Richard Kitchener - The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology

The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology
Author(s): Richard F. Kitchener

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Sep., 1981), pp. 400-415
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
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THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY*
RICHARD F. KITCHENERt
Department of Philosophy
Colorado State University
Although the theory of Jean Piaget is correctly characterized as genetic ep

istemology, its nature and scope remain unclear and controversial. An exam
nation of Piaget's Introduction a I'epistemologie genetique indicates that Piag
relies heavily upon a model of comparative anatomy and, consequently, tha
genetic epistemology is about both the history of science and individual devel-
opment. This biological model seems to be the basis for Piaget's view that th
history of science can be seen as a (Kantian) history of scientific concep
whereas psychogenetic development is a history of these very same concepts o
the individual level. Finally, although there are passages indicating a differe
interpretation of the scope of genetic epistemology, I give several reasons f
preferring the more liberal interpretation.
Introduction. It is now customary among certain groups of peo

label Jean Piaget a genetic epistemologist (instead of a child psycholo
and to refer to his theory as a 'genetic epistemology' (instead of m
a cognitive-developmental theory of psychological development
change of label reflects Piaget's own conceptualization of his theo
is without doubt a more accurate representation of Piaget's progr
this is correct, however, then most people have misunderstood t
of Piaget's theory (mistaking it for child psychology). But if P
theory is a genetic epistemology (somehow distinct from child ps
ogy), there is obviously a pressing need to understand both what gen
epistemology is, and how it differs from child psychology, for until
is done we will not be able to fully understand and evaluate the
theory of Piaget. There have been surprisingly few discussions, howe
of the nature of genetic epistemology (although there have been
discussions of the relevance of genetic epistemology for more traditi
philosophical epistemology [Hamlyn 1971, 1978; Kaplan 1971; Kitc
1980a, 1980b; Russell 1978; Taylor 1971; Toulmin 1971; Wartofsky
1971]).
In what is perhaps the most widely known and often cited philosophical
discussion of this question (an interchange between Hamlyn 1971; Toul-
*Received January 1981.
tI wish to thank Guy Cellerier, Pat McKee and Pierre Moessinger whose comments
about the issues discussed in this paper have been very helpful. I also wish to thank two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981) pp. 400-415

Copyright ? 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association.
400
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 401
min 1971; and Kaplan 1971), one crucial issue that clearly stood
requiring much more discussion concerned what we might call th
of genetic epistemology: is it about the growth of knowledge in
dividual (psychogenesis), does it concern the growth of scientific
edge (sociogenesis or historiogenesis), or does it perhaps include
Both Hamlyn and Toulmin initially took genetic epistemology to be
the individual (psychogenesis), but Kaplan convinced them othe
arguing that "'genetic epistemology', a la Piaget, is not reducib
nor identifiable with the development of intelligence in the ind
(1971, p. 66). The general impression created by Kaplan's discus
Piaget-both on the part of Hamlyn and Toulmin and perhaps e
the general reader-was that Piaget considers genetic epistemolog
concerned with the development of scientific knowledge. Hamly
example, remarks (1971, p. 3):
B. Kaplan points out that Piaget . . defined genetic epistemo
as the study of successive states of a science as regards its d
opment, and thus distinguishes between genetic epistemology and
psychology of intelligence. This raises many questions about P
attitude toward the thesis that there is a parallelism between ont
and phylogeny, but I cannot think that Piaget in general exclude
study of intellectual development in the individual from genetic
temology.
Toulmin (private conversation) has made the same point: "according to

Kaplan, genetic epistemology is really about the history of science."
Contrary to what both Hamlyn and Toulmin say, Kaplan did admit that,
according to Piaget, "genetic psychology of intelligence is clearly rele-
vant to epistemology", but since it is possible for psychogenesis to be
"relevant" to genetic epistemology but still play only a subsidiary role,
the general reader might still have come away with the general impression
(as apparently Hamlyn and Toulmin did) that genetic epistemology is
really about the growth of science (even though Piaget quite clearly and
explicitly denies this).2 But if, on the other hand, genetic epistemology
is not to be identified with the history of science, what then is its scope?
Does it deal only (or primarily) with psychogenesis, or does it encompass
both psychogenesis and historiogenesis? In order to answer these ques-
'The terms 'historiogenesis' and 'sociogenesis' will be used interchangeably to refer to

the growth of knowledge in the species (e.g., the history of science, the cultural trans-
mission of knowledge, etc.) as opposed to the growth of knowledge in the individual
(psychogenesis).
2In private conversation for example (June 20, 1979) Piaget responded to my question,
"Is genetic epistemology about the history of science, the individual, or both?" with "Of
course, both!"
402 RICHARD F. KITCHENER
tions, however, we must first know how Piaget defines the n

genetic epistemology and how he conceives its goal. We must
termine how Piaget characterizes the task of the history of sc
toriogenesis) as well as individual development (psychogenesi
which we may be in a position to answer our question conce
scope of genetic epistemology. Finally, if genetic epistemology
preted so as to include both historiogenesis and psychogenesis,
need to know how the two genetic fields are related to each o
they, for example, related in a parallel fashion, as suggested b
genetic law that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", or are th
in a much more complex fashion? In this paper I examine only
two questions, leaving the third one (concerning the relation betw
history of science and genetic psychology) for another paper
1981b). Likewise, another question not dealt with here concerns th
possibility of a genetic epistemology. Since I have argued els
(Kitchener 1980a, 1980b) that genetic epistemology in general i
ceptually misguided and in fact philosophically plausible, I will no
those arguments here but rather assume there are no insurmount
jections to a genetic epistemology.
I. Genetic Epistemology. What is genetic epistemology? Obvi

the name suggests, it deals with "the genesis of knowledge" a
often characterizes it as the study of knowledge as a function
velopment (Piaget 1950a, p. 13; 1957, p. 13). This leads quite n
to defining it in the following way:
(1) Genetic epistemology is the study of the passage from

lesser knowledge to states of knowledge [that are judge
more advanced (or superior) (1950a, p. 12; 1957, p. 13; 1
p. 7).3
A somewhat similar definition can be found in several other passages of
Piaget, but one whose form stresses a slightly different aspect of genetic
epistemology (namely its explanatory role):
(2) Genetic epistemology is the study of the mechanisms of the in-

crease of knowledge (1957, p. 14).
(Piaget often qualifies this as 'intellectual' mechanisms or 'epistemolog-

ical' mechanisms.) Genetic epistemology thus attempts to explain the
3L'etude du passage des etats de moindre connaissance aux etats de connaissance plus
poussee." Piaget sometimes (1950a, p. 12) adds the word "judged to be" before "ad-
vanced" in order to avoid certain philosophical issues and objections concerning the nor-
mative dimension, but this caveat does not seriously affect the present discussion, nor
really escape the underlying philosophical issues.
growth of knowledge, in particular "to explain how the transition

from a lower level of knowledge to a level that is judged to b
The nature of these transitions is a factual question" (1971, p.
As they stand, these definitions are of little help in answering
tion concerning the scope of genetic epistemology, just as the
shed much light on the question of the nature of genetic epist
Instead they simply raise several more questions in turn. (a) W
example, does Piaget mean by 'knowledge'? Does he have i
particular (philosophical) interpretation of the nature of knowledg
his account relatively neutral? (b) Does he believe that knowled
does advance or progress (and if so, how does he justify this c
Assuming that genetic epistemology does not merely attempt to d
the course of development in, say, the history of physics, ho
explain the increase in knowledge? Does it, for example, attem
vide empirical psychological explanations of the development o
edge (and if so, what does Piaget mean by a psychological exp
or do genetic explanations advance normative epistemologica
tions (and if so, how does genetic epistemology differ from,
perian philosophy of science in which one attempts to provide
reconstruction of the growth of scientific knowledge)? (Kitchener
In order to begin to answer these questions concerning the n
scope of genetic epistemology, we must turn to Piaget's magn
(Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique [1950a, 1950b, 1950c]
volume work, which is the synthesis (Piaget says) he had been
about from the beginning of his studies (1952, p. 255) and a w
must surely be taken as authoritative for his views on these an
questions. In these volumes one finds a biological model lyin
his conceptualization of genetic epistemology, a model of gen
temology as a mental comparative anatomy, and one he has
to seriously hold throughout his later career.
II. Genetic Epistemology as a Mental Comparative Anatom

chogenesis and the History of Science. According to Piaget,
epistemology (and the genetic method in general) is concerned wit
Piaget calls) the real or psychological 'construction' of knowled
then all knowledge (according to Piaget) implies a structure and a
(1950a, p. 14). (Why this is supposed to follow is not obvious
parently Piaget's general biological epistemology is its source
proceeds to suggest that "The study of a mental structure con
kind of anatomy and the comparison of diverse structures can
4This general biological epistemology has been criticized by several individ

cially by Tripp (1978). See also Kitchener (1978).
ilated to a kind of comparative anatomy. The analysis of functio

responds, on the other hand, to a kind of physiology and in the
common functions, to a general physiology" (1950a, p. 14). Thu
pressed by the similarity between biological structure/function and
mological structure/function, Piaget suggests it may be useful
genetic epistemology as involving both a mental anatomy (the st
mental structure), a comparative mental anatomy (the study of
mental structures) and a mental physiology (the study of menta
tions). In biology, according to Piaget, comparative anatomy u
methods: (1) it studies homologous structures in adult organism
it studies the structural relations between the fin, the wing, and th
in various species), and (2) when this method fails or is inadeq
resorts to embryology, which studies the ontogenetic development
individual (1950a, p. 14). By analogy, Piaget suggests, there are
comparable methods available to a mental comparative anatomy
genetic epistemology): (1) it can study the evolutionary structur
tions between certain concepts (e.g., number, space, time, physic
tity) in such a way as to map their structural relations occurring ov
(e.g., positive integers/fractions/negative numbers, etc.). This
method actually employed by certain historians and philosopher
entific thought who employ the historical-critical method (1950a
(2) But this method is not sufficient by itself and must be supplem
by a mental embryology or psychogenesis, which studies "the g
of the construction of all the essential notions or categories of
during the course of the individual's intellectual evolution from bir
adulthood" (1950a, pp. 16-17).5 Genetic epistemology (our comp
mental anatomy) consists, therefore, of both methods, the historico
ical method and psychogenesis. "In sum, the method of genetic
mology as a whole consists of a close collaboration between the histo
critical and the psychogenetic methods . ." (1950a, p. 17). As P
comments clearly bring out, his use of biology as a model of kn
leads him to the view that genetic epistemology is a kind of mental
parative anatomy, i.e., a comparison of diverse mental structu
tween, say, the child and the scientist throughout the history of k
edge. Piaget's plan was to complete the biological analogy by atte
to construct a mental anatomy (psychogenetic structures), a mental
iology (the process of equilibration in the individual), and a general
tal physiology (a general theory of equilibration applicable to b
togenesis and phylogenesis). For our purposes, however, the key
5' ... c'est la construction de toutes les notions essentielles ou categories de l

dont on peut chercher d retracer la genese au cours de 1'evolution intelle
l'individu, entre la naissance et l'arrivee d l'dge adulte ..."
here is that of a mental comparative anatomy, whose two me

the historico-critical method and the psychogenetic method.
The Historico-Critical Method. Beginning with his early pub

(1924, 1925), Piaget has always given an important place to the his
critical method, a method employed by Brunschvicg, Duhem, B
Reymond, Milhaud, Boutroux, Meyerson, Koyre, Canguilhem,
ers.6 Piaget describes this method in slightly different terms thr
his career but what is significant for our purposes is Piaget
tualization of it as a history of concepts (a kind of intellectual his
history of ideas), a conceptual history covering not all concepts o
but rather only those categories which a Kantian might consi
"necessary for thought" (especially scientific thought), e.
space, time, causality, quantity, classification, etc. (Piaget 1925
The historico-critical method is concerned with the development
particular scientific concepts during the course of the history of
and it is concerned not only with the history of a single con
as time) but also with its conceptual relationships with other
(e.g., space and matter).
If one turns to Piaget's Introduction a 1'epistemologie g
(1950a, 1950b, 1950c) one will find this type of structural h
ideas discussed in considerable detail-Volume I is devoted to mathe-
matics, Volume II to physics, and Volume III to biology, psychology and
sociology. But, strangely enough, one will not find discussed there the
typical Anglo-Saxon history of science associated, for example, with the
names of Butterfield, Clagett, Cohen, Crombie, Gillespie, Hall, etc. In
this latter type of history of science one often finds debates centering on
the relative merits of 'external' versus 'internal' history of science. How-
ever, in Piaget's three volumes there is no concern with either type of
history. External history of science is typically characterized as being
concerned with the connection between science and its larger social con-
text involving, say, religion or economics. "Standard topics in external
history of science include the relation between science and religion, sci-
ence and economics, as well as scientific institutions and education, and
the relation between science and technology" (Kuhn 1971, p. 140). Vir-
tually nothing about such topics can be found in Piaget. Even internal
6This group of French thinkers constitutes a loosely-knit unit tied together by an interest
in the philosophy of science done from a historical or critical point of view. It represents
a characteristically French approach to the philosophy of science and has certain ties with
Anglo-Saxon historicist philosophy of science (Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, Buchdahl, Pop-
per, Feyerabend, Shapere, Toulmin, McMullin). Although the latter school has been fre-
quently discussed, very little has been written in English about this French school. Notable
exceptions are Copleston (1977), Farber (1968), Gaukroger (1976) and Lecourt (1975).
history of science is largely neglected if one defines it, for exa

"the sort that focuses primarily or exclusively on the professional
ities of the members of a particular scientific community: What th
do they hold? What experiments do they perform? How do the
teract to produce novelty?" (Kuhn 1971, p. 149). There is, for e
no (or very little) discussion in Piaget of Galileo's or Newton's em
research, their problem situation, the questions they as individuals
etc., but there is a good deal of discussion about their theoretical co
(e.g., velocity and motion). The ordinary historian of science's st
the particular and unique aspects of an episode in the history of
is rarely touched upon by Piaget when he is dealing, for exampl
the concept of number and whether an empiricist account of it is a
or not. Kuhn's comments on Lakatos' concept of rational reconst
apply with equal force to Piaget's discussion of the history of sc
It excludes, for example, all considerations of personal idiosy

whatever its role may have been in the choice of a theory, the c
act which produced it, or the form of the product which result
the same token, it excludes such historical data as the failure of
man who creates a new theory and of his entire generation t
that theory consequences which a later generation found th
finally, it excludes considerations of mistakes or of what a later
eration will see as having been mistakes and will accordingl
constrained to correct. Historical data of these sorts are all central
and essential for the internal history of science (Kuhn 1971, pp. 140-
141).
Thus the reader of Piaget's genetic epistemology might well ask the ques-
tion, what kind of history of science is Piaget concerned with? The an-
swer seems to be that it is neither external history of science, nor internal
history of science, but a type of conceptual history of science.
The task of such a historico-critical method is to chart the structural
and developmental relations between basic scientific concepts such as
number, velocity, space and time. Once completing this task with regard
to number, for example, and having traced, say, the development of pos-
itive integers-fractional numbers-negative numbers, etc., it would then
investigate the relations between these concepts and related ones con-
cerning measurement, space and time, physical quantities, etc. In this
sense it would provide a structural network within which a concept falls.
Its task however would be inherently restricted to the history of science
and thus to socialized adults. But a true genetic epistemology would
surely want to know about the development of number concepts prior to
the positive integers (Cellerier 1973). Thus the historico-critical method
requires a psychogenesis to complete (or supplement) it.
In an effort to trace the sociogenetic or psychogenetic ori

certain type of knowledge, a systematic study of the develop
any given sector of scientific knowledge will necessarily l
tending the analysis of its formative mechanisms into the pres
or infra-scientific terrain of common knowledge, to the h
society (e.g., the history of technology), to the developme
child, and even to the frontiers of the most elementary phys
processes and mental mechanisms on which the acquisition of
edge depends (learning or perception, for example). (Piag
p. 14)
Thus, although the historico-critical method might be adequa

gard to certain concepts in the history of science, it would ha
say about these very same concepts prior to the rise of science, s
the Pre-Socratic philosophers. Piaget sometimes writes as if
genetic epistemology could, in principle, be attained by usin
torico-critical method, but that this task actually cannot be
turns to psychogenesis for help.
It is thus for want of something better, because the scientifi

are initially tied to those of common sense and because the pr
of these notions risk forever being unknown, that it is neces
complete the historico-critical method by the psychogenetic m
(1967b, p. 106)
Passages such as these reinforce the interpretation that gene

mology is really about the conceptual history of science. But, on
hand, Piaget does call such a conception of genetic epistemology
one as contrasted with a more general characterization.
In a limited or special sense, genetic epistemology is the study

successive stages of a given science S in terms of its deve
Looked at in this light genetic epistemology might be de
"the positive science, both empirical and theoretical, of th
opment of positive sciences qua sciences." (1957, p. 13)
But such a conception of genetic epistemology would be too n

Piaget thus prefers a more general description: ". .. one ma
genetic epistemology in a larger and more general way as th
the mechanisms of the increase in knowledge" (1957, p. 14).
Psychogenesis. If intellectual history is really a kind of me
parative anatomy, it must (at the very least) be completed b
embryology or psychogenesis. Such a psychogenetic approach
vestigate the development of the above-mentioned Kantian c
the individual (Piaget 1925). Thus, psychogenesis would be c
with the "embryology of reason" (Piaget 1957, p. 17) (in the Kantian
sense of 'reason') or perhaps as a scientific (psychological) Critique of
Constructed Reason.7 Piaget's genetic epistemology vis-d-vis the indi-
vidual can thus be seen as an attempt to answer the question: what psy-
chogenetic and constructive processes are necessary in order to produce
the kind of knowledge that adults have (Kitchener 1980a, 1980b)? Thus
seen, genetic epistemology is a kind of Kantian transcendental psychol-
ogy concerned with the developmentally necessary conditions of thought
and knowledge. For example, at birth the child has no sense of necessary
connections whereas during adolescence (s)he does. Piaget's question is
how is it ontogenetically possible for the subject to attain such necessity?
Likewise, taking adulthood as an epistemological reference point, Pi-
aget's program may be seen as concerned with the question: how is it
possible for an infant to attain the knowledge the adult has? Consisten
with developmental explanations in general (Kitchener 1982), Piaget i
asking for a 'how-possible' type of explanation.
If this Kantian interpretation is correct, then it must be stressed (and
remembered) that Piaget is using 'knowledge' in its Kantian sense and
not in its empiricist, inductivist sense. He is not investigating how the
individual comes to have particular factual knowledge of various and sun-
dry types about his/her natural and social world. Different individual
learn different things in different environments, but his acquisition of fac-
tual knowledge (knowing-that) or even particular skills (knowing-how)
is not the concern of genetic epistemology. One might say that factua
knowledge is too much concerned with the content of knowledge and thus
varies from individual to individual, whereas Piaget is more concerned
with the form or structure of knowledge (a la Kant), which is universa
(Piaget 1969, p. 282).
If genetic epistemology is primarily concerned with the forms of
thought, then much of current psychology would of course be irrelevant
to the task of genetic epistemology. For example, much of American
learning theory would be discounted since it would be too much con-
cerned with specific content-oriented tasks (e.g., nonsense syllables) in
stead of with the formal structure of learning (or knowledge). Much o
this learning tradition would be discounted because what is learned (a
fact, a particular skill) can be unlearned or forgotten8 and this is not con-
sistent with Piaget's transcendental psychology concerned with how th
fundamental and essential categories of thought develop. Piaget's deni-
gration (and reinterpretation) of classical learning theory is thus partl
7"Kants philosophische ,, Kritik der reiner Vernunft" wird damit zumindest partiell zu
einer wissenschaftlichen ,,Kritik der konstruktiven Vernunft", wie wir in Anlehnung an
Piagets ,,Konstruktivmus" sagen konnen" (Fetz 1969, p. 32).
8I owe this point to Pierre Moessinger.
based on epistemological assumptions which differ widely fr

American psychologists. To oversimplify, American psycholo
and still is largely empiricist in its epistemology, and American
theory has traditionally been committed to a Humean brand
cism. Piaget's epistemology, as many people have pointed o
damentally in opposition to an empiricist reading of experie
and Inhelder 1969). It certainly is Kantian, but it is someth
since in Kant the categories do not develop. Thus it is not an ex
to refer to Piaget's epistemology as Hegelian in a broad sens
Furthermore, Piaget's particular Kantian interpretation of
ogy-as having little to do with content (which is relative to
ual) but rather with form-explains much of his discounting
and importance of individual differences. Particular individ
knowledge about a host of different things. But how individ
in their knowledge or experience is not within the scope of gen
mology, which is concerned with what all subjects have in comm
what everyone must "learn" (the construction of certain con
works) in order to know what all of us as adults know. Piag
this point (perhaps unclearly) by introducing his distinction bet
epistemic subject, which is what is common to all subjects a
level of development independent of individual differences (1
and the individual subject, which is what is unique to such-
individual. Presumably, therefore, genetic epistemology is ab
istemic subject, an idealized individual who is the real subj
temological history. In this qualified sense, genetic epistemo
cerned with psychogenesis, namely the psychogenesis of the fu
categories of thought in the epistemic subject from infancy to
III. The Scope of Genetic Epistemology: Conflicting Int

tions. If we consider Piaget's most explicit, detailed and sy
views about the nature of genetic epistemology (1950a, 195
1957, 1962a, 1962b), genetic epistemology is conceived to b
of the growth of knowledge in the sense of a conceptual histor
it studies the development of certain epistemological categories
and it can perhaps best be seen as similar to the historico-critic
employed in the history of science. This historico-critical ap
be practiced, however, not only on the collective history of tho
toriogenesis) but also on the individual (psychogenetic) lev
interpretation, therefore, genetic epistemology is a concept
pursued on both planes-the historical and the individual-an
program can perhaps best be seen as providing the suppleme
chogenetic half.
On what we may call a weak reading of the connection be
togenesis and phylogenesis, historiogenesis needs to be comple

psychogenesis and hence psychogenesis is, in some sense, necess
if historiogenesis thus cannot do without psychogenesis, could
a psychogenesis independent of historiogenesis? That is, could
a study of the development of the basic categories of thought in t
istemic subject without a reliance upon the history of science? We
want to call it something else (e.g., genetic logic), but that w
largely a terminological question. Is it conceptually possible, th
for psychogenesis to be independent of historiogenesis, and if so i
sense?
Piaget's answer to this question is not without equivocation, for al-

though we do have his remarks on the crucial part that historiogenesis
must play in genetic epistemology, other statements in Piaget point to the
unambiguous claim that genetic epistemology is really identifiable with
psychogenesis alone (a strong reading of the connection between the two
fields). For example, in a recent work (1967b) Piaget distinguishes two
varieties of the genetic method: there is, on the one hand, the historico-
critical method, and, on the other hand, genetic epistemology, "which
by a combination of psychogenetic analysis and the formalization of
structures, attempts to determine the psychological conditions of the for-
mation of elementary knowledge and to coordinate these results with the
study of the conditions of formalization" (1967b, p.66). Here Piaget is
contrasting the historico-critical method with genetic epistemology partly
because the historico-critical method "often neglects considerations of
formalization" (1967b, p. 66) and identifying genetic epistemology with
psychogenesis, a claim he repeats in several other places (1967b, p. 118;
1971, pp. 1, 7; 1972a, p. 8). For example, ". .. genetic epistemology
concerns itself with the psychological development of concepts and op-
erations, that is, with psychogenesis" (1972b, p. 10). And yet in some
of these same passages Piaget reiterates his point that psychogenesis must
be completed by a historico-critical approach (1967b, p. 118). Why this
is so remains unclear, but perhaps some light may be shed on this by
considering an article by Piaget on "Intellectual Evolution" (1942).
But in the last analysis the evolution of individual thought is closely
enmeshed in collective systems of knowledge, especially in those
great systems of rational collaboration which deductive and experi-
mental science has produced. The genetic theory of knowledge must
therefore reach out into an historico-critical analysis of scientific
thought, and also into genetic logic. For instance, to understand the
evolution of the idea of space in the mind of a child, it is not enough
to know how this idea is first born. One must also determine how
the so-called "displacement groups" which form it follow one an-
other in succession from the motor level to that of the most abstract
conceptions; one must establish the respective parts of the scheme
of logic and of the intuition in this formation; one must define exactly
the relationship between the ideas of space and those of time, object,
number, movement, speed, et cetera. In short, truly to understand
the psychological aspect of the development of space, one must at-
tack all the problems which this idea and related ideas suggest in the
realm of mathematics and physics . . . (1942, pp. 409-410)
The history of science, therefore, is an ancilliary or even necessary aid
to psychogenesis, just as psychogenesis is necessary in order to complete
historiogenesis. But after stressing the need for historiogenesis in order
to complete psychogenesis, Piaget proceeds (in the above passage) to say
that "the psychology of intellectual evolution" can be considered to be
a genetic theory of knowledge. "A genetic and experimental epistemol-
ogy is thus conceivable as a special branch of psychology" (1942, p.
410, my emphasis). Several passages seem to support the interpretation,
therefore, that genetic epistemology is really about psychogenesis after
all and thus, contrary to Kaplan (1971), genetic epistemology does seem
to be reducible to, or identifiable with, the development of intelligence
in the individual.
IV. A Suggested Resolution of the Problem. Clearly there are several

passages suggesting that genetic epistemology is identifiable exclusively
with psychogenesis. This stands in stark contrast to our earlier reading
of Piaget in which genetic epistemology was about both fields, a relation
in which each was needed to complete and to fully understand the other.
We cannot, I think, pass over this apparent contradiction, nor dismiss it
in any obvious way. What we must do is to choose between the two
readings, and the basis for the choice must be in terms of which inter-
pretation is more plausible. Although the narrower interpretation (genetic
epistemology is equivalent to psychogenesis) has some support, the lib-
eral interpretation (genetic epistemology is about both historiogenesis and
psychogenesis) seems to have much more plausibility. The liberal inter-
pretation is more firmly grounded in Piaget's writing, it is more natural,
and it is the one with better overall logical and theoretical support. This
claim, however, cannot be established on the basis of textual evidence
alone, since there are passages supporting both interpretations, nor would
it do to rely on quantity of textual evidence. Nevertheless, I would claim
that the liberal interpretation is more firmly grounded in Piaget's writings
and more natural than the narrower view, although I do not have any
philosophical account of 'firmly grounded' or 'natural' at hand that I
could use in support of my claim. Instead I will give three reasons for
thinking that the liberal interpretation is more theoretically coher

the rest of Piaget's theory and thus for thinking that it is more p
First, as I have tried to show in this paper, Piaget's conceptio
netic epistemology rests firmly upon a biological model of com
anatomy, a model which he early (1950a) advanced and one w
has apparently never abandoned (1955, 1965a, 1972a, 1972b). A
known, Piaget depends heavily upon biology and biological m
fact, his epistemology is often criticized for its over-reliance u
ological epistemology. We must, therefore, take Piaget's biolog
temology seriously, one fundamental part of which is the claim th
parative anatomy is a model for genetic epistemology. But if
epistemology is a kind of mental comparative anatomy, and if
characterization of comparative anatomy is correct, then it contain
essential parts, a mental homology (historiogenesis) and a me
bryology (psychogenesis) and thus the liberal interpretation see
correct.
Secondly, for Piaget (and other 19th century evolutionists such a

Spencer, Marx and Comte) all development and evolution has a directi
(orthogenesis). In the case of Piaget, orthogenesis is a tendency towar
a greater equilibrium. This applies not only to biological evolution, b
also to individual psychological development and socio-historical deve
opment (Piaget 1928, 1950c, 1965b). This general orthogenetic princip
thus has several aspects (biological, psychological, logical, social, his
torical) and these correspond to or are parallel to each other; this is t
basis for Piaget's claim that psychological equilibrium is rooted in (an
somehow isomorphic to) biological equilibrium, as well as his claim th
sociological equilibrium (social development) is parallel to psychologic
equilibrium and logical equilibrium (Kitchener 198 la). Thus, psycholog
and sociology are inseparable and study the person or organism fro
slightly different but complementary aspects (1950c). If orthogenesis
a general claim about all types of development, then there is no reas
to claim that historical orthogenesis (the history of science) is reducib
to psychological orthogenesis, but, on the contrary, to see the process of
equilibration as operating on all of these levels simultaneously (Kitchener
1981a). Thus for Piaget historical equilibration explains the history o
scientific concepts, and psychological equilibration explains the histo
of individual concepts. But psychological equilibration is no more bas
than historical equilibration. Both are dual aspects of a single more fu
damental principle.
Thirdly, to put this same point in slightly different dress, there is ver
little in Piaget that would support a reductionistic interpretation, and ye
in a sense, that is precisely what we would have to be proposing if geneti
epistemology were identifiable with psychogenesis. Throughout all
Piaget's writings, a holistic structuralism (1970) runs deep and

feature of such a view is a non-reductionism, a claim that Pia
trates in particular detail with regard to the issue of "the unity o
and the classificatory relations that exist between the various
especially psychology and sociology. One should not, Piage
claims, conceive the sciences to be related in a reductionistic li
but rather in a circular way ("the circle of sciences"). Nowhe
Piaget suggest that sociology can be reduced to psychology, bu
refers to 'psycho-sociology'.
Piaget's classification of the sciences is a very complex affai
1967d) and includes an epistemological aspect no less than an o
aspect. Each science has (what Piaget calls) an internal epistem
which analyzes the foundations and methods of a particular scienc
psychology has an internal epistemology just as sociology do
dition, there is a derived epistemology (a kind of general epist
which investigates the general epistemological relations betwee
sults of the various sciences, especially the relations between
temological subject and the epistemological object, how this k
is possible, etc. This derived epistemology, Piaget says:
is distinct from internal epistemology . . . [Its] domain is, in e

that of all the epistemological implications which may be draw
the study of the subject itself, which is precisely analyzed
sciences. It is thus the epistemology of the common subject
subject considered in the distinct phases of its cognitive develo
and no longer as in the epistemology of psychology or so
(1967c, p. 1198).
It is clear, therefore, that this derived epistemology is not limite

science (e.g., psychology) but makes use of various sciences (
1239), and it is also clear that it is collectively equivalent to genet
temology. Although there are various candidates for a deriv
mology (the usual nine Piagetian entries), Piaget's genetic epis
is obviously taken to be the best (1967d, p. 1241). Thus, gene
temology (as one example of derived epistemology) is not to be ide
with psychology, nor with the internal epistemology of psycholo
is more general, dealing with all the epistemological aspects o
istemic subject and this includes the history of science as muc
thing else.
In sum, therefore, the most plausible overall interpretation of t
of genetic epistemology seems to be that one in which both h
nesis and psychogenesis are included. This interpretation seems to
one most in keeping with Piaget's overall theory, his biologic
mology and, in particular, with his conception of the relations

the various sciences. If this is correct, then the next question
viously arises concerns the conceptual relations between the tw
fields: are there any theoretical reasons for believing that the hist
science and genetic psychology can coherently be conceptualize
parts of the same genetic epistemological field? Is there any r
for example, for believing that a single set of laws or generalizatio
hold for both fields or that the concept of equilibration can ex
growth of knowledge in both domains? Although I (Kitchene
have sketched a partial answer to some of these questions, ther
merous conceptual problems that remain unanswered and reflect b
uncertain philosophical status of genetic epistemology and its curr
terest for historically-oriented philosophers of science.
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The Nature and Scope of Genetic Epistemology

Author(s): Richard F. Kitchener

Although the theory of Jean Piaget is correctly characterized as genetic ep

Introduction. It is now customary among certain groups of peo

Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981) pp. 400-415

Toulmin (private conversation) has made the same point: "according to

'The terms 'historiogenesis' and 'sociogenesis' will be used interchangeably to refer to

tions, however, we must first know how Piaget defines the n

I. Genetic Epistemology. What is genetic epistemology? Obvi

(1) Genetic epistemology is the study of the passage from

(2) Genetic epistemology is the study of the mechanisms of the in-

(Piaget often qualifies this as 'intellectual' mechanisms or 'epistemolog-

growth of knowledge, in particular "to explain how the transition

II. Genetic Epistemology as a Mental Comparative Anatom

4This general biological epistemology has been criticized by several individ

ilated to a kind of comparative anatomy. The analysis of functio

5' ... c'est la construction de toutes les notions essentielles ou categories de l

here is that of a mental comparative anatomy, whose two me

The Historico-Critical Method. Beginning with his early pub

history of science is largely neglected if one defines it, for exa

It excludes, for example, all considerations of personal idiosy

In an effort to trace the sociogenetic or psychogenetic ori

Thus, although the historico-critical method might be adequa

It is thus for want of something better, because the scientifi

Passages such as these reinforce the interpretation that gene

In a limited or special sense, genetic epistemology is the study

But such a conception of genetic epistemology would be too n

based on epistemological assumptions which differ widely fr

III. The Scope of Genetic Epistemology: Conflicting Int

togenesis and phylogenesis, historiogenesis needs to be comple

Piaget's answer to this question is not without equivocation, for al-

IV. A Suggested Resolution of the Problem. Clearly there are several

thinking that the liberal interpretation is more theoretically coher

Secondly, for Piaget (and other 19th century evolutionists such a

Piaget's writings, a holistic structuralism (1970) runs deep and

is distinct from internal epistemology . . . [Its] domain is, in e

It is clear, therefore, that this derived epistemology is not limite

mology and, in particular, with his conception of the relations

Cellerier, G. (1973), Piaget. Paris: P.U.F.

Piaget, J. (1942), "Intellectual Evolution." In R. N. Aushen (ed.), Scienc

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