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European Journal of Social Theory 2(2): 249–252 EJST

Copyright © 1999 Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi

VIEWPOINTS

Reply to Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Critical

Theory at the Crossroads: Comments
on Axel Honneth’s Theory of
Recognition’*
The title Andreas Kalyvas put forth in his critical discussion of my book is indeed
well chosen: the still impressively growing system of Habermasian theory desig-
nates a highly ambivalent heritage, which could be developed in at least two
directions, and whose choice will decide the future of critical theory. Like the
fully matured system of the later Hegel, Jürgen Habermas’s social theory today
represents simultaneously two tendencies between which the succeeding gener-
ation will in some sense have to decide. On one side is the tendency of a concep-
tual stirring into the ‘mainstream’ of political philosophy, with which in essence
a normative reinforcement of the liberal-democratic tradition is concerned. On
the other side is the tendency of a critical questioning of this institutional arrange-
ment, which is accompanied by the suspicion of a social pathology of capitalist
society as a whole. The second of these two tendencies in Habermas’s work is in
some way illustrated by the Theory of Communicative Action, whose aim, despite
all concentration on the justification of a concept of communicative rationality,
in the end, is supposed to be the attempt to produce a kind of post-metaphysi-
cal reformulation of fundamental insights of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. The
first of these two tendencies in Habermas’s work is now to be found in his
‘discourse theory of law’, which was developed, under the heavy influence of the
Kantian traditions of political philosophy, in Between Facts and Norms. Against
this highly ambivalent heritage of Habermasian theory, therefore, the younger
generation of those who have grown up in the shadow of his intimidating system,
in fact, find themselves at a juncture: by their choice of concepts with which they
want the work to be continued are the future and continuation of critical theory
also implicitly decided.
With this theoretical and political situation as his background, Andreas Kalyvas
attempts to examine my book, The Struggle for Recognition, for its ability to
continue the project, begun by Habermas, for a new formulation of critical theory.
In this process, Kalyvas is guided by the valid intuition that, with my concept of
recognition, I have followed the intention of pursuing the second of the two
tendencies described above. After, on the whole, a fair and correct reconstruction
of the central steps I have undertaken in my book through my attachment to the

* European Journal of Social Theory 2(1), 1999: 95–98. 1368-4310[199905]2:2;249–252;007900

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250 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

young Hegel, so as to formulate the normative frame of a critical social theory with
the aid of the concept of recognition, Kalyvas arrives in his examination at the
negative conclusion that I have failed in my intention. This he essentially validates
with two errors which, taken together, lead to the suggestion that my proposed
distinction between three independent forms of recognition (love, right and soli-
darity) cannot be viewed as a normative basis for such an enterprise. I see both
objections in differing degrees as wrong and therefore want to briefly discuss them
consecutively.
(1) The first objection, which Kalyvas formulates, extends in summary to the
thesis that I try to essentialize the normative principles of Habermas’s discourse
ethic through a reliance on injured feelings of recognition and that I thereby
entangle myself in the mistake of treating emotional reactions as such as a
sufficient grounding for normative demands. A more precise engagement with
the intention that I associate with the categorical explication of the three concepts
of recognition, however, would have kept Kalyvas from the premise which under-
lies this observation. It would be adventurous if I took, even with the help of a
clearly differentiated conception of recognition, every accessible experience of
disrespect as normatively justified in the sense that it contains a justified claim
(of whatever kind) to recognition. The idea that human subjects on the whole
are dependent on three different forms of recognition for the development of
their identity leads, first, only to the development of a categorical framework with
which possible motives for social indignation or resistance might be more appro-
priately understood. The thesis which results from this suggests that it is in
general more meaningful to assume the experience of disrespect or humiliation
as motivational cause for protest and resistance instead of presupposing, as was
common in Marxist theory for a long time, the (utilitarian) dynamic of injured
interests. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in my text that I have contributed
to the illusion that every empirically detectable sentiment of social disrespect as
such already contains a morally founded claim to recognition. On the contrary,
in the final part of an essay which was meant to place my proposed concept of
recognition within the tradition of critical theory, I have even cited as evidence
for the impossibility of such a conclusion the remark of a neo-nazi youth, who
explained his participation in hostile activities against foreigners by his experi-
ence of humiliation as an unemployed youth (Honneth, 1994). I only point this
out to clarify how absurd the accusation is that I associate normative demands to
a discussion purely of feelings of disrespect. The relation in which a theory of
recognition would stand to the discourse ethic is much more complicated than
Kalyvas seems to recognize.
A first indication of how complicated the relation in fact is, is in some sense
already provided by the last chapter of my book, which under the title ‘Inter-
subjective Conditions for Personal Integrity’ is meant to outline a formal concep-
tion of morality (Sittlichkeit) (the good life). Kalyvas refers to this concluding
section, but without seeing it in its appropriate context. This chapter fulfills the
function of outlining a minimal as well as formal theory of the good life in which
intersubjective preconditions of relations of recognition are sketched which can
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Axel Honneth Viewpoints 251

be valid as invariant preconditions for the integrity of human personality.

However, because the demands on mutual recognition have grown during
normative learning processes, I want to clarify in this connection that such
conditions are not completely removed from historical changes. In any case,
within the framework of my book such a formal conception merely takes on the
function of providing a first indication of the manner in which progressive
elements would be normatively distinguished from regressive elements in actual
struggles for recognition. Not every act of social resistance is normatively justi-
fied because sentiments of injured recognition are expressed through it. Rather,
such actual indignation and feelings of injustice can only be justified in light of
an independent idea of the good which can designate the reasons for the legiti-
macy of certain demands for recognition. The argument which would have to be
put forth here would probably sound something like this: such demands for
recognition are justified when it can be shown that, with regard to my social
anthropological intuition, they are necessary for the maintenance of the integrity
of a person. Yet that does not say anything about who exactly in relation to whom
has to comply with what kind of expectation of recognition; this could only be
achieved by a theory of morality in which moral obligations are grasped as some-
thing which develops out of the normative implications of our social praxis of
recognition. I have undertaken a first step in this direction in an essay which is
a provisional impression of how complicated the relation of the discourse ethic
to the morality of recognition will be (Honneth, 1997).
(2) The second, strong, objection which Kalyvas raises against my book leads
to the accusation that I not only ignored the fact of the symbolic mediation of
the structure of collective identities, but that beyond this, I also failed to pay
attention to their dependence on social power relations. It appears to me that in
this criticism lies, in fact, an extremely valuable piece of advice which suggests
that a widening of the concept of recognition is necessary, but, once again, I am
unsure if the basic idea of my book can really be challenged. Basically, we have
to distinguish between two dimensions of symbolic transmission among collec-
tive identities. However, due to my book’s primary intentions, these two dimen-
sions do not play any role whatsoever. First, it is certainly appropriate to
ideal-typically distinguish between group identities which are freely chosen and
communicatively achieved and group identities which have been forcefully
brought about through outside coercion. As many present-day examples illus-
trate, both groups will, under normal circumstances, fight for the social recog-
nition of their collective identities (whether it be on a legal or cultural level). Even
though this theoretically introduced distinction might be of little significance to
those whom it actually concerns, it plays a vital role in the normative evaluation
of the aims of recognition itself. Only in the first instance of the ‘freely chosen’
collective identity and its congruence with liberal legal codes are we able to speak
of a legitimate claim to recognition, while the second instance of the forced
identity necessitates a focus on the possibility of a social transcendence of stigma-
tization and the allocation of force. The same distinction repeats itself in a differ-
ent form and on a second level, namely, where the type and manner of granted
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252 European Journal of Social Theory 2(2)

recognition are at stake. Here too, it is appropriate to ideal-typically differenti-

ate between a type of (legal or social esteem [Wertschätzung]) recognition which
does justice to identity claims, and one which is manipulative and thus falsi-
fied.What can thereby be rendered justice is the fact that, in as far as they produce
a stereotypical image of the socially recognized subject or collectivity, legal as well
as appreciative forms of social recognition may exhibit an ideological character.
Such a use of the concept of ideology corresponds interestingly with that of
Althusser, who wanted to conceive of it as manipulative ‘addressing as’ (interpo-
lating). For the purposes of an empirically oriented social theory, all of the former
constitute indispensable distinctions. Andreas Kalyvas fails to sufficiently realize
that these distinctions are based on a normative concept of autonomy which
ought to coincide approximately with what in the last chapter of my book I have
outlined as a necessary condition of self-realization. But the decisive issue is in
reality something else. I did not develop a normatively grounded social theory in
my book; I wanted to outline the basic categories for a social theory in which
moral demands re-attain visibility only as an internal component of social reality.
In short, my intention was to illustrate that the morality of social reality is always
already effective in the form of claims to recognition. With that I neither wanted
to supply the normative viewpoints under which the different recognition claims
themselves can be evaluated, nor was I able to introduce the social-theoretical
categories that are necessary to descriptively grasp the previously mentioned
distinctions between a freely chosen and an imposed collective identity, as well
as autonomy conducive and manipulative, that is to say ideological, recognition.
In conclusion, Andreas Kalyvas seems to have completely misunderstood the
purpose of my book. The latter neither represents the moral-philosophical
outline which provides evaluative criteria for the normative judgement of recog-
nition demands, nor is it a social-theoretical sketch which is able to grasp the
social reality of recognition relations. Rather, my book is neither more nor less
than a philosophically and anthropologically argumentative attempt, influenced
by the early Hegel, to highlight the type of morality which in the social lifeworld
already operates in the form of expectations of recognition.

Axel Honneth, University of Frankfurt

Translated by Ingrid Mittmannsgruber

References

Honneth, Axel (1994) ‘The Social Dynamics of Disrespect’, Constellations 1(2): 255–69.
Honneth, Axel (1997) ‘Recognition and Moral Obligation’, Social Research 64(1): 16–35.