dated 5 November 20097 attesting that
petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per
verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified petitioner and
the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine
inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-
examination, SCAA Buco further elaborated on the search conducted:
Atty. Mamburam
Q And that check point, which was conducted along llang [R)oad,
Davao City, was by virtue of a memorandum?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You said that the hag was heavy?
A Yes.
Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s
inside the bus and that was the only thing or item inside the bus which was
heavy. Is that correct?
A There were many bags and they were heavy. When l asked who is the
owner of the bag because it was heavy but the bag was small. when I
asked, he said the content of the bag was a cellphone. But 1 noticed that
it was heavy.

xxxx xxxx

Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that
intercept a Metro Shuttle passenger bus and you requested all passengers correct?
to alight?
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?
Q passengers were left inside?
A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that
Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes one male passenger you pointed as the accused kept looking at you'?
of the passengers in the bus?
A Yes.
A Yes.

xxxx
Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not
Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black looking at you?
gray colored pack bag which was placed at the back portion of the bus?
A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the]
A Yes. window looking towards his bag.
 xxxx A My elder brother.

Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task
him to open the bag'? force when, in fact, you were not the owner of the bag?

A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it. A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my
brother who were seated at the back.
Q And, when he opened it?
xxxx
A I saw the handle of the firearm. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On content of the bag was cellphone, what happened next?
direct examination, petitioner denied ownership of the bag. However, he
also admitted to answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents A He asked if he can open it.
and allowing SCAA Buco to open it after the latter sought for his
permission: Q And what was your reply?

ATTY. MAMBURAM A I told him yes, just open it.

Q x xx After the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that xx xx
you and your brother were seated at the back of the bus. can you please
tell us what happened next'?
Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that
bag was your brother, what is the name of your brother?
A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and
what were the contents of the bag. A Roger Saluday.

Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?
Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.
Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task
force?
A I told him it was only a cellphone.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?
A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009.9 (Emphasis
supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by
the conductor when the latter was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner
also admitted that he never disclosed he was with his brother when he
boarded the bus:
PROS. VELASCO
Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of
saving yourself considering you don't own the bag> did you not volunteer
to inform them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?
A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my
brother because I was also afraid of my brother.
Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you
had a brother at that time when you were boarding that bus, correct?
A No, sir, I did not.
xxxx
Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but
you confirm now that it was the conductor of that bus who pointed you as
the owner of the bag, correct?
A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at
the back. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the
right to present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial court, the
parties submitted their respective memoranda.
The Decision of the Trial Court
Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court
declared him to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and
explosive without authority or license. Consequently, in the dispositive
portion of the Sentence dated 15 September 2011, petitioner was
adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal possession of high
powered firearm, ammunition and explosive. For the offense of illegal
possession of high powered firearm and ammunition, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its minimum
period. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00. For the offense
of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱50,000.00.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 11
On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the
alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the supposed
illegality of the search. 13 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) argued that the warrantless search was valid being a
consented search, and that the factual findings of the trial court can no
longer be disturbed. 14
In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the
conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with
modification:
WHEREFORE. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated
September 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 11 th Judicial Region,
Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65, 734-09, finding Marcelo
Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that:
(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and
ammunition, he is imposed an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in
addition to the fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00); and
(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the OSG filed
its Comment. 17 In its Resolution dated 15 October 2014, 18 the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro
forma. Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issue
Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals as to warrant his conviction for the offenses charged.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 19 As a result, the Court,
on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the evidence
presented during trial. 20 Further, factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect, even
finality. 21
Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high-
powered firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal possession
of explosive under the same law. The elements of both offenses are as
follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; (2)
ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3)
lack of license to own or possess.22 As regards the second and third
elements, the Corn1: of Appeals concurred with the trial court that
petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered
firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority. The
Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in pertinent part:
In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant
has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition and
explosive by presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative
of the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP. He identified
the Certification issued by the Chief. Records Section. FED of the PNP,
stating that appellant "is not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and
caliber per verification from records of this office."
Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the
veracity or truthfulness of the Ce1tification. He claims that the officer who
issued it should have been the one presented so he would not be denied
the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:
xxxx
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution
more than complied when it presented both.
xxxx
Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the
firearms, ammunition and explosive. However, his denial flies in the face
of the following testimonies which he himself made:
xxxx
Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of the bag.
He even allowed the police officer to open it. Based on his actuations,
there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing the firearm,
ammunition and explosive.
Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to
fabricate. Besides, the allegation that his brother owned the bag is
uncorroborated and self-serving. 23
As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal
possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises questions of fact.
Considering further that the Court of Appeals merely echoed the factual
findings of the trial court, the Court finds no reason to disturb them.
As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of
SCAA Buco on four important points: one, that petitioner was a passenger
of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009 at a military checkpoint in Ilang,
Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and searched the
bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a
small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of the bus; and four, that the
same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded who
three live ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not
challenge the chain of custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely
raises a pure question of law and argues that they are inadmissible on the
ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.
The Court disagrees.
Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, which was patterned after the
Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution,24 reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it
operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. 25
Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of the
Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search,
the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this
jurisdiction,26 may shed light on the matter.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, 27 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such
that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much
the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the
parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner
has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected
area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not.
But this effo1i to decide whether or not a given "area,'' viewed in the
abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem
presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253; £:y; parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
733.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-
part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy.29 Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).30
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from
a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a
person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is
the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not
have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not
reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential
reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson,31 the Court declared airport
searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due
to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as
reasonable:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to
x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs.
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.32 (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport searches
as reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling
public overrides a person's right to privacy:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done
without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of
the traveling public.
xxxx
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-
related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable
in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security
measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.
xxxx
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they]
used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. When
the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag,
the port authorities had probable cause to conduct u search of petitioner's
bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.34
In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justified a bus search owing to the
reduced expectation of privacy of the riding public:
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority
in the performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid
nary a finger on Breis or Yurnol. Neither did his presence in the bus
constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is
open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not
the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only
the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and
the search of moving vehicles has been upheld.36
Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.37 Other factors such as customs,
physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may diminish
this expectation.38 In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a
common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to
the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the
bus. The Could held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their
baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating
the passenger's constitutional rights."40 In Costabella Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,41 a compulsory right of way was found improper for the failure of
the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they
sought to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the
servient estate. The Court thus explained, ''[c]onsidering that the petitioner
operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably
maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the
convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be
compromised."42 Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and
body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry.
Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall owner can
compromise public safety.
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all
private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from
entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are
accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-
intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference
in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the
former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the
promotion of public safety. Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy
is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that arc
accessible to the public.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force
Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No.
66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where
passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco
merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection
was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at
the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be
required to open their bags and luggages. Considering the
reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.
As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues
that petitioner consented to the search) thereby making the seized items
admissible in evidence.43 Petitioner contends otherwise and insists that
his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied waiver.
Petitioner is wrong.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. 44 However, to be
valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific,
and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.45 Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether
he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she
objected to the search or passively looked on;46 (d) his or her education
and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;47 (g) the nature of the
police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.48
In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,49the apprehending officers sought the
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed.
According to the Court, petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the
search. In People v. Montilla, 50 the Court found the accused to have
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted to a
clear waiver of his right. In People v. Omaweng,51 the police officers asked
the accused if they could see the contents of his bag, to which the accused
said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." The
policemen then asked if they could open and see it, and the accused
answered "you can see it." The Court held there was a valid consented
search.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done
by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag,
petitioner answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's own
testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents
of his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly
held:
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers
asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag and he
answered "you can see the contents but those are only clothings.'' When
asked if they could open and see it, he said "you can see it." In the present
case, accused-appellant told the member of the task force that "it was only
a cellphone" when asked who owns the bag and what are its contents.
When asked by the member of the task force if he could open it, accused-
appellant told him "yes, just open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a
waiver of accused-appellants right against warrantless search.52
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless
search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions
are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence
of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced
expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done at
airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In
contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search,"
but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with.
Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence
in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving
vehicle.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following
guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and
luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray
scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also
be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required
instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection
must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object,
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the
security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can
be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her
effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon
receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a
passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en
route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or
luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government
agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus
at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop
and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus
can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where
State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the
passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to
entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must
also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable
search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive
and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search
result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental
rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other
similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search,
it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence
seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just
like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly
accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered
by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a
routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit
constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes
unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars.
Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or
personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a
group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down
by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014
and the Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EANNA
O'COCHLAIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal is the February 9, 2016 Decision1 and July 21, 2016
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which
affirmed the November 22, 2013 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding
accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain (Eanna) guilty of violating Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to
a Filipina and residing in Barangay Aring, Badoc, Ilocos Norte. In an
Information4 dated July 15, 2013, he was charged with illegal possession
of marijuana, committed as follows:
That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession,
custody and control: two (2) sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous
drug, with an aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or
authority to possess, in violation of the aforesaid law.5
With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the presence of a public
prosecutor, Eanna pleaded "NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment.6 He was
allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty, but a hold departure order
was issued to prevent him from leaving the Philippines and his passport
was surrendered to the court for its custody in the course of the
proceedings.
 Version of the Prosecution
Aside from the sworn statements of other intended witnesses, 8 the
testimonies in open court of Security Screening Officer Dexter Suguitan
(SSO Suguitan), Police Officer 3 Joel Javier (PO3 Javier), and PO1 Erald
Terson (PO1 Terson) reveal as follows:
While on his break time around 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2013, SSO Suguitan
of the Department of Transportation - Office of Transportation Security
(OTS), assigned at the initial security screening checkpoint of the Laoag
City International Airport, was told by CAAP9 Security and Intelligence Flor
Tamayo (CSI Tamayo) that the parking space in front of the departure area
smelled like marijuana ("agat sa marijuana"). He suspected that Eanna
was the one who smoked the illegal drug, recounting that at aroud 6:35
p.m. he saw a certain male Caucasian at the parking area lighting
something unrecognizable as he was covering it with his palm. CSI
Tamayo observed that whenever he would suck what he seemed to be
smoking, no visible vapor would come out from his mouth.
However, SSO Suguitan dismissed CSI Tamayo's story as he thought that
it would be impossible for a passenger to smoke marijuana at the airport.
After a while, he returned to his post at the initial check-in area. Meanwhile,
CSI Tamayo reported what he saw to PO2 Pancho Caole, Jr. (PO2 Caole,
Jr.) and SSO Fidel Bal-ot (SSO Bal-ot) , who were manning the final
screening area.
Later on, SSO Bal-ot directed SSO Suguitan to proceed to the final
security checkpoint.10 The latter was instructed to conduct a pat down
search on Eanna, who agreed. He was frisked while he raised his hands
by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with palms open. When
something was felt inside the pocket of his upper garment, he was asked
to take it out. He then brought out a pack of Marlboro red from his left
pocket, as well as a matchbox and another pack of Marlboro red from his
right pocket. The pack of Marlboro red on his left hand contained cigarettes
but the one on his right hand contained two (2) rolled sticks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SSO Suguitan knew it was
marijuana because that was what CSI Tamayo earlier told him. He took
the pack of Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana
leaves and showed it to PO1 Peter Warner Manadao, Jr. (PO1 Manadao,
Jr.) and other police personnel on duty. SSO Suguitan put them on the
nearby screening table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The two
rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were the only items placed thereon.
PO1 Udel Tubon11 then called the attention of PO3 Javier, who was the
investigator on duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) - Aviation
Security Group (ASG). PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan,
and SSO Bal-ot were at the final checkpoint when he arrived. They told
him that marijuana was found in Eanna's pocket. SSO Suguitan turned
over to PO3 Javier the pack of Marlboro red containing the two rolled sticks
of dried marijuana leaves. PO3 Javier then placed them on a tray, together
with Eanna's other belongings. As the area started to become crowded,
the seized items were brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office. He
was accompanied by SSO Suguitan and Eanna.
Together with PO3 Javier at the PNP-ASG office were Police
Superintendent Diosdado Apias (P/Supt. Apias), PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2
Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and a certain SPO3 Domingo.
While waiting for the arrival of the barangay officials, which took 15-20
minutes, the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were placed on the
investigation table where everybody could look but not touch. Eanna was
seated in front of the table, while the others guarded him. PO3 Javier then
prepared the inventory. The two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves and
other seized items were listed. The check-in baggage of Eanna was also
inspected, but it only contained clothes and other personal belongings.
The confiscation/inventory receipts were signed by PO3 Javier and SSO
Suguitan, as well as two (2) officials of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City
(Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Barangay Kagawad
Benjamin Teodoro) and an ABS-CBN cameraman (Juanito Badua), who
acted as witnesses. In their presence, as well as of Eanna, PO3 Javier
marked the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves as "EO-1" and "EO-
2" and, thereafter, placed them inside a Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag. The
guard of the PNP-ASG office, PO1 Terson, took pictures during the
inventory and marking, while P/Supt. Apias prepared the requests for the
medico-legal examination of Eanna and the laboratory examination of the
two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. The marking, physical
inventory, and photographing were likewise witnessed by PO1 Manadao,
Jr. and PO2 Caole, Jr., who executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest with PO3
Javier.
Subsequently, Eanna was brought to the Governor Roque R. Ablan, Sr.
Memorial Hospital for his medico-legal examination. PO3 Javier
proceeded to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office to submit
the request for laboratory examination and the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves. The request and the specimens were received by PO3
Padayao, the evidence custodian. Based on the qualitative examination
conducted by Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann Luis Navarro
(P/Insp. Navarro), which was reduced into writing, the specimens were
found to be positive for the presence of marijuana.
Version of the Defense
At around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 2013, Eanna was with his wife at the Laoag
City International Airport for their Cebu Pacific flight bound for Manila.
Since the x-ray machine operator at the initial security screening was not
yet around, he left his wife in the line and smoked his pre-rolled tobacco
and Marlboro cigarette outside, about 30 meters away. Ten minutes
passed, he went back to the initial security checkpoint carrying his check-
in and cabin luggage, camera bag, and some shopping bags. The airport
police conducted a body search and examined his belongings. Afterwards,
he proceeded to the final security check where he was inspected by a male
"immigration officer" wearing a brown shirt. As a result, a red Marlboro
cigarette pack, containing two pieces of rolled paper of flavored tobacco,
was found in his possession.12 It was shown to him while he was in front
of his wife. The cigarette pack was then put on the desk, on top of one of
his luggage. A camera bag (containing a Sony camera, connecting cables,
headphones, an MP3 player, cigarette paper, and a pack of Marlboro) was
also searched. The officer got some tiny grains after sticking his fingers
into the bag. He showed them to Eanna and asked what they were. The
latter replied that they were flavored tobacco, which he has been smoking
for the past 30 years. Despite the claim, the officer directed an airport
police to bring Eanna to the police station that was about 150 meters away.
Together with his wife, Eanna was escorted by about five to six airport
police. At the PNP-ASG office, his camera bag and other luggage arrived
approximately 20 minutes later. They were placed on top of the table and
stayed there for 30-45 minutes before the police started to search the
contents and catalog the items. Prior to the inventory of the seized items,
Eanna and his wife repacked their luggage as the latter still proceeded
with her scheduled flight. Thereafter, with the permission of PO3 Javier,
Eanna went outside the office to smoke as he waited for his Batac-based
Filipino relatives who arrived approximately after two hours. While
smoking outside, he could not see what was happening, if any, to his
luggage and camera bag. The camera crew of ABS-CBN arrived at almost
11:00 p.m. An asset from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) called Badua and told him to come to the PNP-ASG office. He
went with an off-duty security guard of ABS-CBN Laoag City. There, he
was allowed to cover the incident, which became the basis of a television
news report.
The sticks of the alleged marijuana were shown to Eanna thrice - once at
the airport and twice at the police station. On the second instance, he was
shown two thin rolled sticks that were placed on top of the table in front of
him. On the third time, however, he saw a thin and a fat rolled sticks made
of paper that were different from what he was using.
RTC Ruling
After trial, Eanna was convicted of the crime charged. The fallo of the
November 22, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, accused Eanna O'Cochlain is hereby pronounced
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of illegal
possession of marijuana weighing 0.3824 gram and is therefore
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00).
The two sticks of marijuana subject hereof are confiscated, the
same to be disposed in the manner that the law prescribes.
SO ORDERED.13
The search conducted on Eanna and his subsequent arrest were upheld.
According to the RTC, the search upon his person was not unreasonable
but was actually an exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or right
that was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations to
maintain peace, order and security at the airports. In fact, Eanna's plane
ticket carried a proviso allowing airport authorities to check on his person
and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No.
6235.14 Moreover, another exception to the rule is consented warrantless
search and seizure. In this case, Eanna agreed to the body pat down
search that was requested by SSO Suguitan.
For the RTC, SSO Suguitan was a credible witness. It was observed that
he was spontaneous in his testimony and that he appeared candid and
truthful in his statements. There was nothing in his testimony or in the
manner he testified that could arouse serious suspicion of lying. Some of
his inconsistent statements, which the defense considered as
irreconcilable, were insignificant and trivial as they do not impinge on any
of the elements of the offense charged. Instead, the statements bolster
SSO Suguitan's credibility as they were indicia of his unrehearsed
testimony.
The RTC opined that Eanna's denial was not based on clear and
convincing evidence; rather, it was bare and self-serving. His testimony
was even fraught with incoherence and serious inconsistencies which he
obviously committed as he desperately tried to show that what was taken
from his possession was mere tobacco. Considering his flip-flopping
testimony, his denial was not given credence and did not prevail over the
credible testimony of SSO Suguitan and the unquestioned findings of the
forensic chemist.
Finally, as to the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized, the RTC was
satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject marijuana. It ruled:
In this case, the Court does not doubt a bit that the two sticks of
marijuana presented in evidence are the same sticks of marijuana
confiscated from the accused. There was not only compliance by
the airport authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of the law
and its implementing rules and regulations, there is a complete
account of the complete chain of custody of the two sticks of
marijuana that negates any doubt that their integrity and evidentiary
value have been preserved. As it has been established by the
prosecution, upon being informed of the arrest of the accused, after
SSO Suguitan had confiscated the two [sticks] of marijuana from the
accused, PO3 Joel Javier, the duty police investigator at the airport
at [the] time who was at the ramp outside the departure terminal was
called and when he arrived at the place where the accused was
accosted and was informed of the arrest of the accused, he took
custody of the two sticks of marijuana which were then on the
screening desk or table and invited the accused to the office of the
PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group located within the premises of
the airport not far tram the departure terminal. There, PO3 Javier
marked the two sticks of marijuana with E0-1 and. E0-2. Upon the
arrival of two Barangay officials, Barangay Chairman Edilberto
Bumanglag and Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro of Barangay Araniw,
Laoag City which has territorial jurisdiction over the airport, and a
member of the media in the person of Juanito Badua, a cameraman
of ABS-CBN, Laoag, PO3 Javier also conducted the required
inventory not only of the two sticks of marijuana but the other
belongings of the accused contained in his luggage. In the course
of the inventory, PO1 Erald Terson, also a member of the PNP
Aviation Security Group, took pictures of the seized items as he was
directed to do by their superior. Sometime later, as the accused was
brought for medical examination, PO3 Javier was the one who
brought the two sticks of marijuana together with the prepared letter
request to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for
examination. And to complete the chain, the prosecution established
that at the said crime lab, the two sticks were received by PO3
Padayao who thereupon turned them over to the forensic chemist,
Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro. As the Court takes judicial
notice from the record of the case, the two sticks were finally
submitted to court on July 19, 2013, received by the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Bernadette Espejo[,] who issued the corresponding
Acknowledgment Receipt therefor.
Significantly relative to the chain of custody and as would have
equally done by the other concerned witnesses such as forensic
chemist Police Inspector Navarro who issued her written chemistry
reports of the qualitative examinations she conducted on the
specimens, and PO3 Padayao, both of the crime lab, SSO
Suguitan[,] who discovered the two sticks of marijuana[,] identified
the same in open court, pointing in the process the respective
markings E0-1 and E0-2 that he witnessed to have been placed by
the investigating police officer, PO3 Javier[,] which, after the
inventory, the latter placed in a plastic bag (Ziploc). PO3 Javier
himself also identified the two sticks of marijuana.
 At this point, the Court is not oblivious of the fact that in his testimony
SSO Suguitan initially claimed that he turned over the two sticks of
marijuana to PO1 Manadao, Jr. But actually[,] as it can be clearly
appreciated from the testimony of SSO Suguitan, the turn over that
he said was merely the placing of the two sticks of marijuana on top
of the table at the final screening area, in front of PO1 Manadao and
the accused. In fact, as SSO Suguitan conoborated PO3 Javier, the
two sticks of marijuana which were still on the screening desk were
thereafter placed on a tray and PO3 Javier was the one who then
actually took custody thereof as the accused was invited to the office
of the PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group. PO3 Javier himself,
when he was asked by the defense if it was PO1 Manadao who
turned over the specimens to him, categorically said, "No, sir, Mr.
Dexter Suguitan."
Also, the Court cannot be amiss to point out that the two sticks of
marijuana could not have been switched with another or
contaminated while it was in the custody of PO3 Javier. While
admitting that there were many things that they prepared while they
were already in their office, he testified in effect that no such [thing]
happened. The people there at the office were not examining the
specimens, they were just looking and not holding it.
The Court at this point cannot but express its observation that PO3
Javier, just like SSO Suguitan, was equally credible. He was
straightforward, consistent and candid in his testimony that it cannot
in any way be considered suspect.
Eanna moved to reconsider the RTC judgment, but it was denied; hence,
a notice of appeal was filed.
CA Ruling
Finding no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the CA affirmed the assailed RTC Decision.
The CA affirmatively answered the issue of whether there was probable
cause to justify the warrantless search of Eanna and the seizure of his
belongings. It appreciated the prosecution's version that CSI Tamayo saw
him smoking while out.side the departure area of the airport terminal.
Although no smoke coming from his mouth was seen, CSJ Tamayo still
smelled the scent of marijuana. Similar to the RTC ruling, the warrantless
search and seizure was also valid because the search was conducted
pursuant to a routine airport security procedure and Eanna voluntarily
gave his consent thereto.
It was likewise held that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drug were satisfactorily established. First, Eanna was
caught in possession and custody of two sticks of marijuana on July 14,
2013 at the Laoag City International Airport during the routine search
conducted by the airport authorities. Second, he failed to prove that he
was authorized by law to possess the same. And third, he freely and
consciously possessed the illegal drug.
The CA downplayed the alleged varying testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. As the RTC opined, the inconsistences raised by the defense
were minor and trivial and could not affect the RTC's finding as to the
credibility of the airport police officers.
Finally, anent the chain of custody rule, the CA regarded as specious
Eanna's claim that the procedures set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not followed. The testimony of SSO Suguitan was quoted and the
ratiocination of the RTC was adopted to support the finding that the airport
officials complied with the rule.
Eanna filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on July 21,
2016.
Now before us, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would
no longer file a supplemental brief as it had exhaustively discussed the
legal issues and arguments in its appeal brief before the CA.17 On his part,
Eanna filed a Supplemental Brief18 to bolster his claim that there were
gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drug seized. He argues
that:
1. PO3 Javier was not at the scene where Eanna was found in
possession of the alleged illegal drug; thus, he had no personal
knowledge of its possession by Eanna and its seizure by SSO
Suguitan.
 2. It was not made clear by the prosecution that the two sticks of
rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were marked
immediately upon confiscation.
3. The drug evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration,
tampering and swapping because the Ziploc where it was placed
was not sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than the
natural, built-in resealable feature of the plastic bag.
4. The presence of the marking "JEP" on the two rolled sticks of
alleged marijuana could not be explained and the marking made
thereon compromised their integrity and physical appearance.
5. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
unavailing because the police authorities deviated from the
mandated procedure and offered no valid ground to show that
their actuations were justified.
Our Ruling
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable
administrative search.
The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection
made pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained by
this Court in a number of cases.19 In the leading case of People v.
Johnson,20 we held:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting
to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted
to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and,
if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.21
Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,22 a routine
security check being conducted in air23 and sea24 ports has been a
recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling
that search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented
warrantless search; (6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstance.25
Notably, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution was patterned after the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
America.26 Having been derived almost verbatim therefrom, the Court may
turn to the pronouncements of the US Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts, which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. 27
Like in our country, the circumstances under which a warrantless search,
unsupported by probable cause, may be considered reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment are very limited and that exceptions thereto are few
specifically established and well delineated.28 In a similar way, the
government bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search was
conducted pursuant to an established exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement.29
US courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable" such as work-
related searches of government employees' desks and offices,
warrantless searches conducted by school officials of a student's property,
government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory
scheme when the searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards," and a State's operation of a probation system.30 The Fourth
Amendment permits the warrantless search of "closely regulated"
businesses; "special needs" cases such as schools, employment, and
probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airport screenings under the
administrative search doctrine.31
Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.32 However, because
administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting
criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion.33 Where the
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable." 34 In particular, airport
searches have received judicial sanction essentially because of the
magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the
overriding concern has been the threat of death or serious bodily injury to
members of the public posed by the introduction of inherently lethal
weapons or bombs.35
Although the US Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport
screening searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative
searches, it has suggested that they qualify as such. 36 Airport security
searches can be deemed lawful administrative searches because (1)
these searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward
finding particular items (weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices) that
pose grave danger to airplanes and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-
on luggage is no more intrusive (in both its scope and intensity) than is
necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the screening process (that is,
to ensure air travel safety); (3) airline passengers have advance notice
that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to these security measures,
thus giving passengers the opportunity to place their personal effects in
checked luggage; (4) all passengers are subject to the same screening
procedures; and (5) passengers are aware that they can avoid the
screening process altogether by electing not to board the
plane.37 Moreover, abuse is unlikely because of its public nature. 38
As a permissible administrative search, the scope of airport routine check
is not limitless.39 Airport screening procedures are conducted for two
primary reasons: first, to prevent passengers from carrying weapons or
explosives onto the aircraft; and second, to deter passengers from even
attempting to do so.40 The oft-cited case of United States v. Davis41 sets
the appropriate standards for evaluating airport screening searches as
constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, thus:
[S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in
furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a
criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be
permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported
by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or
person to be searched.
As we have seen, screening searches of airline passengers are
conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance
of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of
weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect
weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but
to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board at
all.
Of course, routine airport screening searches will lead to
discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators. This
practical consequence does not alter the essentially
administrative nature of the screening process, however, or
render the searches unconstitutional. x x x.
There is an obvious danger, nonetheless, that the screening of
passengers and their carry-on luggage for weapons and
explosives will be subverted into a general search for evidence of
crime. If this occurs, the courts will exclude the evidence
obtained.42 (Citations omitted.)
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that
the individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to
determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm
to the passengers and aircraft.43 The search cannot also serve unrelated
law enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for
weapons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime,
substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel through
the system.44 As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement,
the screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless
searches for evidence of crime.45 It is improper that the search be tainted
by "general law enforcement objectives" such as uncovering contraband
unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated crimes or evidencing
general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."46 In United States v. $124,570 US. Currency,47 the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory
motives from coloring administrative searches.48
Hence, an airport search remains a valid administrative search only so
long as the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded;
"once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no
longer be justified under an administrative search rationale."49 Where an
action is taken that cannot serve the administrative purpose, either
because the threat necessitating the administrative search has been
dismissed or because the action is simply unrelated to the administrative
goal, the action clearly exceeds the scope of the permissible search.50 To
the extent that airport administrative searches are used for purposes other
than screening luggage and passengers for weapons or explosives, they
fall outside the rationale by which they have been approved as an
exception to the warrant requirement, and the evidence obtained during
such a search should be excluded.51
Furthermore, to be constitutionally permissible, warrantless and
suspicionless airport screening searches must meet the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness.52 "What is reasonable depends
upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself."53 There can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.54 In other words, an
administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as
is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies
it.55 Specifically, the Court must balance an individual's right to be free of
intrusion with "society's interest in safe air travel." 56 On this
score, Davis again has provided a guidepost. There it was held that an
airport security search is considered as reasonable if: (1) the search is no
more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology,
to satisfy the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith
to that purpose; and (3) a potential passenger may avoid the search by
choosing not to fly.57
In State v. Hanson,58 the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i
believed in the soundness of the logic of the US Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Skipwith,59 which ruled:
Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or
otherwise, does not in itself make all non-probable-cause
searches reasonable. Reasonableness requires that the courts
must weigh more than the necessity of the search in terms of
possible harm to the public. The equation must also take into
account the likelihood that the search procedure will be effective
in averting the potential harm. On the opposite balance we must
evaluate the degree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the
person and effects of the citizen which the search entails.
In undertaking our calculation of the weight to be accorded to
these three factors in the case at bar - public necessity, efficacy
of the search, and degree of intrusion - we need not reiterate what
was said in Moreno about the dangers posed by air piracy; suffice
it to say that there is a judicially-recognized necessity to insure
that the potential harms of air piracy are foiled. The search
procedures have every indicia of being the most efficacious that
could be used. The group being screened is limited to persons
with the immediate intention of boarding aircraft. Metal detectors,
visual inspection, and rare but potential physical searches appear
to this court to provide as much efficiency to the process as it could
have.
On the other side of the judicial scales, the intrusion which the
airport search imposes on the public is not insubstantial. It is
inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be
embarrassing, and at times it can be incriminating. There are
several factors, however, which make this search less offensive
to the searched person than similar searches in other contexts.
One such factor is the almost complete absence of any stigma
attached to being subjected to search at a known, designated
airport search point. As one commentator has put it in the border
search context, "individuals searched because of their
membership in a morally neutral class have less cause to feel
insulted . . . ." In addition, the offensiveness of the screening
process is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the person to be
searched must voluntarily come to and enter the search area. He
has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the
boarding area. Finally, the circumstances under which the airport
search is conducted make it much less likely that abuses will
occur. Unlike searches conducted on dark and lonely streets at
night where often the officer and the subject are the only
witnesses, these searches are made under supervision and not
far from the scrutiny of the traveling public.
Moreover, the airlines, which have their representatives present,
have a definite and substantial interest in assuring that their
passengers are not unnecessarily harassed. The officers
conducting the search under these circumstances are much more
likely to be solicitous of the Fourth Amendment rights of the
traveling public than in more isolated, unsupervised surroundings.
Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of the relevant factors,
is that the standards for initiating a search of a person at the
boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied in
border crossing situations. In the critical pre-boarding area where
this search started, reasonableness does not require that officers
search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest
signs of nervousness or who otherwise appear suspicious. Such
a requirement would have to assume that hijackers are readily
identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The
number of lives placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid
taking such deadly chances. As Judge Friendly has stated:
Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of
the harm against the need. When the object of the search
is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to
arrest is generally the appropriate test . . . . When the risk is
the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a
large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of
reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good
faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage
and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been
given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that
he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air. (Citations
omitted.)
According to United States v. Aukai,60 US case law had erroneously
suggested that the reasonableness of airport screening searches is
dependent upon the passenger's consent, either ongoing consent or
irrevocable implied consent. It opined:
The constitutionality of an airport screening search, however, does not
depend on consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, and requiring that a
potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport
security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world. Such a rule would
afford terrorists multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport
security by "electing not to fly" on the cusp of detection until a vulnerable
portal is found. This rule would also allow terrorists a low-cost method of
detecting systematic vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that
could be extremely valuable in planning future attacks. Likewise, given that
consent is not required, it makes little sense to predicate the
reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an
irrevocable implied consent theory. Rather, where an airport screening
search is otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory
authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44901, all that is required is the passenger's election
to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport. See Biswell, 406 U.S.
at 315; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and
procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks
through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x--
ray machine.61 (Citation omitted.)
Currently, US courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening
search does not depend on the passenger's consent once he enters the
secured area of an airport. The requirement in Davis62 of allowing
passengers to avoid the search by electing not to fly does not extend to
one who has already submitted his luggage for an x-ray scan.63 If a
potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to
fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt.64 The
right to abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the
screening procedures. Any other rule would allow potential hijackers to
leave whenever detection seemed imminent and permit them to try again
another day.65
The instant case does not qualify as a legitimate administrative
search in an airport.
Similar to the mission of the Transportation Security Administration of the
US Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Transportation
Security under the Department of Transportation and its predecessors has
been primarily66 mandated to ensure civil aviation security.67 To be
precise, the OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention
on aviation security which seeks to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities
against acts of unlawful interference, which include but not limited to:
1. unlawful seizure of aircraft,
2. destruction of an aircraft in service,
3. hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
4. forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the
premises of an aeronautical facility,
5. introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or
hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes,
6. use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death,
serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the
environment,
7. communication of false information such as to jeopardize the
safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew,
ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the
premises of a civil aviation facility.68
Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-Hijacking
Law.69 It provides that an airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage
are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances and that it is unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to
ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as a public utility
within the Philippines, any explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous
substance or material.70
It is in the context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine
airport security searches and seizures are considered as permissible
under Section 2, A1iicle III of the Constitution.
In this case, what was seized from Eanna were two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves. Obviously, they are not explosive, flammable, corrosive
or poisonous substances or materials, or dangerous elements or devices
that may be used to commit hijacking or acts of terrorism. More
importantly, the illegal drugs were discovered only during the final security
checkpoint, after a pat down search was conducted by SSO Suguitan, who
did not act based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an
information given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession
of marijuana. In marked contrast, the illegal drugs confiscated from the
accused in Johnson and the subsequent cases of People v.
Canton,71People v. Suzuki,72Sales v. People,73 and People v.
Cadidia,74 where incidentally uncovered during the initial security check,
in the course of the routine airport screening, after the defendants were
frisked and/or the alarm of the metal detector was triggered.
Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-
Hijacking program, not the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search
where a prohibited drug was found by chance, a search on the person of
the passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate and conscious
effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under the exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirement.75 The Court is not
empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the government
may more effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to be fought,
those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not
those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime.76
Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this
case.
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right which may be waived.77 A person may voluntarily
consent to have government officials conduct a search or seizure that
would otherwise be barred by the Constitution. Like the Fourth
Amendment, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe
voluntary cooperation.78
Yet, a person's "consent to a [warrantless] search, in order to be voluntary,
must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, [and]
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion[.]"79 The question of whether a
consent to a search was "voluntary" or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances.80
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether [he] was in a
public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence
of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence [will] be
found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.81
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence.82 The government bears the burden of proving
"consent."83 In the US, it has been held that when the government relies
on the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement, two main issues
must be litigated: did the defendant indeed consent, and did the defendant
do so with the requisite voluntariness?84 Here, we have ruled that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.85
While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as
the sine qua non of effective consent.86 On the other hand, lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.87 Even when security agents obtain a passenger's express assent
to a search, this assent ordinarily will not constitute a valid "consent" if the
attendant circumstances will establish nothing more than acquiescence to
apparent lawful authority.88
The Fourth Amendment inquiry of whether a reasonable person would
have felt free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter applies equally to police encounters that take place on trains,
planes, and city streets.89 "Consent" that is the product of official
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.90
In this case, the Court finds that there is a valid warrantless search based
on express consent. When SSO Suguitan requested to conduct a pat
down search on Eanna, the latter readily agreed. Record is devoid of any
evidence that he manifested objection or hesitation on the body search.
The request to frisk him was orally articulated to him in such language that
left no room for doubt that he fully understood what was requested.
Unperturbed, he verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also
understood the nature and consequences of the request. He voluntarily
raised his hands by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with
palms open. His affirmative reply and action cannot be viewed as merely
an implied acquiescence or a passive conformity to an authority
considering that SSO Suguitan is not even a police officer and cannot be
said to have acted with a coercive or intimidating stance. Further, it is
reasonable to assume that Eanna is an educated and intelligent man. He
is a 53-year old working professional (claimed to be employed or attached
to a drug addiction center) and a well-travelled man (said to have been in
22 different countries and spent hours in customs).91 Indubitably, he knew,
actually or constructively, his right against unreasonable searches or that
he intentionally conceded the same. Having been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, the sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence
against him. Corollorily, his subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of an illegal drug in his person in flagrante delicto.
There is substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.
At the time of the commission of the crime, the applicable law is R.A. No.
9165.92 Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series
of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as –
[T]he duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
 seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody [was]
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.93
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real
evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. 94 To
establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the
proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. 95 In a criminal case, the
prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact
could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims
it to be.96 As regards the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established
US federal evidentiary rule is when the evidence is not readily identifiable
and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts
require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item
with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.97 This evidentiary rule was adopted in Mallillin v.
People,98 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of
custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.99
In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the
documentary and testimonial evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were properly preserved in every step of the way.
Upon confiscation of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from
Eanna, SSO Suguitan put them on the nearby screening table in front of
Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The sticks were the only items placed on
the table.100 Thereafter, the seized items were turned-over by SSO
Suguitan to PO3 Javier, who placed them on a tray together with he other
belongings of Eanna.101 It must be emphasized that SSO Suguitan is an
airport screening officer and not a police officer who is authorized to
"arrest" or "apprehend"102 Eanna. Hence, he should not be considered as
the "apprehending officer" who must immediately mark and conduct the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items conformably with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).
PO3 Javier was the only one in possession of the two rolled sticks of dried
marijuana leaves from the time he took custody of the same at the airport
up to the time he submitted the same to the crime laboratory office. 103 At
the PNP-ASG office, the confiscated illegal drug was marked, physically
inventoried, and photographed in front of Eanna, with SSO Suguitan, a
Barangay Chairman, a Barangay Kagawad, and an ABS-CBN cameraman
as witnesses.104 Per Request for Laboratory Examination,105 the
specimens were personally delivered by PO3 Javier to the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Crime Laboratory Service where PO3 Padayao received them.
Finally, based on the Chemistry Report106 of Police Inspector Navarro and
the stipulation of facts107 agreed upon by the parties, the specimens tested
positive for the presence of marijuana after a qualitative examination.
The specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were
marked, tested, and presented in court were positively identified not only
by PO3 Javier but also by SSO Suguitan as the same two rolled sticks of
dried marijuana leaves seized from Eanna. 108 Hence, it would be
immaterial even if, as Eanna argues, PO3 Javier had no personal
knowledge of their possession by Eanna and their seizure by SSO
Suguitan.
Eanna contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing
marijuana were not marked immediately and were just laid bare on a table
at the PNP-ASG office. According to him, the ABS-CBN video footage
taken shortly before midnight, which Badua submitted and which was
already edited following the news report format, showed that the two sticks
were without markings at first and then with markings later on.
The Court notes that the compact disk showing the video of what
transpired inside the PNP-ASG office does not contain the full footage that
Badua had taken. It was already edited for purposes of news
report.109 Assuming that there is truth to the allegation that the two sticks
of marijuana were not immediately marked, such fact does not
automatically result in an acquittal. As long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of an illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR may be excused. In several
cases,110 we affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant despite
recognizing that the seized illegal drug was not immediately marked at the
place of arrest. Likewise, in People v. Sic-open,111 the Court sustained the
conviction of the accused-appellant even if the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug were not immediately done at the place
where it was confiscated. Here, the reason for the non-observance with
the rule is justified. Immediate marking, physical inventory, and
photograph of the confiscated drug cannot be done at the final checkpoint
area because it started to become crowded by the constant comings and
goings of departing passengers. The seized items were fittingly brought
by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office where it was made sure that the
barangay officials and a media man were in attendance to witness the
regularity of the entire proceedings.
The peculiar situation in airports calls for a different treatment in the
application of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. To require all
the time the immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the
seized illegal drug will definitely have a domino effect on the entire airport
operation no matter how brief the whole procedure was conducted. Stuck
passengers will cause flight delays, resulting not just economic losses but
security threats as well. Besides, to expect the immediate marking,
physical inventory, and photograph of the dangerous drug at the place of
arrest is to deny the reality that the persons 112 required by law to witness
the procedure are unavailable at the moment of arrest. Unlike in a buy-
bust operation which is supposed to be pre-planned and already
coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of necessary
witnesses, arrests and seizures in airports due to illegal drugs are almost
always spontaneous and unanticipated.
In our view, the period of waiting for the arrival of the witnesses did not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject illegal drug, on the
following grounds:
First, the airport police ensured that only authorized personnel were inside
the PNP-ASG office during the investigation. PO3 Javier claimed that he
was with SPO3 Domingo, PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO
Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and P/Supt. Apias.113 It was only the members of
the PNP-ASG and of the Laoag City PNP, the media, and the two
barangay officials who were allowed to stay inside the room. 114 The
defense counsel recognized that the PNP-ASG office has a limited space
and not big in size, estimating it to be around three by four meters
(although PO1 Terson approximated it to be five by seven meters). 115
Second, the airport police made sure that no one could touch the
confiscated drug even if it was in full view of everyone. PO3 Javier testified
that the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were placed on the
investigation table where everybody could look but not hold.116 Eanna
could also see any attempt to switch or alter the evidence as he was
seated just in front of the table while the others guarded
him.117 Interestingly, instead of being concerned at the time of the risk of
substitution, he even requested to smoke so he was allowed to go out of
the PNP-ASG office.118 Although the apprehending officers could have
exercised a better judgment, they are under no obligation to explain why
the accused was permitted to leave the office in order to smoke. Such fact
should not be taken against them as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are not automatically rendered infirmed. Certainly, we
consider the totality of eircumstanees present in this case. Eanna's right
to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise includes the constitutional
right to enjoy his liberty, albeit in a restricted sense due to his arrest. He
retains his (limited) freedom of movement during the course of the
investigation. Likewise, it must be added that the natural tendeney of an
innocent person aceused of committing a crime is not to rest easy by
ensuring that the evidence being used against him is not altered, tampered
or swapped. In this case, Eanna's resolve to smoke outside
notwithstanding a pending concern either shows that he was adamant in
his claim that what was confiscated from him were merely flavored
tobaeco or that he was already resigned to the fact that he was busted
possessing marijuana. The Court cannot speeulate or engage in
guesswork.
And third, the plausibility of tampering with the evidence is nil as the airport
police were preoccupied in accomplishing the necessary documentation
relative to the arrest and seizure. PO3 Javier shared that while waiting for
the arrival of the barangay offieials, their group were busy preparing
documents which mainly consist of reports regarding the incident. 119 The
trial court equally noted that "there were a lot of things they were doing like
the preparation of the spot report that they [would] forward to Manila such
that their Deputy Chief even helped them. It is precisely for [this] reason
that the two sticks of marijuana [appear] to have been submitted to the
crime lab only at 12:50 a.m. of the following day, July 15, 2013." 120
It has been raised that the drug evidence should have been placed in a
sealed container. Eanna asserts that the evidence was rendered
susceptible to alteration, tampering and swapping because the Ziploc was
not sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than the natural, built-
in re-sealable feature of the plastic bag. Contrary to his allegation,
however, the specimens that were submitted to the RTC were actually
placed in a big transparent resealable Hefty One Zip plastic bag sealed
with a masking tape with markings.121 Even if there is truth to his
representation, the specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic
bag that were marked, tested, and presented in court were positively
identified by SSO Suguitan and PO3 Javier, who both testified under oath,
as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves that were seized
from Eanna. Raising a mere possibility is not enough. Eanna should have
shown with particularity how the drug evidence was altered, tampered or
swapped. The nature of illegal drugs as fungible things is not new to him.
He is not a stranger to prohibited drugs, claiming to be familiar with
marijuana since he is employed or attached to a drug addiction center and
has been in 22 different countries and spent hours in customs. 122 As the
RTC opined, he could have submitted for laboratory examination the tiny
grains of dried leaves and seeds that were found in his camera bag in
order to prove that the alleged sticks of marijuana seized from him were in
fact flavored tobacco that he used to smoke all the time.123
The same reasoning as above can be said even if we are to admit that
PO3 Padayao placed his own marking on the specimens he received from
PO3 Javier and before he turned them over to the forensic chemist. A
marking made on the corpus delicti itself is not automatically considered a
form of contamination which irreversibly alters its physical state and
compromises its integrity and evidentiary value.
Where a defendant identifies a defect in the chain of custody, the
prosecution must introduce sufficient proof so that the judge could find that
the item is in substantially the same condition as when it was seized, and
may admit the item if there is a reasonable probability that it has not been
changed in important respects.124 However, there is a presumption of
integrity of physical evidence absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
tampering with the evidence.125 Merely raising the possibility of tampering
or misidentification is insufficient to render evidence
inadmissible.126 Absent some showing by the defendant that the evidence
has been tampered with, it will not be presumed that those who had
custody of it would do so.127 Where there is no evidence indicating that
tampering with the exhibits occurred, the courts presume that the public
officers have discharged their duties properly.128
In this jurisdiction, it has been consistently held that considering that the
integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with, the defendant bears the burden to show that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by the public officers and a presumption that the public
officers properly discharge their duties.129People v. Agulay130 in fact ruled
that failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the
IRR of R.A No. 9165 does not bar the application of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. Thus:
The dissent agreed with accused-appellant's assertion that the
police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure in the
custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance
with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption
of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance
of their official duties. This assumption is without merit.
First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by
 the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said
section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty from applying.
Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the
requirements contained in Section 21 (a) were already there
per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979.
Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-
compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such
presumption. We held:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason
that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug
is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the
failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of
the Dangerous Drugs Board.131 (Emphasis in the original)
People v. Daria, Jr.,132Peop1e v. Gratil,133 and People v. Bala134 have
followed the Agulay ruling.
It is unfortunate that rigid obedience to procedure on the chain of custody
creates a scenario wherein the safeguards supposedly set to shield the
innocent are more often than not exploited by the guilty to escape rightful
punishment.135 The Court reiterates that while the procedure on the chain
of custody should be perfect, in reality, it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.136 The chain of custody need not be perfect for
the evidence to be admissible.137 A complete chain of custody need not
always be proved.138 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's anest
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible or render
void and invalid such seizure.139 The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item. 140
Non-compliance with the requirements of the law is not automatically fatal
to the prosecution's case and the accused may still be held guilty of the
offense charged. This Court ratiocinated in People v. Del Monte:141
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no
such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to
the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded [to] it by the courts.
xxx
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with
said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit
or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be
given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.142 (Italics in the original.)
We restated in People v. Moner143 that if the evidence of illegal drugs was
not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody
rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would
automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of
evidence presented for each particular case. The saving clause under
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 recognizes that the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well
within the power of trial court judges to decide. The Court went on to state
that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to
distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of the rules of evidence, which
are promulgated by the Court pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, or if it is a subject of substantive law, which
is passed by an act of Congress. Taking into account the distinction in
criminal law that a substantive law declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them while a procedural law
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished, it was concluded that the chain of custody rule is a matter of
evidence and a rule of procedure; therefore, it is the Cmni which has the
last say regarding the appreciation of evidence.
Certainly, the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of
procedure, it being ultimately anchored on the weight and admissibility of
evidence which the courts have the exclusive prerogative to decide. Any
missing link, gap, doubt, challenge, break, problem, defect or deficiency in
the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.144 Once admitted, the court evaluates it and, based thereon,
may accept or disregard the evidence.145 In People v. Sipin,146 this Court,
through the ponente, recently conveyed:
At this point, it is not amiss for the ponente to express his position
regarding the issue of which between the Congress and the
Judiciary has jurisdiction to determine sufficiency of compliance
with the rule on chain of custody, which essentially boils down to
the application of procedural rules on admissibility of evidence. In
this regard, the ponente agrees with the view of Hon. Associate
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in People v. Teng Moner
y Adam that "if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled
precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule,
the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would
automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the
weight of evidence presented for each particular case." As aptly
pointed out by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, the Court's power to
promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress.
The ponente subscribes to the view of Justice Leonardo-De
Castro that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and
a rule of procedure, and that the Court has the last say regarding
the appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary matters are indeed well
within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so,
when the courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the
chain of custody rule as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items have been preserved may wanant the
conviction of the accused.
The ponente further submits that the requirements of marking
the seized items, conduct of inventory and taking photograph
in the presence of a representative from the media or the DOJ
and a local elective official, are police investigation
procedures which call for administrative sanctions in case of
non-compliance. Violation of such procedure may even merit
penalty under R.A. No. 9165, to wit:
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any
person who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of
death.
Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any Regulation
Issued by the Board. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a
fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person found violating any regulation duly issued by the
Board pursuant to this Act, in addition to the administrative
sanctions imposed by the Board.
However, non-observance of such police administrative
procedures should not affect the validity of the seizure of the
evidence, because the issue of chain of custody is ultimately
anchored on the admissibility of evidence, which is exclusively
within the prerogative of the courts to decide in accordance with
the rules on evidence. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates
under varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all
times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.147 Like what have been done in past cases, we must
not look for the stringent step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
detennine the guilt or innocence of the accused. 148 The identity of the
confiscated drugs is preserved when the drug presented and offered as
evidence in court is the exact same item seized from the accused at the
time of his arrest, while the preservation of the drug's integrity means that
its evidentiary value is intact as it was not subject to planting, switching,
tampering or any other circumstance that casts doubt as to its existence.149
To assess an allegedly faulty chain of custody, the court looks for ampie
corroborative evidence as to the evidence's acquisition and subsequent
custody.150 Before admitting or excluding real evidence, it must consider
the nature of the evidence, and the surrounding circumstances, including
presentation, custody and probability of tampering or alteration.151 If, after
considering these factors, it is determined that the evidence is
substantially in the same condition as when the crime was committed, the
evidence may be admitted.152 The court need not rule out every possibility
that the evidence underwent alteration; it needs only to find that
the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been altered in
any material aspect.153 Physical evidence is admissible when the
possibilities of misidentification or alteration are eliminated, not absolutely,
but as a matter of reasonable probability.154 All that is required is that the
evidence m question was the same as that involved in the offense and that
it is substantially unchanged.155
Courts are reminded to tread carefully before giving full credit to the
testimonies of those who conducted the illegal drug operations and must
thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple
procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law and the rules.156 In
the performance of this function, among the evidentiary rules to apply are
the following: test in measuring the value of a witness' testimony,
appreciation of inculpatory facts, positive and negative evidence, one-
witness rule, best evidence rule, suppression of evidence, presumption of
regular performance of official duty, rules on circumstantial evidence and
conspiracy, and (non) presentation of poseur buyer or marked money.157
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 9, 2016 Decision and
the July 21, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
36412, which affirmed the November 22,2013 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding
accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain guilty for violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal
and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of
transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,2 and sentencing him to "die
by lethal injection." In view thereof, the judgement was brought to this
Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay
Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.
from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and
was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led by
his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA),
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with
ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male
passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places
when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up
positions thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the
male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time,
ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform
and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly
changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching
officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on
to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers,
the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested
the man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried
speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to
what he termed "sign language;" he motioned with his hands for the man
to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded
to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to
the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the
police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to
comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man
and escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial
features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited
and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have
the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID
ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act
as an enterpreter. In the meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted
twenty-nine (29) plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substance
which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping
Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his
constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied that the man
and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their
uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen
asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence
and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan Police
Station.1âwphi1.nêt
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa
Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region I, received a
letter request3 from CID — incidentally her husband — to conduct a
laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a
multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,4 she stated
that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic
packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case
No. 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, La Union, that the facts of the case could support
an indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was
subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride
(shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the same"
in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty.
The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information
read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter, Thelma Sales
Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a
Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters were
assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the
above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of
CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was substantially
corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry
report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos
sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that they
were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter
Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in
a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was
instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the
latter's 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland
China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their destination, RONG
left the ship, came back without the fish, but with two bags, the contents
of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a
document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters.
So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan, Pangasinan
on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small
speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. While,
sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA
heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see
the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not
see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when
finally, low on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA
anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks
completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat
one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed
out to him that one bag was missing much to RONG's dismay when he
learned of it. When a crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived.
CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police
immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only
gestures and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where
he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer
who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine
of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it,
inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methaphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. He
denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his
"constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his
arrest was tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride
found in the bag should have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He
also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for
the first time at Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him
from running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his
mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the
contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised dominion
over the same.
Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member,
recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the
police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also
remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that
CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had
chased the latter's car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd
became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police headquarters.
There, the mayor took charge of the situation — he opened CHUA's bag
with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic chemist surnamed
CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials
to find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings, photographers were
busy taking pictures to document the event.
Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of Tammocalao
who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two
men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA
when they detected the arrival of the local police. They quickly
disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach
but not CID.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the
prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA
transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal
authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben5 as authority, the RTC
characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride
as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the
language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was "rectified
when accused was duly arraigned and . . . (afterwards) participated in the
trial of this case." The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these
referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of the
witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the testimonies thus
delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged
employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal
trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other
members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic.
Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven
and established by convincing and satisfactory evidence
that the accused had conspired and acted in concert with
one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention Chen Ho Fa, the
Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to the
Country from China and Taiwan, this Court finds the
accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. 15,
Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 as
charged in the Information, and considering the provisions
of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum penalty
shall be imposed if the quantity
sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the
case of Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity
involved in this case is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond
the weight ceiling specified in said Act, coupled with the
findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member of an
organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no
other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to
accused, this Court hereby sentences the said accused
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection; to
pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to
pay the costs.
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic]
Sarmiento of the Philippine National Police to immediately
form an investigating Committee to be composed by [sic]
men of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct an
exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine
whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape
of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who
approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao,
Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the remaining
bag from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the
other bag; and to furnish this Court a copy of the
report/result of the said investigation in order to show
compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu is ordered turned over
immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be
turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union
Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations
against all illegal seaborne activities.
SO ORDERED. 6
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as
competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2) granting
weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite
glaring inconsistencies on material points; and in (3) appreciating
conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce
of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in the information.
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1)
the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure
warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and
comtemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the police
action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures since he consented to the
search.
We reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and
person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.7 Inseparable, and not
merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by
the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceedings.8
The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.9 Verily, the rule is, the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant
issued in compliance with the procedure outlined on the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court; "otherwise such search and seizure
become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision."10 This interdiction against warrantless searches
and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence 11 in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search),12 and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuan to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners. 13
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest,
search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute
a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite
understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted extremely
divergent versions of the incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was
arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person
may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such facts14 or as recent case law15 adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive
of probable cause. The term probable cause had been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.16 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 17 In People v. Montilla,18 the Court acknowledged that "the
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and
correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized." Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential
evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been
dubiously equated with probable cause, the Court explained:
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts
(referring to prima facie evidence and probable cause)
were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under
discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of
evidence required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief"
as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has the same
meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of
the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a
probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be in that
sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest
should be considered as legally authorized." (emphasis
supplied)19
Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on
record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in
on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing
to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was
"accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. At least in People v.
Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that compelling
reasons (e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification
by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive drug, and the
urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police
officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the
Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from
the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel
documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee
when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA
can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards
the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause."
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent
odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or
positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or
the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,21 suspicious
demeanor or behavior 22 and suspicious bulge in the waist23 — accepted
by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case.
There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question.
CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent.
The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA
that CHUA attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely
walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers
approached him. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim,
thus:
Q: How far were you when the accused put the
bag on his sholder?
A: We were then very near him about three
meters away from the male person carrying the
bag.
Q: To what direction was he facing when he put
the bag on his shoulder?
A: To the east direction.
Q: In relation to you, where were you.
A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj.
Cid we approached the accused and when Maj.
Cid went near him, he spoke in Tagalong, English
and Ilocano which accused did not understand
because he did not respond.
Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the
accused doing at that time?
A: He was walking.
Q: To what direction he was walking?
A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
Q: He was walking away from you or going near
you?
A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt.
Reynoso held the right arm of the accused.
Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of
the accused?
A: Yes sir and he stopped.24
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not
obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and
view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually
towards the road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts
did not convey any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores.
Neither were these overt manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity
nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as clearly established in CID's testimony,
thus:
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you
introduced yourselves:
A No, sir.
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach
the accused because he was not doing anything
wrong?
A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the
person and if ever or whatever assistance that we
can give we will give.25
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest.
While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to
deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within
his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or
evidence he can destroy,26 a valid arrest must precede the search. The
process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed.27
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was
no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under
the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court28 as already shown.
Fom all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing
themselves, the police officcers immediately inquired about the
contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers
from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out
evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by
CHUA — in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause and
validate an illegal search and seizure."
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a
consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute
a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.29 CHUA never exhibited that he knew, actually or constructively of
his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded
the same. This can be inferred from the manner by which the search
performed, thus:
Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what
was the first thing that you did when you
approached him (CHUA)?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce
yourselves?
A That is normal practice in our part, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after
introducing yourselves what did you do?
 A He did not answer me and he did not utter any
word,
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did
he do?
A I asked again a question that if he can open his
bag sir.
Q And did he understand your question when you
requested him to open his bag?
A No, sir, there is no answer.
Q No answer?
A Yes, sir, no answer.
Q And when there was no answer what did you
do next?
A I used sign language sir.
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court
how you demonstrated that sign language of
opening the bag mr. (sic) witness?
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made
an action like this sir.
xxx xxx xxx
SHERIFF:
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the
straw bag and then manifesting a sign to open the
zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand from
left to right or from the opening to the end of the
zipper.
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you
open it up to the end of the zipper.
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like
this.
(The witness repeating the motion described on
record.)
COURT: Did you open that personally?
WITNESS:
A No, your honor.
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the
accused to open the bag?
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his
belongings sir.
Q Why, why was it — no, I reform my question
your honor. Is it normal procedure for you to
examine anybody or to request anybody to open
his bag?
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also
our duty to inspect the baggage, it is our routine
duty of a police (sic), sir.
Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to
request a person to open his bag?
A yes, sir.
 Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr.
(sic) witness, to open his bag?
A No, sir.
Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?
A Yes, sir.
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and
overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced themselves to
CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The
police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three
languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the police's request to
open the bag, they resorted to what they called "sign language." They
claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and gestures.
This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language."
More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged
cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and
consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. This Court
is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to
search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such
language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what
was requested. In some instances, the accused even verbally replied to
the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and
consequences of such request.
It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated
subtance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal
search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information
or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous
trees32 how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any
initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case — because the police
admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the
regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.
Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported
methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded, as overzealous police officers are
sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it
guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. "There
are those who say that . . . 'the criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered.'. . . In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result. But .
. . 'there is another consideration — the imperative of judicial integrity . . .
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 33
As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
posecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to
insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a
passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding its
erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is
without question unsupported by the records. Conspiracy was not included
in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of the trial
court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any
other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable
doubt.34
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO
SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the
evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NOEL
TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET, accused-appellants.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means
by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got
evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting
it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will pay
for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.
So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S.1 On this
occasion, this Court is made to choose between letting suspected
criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.2 Solier related that his neighbors have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area.
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan,4 all members of the Intelligence Section of
the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in
Sapa, Toril, Davao City.5 For five days, they gathered information and
learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.6 According to his
neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of
marijuana.8 Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually
wore a hat.9 At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team
composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await
Tudtuds arrival.10 All wore civilian clothes.11
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and
helped each other carry a carton12 marked King Flakes.13 Standing some
five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that
one of the men fit Tudtuds description.14 The same man also toted a
plastic bag.
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers.16 PO1 Desierto informed them
that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would
be arriving that night.17 The man who resembled Tudtuds description
denied that he was carrying any drugs.18 PO1 Desierto asked him if he
could see the contents of the box.19 Tudtud obliged, saying, it was
alright.20 Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on.
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one
wrapped in a striped plastic bag22 and another in newspapers.23 PO1
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.24 They contained what
seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.25
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their
rights and brought them to the police station. 26 The two did not resist.
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.28 Forensic tests conducted by
Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200
grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890
grams.29 Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report,
Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently
charged31 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs.32 Upon arraignment, both accused
pleaded not guilty.33 The defense, however, reserved their right to
question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against
them.34
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic
chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas
Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses
testified to the foregoing narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan,
North Cotabato to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline.35 At
about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by bus. 36 Upon
reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the
bus.
Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him,
pointing a .38 caliber revolver.38 The man told him not to run.39 Tudtud
raised his arms and asked, Sir, what is this about? 40 The man answered
that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and
instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis
pants.
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters
away.42 According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he
disembarked the bus.43 Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but
proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver
at him.44 Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was
something wrapped in cellophane.
What is that? the man asked.46 Tudtud replied that he did not
know.47 Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was
marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.
Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at
the other side of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud.
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after
attending a cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was
accosted.50 After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street.51 Someone
then approached him and pointed a gun at him.52 The man ordered him
not to move and handcuffed him.53 Bolong asked why he was being
arrested but the man just told him to go with them.
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later
claim, they met each other for the first time.
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered
the testimonies of Felicia Julaton,56 Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio
Bohevia,57 Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita Abunda,58 Branch 9
Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They
testified and presented court documents showing that one Bobo or
Bobong Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various
crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and
robbery. The defense asserted that the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused
in these cases is the same person as the informant Bobong Solier.
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors,
the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were
seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
unreasonable within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional
provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.61 Section 3 (2), Article III of
the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only
unreasonable searches and seizures. The following instances are not
deemed unreasonable even in the absence of a warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under
the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as
authorities this Courts rulings in People v. Claudio,63 People v.
Tangliben,64 People v. Montilla,65 and People v. Valdez.66 The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed
decision, invokes the cases of People v. Maspil, Jr.,67 People v.
Malmstedt,68 and People v. Bagista.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12,70 Rule 126 of said Rules read as
follows:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed.71 Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 72 The
question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause
to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of
the peace officers making the arrest.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,74 this Court held that the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his
view.75 In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused
had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New
Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the
accused, the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as
well as purportedly subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then
Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the
information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellants wife.
At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the
time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall
within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so
deserving of full protection.76
Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been
obtained in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
In People v. Aminnudin,77 this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest
and subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following
circumstances:
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon
9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and
so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of
the fact that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from
side to side while holding ones abdomen,79 or of standing on a corner with
ones eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came
near,80 does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a).
Neither does putting something in ones pocket, 81 handing over ones
baggage,82 riding a motorcycle,83 nor does holding a bag on board
a trisikad84sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the
street per se.
Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v.
Doria.86 Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua,87 this Court declared
invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel
clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient.
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful
arrest because of suspicious circumstances: People v.
Tangliben88 (accused was acting suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt89 (a
bulge on the accuseds waist), and People v. de Guzman90 (likewise a
bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable
information sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of
cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr.,91 People v. Bagista,92 People v.
Balingan,93 People v. Lising,94 People v. Montilla,95 People v.
Valdez,96 and People v. Gonzales.97 In these cases, the arresting
authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were
no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the
accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come under
some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches.
Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of
a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and Lising and Montilla were
consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos,
which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule
113. Note the phrase in his presence therein, connoting personal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to
be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own
body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental
one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended
beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely
misplaced. In Claudio,99 the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in
front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing
the latters suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also
acted suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover,
was not without its critics. There, majority of the Court held:
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling
bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the
commission of any crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in the
ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are
necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the
officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion
since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the
drugs were in appellants luggage. It would obviously have been
irresponsible, if now downright absurd under the circumstances, to require
the constable to adopt a wait and see attitude at the risk of eventually
losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that,
at the point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause,
and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers
a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable
cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime
by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is
ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest
and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both
justified.
While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on
the discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful
arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno,
filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant
consented to the inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed
with the conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the
part of the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the
appellant did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would
reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on
some felonious enterprise.
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and
searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In
the former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime
being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he
must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case,
the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that
there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by
the accused.
To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest
or search is in my opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great
jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many decisions made by this Court, in
its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be
practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the
makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out
to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to
search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants
who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their accusations, for
they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive
tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim that
they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon
before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for
validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the
majoritys ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures.
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring
opinion in People v. Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the
alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however,
declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-
accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the
marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs.
Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without any
conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Dorias word, the Narcom agents
had no showing that the person who affected the warantless arrest had, in
his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.102 [Italics in the original.]
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice
Panganiban said that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled
doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly
been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.
Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions
searches incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any
rate, Montilla was a consented search. As will be demonstrated later, the
same could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however,
involved an on-the-spot information. The urgency of the circumstances, an
element not present in this case, prevented the arresting officer therein
from obtaining a warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in
a suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or
was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be
believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box.
Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring,104 pale105 and
trembling,106 this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said
box.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that
appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as
personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier,
for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his
neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to
Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?
A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be
the person whou [sic] would point to him because he had been giving
trouble to the neighborhood because according to them there are [sic]
proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of
our neighbors.
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in
reporting him particularly?
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud
in proliferation of marijuana?
A About a month.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of
marijuana which led to his apprehension sometime in the evening of
August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on your report my
question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him
marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?
A Because of the information of his neighbor.
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even
elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their
information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in
their neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their
informant. He testified on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.
The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any
explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it
necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out,
did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the
act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of information from
the assets there.109 The police officers who conducted such surveillance
did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would
allow them to do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos
assertions of lack of time110 notwithstanding. Records show that the police
had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers
information at around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected
to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same day.111 In People v.
Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure
a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an
intelligence report that the accused, who was supposedly carrying
marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May
20, 1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of
arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m.
the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for
search warrants even after office hours:
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an
application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is
required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after
office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular
No. 19, series of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on
Application for search warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with
Multiple Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on
applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms
and other serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for
prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these
amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-
subversion Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under
whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall
take cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the
Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application
is filed.
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays, shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any
judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in
such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without
delay personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his
witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall observe
the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search
warrants provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated
October 1, 1985.112 [Italics in the original.]
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1
Floretas testimony that the real reason for their omission was their belief
that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes greater
significance. This was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from
Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search
warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have
also no real basis to search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
. It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer
concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts]
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the
marijuana? existence of probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause
in spite of an officers judgment that none exists. 114 However, the fact that
the arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a
A Yes, sir.
warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious
questions whether such surveillance actually yielded any pertinent
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.? information and even whether they actually conducted any information-
gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal knowledge.
A Yes, sir.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.? searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:

A Yes, sir. 1. It must appear that the rights exist;

Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City? 2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right;
A Yes, sir.
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers,
is that correct? Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites.
Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as
A Yes, sir. such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box
supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride? He did not resist and opened the box himself.

A Yes, sir. The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence
of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
the search warrant or the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be
presumed.116 The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not
A They help. amount to permission thereto.

Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act
warrant? of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis. rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.117 [Underscoring
supplied.] Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag 118 or A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is
the chairs119 containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held carrying a gun is a policeman.
there was no valid consent to the search.
Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity
A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden
of proving that the search was unconsented.
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely
diminished by the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting A I told him that is not mine.
officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the subject
box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows: Q What did this man say?

Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
at you[.] [What] was that something?
Q What did you do?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.
Q How did he point it at you?
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
holding something towards somebody). circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee.122 Consequently, appellants lack of
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you? objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
A He said do not run.
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized
Q What did you do? exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about? than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant,
the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
Q Why did you call him Sir?
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of
Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a
position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants
from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause,
and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of
the hierarchy of rights,125 next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right
to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process
clause.126 This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted
freedom advocates,127 the right to personal security which, along with the
right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search
and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing. Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v.
Aruta:

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too
high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate
a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.128

Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting

the government play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and
ineluctable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is

REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret
are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA
@ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and
Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of
Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. 1 The information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the
City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another and without having been
authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to
another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In
November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was
engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents
decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged
by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was
scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP
Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-
bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of
P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes
designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his
back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent
Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom,
gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum,
PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six
(6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The
market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit
marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3
Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit
handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto
Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.5 An hour later, "Jun"
appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of
the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in
plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested
"Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but
did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he
left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth.6 "Jun" led the
police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside.
"Jun" identified the woman as his associate.7 SPO1 Badua asked
"Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's"
house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside
the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun."
His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten
(10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from "Neneth."8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked
bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only
then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while
"Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana
leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from
"Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 9 The
bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria
and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that
on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his
house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if
he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as
the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied
knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house
and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-
appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and
ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes,
accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them
to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One
of the men, later identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door and
he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about
three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The
policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying
water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied
he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time,
surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were
already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard
one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them,
Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something
inside. P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and
board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were
investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta
Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he
and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store.
This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.11
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that
on December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal,
Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan,
aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30
in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her
husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier.
She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for
school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son,
Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home
leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained
standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes.
Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well
to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants
and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man
pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was
P03 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.
They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she
saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The
men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not
know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused
Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and that her husband never
returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge
against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
her person.12 Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the
accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall
"organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused- be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for
appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive destruction in accordance with law.
portion of the decision reads as follows:
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the
y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused
@ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for
doubt, they are both Women, Mandaluyong City.
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively SO ORDERED. 13
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty
imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the
provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which I
explicitly state that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
The maximum penalty shall be imposed WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
if the offense was committed by any FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR
person who belongs to an TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES,
organized/syndicated crime group. INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS
DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN
FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY
An organized/syndicated crime group
IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain II
in the commission of any crime.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND
sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE
and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE. 14
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
I validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY
OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE
BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO
REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY
WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN
CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF
RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS,
AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-
bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the
of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence
obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A
buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as
an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission
of an offense.16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. 17
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created
twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use
of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly
liquor and narcotics offenses.18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of
estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of
decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 19 It also took off from
a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise
resist.20
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally
negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to
commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution against him.21 The classic definition of
entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United
States,22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept:
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer,
and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the
officers."23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery,
or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a
defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in
the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent
defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the
law enforcement officer.24
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment
used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every
deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the
inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise
innocent person into a criminal career.25 Where the criminal intent
originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused
is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute
him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.26 Where,
however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for
the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for
commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission
of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.27 The law
tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense28 that can be raised by an
accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is
a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing
sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the governmet to show
otherwise.30 When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal
courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent"
test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant
facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses,
activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are
considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. 33 The
predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to
draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal."35 If the accused was found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive
inducement.36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective"
test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman
v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states
have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or
legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct.39 The inquiry is focused on
the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on
the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of
the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.40 The test of entrapment
is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce
a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense;41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that
is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct
that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing
conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,43 or appeals to
sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate
illness, are not.44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to
convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the
legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the
methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime
"cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that
the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement
improprieties.45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the
interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the
accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime,
and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered
in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal
person.46
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and
objected to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything
goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other
unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.47 Delving into the
accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task
of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It
ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general
disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular
crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the other
extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for
considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at
least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the
question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was
proper. 49 The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and
chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal
syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment.
Some states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and
"objective"51 In Cruz v. State,52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that
the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this
objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused
was predisposed to commit the crime.53 In Baca v. State,54 the New
Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by
holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime
for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of
proper investigation.55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the
"objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers
while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United
States v. Phelps,56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking
opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel,
actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith,
the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he
overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some
occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance
to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to
convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke
this drug.57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."58 In People v. Abella,59 we acquitted the accused of the
crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police
officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high one" causing the accused
to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct,
persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his
testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the
accused.60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman
smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu
after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said
drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused
to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an
understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the
seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers.62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we
first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or
inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,64 we held:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been
said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for
the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be
deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from
mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being
criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the
detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of
the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as
a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the
latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and
where a person approached by the thief as his
confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless
committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a
 prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase
was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but
there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the
Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,66 the appellate court declared that
"there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The
instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of
the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and
means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People
v. Tan Tiong,68 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is
no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was
affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.70 Entrapment, we further held,
is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to
public policy and illegal.71
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American
jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine
jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to
the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an
absolutory cause.72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or
instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the
crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been
followed in a series of similar cases.73 Nevertheless, adopting the
"objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,74 we applied both tests by
examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and
admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and
dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's
previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious
past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's
evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not
sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise
admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that led to
his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very
material in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become
common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in
buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending
drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes.77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita.78 They are not the traditional type of criminal law
such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with
crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws
defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against
particular individuals, but against public order.80 Violation is deemed a
wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person.81 These offenses are carried on in
secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid
detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously
he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement
of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and
punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of
aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This
means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are
committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies
or stool pigeons.82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the
confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a
person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug
peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who
deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket,
pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the
spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses
underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring
one.83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous,
corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous
law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion,
vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their
superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a
number of cases84 where we observed that it is a common modus
operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons,
particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.85 The use of shady underworld
characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may
be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and
the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled
this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases.86 Criminal activity is
such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal
of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the
coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Barraza,87
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with
illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest,
illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations.
Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation.
Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end,
when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,'
justifies the employment of illegal means. 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the
Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption
should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.89 It is the duty of courts
to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the
criminal law through lawless enforcement.90 Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations
demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and
adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 92 The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must
be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught
but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of
the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of
habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must
also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the
predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.1âwphi1.nêt
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant
who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged
meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed
as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to
accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana.
Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and
categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-
examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's testimony
was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up
security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to
the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently
denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the arresting officers,94 or there are reasons to believe
that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the
appellant,95 or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually
witnessed the entire transaction,96 the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending
officers' eyewitness testimonies.97 There is no need to present the
informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately
proved by prosecution witnesses.98
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies
and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from
the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the
money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It
is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-
appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the
marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana
"sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit
himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom
agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant
Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks
inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of
marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered
from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were
identified and marked in court. Thus:
ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio
Doria:
xxx
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified
that box,. Tell the court, how were you
able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the
crime laboratory which contained the
eleven pieces of marijuana brick we
confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven
bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out
from the said box. . .
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta
Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of
questioning considering the fact that we
are now dealing with eleven items when
the question posed to the witness was
what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record
that the witness is pulling out them after
item from the box showed to him and
brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know
that those are the eleven bricks?
xxx xxx
A I have markings on these eleven
bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those
markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with
the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white
wrapper and pointing to CLM and the
signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just
limit the inquiry to the basic question of
the fiscal as to what was handed to him
by the accused Jun, your Honor?
 PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is
already a ruling by this Honorable Court,
your Honor, despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own
thing and leave the appreciation of what
it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed
to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the
thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your
Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I
marked before I brought it to the PCCL,
your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was
given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own
initials before giving it to the investigator
and before we brought it to the PCCL,
your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR May we request that a
tag be placed on this white plastic bag
and this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this
date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters
and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the
signature, the date and the time and this
Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking,
sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that
this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and
not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and
the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made
these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record
that the one that was enclosed. . .
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also
entries included in that enclosure where
it appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A," etc.
etc., that was not pointed to by the
witness. I want to make it of record that
 there are other entries included in the
enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of
marijuana with a piece of paper, with a
newspaper wrapping with a piece of
paper inside which reads: "D-394-95,
Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as
our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you
identified, the wrapper and the contents
was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto
St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you
were able to recover?
xxx xxx xxx
A These other marijuana bricks, because
during our follow-up, because according
to Jun the money which I gave him was
in the hands of Neneth and so we
proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given
to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets.
This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were
marked as Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine
hundred seventy (970) grams.
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and
his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the
one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant
cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana
in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system.
There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there
must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited
drug between the poseur- buyer and the pusher. 101 Again, the decisive
fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-
appellant. 102
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not
unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided
by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
 xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught
in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant. 104
We submit at this juncture, your Honor,
that there will be no basis for that
question.
Q This particular exhibit that you
identified, the wrapper and the contents
was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and Q Whereat?
residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are
different matters. A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto
Street, sir.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant
and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any Q How about, the other items that you
purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search were able to recover?
and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this
search in violation of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain juncture, your Honor, that there will be no
view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against basis for that question.
unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
COURT There is. Answer.
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a
warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and A These other marijuana bricks, because
the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is during our follow-up, because according
claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the to Jun the money which I gave him was
arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her in the hands of Neneth and so we
lawful arrest. proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under Q Whereat?
any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene
of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise: at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Q And what happened upon arrival
Gaddao: thereat?
 A We saw alias Neneth inside the house Q She was fetching water as a matter of
and we asked him to give us the buy-bust fact?
money, sir.
A She was 'sa bandang poso.'
Q You mentioned "him?"
Q Carrying a baby?
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the
money, the marked money which Jun A No, sir.
gave her, sir.
Q At that particular time when you
Q And what happened? reached the house of Aling Neneth and
saw her outside the house, she was not
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua committing any crime, she was just
who can testify regarding this buy-bust outside the house?
money, sir.
A No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q She was not about to commit any
SPO1 Badua testified on cross- crime because she was just outside the
examination that: house doing her daily chores. Am I
correct?
Q What was your intention in going to the
house of Aling Neneth? A I just saw her outside, sir.

A To arrest her, sir. Q And at that point in time you already

wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you not?
reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling
Neneth was there? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Now, if any memory of your testimony

Q As far as you can see, she was just
inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
is correct, according to you SPO1
Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because P03
Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this
confrontation, arrest or whatever by
SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you
were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what
Manlangit was doing, because precisely
according to you your role in this buy-
bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from
inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A P03 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the
money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your
Honor. Money, there 's no testimony on
that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I
expect an honest answer. According to
the records, the amount of P1,600.00
was recovered from the person of Aling
Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain
and for the record is the fact that you
were not the one who retrieved the
money from Aling Neneth, it was
Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money
from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered
from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling
Neneth, not from the person of Aling
Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell
the Court?
 A No, sir. the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
ATTY. VALDEZ: criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.120

I am through with this witness, your Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it
Honor. 113 follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making
bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule
its warrantless seizure valid.
113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and maybe introduced in evidence.121 The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
suspicion."115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.122 The law enforcement officer
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
which he can particularly view the area. 123 In the course of such lawful
an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.124 The object must be open to eye and
arrested.116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
hand125 and its discovery inadvertent.126
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.117
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container.
Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is
identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared
not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
was.118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate
in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 127 In
This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs.
article is deemed in plain view.128 It must be immediately apparent to the
Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,119 with or without
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.129
appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to
believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-
examination as follows:
ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua
arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the
house?
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand
and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.

A Yes, sir. PROSECUTOR

Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth Can we describe it?

the buy-bust money?
ATTY. VALDEZ
A Yes, sir.
Yes.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the
carton?
PROSECUTOR

A Yes, sir. One flap is inside and the other flap is

standing and with the contents visible.
Q This carton, according to you was
under a table?
COURT

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Noted.

Q I noticed that this carton has a cover? Q At this juncture, you went inside the
house?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover
raised or closed? Q And got hold of this carton?

A It was open, sir. Not like that.

A Yes, sir.

COURT Q Did you mention anything to Aling

Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this. . . Q You went inside the house?

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything A Yes, sir.

to Aling Neneth before getting the
carton? Q You did not have any search warrant?

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling A Yes, sir.

Neneth regarding the buy-bust money
and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as
marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust
you were concerned to validate the fact
money namin?" sir. that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the
buy-bust money because according to
Q Making reference to the marijuana that you, you did not know whether Badua
was given by alias Jun? already retrieved the buy-bust money
from her?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of
this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet Q How far was this from the door?
frisked, is it not [sic]?
A Two and a half meters from the door,
A I just don't know if she was frisked sir. It was in plain view.
already by Badua, sir.
Q Under the table according to you?
Q Who got hold of this?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
A I was the one, sir.
Q Somewhere here?
Q You were the one who got this?
A It's far, sir.
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Q At that particular point in time, you did
not know if the alleged buy-bust money
May we request the witness to place it,
was already retrieved by Badua?
where he saw it?

A Yes, sir. A Here, sir.

Q What you see is a carton? By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not
a piece of plastic.
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal?
A Yes, sir. I'm asking you?

Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of PROSECUTOR

the carton?
With due respect, what I am saying is,
A Yes, sir. let's place the size of the plastic. A piece
of plastic may be big or a small one, for
record purposes.
Q That is all that you saw?

A Yes, sir. COURT

Leave that to the court.

PROSECUTOR

For the record, your Honor. . . PROSECUTOR

Leave that to the court.

Q You were only able to verify according
to you . . .
Q The only reason according to you, you
were able to . . . Look at this, no even
PRESECUTOR
Superman . . . I withdraw that. Not even
a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to contents here. And according to the
the words a piece of plastic. By reading it Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
...
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
Q Siopao?
That's a piece of plastic.
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Q Canned goods?
 A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says
Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana
because it may . . .
Q I am not asking you what your
presumptions are. I'm asking you what it
could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so
why are you voluntarily saying the
information. Let the prosecutor do that for
you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
xxx xxx xxx 130
P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's
house because they were led there by appellant Doria. The
Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant
Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to
her.131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03
Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half
meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton
box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped
in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the
contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and
marked the said contents.132 On cross-examination, however, he admitted
that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the
records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent
as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks
of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and
placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color.133 PO3 Manlangit
himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could
be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.134 It was
not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box
was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the
Constitution.135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.136
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was
found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding
that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.138 Apropos is our ruling
in People v. Aminnudin,139 viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially
the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil
 that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. 140
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as SO ORDERED.
amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited
drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

xxx xxx xxx

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is

material is the submission of proof that the sale took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in
court.141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant
Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution,
however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower
penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.142

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is
reversed and modified as follows: