A lbano

BAR REVIEW
MAGIC AREAS In POLITICAL LAW
2019 Bar Examination
Dean ED VINCENTS. ALBANO
Bar Review Director

Ways of amending the Constitution.

There arc several ways of proposing amendments to the Constitution. One is by way of a constitutional
convention and the other is proposal of % of Congress as a constituent body. There is a third way of proposing
amendments to the Constitution; however, the people through initiative upon petition of at least twelve per cent of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must he represented by at least three per cent of the
registered voters in it, may directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This right is not operative without an
implementing law. (Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution).

Tests in determining If what is being done Is an am endment or a revision ^

The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the "substance entirety” of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions. (Amador Valley
joint Union High School District vs. State Board of Equalization. S83 P. 2d. 1281, 1286 (1978)). The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and docs not consider the degree of the change
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of the basic governmental plan” includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic governmental
plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."
(Lambini), et al. vs. COMELEC, et at).
The proposal to shift the structure of government to Federalism is qualitative as it changes the basic plan of
government.

IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT

Reason behind the principle of State immunity.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodies in Section 3, Article XV! of the 1987
Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized
principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdu lion of another state. The principle is
based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy - that public service
would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government. (Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, june 26, 2009).
It is founded on the principle that there can be no right as against the authority that makes the law upon which
that right depends (Rep v. Villasor).
• ' i

Immunity of Slate from suit, not Instrument to perpetuate injustice.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation
arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted
to of the property. TUips, in Pc Los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the trul court s dismissal based on the
doctrine of non suability of the State of two rases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a
road had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners' knowledge and
lonseot was reversed ar»d the cases remanded for trial on the merits The Supiemc Court ruled that the doctrine ot
sovereign immunity was not an instrument for jM?rpcirutmg any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent
domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis:
yet. even in lhar aiea, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation bomg paid, the
defense of ifmnuoity from suit could not be set up by the State against .in action for juyment by the owners (Air
Ti ansportitionOffure v. Sps Ramos, G.R No. 159402 Fcbruaiy 23,2011. Bersamm. |).

ARTICLE II - Declaration of Principles and Slate Policies

Implication of the right to u balanced and healthful ecology

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it. the convlaitvc duty to retrain from impairing
the environment (Opusa, el a! vs. FacLotan, et al., citing Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol 4. p. 913) It
implies the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests, else the ecological, environmental balance
would be irreversibly disrupted. It is what is known as the inter-generational responsibility of the present generation
to preserve the forests. This is also applicable to the duty to preserve the («*giuta Lake. (Laguna Lake Dev. Authority
vs CA. et aL. 66 SCAD 37Q. G.R. No. 120Ht>5 71. December 7. 1995) In the later case ot C and M Timber Corp. vs
Alcala. etal..G.R. No. 111088. June 13 1997. it was held that the reinstatement of timber licenses may negate our efforts
to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources
Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not impitse policy of monopoly.
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it d o es not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unl.nr The key, as in all economics in the
world, is to strike a balance hetween protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas
of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can
determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the
entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case. Congress has
decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to
Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. (Rep. Espmn. et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, |r. G.R. No. 143855.
September 21, 2010).

Right to information.
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Considering
that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable
to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively lim.ted the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement m US v, Gines-Pcrez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to foisake and renounce all privacy rights to
such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Weh page or the photograph itself
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students* Facebook friends, STC did not
violate the minors' right to privacy, as it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. (RHONDA AVE S. V1VARES, et al. v.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, et al., G.R. No. 202bf>6. September 29, 2014. Velasco, |r , \X

Disclosure of SAIN.
Right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in government decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. The importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of this
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange ot information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to certain records mav be imposed by law (Valmonte v. Berlmonte,
jr.}.

Doctrine of Incorporation
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of internat ional law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty stipulations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
customs as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" are;principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to
legal systems generally," such us "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice.” and the
"ge^ral principles against discrimination" which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Interi|iitibnal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms ofl^acial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination m Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
DLScrmiiMtlon in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, and*embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. (Mary
GraceNadvtdad S. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G R. No. 221697. March 8. 2016, En Banc [PerezJ)

President as sole organ in International relations.

In the seminal case off US v. Custiss-Wnght Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that "the President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.’
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious
embarrassment - is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not he admissible where domestic affairs alone involved.
Moreover, he, not Congress has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in lime of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form, of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with |apan, thereby creating serious implications for stability m
this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department's determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

2 |ABRC2019.Magie Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVlSED 2/EVSA/crys

 (Vlnuya, el al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo. et a!., G.R. No. 162210. April 28. 2010. F.n Bam
(Del Castillo) citing Rayon v. Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary; Sec: offusllce v. Ixi niton).

Duty of parents In rearing ihe youth.

Section 12. Article II of the |9B7 Constitution articulates thr State s policy relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing ..f the youth for civu efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government
The rearing ol children (te. referred to as the '’youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral
character arc' characterized not only as parental rights, hul also as |»arontal duties. This means that parents are not only
given the privilege of exercising then authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority
conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State s independent interest to ensure that the
youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during
childhood that minors arc prepared for additional obligations to society. "|T|hr duty to prepare the child for these
(obligations) must be read to include the Inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship (Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U S 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526;32 L F.d. 2d 15|1972| IJX:. LEXIS 144, emphasis and
underscoring supplied). ’This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to
the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens" (Bcllotti v. Hatrd. 44:4 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L
Ed. 2d 797 j 1979| U.S. LEXISl"; Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v Quezon City, cl al, G.R. No. 225442. August S.
2017. Pcrias-Bornabo. |).

Curfew ordinances are designed to promote children's well-being.

The Curfew Ordinances are examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their rate of promoting their
children’s well-being. These ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety
and the prevention of |uvenilc crime), which necessarily entail limitations on thr primary right of parents to rear their
children Minor's, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time fSec Schleifcr v. City of Charlottesville. 159 F.3d 843
(1998) U.S. App. LEXIS 26597).
The Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors arc not - whether actually or constructively accompanied by
their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State’s deference to the primary future of parental authority and
the importance of parents' role in child rearing. Parents arc effectively given unfettered authority over their children’s
conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting
that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain In public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours (See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F3d 488 (1991) U.S. App LEXIS 29974). In
this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors
nor force parents to abdicate their authority u> influence or control their minors' activities. As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent’s right to bring up his or her child
Samahan ng inga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al. G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, Perlas Bernabe. |).

ARTICLE 111 - BILL OF RIGHTS

The dual aspects of due process and their requirements

The dual aspects of due process are: (1) procedural due process: and (2) substantive due pnx'ess.
The following arc the requirements of procedural due process;
(1) There must be aq jmpartiaf tribunal;
(2) The court must have jurisdiction;
(3) There must be opportunity to be heard; and
(4) The ludgment must be rendered after trial and in accordance withlaw

The following are the requisites of substantive due process:

J l) The means are reasonable for the accomplishment of the purpose of the law; and
(2) The law must be intended for the interest of the public rather than tor private interest
/ V
Requirem ents o f uahd classifications fo r purposes o f the equal protection clause
They are tiic following:
(lj They must rest on substantial distinctions that make reel differences;
(2) They must be germane to the purpose of the law,
(3) They must not ht limited to existing conditions only (People vs Vera. 65 Phil. 56) jtui
f4) They must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Ichong vs. Hernandez. 101 Phil U55).

Investigator cannot he the prosecutor at the sume time.

Thr PCGG cannot gather evidence against a respondent, file a rnmmal complaint and then conduct a ptelirnmary
investigation of the case without contravening the basic tenets ot due process. The due process violation was compounded
by the fact that the PCGG had filed a civil complaint against the same respondent alleging substantially th*. same illegal or
criminal acts
In our criminal justice system thr law enforcer who conducted thr criminal investigation,
gathered the evidence and thereafter file the complaint for thr purpose of preliminary
investigation cannot hr allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation ot his own complaint. It
is to say (he least arbitrary and un|uy. It is m stab instances that We say one cannot be' a prosecutor
and fudge al the same Unte “ Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law
enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his
own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor iPeople v Eduardo Gojuangvo, |r., G.R Nos. 160864 &

3 IABKC2019 Magic Aieas in Polities I Law(convolidated)KE VISED 2/tVSA/cry*

 160897, November 16. 2016; Lai w People, Inly 1 2015 where Ihe SC said that the eold neutrality of a
judge is Imperative and indispensable requirement of due process).

Ordinance No. 1664 authorizes the immobilization of Illegally /parked motor vehicles by clamping the tires; valid.
As to substantive due process. Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by
its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, .is well as with tho requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy Considering that trafllc congestions were already retarding the growth
and progress in the population and economic renters of the rounti'y. the plain objective of Ordinance No 1664 was to
serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was. therefore, in order to fulfill
the compelling government purpose With regard to procedural process the clamping of the petitioners' vehicles was
within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. The Immobilization of illegally parked vehicles hy damping the
tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at Ihe time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous. (Valentino L Lcgaspi V (31ty Of Cebu. Et Al./Bienvrmdo P jahan, Sr., Et Al V
Court Of Appeals. Et Al.. G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013).

Reason for the rule that a temporary protection order under RA 9262 ran be Issued ex parte.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts ot violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all
the remedies necessary lo curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and lo prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. (Tua v.
Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, |).

Ex-parte issuance of TPO not violative of due process.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ
of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hcjring will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could l>e prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. (Tua v.Hon. Mangrobang. et al G.R.
No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta,)).

Requisites of valid classification.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the LGC amending RA 9009.
no less, intended the LGUs covered hy the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion.
The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated hy a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to
be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of ihe law-; (3) noi Ik limited to
existing conditions only; anti (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Al! these requisites have been met by the
laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long
before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
unfair (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et ai v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. Nos. 17t»951 17749 U
178056 December 21 2009. Velasco. Jr.,);)

Mandatory drug testing oj students constitutional.

The dt ug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c) and (d), for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees while mandatory, is a random and suspicion less arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of t us random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals, hence, t onstitutional.
Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well being ol then students and may
adopt such measures ac may reasonably be n ecessary to discharge such duly; and schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants lor admission that are fair, just, and n o n -d isc nmmatory Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations
and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fail, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
(SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(S|S) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY(PDEA),G.R No. 1S7870, November 3 200H, VELASCO, |R , | ).

Mandatory drug testing of persons charged with crimes Is unconstitutional

There is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are randomness' and suspicion less." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never he i andom or suspicion less I he ideas of landomness and being
suspicion less are antithetical to then being nude defendants in a minim i complaint they are not randomly picked
neither arc they hevund suspicion When jmmsoiis suspected ol committing a crime are charged. the\ are singled out and
are impleaded against fheir will The persons thus charged by (he hare fact ot hemg haled before the prosecutor's office
and |>eatc ably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their nghi to privacy. To ini|M>se nundatoiy drug testing on th» accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
4 |ABKC2019 Magu Areas in Politic al l.aw(c onsoiidah»d)KEl ISED 2/EVNA/crvs
 medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165 Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons' right to pnvucy guaranteed under See. 2, Art. Ill of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves (SOCIAL |USTICE SOCIFTY(S|S) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA), G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, |R.. | ). In fact, drug
testing becomes a fishing expedition prior to the prosecution of a person that would make it unconstitutional.

Illegally obtained documents are Inadmissible In evidence

The constitutional injunction declaring privacy of communication and com spnndencc to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply beta use it is the wife who feels aggrieved by her husband's nfidelity and who is a party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception is, if ihcrc is a lawful order of a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them breaking the cabinets and drawers
of the other and m ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his or her integrity or right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her (Zulueta vs. CA, or ai, 68 SCAD 440, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996).

Routine haggoge inspection at the port by port authorities valid even without warrant.
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per so. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to
deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per sc. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic porLs are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or
ports of travel.
Search conducted by the port authorities are reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused's
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against the accused (Erwin Libo-on Dcla Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January
11. 2016; Same as People v. Leila Johnson - where the SC ruled that the intrusion tnro the privacy of an airplane passenger
is so minimal compared to the danger to which the passengers are exposed to).

Nature of stop &frisk search.

"Stop and frisk" searches are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should lie given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should he balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens m accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness”
present m the situation where the police officer finds him or herself in. This may be* undoubtedly based on the experience
of the police officer. The case of the accused was different. Ho was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard
a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal about riding a jeepney and carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver It was the driver who signaled to the police that the
accused was "suspicious". It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead tu a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. For warrantless
searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion sujiportcd by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged." (People v. Cogacd, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014).

Plain View Doctrine; inadvertence Is important elem ent

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest outside the sus|x?cts person and premises under his immediate control. This is so
because "(ojbjects m the 'plain view' of ail officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence." 'The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, hut nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. (It) serves to
supplement the jwniw justifu jtton - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or sonic* other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and
permits the warrantless seizure." The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability m a situation where the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently i ome across the black bag, which
was in hw possession, they deliberately opened it, as part of the searth incident to his lawful arrest. (People v. Galantine,
O R No 202984. June 18,2014)

Evidence discovered during surveillance; witness had personal knowledge.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: ()) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
tomplainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) (he applicant and the witnesses testify on the racts personally
known to the in: and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to lx* searched and the things to be seized x x x (Del
Castillo v People 680 Phil. 447 120121)
On the claim of laik oi pcisoiul knowledge, the farts discovered during survciiljme i undue tod on the basis of
information and evidente provided by petitioners - consulate personal knowledge which coutd form the basis for the
issuance of a seanh warrant (Petron LPG Dealers Assn & Total Gaz LPG Dealers Assn, v Nona Ang, etuL, G.R. No. 199J71,
February 3,2016. Del Castillo, )j

5 |ABH(.2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(conswlidated)KfcVISEU 2/tVSA/* rys

 Ovtrbreadth doctrine.
Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law penalizes the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses does not suffer from overbreadth.
While it seeks to discourage data interference, It does not intrude into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these' guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth do< trine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state i egulatton, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
But Section 4(a)( t) docs not encroach on these freedoms at all It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,
the act of wiMfeily destroying without light the things that belong to others, in tins rase then computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy
other people s computer systems and private documents, (l)isim, |r.. et a), v. The Sec of lustirc, et al., G R. No. 20 3 335 &
other cases, February 11. 2014).

On-Its-face' Invalidation of penal statutes not allowed.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is. only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may he facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary |x*n«il statutes be subjected to a facial challenge The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prnsoi ution of crimes may he hampered. No
prosecution would bo possible A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the
same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may bo appropriately exercised A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. The
allowance ot a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will Impair the State's ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwlthstnnding that the law is clear as
applied to hint (Romualdcz vs. Comclec, supra.; Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et aL v Anti-Terrorism
Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 20101

Aggregate-based airtime Is unreasonable and arbitrary; reasons.

The assailed rule on aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling
state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a
dear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done
is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
It is also jurhcularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time
when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There arc also a lot of languages and
dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many
of the electorates as possible, then it might also bo necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different
dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself - a lorin of suppression of his political
speech. (GMA Network Inc. v COMELEC. G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014).

Freedom of expression, etc.; removal o f tarpaulin, content based restriction.

The removal of the tarpaulin at a church was in violation of their fundamental right to freedom of expression. The
contention that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda which is subject to regulation, especially so that it wjs oversized is
not correct Such act is content-based restriction which amounts to censorship.
Assuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied ... is a mere time, place, and manner regulation,
it's still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective."
The regulation may reasonably be considered js either content-neutral or content-based ( See. Wilson R Huhn.
Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral The tmergmg Constitutional
Calculus. 79 JND. L | 801 (2004) 228 Chare? v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155 207-208 (200H)). Regardless, the disposition of
this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based. (The
Diocese ofBacoiod, etc. v. COMELEC, et a)., G.R No. 191728. |anuary 21. 2015, Loom n. |).

The LEMON TEST; no total separation of church A State.

The “Lemon Test" which has been extensively applied by the ll.S. Supreme Court in issues involving the
determination of non-establishment o! icligion clause originated from the case of Lemon vs Kurtzman 403 U S. 602
(1971). In that case the Court used a three-pionged test to jdjudged whether the assailed governmental act violated the
First Amendment, as follows
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
2 Its principal or primary effet t must be one that neithei advances nor inhibits religion: and
3 The statute must not luster an excessive government entanglement with religion

in that case, the Court ruled that the state laws of Rhode island and Pennsylvania providing financial aid and
resources to teachers of pan* hial private schools who will temh non-set ular subjects to publit schools is
unconstitutional. This was betausc the effect of the law was to require the mdis ulual states to have continuous monitoring
and surveillance of teacher beneficiaries in order to ensure thul they would lu^espouw Catholic teat lungs in their classes.
Such scenario, according to the Supreme Court constitutes as jn excessive entanglement of government in matters of
religion. In that case, however the U S. High court admitted thai drawing the line between allowable jnd prohibited State
acts delving on religion i> not a nutter of dtawing conclusions from well defined formula, to wd.
Oui prior holding* do not call for total separation Ik tween churx h and State, total separation
is not possible m an absolute sense Some relationship between government and religious
6 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Political Lawjcx»nsolidated)KEVISkl) 2/EVSA/crys
 organizations is inevitable. Zoruch v Ctauson.M US. 306, 343 U.S. 312 [1952]; Shebert v. Vemer, 374
U.S. 422 [1963] (Harlan, |„ dissenting). Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state
requirements under compulsory school attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible
contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden
to ascertain that the exempt property was, in fact, being used for religious worship, ludicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a “wall" is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship (Peralta
v. Phil. Postal Corp., et a!.. G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018).

Freedom of Religion; effect o f Insulting words.

Then' is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse'. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His
claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed
to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. They simply illustrate that
petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Hence, his speech cannot be protected
by the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. (ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, etgl., G.R. No.
164785, March 15. 2010, Velasco).

Threat to arrest and cancel licenses, content-based restriction.

The press statements of See. Gonzales threatening those who would play the Garci tapes and the NTC threatening
cancellation of the franchises of media establishments who would play the Garci tapes from a content-based prior
restraint that transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not
reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech
uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of
an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization
of an ad into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition of prior restraint. The
press statements constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press, hence, they were
struck down.
There was enough chilling effect of the complained acts. The warnings catirie from the NTC, a regulatory agency
that can cancel the certificate of authority of radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Sec. of justice. an alter
ego of the President who wields the power to prosecute those violating the laws (Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008, Cf Puno).

Tests on the restraint of freedom of speech.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three
tests, i.e.. (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the Speech restrained and the danger contemplated,(Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 151 (1957];
Gonzales v. Comelec, 137 Phil. 417 (1969]; People v. Perez, 4 Phil. 599 (1905]; People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1933];
People v. Faleo. 57 Phil. 451 f 1933]) (b) the balancing of Interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; (Sec. Gonzales v. Comelec) and (c) the clear and present
danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech
will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high (Cabansag v. Fernandez,
supra; Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, C| Puno).
'» ' >„« *' I
Four (4) aspects o f the freedom o f the press.
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of
freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to
publication; (J) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation (Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al, G.R. No.
168338;February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).
. *' V. 1*
Distinction on restraint of freedom of speech.
A distinction has to he made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e.. merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards;
(|BL Reyes v. Bagatsing, 210 Phil. 457 (1983); Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 18. 1970. 31 SCRA 730;
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956|; Primictas v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 [1948]) or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e.. the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction
determines the lest by which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity (Osmcna v. Comelec, 351 Phil. 692 (1998): Admng v. Comelec, G.R No. 103456, March
.31,1992). Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they arc not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach somewhere between the mere rationality that is
required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test is
called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
7 |ABRC2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(consoJidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys
 interest is unrelated to the suppression of her expression: and if the incident restriction on alleged
|freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest
(Osmena v. Comelec: Adiong v. Comelrr; IIS v. O'Brien, 191 II.S. 167 11968)).

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the p r e s s based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and Invasive impact. Only when the challenged ac t has overcome
theclear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster. (INC c (A, 328 Phil 893 |1996|)with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unrnnstitutionality
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content based restraint will he struck down (INC v.
CA; ABSCBN Broadcasting ( cup v. Comelec, 180 Phil. 780 [2000|; SWS v. Lome et, O R No 147571, May 5, 2001 357
SCRA 496],
With ivspeit to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the lype of harm the speec h sought
to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior
restraint will bo invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be lustificd by hypothetical fears, but only
by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the hlc of a reality already on ground. As formulated, the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a dear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils ihut Congress has a right to prevent It
is a question of proximity and degree (Cabansag v. Fernandez; ABS-CBN v. Comelec).
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression (Adiong v. Comelec; Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al„ G.R.
No. 168338, February 15, 2008, C) Puno).

Freedom of sfteech, etc. and franchises; content-neutral restriction.

Res. No. 9615 of the COMELEC which prohibits the posting or election • ampaign materials during the election
period m PUVs and transport terminals is not valid as it unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals, to express then preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince
others to agree with them.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively
inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate (1-lJTAK v. COMELEC. G.R. No 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411)

COMELEC’s prohibition against the posting o f decals and stickers on mobile places" is unconstitutional.
The freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it
on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may he furnished by a candidate bur once the car owner
agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement hy the owner, primarily his own and
not of anybody else. If, in the Notional Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting bv
newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for
advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his
private property. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April J4, 2015, 755 SCRA 411 citing Adiong v COMELEC G.R.
No. 103956, March 31.1992, 207 SCRA 712).

State may regulate the /sostlng o f commercial ads on vehicles; reasons.

A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the ownership
of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any relation to its
operation as a PUV.
On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it
hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside aie safe, is a egulation on the franchise or permit to
operate It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e, the safety of the passengers. (1 UTAK v
COMELEC,C.R. No. 20602U, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411)

When custodial investigation commences.

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation. (People v. Pavillare, 386 Phil 126, 1 th |20l)0|) An a rule, a police line up is
not part of the custodial investigation, hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused dui mg identification in a police lineup (People v, Pepino, et al.. G.R. No. 171471 January 12, 2016)
In People v. Lara, G.R No. 199H77, August 13. 2012, 678 SCRA 332. it was held that the guarantees of Sec I2( 1).
Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation stalls when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime hut lias begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into i uslody bv the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements Police line up is not part nt the
custodial investigation; hem c, the right to counsel guaranteed hy the Constitution i annul yet !*• invoked at this stage

Extrajudicial confession t*hile ui u detention cell; effect

The tact that the extrajudicial confession was made while inside a detention cell does not by itself render such
confession inadmissible In P» >pie i. Daman (as itst> Phil 459 {|9 ‘)9|, where the accused was also interviewed while inside
a jail cell, the Court held that such circumstance alone docs not taint the extrajudu ul confession of the acc used, especially
since the sjtne was given freely and spontaneously

8 (ABKC2019. Magic Airas in Political law (consolidated JHiAIShU 2/fcVSA/uys

 While there were Indeed some poller officers aroimd because about two to three meters from the )ail were the
police station and the radio room there is no evidence that the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure
or influence on arrused-apprllant and cocrrcd him into giving his confession.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstance* where it is apparent that accused appellant confessed to the killing out of fear (People v. l)a< army. G.R. No.
216064, November 7, 2016; citing People v. |ercz, 349 Phil 319, 327 | 1998))

Root!side questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop cannot he considered a formal arrest
At the time that he was waiting for P03 Alters to write his ritailon ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could not he said to
have been *undei arrest “ There was no Intention on the part of P03 Allezn to arrrst him, deprive him of his liberty, or take
him into custody. Prim to the Issuance of the ticket, the peiiod during which Luz was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time In loci \x x P03 Altea hunsell testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub station was the l.uz had been flagged down "almost in front" of that plate. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convergence that they wort' waiting their There was no intention to lake Luz into custody (Luz v People, C, R No 197788.
February 29, 2012. 2"*' Oiv. Sereno).

Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of questioning; admissible In evidence.

The constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is no applicable if the accused went to the police and
voluntarily told the police that the victim jumped out of his iccp, as he was never held for questioning. Custodial
investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has boon taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of artion in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit informal ion or a confession from him. (People v. Canton, 442
Phil. 743 (2002)). The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the pohee
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements were
spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal |ayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that the
victim jumped out of his vehicle. Thus, the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable. (Icsalva v.
People, G.R. No. 1H7725, January 19, 2011, Nachura. |).

A In ter admitting shortage of dollars In the collection In a bank is not an uncounselled confession.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance
of counsel and its being under oath, hut a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that is
admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to
presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission docs not. (US v. Ching
Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the
admitter.
The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft.
Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily Included therein. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No 159450. March 30, 2011,
Bersamin, J).

Effect If accused Is Invited by police to shed light on a particular case.

HA 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice of issuing an invitation' to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is' suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the inviting' officer for any violation of law." This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a
police officer must be apprised of their Miranifa rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may
have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied hini to the police station. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950. September 22. 2014).

Extent o f the power of the court In a petition for ball.

In cases involving non-ballable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt
is stioug which is a mailer of judicial discretion that remains with the fudge (Pros. )amara v. fudge Bersales. 488 Phil. 22,
31 J2O04J). The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an
intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by ihc parties. "The court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of th* evidence of the prosecution on the liasis of which should be formulated the judge’s ow n conclusion on
whether such evidence is strung enough to indicate the guilt of the accused." In People v. Rluzu. 617 Phil. 669 |2009|. a
summary hearing is such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the pui pose or hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.’ On
such hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight ihat ought to be
allowed to the evidence lor or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may he therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may he left io the discretion of the court which may
i online itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and
cross examination* (People v Di David A Sohrepefia, Sr., et a l, G.R No 2040-63 December 5 2016. Dot Lastillo, I)

Health reason In grunting hall

The currently fragile state of Em ile s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail.
Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused regardless of the crime charged, should fie allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued uti alteration is clearly shown to be' injurious to his health or to endanger his
life Indeed, denying Imn bad despite imperiling hid health and life would not serve the true objective of picventive
incarceration during the ti tal. Granting bail to turtle on the foregoing n isons is not unprecedented.
9 |ABKC2019.MagU Areas in Political Uw(co»solidat**d)KLVISKl> 2/fc'VSA/crys
 It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for
the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can lx? had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing
for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Juan Ponce Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan (3"1Div.),G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin)).

Extrajudicial confession before Bantay Bayan.

Extra-judicial confession to a bantay bayan is not admissible as evidence if there was no compliance with the
Miranda Rule. People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III,
Section 12fl 1 and f3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial
confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbour of the private complainant The Supreme Court distinguished.
Thus: , ^
Arguably, the barangay tanod's, Including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may
be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12[1] and [3], of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x xx [the} Constitution
should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay
Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation' made by the latter - admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-apjaellant for her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as
the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her xXx (People v. Lauga).

Effect If the holding of religious rituals within the halls of justice would be prohibited.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence
a domino effect Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/aocommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari’a courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, ai\d,the exception of Muslims from the
provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The
exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or the riOn-compulsion recognized in favor of members of
the Jehovah’s Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony) will all go down the drain simply because
we insist on strict separation (In Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building
in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).
’V t '** , •
No involuntary servitude In any form shall exist
The Constitution prohibits involuntary servitude except under certain circumstances like:
(1) Punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted. (Sec. 18(2), Art. Ill, Constitution);
(2) Service in defense ofthe State. ($ec. 4,AitJl, Constitution; People vs. Zosa, 38 O.G. 1976);
(3) Naval or merchant marine enlistment. (Robertson vs. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275);
(4) Posse comitatus. (U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil, 245);
(5) Return to work order in industries affected with public interest. (Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy
vs. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G. Supplement No. 9, p. 147); and
(6) Patria potestas. The minor children who are under the custody of their parents may require them to
perform certain acts and duties without violating the rule against involuntary servitude, like when they are
asked to run errands for the parents

Limitations on the right to travel

The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6,
Article HI of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one's right to travel provided that such restriction is in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means
be construed as limiting the Court's inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to “regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court docket and to
avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to
submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the
condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended
travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant
to Section 15(1 J and [2J, Article Vlll ofthe 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for travelling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, Judge Macarine is guilty of
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. (Office of Administrative Services - Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ignacio B Macarine, A M No. MT| 10 1770, 18 July 2012,2^ Div. [Brum]).

Examination of the regulation under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Neither shall the right to travel lie unpaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
10 JABRC2019.Maglc Areas in Political LawlconsolidatedJRfcVlSED 2/EVSA/crys
 Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines (In Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 497-49R (1989), the Court ruled that the right to travel
under our Constitution refer to right to move wilhtn the country, or to another country, hut not the right to return to one's
country. The latter right, however, is provided under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines
is a signatory.). It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty (UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project
hi (1970). Sec Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 1 liS; 78 S. Ct. 1113; 2 L Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U S. LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 705 706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of locomotion is one of the chief
elements of the guaranty of liberty. 91). Liberty a birihright of every person includes the power of locomotion (See
Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945)) and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways
and to live 3nd work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life (Sec Salvador H Laurel. Proceedings
of the Philippine Constitutional Convention. As Faithfully Reproduced from the Personal Record of |osc P. Laurel, Vol. Ill,
652 (1966). See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro; Samahan ng mga Progrcsibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, ct al,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, Perlas-Bernabc, J).

Restrictions on right to travel.

Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute
(See Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) v. Heusdens, 678 Phil. 328,
399 (2011) and Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways. 523 Phil 713, 752 (2006), See also Marcos v.
Manglapus, supra note 89, at 504. In Silveno v. C.A (273 Phil. 128, 133 [ 1991 )), the Court held that "the (State Is] not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations (on this right]," and in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (supra
note 90. at 716), it was held that "citizens (do| not possess an absolute freedom of locomotion"). As the 1987 Constitution
itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: f 1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v,
Quezon City, et al, G.R, No. 225442, August 8, 2017, Pcrlas-Bernabe, \y.y ( j JL*vua - w v . D * L t

Restrictions set by curfew ordinances are constitutionally permissible.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. Minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, (Sec Bellotti) but the exercise of these rights is not co­
extensive as those of adults. As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the right to execute contracts, and the right to engage m
gainful employment. With rcsjiect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel toa foreign country by themselves or with a person
other than their parents (See Section 8 (a) of RA 7610 and Section 5 (t) of RA 8239, entitled "PHILIPPINE PASSPORT ACT
OF 1996," approved on November 22, 1996). These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the
minors’ activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the State’s general interest m the well-being of
minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not
generally apply to adults (Samahan ng mga Progresihong Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 22S442, August 8. 2017,
Perlas-Bernabo, |).

There is double jeopardy If a person Is charged with the same offense.

An accused would be put in double jeopardy if he is charged with imprudence resulting in homicide after pleading
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
The accused’s negative constitutional right not be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"
protects him from, among others, post-convtction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information, The law penalizes the negligent or careless act. not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is merely taken into consideration in the imposition of the penalty. As the careless
act is single, the offense of criminal negligence remains one and the same and cannot he split into different crimes and
prosecutions, (Jason lvlerv. Hon. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172176, November 17, 2010).

I f there Is no new supervening event, then accused can invoke double jeopardy
The accused was charged with less serious physical injuries. He was convicted, but later on, he was charged
with-serious physical injuries. He can properly invoke double jeopardy because there was no new siijx^rvcrung event The
deformity was already existing at the time of his conviction for less serious physical injuries. With proper medical
examination, the deformity could have been detected. (People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230).
• t r j i* *v *• . * - * i
3 related protections under the principle of double jeopardy.
The Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused three (3) related protections,
specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense fNorth
Carolina v. Pearc*. 395 US 711, 717 (1969)). The rationale fnr the three protections is expounded in United States v.
Wilson. 420 US 332, 343 11975)
The interests underlying these three protections are quite similar When a defendant has been
once convicted and punished tor a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he nut
be subjected to the possibility of luither punishment by heing again tried or sentenced lor the same
offense Fa parte I ange 18 Wall 163 11874); /n re Nielsen. 131 U S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has
been acquitted of an ollcnse, the Clause guarantees that the Slate shall not be permitted to make
repeated attempts to convict him "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment expense and ordeal, and
comjx.‘lling him to live m a continuing state ot anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty" (Gloria Macapagai-Airoyo v People, et al., G.R. Nos.
220598& 220953. April 18 2017 Beniamin, I)

li 1A8KC2019 Magic Areas in Hulmcai Law(consolidated)KkVISEL) 2/KVSA/crys

 The Right against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
People v. Ferrer, defined a hill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This
last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be
imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 docs not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be
imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the
power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances attached to it has been
established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require (Misolas v. Panga. 181 SCHA
648, 659-660, |an. 30, 1990).

fir post facto law; Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospcctivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment. RA 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode, of appeal
and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.ev one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
The contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under RA 7975 has beendiluted by
the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. RA. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute, it
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if
the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome (Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive .Secretary, eL al„ C.R.
No. 128096, Ian. 20,1999).

CITIZENSHIP
* '• *
Effect of use of American passport after renunciation offoreign citizenship.
A dual citizen who renounced his American citizenship is not qualified to run for public office if he subsequently
uses his American passport. The declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport - which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national - even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship,
is to allow a complete disregard of this policy. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013; Agustin v.
COMELEC; Amado v. COMELEC).

Sen. Grace Poe admittedly foundling, ahatural-born citizen o f the Philippines.

A ss matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. During the
d^ifairaliDns in the 1935 Constitutional convention, there was an attempt to amend the proposed provisions on
cifteenshipto include foundlings in the concept of natural-born citizens but it was not carried out not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. In fact, some delegates were able to convince their colleagues that there is no more need
to exprtaily declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized. In the words of Chief |ustice
Fernando,^tbe constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. In fact, there is nothing in the 1935, 1973, 1987
Constitution Tor anExpress intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to deny
the use of the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the Constitution really intended to take this
path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamansares v.
COMELEC, etal., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, 1).

The COMELECi ruling in Sen. Poe's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions o f RA. No. 9225 did not result in
the reacquisltlon of natural-bom citizenship is not correct.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will lie restored to hts former status as a natural-born
Filipino (Bengson 111v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633,649 (20011).
RA No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 692 Phil. 407, 420 (2012)). Also included is
Parreno v. Commission on Audit, 551 Phil. 368, 381 |2007|, which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 407, 417
[2006], where it was said that "ftjhe repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
12 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVlSED 2/EVSA/crys
citizenship, Parreno v. Commission on Auditl44 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-horn citizenship." (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansarcs v. COMELEC, et
a!., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).

Effects o f the naturalization o f the husband on the foreigner-wife and his children
11) With respect to the foreigner-wife, the naturalization of the husband will favorably affect her since
she becomes a Fihpmoifshe is not disqualified under the law (Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on
Immigration);
(2) With respect to his children, the following rules shall apply:
(a) If the child was born abroad but was living in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the
parent, he shall automatically become a Filipino citizen;
(b) If the.foreign-born minor child is not in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of his parents, he
shall be deemed a citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines while still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Filipino even after becoming of
age. (Sec. 15, CA 535; see also Vivo vs. Puno, 29SCRA392 (1969|).

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Tests to determine valid delegation o f powers.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete ttfoall its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563
(2007)).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cyhersccurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards, for the CICC to follow
when it provided a definition of cybcrsccurity, (Disini, |r., et al. v. The Sec. of fustice, etal., G.R. No. 203335 & other cases,
February 11, 2014).

Reason for delegation o f powers.

It is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to therenforceinent and administration of a law
may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of.Fihance in this case.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental
functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot ;be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious,
not to say specific solutions. :
I '• ' • •••• i\
Umitatlons on power to fill in details.
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit what is
general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated; in the provision of the law. Such rules and regulations, when
promulgated m pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, "deserve to be
given weight and respect by the Courts in view of tfik rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their
specific expertise in their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of statutory
authority or standard granted by theiegislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the object and purpose
of the law; {2) not contradict, but; conform to, the standards the law prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of
carrying int<£ effect the general provisions of our tax laws. (LA SIJERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY v. CA, G.R, No.
125346, Noyembdr 11^2014).

The principle o f non delegation o f powers is not absolute

S; l^^ppcipfe-;ipf non-delegation of powers is not absolute because there are exceptions making it not rigid or
in % jp h ^ l^ e following are the exceptions:
; yfbeti the Constitution expressly permits it;
"Delegation of power to local governments;
(3) [-<-.Dd&ga£i;d'h of pow er to fill in details;
(4) Delegation of power to ascertain facts, contingencies, or events upon which the applicability of a law is
made to depend;
(5) Delegation of power to administrative agencies provided certain standards are set;
(6) Delegation of power to the people at large; and
(7) Delegation of power to the President in the field of foreign or international relations.
' “ •’ <r *. i *> f• rri >
■
SEPARATION OF POWERS

Separation o f powers; political question.

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the decision
to expel a Senator is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In Alejandrino v.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924), the Supreme Court held that it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a Senator who
assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behavior, because it could not compel a separate and co­
equal department to take any particular action. In Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (I960), it was held that the Supreme
Court could not interfere with Lhe suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behavior, because the House of
13 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KEVI$ED 2/EVSA/erys
 Representatives is the fudge of what ronsiitulcs disorderly behavior Tlic assault ol a fellow Sciiatni «(institutes disor«i«*i ly
behavior

President'%power to enter Into ex m ttl\T agreements; political question.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art tl of the l*>R7 ( onstitution. the Philippine* adopts the
generally accepted prmnples of international law as part of the law of the land An e xrh-mgr of notes falls into the category
of Inter governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement Hem e, the Non
Surrender Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a recognized mode of con* hiding a legally binding international
written contract among nations
An act of the exes utive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great rrspret This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the coneurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and |udicial branches of the government Thus, absent any clear
contravention of the law. the rourts should exercise utmost caution tn declaring any executive agreement invalid (BAYAN
MUNA etal v Al BFRTO ROMIJLO. et al, G.R No I5dMft. February 01. 2011 | Velasc o. |r)

The ‘Port Parrel' System Declared Unconstitutional Reasons; violation of sepaiatlon of powers.
The Court dec lared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, poat
enactment authority in vital arras of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them pe rsonal, ritarrettonury binds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not untualiaed
into the appropriations bill, It has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and. in tha process, denied the
President the power to veto Items; insofar as It has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinise the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has mithorivd legislators, who are
national officers tn intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable (oral institutions it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has oner more transgressed
the principle of non-delegabillty (Belglca, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paqulto N. Ochoa, et a t. G.P. No. iORShb. 7to SCPA I. SO
SI. November 19. 2013. En Banc IPertas-BernabeJ.

Court cannot deprive President of pardoning power.

The court imposes a penalty on accused and provides that there can he no pardon. It violates the discretion of (he
President. It is violative of the principle of separation of powers (San Diego v. People. April H, 2015).

TV Supreme Court's exercise of Its Jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition Is not violative o f the doctrine o f
separation o f powers.
Section 1(1) and 1(6). Article XI of the Constitution respectively provides that the Mouse of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all rases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally defined instrumentality which is given the
power to try impeachment cases is the Senate
Nevertheless, the Court's assumption ol jurisdiction over an action lor quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise* be an impeach able official had ft not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that imprai hinent cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, an ac tion lor quo warranto texts the right of a pe rson to occupy a public position It is a direct proceeding
assailing the title to a public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally
occupying a public jmsition which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally
qualified *au has complete legal title to the office It defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the
relief that fbe Court grants is the ouster and exclusion ol the defendant from office. In otlier wordy while impeachment
concerns actions that make the* officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves martrrs that
req^cr him or her mekgjhU- to hold the position to begin with (Rep v Sereno. G.R No. 217428. May II. 2018. Twain. |,
citing Di*na Gracia v consolidating broadcasting System. Inc, 602 Phil. 62S (200**)}.

i ffo a u fh e k af qualification.
For W Kol l onstrtutiouai qualification, respondent is inriigibitr to hold the position of Chief lustier and is merely
hoidioggcntorahle right pi tale thereto As such lespondent has never attained the status ol an impeachable official and
her rr«*uM%] mom tin eftit* other than by mijwachineut is jutlilWtl I he lemedy thcrvtorv of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is t tu* power to oust respondent from the apjiomtive position o il fuel lustne

AMTIC I f VI Legislative Department

Mrvide tu t and domicile are synonymous

A candidate has to comply with the residence lequiieinent tor him to be qualified to run toe public office m a
particular place The purpose is to give the candidate the opportunity to hr famdiat with the nerds, difkulties.
aspirations potentials of growth and all mailers vital to the welfare of hes constituents It would likewise enable the
electorate to rvaluaU tin office seeker s qualification* aisd future lor the job. If a candidate has proven Ihm. He may be
qualified otherwise he is Unqualified
The term *residence as used in elec don law is synonymous with doaucikr.* which import* not only intention
to reside in a fixed place but also penamai presence in that p la t coupled with conduct indicative of such intention
(Cnllega vs Item 73 Hul *51 4So |i v * l|) The manifest uitriu ol the law in Using a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with (he conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
lattrr from an elective office to serve that community
1* IA8MC20J9 Magn Areas in Politic aJ Law*consolidated)It* VIM.D 2/fcVSA/rrys
 For purposes of election law. the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule
by which to determine where a person actually resides. (Alcantara vs, Secretary of Intenor, 61 Phil 459, 465 J1935J).
Three rules are. however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second,
that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a
time.

Concept of legislative apportionm ent

Legislative apportionment is defined bv Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
Representatives which a Slate, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. (Black's Law Dictionary,
5th Edition, p. 91). It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body m proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts Rcnpportionmcnt, on the other hand,
is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation. (Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 17,p. 1137).

Nature of legislative districts as distinguished from local government units

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is
the basis for the election of a memberof the House of Representatives and membcisofthe local legislative body. It is not,
however, a political subdivision through which functions ol government are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter,
it is not a corporate uiiiL Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising
the district: it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national
affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor, a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a harangay, which has
a punong harangay. a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the Congressman that it elects is to
ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative
district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved
and has no capacity to acL Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They arc the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State. (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., GR. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 836). They possess legal personality on the authority of the
Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law,
create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature. (Constitution, Article X, Secs. 3 and 10; Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government
Code of 1991: The Key to National Development,
p. 5). A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a
majority of the members of its Sanggunian. (Sec. 14, Local Government Code).

HRET as sole fudge.

Article VI, Section 17 provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole fudge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, dear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of
these Tribunals, (Co v. HRET. G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692), which is conferred upon the HRET and the
SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who
has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. (Co v. HRET)
A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judioal proceedings the issue of the
qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was slill a candidate. (Rep. Dantlo Ramon
Fernandez v. HRET, ct al„ G.R. No 187478, December 21, 2009; David v SET, el al„ G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016,
Leoncn, J).

HRET may resolve the Issue o f fraud, terrorism.

An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate horn office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who
between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.
The power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of
elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the
members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.
The HRET has jurisdiction to determine whether there was terrorism in the contested precincts. In the event that
the HRET would conclude that terrorism indeed existed m the said precincts, then it could annul the election results in the
said precincts to the extent of deducting the votes received by Dazj and Abavon in order to remain faithful to its
constitutional mandate to determine who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes «.asr (Abayon v.
HRET, G.R. No 222236, May 3, 2016, Mendoza. |).

HRET hus sole power to decide on the hsue of qualifications of members of Congress including Party List.
Section 17. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress In the case ol jwrty-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning jiarty-list grou|i, oath ol the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House ol Representatives. In thisiase, the COMELEC proclaimed Aung Koop as a winning parly-list group;
petitioner Lico took his oath; jnd he assumed office hi the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case lAlly. Isidro Lico, et al. v COMELEC. et aL G.R. No. 205505,
September 29, 2015 Sercno |).

15 |ABH( 2019.Magic Aieas in Political LavvJconsohdatedJKEVISbl) 2/EVSA/crys

Qualified candidates under the Party-List system
They are not persons or individuals. A qualified participant must be a national, regional, or sectoral party,
organization or coalition. The qualified candidates are those registered national, regional or sectoral parties or
organizations. They must, however be registered with the COMELEC. If they have already registered, it is sufficient
that they manifest their intention or desire to participate in the system. (Sec. 4).
Political coalitions may participate or run under the Party-List system, because as defined by law, it is an
"organization of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political an d /o r election
purposes." Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided that the
coalition does not participate in the Party-List system. (Sec. 3).

The two percent (2%) threshold In the distribution o f additional seats established by RA 7941 deemed
unconstitutional
The Supreme Court struck down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives." (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on
Elections (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), G.R. No 179271, April 21,2009; Bayan Muna, Advocacy fo r -Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., and Abono, vs.
Commission on Elections, GR. No. 179295, April 21, 2009).
The two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of Party-List representatives

Punishment o f members
The power to punish members is a power expressly granted to Congress by the Constitution. Even if not
expressly granted. Congress can still exercise it under the doctrine of necessary implications. If is an inherent power
designed for self-preservation which the courts cannot ordinarily inquire into, except if there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It is one belonging to the legislative body which ordinarily cannot be
reviewed by the courts, otherwise, the courts would play or assume appellate jurisdiction. (Osmena vs. Pendatun,
109 Phil. 863). , -% :? •’

The d istin c tio n betw een C ongress' po w er to su sp en d its o w n members and the Sandtganbayan’s power
o f suspension under R.A. No. 3019
The power granted to Congress under Sec. 16(3) to suspend its own members is a penalty imposed for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives while fhe suspension spoken of in RA 3019 is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding frojn the fa<ct tKit the latter is not being imposed on the Member for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives. (Paredes vs. SB).

Mandatory drug testing as additional qualification Ofan elected public officer before assumption o f office.
It is unconstitutional for the COM^LjEC to impose mandatory drug testing before an elected official may assume
office because it is basic that if a law or an administrative rul&violates any norm of the Constitutioa
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirem^it not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. (SOCIAL JUSTICE
SO C IE T Y ^ v. DANGEROUS DRtfGS BOARDfDDB), et al., G.R. No. 157870, November 3. 2008, VELASCO, |R.. I.).
• .■ . •
Limitations on the power o f Congress to investigate
„ Some of the limitations on the power of Congress to investigate are:
.- | (1) The Bill of Rights;
f . ; {2) Personal matters cannot be investigated;
(3) Congress cannot investigate on matters not within its power to legislate; and
: (4) It cannot inquire into cases pending in court because of the principle of separation of powers. (See
- _ Bcngzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767).
* r *3- f
Purposes o f Congressional Inquiries
The purposes of Congressional inquiries are:
(1) To gather information for the enactment of laws;
(2) To check the performances of agencies of the government;
(3) To check consequences or reactions of the public on laws passed; and
(4) To check how money is being spent.

Executive privilege
Whenever Congress conducts investigations, the President may invoke executive privilege and prevent a
Cabinet official or any official from appearing. Executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, ami the Congress." It is the right ol the President and high-level executive
branch offices to withhold information from Congress, the courts and ultimately the public. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et at.).
Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information, the confidential nature of which is crucial to
the fulfillment of the unique rule and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive
16 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISEL) 2/EVSA/crys
privilege is, thus, premised on the face that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in the pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, m this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation m a particular case. (Senate, el al. vs. Ermita, et al.).

Kinds of executive privilege

One variety of the privilege is the stale secrets privilege where the information is of such nature that its
disclosure would subvert crunal military or diplomatic objectives. Another varic'y is the informer’s privilege, or the
privilege of the government not todislcosc the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach
to intra-govcrnmcntal documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part
of a process hv which government decisions and policies are formulated. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al ).

Basis for the three kinds of executive privilege

Executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information, the confidentiality of
which they felt was crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch
of our government. The executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The
courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances
and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. (In re Scaled, 121 F. cd. 729, 326 U.S. App
D.C. 276; Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al.).

Presidential communications privilege

There is a great public interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President's performance of his official duties, thus, presidential communications arc presumptively privileged.
The presumption is founded on the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality. It i» necessary to
guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.

Two kinds of executive privilege

The two kinds of executive privilege are:
(1) Presidential com m unications privilege This pertains to communications, documents and
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and what the President
believes should remain privileged and/or confidential; and
(2) Deliberative process privilege. This includes advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies arc formulated.

Rule: A bill may not become a law without the approval o f the President
As a general rule, a bill may not become a law withoutthe signature of the President. There are exceptions to the
rule, like: M-
(1) When the veto of the President is overridden;
(2) When the President does not act on it withirt 30 days after receipt;
(3) When it is a bill repealing the emergency powers granted to the President; and
(4) When the bill calls for a special election to elect a President and Vice-President.
All these bills become laws after the third reading

Matters that are required to be entered on the Journal

They are:
(1) The yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill. (Art VI. Sec. 26(2|);
(2) The yeas and nays on any question, at the request of one-fifth of the members present [Id.. Sec. 16(4|);
(3) The yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President’s veto. [Id., Sec. 27| 1|); and
(4) The President's objection to a bill he had vetoed. (Arroyo vs. Dc Venecia, 277 SCKA 26tt).

No use of public funds lo support a religion

The Constitution prohibits the use of public funds to support a particular seel, religion, religious teacher except if
they are assigned to the armed forces, penal institutions, government orphanage or leprosarium. The reason for the rule
is that, public funds must be devoted for public purpose or use.

The power of refusal may be reviewed by the courts

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions the conduct of inquiries in aid
of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised lor Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-m-chief, it
is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries.
(B/Gen. Gudani, etal. vs. Lt. Gen. Senga, ctal.,G.R. No. 170165, August IS, 2006).

Courts can compel appearance of members of the AFP to appear before Congress
Only the courts can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the
legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power This is the fair and
workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. Even if
the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive
is nonetheless obliged to comply with the tinal order ol the courts (B/Gen. Gudani. et al. vs. U. Gen. .Senga, et al.).

17 |ABKC2019 Magic Areas m Political Law(c(iusoltdated)KEVISbD 2/EVSA/crys

 Post-enactment measures like project Identification, etc. not part of the oversight power of Congress.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in - as Guingona. Jr. puts it - "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the —regulation and release
of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated - from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards
this end, the Court abandoned its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents' reliance on the same faltered altogether. (Belgica, et
al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, |r., ct al., C.R. No. 208S66, November 19, 2013).

Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
The transfer of appropriated binds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: ^ A-
(1) There is a law authorizing the President the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief |ustice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices; V
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective offices^ and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices. (Marla Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benlgno Simeon C Aquino III, et a l G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA
1, July I, 2014, En Banc [Bersamln])

There must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which
the savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only. (Nazareth v. Villar, et-al., supra.).
W i;
Power of Congress to select officers; political question.
The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deertf necessary (Sec. 16(1), Art. VI,
Constitution). ^ ft*
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control
(Defcnsor-Santiago v. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276 (1998)). In the tase of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the lith Congress (1998-2001), the Court observed that "(wjhile
the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing k x x (a Speaker of the House of Representatives] it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers (of the Lower House). All that the Charter says is that ‘each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ fA's such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the fHouse ofRepresentatives] itself, not by (the) Court" (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No.
227557, |uly 25,2017).
:£
.at- /’ £-
Four (4) Constitutional provisions relative to the role o f Congress when the President declares Martial Law.
There are four provisions in Article VIItSeetion 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of
the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz.:
a. Within forty-eight ( 48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the wnt
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President;
Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in the same manner extend such proclamation or
fuspension for a period u> be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of call (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et a). &
companion cases, G.R. No. 231671,231694, |uly 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).

Congress to convene k» Joint session If It revokes the declaration o f martial law.

The Constitution grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of tho privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, Le., by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word "may” in
the provision - such that "(tjhe Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as
permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke, the
same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor
revocation.
The provision does not actually refer to a "joint session.” While it inay be conceded, that the phrase "voting
jointly” shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session." notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement that ”[t|he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the
Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Simply put. the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or susjxmsion (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et al & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25,
2017, Leonardo-De Castro, |).
18 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KEVISED 2/EVSA/crys
 Period o f Imprisonment for contempt during Inquiries In aid of legislation.
The contempt power of the legislature under our Constitution is sourced from the American system. The
Congress' inherent power of contempt must have a limitation. In the 1821 landmark case of Anderson v Dunn, the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOVUS) held that although the offense rommifted under the inherent power of contempt by
Congress may be undefinable. it is |ustly contended that the punishment need iot be indefinite. It held that as the
legislative body ceases to exist from the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution, then it follows that
imprisonment under the contempt power of Congress must terminate with adjournment fBalag v. Senate of the Phils., et
al., G.R. No. 234608. |uiy V 2018, Gcsmundo. |).

Statements In media Interviews are not covered by the parliamentary "speech or debate" privilege.
Petitioner admitted that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as former VP
Bmay's “front" or "dummy" m connection with the so-called Hunenda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps
and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's
remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of ihe 1987 Constitution. The statements
were clearly not part of any speech delivered tn the Senate or any of its committees They were also not spoken in the
course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge
or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process
(Ti illancs IV v. Hon. Evangeline Castillo-Morigomen, et al., G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018, Tijam, J).

Purpose o f privilege.
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and Congressmen into "super-citizens"
whose spoken words or actions arc rendered absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action The Constitution
conferred the privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public good." It was intended
to protect them against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their deciston-makihg prerogatives.
Such grant of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain language. Indeed, the
privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless men to slander and even destroy others,” is not a cloak of
unqualified impunity; its invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the
legislative department." As this Court emphasized in Pohre, "the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall" (Trillancs IV v. Hon, Evangeline Castillo-Marigomen, et al., G.R. No. 223451, March
14. 2018, Tijam, |)

ARTICLE VII - Executive Department

Concept or nature of the faithful execution clause.

The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of
power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws
but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws ortho Constitution.” (NATIONAL ARTIST
FOR LITERATURE VIRCILIO ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. No. 189028, |uly 16, 2013).

Power o f control o f the President; extent.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to
administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, ts under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is
under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and docs not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature (See National Electrification Administration v. COA, 427 Phil 464, 485 J2002I) This is why President Dutcrte is
not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of
Marcos interred in Batai. llocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political
agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment
and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate (Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez, et
al , G.R No. 225973. November 8, 2016).

Concept o f "savings. *
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment ot the work,
activity or p u rp o se for which the appropriation is a u th o rized ; (ti)from a p p ro p ria tio n s b alan c es arisin g from unpaid
»ompcnsation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay: and (in) from
appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved at a lesser
cost
The three instances are a sure indication that savings could lx* generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation txung fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longei existent. (Araullo et al. v Aquino III,
et al. G.R No 209H5 & <nmpamoncases. |uly 11. 2014, Bersatnm, I)

The Operative Fact Dot trine

The doctrine of operative fai t recognises the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative tact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded.
In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains Us effects It provides an exception to the general rule that a
void or unconstitutional law produces no effect But its use* must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it
cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive art, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair
19 |ABK( 2019 Magic Areas in Political Uw(consolidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/cry<
 play. It applies only to eases where extraordinary <in umsijrxes exist, .md only when ihe rxtraordinar y i iri uinstances
have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application (Marla Carolina I1. Aruulla, et ol. v. Benlgna Simoon C
Aquino III. et al. G.R No.. 209287. 728 M HA I, fuly I. 2014. F.n Bam /Bertomlnj)

Operative Fact Doctrine Applied In the DAP (Dlehureemenl Acceleration Program) (a te

The doctrine of operative fac t is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP Its application to the
DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and ila related issuances could not fie
ignored or could no longer he undone
The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Exei ufive to finance the PAPs that
were not covered in the t.AA, or that did not have proper appropilation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to
other departments of the Government in dear violation of th# Constitution To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as |unstk worlds of the Government and the Nation is to he impractical and unfair.
Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the dishurser and the ofTVcet under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had Implemented in good faith under the DAP That scenario would he
enormously burdensome for the' Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of
the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To couni th# positive
results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the
homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like Not to apply the doctrine of operative f.ict to the DAP could literally came the
physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness (Marla
Carolina P. Araullo. et al. v. Brntgno Simeon C. Aquino III. et al. G.R No.. 209287, 728 SCRA I. July I, 2014, t n Banc
(BersamlnJ)

President or other officers not authorized lo cross-broader transfer funds.

Although the Executive was authorized to spend in lino with its mandate to faithfblly execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his
own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to
spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth
resides in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would
threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III et al* G.R. No. 209135 & companion
cases. July 11. 2014, Bcrsamin, j).

Requirement that should be met If there Is augmentation o f funds.

Should there be augmentation of savings, it is required that there should l>c an item in the project to which the
savings may be transferred. In Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, (anujry 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 38S, it was ruled that there
must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may
be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had
set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to
the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies. (Araullo, et al. v Aquino III. et al..
supra)

Power o f appointment of Justices at SB; clustering o f nominees Is not constitutional.

The power to recommend of the |BC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the
latter's prerogative to choose someone whom hc/sbe considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the |BC, the appointment is valid.
President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists
submitted by the |BC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino s
power to appoint members of the |udiciary from all those whom the |BC had considered to be qualified for the same
positions oTSendigunbayan Associate Justice.
The |BC, In sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence the
appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering
unptpges upon the President s power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances tor appointment of the qualified
nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vjedney is limited to
thefipe to seven nominees in the cluster, and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed
from considering Uie other nominees in the same <luster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without
legal baas and m contravention of the President's appointing power (Hon Philip Agumaldo. et al v Aquino, et al., G.R. No.
224302. Mwvtmbtr 24.2016. Leonardo D« Castro. |)

kinds of appointments
The kinds of appointments are: regular, ad interim, and recess appointments.
Regular appointment requires the confirmation of the Commission on Apimintmentx (CA) before (he appointee
ran assume office Ihe President nominates, the CA confirms, and the President issues the coimnissioit
An ad interim appointment takes effect immediately It is valid if it is confirmed by Ihe CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress
Recess appointment needs no confirmation by the CA It is effective immediately, but temporary in the sense that
it is valid until disapproved by the (A or until Ihe next adjournment oft ongress

Limitations on the appointing power of the President

The limitations on the appointing power of the Piesident are
(1) He cannot appoint relatives within (he 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. (Sec. 13 |21, Art.
VU, 19H7 Constitution);
(2) Two (2) months prior to the regular election for President, he cannot appoint except temporary
20 JABRf.2019.Magk Areas in Poimral lawf consohdatedJKfc VISED 2/EVSA/cryt
 appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. (Sec. IS, Art. VII, 1987Constitution); and
(3) Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President within ninety
(90) days from his assumption or reassumption of office. (Sec. 14, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution).

Midnight appointments by the outgoing President

He is barred frrtm making appointments two (2) months prior to the regular election for President. (Sec. 6, Art.
VII, 1987 Constitution).
The Constitution prohibits appointments made by President at least 60 days prior to the election, except as
provided for by it. The appointment of the |udp,e does not fall under the exceptions. Temporary vacancies can abide
the period of the ban which covers only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. The purpose of the
Constitution in such prohibition is to prevent vote-buying and similar evils. [In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela. Adm Matter
No. 98-5-01-SC, 100 SCAD S30, November 9, 1998).

Appointment and designation

There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation.
Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure
for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. Appointment is essentially
executive while designation is legislative in nature. It may also mean appointment, but the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed (Binamira vs. Garrucho, Jr., GR. No. 92008, July 1990).''

Exceptions to the prohibition against holding multiple positions.

The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices arc; (1) those provided for under the Constitution,
such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex of6cio capacities as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials' offices. (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al.,
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013; Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53).

Appointment o f diplomatic personnel

The Presidential prerogative to determine the assignments of the country’s diplomatic personnel is
unquestionable, the conduct of the country's foreign affairs is vested on the President through the Secretary, being the
alter ego of the President. Her designation as permanent representative to the ON and other international organizations
was one based on special trust and confidence. Once that trust and confidence ceases to exist, the meumhent's
continuance in the position becomes untenable.
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures. (Corpus vs. Cuademo, 13 SCRA 591). When that
confidence is lost and the officer holding the position is separated from the service, such cessation is not removal from
office but merely an expiration of his/her term. (Cadienle vs. Santos. 142 SCRA 280; Macaraig and Santos vs. Manglapus,
GR. No. 94070, April 10, 1992).

Nature o f the power to deport; Act of State; subject to judicial review.

It is beyond cavil that the B1 has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA. as established
by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own
judgment from that ol Congress or of the President, (Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy. G.R. No. 124360,
November 5,1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma vs. CA, G.R. No. 113216, September 5. 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Tafiada
vs. AngarauG.R No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49), the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether
or not st*ch judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when ihe act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. (Republic vs. Garcia, G R. No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502;
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, lanuury 13, 2004.
419 SCRA 141,148; Domingo vs. Schcer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004); House of Sara Lee vs. Key. 500 SCRA 419 (2006); Secretary*
of |ustice,etal. vs. Christopher Rnruga, G.R No 166199, April 24, 2009)

Solicitor General may not be designated us Acting Secretary of justice.

The designation is void, hence, unconstitutional. See. 13. Article VII of the Constitution provides that the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. Likewise, Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no ap|»omlive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or then subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of |ustue concurrently with his pc^mon ot Acting Solicitor General,
therefore. Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13. Article VII. Hence, Agrj could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
(Funa v. Acting Set. of luslice Aiberlo N Agra, ct al., G.R. No. 191644 February 19,2013).

21 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KEVISED 2/EVSA/crys

 Portioning pow er o f the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
The only instances In which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which their was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that
any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38 11940) and Pelobello v. Palatlno,72 Phil. 441, 442 f 1941) the SC declared
that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action." In Monsanto v. Faclonan. Jr. It was also said that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action. The exercise of the pardoning power Is discretionary in the President and may not
be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when It exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. (Atty.
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, et I., supra.).

Pardon vs. amnesty

The following outline the distinctions between pardon and amnesty:
(1) Amnesty is addressed to political offenses, pardon refers to infractions of laws of the state or ordinary
offenses;
(2) Amnesty is granted to a class or classes of persons, pardon is granted to individuals;
(3) Amnesty need not be accepted, pardon must be accepted;
(4) Amnesty requires the concurrence of Congress, pardon does not need the concurrence of Congress
(5) Amnesty is a public act, pardon is a private act of the President; and
(6) Amnesty looks forward and puts the offense into oblivion, pardon looks backward and relieves the pardonee
of the consequences of the offense.

Limitations on the pardoning power o f the President

The limitations on the pardoning power of the President are as follows:
(1) It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
(2) It cannot be granted in violations of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the
COMELEC;
(3) It can be granted only after final and exercutory conviction (People vs. Salle, )r„ et a!., 66 SCAD 190, GR. No.
103567, December 4,
1995);
(4) It cannot be granted in civil or legislative contempt;
(5) It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability; and
(6) It cannot restore public offices forfeited.

Executive clemency fo r adm inistrative offenses

If those already adjudged guilty criminally In court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should
likewise be extended the same benefit. In short, if those persons who .committed criminal offenses against the State and found
guilty, can be pardoned, how much more for those found guilty of administrative offenses. The acts of the
former are more serious than the latter (Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991)).

Power to extend executive clemency does not apply to administrative cases Involving employees in the judiciary
In Administrative Matter No. 8693-CFI, Re: Absence Without Leave of Violeta M. Medina, December 21, 1989,
the Supreme Court said that executive clemency does not extend to disciplinary measures imposed on
administrative sanctions resolved by the Supreme Court Any relief relating to administrative sanctions imposed by the
Supreme Court should be properly sought from the same.
ja I .c *
Extent o f ike powers o f Congress and Court on declaration o f martial law.
T hefow t may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of Ufk of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall no* be art aside by the President
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information aud data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an
independeut investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other hand. Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior tq, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctMt* of the factual basis, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the (acts
presented bpfore it (Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo,)).

The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke.

The Court s review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding"
by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it. may be activated by
Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the j>ower of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the
power of revocation of Congress.
The framers of die 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from
each other (Rep Edcel Lagman. et al v. Hon Medialdea, et al, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo,)).

Foreign relations.
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department
without either challenge or interference by the judiciary One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It
22 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Politics! LawfconsoJidatedJKEVISED 2/fcVSA/crys
would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely
because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, wc
make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covrring other situations not involved hen?, and confine the opinion only
to the very questions necessary to reai h a det ision on this matter.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' cause would fie inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt out relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department's determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
ludgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make th.it pidgrm nt has been constitutionally committed.
(Vinuya. et al v The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, En Banc [Del
Castillo)).

The power and duty to conduct foreign relations; Its nature; reason for the rule.
The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations (See Constitution,
Art. VII, See. I m relation to Administrative Code of 1087, Book IV (Executive Branch|, Title I Foreign Affairs). Secs. 3(1)
and 20; Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, S80 Phil. 422 (2008|; Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary. SOI
Phil 303 (200S); People’s Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus, G.R. No 84642, 1.3 September 1988 (unreporied)
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.. 299 U.S. 304 (1936)); loaquin Bcrnas, Foreign Relations in
Constitutional Law, 10! (1995); Irene R. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power 187 J1966);
Vicente G. Smco, Philippine Political Law: Principles and Concepts 297 110th cd., 1954|). Since every state has the capacity
to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states (Sec 193.3 Montevideo Convention on the Rights 3nd
Duties of States. Art. 1, 16.5 LNTS 19; lames Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 61 |2"d ed. 2007)). it is
hut logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states
(Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, ct al.. supra).

Role o f the Senate in relation to the power of the President as the sole organ in international relations.
The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of
the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief
Executive so desires. The Senate has 3 role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into,
as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members (Saguisag,
et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

The President Is granted a vast power to enter into executive agreements; role o f the Supreme Court
In the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion,
subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind this power and
discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 4.59, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its
Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DF A shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court docs not look into whether an international
agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute
requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field
of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the
applicable limitations (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, ct al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, |anuary 12,
2016, Sereno, J). This is so because of the principle of separation of powers that the SC cannot intrude into the wisdom of
the Executive Department.

President's power in case of emergency Is not absolute

The well-accepted rule is that, the President’s power in case of emergency is not absolute This is so
because the Constitution has created a government in the concept of balance of power structure. Executive,
legislative and judicial powers are disjicrsed to the President, the Congress and 'he Supreme Court, respectively. Each is
supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to
serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits ms power In times of
emergency, the Constitution reasonably demands that a certain degree of faith be reposed in the basic integrity and
wisdom of the Chief Executive but at the same tune obligates him to operate within carefully prescribed pr»>cedural
limitation. (Dav id et al. vs. Arroyo, et al.. G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 200b and other companion cases).

President's authority to declare a state of rebellion vs. the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency
While the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from the powers as Chief Executive, the
President's declaration of a "state of rebellion" is merely an act declaring a status or co ndition at public moment o r
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 of the Revised Administrative Code. Such declaration, in the
words of Santakas. is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases. P.P. 1017 is more than
that. In declaring a state of national emergency the President did not only rely on Section 18. Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on the provision on the takeover of privately-owned public utilities and businesses affected with public
interest Indeed PP. 1017calls tor theexemseofanawesome power (Daud.et of vs Arroyo, et a l).

Ordinance power of the President

The President's ordinance power is limited to the ioregomg issuances, sue cannot issue decrees similai to those
issued by Former President Marcos under P D 1081 Presidential Det tees are laws which arc of the same category
and binding force of statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during
the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution (Legaspi vs Muustry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 |1982|: Garcia
Padilla vs. Enrilc; Aquino. |r vs. COMELEC, David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al ).

23 IABRC2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(ronsolidited)KEVISb’0 2/bV SA /cry

 Emergency powers; upon which agency vested
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. Thi* is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not he possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and eircrciKC its powers, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditinns, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency;
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only;
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public Interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof. (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al).
It is a well-accepted rule that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised,
remains in Congress even in times of crisis. (Arancta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949|).
Under the concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances, the various branches of the government, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the
duties and discharged the responsibilities committed to them. (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al.].

Power to toke over privately-owned utility or business

While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of business affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article XII in the absence of any emergency powers act by Congress. (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al.).

Constitutional basis granting the President the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf qf the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The
Monetary Board, shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a
complete report of each decision on applications for loans to be contracted by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt and containing other matters as may
be provided by law. (Sec. 20, Art VII, 1987 Constitution).
When the President contracts local loans, there is no need for the concurrence of the Monetary Board
because it is only when foreign loans are contracted that such concurrence is necessary. He is empowered to
contract such loans because he is the best person to know and determine the importance of the same and at the same
time, he is the best person to know the capacity of the Republic to pay
The concurrence of the Monetary Board is required as it is the custodian of foreign resources of the
country, thus, it should know the reasonableness of such contracts and that it should know whether the
resources of the country could afford the re-payment of the same.
The reason for the rule that the Congress be furnished a complete report of the contacts is to guide it in the
enactment of laws necessary to protect the interest of the state. It can even investigate in aid of legislation in relation to
such loans to protect the interest of the people, for there is a danger that that President who may have ill-motives
may contract loans which may not even be used for the development of the country, but for selfish motives.

ARTICLE VIII - Judiciary Department

•r
Requisites of the power of Judicial review.
fyie power of Judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calHngforthe«x«rcise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject actor issuance; otherwise slated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement, (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very Its mota of the case. (Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373, 382; Funa v. The Chatman, CSC Francisco Duque III, et ai„ G.R. No. 191672, November 25. 2014, Bersanun, |;
Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R, No. 212426 and companion cases, lanuary 12, 2016, Serene, J).

Concept of the power of Judicial review.

The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to determine
whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope of the Utter's constitutional powers
(See: Chavez v. |udicial and Bar Council, G.R. No 202242. 17 |uly 2012. 676 SCRA 579; Tagohno v House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013. 693 SCRA 574; Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011); Francisco v. House ol Representatives, supra, Demetrta v Alba. 232 Phil, 222
(1987|). As articulated m Section 1. Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial review involves the power to
resolve cases in which the questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, jiroclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, this Court exhaustively discussed this “moderating power“ as part of the system of checks and balances under
24 |ABRC2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISED 2/bVSA/crys
 the Constitution. In our fundament*)! law the role of the Court is to determine whether a branch of government has
adhered to the specific restrictions and limitations of the latter's power (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, ct al.,
supra)

How 1987 Constitution strengthened the power of /udlclal review.

The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has
been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation
of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse (Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on lustier, supra note 94; Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra note 94, Tanada v
Angara, 338 Phil. 546 11997|; Oposa v. Factoran. G.R. No. 101083, 30 |uly 1993, 224 SCRA 792. 809 810 (citing Uamas v.
Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 |1991|; Bcngron v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA
767; Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452; Coseteng v Mitra, G.R. No. 86649. 12 |uly
1990, 187 SCRA 377, Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 11989|). The expansion of this pow’er has made the political question
doctrine no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power o r the Impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review'.’ (Oposa v Factoran, supra; Saguisag v. Executive
Secretary, supra.)

Independence of the judiciary; indicators

The following arc evidence of the independence of the judiciary;
(1) The salaries of fudges and justices cannot be reduced or diminished;
(2) |udges and justices have security of tenure, for they cannot be removed without cause;
(3) Justices of the Supreme Court can be removed only by impeachment;
(4) fudges and justices cannot be designated to perform non-|udicial work;
(5) The judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. (Bengzon, et al. vs. Dnlon, et al., G.R. No. 103524, Apnf 15, 1992).

Exceptions to the rule that members of judiciary cannot hold other offices.
There are exceptions to the general rule that judges may not perform non-judicial functions, like:
(1) When it sits as the sole ludgeofall contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President
and Vice-President, (Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756);
(2) When the Chief Justice sits as ex-officio Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council;
(3) When the Chief Justice presides over the Senate in trying the impeachment case against the Resident;
and
(4) When justices ofthe Supreme Court sitas members of the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals.

Senate investigation of a case already pending in couit does not violate the sub-judice rule.
The sub-judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice, Suffice it to state tfiat the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. (See Sobio v. Cordon. 504
SCRA 704. October 17,2006)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-gomg judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries m aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (REGHIS M ROMERO 11, et al. v. SENATOR IINGCOY E. ESTRADA,
et at. G.R. No. 174105, April 2. 2009, Velasco, Jr., | )

judicial power may not be exercised in vacuum; meaning of principle.

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a
particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court In other
words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised, (ii Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20
Phil 523 (19J ||, tbo Court elucidated that (t|he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure docs not alter or change that power or authority; it simply
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised
in conformity with the provisions of the |)rocedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. (ComhiU Corpto-Morales v CA, et al.,
G.R No. 217126-27. November 10, 2015. Perlas-Benubc. |).
Judicial power is the power to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. It can be exercised
only in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be icvicwcd. If there is
no showing that its rights have been violated, as when a corporation’s radio stations were ac tually confiscated or shut
down, (he power of judicial icview cannot be invoked There must be a justiciable controversy. (Allied
Broadcasting (.enter vs. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October Id, 1990, Mariano vs. tOMELEC. 54 SCAD 506, G.R. No.
118577, March 7. 1995. Phil Press InsL vs. COMELEC, 61 SCAD 261 G.R. No. 119694. May 27, 1995; Conchita Carpio-
Morales v. CA. et a l. G R No 217126, November 20, 2015)

25 |ABKC2019.Magit Areas in Political Law(iuii.solidatt*d)KtVISbl) 2/EVSA/crys

 Concept of political question does not preclude judicial review.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. (Marcos v Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479
(19891)
How the court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the time
that it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, the Court has taken the historical and social context of
the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was
followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989J and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr., G.R. No. 86649, |uly 12, 1990, 1987
SCRA 377.

The rulemaking power of the Supreme Court (Section 5(5j, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees, The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the C.SIS, i.e.. Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which
exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds," cannot operate to exempt tt from the payment
of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
"The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court The other branches tresf)ass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees
under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSTS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence -
fiscal autonomy, Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees, including legal fees. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
governments-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the
(DF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. (CSIS v. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero, G.R.
No. 158090, 623 SCRA 5,14 15, Oct 4,2010, 2"rf Dlv. (Peralta])

Martial law power; meaning of appropriate proceedings covered by Sec. 18[3J, Article VII o f the Constitution.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review iti a jjetition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is
not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Under Section 18.
Article VII. the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency
powers. Put differently, if the Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No.
231658, July 4,2017, Del Castillo, f).

Constitutional Commission

Independence of the Constitutional Commissions

The Constitution guarantees the independence of the Constitutional Commissions to prevent interference in
the exercise of their powers and functions.
-Some evidence ofthe independence of the Constitutional Commissions are:
(!) The salaries of their Commissioners are fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
(See. 3, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution);
(2) They shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, (Sec. 5, supra.);
(3) The Commissioners can be removed by impeachment. (Art. XI, Sec. 2, Constitution); and
(4) The President cannot designate an acting Chairman, like the Chairman of the COMELEC. (Bnllantes vs.
Yorac, December 18,
1990). The designation can be made by the Commissioners pursuant to their own rules.

Designation of CSC Chairman to the Board of CSIS, ECC, etc. violates the Independence of the Commission.
When the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he
may exercise powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing
interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations Duque's designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex
officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque's designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH. ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC Under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
26 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KEVISED 2/EVSA/crys
 oKicc that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. (Dennis Funa v. The
Chairman, CSC, Francisco Duque III, ctal., G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J).

Promotional appointment of COA Chairman; condition.

Villar's appointment as Chairman of COA Is not prohibited under the Constitution after his resignation as
Commissioner. The Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners (on Audit] shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other
commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacant y shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner
to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for ihc unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan
or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in
said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not
to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). There is nothing in Sec, 1(2), Article
1X(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions. (Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. ViUar, G.R.
No. 192791 April 24,2012, Velasco, |r„ (.).

Accountability of Pubic Offices

Meaning of Initiate" In impeachment

The term ''initiate'' means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. (Francisco v. House of
Representatives, et a)., 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et a)., G.R. No. 193459,
February 15,2011).
-Y*V*’
Power o f suspension by the Ombudsman.
Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act vests the Office of the Ombudsman with disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the government, except officials who may be rem oved only by impeachment. Members of the
Congress, and the Judiciary. While CTD has the rank of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, he does not belong to the Judiciary
but to the Executive Department. This simply means that he has.thq same compensation and privileges as a Justice of the
Court of Appeals. If the Supreme Court were to investigate CT.D, it would be performing a non-judicial function. This will
violate the principle of separation of powers. (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23SCRA 405 (1968).

Preventive suspension by Ombudsman.

When Ombudsman may impose preventive suspension upon a public officer.
If a public officer fails the lifestyle check conducted by the office because his assets were grossly disproportionate
to his salary and allowances and charged withgraft and corrupt practices and pending the completion.of investigations, he
was suspended from office for six months, the suspension is valid.
The suspension meted out to him is preventive and not punitive. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants the
Ombudsman the power to impose preventive suspension up to six months. Preventive suspension may be imposed
without any notice or hearing, it is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not the final
determination of the guilt of the officer concerned. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999).

HUMAN RIGHTS

Meaning of the constitutional provision that the eviction of squatters be done in accordance with law and in a
Just and humane manner
It means that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation
that bis or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the owner,
that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or
demolition is done; and that there lie no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. It
does not mean that the validity or legality of th e demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence ot a resettlem en t
area designated or earmarked by the government. (People vs. Leachon, 98 SCAD 812. G.R. No. 108725. September 25,
1998),

The Commission on Human Rights Is not a court or quasl-Judiclal agency

The Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental law to he another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, duplicate or much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate.
/.£, receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official, the function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusionsmacontruversymustbe accompanied by theautliontyofapplying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Thus, the CHR may only investigate, not adjudicate, alleged violations of civil and political rights. (Simon vs. CHR, 47
27 |ABRC2()19.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISfcl) 2/EVSA/crys
 SCAD 107.GR, No. 100150, January 5 .1994;Carlfto vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483).

ARTICLE XII - General Provisions / National Patrimony

Regalian Doctrine
It is the doctrine which reserves to the State the full ownership of all natural resources or natural wealth that
may be found in the bowels of the earth.
* The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The
doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. (Zarate vs. Dir. Of Lands,
434 SCRA 32 322 (2004); Reyes v. CA, 356 Phil. 606 (1998) as cited in Sec. of the DENR, et.al., vs. Mayor |ose Yap.eLal.,
G.R. No. 167707).

Large scale exploration of natural resources; to be signed by the President

The constitutionality of the Service Contract Agreement for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of oil and petroleum gasses in Tanon Strait entered into between a Japanese petroleum corporation and the
Philippine Government signed on behalf of the Philippine government was the Secretary of Energy, the same is not valid.
It violated Section 2, 4th par., Article XII of the Constitution (National Economy and Patrimony) which states that it
is the President who should enter into that kind of contract with foreign corporations. Public respondents, in trying to
justify their action, however, invoked the doctrine of qualified political agency since the Secretary of Energy is an alter-ego
of the President. This doctrine of qualified political agency may not be validly invoked if it is the Constitution itself that
provides that the act should be performed by the President no less, especially since what are involved are natural
resources (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et a I., G.R.
No. 180771, April 21, 2015, En Banc (Leonardo-De Castro)).

Meaning and purpose o f the Flllpinlzatlon o f public utilities.

The Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which
gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board. 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The
1987 Constitution "provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the
operation of public utilities should be granted only to 'citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.'The
provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security.'1The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of
public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific pfrovision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens
control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal ofttift 1987 Constitution: to "conserve and develop our
patrimony" and ensure "a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality
requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII offhe Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to
operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its "capital” mustbe owned by Filipino citizens. (Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R.
No. 176579, June 28, 2011).

Meaning o f the term "capltaluof a public utility company In the Constitution.

The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
comprising both common and nonvoting preferred shares.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares
which usually have no voting rights, the term'"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall
include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote «n the-election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors (Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance
Sec. Teves; jose Roy 01 v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. No. 207246, November 22,2016, Caguioa. |).

Reason fo r the foregoing definition o f "capital. “

The Court adopted the foregoing definition of the term "capital" in Section 11. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
in furtherance of "the intent and letter of the Constitution that the 'State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos' (because a] broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-
important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility." The provision is an express recognition
of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national security. The evident
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical
to the national Interest. The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities; and, as revealed in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation (Gamboa v.
Teves, 668 Phil. 1 (2011); |ose Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. Nos. 207246, November 22. 2016,
Caguioa, J).

Allens cannot acquire land In the Philippines.

A foreigner who married a Filipino is not entitled to a share of a parcel of land they acquired during marriage
even if the money used to purchase it came from him. Under the Constitution, save in cases of hereditary succession no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. He was well aware of the constitutional prohibition and openly admitted the same. His
actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition, hence, he cannot be entitled to a share of the
real properties. Contracts that violate the Constitution and the law are null and void, vest not rights, create no obligations
and produce no legal effect at all. The denial of his claim does not amount to injustice. It is the Constitution itself that
28 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas In Political Law(consolidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys
 demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. The purpose of the prohibition is to conserve
and develop the national patrimony. (Beumer vs. Amoros. G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012).

Requisites before one may acquire property of public dominion.

In Heirs ofMalnbanan r Republic, 60S Phil. 244 [2009], Bcrsamm, |, it was said that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or
private property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable and
disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
There must lie an official declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere
declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice
for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The period of acquisitive prescription would only begin
to run from the tune that the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
use. public service, or for the development of national wealth (Rep. v. Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2015. 715 SCRA
417; Rep. v. Rizalvo, |r.,659 Phil. 578 [2011]: Rep. v. Heirs of Estacio, G.R. No. 208350, November 14, 2016, Peralta, | ) .

Concept o f academic freedom

The concept of academic freedom depends upon whose view it is perceived.
(a) From the standpoint of the educational institution:
"The freedom of the university to determine ' who may teach; what may be taught; how it shall be
taught; and who may be admitted to study. (Sweezy vs. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S,
234)."
(b) From the standpoint of the members of the academe:
"The freedom of the teacher or research w orker in in stitu tio n s of higher learning to
investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through
publication or in the instruction of the students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical
authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed, unless his
methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession, to be com pletely incom petent or
contrary to professional ethics. (Frank Lovejoy, Encyclopedia of Social Science, p. 348; see also
Alcuaz vs. PSBA. et ai. G.R. No. 76353, May 2,
1988)."

A group o f students were dismissed fo r hazing resulting in the death o f Another; they may be refused admission
The matter of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province
of the courts to decide. (Atcneo de Manila University vs. Capuiong, 41 SCAD 829, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993; UP Board
of Regents vs. Hon. Elsie Ligot-Telan, 45 SCAD 439, G.R. No. 110280, October 21. 1993). In Garcia vs. the Faculty of
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 (1975), it was said that a college or a school possesses
academic freedom to decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference when the overriding-public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
extending to the choice ofstudents.

If a student failed to m eet the school's retention policy; failing to m eet the minimum grade o f 80% in any
major Nursing subject and in two minor subjects, the school can refuse to admit him
This is so because the school is afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the
admission of students, including the setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are
competent to determine who are entitled to admission and re-admission. (University ofSanAgusttn, Inc. vs. CA,eta/.,49
SCAD 274,G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994).
Mediocre students have no right to demand admission in a university since the school, m the exercise of its
academic freedom, has the power to promulgate reasonable rules for study. The right to education is circumscribed in the
phrase "but^subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." (Sec. 5f3], Art, XIV, 1987
Constitution; see Tablarm vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 [1987]; Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College Rizal, et ai, 46 SCAD
116, GR. No. 10342, November 8, 1993).
f r. ;
A codemlc Freedom
_~ Private schools still have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to
establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right has been recognized in ihc Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, which has the character of law. Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools.
(Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600 (1989)).
The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2),
Constitution) for schools to teach discipline; Qcnosa v. Dalariate, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010) in fact, schools have
the duty to develop discipline in students. (Marian College, Inc. v. CA, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) Corollanly, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules. The penalty for
violations includes dismissal or exclusion from rc-cnrollment.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Concept o f local autonomy

Local autonomy simply means the exercise of basic powers, like police power as what is otherwise known as the
general welfare clause of the local government units, power of eminent domain, and the taxing power. It is not, however,
total independence from the national government bur merely the authority to exercise certain basic powers authorized
by law.

29 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys

 Concept o f recall, Initiative and referendum
Recall of officers is a process where registered voters of a local government unit remove local elected
officials due to loss of confidence. The person being recalled is automatically a candidate in the recall election such that
if he wins, the confidence of the people is restored. Under the present law, one person can now initiate a recall
election. This is a process that reaffirms the principle that the Philippines is a democratic state where sovereignty
resides in the people and all authority emanates from them. It is a speedy remedy to remove erring officials rather than
waiting for the next election. Initiative is a process where the people may directly propose the approval of local
legislation, amendment or revision of the same. This is a power reserved by the people from the Congress and the
local legislative bodies. Referendum Is where the people may reject, approve or amend an ordinance by a local
legislative body.

Succession Into office Is not to be counted In determining whether the three term limit rule applies to an
elected local official
No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected" (Sec. 43(b) of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)).
Art.VUIoftheConstitutioncontemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of Section.
The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bar "such officials" from serving for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to
have served his full term of office states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term which he was elected." The term
must therefore be one "for which the official concerned was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not
serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three (3) consecutive
terms in an elective office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. (Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, et al., 98 SCAD 140, GR. No. 133495, September 3, 1998).

Rules in the filling up of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian.

a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be
filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the sangguniang panlalawigan and the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanizedcities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan; and > ^
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay concerned.
b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian
member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the
last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall
come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall
serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a
certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are
conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and
void ah initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor;
In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political
party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a
qualified person to fill the vacancy; and
4) In case of vacancy io the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall
be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned (Sec. 45. RA No. 7160).

Vacancy in SB member not a member o f political party; how filled up.

It is a rule that an appointment in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who
does not belong to any political party is to be made by the Governor upon recommendation of the SB where the vacancy
occurred.The re c o m m e n d a tio n of the SB is c o n sid e re d a c o n d itio n sine qua non for the v alidity of the a p p o in tm e n t
(Fariftas v. Barte, 256 SCRA 396, G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996). Where there is no political party to make the
nomination, the SB where the vacancy occurs must be considered the appropriate authority for making the
recommendation by analogy to vacancies created in the SB whose members are by law prohibited from having any party
affiliation. The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to him by the SB concerned since the
power of appointment is a discretionary power, yet neither is he vested with so large a discretion that he can disregard the
recommendation of the SB concerned. Since the recommendation takes the place of the nomination by political party, the
recommendation must likewise be considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment.

Rower to Impose preventive suspension.

Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly-urbanized or an independent
component city;
(2) By the Governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or
(3) By the Mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay (Sec. 63[a|, RA No. 7160).

30 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys

 Recall; meaning o f the term "regular local election."
The term "regular local election" in Sec. 74(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "no
recall shall take place within one (1) year n x immediately preceding a regular local election" refers to one where the
position of the local ofHc lal to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate (Paras v. Comelec, 76 SCAD
40, G.R No. 129169. November 4, 1996). The one-year time bar will not apply where the local official sought to be recalled
is a mayor and the approaching election is a barangay election (Angobung v. Comelec, supra).
Along the same line, it was said in Paras v. Comelec, 76 SCAD 40, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996 that a recall
election involving a punong bai.mgay could l>e held one year or less immediately pi eroding a Sanggumang Kabalaan (SK).
election. An SK election is not considered a regular election within the meaning of See. 74(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides that no recall shall take place within one (I) year from date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Recall election, not covered by 3 -term IlmlL

After throe consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reclection for a fourth term The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate rc-eicction lor a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reclection for a fourth term as long as the re-election is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid way in the term following the third
consecutive term Is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term (Socrates v. COMELEC, G.
R. No. 1S4S12, September 12,2002).

The Indicators in the creation of a local government units

As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall
be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit;
(1) Income — It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(2) Population — It shall be determined on the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(3) Land Area — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide fot* such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populate.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). (Sec. 7, R.A. No. 7160).

The pow er to create a province or a city Inherently involves the pow er to create a legislative district.
Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for
the House of Representatives. Under Sec. 5, Art. Vf of the Constitution the power to increase the allowable membership
of the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out
of existing ones. The Congress exercises these powers thru a law and not through a law that requires for local
legjsIalivebodies'cnactmenL(Moiitejov.Comelec,312Phil.492[19951).
It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or apportion legislative districts fora national
legislature-An inferior legislative body created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body (Serra v. Comelec. et al., G.R. No. 177597; Marquez v. Comelec. G.R. No. 178628, July 16, 2007).

Condonation doctrine without basis in the Constitution and law.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the other legal provisions now leads to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condo nation is actually bereft of legal bases.
Tv begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to die people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official's administr ative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can he wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post Electiou is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v Orhos, 279 Phil.
920. 937 (1991J, to apply to administrative offenses (Conchlta Carpio Morales v. CA, et al G.R. No. 217126 27, November
10, 2015 Perias-Bernabe. j) Only the President can grant pardon aftc*r final and executory conviction in a criminal or
administrative rase

3-term limit. Its rationale, coverage.

Coverage of the 3-term limit and the reason for the same.
As stressed in Socrates v COMELEC(G.R No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers
only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. An elective local official
cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelecticai for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a
fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition There has. in fine, to be a break or interruption m the successive terms of the official after his or
31 |ABKC2019.Magir A ieas In Political Law(consolidawd)KEVISEl) 2/EV SA/crys
 toer third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official docs not seek a fourth term, immediately following the
third. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA. G.R. No. 20171, January 8,
2013, VELASCO, JR.,).).

Effect o f voluntary renunciation o f the office of an elected official on the 3-term lim it
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service for
three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to
skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes. (MAYOR ABELARDO
ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.).

Involuntarily Interrupted terms, not considered a full term.

The almost two-year period during which Abundo's opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be
considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo's continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. It cannot
be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an
ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat In
other words, during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective
position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in
the mayor’s office and, in fact had no legal right to said position. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, Sft. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.)

Objective o f the 3-term lim it

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court
underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, stating:
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to thepeople's freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for--'three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the M thers when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as niayor of th^ City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants
for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the yery scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it (Talaga v. Com^lec, G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012,
Bersamin, J). ^

3-term limit; effect o f disqualification. __ ^^

It is true that he occupied the portion of mayor in the following periods: 1995-1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004;
2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he wife not duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales
hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for*the .foil term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-
2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales' occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to ItS May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-
term limit Indeed, the period froth 17 May 20O7to $0 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales' first term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et aU G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
. ** ^ v .. -Vjf; .mJJ»

Exceptional situation In the 3<erm lim it

Preventively suspended elective public officer may not run fo r a fourth term.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to
this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons
exist, voluntary or involuntary - some of them personal and some of them by operation of law - that may temporarily
prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A
serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may p re v e n t an office h o ld e r from ex ercisin g the fu n ctio n s o f his office for a tim e w ith o u t forfeiting
title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a
term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the
three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective
Interruption is. (Simon AJdovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, Brion, J).

Basis o f validity of zoning regulations o f LCUs.

It is justified by the police power of the State, for it cannot be denied that one of the ob|ects of police power is to
protect public morals, health and public safety (People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24, Ortigas v. Feati Bank. 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).

LCUs may exercise the power o f eminent domain; conditions.

A local government unit may, through its Chief Executive, exercise the power of eminent domain under the
following conditions:
(1) The property to be taken must be intended for public use or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
32 |ABRC2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(consolldated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys
 «ind the landless,
(2) There must he payment of )u*l compensation;
(3) The exon ise must he pursuant to an ordinance;
14) There must he a valid and definite offer previously made to the owner o f the property and such offer must
not have been accepted (Ser. 19, R A No 7160)

LCU may rinse a mad nr a sh eet.

LGllx may close a road or a street provided that thore is due process and that the closure should he for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from puhin use when ore umstances show that such property is
no longer intended or necessary tor public use or public service (Mai usiano v. Diokno, G.R No 97764, August 10, 1992).

SB has power to grant franchise to operate cockpit.

Mayors have no power to grant franchise to operate a cockpit, otherwise it would constitute an undue
encroachment on his/her administrative prerogatives, as the mayor has no power to do so. The power to grant franchise
to operate and maintain a cockpit is in the Sangguniang Bayon. Under Section 447 of the Local Government Code, the SB as
the legislative body of the municipality shall, thru ordinances, authorize and lirense the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cockpits and regulates corkfjghllng and commercial breeding of gamecocks (Canct v. Mayor Julieta Decena,
G.R. No. 155344, lanuary 20, 2004)

Traffic Is a proper subject of police power.

Traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern hence, it is subject to police power. In Colalang v.
Williams, which Involved a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control traffic on national roads, this Court held:
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
ot public convenience and welfare It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is.
to say the least, a menace to public safety Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. (Lucena Grand Centra! Terminal, Inc. v. |AC Liner,
Inc., supra).

LGVs have the power to classify and reclassify their pmpertles; police power measure.
Ordinance No R187, otherwise known as "An Ordinance Amending Ord No. 8119, Otherwise Known as The
Manila Comprehensive Land Use jnd Zoning Ordinance of 2006 By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3). The creation of the industrial zones lifted the prohibition against owners and operators of
businesses including Chevron and the other oil companies from operating in designated commercial zones, an industrial
zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is valid. The petition is a sequel to the case of 5/5 v. Mayor Atienza. /.
where the SC found that said ordinance (No. 8027) was enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila, hence it ordered the operators of the Pandacan depots to immediately relocate and transfer their oil
terminals. But despite the finality of said judgment, the City of Manila enacted an ordinance, (Ordinance No. 8171)
repealing Ordinance No. 8027 on the theory that a local government unit can classify and reclassify its own properties.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the LGIJ is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents that the
removal of the oil depots in the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies' contention that the Pandacan
terminals have never been the subject of terrorist attacks, hence, the petitions are based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures is not correct. (SJS, ct al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836 & companion cases, November 25. 2014, Perez, J).

Creation of a province; population not on Indispensable requirement

A provmic may be created il it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the l.ands Management Bureau; or
(li) a population nl not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by tbeNatinnal Statistics Office

The requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2. 2010).

Prohibition against midnight appointments; applies only to Presidential appointees, nut to LCDs.
A midnight appointm ent refers to those ap p o in tm en ts m ade w ithin tw o m onths im m ediately prior to the next
presidential rltclion." Midnight a p p o in tm en ts are prohibited u n d er Arm Ir VII, Section 15 ot the Constitution:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make the appointments, except temporary
ap|Miintments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is duty-bound to prepatv for the orderly
transfer of authority to the in< tuning President, and hr or she should not do acts which he or she ought to know, would
embarrass or obstruct the polir ics of lus or her successor" (Aytona v Castillo. No L 191313, lanuary 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1,
9 10), An outgoing President should not deprive the new administration ol an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments
Hnwevei. the consulutumai prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It
docs not apply to appointments nude by local i had executives There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during ihe last days of his or her tenure (The Piuvinital Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No.
202331. April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA I I I Lronen. |. filing De Rama v CA 405 Phil. S31. 35.3 SCRA 94).
33 |ABK( 20)9 Magu Areas in Political L a w f r o n s o lid a te d J K tV I S E D 2/fcVSA/crys
 Body with Jurisdiction over boundary disputes between baranqays.
The RTC has no jurisdiction to settle j boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or municipality.
Said dispute shall he referred for settlement to the sanggumang panglungsod or s.inggumang bayan concerned. If there is
failure of amicable settlemeni the dispute shall be formally tried bv the sjngguman concerned and shall decide the same
within sixty (60) days from the date of ihe certification referred to. Further, the decision of the sangguman may be
appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the lime and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court (Barjngav Mayamot, Antipolo City v. Antipolo City. SB, et al., G.R No. 187149 August 17. 201b)

Police Power

Cost-recovery mechanics imjtosed by ERC does not violate the non-impairment clause; exercise of police power.
The regulation of rales imposed to public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the State's
police power, like the order to refund over-recoveries charged to their customers
When private projicrty is used for a public purpose and is affected by public interest, it ceases to be juris 14nvale
only and becomes subject to regulation. As the state agency charged with the regulation of electric cooperatives, ERC is
mandated to protect public interest by directing NEECO to refund over-charges it made to its consumers. Moreover, the
computation made by the ERC to determine the cap was a mechanism purely for cost recovery and should not be income
generating.
Nor can the cost-recovery mechanism imposed be deemed an impairment of the contracts entered into by
NEECO prior to the enactment of RA 7812 since all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate m easures
taken by the St3te to promote public welfare fNueva Ecija Electric Coop., Inc (NEECOI) v. ERC, G.R. No. 180642, February
3,2016).

Ordinance prevails over restrictions on use of property.

An ordinance re-classifying the area as institutional, hence, the owner expanded the school shall prevail over the
restriction in the title.
The ordinance is an exercise of police power. As early as Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co..
181 Phil. 176 (1979), the SC upheld the validity of an ordinance declaring the residential area in Mandaluyong as
industrial and commercial zone as it was passed in the exercise of police power. Since the motives behind the passage of
the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a felt public need, not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's exercise of police
power. (Learning Child, Inc., ct al. v. Ayala Alabang Village Asso., et al., G.R. No. 134269, and other companion cases. July 7,
2010 )

20% senior citizen discount considered as an exercise of police power.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age. are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities. The discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly
is an integral part of this law (Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Sec. of the DSWD. et al., G.R. No. 175356. December 1,
2013)

R.A. Nos. 9257 A 94427 do not violate the equal protection clause
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification. The
Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs. When the
Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children, it did not make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket
privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class.
R-A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. Specifically, it
caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is based on age and therefore qualifies all who have attained
the age of 60 Senior citizens are a class of their own, who are m need and should be entitled to government supjjort. and
the fact that they may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege (Carlos
SuperdrugCorp etaiv. DSWD.et al.. S53 Phil 120 |2007)).

Reason why senior citizens are grunted the benefits.

It Is well to consider that our senior citizens have already reached the age when work opportunities have
dwindled concurrently as their physical health. They arc no longer exjoected to work, but there are still those who continue
to work and contribute what they ran to the country. Thus, to single them out and take them out ot the privileges of the
(aw for continuing to strive and earn income to fend lor themselves is inimical to a welfare state that the Constitution
envisions. It is tantamount to penalizing them for their persistence. It is commending indolence rather thjn rewarding
diligence It encourages ihem to become wards of the Slate rather than |»roductive partners.
Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract woikcrs of the past While some may
be well to do or may have the capacity to supjmrt their sustenance, the discretion to avail ot the privileges of the law is up
to them Bui to instantly tag them as undeserving of the privilege would be th* height ot ingratitude, it is an outright
discrimination (Carlos SuperdrugCorp,et al. v DSWD et aL 553 Phil. 120|2007|)

Discount to PWDs is an exercise of police power

RA 7277 entitled An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation. Self Development and Sell Reliance of Disabled
Persons and their Integration into the Mainstream ot Society and foi Other Purjwses." otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons,' is constitutional

34 |ABK(.20I9 Magic Areas m Political L<w( consolidated JkhV ISEU 2/fcVSA/tTys

 The law is valid as an exorcise of police power. The case is similar to Carlos Superdrug Carp., et al. v. USWl), et ai,
553 Phil. 120 (2007] upholding the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of KA 0527 which grants 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines of senior citizens as a legitimate oxen ise of police power.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the jwiwer of eminent domain, has general
welfare for Its obicct. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for jn efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefit* (Sangalang v. intermediate Appellate
Court, 257 Phil 930 119R9|). Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs (Hrmita Malate Motel and Motel Operators Association, Inc v City
Mayor of Manila, L-24693. |uly 31. 1967, 20 SCRA H49, citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 M.S 412 (19111). It is the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties nr without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall fudge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same (IJ.S. v. Torihio, 15 Phil. H5 (1910), citing
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush., 53 (Mass. 1851); U S. v. Pompcya, 3 I Phi I. 245, 253 254 ( 1915); Drugstores Assn of the
Phils. Inc., et al. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, et al., G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, Peralta, |).

EMINENT DOMAIN

Nature of power of eminent domain.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by Its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the Jaw. Consequently, when the
sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting
the power. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor When
the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the
statute in which the grant is contained.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9 that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.'1 The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is
a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that
the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, the society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." (City of Manila v. Lagulo, fr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005; cited In
Mosqueda, et al. v. Plllplno Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En
Banc (BersaminJ)

The Two (2) Types of "Taking " under the Power of Eminent Domain
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property. (City of Manila v. Lagulo, fr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12,2005)
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Plllplno Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. 189185, August
16, 2016). it was ruled that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone m all agricultural entities under Section 6 of an
ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying unduly did not deprive all agricultural landowners in that City of the
beneficial use of their property amounting to taking without just compensation, hence did not amount to taking. Citing City
of Manda v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005), it clarified that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property. According to the Court
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 31 of the ordinance requires the planting of
diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatoy requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the
taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they can
suli cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified a%the buffer zones.

Point to determine just compensation.

Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic ot the Philippines. Hence, the
evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject portion must be based on the
values prevalent at such time of taking for like agricultural lands. (DAR v. Henna, et ai.. G.R. No. 183901; LBP v. Berma. et
al.C.R.No. 183931. July 9, 2014)

Concept of public use.

Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public However, the concept has expanded to include
utility advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. In Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department o f
Transportation and Communications, G.R No 169914, April 1H, 2008, 552 SCRA 59, 175, fustice Corona, in his dissenting
opinion said that:
To he valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term public use has evolved
over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally
understood as stru tly limited to artuai ‘use by the public has already been abandoned. Public use" has
now been held to be synonymous with “public interest, “public benefit," and “public convenience. (Kep.
v. Heirs of Saturnmo Borhon, et al., G.R. No. 165354. fjnuary 12 2015).

35 |ABRC2019 Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KtVIShD 2/EVSA/crys

 Effect if the expropriator abandons the public use.
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada. Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not. it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same Otherwise, the
ludgnient of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable clement for the
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
and the ludgment would violate the property owner s right lo justice, fairness and equity. (G.R No.
176625, February 25, 2010, 613 SCRA 618: Rep. v. Heirs of Satumino Borbon, et al.. G.R. No. 165354,
lanuary 12. 2015).

Compensation to be paid; basis; instance of an inverse condemnation proceedings.

State look a private property for public use; cannot it invoke the prescriptive period in recovering the compensation.
The right to recover |ust compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and
categorical language that "|p|rivate property shall not lie taken for public use without iust compensation " (Art 111, Sec. 9,
Constitution). This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R.
No 165828, August 24. 2011). Thus, it has been ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of RA No. 6395 does
not extend to an action to recover just compensation. (Napocor v. Sangkay). It would be a confiscatory act on the part of
the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just
compensation, solely because they failed lo institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time
the transmission lines were constructed To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just
compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their
property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an
action for eminent domain (Rule 67. Sec. 1, Rules of Court) and deposit with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its omission, however, respondents were
constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court.
NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses' constitutional right to just
compensation. (National Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares. G.R No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded
if as a result of the cxpropnation. the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value.
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BP!). C.R. No. 203039, September 11. 2013).

RA No. 8974 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Project
and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings.
The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1)
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substantc; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of
an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in
cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court
of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No
hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974. (Rep v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol Steel Corp v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).

ELECTION LAWS

When person considered a candidate.

The mere filing of certificate of candidacy does not make a person a candidate because she can only be considered
a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which she filed her certificate of candidacy (Sec. 13(3], RA 9369). The
unlawful acts or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period
(Sec. 1.3). Hence, the election offenses may be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before
the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be committed (Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC, et al., G.R No.
181613, November 25, 2009 citing Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114).

Requirement to be met to Justify the cancellation o f a COCon the ground of material/false representation.
In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation pertains to
a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right
to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. (Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386
[1999]). The material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided
for in the Local Government Code. (Villafuertc v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA
312, 323, citing Salcedo 11 v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications).
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 210164, August 18, 2015, Del Castillo, j). So, when he stated in his COC that he was qualified to run despite using his

36 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Uw(consolidated)REVISEl) 2/EVSA/crys

 foreign passport after renouncing his other citizenship, he committed material misrepresentation (Agustin V. Coinelcc, et
al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10. 2015, Bersamin, |).

Two (2) remedies to prevent candidate from running.

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race.
One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due (nurse to or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy In Fermm v Commission on Flections, (» R. No. 179695 and G.R. No 182<69, December 1ft, 2008. 574 SCRA 782,
the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:
|A| petition for disqualification, on the one hand, <an be premised on Section 12 or 6ft of the
OEC. or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material represcnt.ition in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 6ft is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due (ourse
under Section 6ft is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/shc never filed a CoC.

Section 7ft of the Omnibus Flection Code states that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al.. G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, /).

Sections 78 and 68 o f the OF.Cshould not be confused.

A Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the
two sections are different, for they arc based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, hut a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a
CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted
pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate (Talaga v. Comclec.
G.R. No. 196804: 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin,)).

Nature o f petition under Sec. 78.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that
is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, a
proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 25.1 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78" petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate (Agustin v
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, |; sec also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
179695 and G.R. No 1821689. December 19, 2008, 574 SCRA 782; Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No. 186804 197015, October 9,
2013, Bersamin, |).

Dual citizen cannot run for public office.

A dual citizen who renounced his other citizenship hut used his foreign passport thereafter is not eligible to run
and bo voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, llocos Norte because after having renounced his USA citizenship
and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of
the USA He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his
Philippine pwsport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the
first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 Consequently, he could be
coostdcretfan exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
His continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation
of his USA ctuzenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. (Maquiling v Commission on Elections. G.R. No.
195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420). Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code for being a dual citizen.
A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office (Salcedo II v Commission on Elections) Even if if made no finding thal th e petitioner had
deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could still
declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code. lAgustin v COMELEC, et
al.. G.R No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin. |; Arnado v Comelec. et al.. G.R. No. 210164 August 18. 2015. Del
Castillo, I)

Effect if cundidaie was declared disqualified by final judgment be/ore election day, effect on votes cast for him
The effect of his disqualification depends upon when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists
because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of I987)§which states that any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment in lie disqualified shall not lie voted for and the voles cast for him shall not he
counted It for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing oi the action inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Cayat v
Commission on Elections. G R No. 163776. and G.R No. 165736. April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23; Agustin v COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No 207105 November 10. 2015 BcTsatnm. |)
37 |ABKC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidaied)KtVISLl) 2/EVSA/cryx
 Conviction fo r libel; candidate Is disqualified.
Someone who was convicted of Ihe crime of libel run for public office s disqualified to run for public office,
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec 12. Omnibus Election Code) which shall be removed
after the expiration of five years from his service of sentence.
In Tcvcs v. Comelec, 604 Phil. 717 |2009|, the five year period of disqualify ation would end only on 2S May 2010
or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to pay in Tevcs v. Sondiqanbayan. In this
case, since he served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five year period shall end only on 16
February 2016. Thus, he is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then. (Mary Elizabeth
Ty-Dclgado v HRET, ct al., G.R. No. 219603, January 26. 2016, Carpio, J).

Concept o f nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate." (Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015, Lconen, I).

Substitution o f candidate in case a candidate dies, or is disqualified or withdraws after the last day for filing o f the
certificate of candidacy.
Only a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission (Domingo v. City Board of
Canvassers, G.R. No. 105365, June 2, 1992).

Who may be substituted.

Under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party" maybe substituted.
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at ail cannot be a candidate at all.
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute
presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who docs not
exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all instances enumerated in Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy filed is a requisite sine qua non.
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy. In the first place
because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a
candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were
to allow the so-called “substitute" to file a “new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing
thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution (Miranda v.
Abaya, 110 SCAD 209, G.R. No. 136351, July 28. 1999; Tagolmo v. HRET. etal., G.R. No. 202202. March 19. 2013)

Substitution o f candidate.
A candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not
be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to
the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code (Luna v. Comdex, G.R. No. 165983. April
25, 2007; Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamm, J|.

Substitution v f under-age candidate.

A minor who filed his certificate of candidacy as an official candidate of a party who subsequently withdrew his
certificate after the deadline of filing of certificates of candidacy may be substituted because she was an official
candidate/nominee of the party, hence, she can be validly substituted. Under Sec 77 of BP 881, not just any person, but
oniy an official candidate of a registered political party may be substituted. In Luna v. COMELEC. 550 Phil. 284 (2007), the
SC held that a candidate who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election day and was substituted by a qualified
candidate and it was held that substitution was proper.
If candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth oi age in his certificate ot undidacy, his
eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy
under Section 7B of the Election Code.
M oreover, th e can d id a te has already w ith d raw n his certificate of Candida*, y before the COMELEC d e c la red th a t he
was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless his certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled m accordance
with Section 78 of the Election Code, his certificate ni candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
(Cerafica v. COMELEC. G.R. No 205136, December 2, 2014, Perez. |).

Lone Candidate Law; its salient provisions.

The Lone Candidate Law is Republic Act No H295, enacted on June 6. 1997 Section 2 thereof provides that "Upon
the expuation of the deadline ior the filing ot the certificate of candidacy in a special election called to fill a vacancy m an
elective position other than lor President and Vice-President, when there is only one (1) qualified candidate for such
position, the lone c andidate shall be proclaimed elected to the position by the proper proclaiming body of the Commission
on Elections without holding the special election upon certification by the Commission on Elections that he is the only
candidate for the office and is thereby deemed elected.'
Section 3 thereof provides that “the lorn* candidate so proclaimed shall assume office not earlier than the
scheduled election day, in the absence ot any lawful ground to deny due tourse or cancel the certificate of tandidacy in
38 |ABKC2l))9 Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KEVISED 2/tV SA /crys
order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Sections 69 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 also known
as the Omnibus Election Code."

Who may file election contests.

Section 253 gives any candidate voted for in the election who has presented a certificate of candidacy the right to
file an election protest. So where the plaintiff in an election contest alleges that he is a duly qualified elector of the
municipality, this fact docs not give him any standing in the Court to ask for the review of the judgment. There is nothing
in the Court to ask for the review of the judgment. There is nothing in the Election Code which allows a voter who is not a
candidate to take any proceedings in Court to contest the legality of an election (Gil Mcrmanos v. Hand, 100 Phil. 217).

Period to pie election contest.

The petition should be filed within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election. So. if a protest is
filed prior to the proclamation by the provincial board ot canvassers, such protest is premature and must be dismissed if
an objection thereto is made on time. If no objection is made, and the protest is continued and heard after the
proclamation of the result by the board of canvassers, the protest will be deemed to have been filed after such
proclamation and, therefore, to have been presented at the jumper time (Manalo v. Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609; Macias v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 85642, February 12, 1990; Tan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86796, |une 22, 1980). The rule is equally
applicable to a counter-protest which must be filed within the period to file a protest, otherwise, the forum loses
jurisdiction to entertain a belatedly filed counter-protest (Kho v. COMELEC, et al„ 87 SCAD 188, G.R. No. 124033,
September 25, 1997).

What to allege in the election protest.

1) That the protestant is a candidate voted for in the last election and that he has presented a certificate of
candidacy;
2) That the protestee has been proclaimed in the said election; and
3) The date of the proclamation in order to determine the period within which the protest should he filed.

The above facts are jurisdictional. The Court of First Instance (now RTC) being a court of special and limited
jurisdiction, cannot try an election protest until the special facts upon which it may take jurisdiction are expressly shown
in the motion of protest (Tengco v. Jocson, 43 Phil. 715).

Quo warranto in election versus quo warranto in appointment

In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the
candidate-elect, while in quo warranto proceeding referring to office filled by appointment, what is determined is the
legality of the appointment. In the first case, when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration
of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In
the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to
occupy the office (Garland v. Catubig, G.R. No. 23964, June 1,1966).

Proper procedure to be resorted to In case of a tie.

To resolve the tie, there shall be drawing of lots. Whenever it shall appear from the canvass that two or more
candidates have received an equal and highest number of votes, or in cases where two or more candidates received the
same number of votes for the last place in the number to be elected, the board of canvassers, after recording this fact in its
minutes, shall by resolution, upon five days notice to all the tied candidates, hold a special public meeting at which the
board of canvassers shall proceed to the drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as elected the
candidates who may favored by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to assume office in the same
manner as if he had been elected by plurality of votes. The board of canvassers shall forthwith make a certificate stating
the name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and his proclamation on the basis thereof.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to contest the election (Sec. 240.
BP.881, Tugade v. COMELEC, etal., G.R. No. 171063, March 2, 2007).

Wreath of victory cannot be transferred to an Ineligible candidate.

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may
have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged Ineligibility does not only
pertain to his qualifications as a candidate- but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast
in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to quality with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office (Cason Macode Muqulllng v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 201J. En Bam ISere no. CJJ)

PUBLIC OFFICERS

Government employees do not have the right to strike

Employees in government can form unions but lannot strike considering that under the 1987
Constitution the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled lorporations with charters. (Sec. 2|1|. Art. IX B. 1987 Constitution). This
being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal (SSS Employee* Association, et al. vs. CA, el al..
G.R. No. 85279. July 28. 1989).
Government employees may through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment whuh are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies tor the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there Ik- any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor Management Council tor appropriate action. (SSS
39 IABKC2014 Magic Areas in Political Uw(consolidated)KEVISED 2/EVSA/erys
 Employees Association, et al. vs. CA. et at.. |uly 28, 1989).

Administrative liability distinct from penal liability.

It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials arc under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of
their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may lie held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for
the same act (Tccson v. SB, 376 Phil. 191 (1999)). Obviously, administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal
and civil liability (Veloso v. SB, I87SCRA 504,|1990|).
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correctively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and
second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the
same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability (People v. SB, G.R. No. 164S77, |uly 5, 2010, 623 SCRA
147, citing People v. Paredes, G.R. No 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA S77; Office of the President v. Calixto Cataquiz. G.R.
No 183445, September 14.2011).

When a person guilty of nepotism.

One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office; and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

There are four (4) situations covered. In the last two (2) mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended
or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of bureau or office, or
the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee (Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 106 SCAD 77, 306
SCRA 425, April 29, 1999).
Having the same family name or middle name with the appointing authority, does not make nepotism. Besides,
the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office the appointing authority of which is a
relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not within the prohibited degree (Mun. of Butig, Lanao del
Sur v. CA, et al.. G.R. No. 138348, December 9, 2005).

Basic purpose against nepotism.

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, it was
said that "the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition
was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which
is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that should just be
nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head, x x x (Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 106
SCAD 77, 306 SCRA 425, April 29, 1999).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Doctrine o f primary jurisdiction.

A resolution was issued by Samar MElectric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCOII) Board of Directors removing a certain
Setudo, |r. as a member of the Board of Directors is not within the jurisdiction of the court to decide. The National
Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The NEA has the power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence, the resolution removing the
Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no jurisdiction (Samar I! Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo. Jr..
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
The doctrine of prjmary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R. No. 18487, August
15. 2011). in such a case, the court m which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al.. supra.; SEC. et al. v. C|H Dev. Corp., et al., G.R. No.
210316, November 28, 2016, Peralta, |).

Basis o f the doctrine.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on prachcal and legal reasons. (Public Hearing
Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.. G.R. No. 170599, September 22. 2010.
631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No. 183142, September 17, 2009,
600 SCRA 217). The availinent of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

Exhaustion o f administrative remedies; exceptions.

It is true that whenever a decision of an administrative agency may be questioned and the law provides for a
remedy of appeal within the administrative structure of government, there must lie compliance with the same, otherwise
recourse to the courts directly would be improper for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The rule regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard aiul fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by hint, or (4) where there are circumstances
40 |ABRC20I9.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)KhVISbD 2/bVSA/crys
 indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, - Gonzales vs. Hechanova. L-21897, October 22, 1963. 9 SCRA 230;
Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17. 1966,18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, September IS, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.
Said principle may also bo disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there is no due process observed (Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or where
the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Mana vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637; SEC, ct al. v. C)H Dev. Corp.. et al.).

Requisites of rule-making power of administrative agencies.

Before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of
legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which arc sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his lunctions (William C. Dagan
v. Philippine Racing Commission, 598 Phil. 406, 417 (2009); Genuino, et al. v. Dc Lima, & other cases, G.R. Nos. 199034.
199046 and 197930, April 17, 2018).

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Doctrine of Incorporation; The Doctrine of Transformation.

The doctrine of incorporation means that the rules of international law for part of the law of the land and no
legislative action is required to make them applicable to a country. The Philippines follows his doctrine, because Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land.
The doctrine of transformation on the other hand requires that an international law principle be transformed into
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007). The transformation theory is applied in the Philippines
through treaty-making power of the President. Through this power, rules and principles embodied in a treaty in force
would be transformed into Philippine Law and shall become valid and effective upon the concurrence of 2/3 of all
members of the Senate.

Baseline Law
The Philippine Baseline Law (RA 9522) can constitutionally "convert" internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS HI, including over flight.
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49(1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo
Ermita,etal., G.R. No. 187167, July 16,2011).

UNCLOS; balance State sovereignty.

Under Sec. 31 of the UNCLOS, a flag State shall bear International responsibility for any loss or damage to the
Coastal State resulting from non-compliance with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long standing policy the US considers itself bound
by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the ocean as codified in the UNCLOS.
The international law of the sea is a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the
exploration of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international
law, regulating the relations of-states with respect to the uses of the oceans. The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was
opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 and
became into force on November 16,1994.
/ '0' The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and
the; prij®|i|^e of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum) (Bertrand Theodor L Santos, "Untangling a Tangled Net of
ConfiHhiCH^ IReconciJing the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the UNCLOS" World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-
Deccffiber 2002), p. 96). The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of
intcrn^(^K l^;(A m ic Bardin, "Coastal State's Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels" 14 Pace lnt'1. Rev. 27, 28 (2002)). The
UNCLOS gwes to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which arc: 1)
internal watc^.2J^ferritorial sea<3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal
States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to
the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil (Fr. Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014).

Jurisdictional rules under the International Criminal Court

The Roman Statute provides for the following jurisdiction:
1. ICC shall have the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern, covering the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as
defined in the Statute. (Article 5, Rome Statute; Pimentel. Jr. V. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
158088, July 6, 2005)
2. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the person of an accused only if the crime was committed in the
territory of a State a party to the Rome Statute or if the accused is a national of a State that is party to the
Rome Statute. (Article 12, Rome Statute)
41 |ABRC2019.Magit Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISEl) 2/EVSA/crys
 3. A person shall not be criminally liable under the Rome Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at
the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and after the entry into force of the Rome
Statute. (Article 11 and 22, Rome Statute)

The Philippine Baseline Law (RA 9522) can constitutionally "convert" Internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of Innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, Including over flighL
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article ! of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49(1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).

Concept of the rule of specialty; Extradition.

Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting Sta te a person
to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition. Conformably with the dual criminality rule
embodied in the extradition treaty between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR),
however, the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR
as the Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent considering that the extradition treaty is
forthright in providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming within the descriptions of offenses in its
Article 2 insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a
more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.
Juan Antonio Munoz could only be extradited to and tried by the HK.SAR for seven (7) counts of conspiracy to
defraud, but not for the other crime of accepting an advantage as an agent. This, because conspiracy to defraud was a public
sector offense, but accepting an advantage as an agent dealt with private sector bribery, hence, the dual criminality rule
embodied in the treaty of extradition has not been met.
Article 2 of the RP-Hong Kong treaty provides that surrender of the extraditee by the Requested State to the
Requesting State shall only be for an offense coming within any of the descriptions of the offenses therein listed insofar as
the offenses arc punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe
penalty according to the laws of both parties. The provision expresses the dual criminality rule. The determination of
whether or not the offense concerned complied with the dual criminality rule rests on the Philippines as the requested
party. Hence, the Philippines must carefully ascertain the exact nature ofthe offenses involved in the request, and thereby
establish that the surrender of Munoz for trial in the HKSAR will be proper. On its part, the HKSAR as the requesting party
should prove that the offense is covered by the RP-Hong Kong Treaty, and punishable in our jurisdiction (Hongkong
Special Administrative Region v. Juan Antonio Monuz, G.R. No. 207342, November 7. 2017, Bersamin, J).

Amparo Rule to address problems of extrajudicial killings, etc.

The amparo petition before the RTC did not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
disappearance, or any threats thereof. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect
government participation. This is an off-shoot of a quarrel between the parties at the airport. The Court dismissed the case
(Sps Santiago v. Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015).
The writ o I amparo, under its present procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise known as
“The Rule on the Writ of Amparo," was intended to address and, thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal
killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof:
As the Amparo Rule was Intended to address the intractable problem of ' extralegal
killings” and ’enforced disappearances/' its coverage, in its Present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof, x x x (Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo); Sps Santiago v.
Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, October 21,2015).
Section I. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
tight to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
f ^ p^ibhc official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings
j^ndenforced disappearances or threats thereof.

While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that the writ is a
remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it. the same section’s second
paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and
security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly
applicable is the statutory construction rule that “clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute (or, in this case, procedural rule] must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e„ that every part of the statute must he considered together with other parts of the statute and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Writ of habeas data; concept.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
42 |ABRC2019.Magic Areas in Political Law(consolidated)REVISED 2/EVSA/crys
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends (Vivares,
et al. v. St. Theresas College, et al.).

WRIT OF KALIKASAN

W rit o f continuing m andam us.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an
act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC's mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, which provides that
continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective
until judgment ;s fully satisfied (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA
555, Macano Dolot v. Hon. Pajc, etal., G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013, Reyes. J).

N ature o f a Writ o f Kallkasan.

A remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, private individual or entity, involving environmental damages of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (Rule 7, Sec.
1; Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555; Macano Dolot v. Hon. Paje,
ct al., G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013, Reyes, |).

Compliance w ith th e requirem ents.

Under Section I of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary
remedy: (I) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces (Mayor Tomas Osmena v.
Garganera, G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018, Tijam, |).

SLAPP In a civil suit; defined; w hen available.

A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or
the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or
assertion of environmental rights.
May be alleged as a defense in a suit. After allegation in the suit, it shall be treated as an affirmative defense which
shall be heard accordingly.
Notice the difference between the party plaintiff and party defendant. The required evidence to be adduced by the
petitioner (who initiated the suit classified as a SLAPP) in order to secure a judgment in his favor shall be by
preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, the required evidence to be adduced by the defendant (who alleges the
affirmative defense of SLAPP), shall merely be substantial evidence. Hence, m the hierarchy of evidence, the burden on the
petitioner is higher.

Good Luck to All 2019 Bar Examinees

We Are Praying for Your Success

God Bless

From; ABRC Family