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A Tragic and Unpredictable Station Cavern Collapse During Construction of a

Metro, Despite Extensive Drilling Investigations

Conference Paper · January 2009

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 A Tragic and Unpredictable Station Cavern Collapse During
Construction of a Metro, Despite Extensive Drilling Investigations

N. R. Barton

Nick Barton & Associates, Oslo

ABSTRACT

In January of 2007, seven people in a São Paulo street, four of them in a small bus, were
suddenly sucked into falling soil and saprolite, from a street elevation about 20 m above a metro
station cavern of 19 m span and 40 m length. Despite the evidence of four surrounding and one
central borehole, and six more boreholes around the adjacent station shaft, the assumed mean
rock cover of just 3 m above the 20 m deep cavern arch, proved locally to be more than 10 m in
error, due to a buried ridge of rock running high above the cavern arch, with one fateful low point
exactly where drilled on the cavern centre-line. Seven lanes of adjacent highway and twin railway
lines prevented viable seismic refraction, and a consistent drilling result had not proved this to be
necessary. Due to the assumed low rock cover, heavy lattice girders, embedded in 40 cm of S(fr)
were used as temporary support. The feet of the lattice girders were founded on broad ‘elephant’
footings. Due to the unknown adverse loading from a wedge-shaped, clay-bordered, giant ridge of
rock and saprolite, weighing some 15,000 tons, all forms of temporary support would eventually
have failed. Post-collapse, painstaking, police-supervised excavation of the entire 20 by 20 by 40
m of collapsed materials, taking some 15 months, finally revealed large remnants of the arch and
wall support, crushed and folded beneath the fallen gneiss, amphibolite, saprolite, sand and soil.

1 INTRODUCTION

Fortunately for the civil engineering tunneling profession,

the dramatic case record to be described here, with tragic
consequences for seven people, is extremely rare. The
geometric peculiarities described in the abstract above,
were compounded by opposed, steeply-dipping foliation,
and by a steep, bounding discontinuity resembling a fault,
and by the presumed cracking of a buried 1000 mm
diameter storm drain, with change of cross-section to 700
mm immediately upstream of this major discontinuity.
A slight shearing of this feature, caused by the
advance of the cavern many meters below, is presumed to
have been the reason for the leaking, broken pipe that
Figure 1: The appearance of the recovered core from borehole
was filmed following collapse of the 16,000 m3 of soil, 8704 drilled near the centre of the (future) station cavern.
sand, saprolite, gneiss and amfibolite. To complete the
list of adverse features, there was exceptionally heavy
rainfall in a period three to four weeks before the sudden The eighteen plastic containers seen in the above core
collapse, perhaps responsible for locally elevated water box, contain the nominal recovery of 18 m of overlying
pressure and perhaps for softening of the clay and sand, soil and saprolite. The rock head, encountered first
saprolite surrounding the 10 m high, sub-surface ridge- at an average 18 m depth, at an average elevation of 706
of-rock. In retrospect, this ridge was the result of a higher m, and 3 m above the cavern arch, was weathered gneiss.
RMR-value, as consistently logged by the geologist, The mostly steeply-dipping foliation is not clearly
along the cavern centre, with lower RQD on either side. indicated in these and other core photographs.

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2 BEFORE AND AFTER COLLAPSE FIGURES

Figure 2: a) Appearance of station shaft and top-heading in

autumn 2006. FF marks the bounding discontinuity beneath
Rua Capri. b) The dramatic collapse of 12th January, 2007. The
collapsed and cracked street above the white car is Rua Capri,
where six people died: two pedestrians and four occupants of a
small bus. c) Some 16,000 m3 of collapsed materials now
removed after 15 months of police-supervised stage-by-stage
excavation, organized by the investigating institute IPT. Note
running tunnel and remnant 6 to 7 m of cavern beyond ‘FF”. Figure 3 a, b, c: Some of the painstaking IPT investigations.

2
3 RIDGE OF ROCK THAT WENT UNDETECTED
Figure 4a shows what was expected on average
concerning top-of-rock elevations, when a diagrammatic
vertical cross-section is stripped of all sophisticated
geological detail. The reality was a uniquely adverse sub-
surface ridge of rock with steep sloping sides, discovered
along the axis of the cavern after the collapse. The ridge,
highly idealized in Figure 4b, proved to be an astonishing
10 to 11 m in height, in relation to the surrounding top-
of-rock levels, running for many tens of meters along the
cavern and running tunnel. It appears to have been
divided into two unequal ‘halves’ close to the location of
the fated 8704 borehole, as sketched in Figure 5.
EXPECTED MEAN ELEVATIONS (simplified)
THE EXTRAORDINARY REALITY (simplified)
Figure 4: a) Expected rock elevation 3 m over cavern arch.
b) The reality, highly idealized, to demonstrate adverse
effects on arching, and therefore a huge load on the support.
FATED CENTRE-LINE BOREHOLE 8704
Figure 5: The assumed components of the collapse.
4 ROCK QUALITY LOGGING IN CAVERN
During construction of the station cavern that collapsed
(on the east side of the shaft), geologists had registered an
increasing volume of medium quality class III rock mass
rating , with RMR = 44-48 in the centre of the cavern in
the direction of Rua Capri. This ‘core’ (B) of improved
rock is indicated by simplified cavern face maps, two of
which are shown in relation to cavern progress in Figure
6. Face logs also described some clay on two joint sets.
Figure 6: The RMR rock class values of the ‘core’ (B) and the
surrounding rock (A). Extracted from geologist logging sheets.
The Class III ‘core’ mapped along almost the whole
length of the cavern centre was surrounded by poorer
quality Class IV rock (RMR= 34-36) on either side (as
classes A/B/A). That this better quality rock ‘core’ could
be a threat to cavern stability was not of course
imagined, since approximately 3 m thickness of rock
cover had been ‘confirmed’ by all boreholes.
5 CONCEPTUAL RIDGE-OF-ROCK ORIGIN
The following figures are designed to illustrate a
concept: that variable sub-surface rock quality, when
steeply dipping, may stimulate differential weathering.
Figure 7: Conceptual model of potential source of rock ridge,
exhibiting higher velocity. Its adverse effect on arching and the
potential loading on arch support is easy to comprehend.
3

Figure 8: Conceptual stages in the development of a high-
standing ridge-of-rock, with faster weathering of the lower
quality surroundings. Parallels to ‘tor’ structures are apparent,
as suggested in the next figure.
Figure 9: The sketch is from Linton ( 1955). (‘The problem of
tors’). Despite the much less massive nature of gneiss (as
compared to granites), the remnants of more jointed, and
differentially weathered structures were clearly evident
throughout the stage-by-stage excavation. The arrow shows a
conceptual borehole 8704 location, between two towers, in this
case remnant towers or ‘tors’ of granite from SW England.
Figure 10 shows part of the flanks of the exposed
ridge or ‘core’ that had a loosened appearance due to its
fall of about 10 m. It exhibits a curved, smoothed surface,
due to deep weathering.
Figure 10: Part of the side of the smooth weathered ‘core’
exposed by excavation, here consisting of gneiss. It has
prominent cross-jointing, loosened by its rapid 9 to 10 m fall to
the floor of the cavern. The superficial UCS here may be as
low as 5 MPa, due to an original elevation about 9 m above the
arch, surrounded by the presumed saprolite of the Class IV
rock, as recorded at the lower level of the cavern.
Figure 10 is assumed to be a sample of ‘remnant’
Class III, but originating from a higher level (+10 m) than
when recorded by the geologist at the cavern face. Note
that the conceptual sketches in Figure 8 were created
before excavation had progressed to the level of this
fallen rock. The ridges could have been more rounded,
‘to aid’ (explain) the collapse, as a wedge phenomenon.
A photograph of part of the top of the exposed ridge is
reproduced in Figure 11. An original elevation of 705+2+
10 = 717 m is suggested, 11 m above the assumed rock
elevation of 706 m.
Figure 11: Part of the top of the ridge-of-rock, proving the high
original elevation (717 m). Remarkably, the investigating
institute working on behalf of the police, missed or ignored this
elevation discrepancy in their 3000 pages report to the
authorities.
6 THE COLLAPSE OF LATTICE GIRDER
SUPPORT
In order to compare with subsequent collapse
photographs, the robust appearance of the lattice girder
and S(fr) support is illustrated during a spraying cycle in
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 S(fr), which in this case would need to be combined with
RRS, or rib-reinforced lattice girders, to take care of the
lowest quality rock mass. (Q was estimated from 0.1 to
4). It is the opinion of the writer that all conventional
methods of support would have failed in this special case.

7 A BRIEF SUMMARY OF NUMERICAL

MODELLING OF THE CAUSE OF COLLAPSE

The writer, acting as independent consultant to the

Figure 12: Application of S(fr) of 35 to 40 cm thickness for
embedding the lattice girders, which had 25 and 30 mm ϕ bars.
Figure 12. Of course an important element of this
temporary support is the size and depth of the ‘elephant
footing’ foundations, which measured 50 x 60 cm and
were founded on rock that was variously weathered. It
was nominally class IV rock, based on the cavern
mapping. There was evidence of clay near the left wall.
consortium CVA following the collapse, was assisted in
analysis of the collapse mechanisms by Dr. Baotang
Shen, who performed FRACOD analyses of cracking
mechanisms beneath the ‘elephant footings’, and by Dr.
Stavros Bandis, who performed UDEC analyses of the
full-scale collapse mechanisms. These included the
modelling of plastic hinge development in the lattice-
reinforced shotcrete, using NM force-moment diagrams.
Figure 14 shows a brief glimse of one of the cracking
mechanisms. Nine models were performed with varying
rock strengths, deformation moduli and load levels.
Pinheiros Station Cavern - UCS=8MPa

The dramatic appearance of some of the collapsed

X Axis (m)
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
6.0 6.0

and folded lattice girders along part of the left wall is

5.5 Pxx (Pa): 0E+0 Pyy (Pa): 0E+0 5.5
Pxy (Pa): 0E+0

5.0 Max. Compres. Stress (Pa): 1.40664E+7 5.0

Max. Tensile Stress (Pa): 2.42942E+6

seen in Figure 13. The mesh reinforced wall shotcrete has

Creep Time (s): 0E+0
4.5 Creep Time Step (s): 1E+0
4.5
Max. Crack velocity (m/s): 0E+0
0
4.0 Cycle: 28 of 50 4.0

in this case been displaced inwards, due to assumed

Elastic fracture
Open fracture -0.1
3.5 Slipping fracture
3.5
Fracture with Water

failure of the ‘elephant footings’ in this location. The IPT

-0.2
3.0 Compressive stress 3.0
Tensile stress
-0.3
2.5 Fracom Ltd 2.5

drawings (Figures 3a, b and c) differentiate collapsed

Date: 19/12/2007 16:19:57
-0.4
Y Axis (m)

Y Axis (m)
2.0 2.0
-0.5

Principal Major Stress (Pa) xE7

arch shotcrete (light), and collapsed wall shotcrete
1.5 1.5
-0.6

1.0 1.0

(shaded), recorded in the collapsed positions.

-0.7

0.5 0.5
-0.8

0 0
-0.9

-0.5 -0.5
-1.0

-1.0 -1.0
-1.1

-1.5 -1.5
-1.2

-2.0 -2.0
-1.3

-2.5 -2.5
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
X Axis (m)

Figure 14: An example of FRACOD modelling of cracking

beneath the overloaded ‘elephant footings’.

Figure 13.: Evidence of ‘plastic-hinge’ development in the Figure 15: A final stage of collapse with UDEC, stage 2 invert.
lattice girders. Note the remnants of pre-grouting tubes just
above the collapsed shotcrete (and lattice girder) support.

The ‘folding’ of the lattice girders shown in Figure 13,

stands in stark contrast to the robust support shown
during construction, in Figure 12. It also emphasizes the
normal reliance on arching for cavern or tunnel stability,
with tangential stress combined with sufficient shear
strength, taking most of the assumed load. This of course
is the principal of NMT or permanent support with B + Figure 16.: The final adverse feature was the storm-water
drain, with reduced cross-section in just the ‘wrong’ location.

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