DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M.

ROMBLON

ELECTION PROTESTS
MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA

FACTS: In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the
winner thereof, receiving a total of 95,865 votes as against the 93,445 votes received by private
respondent. The private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC for
allegedly committing election frauds and irregularities which translated to the latter’s ostensible win as
Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole, private respondent claims that he is the actual winner of the
mayoralty elections in Taguig City. In the petitioner’s Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim,
she raised, among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the Election
Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. However, it was denied by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content?

HELD: The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly
to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the
division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer
the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are
not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. This does not mean that the
aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The
aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he
decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated is when the
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue
the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a
time limit, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed
beyond the reglementary period.

The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of
a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order,
or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying
the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for
certiorari. Although the rule admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order
is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same. However, none of the
circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.

In addition to that, certiorari will not lie in this case. The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two
prerequisites:

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

(1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and;

(2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Although it is not the duty of the Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the
appropriate remedy which she should have taken, we refer her to the cue found in Soriano, Jr. v.
COMELEC, i.e., [t]he aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of
the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. In addition, the protest
filed by private respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending before the
COMELEC, which should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances. Thereafter, the
COMELEC should decide these cases with dispatch.

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

EXECUTIONS PENDING APPEAL

MALALUAN VS. COMELEC
G.R. # 120193

FACTS: Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.
Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor
against the Petitioner. Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181
precincts of the said Municipality. The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal
Mayor. The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared
Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor. The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for
attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse
denominated as actual damages. Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award
upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.
COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual
damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court,
the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD: We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act
officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of
election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as
the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim
winners in electoral contests. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith,
has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office.”

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
PEREZ V COMELEC GR 133994
October 28, 1999

FACTS: On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the
Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later petitioner, as a voter and citizen,
filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the
ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one 1 year immediately before the day of
the elections as required by Art.6 Sec.6 of the Constitution. On May 10,1998, the first Division of the
COMELEC in a unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private
respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.

Issue: Whether or not residency in the respondent’s certificate of candidacy for governor actually
connotes domicile to warrant his disqualification from the position in the electoral district.

RULING: NO. As this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC it is the fact of residence,not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be deliberatw attempt to mislead,misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. There is substantial evidence supporting the
finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing
in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding. The private respondent was actually a
resident of the Third District for one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than 7 years
since July 1990.

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON

LOPEZ VS COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually declared the winner. On
October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the
Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for
any public office.Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. On
February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez
from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections,
Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the
office of Barangay Chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying
petitioner.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007. Lopez
was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for a public office in the Philippines.

Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his
oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles,
California; the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. Lopez’s failure to renounce his
American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.

DIGESTED BY SHIRLEY KRIS M. ROMBLON