Tohme V Branca Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Civil Division
West District, Santa Monica Courthouse, Department M
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

TOHME R. TOHME vs JOHN BRANCA, AS PERSONAL 10:30 AM
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL
JOSEPH JACKSON, DECEASED,, et al.
Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

Judicial Assistant: K. Metoyer ERM: None
Courtroom Assistant: J. Morgan Deputy Sheriff: None
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff(s): Emerson B. Luke (Telephonic); Dylan John Price (Telephonic)
For Defendant(s): HOWARD WEITZMAN By: Patricia Millett (Telephonic)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Status Conference; Hearing on Motion for Leave Motion for
Leave to File Under Seal; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Government Code sections 68086, 70044, and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956,
Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738, certified shorthand reporter is appointed as an official Court
reporter pro tempore in these proceedings, and is ordered to comply with the terms of the Court
Reporter Agreement. The Order is signed and filed this date.
The matter is called for hearing.
The Court has read and considered all documents filed hereto regarding the above-captioned
Motions and provides counsel with its written Tentative Ruling.
Counsel are given the opportunity to argue. After argument, the Court takes the matter under
submission. Later, the Court amends and adopts its Tentative Ruling as the Final Ruling as
follows:
**FINAL RULING**
BACKGROUND
On November 19, 2019 Tohme R. Tohme (“Plaintiff or “Tohme”) filed a complaint against John
Branca and John McClain as personal representatives of the Estate of Michael Joseph Jackson
(“The Estate” or “Decfendant”) and Does 1 -50 for breach of contract.
The complaint alleges that “[o]n February 17, 2012, Tohme filed a lawsuit against the Jackson
Estate (Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. SC115988) asserting causes of action for breach of
contract, accounting and declaratory relief and seeking compensation for his valuable services in
accordance with the terms of his agreements with Michael Jackson.” (Compl. ¶ 9.) “On May 21,
2019, after several days of trial, Tohme one the one hand, and the Jackson Estate, on the other
Minute Order Page 1 of 11
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


hand, reached an agreement on confidential terms to settle the Prior Litigation and for all parties
to dismiss their respective claims with prejudice (the “Settlement Agreement”). The parties put
their Settlement Agreement on the record before the Court, by and through their respective
counsel.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges “[t]he specific terms of the Settlement Agreement are
confidential and the Court ordered that the transcript containing the terms of the Settlement
Agreement be sealed; however, by way of reference, both counsel for the Jackson Estate as well
as counsel for Tohme—after first verbally confirming all of the material terms of the Settlement
Agreement in the presence of the Court—represented on the record that they had been authorized
by their respective clients to enter into the Settlement Agreement.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff further alleges that “the Parties attempted to memorialize the Settlement Agreement in
written form. On June 3, 2019, the Jackson Estate’s counsel sent an email to counsel for Tohme,
which purported to attach a ‘settlement agreement confirming the settlement reached on the
record at court.’” (Compl. ¶ 17.) However, Plaintiff alleges that “the Jackson Estate’s draft
settlement agreement included new terms that were never agreed upon by Tohme.” Plaintiff’s
counsel redlined the draft settlement agreement and the Jackson Estate dispute those terms. (Id. ¶
20.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the settlement agreement.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts
with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires
the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence,
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.)
“The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all
material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated
shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this
requirement of a separate statement may in the court's discretion constitute a sufficient ground
for denial of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(b)(1); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1350(c)(2) & (d).)

Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


“The opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material
facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating if the opposing party agrees or
disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely
any other material facts the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended
by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.
Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient
ground, in the court's discretion, for granting the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437b(b)(3)
(emphasis added).)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a
prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if
they can show that there is no triable issue of material fact or if they have a complete defense
thereto. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfiend Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1)
identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated
the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence
of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th
289, 294.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2):
A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has
no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of
action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as
to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon
the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists
but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as
to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court must consider all of the evidence
set forth in the papers, except evidence to which the Court has sustained an objection, as well as
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 467.)

Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


“For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication: A plaintiff or cross-
complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if
that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the
cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to
the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists
as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely
upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists
but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as
to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1) [emphasis added].)
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The Estate filed three evidentiary objections to the declaration of Dylan Price.
Objection numbers 1–3 are overruled.
Plaintiff filed evidentiary objections to the declarations of Zia Modabber and Patricia Millett and
exhibits, for a total of 8 objections.
Objection nos. 1-6 and 8 are sustained. As to objection nos. 5 and 6, which were addressed at
oral argument, the Court sustains the objections on relevancy grounds for reasons set forth
below. Objection no. 7 is overruled.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Estate requests judicial notice of Exhibits 1 – 9. These documents are judicially noticeable
as court records, therefore, the court GRANTS the Estate’s request.
ANALYSIS
PLAINTIFF’S INITIAL BURDEN
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the sole cause of action against the
Estate for breach of contract. Plaintiff argues that he has established all of the elements of his
action. The elements of a breach of oral contract are the same as those for a written contract.
(Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 437, 453.) To meet his initial burden,
Plaintiff must plead and prove all elements of a breach of contract, specifically (1) the contract,
(2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4)
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


damage to plaintiff therefrom. (Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Constr. Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887,
913.)
Breach of contract
Plaintiff alleges that the Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to the Settlement Agreement.
(Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges, “On May 21, 2019, after several days of trial, Tohme on the one
hand, and the Jackson Estate, on the other hand, reached an agreement on confidential terms to
settle the Prior Litigation and for all parties to dismiss their respective claims with prejudice (the
‘Settlement Agreement’). The parties put their Settlement Agreement on the record before the
Court, by and through their respective counsel.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Plaintiff has performed all obligations on his part to be performed
under the Settlement Agreement, except to the extent excused by the Jackson Estate. (Id. ¶ 33.)
Plaintiff alleges that the Jackson Estate has breached by failing to perform under the contract.
(Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has been damaged as a result. (Id. ¶ 35.)
“Settlement agreements may . . . be enforced by motion for summary judgment, by a separate

suit in equity or by amendment of the pleadings to raise the settlement as an affirmative defense.
Settlement agreements not enforceable under section 664.6 are governed by the legal principles
applicable to contracts in general. Thus, unless a writing is required by the statute of frauds, oral
settlement agreements are enforceable in the same manner as oral agreements in general.
(Gorman v. Holte (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 984, 211 Cal.Rptr. 34.)” (Nicholson v. Barab (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1681[emphasis added].)
A. The Contract
The essential elements of a contract are: “(1) Parties capable of contracting; [¶] (2) Their
consent; [¶] (3) A lawful object; and, [¶] (4) A sufficient cause or consideration.” (Civil Code, §
1550.) The redacted transcript containing the oral contract between the Estate and Plaintiff is
attached as exhibit A to the Declaration of Dylan Price and was also filed under seal. (See Ex. A)
(P UMFs 4-6.) Plaintiff argues that oral settlement agreements entered into by parties, through
counsel, are enforceable, citing Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 97.
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that whether parties intended for an oral agreement to be
immediately enforceable depends on the circumstances of the particular case. (Columbia Pictures
Corp. v. De Toth (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 620, 629.) Upon review of the under-seal transcript, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has presented evidence of an enforceable oral agreement between the
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


parties, made through their attorneys, containing the material terms, and accepted by the parties
through counsel. The circumstances of this case leads the Court to the conclusion that the parties
intended to be immediately bound by the oral agreement. (UMF 5, 8.) Plaintiff meets his initial
burden with respect to this element.
B. Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance

Plaintiff argues that he performed under the contract. In support, Plaintiff cites UMFs 6-8.
Plaintiff also provides evidence that he moved to dismiss his complaint on the record on May 21,
2019. (UMF No. 7.) Upon review of the sealed evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
presented evidence that Plaintiff performed under the agreement, including his oral agreement to
a mutual general release of claims against the Estate. (UMF No. 6.) Plaintiff meets his initial
burden with respect to this element.
C. Defendant’s breach, and damages caused from breach

Plaintiff argues that Defendant breached the settlement agreement. In support, Plaintiff cites
sealed evidence. (UMF No. 10.) Upon review of the sealed evidence, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has presented evidence that Defendant breached the settlement agreement and has been
damaged as a result. Plaintiff meets his initial burden with respect to this element.
THE ESTATE’S BURDEN

Since Plaintiff has met his initial burden of proving all elements of his cause of action, the
burden shifts to the Estate to demonstrate a dispute of material fact as to any of the elements of
breach of contract, or a complete defense. The Estate argues that there are triable issues of
material fact as to whether Plaintiff actually performed under the contract as required. The Estate
also argues that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether there was a meeting of the
minds with respect to a material term in the contract and whether the parties intended for the
settlement to become binding upon execution of a written agreement. Finally, the Estate argues
that the Court cannot grant summary judgment based on judicial estoppel.
A. Performance
The Estate argues that Plaintiff has not shown that he has performed all of his obligations under
the settlement agreement. In support of this the estate cites sealed evidence. (DSS, Facts 29-34,
38 and 41.) However, with respect to that provision, there is nothing in the oral settlement
agreement requiring further action from either party, including reducing the oral agreement and
mutual general release to a writing. Therefore, Defendant has failed to show that there is a
dispute of material fact as to this element. While Defendant cites to subsequent negotiations
between the parties to enter into a written agreement with additional terms, those subsequent
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


negotiations are irrelevant to the determination of whether Plaintiff performed his obligations
under the May 21, 2019 oral settlement agreement.
B. Mutual Assent/Mutual Consent
The Estate also argues that there is a dispute as to what the parties agreed to. (See Mot. at 15.)
Mutual assent or mutual consent is an essential element of a contract and “is determined by
objective rather than subjective criteria.” (Estate of Thottam (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1340
[citations omitted].) If there is no mutual assent, there is no contract. (See Civil Code, §§ 1550,
1565.) “The manifestation of mutual consent is generally achieved through the process of offer
and acceptance. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 117, pp. 156–
157.)” (DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 800, 813.)
“Where the existence of a contract is at issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more
than one inference, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the contract actually existed.
But if the material facts are certain or undisputed, the existence of a contract is a question for the
court to decide. (Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 396, 407, 110
Cal.Rptr. 675.)” (Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.) Whether the
contract contains definite terms is also a question of law. (Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp. (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 613, 623.)
As an initial position, the Estate argues “that the recital on the record was not a complete
statement of settlement terms is clear from the transcript.” (Opp. p. 8). The transcript, however,
directs otherwise:
COURT: And those are the full terms and conditions of the settlement.
MR. MODABBER: Yes
MR. CURRY: Yes.
(Curry Decl., Exh. A, p. 27). The Estate further argues that because there was subsequent
disagreement as to one of the material terms in the oral agreement, there is no mutual assent. The
Estate provides no evidence as to a dispute of what this particular material term meant before the
parties agreed to settle the case before the Court. Plaintiff argued and provided evidence that
there was mutual assent here by presenting evidence that there was an offer and acceptance
between the parties. Furthermore, the term the Estate argues there is a disagreement over (mutual
general release) is a standard term with a standard meaning. For these reasons, the Estate has
failed to show that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether there was mutual assent.
Therefore, the Estate has failed to negate an essential element of breach of contract.
C. Whether there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the parties intended the settlement to
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


become binding upon a written agreement?

The Estate argues that there is a dispute of fact as to whether the settlement agreement would be
binding upon the execution of a written settlement agreement. Defendant’s position is that the
general rule relied upon by Plaintiff is inapplicable in this instance. (See Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby,
Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534; Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91,
97; and Magness Petroleum Co. v. Warren Resources of Cal., Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 901,
910.)
In Richardson, at a mandatory settlement conference, “husband appeared in propria persona, and
the conference took place in Judge Storch's chambers without a court reporter. Wife's counsel
understood that husband offered to release to wife the money deposited in court, and wife in turn
would dismiss the consolidated cases. She had 48 hours in which to accept the offer.”
(Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) “[W]ife's counsel accepted the
settlement offer and sent husband a proposed settlement agreement, but husband imposed
additional conditions which had not been discussed before the judge.” (Id. at 97.) The trial court
found that there was an enforceable oral agreement to settle the dispute. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal found that “[t]he trial judge properly confirmed the settlement agreement.” (Ibid.)
“The mere fact that a formal written agreement to the same effect is to be prepared and signed
does not alter the binding validity of the oral agreement. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Kohn v.
Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534.) The court noted that “a [proposed]
written agreement not yet signed may be enforceable if the parties orally agree to the proposed
written terms with the intention that the oral agreement should thereupon become binding.
(Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 358, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d
598.) [footnote omitted.]” (Magness Petroleum Co. v. Warren Resources of Cal., Inc. (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 901, 910) In a footnote, the Magness Court pointed out that the issue before the
Banner Entertainment Court was “whether a proposed written agreement is binding on a party
who has not signed it.” (Id. fn. 6 [emphasis in original].)
Defendant further argues that under Columbia Pictures, the contract between Plaintiff and
Defendant is unenforceable because:
it is, of course, likewise the law that if it is the intention of the parties that before a contract shall
exist between them, the terms of the contract are to be reduced to writing and signed by them, a
complete or binding contract does not arise until a writing evidencing the terms of the agreement
has been executed. [Citations omitted.] The distinction between the two lines of cases is pointed
out in O'Donnell v. Lutter, 68 Cal.App.2d 376, 382, 156 P.2d 958. Whether it was the mutual
intention of the parties that the oral agreement should be binding eo instante is to be determined
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


by the surrounding facts and circumstances of a particular case and is a question of fact for the
trial court.
(Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 620, 629.) It is also the law that
“when the respective parties orally agree upon all of the terms and conditions of an agreement
with the mutual intention that it shall thereupon become binding, the mere fact that a formal
written agreement to the same effect is to be prepared and signed does not alter the binding
validity of the oral agreement.” (Ibid.) Here, the parties orally agreed to all of the terms and
conditions of a settlement agreement. (Price Decl., Exh. A, p. 27). Defendant fails to produce any
evidence that parties intended for there to be a binding contract after a writing was produced,
such that there exists a material issue of dispute fact. Moreover, Defendant has not produced any
evidence to refute the fact that all of the material terms of the settlement agreement were
included in the oral agreement before this Court, or that a party represented to the Court that this
was merely a conditional settlement.
Defendant has failed to show that there is a dispute of material fact as to any element of
Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract. Since Plaintiff met his initial burden, Plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
D. Judicial Estoppel
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. [Citations.]
The doctrine's dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties
from opponents' unfair strategies. [Citation.] Application of the doctrine is discretionary.” (Koo
v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc., (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 719, 735. The doctrine applies when: (1)
the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the
tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent;
and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. (Jackson v.
County of Los Angeles, (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 171, 181.) Judicial estoppel focuses on “the
relationship between the litigant the judicial system and is designed to protect the integrity of the
judicial process.” (Id. at 182).
As set forth above, the Court concludes that the parties entered into a binding settlement
agreement with all of the material terms placed on the record in open court. Even if the
agreement was not binding, however, the Court would conclude that the Estate is judicially
estopped from denying the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. The undisputed facts are
Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


that the Estate’s counsel (1) represented to the Court that the matter was settled, and (2) that all
of the material terms of that agreement had been placed on the record in open court. (UF Nos. 5-
6). The Court relied upon these representations and dismissed the jury and the parties’ respective
claims. In addition, the Estate has presented no evidence that their May 21, 2019 position was
not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud or mistake.
In opposition, the Estate argues that there are material issues of disputed fact as to the terms of
the settlement, which prevents entry of summary judgment. (Opp. at p. 19). The inquiry,
however, is not whether the parties now disagree as to the terms of the settlement, but whether
the Estate represented to the Court that the parties had settled the matter and that all material
terms had been placed on the record in open court. Those facts are not in dispute. Here, the
Estate has taken two positions before the Court that are totally inconsistent. Moreover, the Court
relied upon the Estate’s first position of May 21, 2019 that an enforceable settlement had been
reached and in reliance, dismissed the jury in the middle of trial in addition to all claims.
The facts of this case are comparable those in Blix St. Records, Inc. v. Cassidy, (2010) 191 Cal.
App. 4th 39. In Blix, the parties reached a settlement agreement mid-trial, signed a short form
settlement agreement, and most importantly, represented to the court that the matter was settled.
(Id. at 42.) Based upon these representations, the court discharged the jury. (Id. at 44). After
negotiations regarding bankruptcy court approval and a long form settlement agreement broke
down, Plaintiff took the position that the prior agreement was not an enforceable contract and did
not contain all the material terms. (Id. at 49.) In a subsequent court trial, the trial court held that
even though the settlement agreement did not constitute an enforceable contract, Blix Street was
judicially estopped from denying the enforceability of the settlement agreement. (Id. at 45-46).
Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that “Blix Street took two totally inconsistent
positions in judicial proceedings—originally that there was an enforceable settlement agreement,
but later that the settlement agreement was not enforceable. Blix Street was successful in
asserting the first position because the trial court accepted Blix Street's position by terminating
the trial and discharging the jury.” (Id. at 51).
The same fact pattern is present in this case. Moreover, there are no disputes as to these material
facts. For these reasons, the Estate is judicially estopped from asserting that the Settlement
Agreement entered into on May 21, 2019 is not enforceable.
Conclusion

Civil Division
19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020


Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
The Court further grants Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to file under seal.
**END OF FINAL RULING**
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Tohme R. Rohme on 03/10/2020 is Granted.
The Motion for Leave to File Under Seal filed by Tohme R. Rohme on 03/09/2020 is Granted.
On the Court's own motion, the Hearing on Motion to Seal DOCUMENTS AND
OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled for 08/27/2020 is
taken off-calendar and deemed moot.
Clerk to give notice.
Certificate of Mailing is attached.

Tohme V Branca Ruling

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Tohme V Branca Ruling

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

The matter is called for hearing.

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

Minute Order Page 2 of 11

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

Minute Order Page 3 of 11

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

PLAINTIFF’S INITIAL BURDEN

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

“Settlement agreements may . . . be enforced by motion for summary judgment, by a separate

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

B. Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance

C. Defendant’s breach, and damages caused from breach

THE ESTATE’S BURDEN

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

become binding upon a written agreement?

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

Minute Order Page 10 of 11

19SMCV02023 July 14, 2020

Judge: Honorable Mark A. Young CSR: Audrey Lehman, CSR # 12738

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

**END OF FINAL RULING**

Clerk to give notice.

Certificate of Mailing is attached.

Minute Order Page 11 of 11

You might also like

END OF FINAL RULING