DAVID TAYLOR vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
COMPANY
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
FACTS:
David Taylor, 15 years old, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company, for the purpose of visiting one
Murphy, an employee of said company, who and promised to
make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on
inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
wandered in the company's premises.
As they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces, they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps
are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges
of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power, the boys picked up all the caps they could find, and
carried them home.
On their way to Manuel’s home, they met and picked a little
girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old. The boys then
made a series of experiments with the caps. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was
filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David
held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed
putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in
the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent
as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other
injuries, was then instituted by David’s father in his behalf.
ISSUE:
Was plaintiff’s negligence, in this case David’s, the proximate
cause of his injury?
HELD:
Yes. The entry of David upon Manila Electric's property
without Manila Electric's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility
for injuries incurred there by David, without other fault on his
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of
Manila Electric, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of Manila Electric in
proximate cause of the injury received by the David, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that David’s action in cutting open the detonating
cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate
cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon him, and that Manila Electric, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
David contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, that because of David's youth the intervention
of his action between the negligent act of Manila Electric in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we
cannot agree with this proposition, although we accept the
doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it
is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to
recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
negligence of another he must himself have been free from
fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case."
As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which
rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no
fault which would relieve Manila Electric of responsibility for
injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to
David, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his
entry upon Manila Electric's uninclosed premises without
express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different
question whether such youth can be said to have been free
from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing,
as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an
explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the
particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down
in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid,
although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
"Torpedo" and analogous cases, the record discloses that
plaintiff’s, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed,
were of such tender years that they were held not to have
the capacity to understand the nature or character of the
explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, David at the time of the accident was a
well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea
as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present,
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode
it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous,
in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
within him at the time when he put the match to the contents
of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he
did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity"
he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably
be required of him, or that Manila Electric or anyone else
should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
We are satisfied that the David in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that he was sui juris  in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by
him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may
be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but
for the negligence act of Manila Electric in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless David's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
FERNANDO v. CA
GR No. 92087, May 8, 1992
FACTS:
Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market
filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the
City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank
in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano,
Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio
Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. Bascon was notified and he
signed the purchase order. However, before such date,
bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo,
Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned
that the five victims entered the septic tank without
clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the
market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be
almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health
Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause
of death of all five victims as 'asphyxia' caused by the
diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below
normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled
in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of
toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from
the... waste matter inside the septic tank
ISSUE:
Whether Davao City was negligent, and if so, was it the
immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims
RULING:
No.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Considering that the case was yet no award to commence
work on the septic tank, the duty of the market master or his
security guards to supervise the work could not have started.
Also, the victims could not have been seen working in the
area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage
which is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort
room itself. The surreptitious way in which the victims did
their job without clearance from the market master or any of
the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their
relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank.
Also, Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic
tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of
the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so
with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident.
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and
GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents
FACTS:
An action for damages was filed by private respondent
spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran
over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation
of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged
that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result
of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered.2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the
injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of
their own negligence and that the entity which should be held
responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for
short), an independent contractor which undertook the
construction of the manhole and the conduit
system.3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any
accident or injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.4  ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken.
In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor
was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses
and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with
PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard
signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both
ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.5
The RTC decided in favor of the spouses however this was
reversed by the CA ruling that respondent Esteban spouses
were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT
from the claim for damages.
Issue:
WON PLDT is liable
Ruling:
NO. PLDT is not liable.
We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its
original decision that the accident which befell private
respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission
on the part of petitioner PLDT.
First.  Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of
Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would
not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT
MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is,
swerving from the inside lane. The accident was not due to
the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain
plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it.
Second.  That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been
corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south
of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had
already been covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the
ACCIDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the
ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had
already been covered, but not in such a way as to allow the
outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles.
The situation could have been worse to the south of the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason no picture of the
Third.  Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could
have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT
MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit
B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had
been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not
have been thrown against the windshield and they would not
have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or
other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb
over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim
lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should
have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was
running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on
dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT
MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high
and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND
in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He
knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND,
having seen it many previous times. With ordinary
precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the
accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND.29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his
injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to
inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge
of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving
of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,
such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the
doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the
injury.31 It is basic that private respondents cannot charge
PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due
and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a
reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear
chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of
Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and
his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court
of Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient
evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We
have for consideration only the self-serving testimony of
respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified photograph
of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence
of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a
medical report from the hospital where private respondents
were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily
explained.
As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited
extended resolution of January 24, 1980 —
(a) There was no third party eyewitness of
the accident. As to how the accident
occurred, the Court can only rely on the
testimonial evidence of plaintiffs
themselves, and such evidence should be
very carefully evaluated, with defendant, as
the party being charged, being given the
benefit of any doubt. Definitely without
ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs,
another person could have deliberately
engineered a similar accident in the hope
and expectation that the Court can grant
him substantial moral and exemplary
damages from the big corporation that
defendant is. The statement is made only to
stress the disadvantageous position of
defendant which would have extreme
difficulty in contesting such person's claim.
If there were no witness or record available
from the police department of Bacolod,
defendant would not be able to determine
for itself which of the conflicting
testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to the
report or non-report of the accident to the
police department.32
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence.33 Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of
action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must
fail.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated March 11, 1980 and September 3,1980, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September
25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
TEH LE KIM V. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO., INC.
G.R. NO. L-39309 NOVEMBER 24, 1933
FACTS:
On the Morning of September 4, 1931, the plaintiff herein
bought, in Manila, a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in
one of the defendant company's hydroplanes starting from
Madrigal Field in Pasay.
Inasmuch as the engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he
was to take the flight, was not working satisfactorily, the said
plaintiff had to wait for some time. While the engine was
being tested, the plaintiff saw how it was started by turning
the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it ran
away from it each time in order not to be caught by the said
propeller. Before the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for
the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it was decided to have
the plaintiff make the flight therein. The plaintiff and his
companion were carefully carried from the beach to the
plane, entering the same by the rear or tail end, and were
placed in their seats to which they were strapped. Later, they
were shown how the straps could be tightened or loosened in
case of accident and were instructed further not to touch
anything in the plane. After an uneventful flight, the plane
landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait.
When the pilot observed that a banca was approaching, he
arose signalled and shouted to the boatman to keep
his banca at a distance from the plane, inasmuch as there
were waves and quite a strong current, and he feared that
the banca might collide with the plane and damage either the
wing or the pontoon thereof. While he was doing this, he
heard the propeller strike something. He immediately turned
off the switch and, looking on the other side, he saw Bohn
picking up the plaintiff out of the water.
What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons
touched bottom and while the pilot was signalling to
the banca, the plaintiff unfastened the straps around him
and, not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door
to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and
walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller.
The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he threw up his
arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so
injured that it had be amputated.
Bohn and Garrett of Warner, Barnes & Co., consignees of the
defendant, were on the beach to meet the plane and to make
arrangements for the disembarking of the passengers. Upon
seeing the plaintiff walking toward the propeller, they
shouted frantically and motioned to him to keep away from
it, but the said plaintiff took no heed of them.
The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a
hydroplane is to wait until the propeller stops, then turn the
plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and
thereof towards the beach, and then take the passengers to
shore in a banca. The pilot in charge of the plane has had
fourteen years experience, having first learned to fly during
the World War. He is duly licensed by the Department of
Commerce of the United States and by the Department of
Commerce and Communications of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc. has
complied with its contractual obligation to carry Teh Le Kim
safe and sound to his destination.
RULING:
Yes. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane arrived at the
Iloilo beach with nothing more left to do but to take the
plaintiff and his companion, safe and sound, ashore. In order
to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop,
turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take
the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof,
place them in a banca and take them ashore. By sheer
common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller,
be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in
motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being
caught and injured thereby. He ought to know furthermore
that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait
for a banca to take him ashore. Notwithstanding the shouts
and warning signals given him from the shore by the
representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not
being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the
plane, walked along one of the pontoons and directly into the
revolving propeller, while the  banca which was to take him
ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was
instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the
plane.
Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand
that the plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless negligence in
approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and
when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That
the plaintiff-appellant's negligence alone was the direct cause
of the accident, is so clear that it is not necessary to cite
authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the
injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation
thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own
imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable
to the defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone
should suffer the consequences of his act.
American Express International Inc. vs. Cordero
G.R. No. 138550, October 14, 2005
FACTS:
American Express International was a foreign corporation
that issued charge cards used to purchase goods and services
at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda
Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an
American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was
likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also
signed. Respondent, together with his family went on a three-
day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the
Watson’s Chemist Shop. While there, Noel picked up
chocolate candies and handed his American Express
extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his
purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed
respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon,
she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a pair
of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him
embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for
the purchases using her own American Express charge card.
The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System,
asystem utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the
company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of
their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized
use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is
tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true
identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored
and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked
or confiscated.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees
as a result of the humiliation he suffered. According to the
trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to
use a charge card bearing similar number to that of
respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to
do so is the proximate cause of the “confiscation and cutting
of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to
public humiliation for which the petitioner should be held
liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of petitioner to inform
the respondent of the November 1, 1991 incident was the
proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of the
respondent’s card.
HELD:
No. To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be
the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by
the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his
card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that
indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been
accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that
respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no
negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to
petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation and
embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s
representative.
FE CAYAO-LASAM vs SPOUSES RAMOLETE
G.R. no. 159132 December 18, 2008
FACTS:
On July 1994, respondent three months pregnant Editha
Ramolete was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) to
vaginal bleeding. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on
Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. Editha’s
repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus
weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding,
petitioner Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam advised Editha to undergo a
Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or raspa which the
petitioner performed.
On September 1994, Editha was brought again to LMC due to
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. One of the attending
physician, Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was
a dead fetus in her womb. Editha underwent laparotomy
where she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Editha had to undergo a
procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more
chance to bear a child.
On November 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete
filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and Malpractice
against petitioner before the PRC.
Respondents alleged that Editha’s hysterectomy was caused
by petitioners unmitigated negligence and professional
incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the
petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Editha’s womb.
Petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and
incompetence
On March 1999, Board of Medicine of the PRC exonerated
petitioner from the charges filed against her. Feeling
aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal. On
November 2000, the PRC reversed the findings of the Board
and revoked petitioners authority or license to practice her
profession as a physician. Petitioner brought the matter to
the CA but was dismissed on the ground of being improper
and premature.
ISSUE: Was there medical malpractice in the case?
HELD:
No.
There was no medical malpractice in the case.
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which
consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his
practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is
ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under
similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In
order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must
prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon
would not have done, and that the failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases:
duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
From the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons
given by him, it is evident that the D&C procedure was not
the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus. Further
in the testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was
conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the
same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances,
and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner
dealt with Editha.
Medical malpractice is often brought as a civil action for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in
an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the
Civil Code are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
It is also undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up
evaluation, in defiance of the petitioners advise. Editha
omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which
could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning
for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in
bringing about Editha’s own injury. Had Editha returned,
petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and
procedure necessary to determine Editha’s health condition
and applied the corresponding treatment which could have
prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure
having been conducted in accordance with the standard
medical practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the
proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a
contributory negligence on her part.
POLO S. PANTALEON v AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
G.R. No. 174269-2010 Aug, 25, 2010
FACTS:
AMEX is a corporation engaged in providing credit services
through the operation of a charge card system. Pantaleon
was a cardholder since 1980.
Pantaleon, his wife, daughter and son went on a guided
European tour and subsequently arrived in Amsterdam. While
in Coster Diamond House, his wife wanted to purchase some
diamond pieces, amounting to $13, 826. Pantaleon presented
his credit card which was swiped. He was then asked to sign
the charge slip which was electronically transferred to
AMEX’s Amsterdam office. However, Coster was not able to
receive approval from AMEX for the purchase so Pantaleon
asked the clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager
convinced Pantaleon to wait for a few minutes and
subsequently told Pantaleon that AMEX was asking for bank
references and Pantaleon responded by giving names of his
Phil. depository banks. Still, it was not approved. But Coster
decided to release the items even without AMEX’s approval
since the tour couldn’t go on without them.
In all, it took AMEX a total of 78 minutes to approve
Pantaleon’s purchase and to transmit the approval to the
jewelry store.
This was followed by two similar incidents when the family
then had another trip to the US. They also experienced
inconvenience using the AMEX credit card in purchasing golf
equipment and children’s shoes.
When they got to Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter to AMEX,
demanding an apology for the humiliation and inconvenience.
AMEX responded that the delay in Amsterdam was due to the
amount involved, saying that the purchase deviated from his
established charge purchase pattern. Dissatisfied, Pantaleon
filed an action for damages in RTC.
The testimony of AMEX’s credit authorizer Edgardo Jaurique,
the approval time for credit card charges would be three to
four seconds under regular circumstances. Here, it took AMEX
78 minutes to approve the Amsterdam purchase. SC
attributed the unwarranted delay to Jaurique, who had to go
over Pantaleon’s past credit history, his payment record and
his credit and bank references before he approved the
purchase.
In 2009, the SC reversed the ruling in CA; and said that AMEX
was guilty of mora solvendi or debtor’s default. AMEX as
debtor had an obligation as the credit provider to act on
Pantaleon’s purchase requests, whether to approve or
disapprove them, with "timely dispatch."
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON Pantaleon’s action was the proximate cause for his
injury.
HELD:
Yes. Pantaleon mainly anchors his claim for moral and
exemplary damages on the embarrassment and humiliation
that he felt when the European tour group had to wait for
him and his wife for approximately 35 minutes, and
eventually had to cancel the Amsterdam city tour. After
thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, we have come
to the conclusion that Pantaleon is the proximate cause for
this embarrassment and humiliation.
As borne by the records, Pantaleon knew even before
entering Coster that the tour group would have to leave the
store by 9:30 a.m. to have enough time to take the city tour
of Amsterdam before they left the country. After 9:30 a.m.,
Pantaleon’s son, who had boarded the bus ahead of his
family, returned to the store to inform his family that they
were the only ones not on the bus and that the entire tour
group was waiting for them. Significantly, Pantaleon tried to
cancel the sale at 9:40 a.m. because he did not want to cause
any inconvenience to the tour group. However, when Coster’s
sale manager asked him to wait a few more minutes for the
credit card approval, he agreed, despite the knowledge that
he had already caused a 10-minute delay and that the city
tour could not start without him.
In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, we ruled that a person
who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger
cannot claim damages for the resulting injury:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes
the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case.
Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when
travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of
any delay because the schedule is very strict. When Pantaleon
made up his mind to push through with his purchase, he must
have known that the group would become annoyed and
irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable
consequence of his decision to make them all wait.
We do not discount the fact that Pantaleon and his family did
feel humiliated and embarrassed when they had to wait for
AMEX to approve the Coster purchase in Amsterdam. We
have to acknowledge, however, that Pantaleon was not a
helpless victim in this scenario – at any time, he could have
cancelled the sale so that the group could go on with the city
tour. But he did not.
More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to
Pantaleon under the circumstances under the principle of
damnum absque injuria, or damages without legal wrong, loss
without injury. As we held in BPI Express Card vs. CA: We do
not dispute the findings of the lower court that private
respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation
of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Pantaleon is not entitled to damages
M.H. RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY
G.R. No. 1719 JANUARY 23, 1907
FACTS:

The case involves an action for damages brought about by
petitioner. It was alleged that Rakes was one of eight black
laborers in the employment of respondent. Their work
consisted mainly of transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company’s yard near the malecon in Manila.
One day, they were working in the company’s yard,
transporting heavy rails using two cars. Each car was carrying
the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope
from the front, while other workers were pushing the cars
from behind. There were no side guards installed on the side
of the cars, but the transported rails were supported by
ropes.
The cars reached the depressed portion of the track, and
while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave
causing the rails to slip. Rakes’ leg was crushed and the same
had to be amputated.
It was alleged that the track where the cars were being
moved was apparently weakened by a previous typhoon.
Antlantic was notified of the said damage to the tracks but
the same remained unrepaired.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Rakes and awarded him Php
5,000.00 in damages (the equivalent of $ 2,500.00).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court, alleging that
they specifically told the workers not to walk on the side of
the cars because the same have no guards to protect them in
case the rails would slip, and that rakes was negligent for
having known of the depression on the track, yet he
continued to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the
part of Rakes.
RULING:
YES. The most controverted question in the case is that of the
negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be
given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he
continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of
the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate
either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the
evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the
displaced timber underneath the sleeper. The claim that he
must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is
assumed to have been a probable condition of things not
before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony.
While the method of construction may have been known to
the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise
with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two
days. A man may easily walk along a railway without
perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The
foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the
day of the accident and that it was then in good condition,
and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant, working on
the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in
the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the
track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his
hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to
repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under
the severe American rule. On this point we accept the
conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that "the
plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being lower
than then other" and "it does not appear in this case that the
plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers
and rails joined in the same place."
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were
they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of
this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think
that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being made
known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to
the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident
and the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure
to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for
damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking
by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act
of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can
not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the
trial court, fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000
pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money,
we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly
attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500
pesos.
ISAAC V. AL AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO.
G.R. NO. L-9671, AUGUST 23, 1957
FACTS:
AL. Ammen Transportation Co.(Defendant) , is a corporation
engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land
for compensation. Isaac boarded one of its busses as a
passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound
for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination,
the bus collided with a pick-up vehicle coming from opposite
direction. As a result, Isaac’s left arm was completely severed.
He was the only one sustained major injury in this incident
because he placed his hands outside the window. He was
brought to the hospital and was saved.
According to Isaac, he incurred expenses amounting to
P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by Al
Ammen. He brought this action for damages against Al
Ammen alleging that (1)the collision which resulted in the
loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence
and recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by Al
Ammen and (2) in culpa contractual arising from its non-
compliance with its obligation to transport him to his
destination.
Al Ammen set up special defenses that the injury suffered
by Isaac was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the
driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by
its driver and to the contributory negligence of Isaac himself.
Also, they alleged that it was a fortuitous event.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Al Ammen and dismissed the
case.
ISSUE:
Was there contributory negligence on the part of Isaac in this
case?
HELD:
YES. A circumstances which miliates against the stand of Isaac
is the fact borne out by the evidence that when he boarded
the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof
resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow
outside the window, this being his position in the bus when
the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision
resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of
Isaac thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent
that Isaac is guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not
placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof
protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been
avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be
noted that Isaac was the only victim of the collision.
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a
passenger on a railroad voluntarily or inadvertently to
protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body
through the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge
of the window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in
contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no
recovery can be had for an injury which but for such
negligence would not have been sustained.
It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve Al
Ammen of its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of
the amount of damage caused, but this is a circumstance
which further militates against the position taken by Isaac in
this case.
TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO vs.
J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD.,
G.R. No. L-30741 January 30, 1930

FACTS
On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy
Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another
municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the
procession was over, the woman and her daughter,
accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto
and Elias, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan.
The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance
of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of
the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile
appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the
child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into
the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this
gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the
child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her
clothes were immediately removed and, then covered with a
garment, the girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There
she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A.
Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at
11:40 o'clock. Dr. Benitez certified that the cause of death
was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the
contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen".
The defense of J. V. HOUSE was that the hot water was
permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain
with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the
cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the
death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence. 
The trial judge was led to order the dismissal of the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE
Whether there was contributory negligence?
RULING
None. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on
the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when
the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence
of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,
does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
Having reached the conclusion that liability exists, we next
turn to discover who can recover damages for the obligation,
and against whom the action will lie. The plaintiffs are Tomas
Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of
Purificacion Bernal and the former was the natural father,
who had never legally recognized his child. The daughter lived
with the mother, and presumably was supported by her.
Under these facts, recovery should be permitted the mother
but not the father. As to the defendants, they are J.V. House
and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was
granted a franchise by Act No. 2700 of the Philippine
Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only transferred
this franchise formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is, nearly a year after the death
of the child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J.V. House
is solely responsible.
Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory
proof to establish the pecuniary loss. That is true. But in cases
of this character the law presumes a loss because of the
impossibility of exact computation. There is not enough
money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the
death of her child. In criminal cases, the rule has been to
allow as a matter of course P1,000 as indemnity to the heirs
of the deceased. In the case of Manzanares vs. Moreta
([1918], 38 Phil., 821), which in many respects is on all fours
with the case at bar, the same amount of P1,000 was allowed
the mother of the dead boy eight or nine years of age. The
same criterion will have to be followed in this instance.
The result will, therefore, be to accept the findings of fact
made by the trial judge; to set aside the legal deductions
flowing from those facts; to hold that the death of the child
Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in
permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there
to endanger the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately
enough to fall into it; to rule that the proper plaintiff is the
mother Fortunata Enverso and not the natural father Tomas
Bernal; to likewise rule that the person responsible to the
plaintiff is J.V. House and not the entity the Tacloban Electric
& Ice Plant, Ltd.; and finally to adjudge that the amount of
recovery, without the tendering of special proof, should be
fixed, as in other cases, at P1,000.
Concordant with the pronouncements just made, the
judgment appealed from shall in part be reversed and in the
court of origin another judgment shall issue in favor of
Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of
P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF NOBLE
CASIONAN
G.R. NO. 165969: November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno,
Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
Sometime in the 1970's, NPC installed high-tension electrical
transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail
leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was
regularly used by members of the community. Eventually,
some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing
their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten
feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were
exposed to the danger of electrocution especially during the
wet season.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor
Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for
their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other
was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on
his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor
carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed
through the trail underneath the NPC high tension
transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip
of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the
dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking
behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the
tip of Noble's pole touched the wire for only about one or
two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground.
Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was
already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchor's shout for
help and together they brought the body of Noble to their
camp.
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim
for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Benguet.
At the trial, NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution,
it was due to his own negligence.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Noble.
NPC claimed that the damages awarded by the trial and
appellate courts, in view of what petitioner alleges to be
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, should be
deleted or mitigated.
ISSUE:
Was there a contributory negligence on the part of Noble?
HELD:
None.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high
tension wires above the trail did not cause the victim's death.
Instead, it was Noble's negligent carrying of the bamboo pole
that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent
when he allowed the bamboo pole he was carrying to touch
the high tension wires.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to
happen. As established during trial, the lines were sagging
around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18
to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained
by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not
have touched the wires. He would not have been
electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly
maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the
purpose of preventing derailment accidents belonged to the
company. The company should not have been negligent in
ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait
until a life was lost due to an accident.
Moreover, we find no contributory negligence on Noble's
part.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other
hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is
required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of
ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is
proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in
consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of
the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on
this score:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard
of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and
body.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was
regularly used by members of the community. There were no
warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to
their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket
mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.
In Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the
violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury
that happened was precisely what was intended to be
prevented by the statute.
That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a
justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines
dangling. We quote with approval the observation of the RTC
on this matter:
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to
operate within the area of Dalicno, Itogon, Benguet as there
was no permit issued by DENR is beside the point. The fact is
that there were not only pocket miners but also there were
many residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon,
Benguet using the trail. These residents were using this trail
underneath the transmission lines x x x. They were using this
trail even before the transmission lines were installed in the
1970's by NPC. The pocket miners, although they have no
permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human
beings who have to eke out a living in the only way they know
how. The fact that they were not issued a permit by the DENR
to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave
their transmission lines dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet
above the ground posing danger to the life and limb of
everyone in said community. x x x
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON
GR No. 160709, February 23, 2005
FACTS:
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the
house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and
borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio
Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle
with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after
eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of
beer, they travearsed the highway towards Tambo at a high
speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an
accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen
Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling
on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The
incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and
injuries to Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action
for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against
the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon
for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993,
after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by
20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray.
ISSUE:
Whether the accident was entirely due to the fault of Ray
since his motorcycle bumped the rear of the jeepney and was
therefore presumed to be the cause of the accident.
RULING:
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without
first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of
the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is
traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial
court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened. Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another
vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence. In this case, the said rule is
contradicted by the sudden left turn made by Cardo which
proximately caused the collision.
The trial court is likewise correct in finding Rey guilty of
contributory negligence. But the ratio of apportionment of
damages must be increased. It was established at the time of
the mishap that Rey (1) was driving the motorcycle at high
speed; (2) was tailgating the jeepney; (3) had imbibed one or
two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Rolly contributed
to the same result.
LARRY ESTACION vs NOE BERNARDO
483 SCRA 222 (February 27, 2006)
FACTS:
On October 16, 1982 in the afternoon, respondent
Noe Bernardo was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu. He
boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Quinquillera and
owned by Bandoquillo. He was seated on the extension seat
at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman
wanted to ride so Noe offered his seat and hung/stood on the
left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera slowed down and
stopped to pick up more passengers.
Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by the
petitioner Larry Estacion and driven by Gerosano, which was
travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the
jeepney. The Fiera crushed Bernardo’s legs and feet, and he
was brought to Silliman University Medical Center where his
lower left leg was amputated. Police report showed that
there were 10 more who were injured by the accident.
On February 18, 1993, Bernardo, and his guardian ad
litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict
against petitioner as owner of the truck and his driver.
RTC ruled that Gerosano was negligent and it was
the direct and proximate cause of the incident. It also held
petitioner liable as employer. CA affirmed in toto the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is liable
2. Whether or not Bernardo was guilty of
contributory negligence
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner is liable.
From the way the truck reacted to the application of the
brakes, it can be shown that Gerosano was driving at a fast
speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as shown in
the sketch of the police. There was also only one tire mark
which meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned
properly, otherwise, there would have been 2 tire marks. It is
the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo
truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was
the proximate cause of the respondent Bernardo’s injury. As
employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solitarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. He is
presumed to be negligent in the selection of his employee
which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that
he examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications,
experience and records.
2. Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by
standing at the rear portion of the jeep.
Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. Bernardo’s act of
standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary
care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put
his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to
his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of
an impending danger to health and body. Respondent Noe’s
act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life
and limb.
Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also negligent because
there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and
regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left
rear of his jeep. There is also a presumption of negligence on
the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to which she
did not rebut.
Turning now to the award of damages, since there was
contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe,
petitioner’s liability should be mitigated in accordance with
Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept of the above article on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.
In the present case, taking into account the contributing
negligence of respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the
demands of substantial justice are satisfied by distributing the
damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. Consequently, 20% should be deducted
from the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial
court in favor of respondent Noe, that is: 20% of ₱129,584.20
for actual damages is ₱25,916.84 and 20% of ₱50,000.00 for
moral damages is ₱10,000.00. Thus, after deducting the
same, the award for actual damages should be ₱103,667.36
and ₱40,000.00 for moral damages or 80% of the damages so
awarded.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. ETHEL BRUNTY AND
JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 169891 NOVEMBER 2, 2006
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an
American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime
in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with
her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio
City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo L.
Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By
then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its
way to Tutuban, Metro Manila. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty,
Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad
crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita,
driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle,
unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were
about to collide with PNR Train. Mercelita was instantly killed
when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two
other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A certain
James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon
Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead
after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered
severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same
hospital.
Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter to the PNR demanding
payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as a
result of her daughter’s death. When PNR did not respond,
Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint for damages
against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. They alleged that
the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the
physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and
proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR
in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red
light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the
railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only
equipped with a hand flashlight. They likewise averred that
PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of
their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot
and operator of the train.
PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family not only in the selection but also in the supervision of
its employees. It stressed that it had the right of way on the
railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to
put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted
that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs
strategically posted on the sides of the road before the
railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita’s negligence,
and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of
the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by
the guard.
RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. CA affirmed the findings of the
RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. It ruled that the alleged
safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing
were not merely inadequate – they did not satisfy the well-
settled safety standards in transportation. However, the CA
did not agree with the RTC’s findings on the contributory
negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It
held that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that
would befall him and the two other passengers under the
prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty
of contributory negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes
Benz) is guilty of contributory negligence.
RULING: Yes. As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of
contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. To hold a person
as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard
of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
The court below found that there was a slight curve before
approaching the tracks; the place was not properly
illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and
Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also
established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes
Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a
vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did.
However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they
nevertheless do not negate petitioner’s liability. Pursuant to
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such
contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability,
which, however, is not applicable in this case.
Note: The record is, likewise, bereft of any allegation and
proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver)
and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory
negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the
effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.
Other issues:
It is, however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found
negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary
safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the
railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the
provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a
claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts
he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and damage. Applying the
foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following
conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees
(respondents herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of
the collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is,
likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety
measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not
only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety
standards in transportation. x x x
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad
crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR
itself would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or
safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning
signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus,
even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed
by PNR (petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or
see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that
there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the
road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. x
xx
Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the
Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is
an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at
an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part
of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the
public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to
avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings,
which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the
maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct
at all points where such railway crosses any public road,
good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points,
at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free
passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and
distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity
of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking
out for trains.
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable, we rule in the negative. The doctrine of last clear
chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. The proximate cause of the injury
having been established to be the negligence of petitioner,
we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the
instant case.
AL DELA CRUZ vs CAPT. RENATO OCTAVIANO
G.R. No. 219649, July 26, 2017
FACTS:
Captain Renato Octaviano, a military dentist assigned at the
Office of the Chief Dental Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, respondent Wilma
Octaviano, Renato's mother and Janet Octaviano, Renato's
sister, rode a tricycle driven by Eduardo Y. Padilla.
Respondent Wilma and Janet were inside the sidecar of the
vehicle, while Renato rode at the back of the tricycle driver.
They then proceeded to Naga Road towards the direction of
CAA and BF Homes. Renato was asking his mother for a
change to complete his₱l0.00 bill when he looked at the road
and saw a light from an oncoming car which was going too
fast. The car, driven by petitioner, hit the back portion of the
tricycle where Renato was riding. The force of the impact
caused the tricycle to tum around and land on the pavement
near the gutter. Thus, Renato was thrown from the tricycle
and landed on the gutter about two meters away.
ISSUE: Civil Code, “The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses
W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of the the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such
tricycle driver animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability
shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force
RULING:
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
NO.
suffered it.”
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is ISSUE:
required to conform for his own protection. To hold a person
Is Hisole, as the owner of the carabao, liable for the damage
as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard caused to its caretaker?
of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the HELD:
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal No.
sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal.”
occurrence. In this case, the causal link between the alleged Afialda was the caretaker of the animal and was compensated
negligence of the tricycle driver and respondent Renato was to tend the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, was the
not established. This court has appreciated that
possessor and the user of the carabao, and was thus the one
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic
statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability who had custody and control of the animal and was in a
for damages.  position to prevent the animal from causing damage. It was
the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from
Also, noteworthy is the ruling of the CA as to the matter, thus: causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
The trial court absolved defendants of liability because of the being injured by the animal under those circumstances was
failure of the plaintiffs to present the tricycle driver and thus one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
concluding that plaintiffs suppressed evidence adverse to
assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
them. This is error on the part of the trial court. The non-
presentation of the tricycle driver as a witness does not affect
the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants against herein
defendants-appellees. Even granting that the tricycle driver
was presented in court and was proved negligent, his
negligence cannot cancel out the negligence of defendant
Dela Cruz, because their liabilities arose from different
sources. The obligation or liability of the tricycle driver arose
out of the contract of carriage between him and petitioners THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,vs.
whereas defendant Dela Cruz is liable under Article 2176 of HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN
the Civil Code or under quasi-delicts. There is ample evidence JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA
to show that defendant Dela Cruz was negligent within the JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
purview of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, hence, he cannot
escape liability. G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

MARGARITA AFIALDA vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO FACTS:

HISOLE
G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1979
FACTS:
Loreto Afialda was employed as a caretaker of the carabaos
owned by spouses Basilio and Francisco Hisole. On March 21,
1947, Afialda was gored by one of the carabaos, causing
injuries which resulted to his death. The mishap was due
neither to his own fault nor to force majeure. Afialda’s sister,
Margarita, sued Hisole arguing that under Article 1905 of the
Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte.
After the typhoon had abated, the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan,
ventured out, and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of
which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise that might have been damaged. Wading in
waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into
the water. The two girls attempted to help, but failed. There
was an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water.
Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes.
Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away
from her he turned back shouting that the water was
grounded.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his
mother-in- law had been electrocuted, they requested the
police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the electric
current.
The body of the deceased was recovered about two meters
from an electric post. Dr. Castro examined the body. The skin
was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated
death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an
“electrically charged wound” or a first-degree burn. About the
base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The
certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of
death as “circulatory shock electrocution”.
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the
testimonies of its officers and employees, and sought to
prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao Juan’s
death, the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole
franchise area, did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines,
devices and other INELCO equipment had been newly-
installed prior to the date in question. As a public service
operator and in line with its business of supplying electric
current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices
to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000
was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI.
INELCO, however, theorizes that the deceased could have
died simply by either drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself. it was pointed out that
the deceased, without petitioner’s knowledge, caused the
installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from
the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting,
thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the
switch is on. This might have caused the electrocution.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint
but awarded P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of
P45000.
The CA set aside the CFI decision and ordered INELCO to pay
actual damages of P30229.45, compensatory damages of
P50000, exemplary damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of
P3000, plus the cost of the suit.
ISSUE:
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private
respondents from collecting damages from INELCO
HELD:
NO. Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the
deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that
the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has
been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must
abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist
or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he
seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the
fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to INELCO’s consent as she was on her
way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents,
as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a
result of the death caused by INELCO’s negligence.
Reasoning
INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and
floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons
and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag
City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29,
1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity
to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not
show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence
discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area,
nor even manning its office.
INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the
general public"... considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to
the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of
diligence and care extends to every place where persons have
a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to
produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would
not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission"
CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual
damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED
ANTONIO TRANSPORTO vs. HERNANI MIJARES
(1 CAR 2s 860)b1961
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Transporto and Hernani Meharis were
both employees of La Carlota Sugar Central in Negros
Occidental.
On December 23, 1956, at about 12:30nn, the parties found
an unusually big-sized firecracker on the table of Vicente Lim,
chief of the Analyst Department.
Petitioner approached the table and examined the
firecracker. He then bragged that he used to explode bigger-
sized firecrackers, and that if held tightly, no one would get
hurt by the explosion thereof. His office companions laughed
at the remark.
Apparently irked by the laughter of his companions, he
challenged them to a bet of Php 100.00. Despite the
statement of Vicente Lim that the firecracker was a real one
and would explode. Respondent accepted the bet but for only
Php 20.00.
Petitioner went as far as tying the firecracker to his hand. He
then simulated lighting the fuse with his cigarette and
suddenly thrusted his hand towards Mijares, at the same time
shouting “Boom!” After joking, plaintiff held the firecracker
tightly, ignited the fuse, and it exploded. He then taunted the
MIjares by saying that the latter “lost”.
When they all went back to work, Petitioner Transporto
noticed that his hand was bleeding. He immediately said:
“Well, it is an accident; it is my fault.”
He was then taken to the hospital where he was confined for
14 days. He paid Php 172.00 for the room, Php 53.35 for
medicine, and Php 200.00 for subsistence and transportation
expenses of his family.
Transporto’s monthly salary was Php 150.00, which he failed
to receive since the date of the incident because his
employers did not take him back.
Upon his discharge, plaintiff asked for monetary help from
Mijares which the latter agreed to pay him Php 1,000.00; Php
500.00 of which was deposited on January 21, 1957.
In February 1957, Transportino demanded payment of the
balance of Php 500.00 but he was simply told that he was
already paid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Transportino can demand for the payment.
RULING:
NO. The case is governed by the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria (no wrong is done to him who consents, that is, “that
to which a person assents is not esteemed, in law, an injury”,
the facts and circumstances being such as to warrant the
conclusion that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he ran,
impliedly agreed to incur it. When a person, knowing and
appreciating the danger and the risk, elects voluntarily to
encounter them, he can no more maintain an action founded
upon the statue than he can in cases to which the statute has
no application.

The principle that one who voluntarily assumed the risk of
injury from a known danger is debarred from a recovery is
recognized in negligence cases. As stated, a plaintiff who by
his conduct has brought himself within the operation of the
maxim, ‘violenti non fit injuria’, cannot recover on the basis of
the defendant’s negligence.
It is said that one knows, appreciates, and deliberately
exposes himself to a danger ‘assumes the risk’ thereof. One
cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal injury,
especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then
hold the author of the danger for the ensuing injury.
AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
FACTS:
Picart was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bridge at San
Fernando, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across,
Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per
hour. As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule
of the road.
Picart, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In
so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would move to
the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and
the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing
that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering
to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the
other side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, it has struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in this case?
HELD:
YES. The doctrine is applicable. In other words, when a
traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his
negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition
and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not
preclude a recovery. 
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free
from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
 
In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant
was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to
weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to
apportion the damage according to the degree of their
relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the
defendant was in this case the immediate and determining
cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION vs.
PURIFICACION VIZCARA
G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012
FACTS:
On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning,
Reynaldo Vizcara was driving a passenger jeepney headed
towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions,
namely, Cresencio Vizcara, Crispin Natividad, Samuel
Natividad, Dominador Antonio and Joel Vizcara.
While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a PNR
train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas,
suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The
collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo,
Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand,
Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing
installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the "Stop, Look
and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop"
signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was
partly blocked by another signboard.
On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, herein
respondents, filed an action for damages against PNR,
Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train,
before the RTC of Palayan City. Respondents alleged that the
proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries
sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners’
gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures
to prevent injury to persons and properties. They pointed out
that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the
accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting
equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence
of the track and of the approaching train.
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due
diligence in operating the train and monitoring its
roadworthiness. They asseverate that Estranas was driving
the train at a moderate speed. Four hundred 400 meters
away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn
to warn motorists of the approaching train. However, when
the train was already 10 meters away from the intersection,
the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly
crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the
brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer
weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a complete
stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away
from the point of collision.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision with modification with respect to the
amount of damages awarded to the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable in the
instant case.
RULING:
NO. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of
the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the
petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The
unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not
have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate
incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any
overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus,
absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents,
the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO
VALDEZ vs. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and
KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS
G.R. No. 175172, September 29, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995,
Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading north
on the national highway in Barangay Tablac, Ilocos Sur in a
reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake
a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the
opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos
caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical
assistance.

In their Answer, petitioners denied respondents’ allegation
and alleged that, Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a
moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming
from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag
manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To
avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards
the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type
jeep continued to move toward the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and
negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew
had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of
action against petitioners.
The trial court held that, the doctrine of last clear chance was
applicable to this case. It cited Picart v. Smith, where both
parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one
succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time,
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
The trial court held that the driver of the passenger jeep,
Benigno Valdez, having seen the risk exhibited by the wiggling
of the front wheels of the owner-type jeep, causing it to run
in a zigzag manner, should have parked his vehicle on the
right shoulder of the road so that the mishap could have been
prevented. Since he ignored to take this reasonable
precaution, the omission and/or breach of this duty on his
part was the constitutive legal cause of the mishap.
The trial court stated that the doctrine of last clear chance, as
applied to this case, implied a contributory negligence on the
part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of the mechanical
defect of his vehicle.
ISSUE:
Is the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applicable in this case?
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so − is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident,
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case,
because even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who
had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep,
Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
The Answer of petitioners stated that when the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno
Valdez maneuvered his vehicle towards the western shoulder
of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep
driven by Ramos continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners
assert in their Petition that considering that the time the
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the
time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer
had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the
records are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance
between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have
been near enough, because the passenger jeep driven by
Valdez was unable to avoid the collision. Hence, the doctrine
of last clear chance does not apply to this case.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily
prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular
accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the
inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Bank of America vs. Philippine Racing Club
G. R. 150228, July 30, 2009
FACTS:
Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a
current account with petitioner Bank of America. Its
authorized signatories are the company President and Vice-
President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they
pre-signed checks to accommodate any expenses that may
come up while they were abroad for a business trip. The said
pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs
accounting officer. Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks
came into the hands of one of its employees who managed to
encash it with petitioner bank. The said check was filled in
with the use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the
'Payee', the amount in words was written, with the word
'Cash' written above it.

Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the
blank checks as both showed similar infirmities and
irregularities and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to verify
with the corporation and proceeded to encash the checks.
PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower
court awarded actual and exemplary damages. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the lower court's decision and held that the bank
was negligent. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that it
was merely doing its obligation under the law and contract in
encashing the checks, since the signatures in the checks are
genuine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for
negligence and thus should pay damages to PRC
RULING:
Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last
clear chance to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is
the one foremost liable .
There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are
genuine but the presence of irregularities on the face of the
check should have alerted the bank to exercise caution before
encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the
business impressed with public interest that they are duty
bound to protect their clients and their deposits at all times.
They must treat the accounts of these clients with
meticulousness and a highest degree of care considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required
of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.
The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously
negligent and highly risky behavior which makes them also
contributor to the loss. It's own negligence must therefore
mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person who
stole the checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in
its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC
supposedly should have control and supervision over its own
employees.
3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the
total amount of damages while PRC should shoulder 40% of
the said amount.
G.R. No. 153076 June 21, 2007
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL, and
APOLONIO R. DEOCAMPO, petitioners,
vs. MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA, respondent.
FACTS:
On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with
plate no. PEC-93 was driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped
into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by
Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres.
Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO)
owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager
Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of
Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St.,
Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.
The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper
of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment
of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he
did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case
against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.
Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages,
and Attorney’s fees against LADECO, its administrative officer
Henry Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his
pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per
hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning
south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab
which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab
stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent
alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact.
Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at
the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent
testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a
blinking light while looking at the speedometer.
In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City ruled in favor of defendant and ordered LADECO
and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court
found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the
owner of the crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13,
1995. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Who is negligent?
 2. Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable
RULING:
1. Both drivers are negligent.
Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn.
Following Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have
stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the
center of the highway. However, Deocampo was equally
negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to
executing the U-turn. Deocampo should have also slowed
down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo admitted
that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about 20 meters
away from him.13 Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the
incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles
on the road. Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he
was not driving very fast before the collision, as found by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We sustain this
finding since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming
those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this
Court. Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the
point of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampo
was not driving very fast.
2. Yes. The doctrine is applicable.
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last
clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had
full control of the situation since he was in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding
and overturning, compared to running straight ahead.
Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not
driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was
not only driving fast, but he also admitted that he did not step
on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped
on the brakes after the collision.
WILLIAM TIU, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND
STYLE OF "D’ ROUGH RIDERS," AND VIRGILIO TE LASPIÑAS V.
PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO
PEDRANO AND PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND
INSURANCE, INC.
G.R. NO. 138060 SEPTEMBER 1, 2004
FACTS:
A cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General
Merchandise" was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and
left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one
of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then
parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby
shop. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch
over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a
spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve
as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The truck’s tail lights
were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D’ Rough Riders passenger driven by
Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national highway of
Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. Among its
passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa
Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the
bus. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the
stalled truck. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the
left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
rammed into the truck’s left rear. The impact damaged the
right side of the bus and left several passengers injured.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney’s fees
before the RTC against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus
operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas. The
respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was
cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and
that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures
to avoid the accident.
The petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint against the
following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tiu’s insurer; respondent
Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck;
and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They
alleged that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill
climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further
alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear
portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no
early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas
promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid
damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers,
the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck’s left rear.
The respondent PPSII admitted that it had an existing contract
with petitioner Tiu, but averred that it had already attended
to and settled the claims of those who were injured during
the incident. It could not accede to the claim of respondent
Arriesgado, as such claim was way beyond the scheduled
indemnity as contained in the contract of insurance.
RTC ruled in favor of Arriesgado. It ruled that if Laspiñas had
not been driving at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved
to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus, averting the
unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner
Laspiñas was negligent. According to the CA, the action of
respondent Arriesgado was based not on quasi-delict but on
breach of contract of carriage. As a common carrier, it was
incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary
diligence was observed in ensuring the safety of passengers
during transportation. Since the latter failed to do so, he
should be held liable for respondent Arriesgado’s claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable in this case.
RULING: No. The principle of last clear chance only applies in
a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery
to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if
any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179
of the Civil Code. Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability
for the death of respondent Arriesgado’s wife due to the
negligence of petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this score.
Other issues:
Petitioner Laspiñas was negligent in driving the ill-fated bus.
The damage sustained by the truck itself supports the finding
of both the trial court and the appellate court, that the D’
Rough Rider bus driven by petitioner Laspiñas was traveling at
a fast pace. Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25
meters, petitioner Laspiñas had more than enough time to
swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the
bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As
found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that
petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, since at
4:45 a.m., the hour of the accident, there were no oncoming
vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner Laspiñas could
have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and,
thus, could have avoided the truck. Instinct, at the very least,
would have prompted him to apply the breaks to avert the
impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he
caught sight of the stalled truck. He also violated Section 35
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No.
4136, as amended:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. – (a) Any person
driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the
same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due
regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and
or any other condition then and there existing; and
no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a
highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb
and property of any person, nor at a speed greater
than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
Petitioner Tiu failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence against him as one engaged in the business of
common carriage. While evidence may be submitted to
overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown
that the carrier observed the required extraordinary
diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and
foresight can provide, or that the accident was caused by
fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court,
petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption.
The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the
passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the
owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.
FERRER VS. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-41767. August 23, 1978
FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of
a Ford pick-up car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 31, 1970, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider,
who was then only sixteen (16) years of age, without proper
official authority, drove the for pick-up, without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to
property. The pickup car was overturned, causing physical
injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger
therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical
treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more
than two (2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries
sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable physical
pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental
anguish, moral shock and spent a considerable sum of money
for her treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to
reimburse them for actual expenses as well as other
damages.
The complaint was only filed on January 6, 1975.
At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel
were present. As such the Pfleiders were declared in default
and the court rendered judgment against them. Upon filing a
motion for reconsideration, respondent judge, without
setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action because it does not allege
that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of
the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company; and
(b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of
the accident, and the action to recover damages based on
quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years. Hence, the instant
petition for mandamus.
ISSUE:
W/N the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by
private respondents' failure to allege the same in their
answer.
RULING:
Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as
to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his
failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does
not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. The
defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such
defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the
preceding pleading.
It is true that the defense of prescription can only be
considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the
defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense
was invoked because the defendants had been declared in
default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence
shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's
complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
limitations.
In the present case, there is no issue of tact involved in
connection with the question of prescription. The complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which
caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette Ferrer
occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the
action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions
for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort
must be filed within four years. The four-year period begins
from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
ERNESTO KRAMER vs CA
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer collided
with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned
by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As
a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking
with it its fish catch.
Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine
Inquiry for the determination of the proximate cause of the
collission. The Board decided that the collision occurred due
to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent
who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines.
The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine
Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of
the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for
damages against the private respondent before the RTC. The
private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the
Complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents argue that the prescription period for actions
based on quasi-delict is 4 years from when the cause of action
accrued as stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the
period should be counted from April 8, 1976 when the
collision occurred.
Petitioners argue that the period should be counted from 1982,
or when the date when the Decision ascertaining the
negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had
become final. They claimed that maritime collisions have
peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the
Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve.
RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the
petitioners. It stated that prescriptive period under the law
should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when
the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been
finally ascertained.
The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA stated that the
decisions of an admin are not binding on the courts. If an
accrual of a cause of action has to be dependent on an action
of an admin body, then it might get delayed.
ISSUE:
Did the action prescribe?
HELD:
YES.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The
prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action,
which consists of 3 elements, namely:
A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created.
An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right.
An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff
The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause
of action arise.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from
the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision. The
aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other
party before he can file an action for damages.
The period should be counted from April 8, 1976.
SANTOS vs. PIZARDO
GR No. 151452. July 29, 2005
FACTS:
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan
(Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite
Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van’s driver and three
(3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers.
In a decision dated December 17, 1998, the MTC convicted
Sibayan. As petitioners expressly made a reservation of their
right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan, the MTC did not make any
pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, predicating their claim on the judgment
of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil
action made in the criminal case. Petitioners assert that by
the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondent’s civil liability arising from crime.
Respondent Judge Normandie B. Pizardo of RTC-Quezon City,
dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of
action was based on quasi delict and should have been
brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident. MR was
denied. Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for
being improper remedy. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for civil liability has prescribed
HELD:
No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations
therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim that the action
was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime.
Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean
that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on
quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and
an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this
case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e.,
the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the
prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent
a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not
crime especially as the latter action had been expressly covered by a warranty.
reserved.

In the case of Mendoza vs La Mallorca Bus Company, it was

held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana
is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of
the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the
commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of
the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity
even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the
employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed
the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead
allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’ allegations
in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting
that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of
multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. However, since the
stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be
considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners
to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only
recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.
This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
CARLOS B. DE GUZMAN vs. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC.
G.R. No. 141480 NOVEMBER 29, 2006
On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for damages
against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the
Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as
the case was filed more than six months from the date the
vehicle was sold and/or delivered.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, holding that since no
warranty card or agreement was attached to the complaint,
the contract of sale of the subject pick-up carried an implied
warranty that it was free from any hidden faults or defects, or
any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the
buyer. The prescriptive period thereof is six (6) months under
Article 1571 of the Civil Code.
Further, the RTC held that the claim for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees is based on quasi-delict or
breach of contract, such are merely ancillary to the main
cause of action which is based on warranty against hidden
defects. Without the latter, the former cannot stand alone.
Petitioner contends that the dismissal on the ground of
prescription was erroneous because the applicable provision
is Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 (otherwise known as
"The Consumer Act of the Philippines"), and not Article 1571
of the Civil Code. Petitioner specifies that in his complaint, he
neither asked for a rescission of the contract of sale nor did
he pray for a proportionate reduction of the purchase price.

ISSUE:
FACTS:

Whether or not petitioner’s action is barred by the statute of

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from limitations.
respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 1996 model for
the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of
P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in
RULING:
36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to
petitioner in two days.

YES. Petitioner's argument is erroneous. Article 1495 of the

Civil Code states that in a contract of sale, the vendor is
On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement
bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing
of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after
that is the object of sale. Corollarily, the pertinent provisions
traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner
of the Code set forth the available remedies of a buyer
asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a
against the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden
defects:
Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty
against the hidden defects which the thing sold may have,
should they render it unfit for the use for which it is intended,
or should they diminish its fitness for such use to such an
extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would
not have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it;
but said vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects or
those which may be visible, or for those which are not visible
if the vendee is an expert who, by reason of this trade or
profession, should have known them. (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any
hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was
not aware thereof.
This provision shall not apply if the contrary has been
stipulated and the vendor was not aware of the hidden faults
or defects in the thing sold.
Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding
ten articles shall be barred after six months from the delivery
of the thing sold.
Wherefore, the SELLER is not liable for the defects and a
redhibitory action for violation of an implied warranty against
hidden defects has been time-barred.
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORP. V. CHATTO
G.R. NO. L-87584, JUNE 16, 1992
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and
her daughter Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie
"Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant
Gotesco Investment Corporation. Hardly 10 minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The
theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium
ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the
street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for 1 day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. They were
treated for several days due to physical injuries sustained.
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness,
Chatto went to USA for further treatment and stayed for
about 3 months there.
Chatto filed an action against Gotesco for the damages they
have suffered. Gotesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that
the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due
to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer
from any structural or construction defect.
The RTC ruled in favor of Chatto and found out that the
incident was due to a structural defect. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Was the falling of the ceiling due to a fortuitous event?
HELD:
NO. Gotesco's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even
founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong,
admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling
collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by  force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That
Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply  force
majeure.
Gotesco could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind,
the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or
reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he is, as the Court impliedly held,
incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had
not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-
incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the
present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the
trial court, affirmed by the Court, that the collapse was due to
construction defects. There was no evidence offered to
overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not
shown that any of the causes denominates as  force
majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the
collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the
testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of
the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to
the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the
exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of
the same. That the structural designs and plans of the
building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do
not at all prove that there were no defects in the
construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering
that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all.
It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances
and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which
they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract
against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a
patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is
injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of
an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as
Gotesco vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was due
to force majeure, Gotesco would still be liable because it was
guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated
as  gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and
Cockburn's elucidation on  force majeure for one to be
exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of
negligence.
AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO vs. PHILIPPINE
STEAM NAVIGATION CO
G.R. Nos. L-36481-2. October 23, 1982.
FACTS:
Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel
of Philippine Steam Navigation Co. (PSN) for carriage from
Manila to Negros Occidental 1,528 cavans of rice and 44
cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise.
The contract of carriage of cargo was evidenced by a Bill of
Lading (B/L). There was a stipulation limiting the
responsibility of the carrier for loss or damage that may be
caused to the shipment
xxxx
a. “carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to
shipments billed ‘owner’s risk’ unless such loss or damage is
due to the negligence of the carrier. Nor shall the carrier be
responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure,
dangers or accidents of the sea, war, public enemies, fire”.
xxxx
Upon arrival of the vessel at the place of destination, inside
the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs, the cargoes were
discharged, complete and in good order, into the warehouse
of the Bureau of Customs. After appellee Uy Bico had taken
delivery of apportion of her cargoes, the warehouse was
razed by fire of unknown origin, destroying the rest of the
two appellees' cargoes. Appellees filed their claims from
appellant for the recovery of the value of the goods
destroyed by fire.
Trial Court ruled in favor of appellees and ordered payment
of their claims, stating that since the burning of the
warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable?
RULING:
No. PSN as obligor, is exempt from liability for non-
performance because the burning of the warehouse
containing appellees' goods, which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the loss, is a fortuitous event or force
majeure which could not have been foreseen by PSN.
Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate
and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from
liability for non- performance. (Art. 1174 of the New Civil
Code.)
The Partidas(Law II, Title 33, Partida 7), the antecedent of
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as "an
event that takes place by accident and could not been have
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses,
unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers."
In the dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the
Encyclopedia Juridicada Española says: "In a legal sense and
consequently, also in relation to contracts, caso fortuito
presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) the cause of the unforseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to creditor."
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier
incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It
appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the
arrival of their shipment, out had demanded that the same be
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy
Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the
burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the PSN or its employees be charged with negligence.
The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending
withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made
with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse
belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would
be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter
having no control whatsoever over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down
in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio, 43 Phil. 511, where this Court
held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire
caused by the negligence of the defendant's employees while
loading cases of gasoline and petroleum products. But unlike
in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present
case that the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom's
warehouse was in any way attributable to the negligence of
the appellant or its employees. Under the circumstances, the
appellant is plainly not responsible.
EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. UCPB
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 146018. June 25, 2003
FACTS:
On December 12, 1991, Feliciana Legaspi insured her cargo
with the UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., for the amount
of P100,000.00 against all risks. Her cargoes were to be
transported on board the M/V Tandag, owned by Edgar
Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc., scheduled to depart from Cebu
City to Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
When the vessel left port, it had thirty-four (34) passengers
and assorted cargo on board, including the goods of Legaspi.
After the vessel had passed by the Mandaue-Mactan Bridge,
fire ensued in the engine room, and, despite earnest efforts
of the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and
destroyed the entire vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel
and the cargoes therein.
Shortly thereafter, Feliciana Legaspi filed a claim, with UCPB
General Insurance, for the value of the cargo insured. UCPB
General Insurance approved the claim of Feliciana Legaspi.
UCPB General Insurance, as subrogee of Feliciana Legaspi,
filed a complaint anchored on torts against Cokaliong
Shipping Lines, with the RTC, for the collection of the total
principal amount of P148,500.00, which it paid to Feliciana
Legaspi for the loss of the cargo.
Cokaliong Shipping Lines argues that the cause of the loss of
the goods, subject of this case, was force majeure. It adds
that its exercise of due diligence was adequately proven by
the findings of the Philippine Coast Guard.
ISSUE:
Was the cause of the loss of the goods, subject of this case, a
force majeure?
HELD:
No. The uncontroverted findings of the Philippine Coast
Guard show that the M/V Tandag sank due to a fire, which
resulted from a crack in the auxiliary engine fuel oil service
tank. Fuel spurted out of the crack and dripped to the heating
exhaust manifold, causing the ship to burst into flames. The
crack was located on the side of the fuel oil tank, which had a
mere two-inch gap from the engine room walling, thus
precluding constant inspection and care by the crew.
Having originated from an unchecked crack in the fuel oil
service tank, the fire could not have been caused by force
majeure. Broadly speaking, force majeure generally applies to
a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an
earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy. 14 Hence, fire is not
considered a natural disaster or calamity. In Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we explained:
x x x. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some
act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the
category of an act of God unless caused by lighting or by
other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by
the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
Article 1680 of the Civil Code, which considers fire as an
extraordinary fortuitous event refers to leases or rural lands
where a reduction of the rent is allowed when more than
one-half of the fruits have been lost due to such event,
considering that the law adopts a protective policy towards
agriculture.
As the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions
in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides
that in all cases other than those mentioned in Article 1734,
the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has
observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.
Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of
a vessel to inspect their ship frequently so as to discover the
existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to
force majeure, but to the negligence of those officials.
The law provides that a common carrier is presumed to have
been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised
extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported.
Ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel is the first step in
exercising the required vigilance. Cokaliong Shipping Lines did
not present sufficient evidence showing what measures or
acts it had undertaken to ensure the seaworthiness of the
vessel. It failed to show when the last inspection and care of
the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank was made, what the
normal practice was for its maintenance, or some other
evidence to establish that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence. It merely stated that constant inspection and care
were not possible, and that the last time the vessel was dry-
docked was in November 1990. Necessarily, in accordance
with Article 1735 of the Civil Code, we hold Cokaliong
Shipping Lines responsible for the loss of the goods.
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN v. ARSENIO DELIM
GR No. 56487, Oct 21, 1991
FACTS:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded a mini bus at Aringay, La Union
bound for Bauang, of the same province. The bus bumped a
cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured with
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their
hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave
transportation expense of P12 in going home from the
hospital and they were made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating
that they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal
or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages stating that the mishap
had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2
inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an
inferiority complex on her part. Respondents raised in
defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner.
The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed
the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was
invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid waiver
RULING:
No valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by
petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective,must in the first
place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do
not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed
by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner
testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the
vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of
the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while
reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing
the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances,
there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by
or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and
whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon arrival
action against private respondent. in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a
seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been
familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight
ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by
SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES vs HON. COURT OF
the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay
APPEALS and MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN
or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only
G.R. No. 104685. March 14, 1996
US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance
and corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At
FACTS:
the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in
Ma. Paula San Agustin was a passenger on board
checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents
Flight SN 284 of Sabena Belgian World Airlines originating
or value. Petitioner cites Section 5(c), Article IX, of the
from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to
General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on
Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her
02 October 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955,
valuables, namely: jewelries valued at $2,350.00; clothes
generally observed by International carriers, stating, among
$1,500.00; shoes/bag $150; accessories $75; luggage itself
other things, that:
$10.00; or a total of $4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag
No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage
“Passengers shall not include in his checked
was left on board Flight SN 284.
baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as
checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles,
Plaintiff arrived at Manila International Airport and
money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers,
immediately submitted her Tag to facilitate the release of her
securities or other valuables.”
luggage but the luggage was missing. She was advised to
accomplish and submit a property Irregularity Report which
ISSUE:
she submitted and filed on the same day. She followed up her
1. Whether or not Sabena Belgian World Airlines is
claim but the luggage remained to be missing. On September
liable for the loss of the luggage.
15, 1987, she filed her formal complaint with the office of the
defendant’s Local Manager.
2. Whether or not the contention petitioner that
their liability is limited to only US$20.00 per kilo
On the occasion of plaintiffs following up of her
unless a higher value is declared in advance and
luggage claim, she was furnished copies of defendant’s
corresponding additional charges are paid
telexes with an information that the Brussels Office of
thereon
defendant found the luggage and that they have broken the
locks for identification. Plaintiff was assured by the defendant
RULING:
that it has notified its Manila Office that the luggage will be
1. Petitioner Airline Company should be held liable
shipped to Manila on October 27, 1987. But unfortunately,
for the loss of the luggage of its passenger.
plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the
second time. At the time of the filling of the complaint, the
It remained undisputed that private respondents luggage was
luggage with its content has not been found.
lost while it was in the custody of petitioner. It was supposed
to arrive on the same flight that private respondent took in
Plaintiff demanded from the defendant the money
returning to Manila. When she discovered that the luggage
value of the luggage and its contents amounting to $4,265.00
was missing, she promptly accomplished and filed a Property
or its exchange value, but defendant refused to settle the
Irregularity Report. She followed up her claim, and filed, on
claim.
the following day, a formal letter-complaint with petitioner,
felt relieved when she was advised that her luggage had
The trial court rendered judgment ordering
finally been found, and could expect it to arrive. She then
petitioner Sabena Belgian World Airlines to pay private
waited anxiously only to be told later that her luggage had
respondent Ma. Paula San Agustin. Sabena appealed the
been lost for the second time. Thus, negating the alleged
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals.
passenger’s negligence and finding petitioner ultimately guilty
The appellate court, in its decision, affirmed in toto the trial
of gross negligence in the handling of private respondent’s
courts judgment.
luggage.
Petitioner airline company, in contending that the
The loss of said baggage not only once but twice, underscores
loss of the luggage was due to plaintiffs sole if not
the wanton negligence and lack of care on the part of the
contributory negligence and the alleged negligence of private
carrier.
respondent should be considered the primary cause for the
loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the
2. The contention is without merit.
flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and
Brussels, and that her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet
 The rights petitioner might have had to the possible
limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention (Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, the
Montreal Agreement of 1966, the Guatemala Protocol of
1971 and the Montreal Protocols of 1975) denies to the
carrier availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to
wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused by
any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment. Hague Protocol amended the Warsaw
Convention by removing the provision that if the airline took
all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate
itself completely, and declaring the stated limits of liability.
However, such is not applicable if it is proved that the
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result. The same deletion was effected by the Montreal
Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger could
recover unlimited damages upon proof of wilful misconduct.
Thus, the Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It should be
deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause
of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or
damage to property or delay in its transport is not
attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct, bad
faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part
of any official or employee for which the carrier is
responsible, and there is otherwise no special or
extraordinary form of resulting injury. The provisions, in
short, do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches
of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage. Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt from any
liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in
bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is
absurd.
The Court thus sees no error in the preponderant
application to the instant case by the appellate court, as well
as by the trial court, of the usual rules on the extent of
recoverable damages beyond the Warsaw limitations.
Under domestic law and jurisprudence (the Philippines
being the country of destination), the attendance of gross
negligence (given the equivalent of fraud or bad faith) holds
the common carrier liable for all damages which can be
reasonably attributed, although unforeseen, to the non-
performance of the obligation. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC. V.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 102316 JUNE 30, 1997
FACTS:
It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff (Valenzuela
Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.) entered into an
agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers (Shipping
Corporation) whereby the latter undertook to load on board
its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the formers lauan round
logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for
shipment to Manila. The plaintiff insured the logs against loss
and/or damage with defendant South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00. It gave the check in
payment of the premium on the insurance policy to Mr.
Victorio Chua. The said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank
resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs.
A check for P5,625.00 to cover payment of the premium and
documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered due to
the insurer but was not accepted. Instead, the South Sea
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. cancelled the insurance policy
it issued as of the date of the inception for non-payment of
the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the
Insurance Code.
The plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy
but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff
likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the
latter denied the claim. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants. CA affirmed in part the RTC judgment by
sustaining the liability of South Sea Surety and Insurance
Company (South Sea), but modified it by holding that Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation (Seven Brothers) was not liable
for the lost cargo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Seven Brothers is liable.
RULING:
No. The charter party between the petitioner and private
respondent stipulated that the owners shall not be
responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any
kind of damages to the cargo. The validity of this stipulation is
the lis mota of this case.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute
between the parties that the proximate cause of the sinking
of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo
was the snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent
rolling of the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the
captain in stowing and securing the logs on board the vessel
and not due to fortuitous event. Likewise undisputed is the
status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private
carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner
Valenzuela.
The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for
being contrary to public policy, citing Article 1745 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be
considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public
policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or
shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence
in the custody of the goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of
diligence less than that of a good father of a family, or of a
man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables
transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the
acts or omissions of his or its employees;
(6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by
thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the
defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other
equipment used in the contract of carriage.
Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for
being contrary to Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of
Commerce and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code.
Citing Article 1306 and paragraph 1, Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, petitioner further contends that said stipulation gives
no duty or obligation to the private respondent to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family in the custody and
transportation of the cargo."
The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is
undisputed that private respondent had acted as a  private
carrier in transporting petitioners lauan logs. Thus, Article
1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers
which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless
expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly
stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the
charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of
or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the
ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such
stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the
parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract
of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We
stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may
freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce
would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a
common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general
public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods
as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied
therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party
that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts
involving common carriers.
Petitioner Valenzuela insists that the charter party stipulation
is contrary to Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce
which confer on petitioner the right to recover damages from
the shipowner and ship agent for the acts or conduct of the
captain. We are not persuaded. Whatever rights petitioner
may have under the aforementioned statutory provisions
were waived when it entered into the charter party.
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that (r)ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
person with a right recognized by law. As a general rule
patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to rights to
personality and family rights which may not be made the
subject of waiver. Being patently and undoubtedly
patrimonial, petitioners right conferred under said articles
may be waived. This, the petitioner did by acceding to the
contractual stipulation that it is solely responsible for any
damage to the cargo, thereby exempting the private carrier
from any responsibility for loss or damage thereto.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the contract of private
carriage binds petitioner and private respondent alone; it is
not imbued with public policy considerations for the general
public or third persons are not affected thereby.
YHT Realty Corporation Et Al vs. CA
G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel
every time he is here in the Philippines and would rent a
safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be
opened through the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to
the registered guest, and the other remaining in the
possession of the management of the hotel.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety
deposit box – 2 envelopes containing US Dollars, one
envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit cards,
bankbooks and a checkbook.
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip,
McLoughlin took some items from the safety box which
includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00), the other envelope containing Ten Thousand
Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his
credit cards. The other items were left in the deposit box.
Upon arrival, he found out that a few dollars were missing
and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing.
Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted
that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned
to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was
staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen
McLouglin’s key and was able to open the safety deposit box
with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also
told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLouglin
while the latter was asleep.
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must
assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez refused
to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting
the safety deposit box entitled “Undertaking For the Use of
Safety Deposit Box”
ISSUE:
WON the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box"
admittedly executed by private respondent is null and void.
RULING:
YES.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an
expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations
such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the
common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the
public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in
so-called “undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared
forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to
hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their
guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to
the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such
effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should
the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing
items are taken without the guest’s knowledge and consent
from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in
this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the “undertaking” manifestly
contravene Article 2003, CC for they allow Tropicana to be
released from liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar
any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the
safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that
the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of,
or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if
caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or
inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from
any force majeure.41 It is the loss through force majeure that
may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was
done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to
qualify the same as force majeure.
HEDY GAN vs CA
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
FACTS:
In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was
driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There
were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one
following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the
place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a
vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by
another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby
encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a
head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a
consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the
street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked
vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to
move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it.
The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked
vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On
appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan
of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
ISSUE:
Is Hedy Gan guilty for the death of the pedestrian?
HELD:
NO.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency
rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which
he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the
petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would
seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion
did not take into account the amount of time afforded
petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is
undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes
sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others. The appellate court is asking too much
from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an
eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself
from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver
of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be
expected to act with all the coolness of a person under
normal conditions. The danger confronting petitioner was
real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had
no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to
heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH
TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
FACTS:
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned
by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a
Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in
the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,
and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh
McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford
Escort.
When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away
from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the
car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with
the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was
filed with the trial court. Judge Capulong found Galang guilty
of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages.
Galang appealed to IAC.
IAC affirmed decision. Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil
cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee. Petitioners appealed
to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it
reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered the
defendants to pay damages. The decision is anchored
principally on the findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness
or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The
appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence
on the part of the defendants, as employers of Galang, in the
selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted
that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting and supervising the said employee.
In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was
reversed. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
WON Jose Koh is negligent under what is known as
“emergency rule”.
HELD
NO.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be
said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred; the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot
be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event,
the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the
truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow
down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its
proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary
measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver
continued at full speed towards the car.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He
himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per
hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by
law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last
clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a
doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in
a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance
or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. The
practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant
is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who
has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of
due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident.
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily
liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they
are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et
de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. The answers of the private respondents in the civil
cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt
to prove it.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while
its original is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that
the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
McKee
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs.
MINORS: DENNIS, MYLENE, MELANIE and MARIKRIS, all
surnamed MANGALINAO y DIZON,
G.R. No. 174089               January 25, 2012
 
FACTS:
This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death of all the passengers
in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spousesa and a
sibling of the surviving orphaned minor heirs.
An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the
minor children of the Mangalinao spouses through their legal
guardian against the registered owners and drivers of the two
10-wheeler trucks that collided with their parents’ Nissan
Pathfinder. The children imputed recklessness, negligence,
and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their
sister and parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix equally
liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their respective
drivers.
The RTC found recklessness on the part of both truck drivers
and held that the Pathfinder driven by the deceased had no
way to avoid a collision because it was about to pass the truck
when suddenly blocked. On the other hand, the Isuzu truck
was practically tailgating the Pathfinder on the dark slippery
highway such that when the Pathfinder collided with the Fuso
truck, it became inevitable for the Isuzu truck to crash into
the Pathfinder. The affirmed this decision.
Sonny and Antonio, alleged among others that the proximate
cause of the death of the victims is Loreto’s gross negligence.
Antonio should have been accorded the benefit of the
‘emergency rule’ wherein he was immediately confronted
with a sudden danger and had no time to think of how to
avoid it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the emergency rule find application in the
case at bar.
RULING:
NO. As correctly found by the CA, the smashed front of the
Isuzu strongly indicates the strong impact of the ramming of
the rear of the Pathfinder that pinned its passengers.
Furthermore, Antonio admitted that despite stepping on the
brakes, the Isuzu still suddenly smashed into the rear of the
Pathfinder causing extensive damage to it, as well as hitting
the right side of the Fuso. These militate against Antonio’s
claim that he was driving at a safe speed, that he had slowed
down, and that he was three cars away. Clearly, the Isuzu
was not within the safe stopping distance to avoid the
Pathfinder in case of emergency. Thus, the ‘Emergency Rule’
invoked by petitioners will not apply. Such principle states:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.[46]
Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that
night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed
and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done
so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in
front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent
such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring
evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his
driving.
VALENZUELA V. CA
G.R. NO. 115024, FEBRUARY 7, 1996
FACTS:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at
Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. She noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the
people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear
to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the
rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help
her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li.

Because of the impact Valenzuela was thrown against the
windshield of the car of Li which was destroyed, and then fell
to the ground. She was pulled out from under Li's car. She
was brought to a hospital where they had to amputate her
left leg due to the injuries she suffered. Valenzuela was
confined for 20 days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg. The expenses of hospital and artificial leg were
paid by Li’s car insurance.
Valenzuela filed a complaint for moral damages in amount of
1 million and others because of expected loss of earnings. The
RTC ruled in favor of Valenzuela and found out that Li was
negligent because they gave credence to the witnesses
involved and he was drunk at that time. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is Valenzuela contributory negligent when she parked in a no-
parking zone by reason of her flat tire (emergency)?
HELD:
NO. Traditionally, an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in
threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the
same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled
by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping
at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which
is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help
her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the
emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of
Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a
flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in
danger, she did what was best under the situation. As
narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2
feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." In fact, respondent
court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of
the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very
close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he prepared after the
incident showed Valenzuela's car partly straddling the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one
of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.res
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC.,, v. C & A construction, inc.,
G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003
FACTS
C & A Construction, Inc. (respondent) was engaged by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector
wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish
Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing
the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20,
1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express
received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. At
approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt.
Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not
enter the area because it was already congested.
At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the
vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power
barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10
feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to
counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the
Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered
a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power
barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was
maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed
by respondent. The damage caused by the incident amounted
to P456,198.24.
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from
petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused
by a fortuitous event.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of
negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions
to avoid the accident. Applying the emergency rule, it
absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no
opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a
threatening situation. It further held that even if the
maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot
be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by
respondent was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God.
The Court of Appeal reversed and set aside RTC’s ruling.
ISSUES
(1) Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent (yes)
(2) Whether (DELSAN) is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
(yes)
RULING
1. YES. Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the
vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a
report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon
was going to hit Manila after 8 hours.This, notwithstanding,
he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994,
when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which
unfortunately was already congested. The finding of
negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could
not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the
transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or
failure of a decision that determines the existence of
negligence in the present case, but the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances.
Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit
Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more
than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change
direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise
instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after
receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at
night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore,
he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according
to him, it was not very cloudy23 and there was no weather
disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding
reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have observed in the same situation.
Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater
chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering
that the Navotas Port where they docked was very near
North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he
would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.
The trial court ERRED in applying the EMERGENCY RULE.
Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence . Clearly, THE
EMERGENCY RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE BECAUSE THE DANGER WHERE CAPT. JUSEP FOUND
HIMSELF WAS CAUSED BY HIS OWN NEGLIGENCE.
2. YES. Vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held
solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee.
There is no question that petitioner, who is the
owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer
of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within
the scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner was
that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master
Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required
diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not
enough that the employees chosen be competent and
qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to
exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. In the
case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it
formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of
functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented
and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the
burden, petitioner should therefore be held liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep. So also, petitioner cannot
disclaim liability on the basis of respondents failure to allege
in its complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees.
RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF OF CUSTOM
INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION vs. SOLMAC
MARKETING CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83589 March 13, 1991
FACTS:
Solmac Corporation imported OPP film/waste scrap into the
Philippines, one of which is the Clojus shipment. Upon
application for entry, SOLMAC presented a Board of
Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap to the
BOC. However, upon examination of the shipment by the
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned
out that the importation were oriented in such a way that the
materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. Considering that
the shipment was different from what had been authorized
by the BOI and by law, petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation.
Petitioner Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice
on whether or not the subject importation may be released. A
series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and
the Bureau of Customs, on one hand, and between the
counsel for the private respondent, and the BOI and the
Bureau of Customs, on the other, ensued, which said that
holes must be drilled before the release. Petitioner Farolan
wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the
disposition of importations OPP. Since the goods were not
released, Solmac filed the action for mandamus and
injunction with the RTC praying for the unconditional release
of the goods and asked for award of damages. The RTC
rendered a judgment in favor of Solmac ordering the release
of the goods unconditionally. Solmac appealed to the CA only
insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is
concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners had already
released the goods without drilling holes. Also, the private
respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be
held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for
damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of
the public officers. The CA ruled in favor of respondent and
awarded damages. On motion for reconsideration, the CA
lessened the damages awarded. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Should the petitioners be held liable for damages in favor of
private respondent?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are in good
faith. Good faith refers to a state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists
of the honest intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is
the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established
by convincing evidence."
In the present case, the record is replete with evidence
bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was
the report of the NIST that, contrary to what the respondent
claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but
oriented polypropylene whose importation to the Philippines
was restricted, if not prohibited. It was on the strength of this
finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the
subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, on
many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of
the BOI on whether the subject importation might be
released and there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the
BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented
polypropylene. Thirdly, when a public officer takes his oath of
office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office
faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act
primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge
of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and
attention which careful men use in the management of their
affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that petitioners
first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines
regarding the disposition of the subject importation then
being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These products
were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene
and oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were
then already sufficient to meet local demands, hence, their
importation was restricted, if not prohibited. The petitioners
cannot be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately
releasing the import goods without first obtaining the
necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public
officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law
they were tasked to implement was faithfully complied with.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in
withholding the release of the subject importation because
indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the
evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and
Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP,
nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public
officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties
or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for
damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may
have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation,
if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the
acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith.

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION v. CA
GR No. 120639, Sep 25, 1998
FACTS:
The records of this case show that plaintiff, who is a lawyer by
profession was a complimentary member of BECC from
February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued a credit card.
Their contractual relations went on smoothly until his
statement of account for October, 1989 amounting to
P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. He was informed by his
secretary that defendant was demanding immediate payment
of his outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check
for P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card.
Plaintiff issued a check in the amount of P15,000.00,
postdated December 15, 1989 which was received on
November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the
defendant, who in turn gave the said check to Jeng Angeles, a
co-employee who handles the account of the plaintiff. The
check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto
Maniquiz, head of the collection department of defendant
was formally informed of the postdated check about a week
later. On November 28, 1989, defendant served plaintiff a
letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the
inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.
In a letter addressed to the defendant dated December 12,
1989, plaintiff requested that he be sent the exact billing due
him as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of his
postdated check and that said check be returned to him
because he had already instructed his bank to stop the
payment thereof as the defendant violated their agreement
that the plaintiff issue the check to the defendant to cover his
account amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that
the defendant will not suspend the effectivity of the card
(Exh. D).
A letter dated December 16, 1989 was sent by the plaintiff to
the manager of FEBTC, Ramada Branch, Manila requesting
the bank to stop the payment of the check. No reply was
received by plaintiff from the defendant to his letter dated
December 12, 1989. Plaintiff sent defendant another letter
dated March 12, 1990 reminding the latter that he had long
rescinded and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered
into with defendant and requesting for his correct billing, less
the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation
within five (5) days from receipt thereof why his card was
dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite assurance to the
contrary by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise the
necessary court action shall be filed to hold defendant
responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered
by him. Plaintiff alleged further that after a few days, a certain
Atty. Albano, representing himself to be working with office
of Atty. Lopez, called him inquiring as to how the matter can
be threshed out extrajudicially but the latter said that such is
a serious matter which cannot be discussed over the phone.
The defendant served its final demand to the plaintiff dated
March 21, 1990 requiring him to pay in full his overdue
account, including stipulated fees and charges, within 5 days
from receipt thereof or face court action also to replace the
postdated check with cash within the same period or face
criminal suit for violation of the Bouncing Check Law. The
plaintiff, in a reply letter dated April 5, 1990, demanded
defendant's compliance with his request in his first letter
dated March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt,
otherwise the plaintiff will file a case against them.
Thus, on May 7, 1990 private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney’s
fees arising out from the dishonor of his credit card
RULING:
There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages
is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused
the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at
Café Adriatico. He can not now pass the blame to the
petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card.
As quoted earlier, the application contained the stipulation
that the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose
billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere
is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that
there is a need of notice before suspension may be effected
as private respondent claims.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, is SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is DIRECTED to pay his outstanding
obligation with the petitioner.
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES
LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA
G.R. No. 116100             February 9, 1996
FACTS:
The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with
a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.
Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said
property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to respondents herein.
As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondent’s property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is
approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant
from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses
of the petitioners. The second passageway is about 3 meters
in width and length from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos
Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway,
a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were
tenants occupying the remises and who were acknowledged
by Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982,
one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa
went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by Petitioners
Santoses along their property which is also along the first
passageway. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed
said fence because of inconveniences of having the front of
her house as a pathway as when some of the tenants were
drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
RTC: T rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios
and Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access
ingress and egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay the
Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway.
Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. The CA rendered its decision affirming
the judgment of the trial court with modification only insofar
as the grant of damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE:
1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private
respondent Mabasa is proper
2. WON the award of damages is in order
HELD:
1. Yes. The grant of right of way was proper.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already
barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from
the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents
the right of way; hence they are presumed to be satisfied
with the adjudication therein.
With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to
petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way
has already been laid to rest.
2. No. The award of damages was not proper.
A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award
of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does
not give rise to a right to recover damages.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. (damnum absque injuria). In order
that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it (damnum et injuria.)
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence
within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of
the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or
fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not
subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing
right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way
in their favor after payment of just compensation.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute
right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully
perform in the employment and exercise of said right.
To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use
of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
SERGIO AMONOY V. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND
ANGELA FORNIDA
G.R. NO. 140420 FEBRUARY 15, 2001
FACTS:
Amonoy was the counsel of Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos,
Asuncion Pasamba, and Alfonso Formida in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six parcels
of land. The Project of Partition submitted was approved and
two of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Formilda. They executed a deed of real estate
mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor
of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney's fees. But it
was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the
claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate
was declared closed and terminated. Asuncion Pasamba died
on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on
2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter,
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. Because his Attorney's
fees were not paid, Amonoy filed for their foreclosure. The
heirs opposed, contending that the attorney's fees charged
[were] unconscionable. Judgment was rendered in favor of
Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the
P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of
the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's
fees. They failed to pay. The said lots were foreclosed and
auction sale was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder.
A temporary restraining order was granted enjoining the
demolition of the houses. Respondents' house had already
been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of
Demolition ordered by the lower court.
A complaint for damages in connection with the destruction
of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner
before the RTC. It dismissed respondents' suit. CA set aside
the lower court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay
respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Amonoy is liable.
RULING:
Yes. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the
legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without
injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no
remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's
rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for
damages. Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that
he is not liable for the demolition of respondents' house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the
Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria  finds no
application to this case. True, petitioner commenced the
demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the
records show that a TRO, enjoining the demolition of
respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court on
June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of
Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of
the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We
agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition
of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. This is
clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's testimony.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified
at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his
actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC.
Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an
invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended  when he
received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he
was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by
petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting
on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order
and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents;
house.1âwphi1.nêt
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque
injuria,  a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.
Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the
legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage
or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot
be obscured, much less abated. In the ultimate analysis,
petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or
to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs REYNALDO B. RODRIGUEZ and
LIBORIO AFRICA
G.R. No. 174646 August 22, 2012
FACTS:
Checkered Farms entered into an Exclusive Purchasing
Agreement with petitioner which bound itself to purchase all
the acceptable bananas that would be produced by the
former. Checkered Farms, in return allow petitioner to
introduce installations and improvements on the land and to
dismantle and remove all non-permanent installations and
improvements it has introduced upon the expiration of the
period of the contract. Rodriguez, the new owner of the said
land, authorized petitioner to manage the plantation under
an interim arrangement pending final resolution of their
negotiation. In the same letter, Rodriguez demanded for the
accounting of fruits harvested from the expiration of their
contract, petitioners failed and refused to pay, in fact, raided
the subject plantation destroying the facilities therein arguing
that the contract expires and have the right to dismantle their
own installations.
In the court, petitioner insists that it cannot be held liable for
damages' allegedly suffered by respondents based on the
principle of damnum absque injuria and such act was acts
contra bonus mores.
ISSUE:  Does the principle of damnum absque injuria justifies
the petitioner’s right to remove the improvements on the
subject plantation?
RULING: 
No.
Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate
exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law
does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle,
however, does not apply when there is an abuse of a person's
right as in this case.[72] While we recognize petitioner's right
to remove the improvements on the subject plantation, it,
however, exercised such right arbitrarily, unjustly and
excessively resulting in damage to respondents' plantation.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must
nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When
the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Civil Code, Article 21, any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage; this refers to acts contra bonus mores. The act is
within the article only when it is done willfully. The act is
willful if it is done with knowledge of its injurious effect; it is
not required that the act be done purposely to produce the
injury.
Undoubtedly, petitioner removed the pipes with knowledge
of its injurious effect which is the destruction of the banana
plants and fruits; and failed to cover the diggings which
caused ground destruction. Petitioner should, therefore, be
liable for damages.
LEONARDIA VS. PHUTURE VISIONS INC.
G.R. No. 190289,January 17, 2018
FACTS:
Respondent Phuture processed, completed and submitted its
Application for Permit to Engage in Business, Trade or
Occupation to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod and paid
the fees therefor to the Permits and Licensing Division of the
City Mayor of Bacolod City. It was then issued a claim slip for
its permit.
Phuture commenced bingo operations at SM Bacolod prior to
the issuance of the actual hard copy of the mayor’s permit.
Later, respondent learned that its bingo outlet was padlocked
by agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and a copy of
a Closure Order was posted at the entrance of the bingo
outlet.
Phuture claimed that such closure was tainted with malice
and bad faith and that petitioners did not have the legal
authority to shut down said bingo operations. Phuture’s filed
an Application for the issuance of a temporary mandatory
order and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to remove the
padlock installed at respondent’s place of business at SM
Bacolod and allow it to conduct unhampered bingo
operations.
The RTC denied the Application and dismissed the case for
lack of merit. On appeal, the CA concluded that the
respondent was denied its proprietary right without due
process of law.
Accordingly, the appellate court ordered the case to be
reinstated and remanded to the RTC to determine if damages
should be awarded. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.
Petitioners oppose respondent's arguments, saying that the
issues they raised in the instant petition cannot be considered
as having been raised for the first time since they are
intertwined and bear relevance and close relation to the
issues resolved by the trial court. They further reiterate that
they cannot be held liable for damages since they were
merely performing governmental or sovereign acts in the
issuance of a mayor's permit. Thus, they argue that whatever
damages that respondent may have incurred belong to the
concept of damnum absque injuria for which the law provides
no remedy.
ISSUE:
released from liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar
any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the
safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that
the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of,
or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if
caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or
inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from
any force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that
may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was
done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to
qualify the same as force majeure.
In order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many
cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss
to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury,
that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the
bingo operations at the outset, then it is not entitled to the
damages which it is demanding from petitioners.

Whether the petitioners may be held liable for damages in

favor of respondent.

RULING:

YES.

Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an

expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations
such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the
common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the
public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in
so-called “undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared
forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.

In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to

hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their
guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to
the innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such
effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should
the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing
items are taken without the guest’s knowledge and consent
from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in
this case.

Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the “undertaking” manifestly

contravene Article 2003, CC for they allow Tropicana to be