Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2019 Book RecoveringOverlookedPragmatist
2019 Book RecoveringOverlookedPragmatist
Pragmatists in
Communication
Extending the Living Conversation
about Pragmatism and Rhetoric
Edited by
Robert Danisch
Recovering Overlooked Pragmatists
in Communication
Robert Danisch
Editor
Recovering
Overlooked
Pragmatists
in Communication
Extending the Living Conversation about
Pragmatism and Rhetoric
Editor
Robert Danisch
Department of Communication Arts
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, ON, Canada
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Acknowledgements
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Index 223
Notes on Contributors
ix
x Notes on Contributors
Robert Danisch
R. Danisch (*)
Department of Communication Arts, University of Waterloo,
Waterloo, ON, Canada
e-mail: rdanisch@uwaterloo.ca
rhetorical tradition. Dewey and James certainly did not see themselves
as part of the larger contest between philosophy and rhetoric. In my
view, however, I think that useful and important insights about prag-
matism are made possible by reading pragmatists into this larger, longer
debate. And, in some sense, the authors of the essays in this book also
read a broader group of pragmatist figures into the intellectual tradi-
tion of rhetoric and communication studies to help offer fresh insights
about the cash value of pragmatism. A careful look at the origins and
development of Communication Studies as an academic discipline in the
twentieth century can show how a set of pragmatist commitments helped
to breathe life into an American version of the rhetorical tradition.
In Orators and Philosophers, Kimball describes the ways in which
Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian and other ancient rhetoricians were critical
of the theoretical and abstract pursuit of truth promoted by Socrates and
Plato. On the other hand, and from a philosophical perspective, Socrates
and Plato criticized advocates of rhetoric for their ambivalence or apa-
thy toward truth and “their hand-to-mouth pragmatism” (xvii). Today’s
modern research university, according to perspectives informed by these
earlier debates, represents a triumph of the philosophers over the ora-
tors. Kimball reminds us, however, that the rhetorical perspective made
important and valuable contributions to both our broader intellectual
history and the pedagogical mission of higher education. The orators, for
example, claimed that communicating knowledge was crucial to learn-
ing and that a community of learners would need to make judgments
about what to do and how to act in uncertain circumstances. Isocrates,
Cicero and Quintilian all taught their students the language arts in order
to produce wise, public citizens capable of eloquent and persuasive com-
munication and good decision-making. Beyond commitments to com-
munication and community, the classical rhetorical tradition believed
persuasion was integral to the cultivation of moral character and vir-
tue, and this belief led to the formation of the first version of the lib-
eral arts tradition with the goal of training good citizens to lead society.
Rhetorical education, from this perspective, produced an active citizen,
who was a virtuous, universally competent, and capable orator with the
ability to address any topic and assume any position of leadership in the
state. One main difference between this classical version of the rhetori-
cal tradition and the pragmatist commitments outlined above is the role
of oratory (or, put more simply, the kind of communicative competence
being taught). Classical Athens and Republican Rome required oratory
1 ON THE USES AND ON-GOING RELEVANCE OF PRAGMATISM … 13
philosophy. Moreover, his work also shows the importance of such privi-
leging for building an effective democracy.
Unlike Isocrates’ school, the primary function of the modern research
university is to produce new knowledge. Science and Engineering pro-
grams tend to be the privileged producers of new knowledge in higher
education (and are often described in the most attractive terms to poten-
tial students) while communication skills are thought of as “soft skills,”
capable of helping with the transmission of new knowledge produced
by scientists and engineers. Unfortunately, the humanities and social
sciences have followed the commitment to knowledge production pro-
moted by the sciences and engineering. Within such a model of higher
education, research is the privileged activity of academics in all fields,
and philosophy occupies a privileged place in the hierarchy of humani-
ties disciplines because of its ability to offer epistemological accounts of
all of this new knowledge. These may be some fairly broad statements,
but I think it is fair to argue that the modern research university is more
committed to knowledge-making than to cultivating wisdom or prac-
tical judgment in students. The mission statements of almost all North
American universities suggest a civic purpose but rarely does the curricu-
lum deliver on that promise. The professionalization of higher education
has coincided with this greater attention on knowledge and research, and
has, in some ways, cut the university off from the civic responsibilities of
leadership within our democratic culture. The “ivory tower” as an apt
descriptor of the modern university nicely summarizes and shows the
gap between the practical judgment required to lead a community and
the abstract, systematic search for knowledge characteristic of systems
of education that stretch back to Plato’s Academy. My argument here is
that a central component of both the pragmatist tradition and the rhe-
torical tradition is a commitment to fostering practical judgment and not
just transferring bodies of knowledge.
William Keith (2007) recounts the origins of Speech Communication
programs in the twentieth century, and in so doing shows that the tradi-
tion of rhetorical education has persisted alongside the successes of sci-
ence and engineering programs. Speech Communication Departments
(which later became Communication Departments) grew out of English
Studies at the beginning of the twentieth century. The split between
English and Communication was mostly a result of a dissatisfaction with
teaching rhetoric as just a matter of composition and taste. From Keith’s
perspective, the central question that Speech Communication programs
1 ON THE USES AND ON-GOING RELEVANCE OF PRAGMATISM … 15
Before engaging with the diverse set of figures in this book, I think
we ought to first assess the continued and broad-ranging relevance of
first-generation pragmatism. In my view, the earliest versions pragmatism
gave us two important insights: First, Dewey, James, and others gave us
a series of interesting answers to philosophical questions that foreground
the role of social interaction, plurality, contingency, community, and
practical action. Second, they also gave us an argument for building and
improving a democratic culture. These two insights and commitments
are related and they recommend the development of both philosophical
1 ON THE USES AND ON-GOING RELEVANCE OF PRAGMATISM … 17
References
Bacon, Michael. 2012. Pragmatism: An Introduction. Boston: Polity Press.
Brandom, Robert. 1998. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and
Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Danisch, Robert. 2015. Building a Social Democracy: The Promise of Rhetorical
Pragmatism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
22 R. DANISCH
Peter Simonson
P. Simonson (*)
University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA
e-mail: peter.simonson@colorado.edu
There are several reasons for this neglect. One is the relative inattention
to the generation of pragmatist-infused thought between the 1940s and
1970s, McKeon’s prime years. Even among those invested in reclaim-
ing that era, it’s rare to mention McKeon.1 Part of this is due to an unu-
sual and difficult prose style that wards off casual readers. Adding to the
problem is McKeon’s vast corpus of more than 150 essays and a handful
of books, with no single definitive statement to read and teach. His prose
in turn reflects a unique philosophical style that doesn’t easily fit the usual
categories of thought (see Garver 1984). Because he edited two critical
volumes of Aristotle’s writings and consistently drew upon Aristotle, he’s
often been misidentified as an “Aristotelian.”2 Douglas Mitchell insightfully
calls McKeon’s philosophy “Pragmatism in a new key” (2016, 243), a truth
partially cashed out in handful of illuminating studies (Depew 2000, 2010;
Buchanan 2000; Garver 2000; Gross 2008; Danisch 2015; Baranowski
2016). Yet, as I’ll elaborate below, McKeon’s was a complex articulation
of pragmatism. As such, it has largely fallen outside the ken of the con-
temporary pragmatists who charted histories and usable pasts. As David
Depew (2010), Richard Buchanan, and most extensively Robert Danisch
have begun to show, McKeon’s was a pragmatist-inflected rhetorical philos-
ophy animated by a view of culture and intellectual life as communicative
phenomena. Based on my reading of the full corpus of McKeon’s extensive
writings on rhetoric and communication, I’ll sketch the history and con-
temporary significance of his brand of forgotten pragmatism.
Little writing on McKeon provides a historical account of the devel-
opment of his work, which I believe has contributed to misunder-
standings and neglect.3 I try to remedy that lack by telling a mostly
1 Many philosophers try to reclaim mid-century pragmatism, but none makes even passing
mention of McKeon. The key book-length exception comes from a rhetorician, Danisch
(2015).
2 Although McKeon was strongly influenced by Aristotle, he repeatedly claimed that he was
“no Aristotelian,” but “viewed himself primarily as an American philosopher, in the tradition
of the pragmatists. His devotion to pluralism was thoroughgoing. Politically, he was a World
Federalist” (Editors’ Preface to McKeon 1986, 577; see also Buchanan 2000, 141, 153–158).
3 For good overall introductions to McKeon’s work, see the Introductions by
Ruttenberg and by Zahava McKeon in the University of Chicago Press collections of his
essays (McKeon 1990, 2005). The only book-length monograph is the important study
by Plochmann (1990). Buchanan and Garver (2000) has number of penetrating essays,
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 25
chronological tale across five sections of this essay. In the first, I provide a
brief introduction to McKeon’s life and work for readers unfamiliar with
him. Second, I turn to the questions of what it means to be part of the
pragmatist tradition and how McKeon fits into it. I adopt a rhetorical
framework for addressing those questions. Focusing on his writings from
the 1920s to the 1940s (a period when discovered and began reinvent-
ing rhetoric), I show how he mediated elements of Deweyan pragmatism
and its central topoi of analysis. In the third section, I sketch McKeon’s
postwar embrace of the concepts of communication and culture—the first
a central Deweyan topos, the second partially submerged. Next, I show
how mid-century pragmatism took form in McKeon’s historical seman-
tics and metaphilosophy, before turning to his mature communication
and rhetorical theories of the 1960s and ’70s, when the new key of his
pragmatism came into a different pitch. I conclude with thoughts on
McKeon’s relevance today.
including several touching upon McKeon’s rhetorical thought. For helpful discussions
of his writings on rhetoric, see Backman (in McKeon 1987, vii–xxxii), Depew (2010),
Goodnight (2014), Hauser and Cushman (1973), and Wess (2015).
4 The main autobiographical sources are McKeon (1952 [1987], 1953 [1990], 1970
5 For discussions of McKeon and Burke together, see Baranowski (2016) and Wess
(2008, 2015).
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 27
pursuit are determined in part by the problems of the times and in part
by the knowledge available” (1949 [2005], 235).6
McKeon’s deanship ended as he was becoming deeply involved with
UNESCO, the cultural and scientific arm of the newly formed United
Nations. During the war, he had directed the Army Specialized Training
Program’s Area and Language Studies unit at the University of Chicago.
Beyond its geopolitical functions, the project accelerated an educational
trend toward investigating “the interrelations of cultures and the broad-
ening of interest beyond the limits of the traditions of Western European
and American culture” (McKeon 1953 [1990], 25). This experience
provided an entry point into McKeon’s participation in UNESCO,
which he conceived as “the first attempt to create a public institution in
which ideas are the acknowledged instruments for the achievement of
such political purposes as ‘the intellectual and moral solidarity of man-
kind’” (1948, 574). UNESCO was also a politically crucial example of
“knowledge embodied in organization and required for common action”
and issuing in material “structures of relations,” not merely applications
of some theory (1952, 298, 299). He served as a member of the US
delegation to the first three General Conferences (Paris 1946, Mexico
City 1947, Beirut 1948) and American Counselor for UNESCO in the
U.S. Embassy in Paris (1947). From those positions, he would go on
to take a major role in committees that investigated the place of philos-
ophy and the humanities in UNESCO and the philosophic basis for the
UN’s historic International Declaration of Human Rights (see Doxtader
2010).
The Human Rights Committee opened an important line of inquiry
into key political and philosophical concepts. It reflected McKeon’s plu-
ralistic, historically inflected pragmatism and served as a bridge to the
metaphilosophical semantics projects he would develop over the next
6 As an educator, McKeon left his mark on, among others, the philosopher Richard
Rorty, philosopher-novelist Robert Persig (whose figure of the professor in Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance was inspired by McKeon), writer-filmmaker Susan Sontag,
wide-ranging intellectual Paul Goodman, poet-literary critic Elder Olson, sociologist
Donald Levine, anthropologist Paul Rabinow, University of Chicago editor Douglas
Mitchell, and a group of rhetoricians and rhetorically attuned philosophers and critics
that included Wayne Booth, Eugene Garver, Richard Buchanan, Thomas Farrell, Thomas
Conley, Walter Watson, and indirectly David Depew—a list whose near absence of women
should remind us of the gendered conditions of intellectual production of McKeon’s career
and the lines of (often ambivalent) male relations that ran through it.
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 29
two decades. The concept of human rights—and related ideas like liberty
and democracy—had disparate meanings and ambiguities across history
and cultures. The philosophic problem at hand, however, was “not to
achieve doctrinal consensus but rather to achieve agreement concerning
rights, and also action in the realization and defense of rights, which may
be justified on highly diverse doctrinal grounds” (UNESCO 1947, 4–5).
This sensibility informed subsequent UNESCO-sponsored inquiries into
the varied cultural meanings and histories of key concepts of the modern
political world (including freedom, democracy, right, dialectic, state, force,
society, institution, justice, common good, and class). The unrealized hope
was to produce a 150-entry International Dictionary of Fundamental
Terms of Philosophy and Political Thought. Several cross-cultural inves-
tigations did however come to fruition.7 McKeon saw them not as exer-
cises in history or philosophy but rather investigations of what those
concepts “significantly and operatively mean to people who seek free-
dom, rights, and justice” (1965, 158–159). They were efforts to exca-
vate “a plurality of meanings which had been, and might again be made,
an effective force in action and in formation of policy” (1975, 110).
Across his UNESCO work, we can hear elements of a liberal democratic
pragmatism attuned to ideas as embedded in cultures, institutions, and
practices; and a rhetorical sensibility attendant to the significance of lan-
guage in use.
7 Most notably in the 1948 UNESCO-edited symposium Human Rights: Comments and
Interpretations and the 1951 McKeon-edited Democracy in a World of Tensions. The con-
cepts of responsibility, justice, and society were treated in issues of the Revue Internationale
de Philosophie Volumes 39 (1957), 41 (1957) and 55 (1961) respectively.
30 P. SIMONSON
8 The sense of truth being one but given many expressions would also be a lesson the
9 While still Dewey’s colleague at Columbia, McKeon (1933) obliquely critiqued his for-
mer teacher’s approach to the history of thought. Comparing Dewey’s treatment of medi-
eval philosophy to Hegel’s, McKeon observed, “Philosophers…are untrustworthy guides
to the historic lineaments and thoughts of the ages and the men whom, for the purposes
of…philosophy, they attempt to describe or controvert” (433). He concluded that “[t]he
impractical, supernatural, medieval thinker of recent construction is explained less by the
social and economic organizations…of his times, than by the philosophic convictions of our
own times” (436).
34 P. SIMONSON
what the contemporary observer did see when he looked about him,”
he wrote (1929, 220). Observation and facts are dependent upon “the
system of thought to which they are proper,” so that facts of one time
period are not facts of another; in the Middle Ages the things of the
world were observed and explained through analogical interpretation,
with “the marks of truth…scattered throughout nature and literature”
(219, 221).
In abbreviated form, McKeon was pointing toward paradigms of
knowing and advancing pragmatism by arguing that all thinking occurs
through particular conceptual frames (Depew 2000, 32f.). As he wrote
four years later, again in unstated dialogue with pragmatism, “what con-
stitutes the practical has not been a fixed concept,” an insight he later
developed by parsing out four different philosophical accounts of the
practical, charting its “rhetorical transformation” through Isocrates and
Cicero with asides to John Stuart Mill and William James (1944, 242).
McKeon’s conceptual pluralism in turn fed a more complex kind of his-
toricism than Dewey’s. Like Dewey, he saw philosophy as a reflection of
its cultural moment. Unlike Dewey, he maintained a distance between
theory and practice, and philosophy was both tied to its moment and
part of a transhistorical conversation whose fundamental terms took dif-
ferent meanings over time.
Building out from his knowledge of ancient and medieval thought,
and perhaps drawing upon conversations he was having with Burke,
McKeon began writing about rhetoric while living in New York in the
early 1930s.10 He brought his conceptual pluralism to bear on a grand
interpretive framework for the history of Western thought based on the
arts of the trivium. “Medieval philosophers learned from the ancients…
that philosophic attitudes are determined by the distinctions laid in the
study of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic,” he wrote (1933, 433–434).
Two years later, that kernel of insight had grown into a fuller-blown
schema he characterized as the “first stage of [an] inquiry into the nature
of history, or of verbal expression in general” (1935, 49, 108). Rejecting
10 Wess (2015) dates McKeon’s turn to rhetoric to mid-century, but my reading of his
corpus shows rhetoric to be a topic of interest from the 1920s forward, albeit one that
accelerates in the 1950s and ’60s.
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 35
The word “does not signify a problem newly discovered in our times, but
a fashion of thinking and a method of analyzing which we apply in the
statement of all fundamental problems,” McKeon wrote (1957 [1990],
89). Adopting that fashion, McKeon retroactively characterized elements
of Aristotle’s philosophy of language and Cicero’s rhetorical theory in
terms of “communication” (McKeon 1947, 1950b). In Deweyan natu-
ralism, communication was a universal human activity. McKeon agreed,
but also recognized it as a historically specific way of seeing the world
that marked certain epochs, including the twentieth century.
By his summative “Communication, Truth, and Society” (1957
[1990]), communication had become an architectonic concept in
McKeon’s pragmatist pluralism. He self-consciously embraced the intel-
lectual fashion of an age where “all problems can be stated as problems
of communication” (90). In different ways, this was also true in the
Roman Republic and Renaissance, an insight he would return to in the
long historical view he adopted for communication across cultures. In
the current era, the “invention of instruments of communication and
massive extension of their use” had both given new intellectual sali-
ence to the concept of communication and created societies that “have
themselves become systems of communication” (92). Speaking into that
moment, McKeon conceived philosophy, political practice, and policy
as forms of communication that also generated problems of communi-
cation (see also 1947, 1950c). At the same time, in a departure from
Deweyan pragmatism, McKeon made a harder separation between the
realms of theory/philosophy and policy/practice. While he cast both as
fundamentally communicative, McKeon argued that the problems raised
by theory required the reconciliation of differences among the principles
of experts, while those raised by practice could be addressed through a
common commitment to find a workable solution (1947, 80–83). One
can hear echoes of Peirce in his view of theory and of Dewey in his view
of practice.
By the 1950s, McKeon was also embracing the concept of culture and
linking it to communication. After his studies at the University of Paris
in the 1920s, he had come to see philosophical systems as “functions of
culture” (1953 [1990], 13), but before 1945 the term made only spo-
radic appearance in his writings. About that time, he begins referenc-
ing anthropologists like Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckholn, but it is
only after his immersion in UNESCO that culture becomes part of his
central vocabulary. During this period, a major source of his intellectual
38 P. SIMONSON
Semantics and Metaphilosophy
Paralleling his turns to communication and culture, McKeon developed
two metaphilosophical schemas to facilitate understanding and dialogue
across competing philosophies and the social practices they informed:
historical semantics and philosophical semantics. He situated these twin
programs within the contexts of the current era, when the “dominant
intellectual tendencies…turn discussion of basic questions to consid-
erations of action or of language” (1952 [1990], 161). Again he drew
parallels with the Renaissance and the Roman Republic, whose philo-
sophical loyalties were captured by Cicero’s dictum “words and deeds.”
McKeon’s metaphilosophy leveraged “current fashion in order to analyze
the causes of difficulties and disputes” and provide “a means of commu-
nication” across philosophical difference (ibid., 162, 181). On the one
hand, historical semantics investigated key terms across different phi-
losophies and the ways that persistent human problems took different
forms among them—a project that overlapped with his UNESCO work.
McKeon envisioned it as a framework for analyzing how the meanings
of “important words carry over from the systems of philosophers” into
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 39
the broader discourses of politics, poetry, and ordinary speech across his-
tory and cultures (163), though his own studies focused mostly on phil-
osophical thought. Philosophical semantics in turn investigated the formal
principles and rules for determining truth within particular philosophies
(McKeon 1952 [1990], 163, 179). This project reflected McKeon’s view
that the primary purpose of philosophy is the discovery and demonstra-
tion of truth; but he recognized that “‘truth’ is differently conceived
according to the principles of different philosophies,” and philosophi-
cal methods are constructed to form and justify doctrines derived from
those competing principles (1956 [1990], 122). Philosophical semantics
was a metaphilosophical framework for advancing what Walter Watson
calls McKeon’s “agonistic pluralism that develops tensions and opposi-
tions in order to test positions by their consequences” (1994, 23). In
different ways, both historical and philosophical semantics advanced the
pragmatist project, and both were informed by rhetorical and commu-
nicative sensibilities.11
While the project in philosophical semantics grew into an elaborate
system that, in my view, is mostly of interest to harder-core McKeonites,
historical semantics is accessible, useful, and relevant to the purposes
of my essay. Robert Wess calls it “the best place to begin a study of
McKeon” (2015, 56). I’ll speak into two of its dimensions. The first per-
tains to what Wess calls McKeon’s “quartet” of commonplaces: things,
thoughts, actions, words. Playing different roles, these commonplaces
recur across McKeon’s work (see Watson 2000, 16, 234). To my point
here, they provide a means for characterizing the dominant philosophical
positions of cultures and historical eras as well as the grounding princi-
ples for particular theories and disciplines. When things are fundamen-
tal, realities independent of human thought, language, and purpose are
foundational. This is the way of metaphysics, objectivist science, and—in
our own day—new materialisms. When thoughts are fundamental, struc-
tures of the mind and knowing are foundational. This is the way of epis-
temology and Idealism. When actions are fundamental, human purposes,
practices, and actually experienced realities are foundational. This is the
way of politics, Ciceronian civic republicanism, Deweyan pragmatism,
and certain forms of Marxism. When words or signs are fundamental,
11 For a good account of McKeon’s historical semantics, see Harvanek (1956). For his
philosophical semantics, see Zahava McKeon (1990, xvii–xxv; 1998, 5–15), Plochmann
(1990, Chapter 4), Watson (1994), and Depew (2000, 38–44).
40 P. SIMONSON
“aesthetic pragmatism” that challenged Dewey’s linkage of science and democracy, emphasized
the power of words to construct realities, and interjected a corrective based on art instead of
science. This underplays McKeon’s allegiance to a Dewey-inspired problematic method and
the plural forms of inquiry it required.
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 43
Concluding Thoughts
McKeon’s work illuminates lines of pragmatism’s development, shows its
entanglements with ideas of rhetoric and communication, and provides
resources to think with today. I’ve shown that while McKeon may have
resisted explicit identification as a “pragmatist,” he made use of central
topoi and problematics of Deweyan pragmatism and advanced its lines
of thinking. Though the historiography of pragmatism has mostly been
silent about him, McKeon occupies a key position between Dewey and
Rorty, which his own schema of methods helps us chart. Dewey sat
squarely within a problem-focused method grounded in experience and
open to science. Rorty wrote a dissertation indebted to McKeon and
early essays on metaphilosophy, but his later neopragmatism represented
an operational/rhetorical method grounded in language and culture and
opening toward poetics. As I argued above, McKeon embraced elements
of both methods and in a way sits between Deweyan modernism and
Rortyean postmodernism. Dewey’s experience morphs into McKeon’s
culture, which Rorty turns toward language. History is central to phi-
losophy for all three but takes different forms: Dewey’s evolutionary
46 P. SIMONSON
13 Thanks to Chris Voparil and Robert Danisch for helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this essay.
2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 47
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2 RICHARD MCKEON IN THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION 51
Rya Butterfield
1 For consistency within the text, words written in the Wade-Giles Romanization system
in direct quotes have been changed to the contemporary pinyin Romanization system.
Likewise, Hu Shi’s name is written according to pinyin in the text. The older variation, Hu
Shih, is used in citations if the source was originally written using Wade-Giles.
R. Butterfield (*)
Department of Mass Communication, Nicholls State University,
Thibodaux, LA, USA
e-mail: rya.butterfield@nicholls.edu
that adhered to the principles of liberal reform sprung up around the nation,
he applauded the students’ efforts. He said that the events of 1919 had
imparted a “new lesson,” that activities like these could be “democratizing
forces,” “new channels of activity…to rebuild a new foundation for Chinese
democracy” (Hu 1919, 113–114). Later, “Hu described the May Fourth
movement as ‘a most unwelcome interruption’ of the work initiated in 1917
and 1918, a blow from which the New Culture movement never fully recov-
ered” (Grieder 1999, 176–177). He saw that nonpolitical forces, even when
they seem to arise from new intellectual awareness, can, and were, employed
for antagonistic political ends that undermine lasting reform.
To help China along the path of Renaissance, Hu developed a two-
pronged plan for rhetorical pragmatic reform specifically focused on
developing democratic thought and democratic communication. These
developments were intended to “improve [the] lived experience” of
Chinese people, which puts Hu in step with the ambitions of “rhetor-
ical pragmatism” (Danisch 2015, xvi). The first arm of the reform, the
Literary Revolution, focused on the adoption of the vernacular lan-
guage for new intellectual and literary creation and translation of exist-
ing works. The Literary Revolution was intended to develop a shared
logical consciousness among the people and allow for consolidation of
rapid, and sometimes drastic, social changes into a stable cultural whole.
See my essay on Hu Shi’s Literary Revolution in China Media Research
for a more detailed account of that part of the reform. The present
chapter focuses on the second arm of Hu’s leadership, the intellectual
project undertaken in his Ph.D. dissertation, “The Development of
Logical Method in Ancient China.”
Written under the advisement of John Dewey, the dissertation was
itself an exercise in pragmatic judgment. It employed a theory of crit-
ical sophistic logic to evaluate China’s ancient intellectual traditions of
humanism and rationalism. Hu holds that reclamation of the progres-
sive aspects of these traditions is the most necessary step for China’s
transition into the modern world. The latter part of this essay evaluates
three intellectual traditions, the Daojia, Rujia,2 and Mojia, that Hu
Chinese. The term for Confucian teachings and practices is “Ru.” As Xinzhong Yao (2000)
explains, “Confucius,” named Kongzi in Chinese, “was recognized as the symbol of the
Ru” (p. 27). The term “Rujia” refers to “the school or tradition of literati or scholars who
have committed themselves to the tradition of the Ru” (Yao 2000, 27).
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 57
3 Hu says the faith “never had a generic name.” Elsewhere he calls it Siniticism
the rhetorical practices his reforms aimed at. In a word, they were to
function by enabling new means of making power.
Here, considering the means by which a citizen can claim rhetorical
power in a social democracy, is one place where Hu’s focus overlaps
with that of Hugh Dalziel Duncan. Duncan pointed to the differences
between the rhetorical practices that enable authoritarianism and those
that enable democracy. Democracy, he argued, demands conditions
that “[value] disagreement, debate, and discussion (classic pragmatist
preoccupations)” (Danisch 2015, 163). There are also comparisons to be
drawn between Hu’s focus on literature and poetry and Duncan’s focus
on art in its comic form. For Duncan, studies of comic art could “explain
how communication between equals fosters social integration” (Danisch
2015, 169–170). Hu’s approach to creations in the vernacular language
were aimed at social equality and integration.
The authority traditionally attributed to the scholarly ruling class
needed to be recognized as a faulty means-selection. Hu’s Literary
Revolution was intended to carry out something that had already begun
in Chinese society akin to the sophistical movement in ancient Greece—“a
fundamental shift in how power was distributed and formed” (Crick
2015, 67). Hu wanted to upend the structure and means of making
power. It should be clarified that his predicament was less in a dis-
tant space between the traditional and modern and more in a transition
between the two. So, unlike Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, whom
Arendt (2006) refers to in her 1954 work Between Past and Future, as
“nineteenth-century rebels against tradition,” who “tried desperately to
think against the tradition while using its own conceptual tools,” Hu tried
to show that there was, in fact, consistency between Chinese tradition and
what he hoped to see develop as modern Chinese thought (pp. 24, 26).
An important consequence of this was that a “conscious” political reform
could be enough. Hu explains this concept of consciousness here:
We are not willing to be led by the nose by a set of blind leaders. At this
time we must open our eyes and look ahead to the different roads which
branch before us, and see which road takes us to which place, see for
ourselves which road we may, indeed must, travel. Of course we cannot
guarantee that our observation and judgment will be free of error, but we
have a deep belief that a conscious search for the road is far better than
allowing ourselves to be led blindly. We also hope that by public discussion
the search will result in enabling us to find a truer and rounder route.
(Hu 1930, 934)
62 R. BUTTERFIELD
recognize that some of Dewey’s works that most directly point toward
the rhetorical turn, and that would have most influenced McKeon, were
written after Dewey’s time in China under the guidance of Hu (123).
Nonetheless, Addams, McKeon, and Hu are consistent in their attention
to social pluralism. As Danisch (2015) writes, “The pragmatist emphasis
on associated living and the need for identification between plural people
operates at McKeon’s intellectual center of gravity just as it operated for
someone like Jane Addams” (138). However, “McKeon did not leave us
a handbook by which we could practice this new rhetoric in a social and
political context” (Danisch 2015, 138). Hu, on the other hand, was try-
ing to provide that kind of practical guidance. Similarly, like Addams in
Hull House, Hu was trying to “inhabit” the right rhetorical structures
and tried to set an example of how one ought to communicate within
such structures so as to “promote positive social and political change”
(Danisch 2015, 257). As a result, Hu likely suffered a similar fate as
Addams, which was likely compounded by the fact that he undertook
reform far away in China. Of the former point Danisch (2015) explains,
“I believe Addams is largely left out of the history of pragmatism because
she functions more as a rhetorical leader and less as a philosopher”
(257). Hu was always very active as a leader in the reform and was likely
overlooked in much the same way.
The firm divide between the two strata of society kept the intellec-
tual-elite, who might have otherwise given the people the tools they
needed to effectively confront modern challenges, too separate from
the experiences of the common people to fully understand their diffi-
culties or the living philosophy that guided them. Likewise, the future
was uncertain for the elite class following the abolition of the civil ser-
vice examination system. As Wang Ke-wen writes, “with the collapse
of its institutional basis in 1905, the gentry ceased to be an active
class. Its various social and political roles were gradually assumed by
landlords, bureaucrats, merchants, or local bullies, in the twentieth
century” (Ke-wen 1998, 67). The absence of the examination system
left a hole in Chinese society, which created panic among young peo-
ple who now saw no clear means of social or political advancement.
Hu, however, sought to temporarily preserve this new separation
from politics. He asked intellectuals to abstain from dealing with the
established political system, to instead help develop a cultural ground-
work capable of giving rise to an alternative responsible system of
government.
64 R. BUTTERFIELD
A pragmatic attitude toward ideas is one that sees ideas as tools for
confronting social problems (Danisch 2007, 4). Danisch (2007) writes,
“by believing that ideas are useful and adaptable social tools, the pragma-
tists implicitly rejected dogma, moral certainty, and the quest for abso-
lute truth” (4). Also, consistent with Hu’s perspective on reform is the
emphasis Dewey places on conscious decision making. Since “political
facts are not outside human desire and judgment” (Dewey 1954, 6), one
must purposefully choose “between blind, unreasoned attack and defense
on the one hand and discriminating criticism employing intelligent
method and a conscious criterion on the other” (Dewey 1954, 6–7).
However, it is beyond clear that Hu’s assessment of China’s need and
evaluation of China’s intellectual history were guided by this “attitude
toward ideas.” He recognized the adaptability of Rujia thought, which
accounted for its centuries long staying power, and in turn, recognized
how Rujia lost its adaptability once entrenched in intellectual institu-
tions used to preserve political power. The progressive qualities of Rujia
were stifled and the regressive qualities encouraged. Likewise, the propa-
gandized revolutionary zeal of young twentieth-century intellectuals was
no less dogmatic. In step with the way Dewey conceived of democracy as
a “social idea, a way of life” (Danisch 2015, 204), Hu regarded democ-
racy less as a concrete system of political institutions than a state of mind
conducive to the maintenance of a particular social condition. It followed
that the creation of a democratic society would be essentially an intellec-
tual, rather than a political, accomplishment (Grieder 1999, 178).
Hu wanted to create the cultural space for “genuine politics.”
“Genuine politics comes into being” Crick (2015) writes, “when the
resources of logos can be harnessed by ordinary citizens to challenge,
invert, and transform…[the] established hierarchies” that held “strength
and morality…[as] synonymous” (p. 73). Hu wanted to shift author-
ity from an idea’s origin or professed moral aptitude, where it had been
attributed by Rujia, to its performance in an intellectual space con-
structed in the spirit of scientific inquiry. Traditional domestic ideas and
modern foreign ideas should be judged on equal footing according to
their practical merit within a particular situation of need.
Hu saw the lack of a scientific spirit as the chief obstacle to develop-
ing a pragmatic “attitude toward ideas” and enabling “genuine politics.”
Like Dewey, Hu understood the process of critical inquiry as fundamental
to democratic culture. Danisch explains, “at the core of Dewey’s commit-
ment to inquiry as a vital matter for the organization of community life lie
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 65
The Republic has failed, not because modern China has failed—there has
never been a modern China—but because in all these processes the changes
have been superficial and have hardly touched the fundamental issues of
political transformation. There has been practically no modern leadership,
practically no genuine admission of our real weaknesses, no recognition of
the spiritual possibilities of the new [civilization]. (Hu 1926, 269)
4 The English name “Confucius” is replaced with the Chinese “Kongzi” in brackets.
66 R. BUTTERFIELD
This spirit of doubt has always manifested itself in every age in a critical
examination of our own civilization and its ideas and institutions. Such
self-critical examination of one’s own civilization is the prerequisite with-
out which no ‘profound and sweeping’ cultural changes are ever possible
in any country with an old civilization. (Hu 1963, 299)
The strict social system of the Zhou dynasty held society stable for cen-
turies. “The Emperor, or ‘Son of Heaven,’” Hu explains, “was not only
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 67
the temporal but also the spiritual head of the empire, ruling in the name
of Heaven to which he alone was privileged to sacrifice” (Hu 1922, 9).
The emperor was lord atop a feudal pyramid. Every tier of the pyramid
was governed by strict rules and duties. With a benevolent emperor,
the system had kept society stable but after the Zhou dynasty, when led
by weak and wicked leaders, the entire system turned weak and wicked
in turn. While poets like the one quoted above continued to appeal
to the righteousness of the old order, other poets believed they were
experiencing the disdain of Heaven itself. Hu mentions one such poet
“who…in bitter distress and despair,” acquiesced that his fate must be
the unfortunate “decree of Providence” (Hu 1922, 13).
Three great leaders, [Laozi], [Kongzi], and [Mozi], arose within the
brief space of less than two hundred years (about 570-420 BC) and laid
the foundation of Chinese philosophy for all the centuries to come. All
of the three can only be best understood in their respective relation to
the tottering Sinitic religion and to the critical and skeptical atmosphere
of their times. Broadly speaking, [Laozi] stood at the extreme Left in
the attitude towards the old religion; [Kongzi] occupied the center with
strong leanings towards the Left; and [Mozi], founder of the Mo Sect,
68 R. BUTTERFIELD
Laozi
Laozi was a critic, a doubter, and a rebel; Hu Shi calls him “the
Protagoras of ancient China” (Hu 1922, 16). As an individual figure,
Hu saw Laozi as beneficial to the advancement of logic in ancient China
because he was a bold critic of the established social order. In response
to the poet who asked if God hates anyone, Laozi likely would have
responded that God neither hates nor loves nor cares at all. Heaven, for
Laozi, was indifferent.
Laozi was a “Sophist” Hu says, because his philosophy was fueled
by skepticism and creative doubt (Hu 1922, 14). He juxtaposed the
warped and malfunctioning imperial order of his time with life earlier,
during the time of the old Sinitic faith, before detailed rules and regula-
tions bound the common people to their maltreated lot. The old Sinitic
religion considered only what was relevant in daily experience. The peo-
ple lived on the land and experienced the cruelty of the elements as if
they were part of the land. In the world Laozi knew, this sentiment had
much more fidelity than the conception of a benevolent Son of Heaven.
“Nature,” he says, “is not benevolent: it treats all beings as if they were
mere grass and dogs” (Hu 1922, 17). He thought the existing politi-
cal and social hierarchy was “foolishly civilized and refined and artificial”
(Hu 1922, 16). Worse, not only was the social organization contrived,
but it had also become dangerous to those who partook in its foolish-
ness. Hu explains this with Laozi’s “Master Executioner” analogy for
“nature”:
Nature will steamroll anyone who stands in the way of its inevitable path.
Thus, Laozi maintained that people should live in a state of noninterfer-
ence and nonresistance.
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 69
Kongzi
Kongzi was not a common kind of philosopher, “he was concerned with
drawing up a set of rules for human conduct… [not] the elaboration of
theories” (Hu 1995, 431). This aspect of Rujia helped the philosophy
develop into bureaucratic form. Kongzi was more tempered in his criticism
than Laozi. “His philosophy was a compromise” between the naturalistic
influence of the sixth-century and the cautious attitude toward traditional
values he maintained as a statesman (Hu 1995, 431). “Whereas [Laozi’s]
naturalism was radically nihilistic,” Rujia can be called a philosophy of
moderation (Hu 1995, 431). It favored consistency, and thus, promoted a
highly stable bureaucracy as a structure of authority. The authority’s legit-
imacy came from a literary tradition revolving around universal original
ideas recorded by sages of antiquity. Due to the reverence, Kongzi attrib-
uted to the history and institutions of the literary tradition, he was called
the “father of Chinese history” (Hu 1995, 431).
The most important rhetorical resource of Rujia thought came from
the important role played by doubt. Hu (1919) writes, “doubt is rarely
purely negative. It leads to inquiries which in most cases lead in turn
to positive reconstructions” (116). The positive kind of doubt is exem-
plified by the “skepticism” that is part of the “‘Socratic Tradition’ of
[Rujia]—the tradition of free discussion, criticism, and intellectual hon-
esty” (Hu 1959, 29). Rujia skepticism asserted “the right to doubt,”
Hu (1963) writes “even in matters traditionally regarded as sacred or
sacrosanct” (296). Kongzi said that some things, like death, fall out-
side of our ability to know and we should not claim to know about
those topics. He kept social focus on the secular world and prevented
formation of metaphysical beliefs, such as belief in an afterlife. This
wholly secular focus worked to further simplify the old Sinitic religion
that already had little mythology or ritual but maintained practices like
burial and ancestor worship.
70 R. BUTTERFIELD
the sages, scholarship in the classics became the gateway to social power.
Second, since instruments, customs, and institutions were developed as
social representations, or implementations, of these names, the historical
record of these developments became an extremely important tool for
social reform and intellectual reorganization. The arts of writing became
inextricably linked with the arts of ruling. Hu saw this structure of intel-
lectual authority as a major constraint to reform.
It has been justly said that the greatest obstacle to progress in China is
the deductive habit of mind; that is, the willingness to accept things on
authority, to acquiesce in ideas and ideals without questioning whence they
are derived and whether they are true or not. A quotation from the classics
is sufficient argument for national policy, and a serious saying of [Kongzi]
is good enough to justify the existence of any obsolete custom or institu-
tion. This habit is the most formidable enemy to innovation and progress.
(Hu 1919, 116)
class” (Hu 1995, 440). It was one of the first places where the roles of
priests, scientists, and philosophers clearly merged. They read the ora-
cles and interpreted them as guides for moral behavior. They looked into
the skies and made the calendar. They recorded their findings and main-
tained their class hierarchy (Hu 1995, 441). On the one hand, Rujia
class organization led to the bureaucratic tendency of thought that later
became an impediment, but the intellectual organization it represented
accounted for a constructive aspect of the Rujia philosophy.
Even though Rujia introduced constructivist elements into Chinese
intellectualism, it had a similar shortcoming as Daojia in that its final
aim made it essentially a passive philosophy. They both wanted an end
to the disorder that plagued society. Likewise, both tried to determine
a method of limiting the kinds of disruption that antagonized the dis-
order. Kongzi maintained that “all change…arises from motion, which
is produced by the pushing of that which is active against that which is
passive” (Hu 1922, 26). Thus, for Kongzi, to be “passive” is to remain
simple and close to the original ideas. The “passive” is natural, good, and
difficult. The “active” is the unnatural, bad, and easy. All other major
elements of Rujia thought must be considered in this context. Rujia
gave society access to the original ideas that all things should closely
adhere to. Further, since Rujia determinism maintained that “wealth
and honors are in the hands of Providence” (Hu 1922, 40) and since
Rujia skepticism prevented belief in an afterlife, all of man’s energy
should be focused on the one thing over which he has any control—
keeping man’s institutions aligned with their ideal purpose.
Mozi
The promise of Mojia is in the critical tendencies of thought and argu-
mentative traditions it developed. This promise is countered, however,
by its philosophical and religious encouragement of conformity. Hu
credits Mozi with the beginning of logic in China, writing, “As John
Dewey has long ago pointed out, logic always arose as an instrument
for the defense of a faith that was in danger of being overthrown” (Hu
1995, 448). The polemic machinery of Mojia was engineered to counter
the protests of atheist rebels and agnostic reformers with a united reli-
gion of altruism. Mozi “openly condemned the [Rujia] as ‘atheists’ who
denied the existence of gods and ghosts and yet ceremoniously practiced
all the rites of ancestral worship” (Hu 1995, 446–447)! He said it was
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 73
useless to practice the rituals premised on belief in the gods, but at the
same time, deny the gods. “That is as meaningless as throwing a fishing
net where you are sure to find no fish” (Hu 1995, 447)! It was with
the intention to defend his theism against the atheists and agnostics that
Mozi “invented the logic of three-fold argument,” which maintained the
importance of history and the sages of antiquity, but which also devel-
oped the importance of practicality. In short, the most pragmatic of the
leaders in the foundational Chinese philosophies, Mozi, was also the
most conservative. For him, there was nothing inherently impractical
about theism. Theism became impractical when theistic practices were
maintained in the absence of belief; at that point, how could the prac-
tices serve any utility at all?
Mozi was a great religious leader and reformer born around 10 years
after the death of Kongzi (Hu 1922, 39–40).5 Hu likes Mozi as a char-
acter; he explains him as the type of public intellectual who was strong
enough, and could endure enough, to advance a different kind of think-
ing. In particular, Mozi aimed at reducing doubt.
[Mozi] doubted the doubters, and wanted to restore faith and belief in the
traditional religion of the people—the religion of God’s Spirit. He believed
that all evil came from doubt, from freedom of thought and belief, espe-
cially from diversity and standards of right and wrong.
keeping the intellectual and ruling class focused on the classical literature
written by the sages rather than the practical world surrounding them.
The rulers would continue to be drawn into the literature until they
became very distant from society and its problems.
Now a blind man may say, ‘That which shines with brilliancy is white, and
that which is like soot is black.’ Even those who can see cannot reject these
definitions. But if you place both white and black things before the blind
man and ask him to choose the one from the other, then he fails. Therefore
I say, ‘A blind man knows not white from black, not because he cannot
name them, but because he cannot choose them.’ (Hu 1922, 46–48)
Rujia does not consider the practical results when setting a course for the
ideal. Mojia considers the ideal, considers the practical results, and then,
sets a course. This shift is important for the consideration of practical
3 HU SHI’S SEARCH FOR THE ‘CHINESE SOPHIST’ … 75
Conclusion
Hu’s intellectual project was an exercise in rhetorical pragmatic reform
that pushed against regressiveness and dogmatism and worked toward
progressiveness and critical doubt. After the Communist Revolution,
nuanced representations of Hu’s ideas and project were quieted and he
is now largely known as a Westernizer who wanted to press China into
a Western mold of development at the expense of traditional Chinese
76 R. BUTTERFIELD
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78 R. BUTTERFIELD
Scott R. Stroud
S. R. Stroud (*)
University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
e-mail: sstroud@austin.utexas.edu
This chapter will argue that Ambedkar was the leading pragmatist in
the Indian context, given both his emphasis on a deep sense of democ-
racy as well as his use of Dewey’s pragmatic method of reconstruction.
In the Indian context, Ambedkar selectively appropriates ideas and texts
from Dewey and uses them in his many nuanced attempts to persuade
Indians to act justly toward his fellow untouchables. Ambedkar’s prag-
matism became a way to communicatively meld Indian tradition with
enlightenment ideas, a fact evident in his writing of the Indian constitu-
tion later in his life in English, with a preface that included the enlight-
enment ideals of equality, liberty, and fraternity. Always a pragmatist
democrat, Ambedkar strove to preserve what was useful in tradition
while throwing out what was harmful or dead. Initially, I will introduce
the context from which Ambedkar came, as well as his connection to the
pragmatist tradition represented by John Dewey. Why should we con-
sider pragmatism central to his thought, and not an amusing side episode
or influence? I will then explore this question through a detailed analy-
sis of one of his most important works: the 1936 speech—undelivered,
due to its controversial nature—titled “Annihilation of Caste.” This
speech is important for many reasons, but, most importantly, this speech
serves as Ambedkar’s longest and most sustained engagement with and
use of Dewey’s pragmatism. In examining the rhetorical techniques in
this work, we can see Ambedkar practice what can be identified as recon-
structive rhetoric, or the communicative technique of appropriating and
reconstructing past resources to meet present social problems. This
shows the deep influence of Dewey’s pragmatism at two levels: first, in
terms of the method of reconstruction, and second, in terms of the con-
ceptual resources appropriated by Ambedkar. Ambedkar’s pragmatism
is worth more attention that we traditionally give him—it serves as the
most notable appropriation of Dewey’s pragmatism in South Asia, one
that is integrally tied to a strong view of persuasion in rectifying social
injustice.
strategies (Stroud 2017a, c). From his own annotation in his personal
copy, we know that Ambedkar acquired his copy of Dewey’s Democracy
and Education in January 1917 while in London. Looking at the anno-
tations and underlining in his copy of this book, we see many passages
highlighted that bear on important Deweyan themes: experience as
educative, the idea of reconstruction in improving society from its past
states, and the relation between individual dispositions and social func-
tioning. His copy of the 1908 Ethics is also heavily marked, but it is more
difficult to determine when he acquired this copy. As I speculate else-
where (e.g., Stroud 2017c), it is most likely that he received this book
as a gift from K. A. Keluskar in the late 1920s or early 1930s. Looking
at the fifty plus pages that are marked in this book, one sees Ambedkar
the reader becoming entranced with Deweyan points that would find a
place later in Ambedkar’s mature speeches and writings. For instance,
the 1908 version of Tufts and Dewey’s Ethics places a greater emphasis
on the role of the individual in moral progress than does the later edi-
tion in 1932. Societies make moral progress when the individuals within
them move from a reliance on customary morality to what Tufts and
Dewey call a “reflective morality.” Another point that one sees Ambedkar
highlight in his copy of Ethics is the well-known Deweyan distinc-
tion between rules and principles. Ambedkar, whenever he was reading
the 1908 Ethics, saw clearly one of its most important themes: society
improves in moral quality as its members rely more and more on such
individualized habits of reflective thinking.
A second way is to examine influence as something that is evident
from the effect—the texts or works that he produced. This method
has the advantage of sorting through influences and potential lines of
influence—not everything Ambedkar heard from Dewey (or any other
teacher) “stuck.” This approach also allows some flexibility in assessing
what exactly was influencing a present text. As Meera Nanda (2003) has
demonstrated, Deweyan conceptions of science and inquiry have ready
parallels with Ambedkar’s revisioning of Buddhism as a rational faith
later in his life. This operates at a general or more probabilistic level of
influence: one thinks it more likely than not that Ambedkar’s reading
of Buddhism as rational and scientific was influenced by Dewey, but he
nowhere writes or says this is the case. This is useful, though, as it shows
a powerful way of understanding what lies behind Ambedkar’s works on
the Buddha—and why he emphasizes or changes some points of the tex-
tual record of the Buddha’s own activities (see Queen 2004; Fiske and
4 ECHOES OF PRAGMATISM IN INDIA: BHIMRAO AMBEDKAR … 85
Emmrich 2004). Keya Maitra (2012) also operates at the level of philo-
sophical convergences, arguing for the influence of Dewey’s experimen-
tal method on Ambedkar’s views on the ideal constitution for Indian
democracy.
A more specific way of assessing influence from Ambedkar’s work
would be to look for specific passages or concepts taken from Dewey’s
work. This method has the strength of clearly identifying what
parts are influenced by material within Dewey’s corpus. Mukherjee
(2009) has done an admirable job pursuing a specific version of this
textual-trace method of influence estimating, scanning Ambedkar’s 1936
“Annihilation of Caste” address for its Deweyan resonances:
not be gained for him and his millions of untouchable followers within
Hinduism. He delivered a bombshell of an address at Yeola in October
1935 that even though he was born as a Hindu, “I solemnly assure you
that I will not die a Hindu” (Ambedkar 2003, 95). This announcement
caused a stir across India, as Ambedkar was the undisputed leader of the
millions of untouchables and outcastes throughout the colony; he would
inevitably take millions out of the Hindu fold with him. Muslims, Sikhs,
Christians, and other delegations visited with him in an attempt to gain
this mass of converts. Ambedkar spent twenty years before he formally
announced that Buddhism was to be the religion of his, and his people’s,
conversion.
In 1936, Ambedkar was invited to give the Presidential Address for
the Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal of Lahore, a group of upper-caste Hindus
dedicated to erasing caste discrimination. As Keer (1990) documents,
the Mandal’s leaders eventually got wind of Ambedkar’s address—which
he had printed in advance—and demurred at his mention of destroying
the vedas, or Hindu holy books, as the only way to eradicate caste. In the
prologue to the published version of the address, Ambedkar reprinted
the letters from one official of the Mandal, Sant Ram, who worried:
“I am now very anxious to read the exposition of your new formula—‘It
is not possible to break Caste without annihilating the religious notions
on which it, the Caste system, is founded’” (Ambedkar 2003, 27). The
Mandal saw this path of eliminating the textual basis of Hinduism as too
big of a threat to the version of Hinduism they sought to preserve; it
probably also perturbed them that the month before the conference was
to be held, Ambedkar was meeting with Sikhs in Amritsar, a possible tar-
get for untouchable conversion (Keer 1990, 267). The Mandal decided
to postpone the conference indefinitely so as to prevent Ambedkar’s
delivery of his incendiary speech. Ambedkar, having already printed
up 1500 copies of “Annihilation of Caste,” sold them all within two
months in 1936. A second edition would be printed in 1937, this time
with Gandhi’s reply to the speech and Ambedkar’s subsequent response.
This speech has an interesting rhetorical history of its own, seeing that
it was read at a range of subsequent untouchable conferences as a sort
of stand-in for the great leader, Ambedkar (Zelliot 2013). The address
was composed in English, a move with its own normative dimensions—
untouchables were not allowed to learn Sanskrit in Hindu schools, so the
English of the colonial educational system became a way to have agency,
4 ECHOES OF PRAGMATISM IN INDIA: BHIMRAO AMBEDKAR … 87
This seems like a pointed argument that caste divides workers based
upon a metaphysics of karma, thus writing unjust social exclusion and
servitude into the nature of the world. But looking closer at this text
next to a book that we know Ambedkar read and annotated—Dewey’s
1916 Democracy and Education—we begin to see something curious.
Ambedkar uses, without any citation or reference, Dewey’s own phrases
and sentences in this novel argument against the Indian caste system.
Here is Dewey’s original passage from Democracy and Education, with
the words appropriated by Ambedkar emphasized:
Sentimentally, it may seem harsh to say that the greatest evil of the present
régime is not found in poverty and in the suffering which it entails, but in the
fact that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them, which
are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues. For such callings
constantly provoke one to aversion, ill will, and a desire to slight and evade.
Neither men’s hearts nor their minds are in their work. On the other hand,
those who are not only much better off in worldly goods, but who are
in excessive, if not monopolistic, control of the activities of the many are
shut off from equality and generality of social intercourse. (Dewey 1916
[1985], 326–327, emphasis added)
While his target is uniquely Indian, some of the ideas are not. Compare
this passage to Dewey’s argument about the nature of democracy in
Democracy and Education, with overlapping phrases highlighted:
The isolation and exclusiveness of a gang or clique brings its antisocial spirit
into relief. But this same spirit is found wherever one group has interests “of
its own” which shut it out from full interaction with other groups, so that its
prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has got, instead of reorgani-
zation and progress through wider relationships. It marks nations in their
isolation from one another; families which seclude their domestic concerns
as if they had no connection with a larger life; schools when separated
from the interest of home and community; the divisions of rich and poor;
learned and unlearned. (1916 [1985], 91)
The assertion by the individual of his own opinions and beliefs, his own
independence and interest as over against group standards, group authority
and group interests is the beginning of all reform…. It is true that man
cannot get on with his fellows. But it is also true that he cannot do with-
out them. He would like to have the society of his fellows on his terms. If
he cannot get it on his terms then he will be ready to have it on any terms
even amounting to complete surrender. This is because he cannot do with-
out society. (56)
The ideas and concepts in these lines can be traced back to Ethics, a work
that Dewey published with James H. Tufts in 1908. While the first and
third sections of this book are authored by Tufts and the second section
by Dewey, the preface indicates that each author made “suggestions and
criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book
throughout a joint work” (Dewey 1908 [1978]). In the first section,
authored by Tufts, we find material (with the echoed portioned empha-
sized) that must have been in the mind of Ambedkar as he wrote the pre-
vious passage in “Annihilation of Caste”:
We see here the same tactic of echoing, and the insertion of small
changes—the order in “Annihilation of Caste” is different than it is the
original text, and Ambedkar breaks the quotations about Kant’s notion
of unsocial sociability into two parts, deleting Dewey’s reference to the
Prussian philosopher along the way. The argument becomes Ambedkar’s,
but it remains tied to its original pragmatist formulation.
Turning our attention to one of the most crucial passages in
“Annihilation of Caste,” we see Ambedkar use this echoing technique
alongside an evocation of enlightenment values in his critique of caste.
He turns to the “constructive side of the problem” (57), and inquires
as to what the “ideal society” will be based upon: “If you ask me, my
ideal would be a society based on Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” (57).
These values—tied to French revolution—were probably first heard by
an attentive Ambedkar in Dewey’s course in spring 1916, judging from
92 S. R. STROUD
the lecture notes we have of what Ambedkar heard in this course (Stroud
2017b). In “Annihilation of Caste,” Ambedkar defends these values,
especially fraternity or fellow-feeling, without referring to Dewey:
In short, there are many interests consciously communicated and shared; and
there are varied and free points of contact with other modes of association.
(1916 [1985], 89, emphasis added)
Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes which
control his conduct. This condition obtains even where there is no slavery in
the legal sense. It is found wherever men are engaged in activity which is
socially serviceable, but whose service they do not understand and have no
personal interest in. (1916 [1985], 90–91, emphasis added)
Equality may be a fiction but nonetheless one must accept it as the gov-
erning principle. A man’s power is dependent upon (1) physical heredity,
(2) social inheritance or endowment in the form of parental care, educa-
tion, accumulation of scientific knowledge, everything which enables him
to be more efficient than the savage, and finally, (3) on his own efforts. In
all these three respects men are undoubtedly unequal. But the question is,
shall we treat them as unequal because they are unequal? This is a question
which the opponents of equality must answer. From the standpoint of the
individualist it may be just to treat men unequally so far as their efforts
are unequal. It may be desirable to give as much incentive as possible to
the full development of every one’s powers…. On the other hand it can
be urged that if it is good for the social body to get the most out of its
members, it can get most out of them only by making them equal as far as
possible at the very start of the race. (58)
From what source does Ambedkar draw some of the inspiration for this
argument? Our answer lies in Tufts’ final section in Ethics, identified here
with the appropriated parts highlighted:
A man’s power is due (1) to physical heredity; (2) to social heredity, includ-
ing care, education, and the stock of inventions, information, and institu-
tions which enables him to be more efficient than the savage; and finally (3)
to his own efforts. Individualism may properly claim this third factor. It is
just to treat men unequally so far as their efforts are unequal. It is socially
desirable to give as much incentive as possible to the full development of
every one’s powers. But the very same reason demands that in the first
two respects we treat men as equally as possible. For it is for the good of
the social body to get the most out of its members, and it can get the most out
of them only by giving them the best start possible. (1908 [1978], 490,
emphasis added)
Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things according to
prescription. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of
judging things. Rules seek to tell an agent just what course of action to
pursue. Principles do not prescribe a specific course of action. Rules, like
cooking recipes, do tell just what to do and how to do it. A principle, such
as that of justice, supplies a main head by reference to which he is to con-
sider the bearings of his desires and purposes, it guides him in his thinking
by suggesting to him the important consideration which he should bear in
mind. This difference between rules and principles makes the acts done in
pursuit of them different in quality and in content. (75)
Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles
are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things. The fundamen-
tal error of the intuitionalist and of the utilitarian (represented in the
quotation from Mill) is that they are on the lookout for rules which will
of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue; whereas the
object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will
96 S. R. STROUD
Ambedkar takes this point from Dewey and Tufts’ vision of ethics as an
evolution from customary morality to reflective morality and applies it to
the caste system. Caste is a harmful habit that needs reflective attention
and melioration; it is based upon rules that cannot adapt to situations of
injustice and detriment. What is needed is the use of principles to sort
through this complex, problematic social situation in India; Ambedkar
wants to destroy Hinduism as set of rules and replace it with “Religion in
the sense of spiritual principles” (75). This would be a type of religious
orientation that would be “truly universal, applicable to all races, to all
countries, to all times” (75). Whereas Dewey and Tufts’ critique applied
to overly sedimented habits of moral judgment, Ambedkar adapts their
ideas and text to religion: “Religion must mainly be matter of principles
only. It cannot be a matter of rules” (75). Hinduism, as a religion of
rules, promulgates caste and results in a situation that Deweyan prag-
matists would abhor: “[it] tends to deprive moral life of freedom and
spontaneity and to reduce it (for the conscientious at any rate) to a
more or less anxious and servile conformity to externally imposed rules”
(76). The words and ideas of Deweyan pragmatism seep into both his
indictment of Hinduism and the advocated solution to its caste-based
problems. Ambedkar could not make these same points with the same
strength if he had lacked the guidance of pragmatist texts such as Ethics
and Democracy and Education.
with the protection of the speaker. King’s activist goals were extreme for
his day, and even white civil rights partisans might be shocked at portions
of his message. King’s use of “approved” sources in his own arguments
then allows him to advance relatively radical points:
Prof. John Dewey, who was my teacher and to whom I owe so much, has
said: “Every society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood
from the past, and with what is positively perverse… As a society becomes
more enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not to conserve and
transmit, the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as make for
a better future society”. (1989, 79, ellipses in original)
Ambedkar both cites Dewey and approves of his teacher’s relation of past
to present. Following Dewey, Ambedkar insists that the materials of the
past do not need to be used in the same fashion in the present and the
future; these materials can be trimmed or reconstructed to fit our chang-
ing needs of the present. It is helpful to look at the original passage from
Dewey’s Democracy and Education, however:
Every society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the
past, and with what is positively perverse. The school has the duty of omit-
ting such things from the environment which it supplies, and thereby doing
what it can to counteract their influence in the ordinary social environment.
By selecting the best for its exclusive use, it strives to reenforce the power
of this best. As a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that it is respon-
sible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but
only such as make for a better future society. The school is its chief agency for
the accomplishment of this end. (1916 [1985], 24, emphasis added)
We can sense here the Deweyan ideas of reflective thinking and inquiry,
perhaps even the final stage of moral development in the Ethics known
as reflective morality. But what we also see is that in his response to
Gandhi, Ambedkar continues to use and adapt Dewey’s texts—situated
in a vastly different context—as vital tools in his rhetorical struggles
against the habits of caste. Looking at Dewey’s 1925 Experience and
Nature, a book that can be found among the remains of his personal
library, we can identify where Ambedkar gets part of his response to
Gandhi:
102 S. R. STROUD
Let us admit the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking no one
can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends
and institutions are surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an
apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will
emerge in its place. (1925 [1981], 172, emphasis added)
References
Ambedkar, Bhimrao R. 1989. “Annihilation of Caste.” In Writings and Speeches,
vol. 1, edited by Vasant Moon, 23–98. Bombay: Government of Maharashtra.
———. 2003. “Unfortunately I Was Born a Hindu Untouchable but I Will
Not Die a Hindu.” In Writings and Speeches, vol. 17 part 3, edited by Hari
Narake, N. G. Kamble, M. L. Kasare, and Ashok Godghate, 94–99. Bombay:
Government of Maharashtra.
Anand, S. 1999. “Sanskrit, English and Dalits.” Economic and Political Weekly 34
(30, July 24): 2053–2056.
Boydston, Jo Ann. 1969. John Dewey: A Checklist of Translations, 1900–1967.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, John. 1908 [1978]. “Ethics.” In The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 5,
edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1916 [1985]. “Democracy and Education.” In The Middle Works of John
Dewey, vol. 9, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press.
———. 1925 [1981]. “Experience and Nature.” In The Later Works of John
Dewey, vol. 1, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press.
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Fiske, Adele, and Christoph Emmrich. 2004. “The Use of Buddhist Scriptures
in B.R. Ambedkar’s The Buddha and His Dhamma.” In Reconstructing the
World: B.R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India, edited by Surendra Jondhale
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Kadam, K. N. 1997. The Meaning of the Ambedkarite Conversion to Buddhism
and Other Essays. New Delhi: Popular Prakashan.
Keer, Dhananjay. 1990. Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
Maitra, Keya. 2012. “Ambedkar and the Constitution of India: A Deweyan
Experiment.” Contemporary Pragmatism 9: 301–320.
Miller, Keith. 1992. Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Its Sources. New York: The Free Press.
Mukherjee, Arun P. 2009. “B.R. Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the Meaning of
Democracy.” New Literary History 40: 345–370.
Nanda, Meera. 2003. Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodern Critiques of Science
and Hindu Nationalism in India. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Omvedt, Gail. 2004. Ambedkar: Towards an Enlightened India. New York:
Penguin Books.
Queen, Christopher S. 2004. “Ambedkar’s Dhamma: Source and Method in
the Construction of Engaged Buddhism.” In Reconstructing the World: B.R.
Ambedkar and Buddhism in India, edited by Surendra Jondhale and Johannes
Beltz, 132–150. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
———. 2015. “A Pedagogy of the Dhamma: B. R. Ambedkar and John Dewey on
Education.” International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture 24: 7–21.
Shastri, Shankranand. 2012. My Experience and Memories of Dr. Babasaheb
Ambedkar. Delhi: Gautam Book Centre.
Stroud, Scott R. 2016. “Pragmatism and the Pursuit of Social Justice in India:
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Society Quarterly 46 (1): 5–27.
———. 2017a. “The Influence of John Dewey and James Tufts’ Ethics on
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———. 2017b. “Pragmatism, Persuasion, and Force in Bhimrao Ambedkar’s
Reconstruction of Buddhism.” Journal of Religion 97 (2): 204–243.
———. 2017c. “What Did Bhimrao Ambedkar Learn from John Dewey’s
Democracy and Education?” The Pluralist 12 (2): 78–103.
Zelliot, Eleanor. 2005. From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar
Movement. New Delhi: Manohar.
———. 2013. Ambedkar’s World: The Making of Babasaheb and the Dalit
Movement. New Delhi: Navayana.
CHAPTER 5
Jansen B. Werner
J. B. Werner (*)
Independent Scholar, Minneapolis, MN, USA
contributions of Invisible Man. More than six decades after its pub-
lication, not only does Invisible Man remain a wildly popular book, it
also continues to draw significant scholarly attention (Germana 2018;
Harriss 2017; Conner and Morel 2016). Furthermore, within the field
of Ellison scholarship, even when projects do not take Invisible Man
as their primary focus, there is still a tendency for scholars to link their
projects to Invisible Man in some fashion—often treating the success of
Invisible Man as a justification for why further research on Ellison is war-
ranted (note, for example, that it took this chapter merely two sentences
to invoke Invisible Man) (Foley 2010; Parrish 2012; Turner 2012).
In short, it is possible that the scholarly fixation with Invisible Man has
attenuated scholars’ appreciation for the richness of Ellison’s overall cor-
pus by deflecting critical attention from the nonfiction works wherein he
grapples most overtly with pragmatist concepts.
Second, and closely related to the previous point, it seems that a
consequence of Invisible Man’s popularity has been for Ellison to be
regarded principally as a novelist. Though such a categorization is under-
standable, it is also reductive. After all, throughout his career, Ellison
produced two volumes of essays—one of which, the 1964 Shadow &
Act, is widely considered to be among the greatest essay collections
ever published (Callahan 1987, 125–143). Nevertheless, the critical
acclaim and enduring popularity of Invisible Man has enshrined Ellison
chiefly as a novelist within the public imaginary. And while there does
not exist a mandate of mutual exclusivity that would prevent one from
being both a novelist and pragmatist, in reality, novelists (or, at least,
those who are regarded as novelists) have received only sparing attention
within the published literature on pragmatism. Within my disciplinary
homes of Communication Studies and Rhetorical Studies, for example,
the work on pragmatism has focused almost exclusively on academicians,
legal figures, and social reformers—which is sensible, given the fact that
such roles tend to coincide with robust involvement in public affairs.
In this respect, perceptions that Ellison was principally a novelist may
help to further explain why his work has not received greater considera-
tion within pragmatist circles.
Finally, and particularly germane to the focus this chapter will take, it
is possible that Ellison’s relative lack of uptake within pragmatist schol-
arship owes at least in part to his proclivity for vitriol. For example, in
his biography of Ellison, Arnold Rampersad (2007) notes that Ellison’s
contemporary, James Baldwin, referred to Ellison as “the angriest man
5 THE ART OF ADJUSTMENT: RALPH ELLISON’S PRAGMATIST CRITIQUE … 107
he knew” (455). It is perhaps fitting that Ellison, the man who crafted
the iconic “Battle Royal” scene in Invisible Man, happed to find himself
involved in skirmishes of his own periodically—albeit of the intellec-
tual variety. A journey through Ellison’s corpus reveals some rather
acidic exchanges with other thinkers. Such a tendency toward clash
seems out of step with the spirit of reflective, experimental inquiry that
is normally ascribed to pragmatism. And, so, it is possible that Ellison’s
reputation as something of a scornful, counterpuncher may offer yet
another explanation for his relatively cool reception within pragmatist
scholarship.
In a broad sense, this chapter proposes that scholars of pragmatism
ought to give greater consideration to Ralph Ellison’s work. To advance
that general claim, I explore what many Ellison scholars regard as perhaps
Ellison’s most vitriolic public exchange: his multi-part essayistic feud with
Irving Howe (Porter 2001; Jackson 2005; Posnock 2005). To briefly recap
the sequence of the exchange: The feud was set in motion by Howe’s 1963
essay “Black Boys and Native Sons”; Howe’s essay prompted a rebuttal
from Ellison, entitled “The World and the Jug”; Howe answered Ellison’s
rebuttal with a rebuttal of his own; and the feud came to a close with a
final rejoinder from Ellison (in the interest of clarity, it must be noted that,
following his clash with Howe, Ellison published his contributions to the
exchange as a single essay entitled “The World and the Jug” in his 1964
essay collection Shadow and Act; hence, throughout the chapter, I use
“The World and the Jug” to refer to that combined version of the texts).
Shaped by the trajectory of Howe’s initial essay, the exchange essentially
gravitated around the following questions: (1) Is there such a thing as a
representative—or authentic—African American experience? (2) What is
the basis for African American identity? (3) What, if any, political obliga-
tions, do African American writers face? (4) Who has the authority to define
the objectives of African American artistic expression? Frustrated by what
he viewed as the ideological limitations of Howe’s perspective, at times,
Ellison regarded his interlocutor with contempt; indeed, at one point
in the exchange, Ellison (1964 [1995]) even suggested that Howe—a
socialist literary critic and civil rights advocate—was just as complicit in
stymieing African American advancement as the most ardent southern
white supremacist (120). In issuing critiques of that nature, it would seem
unlikely that, in the very same exchange, Ellison would also perform a
masterful pragmatist critique of Howe’s position. Yet, as this chapter will
demonstrate, such was precisely the case. And that dynamic—the pairing of
108 J. B. WERNER
Meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one
moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event
may be bettered. It encourages intelligence to study the positive means of
good and the obstruction to their realization, and to put forth endeavor
for the improvement of conditions. (181–182)
What, then, was the experience of man with a black skin, what could it be
in this country? How could a Negro put pen to paper, how could he so
much as think or breathe, without some impulsion to protest, be it harsh
or mild, political or private, released or buried? The “sociology” of his
existence formed a constant pressure on his literary work, and not merely
in the way this might be true for any writer, but with a pain and ferocity
that nothing could remove. (660)
In the analysis that follows, I will illustrate that “The World and the
Jug” articulated a Deweyan sense of adjustment. In order to establish
this claim, I focus on two sets of moves that Ellison performed in the
text. First, Ellison suggested that Howe operated from a flawed orien-
tation; in gesturing to that flawed orientation, Ellison implicitly signaled
the need for adjustment. Second, by outlining the wide range of strat-
egies that African Americans have devised to counter white supremacy,
Ellison showed that adjustment possesses dynamic possibilities for the
invention of civic agency. In tandem, these moves constituted a call for a
renewed civic commitment to adjustment.
Orientational Critiques
At root, “The World and the Jug” marked Ellison’s rhetorical corrective
to the orientation that Howe had expressed in “Black Boys and Native
Sons.” Synthesizing insights from Dewey, Scott Stroud (2014) concep-
tualizes “orientation” as the “deep-seated habituation of an organism
toward its environment” (51). Orientations, then, are like the figuration
that emerges from a constellation of habits. And, like habits, orienta-
tions “set up ways of acting/reacting in future situations” (Stroud 2014,
59). From this standpoint, one’s orientation is not innate. Rather, as
Stroud points out, orientations are formed culturally, in accordance with
“the range of experiences we undergo” (56). Insofar as our experience
is mediated through language, discourse plays a powerful role in shap-
ing our orientations. “The World and the Jug” teemed with Ellison’s
critiques of Howe’s orientation. However, Ellison’s critiques did more
than just highlight the shortcomings of Howe’s individual orientation;
“The World and the Jug” demonstrated that orientation, in general, was
instrumental to the development of civic consciousness.
In a sense, Ellison’s response in “The World and the Jug” was insti-
gated by Howe’s interpretation of Richard Wright’s significance. In
Ellison’s view, Howe misinterpreted Wright as synecdochal of black writ-
ers in particular and black American experience more generally. Ellison’s
critique advanced the sense that Howe’s assessment of Wright stemmed
from orientational flaws. Addressing what he judged to be Howe’s dis-
torted view of Wright, Ellison (1964 [1995]) stated, “Wright, for Howe,
is the genuine article, the authentic Negro writer, and his tone the only
authentic tone” (118). Though not overtly critical, Ellison’s use of the
terms “genuine” and “authentic” was significant. As many scholars have
5 THE ART OF ADJUSTMENT: RALPH ELLISON’S PRAGMATIST CRITIQUE … 113
Howe is not the first writer given to sociological categories who has
had unconscious value judgments slip into his “analytical” or “scien-
tific” descriptions. Thus I can believe that his approach was meant to be
116 J. B. WERNER
Howe seems to see segregation as an opaque steel jug with the Negroes
inside waiting for some black messiah to come along and blow the cork.
Wright is his hero and he sticks with him loyally. But if we are in a jug it
is transparent, not opaque, and one is allowed not only to see outside but
to read what is going on out there; to make identifications as to values and
human quality. (116)
I could escape the reduction imposed by unjust laws and customs, but
not that imposed by ideas which defined me as no more than the sum
of those laws and customs. I learned to outmaneuver those who inter-
preted my silence as submission, my efforts at self-control as fear, my
contempt as awe before superior status, my dream of faraway places and
room at the top of the heap as defeat before the barriers of their stifling,
provincial world. And my struggle became a desperate battle which was
120 J. B. WERNER
Conclusion
Viewed within the overall landscape of Ellison’s public discourse, “The
World and the Jug” embodied a pair of rhetorical patterns that were
prevalent within his work. As Jack Turner notes, Ellison’s work gener-
ally signals a commitment to at least two intellectual projects. The first
project is “diagnostic” and functions by “identifying the individual
and social psychoses underlying American white supremacy” (Turner
2012, 72). Ellison’s criticism of Howe’s orientation marked just such
124 J. B. WERNER
References
Albrecht, James M. 2012. Reconstructing Individualism: A Pragmatic Tradition
from Emerson to Ellison. New York: Fordham University Press.
Allen, Danielle. 2004. Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown
v. Board of Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Asen, Robert. 2003. “The Multiple Mr. Dewey: Multiple Publics and Permeable
Borders in John Dewey’s Theory of the Public Sphere.” Argumentation and
Advocacy 39: 174–188.
Baker, Houston, Jr. 1987. Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Baldwin, James. 1955 [1998]. “Notes of a Native Son.” In James Baldwin:
Collected Essays, edited by Toni Morrison. New York: Library of America.
Baldwin, James. 1963 [1993]. The Fire Next Time. New York: Vintage Books.
Callahan, John F. 1987. “Choas, Complexity, and Possibility: The Historical
Frequencies of Ralph Waldo Ellison.” In Speaking for You: The Vision of Ralph
Ellison, edited by Kimberly W. Benston, 125–143. Washington, DC: Howard
University Press.
Conner, Marc C., and Lucas E. Morel, eds. 2016. The New Territory: Ralph Ellison
and the Twenty-First Century. Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi.
Dewey, John. 1911a [1968]. “Adjustment.” In A Cyclopedia of Education,
vol. 1, edited by Paul Monroe, 38–39. Detroit: Gale Research Company.
126 J. B. WERNER
Posnock, Ross. 1998. Color and Culture: Black Writers and the Making of the
Modern Intellectual. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Posnock, Ross. 2005. “Ralph Ellison, Hannah Arendt, and the Meaning of
Politics.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Ellison, edited by Ross
Posnock. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rampersad, Arnold. 2007. Ralph Ellison: A Biography. New York: Knopf.
Stob, Paul. 2005. “Kenneth Burke, John Dewey, and the Pursuit of the Public.”
Philosophy and Rhetoric 38: 226–247.
Stroud, Scott. 2010. “What Does Pragmatic Meliorism Mean for Rhetoric?”
Western Journal of Communication 74: 43–60.
Stroud, Scott. 2011. “Mindful Argument, Deweyan Pragmatism, and the
Ideal of Democracy.” Controversia: An International Journal of Debate and
Democratic Renewal 7: 15–33.
Stroud, Scott. 2014. “John Dewey, Kenneth Burke, and the Role of Orientation
in Rhetoric.” In Trained Capacities: John Dewey, Rhetoric, and Democratic
Practice, edited by Brian Jackson and Gregory Clark. Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press.
Turner, Jack. 2012. Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness
in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, Kirt. 2002. The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of
Equality and the Rhetoric of Place, 1870–1875. East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press.
Wright, John S. 1987. “Shadowing Ellison.” In Speaking for You: The Vision
of Ralph Ellison, edited by Kimberly W. Benston, 63–88. Washington, DC:
Howard University Press.
CHAPTER 6
K. Shea (*)
Johnson & Wales University, Providence, RI, USA
e-mail: Karen.Shea@jwu.edu
K. Manke
University of Rhode Island, South Kingstown, RI, USA
1 John Dewey to Alice Dewey, April 1, 1886 (00038) The Correspondence of John Dewey
industry, the other the contact with nature which supplies it with its mate-
rials. … This general theorizing is very edifying when our own children
can’t get even a poor school to go to….2
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 133
book that would hold their creations. In this school, educators took on
the role of mentors, and treated the school like a home environment.
Students, by turn, learned activities through an “occupational” lens; that
is, they learned skills in relation to how those skills were used to create
the environment with which the children were familiar.
These activities were all in service of building among students the
kind of habits that would imbue in them “the idea of responsibility,
of obligation to do something, to produce something, in the world”
(Dewey 1899, 7). The occupational curriculum was meant to bring each
child into “contact with realities” with the hope that, “with the growth
of the child’s mind in power and the knowledge it ceases to be a pleas-
ant occupation merely and becomes more and more a medium, and
instrument, and organ of understanding—and is thereby transformed”
(19–20). Given these motivations, it is easy to see how the pedagogy
John and Alice worked together to promote at the Dewey School aligns
with current conversations about rhetorical education, which include
“any educational program that develops in students a communal and civic
identity and articulates for them rhetorical strategies, language practices,
and bodily and social behaviors that make possible their participation in
communal and civic affairs” (Enoch 2008, 7–8). In all activities, children
were focused on working together to learn skills that would allow them
to positively impact the “embryonic community” of their classroom, so
that they might be better prepared for the responsibilities of a demo-
cratic citizen later.
In order to discover the best means to achieve these pragmatic ped-
agogical goals, the Laboratory School was largely experimental, and
students, instructors, and administrators navigated a constantly chang-
ing curriculum that sought, as well as possible, to accommodate each
individual and that individual’s relationship with the larger social envi-
ronment. This process was meant to demonstrate the revision process
inherent to democracy, a process that John Dewey described in The
Public and its Problems: “By its very nature, a state is ever something to
be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. Almost as soon as its form is
stabilized, it needs to be remade” (Dewey 1927, 56). As John Dewey
saw it, endeavors in democracies and in the classrooms that educated citi-
zens required constant revision in order to be actively applicable.
Such a system meant that students did not follow the traditional pat-
terns of learning, which meant that parents often bore anxiety when their
children had not learned skills, like literacy, that were seen as compulsory
134 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
Parents who are anxious to have their children learn reading and writing
before the years mentioned are not urged to place their children in the
school unless they are willing to wait for the later results to justify the
methods used. The chief aims with children of ten and older, are to cul-
tivate a love of good literature, to form a habit of consulting books, and
of using them independently as tools - both being points in which those
methods of teaching language which lay the emphasis upon facility in deal-
ing with symbols only are lamentably defective.3
3 Article in the 1900 Elementary School record, a nine-part monograph that explained
the theory and practice of the Laboratory School, Box 12 Folder 2, Katherine Camp
Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 135
and students alike to find out where Laboratory School alumni had
ended up. One parent explained that her child was now a lawyer at a
firm.4 Another stated:
One of the girls of the class in later years, as part of her entrance require-
ments to Bryn Mawr, wrote a paper on this subject of great outstand-
ing quality. The head of the Department of Physiography declared: ‘this
girl must have been a pupil of Professor Salisbury’s.’ [Professor Salisbury
taught at the University of Chicago and lent his support to the Laboratory
School by instructing students.] Needless to say, the same teacher made for
this pupil an easy way into her department classes.5
One student reflected that there were so many great events at The
Dewey School that it was difficult to recall them all.6 Still another for-
mer student reflected that, with her own children, she found that in “the
problem of preparing them for life I find that my greatest aid on help-
ing them is my ‘Dewey School’ background,” explaining that since she
was understood by her teachers, she has been able to raise her children
under that same premise, in a way that makes it possible for her to “enter
into my children’s childhood life with them, and influence not merely
through my point of view born of experience but through theirs too.”7
A note at the end of her letter indicates that Mrs. Russell had gone on to
open her own Dewey School in California.
Of course, there were students who recognized the problematic nature
of the curriculum. Paul McClintock was a perfect example; he did not
learn to read until he was fourteen years old, much to the despair of his
literary parents. In 1930, McClintock reflected to Mayhew and Edwards:
4 Correspondence from Mrs. C.M. Burns to Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna
Edwards describing her son’s life following The Laboratory School, Box 17 Folder 7,
Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell
University Library.
5 Footnote in draft for Chapter 9 of The Dewey School, Box 17 Folder 3, Katherine Camp
Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
6 Article by Brent Dow Allinson, former student of The Laboratory School, Box 17
Folder 7, Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript Collections,
Cornell University Library.
7 Correspondence from Helen Greeley Russell to Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna
Edwards, Box 18 Folder 3, Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript
Collections, Cornell University Library.
136 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
8 Letter from McClintock’s parents, Box 18 Folder 3, Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers
Folder 11, Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers (6561), Rare and Manuscript Collections,
Cornell University Library.
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 137
School, existing in Chicago between 1896 and 1903, the ideas attained
such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in prac-
tice” (Dewey 1910, iv). Similarly, in The Dewey School, Katherine Camp
Mayhew and Anna Edwards write, “The school was deeply indebted to
Mrs. Alice C. Dewey for her exceptional insight in solving many of its
problems” (Dewey 1910, vii). They go on to explain that it was Alice
who made sure records of the experiment were maintained, and that she
had preserved a large part of the source materials that they used to write
their book. Deweyan scholars have also noted that Alice’s influence was a
controlling factor in improvement of the Laboratory School, and intro-
duced a system of order that it had previously lacked (Lagemann 1996,
176; Nebeker 2002, 16).
When the school opened, Alice was an instructor of literature,
Director of the Department of English and Literature, and coordinator
of language expression at the school (Mayhew and Edwards 1936, 9). In
1901, she became principal. Assuming this position was particularly dif-
ficult, especially since her dedication to the Laboratory School and to its
following a truly experimental, organic course combined with her admin-
istrative duties meant that she was frequently the face of what could be a
frustrating curriculum. These difficulties became particularly pronounced
following the increased association and eventual merging with William
Parker’s University Elementary School, another elementary school on
campus. Alice maintained her position as principal during this time,
which meant that she was constantly embroiled in the issues surround-
ing this integration, which was already fraught as it had been opposed by
both schools and only carried forward out of budgetary necessity.
Some historians have placed blame directly on Alice for the issues
associated with the merger. Knoll asserts that teachers both at the Dewey
School and the Parker School disliked Alice, and contends that: “Because
of her unprofessional conduct and poor management, less because of
the issue of nepotism, Alice Dewey faced such powerful opposition, in
particular from the former Parker School faculty … that Harper had no
other choice than to ask for her resignation as school principal” (Knoll
2014, 455). Biographer Joan K. Smith further contends that Alice and
John lacked the personal and administrative skills necessary to make the
experiment successful. It is true that Alice Dewey expected nothing less
than the best from her teachers (Stack 2009, 30), and to be sure, Alice’s
strong-willed demeanor was certainly not typical for a woman of her
time. Instead, she was a woman ahead of her time, and her strength of
138 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
mind combined with her powers of advocacy would seem far less out of
place today. Given the political climate of her own time regarding wom-
en’s rights, it is worth considering the extent to which systemized sexism
undermined the true nature of Alice’s pragmatic contributions.
Evidence of such inequity can be seen in correspondence regarding
the Dewey School. As the plans to merge the Dewey School with the
Parker School progressed, John Dewey and Wilbur Jackman, head of the
Parker School, exchanged a series of letters regarding the future of their
educational endeavors together. In one such letter, Jackman sent over
4000 words to Dewey suggesting revisions to the school on administra-
tive levels, organization of the grades, and suggestions for faculty. In this
last, Jackman specified that, with regard to the position of principal in
this combined school, “I would suggest delaying the appointment until
the plan of organization has been decided upon and then I should get a
strong man for the place” [emphasis in original].10 With Alice still serv-
ing as principal, Jackman’s specificity seems to underscore his disapproval
that a woman occupied the position.
It also stands to reason that another gender-related dispute occurring
throughout the university shaped the public perception of Alice as prin-
cipal. At the time, the university was trying to decide whether to separate
the men and women in the junior colleges. John and Alice Dewey were
both fervently opposed to the idea, and John expressed:
Both Deweys were perpetual supporters of women’s rights who had seen
firsthand how people from both genders could collaborate to better an
10 Wilbur Jackman to John Dewey, June 10, 1902 (01503) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
11 John Dewey to Alonzo K. Parker, July 25, 1902 (00765) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 139
Miss Rice, Miss Baber, and Mrs. Blaine, teachers at the Parker School, April 17, 1903
(08087) The Correspondence of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1999–2004).
140 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
instructor admitted that she “felt intellectually Mrs. Dewey should lead
the school well.” Following the registration of these objections, the
faculty of the School of Education unanimously voted to ask Alice to
become Editor of the Elementary School Teacher, which she declined in
fear that it would cause further tension.
In Spring 1904, the final straw came in the form of a misunderstand-
ing about Alice Dewey’s tenure as principal. President Harper claimed he
had explained the temporary nature of Alice’s position as principal, but
the Deweys did not believe themselves to be informed of that decision.
On April 5, 1904, on President Harper’s request, Alice submitted a letter
of resignation in which she acknowledged “the satisfaction I have had in
sharing in the furtherance of this interesting educational experiment.”13
John’s resignation immediately followed, and thus, the Laboratory
School in its original iteration came to an end. The nature of its demise
continues to be a topic of debate among Deweyan scholars, and the neg-
ative attention that Alice sometimes received obscures the level to which
her contributions to the Laboratory School identify her as a pragmatist.
This is particularly true since Alice’s disassociation with the
Laboratory School by no means signaled an end to Alice’s staunch
support of experiential education, social justice, and equal opportu-
nities, as she continued to defend the rights of minorities, particularly
by becoming involved with the NAACP. As Larry Hickman explains,
Alice’s “involvement in the progressive causes such as securing the vote
of women and defending the rights of ethnic minorities had a great influ-
ence on John Dewey’s growing awareness of social justice” (Hickman
2009, 5). Dewey biographer Jay Martin reiterates this activism, and once
again highlights how Alice is often the catalyst and the vehicle for action:
When John was passionate about some aspect of social justice, Alice was
likely to be even more active. No sooner had the NAACP been formed
than Alice organized a big meeting of a group of African American women
at her house, in an attempt to join with them and to join them to the
women’s suffrage movement. Hearing of this, the owner of the building
forbade by letter any further integrated meetings in the Dewey apartment.
(Martin 2002, 248)
13 Alice Dewey to President Harper, resignation letter, April 5, 1904 (00931) The
Of course, Alice held the meeting anyway, and her support launched
a new dialogue about rights to assemble. Her ability to cultivate
open-mindedness in her own environment as she had in the Laboratory
School meant that her contributions to women’s suffrage were many,
and her involvement gave her new opportunities to engage with people
from different cultures and backgrounds. When granted the opportu-
nity to expand her efforts to understand others, then, it is not surprising
that Alice agreed to venture to Asia with John, a journey that opened her
mind to difference in ways that would not have been possible had she
remained in the United States.
In 1918, while living in California, Alice and John decided to voyage
across the Pacific in order to explore Japan for a few months. When John
was invited to lecture in China as a visiting scholar by his former student,
Hu Shih (Wang 2007, 3), their stay was extended to a year in Asia. One
year ultimately became two, which enabled the Deweys to experience the
diverse cultures of two Asian countries far more comprehensively than if
they had been tourists on a temporary visit.
Prior to experiencing life as a foreigner in Japan and China, John had
dedicated much of his early twentieth-century writings to advocating
open-mindedness as a critical value for education—an idea which had
been proven valuable through his experiences with Alice and with the
Laboratory School. Rather than a passive kind of tolerance that is acquired
through intellectual consideration alone, he recommended open-mind-
edness that is attained through a combination of contemplation and
embodied experience. The profound impact that experiencing the unfamil-
iar cultures of Japan and China had on his understanding of difference
compared to considering them from afar is apparent in his personal corre-
spondence sent to friends, colleagues, and family members in the United
States between 1919 and 1921, while he was living in Asia. Although
some attention has been given to the concept of open- mindedness
in John’s personal correspondence from Japan and China (see Shea
2016), there has been far less regard for Alice’s correspondence dur-
ing the same time, particularly her letters related to the ways in which a
pragmatic rather than merely contemplative approach to cultural aware-
ness led to her deeper understanding of otherness. Like John, Alice wrote
several letters to the Dewey children in which she recounted experienc-
ing the language, food, and ways of thinking in Japan and China, with
an added emphasis on what it meant to appreciate nature, enjoy food,
and be a woman there. Alice’s letters, then, not only support John’s idea
142 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
the same letter, “One thing about the J woman I can never get used to
… the thing I cannot like is the odor she spreads. The grease on her
hair always gives out a stale odor and then the perfume of the powder
and perfumery mixes with that rather than for a blend to shock you into
wondering what she is trying to cover up.” Alice is equally disturbed by
the slurping sounds made by Japanese men while eating, and she com-
plains, “The Japanese have the worst [table manners] in the world.”14
Perhaps the most significant cultural difference that Alice experiences
in Japan and China, and one that she cannot accept even after two years,
is the attitude toward women. A strong woman who has raised strong
daughters, Alice emphasizes in her letters her frustration as a woman and
for all women in Japan and China. She notes, for example, that speaking
Japanese is “impossible” for a foreign woman since Japanese language
books are tailored to men. As she explains to her children, “The way
given in the phrases of the guide book is the way the man speaks,” an
injustice of which she is constantly reminded when she is corrected by
the Japanese women who find her “male speak” quite amusing. She con-
tinues, “So when I stammer off those phrases the girls are literally tickled
to death. When they tell me what I ought to say in the more elaborated
polite way of the women, then I am floored.” In the same letter, she
describes how men and women are separated into two different rooms
at typical dinner parties, “the men all seated and smoking in one, and
the women in the other.”15 Later, when she and John visit a shrine, they
learn that ladies could not enter without “visiting dresses,” a surprisingly
discriminatory experience that John relays in a letter to the Dewey chil-
dren.16 In Japan, Alice learns that women are legally prohibited from
“taking any part in politics,”17 and in China, she dines with John and
14 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 27, 1919 (03893) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
15 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, March 14, 1919 (10743) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
16 John Dewey to Dewey children, April 12, 1919 (10749) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
17 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 19, 1919 (10752) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
144 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
their male host at a dinner party while the man’s wife remains in the
kitchen for the duration of the meal. While Alice has played major roles
both at home and in the workplace, she describes with dismay women
in China who are constantly “plodding to keep up with the house work
and sewing with no stimulation from without.”18 She notes that women
are segregated at public gatherings and in theaters.19 After attending a
wedding, she reports that “none of the men spoke to the women.”20
Although these firsthand experiences open Alice’s mind to difference,
she never accepts the gender inequality that she witnesses in Asia, even
though she is forced to acknowledge its social primacy. Although John
may have noticed this discrimination even if he had traveled to Asia
alone, Alice’s direct experiences as a woman expose John to experiences
that he may not have had without her.
Alice is particularly appalled by the gender inequality in Japanese and
Chinese schools, describing to the Dewey children the rare and mainly
unsupported efforts to raise funds to educate girls “that make you want
to sell your earrings.”21 In a letter to her daughter Evelyn, Alice calls the
supposed efforts of the Chinese government to foster democratic educa-
tion “a farce,” and claims that the “authorities” are satisfied by minimal
efforts to promote education for women. She asserts that “to teach dem-
ocratic education to men only is a false representation of democracy,”
and in frustration concludes, “I for my own part shall refuse to have any
part in it.”22 Not long after filling this letter with anti-government rhet-
oric in the face of such discrimination, she reports in another letter to
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
19 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, June 7, 1919 (10762) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
20 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, June 25, 1919 (10766) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
21 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 15, 1919 (10751) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
22 Alice Dewey to Evelyn Dewey, May 26, 1919 (03906) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 145
her children that a girls’ “Normal School” has been established. Rather
than citing this as a victory for girls, however, she sarcastically highlights
the fact that the principal assigned to oversee the school is “thin in h[i]
s body as in his mind,” and that those in charge of reluctantly establish-
ing a school for girls have simply found “a convenient place to unload
an antiquated official who really [can’t] be endured any longer by real
folks.”23 Alice’s steadfast promotion of gender-equal education at the
Laboratory School and in the University of Chicago’s junior colleges
clearly laid the foundation for her frustration, which was undoubtedly
expressed to John in person as it was to their children in these letters.
John’s decades-long philosophical consideration of just about any topic
in his published works prior to 1920 implies that when Alice vented her
frustration, he not only paid attention but was deeply influenced by her
perspective on their experiences in Asia.
Alice’s experiences in Asia as a foreign woman exemplify the kind
of immersion that William James describes when he compares water to
reality and air to abstraction, noting that experience results from immer-
sion in the water (James 1995, 49). Submersion in the new environment
understandably causes preliminary shock, but in time, Alice begins to
appreciate the beauty and other-worldliness surrounding her. New visual
and physical experiences gradually convince Alice that reality is relative,
and her stay in Asia supports William James’s suggestion that the uni-
verse be considered a “pluriverse” (Menand 88) and that truth must
constantly be reevaluated (James 1995, 27). Likewise, immersion in the
Asian cultures leads Alice to reconsider her own culturally determined
definitions of “beautiful,” “clean,” “delicious,” “respectful,” “uncom-
fortable,” and “fair,” and confirms the futility of a dogmatic belief in
one truth and one reality, just as William James did when he called for a
world in which individual differences are respected, “in which the eaches
form an All and the All a One that logically presupposes, co-implicates,
and secures each each without exception” (Menand 2001, 102).
In her correspondence to the Dewey children, Alice describes with
awe and envy the ability of the rickshaw drivers to tolerate without com-
plaint what she perceives to be unbearable discomfort. Even experiencing
23 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, June 1, 5, 1919 (03907) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
146 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
24 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, February 10, 1919 (10735) The Correspondence
of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
25 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, March 4, 1919 (10740) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 147
How We Think, for example, John calls for “conclusions that are prop-
erly grounded” (Dewey 1910, 202) but stops short of explicit references
to the importance of firsthand experience. In the revised 1933 edition
of How We Think, in contrast, he asserts, “No one can think about
everything, to be sure; no one can think about anything without expe-
rience and information about it” (Dewey 1933, 139). Although John
delivered the message regarding the importance of experience in the
attainment of open-mindedness in his post-1920 publications, his ideas
were supported, reinforced, and expanded by Alice.
While Alice struggles to embrace some of the cultural differences that
she experiences in Asia, she is envious of others, particularly the polite-
ness and respect expressed toward foreigners in Japan. In a letter to the
Dewey children, she describes a typical scene: “This morning a man
came out of a curio shop. Bow. ‘Exguse me, madame, is this not Mrs.
Daway? … Will you not come in and look at our many curios? I shall
have the pleasure of bringing them to your hotel’ … Bow. ‘No, please do
not bring them to my room, for I am always out. I will come in and see
them sometime.’ ‘Thank you, madame, please do so, madame …’ Bow.
‘Good-morning, madame.’”26 A few days later, John explains their warm
reception upon returning home, writing to the Dewey children, “There
were five maids bowing and smiling to get our slippers and hang up our
hats,” and that “just going in or out is like going to a picnic.”27
Alice and John are similarly impressed by the hospitality of the
Chinese people, describing a time when they were lost in Shanghai:
“First we got to the wrong hotel and there while we were waiting
they gave us tea. We were struck by the fact that they asked for noth-
ing when we [left] and thanked us for coming to the wrong place.”28
Likewise, trying to utter Japanese or Chinese words and phrases leaves
Alice feeling thankful for the patient kindness of the locals. In Japan, for
26 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, February 10, 1919 (10735) The Correspondence
of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
27 John Dewey to the Dewey children, February 22, 1919 (03877) The Correspondence
of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
28 John and Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, May 1, 1919 (03898) The
29 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, April 19, 1919 (10752) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
30 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, April 1, 1919 (10745) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
31 John Dewey to the Dewey children, February 22, 1919 (03877) The Correspondence
of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 149
any American one, even the best.”32 In another, she praises the Japanese
for leaving their shoes at the door to keep their homes, schools, and
other buildings tidy, concluding, “Truly, the Japanese are a cleaner peo-
ple than we are.” In the same letter, she compliments the Japanese for
their reverence toward the “o-furo,” or “honorable bathtub,” a sacred
part of the bathing ritual of the Japanese. She writes, “Have I told you
we bathe in a Japanese tub? Every night a hot, very hot wooden box
over three feet deep is filled for us … It seems all right and I regret all
the years our country went without bath tubs.”33 By exchanging her
shoes for slippers upon entering any building and soaking in the Japanese
o-furo, Alice feels rather than only imagines a new definition of “clean.”
Even after dedicating much of their personal and professional lives to
experiential education at the Chicago Laboratory School, both Alice and
John further comprehend the emotional and physical impact of experi-
ence by living in Japan and China; their conversations surrounding such
experience undoubtedly influenced John’s later philosophical works,
in which his earlier beliefs about the importance of experience become
firm convictions regarding the necessity of experience in understanding
difference.
Alice’s correspondence reveals a more contemplative approach to their
experiences of nature and art than John’s letters do; in a letter to the
Dewey children, for example, Alice describes the “wonderful temples of
enormous size, of natural wood filled with paintings and sculptures of
an ancient and unknown kind … a combination of nature and art as one
dreams of” and temples that “fascinate to the point of feeling there must
be many more worlds when such multiplicity of ideas and feelings can
exist on a single planet, and we live unconscious of the whole of it or
even any part of its extent.” And while at first, she cannot see the beauty
of the popular screens in Japan, after some time, her descriptions begin
to shift, as she reveals in a letter to the Dewey children, “The kakemonas
and the screens and the makemonas … are wonderful and I am glad to
say that we have got over seeing them as grotesque and we feel their
32 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, February 28, 1919 (10738) The Correspondence
of John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
33 Alice Dewey to the Dewey children, April 1, 1919 (10745) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
150 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
34 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 15, 1919 (10751) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
35 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, February 11, 1919 (13873) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
36 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 19, 1919 (10752) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
37 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, April 27, 1919 (03893) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
38 Alice Dewey to Dewey children, February 10, 1919 (10735) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 151
39 Alice Dewey to Albert C. Barnes, August 19, 1920 (04099) The Correspondence of
John Dewey (electronic resource) (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1999–2004).
152 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
In later years, Alice continued not only to validate but also to expand
the scope of John’s confidence in pragmatism as a guiding philosophy
while they experienced life as foreigners in Asia for two years. In Asia,
as with the Laboratory School, Alice and John revised and rebuilt their
expectations about otherness, this time by immersing themselves into
a new and sometimes uncomfortable setting. Unlike John, Alice expe-
rienced Japan and China as a woman, mother, and elementary school
teacher, which arguably encouraged John to consider both the treatment
of women and the education of children in new ways, and bolstered the
open-mindedness of his pragmatism. Their extensive correspondence
with their children during this time period demonstrates the rhetorical
strategies by which Alice relays her various experiences to her husband,
and John’s later works reveal the extent to which these communications
had an impact on his thinking.
As various historians, friends and associates, and even the Deweys’ own
children have pointed out, Alice perpetually drew her husband out of his
own mind and into the world around him. She was a driving force that
helped him to realize that merely considering great concepts does not
lead to greater awareness of those concepts. Actually creating, inventing,
exploring, and experiencing them, on the other hand, results in the kind
of openness of mind that fosters understanding of otherness and advances
social issues. Under this interpretation, it is clear that Alice demonstrated
the workings of a consummate pragmatist whose efforts at home and
abroad should not be overlooked. Her efforts to realize gender-equal,
experiential education by co-creating the University of Chicago
Laboratory School, combined with her suffrage work and personal
experiences in the face of genuine difference in Asia, opened countless
minds, including John’s, to the epistemic nature of experience. Through
her time in Chicago, Japan, and China, Alice proved herself to be the
practitioner of John’s theories about education and open- mindedness.
Throughout their lives together, John and Alice came not only to know,
but more importantly to feel, that pragmatism is a philosophy that makes
things happen.
Although Alice did not receive the credit that she deserved in con-
tributing to John’s philosophical insights and contemplations, he himself
must have been aware of the influence that she had on his conclusions
regarding the power of pragmatism to help members of a society attain
knowledge and openness of mind. As John writes in The Public and Its
Problems, “Nothing has been discovered which acts in entire isolation.
154 K. SHEA AND K. MANKE
References
Dewey, Alice. 1903. “The Place of the Kindergarten.” The Elementary School
Teacher 3 (5): 273–288.
Dewey, John. 1899. The School and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
———. 1910. How We Think. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co.
———. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. New York: H. Holt and Company.
Durst, Anne. 2010. Women Educators in the Progressive Era: The Women Behind
Dewey’s Laboratory School. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dyehouse Jeremiah, and Krysten Manke. 2017. “The Philosopher as Parent:
John Dewey’s Observations of His Children’s Language Development and
the Development of His Thinking About Communication.” Education and
Culture 33 (1): 3–22.
Enoch, Jessica. 2008. Refiguring Rhetorical Education: Women Teaching
African American, Native American, and Chicano/a Students, 1865–1911.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Hickman, Larry A. 2009. John Dewey Between Pragmatism and Constructivism.
New York: Fordham University.
James, William. 1995. Pragmatism. New York: Dover Publications.
Katherine Camp Mayhew Papers, #6561. Division of Rare and Manuscript
Collections, Cornell University Library.
Knoll, Michael. 2014. “Laboratory School, University of Chicago.” In
Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy, edited by D. C. Phillips,
455–458. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
6 LIVING PRAGMATISM: ALICE DEWEY’S OPEN-MINDED … 155
Jeremy Smyczek
In The Public and Its Problems, John Dewey famously writes, “The essential
need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of
debate, discussion, and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. We
have asserted that this improvement depends essentially on freeing and per-
fecting the processes of inquiry and the dissemination of their conclusions”
(1927 [1954], 208). In the passage, Dewey neatly combines a number of
his central and always-interrelated concerns: communication, deliberation,
logic, science, and education. Successful communication is enabled by bet-
ter information, the product of good-faith inquiry into the problems that
arise in human experience. Read thus, two of Dewey’s seemingly contra-
dictory impulses—a lionization of democracy and communication and an
ostensible affection for technocracy—become expressions of appreciation
for problem-solving endeavors springing from a common origin in the
experience of humans dealing with uncertainty. William Keith and Robert
Danisch (2014) explain that Dewey used the term “science” to mean both
“the professional practices of those who pursue knowledge, not for its own
J. Smyczek (*)
St. Bonaventure University, Allegany, NY, USA
e-mail: jsmyczek@sbu.edu
Likewise, Dewey was doubtful about efforts to “prove” anything via for-
mal logical propositions divorced from the empirical content of a specific
unresolved situation. Use of such theory “is formal only in the sense of
being empty and mechanical. It neither reflects existence already known
nor forwards inquiry into what may be known. It is a logical vermiform
appendix” (198). Yet because so much science outreach proceeds from
rationalist models of persuasion that appeal to objective universals of rea-
son and argument, it is apparent that Deweyan pragmatism is in short
supply in this genre of published writing. In looking for pragmatist sci-
ence outreach, we would look for writing that minimizes or eschews
such strategies.
Nevertheless, I will propose that there is science outreach that oper-
ates upon pragmatic rather than rationalist principles, and as an exam-
ple, I offer selections from the work of the moral psychologist Jonathan
Haidt as examples of such outreach. Haidt both models science com-
munication that is both pragmatic in the general sense of being effec-
tive but also in the historically specific sense that Haidt is consciously
applying the work of William James. Based on his opposition to naive
realism, philosophical monism, and rationalism, his assiduous emphasis
on living beings negotiating a world of sense and meaning, his interest
in elevated, “peak,” experiences, and his generally unnoticed citations of
James (James is quoted at length in Haidt’s major works and on occa-
sion echoes James’ language), I want to situate Haidt’s writings within
the extended philosophical context of American pragmatism. Finally, I
suggest that by looking for pragmatists outside of the traditional lines of
transmission within philosophy departments, we may help to ameliorate
debates about the extent to which pragmatism goes into periodic eclipse.
My claim, though, is somewhat heterodox: although Haidt cites James
but not Dewey, he uses science to provide practical tools for everyday
living and to promote improved democratic deliberation in the service of
Dewey’s democratic and melioristic project. I will first introduce Haidt’s
work and contextualize my claim that Haidt should be considered a
160 J. SMYCZEK
Rationalist models made sense in the 1960s and 1970s. The cognitive rev-
olution had opened up new ways of thinking about morality and moral
development, and it was surely an advance to think about moral judgment
as a form of information processing. But times have changed. Now we
know (again) that most of cognition occurs automatically and outside of
consciousness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) and that people cannot tell us
how they really reached a judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Now we
know that the brain is a connectionist system that tunes up slowly but is
then able to evaluate complex situations quickly (Bechtel & Abrahamsen,
1991). Now we know that emotions are not as irrational (Frank, 1988),
that reasoning is not as reliable (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), and that
animals are not as amoral (de Waal. 1996) as we thought in the 1970s.
The time may be right, therefore, to take another look at Hume’s perverse
thesis: that moral emotions and intuitions drive moral reasoning, just as
surely as a dog wags its tail. (830)
For Haidt, the answer is that religion has positive affiliations with human
happiness, and that “a society that utterly ignored the ethic of divin-
ity would be ugly and unsatisfying” (211). He adds that, “If religious
people are right in believing that religion is the source of their great-
est happiness, then maybe the rest of us who are looking for happiness
and meaning can learn something from them, whether or not we believe
in God” (211). In other words, religion has “cash-value in experiential
terms.” It offers benefits that are practical and social, and in this regard,
Haidt closely mirrors James’ thought.
166 J. SMYCZEK
Because The Happiness Hypothesis is, like most popular science books,
an ambitious synthesis of hundreds of books and peer-reviewed articles,
James may not initially seem to have outsized influence on the argu-
ment. I think, however, even though the first discussion of James is both
lengthy and laudatory, that James looms still larger in the work than is
apparent on a casual reading. Beyond the fact that both specific discus-
sions situate James as a still-valuable starting point for research on expe-
rience and perception, Haidt’s conclusion that “happiness comes from
between” and is neither a purely internal condition nor a quest for exte-
rior goods—that in fact, this internal–external boundary is both arbitrary
and malleable—is a solvent that ameliorates reason–emotion, East–West,
religion–philosophy, thought–action binaries in ways that deserve to be
described as pragmatist in their treatment of these concepts (238).
Haidt cites James three more times in 2012s The Righteous Mind: Why
Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, his longest work and,
in its attempt to understand and ameliorate the more vitriolic aspects of
the contemporary US culture wars, Haidt’s project that is most osten-
sibly focused on rhetoric and communication. Haidt frames the book’s
purpose in three interrelated ways that strike me as broadly Deweyan
in their orientation, despite Haidt’s reliance on James and unfamiliarity
with Dewey. The first is to alleviate conflict through applied intelligence.
Haidt asserts, “My goal in this book is to draw some of the heat, anger
and divisiveness out of these topics and replace them with awe, won-
der, and curiosity” (xii). The second is to encourage more effective and
democratic communication. Haidt writes, “My hope is that this book
will make conversations about morality, politics, and religion more com-
mon, more civil, and more fun, even in mixed company. My hope is that
it will help us to get along” (xii). The third is to extol the valuation of
many perspectives in ways that lead to interconnectedness and coopera-
tion combined with checks and balances rather than violence and coer-
cion. Haidt shares that “When I was a teenager I wished for world peace,
but now I yearn for a world in which competing ideologies are kept in
balance, systems of accountability keep us all from getting away with
too much, and fewer people believe that righteous ends justify violent
means” (xiii).
To achieve those ends, Haidt uses James in a variety of ways. First,
in “Elephants Rule,” an expansion of the elephant-rider metaphor intro-
duced in The Happiness Hypothesis, Haidt contends that babies enter into
life unable to easily map and categorize the stimuli in the world around
7 THE ACCIDENTAL PRAGMATIST: JONATHAN HAIDT’S MORAL … 167
But even if one agrees with Harris’s normative views, would the reduction
of all morality to harm help us understand how morality actually works?
Or Would it be (to paraphrase William James) another attempt to clean up
the litter the world actually contains? A monist model in which all moral
judgments(even those based on explicitly harmless transgressions) are pro-
duced by a single mental process (perceptions of intentional dyadic harm)
cleans up much of the “litter” of empirically observed moral life, and in
this cleaning suffers as a scientific description of morality.
170 J. SMYCZEK
In this final citation, Haidt frames both the positive features of his
descriptive model of ethics as derived from James as well as his oppo-
sition to reductionist and rationalist prescriptive models. Moreover, by
adding a third of James’ major works to his growing list of citations,
Haidt indicates an ongoing and evolving relationship with the great
pragmatist thinker.
Answering Objections
Next, I want to consider some objections to the definitional claim that
has been made thus far. My contention is that the definition is a pro-
ductive one in that, by following the ways pragmatists are cited by
those off the direct line of descent from accepted pragmatists, we gain
a method for assessing the pragmatist canon as well as a new take on the
rhetorical analysis of scientific outreach. Although there will be signifi-
cant differences between Haidt and any currently canonical pragmatist,
these differences need not be fatal to the argument: differences exist, of
course, between any two pragmatists who are rough contemporaries or
between the pragmatism of early scholars such as James and Dewey and
neo-pragmatists such as Rorty and Fish. Given the thoroughgoing com-
mitment to pluralism demonstrated by pragmatist thinkers, uniformity of
perspective has never seemed much of a goal. Nevertheless, there must
be some evidence, some test-in-experience that would work against a
claim of similarity between any two things to be worth debating. What
kind of arguments might problematize such a suggestion?
First, we might consider James’ status as a seminal figure in American
psychology. Although Haidt’s citations of James are weighty and indi-
cate a significant influence relative to his other sources, it could be the
case that a broad survey of similar works—that is to say popular books
written by psychologists—might show that Haidt cites James neither
more frequently nor meaningfully on average than other practitioners of
his discipline of psychology or sub-disciplines of positive or moral psy-
chology. While it appears that Haidt’s commitment to James’ theory
of religion and moral pluralism take Haidt outside of the mainstream
of popular writing about psychology, it might be conceded that such a
finding would, nevertheless, undermine the distinction—that Haidt is
“doing” pragmatism—that has been proposed. Nevertheless, that might
be a battle lost on the way to a war won: if James is or other pragma-
tists are cited more frequently in psychology than scholars of rhetoric
7 THE ACCIDENTAL PRAGMATIST: JONATHAN HAIDT’S MORAL … 171
The spirit of his description is, then, that our abstractions do not sub-
stitute for the living experiences that they represent in shorthand. Haidt
seems to avoid situating the foundations as anything other than useful
criteria based in other useful criteria, names given to cognitive responses
humans experience as beings that evolved in certain evolutionary con-
texts. Human capacities for moral feeling and judgment are then not
discontinuous with those of other animals; they have been shaped by
and they shape the material exigencies of live creatures in a world of
things, always navigating the interplay between biology and environ-
ment, innate and trained capacities, to solve the problems contained
therein.
Lastly, I want to address the question of definitional rigor. Defined
loosely enough, of course, everyone is a pragmatist in a very general
sense of the word: we all devote substantial thought applying our intelli-
gence to improve problematic situations, and it should come as no spe-
cial surprise that a psychologist is interested in providing people with a
toolkit for better living. The social sciences in general and psychology
in particular have long been interested in human happiness more than
the secrets of the cosmos, almost by definition. It is true that, from
the founders of the pragmatic tradition such as James and Dewey, that
there has been a strain of pragmatism in social science that one is less
likely to find in, say, the popular works of physicists (Shook). Taking
note of Haidt’s claim that rationalist arguments in popular science tend
to be more the province of the physical sciences than the social ones,
I’ve nevertheless tried to offer criteria that engage existing arguments
about the lines of hereditary transmission, practical method, and the-
oretical orientation that define the pragmatist canon in order to claim
that Haidt’s public outreach efforts are pragmatic in both the melio-
ristic sense of using intelligence as a tool to improve human situations
as well engaging with the philosophical tradition of pragmatism. But
I offer an additional word to Hickman (2009), who writes, “if you
look to the sciences, the humanities, and the arts as informing and
informed by philosophical inquiry and thus as sources of philosoph-
ical insight and renewal—then you are aligned with the program of
American Pragmatism” (3). It certainly seems that Haidt’s work fits that
description well.
7 THE ACCIDENTAL PRAGMATIST: JONATHAN HAIDT’S MORAL … 173
Conclusion
Much of the scholarship on pragmatism speaks in tropes of eclipse and
revival, ebb and flow. West writes in 1988 that “A small-scale intellec-
tual renascence is occurring under the broad banner of pragmatism” (3).
Dickstein writes in 1998 that “The revival of pragmatism has excited
enormous interest and controversy in the intellectual community over
the past two decades” (1). Nevertheless, this conception is hotly con-
tested by Shook, who offers the following rejoinder:
There has been much talk of pragmatism’s “eclipse” during analytic phi-
losophy’s greatest dominance from 1950 to 1990. The myth must be
corrected: pragmatism was never eclipsed … Already quite marginalized in
the 1920s and 1930s, the handful of pragmatist professors such as Dewey
at Columbia and Mead at Chicago encouraged many of their students to
go into psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, education, and
economics. Many of the best new minds favorable towards pragmatism
strongly influenced the social sciences during the 1940s - 1980s.
own, and knowledge in any given field is so vast that it is hard to claim
general command of any one discipline, let alone several. But it is worth
noting that despite writing about political and religious divisions in the
United States that are poorly addressed by current argumentative strate-
gies, Haidt cites pragmatists but not a single theorist of rhetoric besides
Aristotle, and even then cites only the Nichomachean Ethics. The idea
that interpersonal conflict, ethical values, and public deliberation can be
spoken about through multiple academic lenses both historically and in
the present is obvious; the idea that pragmatism offers a natural bridge
between modern discussions of ethics, psychology, and communication
is perhaps less so. Looking at how different thinkers in largely isolated
fields continue to use pragmatism to advance their individual projects can
not only expand our conceptions of whom we might call a pragmatist
but may also offer a point of common ground between those looking to
better understand the relationship between thought and communication.
References
Berg, Chris. 2012. “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?” Review of The Righteous
Mind, by Jonathan Haidt. Institute of Public Affairs Review 64 (2): 60–62.
http://ipa.org.au.
Cavell, Stanley. 2009. “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”
In The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and
Culture, edited by Morris Dickstein, 72–82. Durham: Duke University Press.
Christensen, Bryce. 2012. “Review of The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are
Divided by Politics and Religion, by Jonathan Haidt.” Booklist, 6. March 15.
Crick, Nathan. 2010. Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts of
Becoming. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Dewey, John. 1927 [1954]. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt.
———. 1934 [2005]. Art as Experience. New York: Perigee.
———. 1938 [1949]. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt.
DeWitt, Iain. 2013. “Moral Matter.” Review of Braintrust by Patricia
Churchland, The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt, Why Everyone (Else) Is a
Hypocrite by Robert Kurzban, and Who’s in Charge? by Michael S. Gazzaniga.
The American Interest 8 (4): 72–79.
Dickstein, Morris, ed. 1998. The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social
Thought, Law, and Culture. Durham: Duke University Press.
Fromm, Harold. 2013. “Groping for Groups.” Review of The Righteous Mind:
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, by Jonathan Haidt.
Hudson Review 65 (4): 652–658. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43489291.
7 THE ACCIDENTAL PRAGMATIST: JONATHAN HAIDT’S MORAL … 175
Amy E. Dayton
1 The Diaz interview is part of a collection of oral histories taken in the 1980s to gather
the recollections of people who worked or participated in the settlement activities and who
interacted with Addams.
A. E. Dayton (*)
The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA
e-mail: adayton@ua.edu
for me, because I went talking to her in [that] manner” (4).2 But instead of
dismissing her, Addams “began listening … and the more [Diaz talked]—
the more she asked about things” (6). As Diaz and Addams talked, their
conversation spanned Diaz’ education in Mexico, her life in the United
States, her family, her work as a teacher, and more. This encounter was the
beginning of a long association marked by frequent visits and much conver-
sation that Diaz still remembered fondly, many decades later.
Addams’ published work also demonstrates her love of listening. In
fact, it is the impetus for her book The Long Road of Woman’s Memory
(2002), which begins with an account of one summer at Hull House
when local residents became caught up in a wild rumor that there was
a possessed “Devil Baby” living at the settlement.3 For six weeks dur-
ing that summer, people called the settlement and came to its doors,
demanding to see the baby and refusing to believe that it did not exist,
despite staff members’ denials. Although Addams recognized the clamor
over the Devil Baby as a form of group hysteria; she nonetheless found
herself compelled to talk—and listen—to some of the residents who
came to see it. As she puts it, “when I heard the high eager voices of old
women, I was irresistibly interested and left anything I might be doing
in order to listen to them” (9). While they came out to see the mythical
baby, the women lingered to share their own stories of marital strife, mis-
carriage, loss of children, and trauma. Sharing these stories allowed them
to protest the trauma and loss they had experienced, and to scold and
teach the younger generation. As William Duffy puts it, Addams saw that
the women’s stories “served to legitimate experience [and] gave them
power to speak… from positions of knowledge and authority” (2011, 6).
By sharing their stories, women could reinterpret and transform their
2 The conflict that prompted Diaz to confront Addams was a racialized incident. The
local children believed they were turned away because they were Mexican. Addams told Diaz
that all children were welcome but that Hull House was open to children only for specific
hours of the day when children’s programming was taking place. Stories like Diaz raise ques-
tions about how racial conflicts might have played out at Hull House, but unfortunately do
not answer that question.
3 Several versions of the story circulated among the various ethnic groups that comprised
the Hull House community, but the essential details of the tale were as follows: a young
couple was expecting a baby and had a fight when the woman attempted to hang pictures
of the saints on their wall. Her husband yelled that he would rather have a “devil for a
baby” than religious pictures in his home. Upon his curse, the child was transformed into a
demon. After its birth, it was brought to Hull House to be baptized and cared for.
8 JANE ADDAMS’ RHETORICAL EAR: TEACHING, LEARNING … 179
story (in Twenty Years at Hull House) about a visitor to the settlement
who criticizes it for being un-American. As the man looks around the
settlement at artwork that celebrates the new immigrants’ cultures, he
complains that Hull House is promoting “foreign views” (1961, 71).
Addams listens to the man’s concerns, then responds by gently pointing
out that the artwork at Hull House is meant to be “a familiar island to
the immigrants in a sea of new and strange impressions.” Her comments
spark a sympathetic response from the man, who admits that he feels the
same way when he encounters “Yankee notions” from his home [back
East]. Rather than judging or overtly criticizing the man’s rejection of
“foreign” art, Addams invites him to place himself in the role of immi-
grant or outsider. Because she recounts the story in her memoir, we the
readers also get to “listen in” on this conversation and to imagine our-
selves as part of the larger dialogue about what it means to be American,
and about what we should expect from new citizens. Through exchanges
like these, Addams shows the reader that the act of listening is essential
to the work of interpreting America to its newcomers, and vice versa, and
that thoughtful listening can lead to increased cooperation and tolerance.
In her book, The Dissonance of Democracy, political theorist Susan
Bickford (1996) argues that an understanding of listening is critical to any
theory of political action. Far from being a passive activity, “listening,”
writes Bickford, “is a creative act, one that involves conscious effort”
(144). Krista Ratcliffe (2005) notes that historically, western rhetor-
ical theories have neglected the art of listening. Listening is often seen
as a feminine practice, and thus, less important than speaking; moreover,
dominant cultural groups have not historically seen a need to listen to
people of color or the working class, though the opposite is not true (21).
Ratcliffe promotes the practice of rhetorical listening—“a stance of open-
ness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text,
or culture,” especially “in cross-cultural exchanges” (2005, 1). When we
approach a text or situation with a stance of rhetorical listening:
empathy for the man is not “naïve,” but rather, strategically designed to
prompt reflection. Rather than passively accepting his criticism of Hull
House, she gently argues for what she believes is “fair and just.”
To practice listening in a rhetorical fashion involves seeking to under-
stand ourselves and others, and to be accountable for our actions. It
means finding ways to identify with others without smoothing over or
erasing differences. And finally, it requires that we seek to understand the
other people’s claims as well as “the cultural logics in which these claims
function” (Ratcliffe 2005, 26). As Wayne Booth (2004) puts it, listening
rhetorically is an ethical practice that transforms the act of persuasion,
from a one-directional process to a reciprocal one that sparks change
from both speaker and listening. Listening rhetorically requires “not just
seeking a truce” but “[pursuing] the truth behind our differences” (46).
It requires that “both sides [pursue] not just victory but a new real-
ity, a new agreement about what is real” (47). Seen through this lens,
Addams’ responses to conflicts such as the Devil Baby incident, or visi-
tor who criticized Hull House’s “foreign” influences, offer a good model
of rhetorical listening. She seeks to achieve identification with others
without negating her differences with them, and she looks for ways to
connect individuals’ experiences to the larger social tensions playing out
around them. And she expects that rhetorical engagement will lead to
change from both parties. Addams herself was changed and moved by
the time she spent listening to the women who came looking for the
Devil Baby. The settlement’s image and mission is shaped through the
interaction of the residents and their neighbors, and through rhetorical
exchanges like those that Addams shares with local women, with Marie
Diaz, with the visitor to Hull House, and with many others.
5 There were some exceptions, as labor unions and other progressive groups taught
classes designed to promote activism. Pedagogically speaking, however, even these ideo-
logically liberal programs were not necessarily more progressive than the more conservative
courses operated in the factories and the public schools.
186 A. E. DAYTON
Hull House pedagogy had multiple aims: to help students lead produc-
tive, meaningful lives; to prepare them to be active participants in a social
democracy; and to allow them to make productive use of their experience.
For Addams, a pedagogy of civic engagement should not create sepa-
rate classes of people, or segregate the poor into vocational or manually
learning programs that solidified their place within the working class, but
rather, should “connect [the student] with all sorts of people by his ability
to understand them” (1961, 285). In other words, Addams sees educa-
tion as a critical tool for forging connections—between groups and classes
of people, as well as between individuals and their larger communities.
The Hull House model was built on real-world inquiries into civic and
social problems. It invited learners to participate in exploring, understand-
ing, and addressing those problems by bringing them in conversation
with one another and with other members of the larger community. For
Addams and her colleagues, good pedagogical practice requires rhetorical
engagement. Moreover, following Dewey’s maxim that “education is not
preparation for life, it is life itself,” Addams believes that all the activities
of Hull House should serve an educational function.
Addams is critical of pedagogies that place students in a passive role and
encourage students to listen passively. When a child arrives in a traditional
school, “The first thing that [he] must do … is to sit still, at least part of
the time, and … learn to listen … with all the perplexity of listening to
a foreign tongue” (1907, 185).6 Public schools, in other words, encour-
aged an a-rhetorical form of listening—one that was disconnected from the
broader social world, and that placed students in a passive role as recepta-
cles of new information, not possessors of pre-existing knowledge. Addams
faults public schools both for operating in isolation from the larger com-
munity and for offering rhetorical instruction that is removed from stu-
dents’ lived experiences: They force students to write about dull topics
unrelated to their own experience, “and [students] patiently accept this
uninteresting information because they expect ‘education’ to be dull and
hard. There seems to be a belief among educators that it is not possible for
the mass of mankind to have experiences which are of themselves worth
anything” (1994, 85–86). Rather than wanting to listen quietly, Addams
says, students desired to “express in the newly acquired tongue some of
6 Addams and Dewey make similar critiques of the public schools. In Democracy and
Education, Dewey criticizes schools for “the great premium put upon listening, reading, and
the reproduction of what is told and read” (1916, 155).
188 A. E. DAYTON
the hopes and longing which had so much to do with their emigration”
(1961, 285). In other words, they want to be listened to and heard.
In the settlement house context, numerous barriers to listening exist.
One barrier was a traditional mode of pedagogy which did not allow for
much interaction between student and teacher. Another was a literal lan-
guage barrier, since Hull House residents did not always speak their neigh-
bors’ language. Another barrier was cultural misunderstanding. For all of
these reasons, the acts of translation and interpretation—acts that turn the
passive process of listening into an active process of engagement—became
central to the settlement’s mission. Addams frequently suggests that trans-
lation is one of the most important activities that settlements can foster;
the role of the settlement, says Addams, is to “interpret democracy in
social terms” (1961, 83). In turn, for second generation immigrants who
have been assimilated, their job is to become “transmitter[s]” and “help-
er[s]”, who “teach the entire family and [form] a connection between
them and the outside world, interpreting [emphasis added] political
speeches and newspapers and eagerly transforming [native] customs into
American ones” (1994, 81). Emphasizing translation and interpretation—
whether linguistic interpretation or cultural interpretation—is a means by
which the settlement promoted active, reciprocal forms of listening.
For Addams and her fellow pragmatists, however, the most important
means by which to transform passive listening into meaningful, recip-
rocal classroom engagement, is to make productive use of experience.
Listening to students means creating opportunities for them to share
and interpret their experiences. Addams draws on Dewey’s belief (drawn
in turn from William James), that experience is both active and passive,
a central component in how knowledge is made and how we come to
understand the world. As Dewey (1916) puts it,
but made little progress; ultimately, Addams says, “It has been possible
to teach some of these women to feed their children oatmeal instead of
tea-soaked bread, but it has been done, not by statements at all, but by
a series of gay little Sunday morning breakfasts” (1961, 67–68; 1994,
89). In fact, Addams frequently suggests that embodied listening trumps
any kind of lectures or statements that the settlement workers could
make. She envisions classes in which Americans would teach English to
immigrants while the immigrants teach them how to make Italian pasta,
or how to handle tools and materials. As in the Labor Museum, this
approach makes learning “a comparatively easy thing” because students
are learning something new while conducting a physical activity (cooking,
for instance) that is already familiar to them (1994, 121).
I have argued that in its pedagogical approach, Hull House—
especially its Labor Museum, offered a space that redefined listening as
a reciprocal, embodied process with the potential to foster civic progress
through rhetorical engagement. In Twenty Years at Hull House and her
various essays on education, Addams illustrates the importance of this
specific kind of listening. But she also conveys her commitment to lis-
tening implicitly, through her use of narrative as a tool for teaching. Her
use of narrative and autobiography shows us what the process of rhetori-
cal listening can look, especially when it is accompanied by the reflection
that is required to make sense of experience. Addams frequently takes the
approach of sharing an experience from the settlement, and then walking
the reader through the process of reflection that allows her to learn from
it. She does this even when her stories don’t paint her in the best light,
illustrating her willingness to be uncertain and to work from contingent
truths. One example is the story of a man who comes to the settlement
to request aid for his family. Addams gently suggests that he should look
for work before seeking charity, and points him toward an opportunity
to work on a local drainage canal. After two days of work, she reports, he
collapses and died of pneumonia. Addams says: “I have never lost trace
of the two little children he left behind him, although I cannot see them
without a bitter consciousness that it was at their expense I learned that
life cannot be administered by definite rules and regulations” (1961,
108). Through this unfortunate experience, Addams recognizes the flaws
in a “charity” model that faults the poor while it purports to help them.
In contrast to this model, she points out that she has often been struck
“with the kindness of the poor to each other; the woman who lives
192 A. E. DAYTON
upstairs will willingly share her breakfast with the family below because
she knows they are ‘hard up’” (108). She connects these observations
to some emerging research on unemployment among the working class,
synthesizing her experience with the more abstract knowledge of expert
research. Addams is willing to model her own process of listening, reflec-
tion, and learning, even when that process implicates her in some of the
social problems that she critiques.
Addams’ use of narrative and reflection place the audience in the posi-
tion of listener and learner—perhaps more so than that of reader. After
all, reading is an act that is marked by separation between writer and
audience. Listening, on the other hand, involves personal, immediate
interaction with our interlocutors. Though her future audience cannot
have first-hand experience of Hull House, Addams’ narratives provide
a window in these experiences. For O’Rourke (2014), this use of sto-
rytelling reflects Addams’ philosophical stance and her educational phi-
losophy: “Addams’ use of storytelling rather than objective analysis …
exemplifies her philosophical position that abstractions are best defined
by daily actions” (36). Addams not only promotes a pragmatist, feminist
style of rhetorical and pedagogical engagement, she models it in her own
writing.
Conclusion
Jane Addams’ Hull House represents a unique space—historically, a sig-
nificant social movement that attempted to redefine democracy to fit
the changing needs of an increasing diverse, industrial, and urban soci-
ety; rhetorically, a movement that championed new methods for talk-
ing, listening, and communicating across social and cultural divides;
and pedagogically, as a model that brought these social and rhetorical
goals into the classroom and made them an explicit focus for teaching
and learning. Jane Addams was troubled by the wide gap between the
social classes, which was a function of geographical, cultural, and rhetor-
ical/ideological differences. If citizens were to overcome those divides, it
was necessary not only to find new means of rhetorical engagement but
also to learn how to use those new methods—to find spaces where stu-
dents could study social issues, discuss solutions, and practice engaging
in debate and discussion that could lead to social change. It is true, as
critics have pointed out, that the Hull House model of public pedagogy
8 JANE ADDAMS’ RHETORICAL EAR: TEACHING, LEARNING … 193
sometimes fell short, and that settlement workers were sometimes una-
ware of their own biases and limitations. Despite its limitations, how-
ever, the settlement represents an educational model that was unlike any
other of its day, and that continues to shape our understanding of what
community-based rhetorical instruction can achieve. It was quintessen-
tial pragmatist in its emphasis on individual experience and concrete con-
sequences. It foreshadows feminist efforts to give voice to women, the
working-class, and other marginalized groups. It illustrates the potential
for rhetorical and pedagogical engagement to contribute to a more just,
robust democracy for all.
References
Addams, Jane. 1902. First Report of the Labor Museum at Hull House, Chicago,
1901–1902, 1–16. https://hullhouse.uic.edu/hull/urbanexp/main.cgi?-
file=new/show_doc.ptt&doc=293&chap=61.
———. 1907 [1964]. Democracy and Social Ethics, edited by Anne Firor Scott.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1912a. “A Modern Lear.” Survey 29 (5): 131–37.
———. 1912b [1961]. Twenty Years at Hull House. New York: Penguin, Signet
Classic.
———. 1916 [2002]. The Long Road of Woman’s Memory. Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
———. 1994. On Education. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Bickford, Susan. 1996. The Dissonance of Democracy: Listening, Conflict, and
Citizenship. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Booth, Wayne. 2004. The Rhetoric of Rhetoric: The Quest for Effective
Communication. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Carlson, Robert A. 1975. The Quest for Conformity: Americanization Through
Education. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Carson, Mina. 1990. Social Thought and the American Social Settlement, 1885–
1930. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Ceraso, Steph. 2014. “(Re-)Educating the Senses. Multimodal Listening, Bodily
Learning, and the Composition of Sonic Experiences.” College English 77 (2):
102–123.
Cremin, Lawrence. 1961. The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in
American Education, 1876–1957. New York: Vintage.
Danisch, Robert. 2007. Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric.
Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press.
194 A. E. DAYTON
Daniel P. Richards
D. P. Richards (*)
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
e-mail: dprichar@odu.edu
what Ulrich Beck (1999) coins our “world risk society.” For Bennett,
this means thinking more inclusively about our political ecologies, which,
in the key ontological shift marked by posthumanist and new materi-
alist thinkers, now require more thorough theorization about the role
of nonhuman entities in our political lives—entities that were indeed
acknowledged as part of publics but left under-theorized by Dewey, part
of Latour’s (1992) lamentable “missing masses” (225). Faulty power
grids, deepwater carbon deposits, litter, pesticides—all co-constitute
our public spaces and affect and are affected by human agency. This is
in no small part an aspect of Hickman’s articulation of pragmatism as a
post-postmodern enterprise able to address the questions postmodernism
left unresolved (14).
This chapter delves into Bennett’s specific project on political ecol-
ogies and positions her work as inherently pragmatist, not only in its
explicit use of Dewey to think more holistically about the human and
nonhuman co-constitution of publics, but moreover in its move toward
using this vision of publics to facilitate a more prudent, socially respon-
sible communicative approach in the context of risk, accidents, and dis-
asters. More than just engaging in definitional work, this chapter deploys
Bennett’s theory of vital materialism to articulate a more prudent way
to engage with the troubling prospect of communicating causality and
blame in disasters, using the Deepwater Horizon blowout and subse-
quent oil spill of 2010 as an example. In doing so, this chapter furthers
the conversation of communicative prudence in the context of risk com-
munication in the ever-changing role of risk in changing political cul-
ture (Danisch 2010) and reasserts the importance of moving beyond the
inadequate postmodern toolkit (Latour 2004) to address technoscien-
tific problems currently facing rhetoricians and communication scholars.
When it comes to ecological disasters such as Deepwater Horizon, chalk-
ing fault and blame up to miscommunication or organizational disjuncts
is losing usefulness in the larger role of science in our everyday lives.
Attention to new materialist approaches, which call to mind pragmatist
principles and impulses, is allowing us more and more to think forward
about improving our relations across ontological lines through renewed
forms of communication.
But before moving on, it is worthwhile to pause for a moment on my
phrasing above, that new materialist approaches “call to mind” pragma-
tist principles and impulses. I realize that this chapter is not digging dil-
igently through the canon to dust off a lost figure with clear pragmatist
9 EMERGENT PUBLICS, PUBLIC EMERGENCIES: THE IMPORTANCE … 199
culminating into the argument that Bennett has indeed been to this
point an overlooked or under-defined pragmatist and that, as articulated
in the conclusion, much is to be gained by reading Bennett and pragma-
tism together.
Bennett broaches this question not from the perspective of protest rhet-
orics or engineering inquiry or media messaging but from a philosoph-
ical standpoint of ontology. A political theorist, Bennett is certainly
concerned with crafting more responsible environmental policy; how-
ever, this position is predicated on the argument that the reason why we
might not have the best extant policies to date is precisely because we
have not been attentive enough to the complexity involved in the pre-
cipitation of public events, specifically ecological and technoscientific
disasters. This complexity of causality hinges upon questions of agency
as Bennett asks us to think slowly through the idea that matter itself is
“passive stuff” and instead consider the proposition that our material
surroundings are imbued with a vitality—“thing power”—that philos-
ophy, by and large up until recent surges in new materialist and post-
human thinkers, has overlooked. Bruno Latour refers to this work as
uncovering philosophy’s and sociology’s “missing masses.” While not
Bennett’s lone focus, disasters are apt exigencies for this project since
they act as ruptures that allow her to “highlight the active role of nonhu-
man materials in public life” (2).
Bennett proffers a genealogy (in the Neitzschean sense) exploring
the vitality of nonhuman things beginning well before the posthuman
project of Donna Haraway or the anthropological and science and tech-
nology studies (STS) Actor-Network Theory project of Bruno Latour
and John Law to the work of Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics published post-
humously in 1677. There, readers find an ecologically minded Spinoza
9 EMERGENT PUBLICS, PUBLIC EMERGENCIES: THE IMPORTANCE … 201
When the materiality of the glove, the rat, the pollen, the bottle cap, and
the stick started to shimmer and spark, it was in part because of the con-
tingent tableau that they formed with each other, with the street, with the
weather that morning, with me. For had the sun not glinted on the black
glove, I might not have seen the rat; had the rat not been there, I might
not have noted the bottle cap, and so on. But they were all there just as
they were, and so I caught a glimpse of an energetic vitality inside each of
these things, things that I generally conceived as inert. In this assemblage,
objects appeared as things, that is, as vivid entities not entirely exhausted by
their semiotics. (5)
[T]here is not so much a doer (an agent) behind the deed [blackout] as a
doing and an effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage. This federation
of actants is a creature that the concept of moral responsibility fits only
loosely and to which the charge of blame will not quite stick. (28, empha-
sis added)
Investigators still do not understand why the cascade ever stopped itself,
after affecting 50 million people over approximately twenty-four thou-
sand square kilometers and shutting down over one hundred power plants,
including twenty-two nuclear reactors. The U.S.-Canada Power Outage
Task Force report was more confident about how the cascade began,
insisting on a variety of agential loci. These included electricity, with its
internal differentiation into “active” and “reactive” power; the power
plants, understaffed by humans but overprotective in their mechanisms;
transmission wires, which tolerate only so much heat before they refuse
to transmit the electron flow; a brush fire on Ohio; Enron FirstEnergy
and other energy-trading corporations, who, by legal and illegal means,
had been piling the grid without maintaining its infrastructure; consum-
ers, whose demand for electricity grows and is encouraged to grow by the
government without concern for consequences; and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, whose Energy Policy Act of 1992 deregulated the
grid, separated the generation of electricity from its transmission and distri-
bution, and advanced the privatization of electricity. (26–27)
characteristic of efficient causality: “If one extends the time frame of the
action beyond that of even an instant, billiard-ball causality falters” (33).
Journalistic attempts to identify the “initial” cause in lay language rests
on the implicit ontological assertion that, in the chain of agency, identi-
fication of the technical cause reigns supreme atop the hierarchy of agen-
cies and, more importantly, that other utterances of blame are entirely
contingent upon the identification of that initial cause.
For Bennett, distributing agency and thus pinning the locus of polit-
ical responsibility in a human–nonhuman assemblage (36) reflects a
larger value system that resists reductive attributions. In her examples of
Middle East conflict, this reductiveness often leads to violence. On the
great North American blackout of 2003, she writes: “Though it would
give me great pleasure to assert that deregulation and corporate greed
are the real culprits in the blackout, the most I can honestly affirm is
that corporations are one of the sites at which human efforts at reform
can be applied, that corporate regulation is one place where intentions
might initiate a cascade of effects” (37). Bennett intentionally withholds
the temptation to dole out blame to individual parties because for her
“autonomy and strong responsibility seem […] empirically false, and
thus their invocation seems tinged with injustice” (37). If considering
the Deepwater Horizon blowout, one can anticipate Bennett feeling
uncomfortable with the anti-BP protestors or the heavy-handedness with
which the Obama administration levied out blame and subsequent penal-
ties and fines because her distributed ontological/philosophical purview
of the disaster produces a less reductive approach to causality and, thus,
blame.
As such, Bennett’s project to think more slowly and thoroughly about
the roles of nonhuman things in public events is simultaneously a phil-
osophical argument about ontology but also and inevitably a political
argument about how shifting the way we conceive of publics might pro-
ductively alter our communicative frameworks and lead to more appro-
priate and productive policy.
Even if a convincing case is made for worms as active members of, say, the
ecosystem of a rainforest, can worms be considered members of a public?
What is the difference between an ecosystem and a political system? Are
they analogs? Two names for the same system at different scales? What
is the difference between an actant and a political actor? Is there a clear
difference? Does an action count as political by virtue of its having taken
place “in public”? Are there nonhuman members of a public? What, in
sum, are the implications of a (meta)physics of vibrant materiality for polit-
ical theory? (94)
together as they respond to harm, and then re-acting from this for-
mation into new trans-actions and new groups (or “swarms”) to be
affected—and publics (r)emerge ad infinitum: “Any action is always
a trans-action […] This is because an act can only take place in a field
already crowded with other endeavors and their consequences, a crowd
with which the new entrant immediately interacts, overlaps, and inter-
feres. The file of political action is thus for Dewey a kind of ecology”
(101). For Dewey, conjoint actions generate “multitudinous conse-
quences” and “each of these consequences ‘crosses the others’ to gen-
erate its own problems, and thus its own publics or ‘group of persons
especially affected’” (101).
According to Dewey publics do not, however, preexist. Publics are
not simply willed into existence. They arise or emerge in response to
particular problems; enrollment of individuals into these publics is char-
acterized by induction rather than willing volunteering. Because pub-
lics emerge as responses to events, as responses to problems, they can
be characterized in terms of their shared harm: a public “consists of all
those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to
such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences
systematically cared for” (Public 16). The homeowners with no energy
in 2003, the individuals running fisheries in coastal Louisiana, and the
progressive clean energy protestors during the spill in 2010—they con-
stitute a cohesive public because they are a group that emerged out of
shared harm, provoked together by the “indirect, serious and enduring
[consequences of] conjoint action” (Public 16). Conjoint action can be
best understood as the intentional and unintentional effects of a given
interaction, an interaction in which “no efficient cause of the problems
it generates can really be pinpointed” (Bennett 100). In characteristically
pragmatist fashion, publics for Dewey do not concern themselves with
infighting over the specifics of their genesis but rather with their ability
to produce effects and affect to resolve a given problem at hand. This is
how rural, coastal fishers can conjoin with progressive protestors. There
is an emphasis on consequences, not intentions—of the ethical responsi-
bility of responding to harm, not identifying blame. This is precisely how
Bennett sees Deweyan theories of publics as “[paving] the way for a the-
ory of action” (103).
Bennett reads Dewey as ahead of his time in terms of addressing the
complicated intersections of humans, technologies, and ecologies, stat-
ing that even current theories of democracy are not equipped to address
210 D. P. RICHARDS
If disasters teach any lessons, then experience with the Gulf oil spill might
be expected to alter opinions about the need for environmental protection.
About one-fourth of our respondents said that as a result of the spill, their
views on other environmental issues such as global warming or protect-
ing wildlife had changed […] This proportion rose to 35 percent among
those most affected economically by the spill. People reporting changed
views also expressed greater concern about sea level rise due to climate
change, more support for a moratorium on deepwater drilling, and were
more likely to favor alternative energy rather than increased oil explora-
tion. (Wright 2012)
The pattern of responses from coastal Louisiana, where many more peo-
ple reported effects from the spill, extreme weather, or threats from cli-
mate-related sea-level rise—but fewer supported a deepwater moratorium,
alternative energy, or resource conservation—reflects socioeconomic
9 EMERGENT PUBLICS, PUBLIC EMERGENCIES: THE IMPORTANCE … 217
development around oil and gas. Specialization has been channeled partly
by physical characteristics of the Louisiana coastline itself. (Wright 2012)
Productive skill is required on the parts of the mining engineer and smelter
in order to effect the transformation of natural materials such as ores into
artifacts that possess intrinsic as well as extrinsic meanings. Productive skill
is required on the parts of individuals going about their quotidian busi-
ness in order to effect the transformation of the raw and immediate mate-
rials of focus and context, enjoyment and routine use, into an experience
that exhibits enlarged meaning and significance. And productive skill is
required of those who appreciate and use art objects in order to effect the
transformation and appropriation of those objects into sources of renewed
delight and refined insight. (67)
Far from merely generously doling out the blame of the oil spill to all
those involved, to all those who have every pumped gas, Hickman’s read-
ing of Dewey is contending that the failure of artifacts—say, an oil rig—
is a failure of collective inquiry, a failure on behalf of society to create
the proper conditions of debate and access of risk for all those impacted:
9 EMERGENT PUBLICS, PUBLIC EMERGENCIES: THE IMPORTANCE … 219
Conclusion
When disasters happen, we clearly require frames inclusive of both
human and nonhuman agents. The media-driven bloodlust for a singu-
lar moral failure, while temporarily satiating, does little in the realm of
long-term prevention or mitigation. Reading Bennett and Dewey (and
perhaps pragmatism more broadly, as well) side by side brings us payoff
three-fold. First, it highlights their shared concern for altering in rela-
tively radical ways the conditions and structures of communication, and
also highlights how they can mutually supplement each other. Dewey
provides for Bennett’s political ecology an ethic of action to supplement
her already expansive criteria for participation. In tandem, Bennett works
to expand what has agency (to help supplement Dewey) and Dewey
works toward moving this vision toward action (to help supplement
Bennett). Read together in light of the rhetorics of disaster, Bennett and
Dewey can work to help us in avoiding the same sins over and over by
being less reductive in blame, more inclusive in the agents involved, but
also more incisive and intelligent about the political actions required.
Second, Bennett’s reliance on Dewey hints at a new sense of what
I might call posthuman pragmatism (and what Hickman’s frames as
pragmatism as post-postmodernism). More work into this sense would
be quite productive, not only because it might help address divides
between analytical and continental philosophy as well as realist and anti-
realist stances, but also because it provides a new frame for synthesizing
Dewey’s naturalistic writings with his more political ones. And thirdly,
reading Bennett and Dewey together helps paint a clearer, more realistic
picture of a political ethic—particularly for but not just related to disas-
ters—for new materialists, who are leaving our humanist ethics behind
potentially at great risk.
220 D. P. RICHARDS
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Index
E
Ellison, Ralph, 17, 105–108, 110– K
125, 161 King Jr., Martin Luther, 97
Epistemology, 2, 4–9, 11, 13, 16, 18,
39, 99, 158, 160, 201
Experience, 2, 4, 6, 10, 13, 16, 18, L
27, 28, 30–32, 36, 39–41, 43, Laboratory School, 130, 132–137,
45, 56–58, 62, 63, 66, 68, 81, 139–142, 145, 149, 151–153
84, 92, 93, 101, 105, 107, 109, Latour, Bruno, 198–201, 203
111–117, 121–124, 130–132, Lippmann, Walter, 208, 214, 217
134–136, 139, 141–147, 149– Listening, 13, 177–180, 182–184,
154, 157–159, 162, 164–166, 186–192, 211
168, 170–172, 178–182, 184,
Index 225
M R
Marxism, 39, 43 Reconstructive rhetoric, 80, 85, 96
Materialism, 39, 198–200, 207, 211 Reflective morality, 84, 96, 101
McKeon, Richard, 17, 23–46, 57, 59, Rhetorical listening, 183, 184,
62, 63 189–191
Mead, George Herbert, 130, 173 Rhetorical practice, 2, 10, 11, 15, 17,
Meliorism, 97, 108–110, 158 19, 57, 61, 62, 87, 97, 99, 129,
Moral psychology, 162, 169, 170 179, 181, 182
Rhetorical pragmatism, 1–5, 7–11, 15,
17, 19, 21, 46, 56, 62, 181
O Roman Republic, 37, 38
Orientation, 3, 11, 15, 17, 35, 42, 43, Rorty, Richard, 2, 7, 11, 17, 20, 23,
96, 100, 101, 109, 110, 112– 28, 41, 45, 46, 170
116, 118, 122–124, 163, 166,
167, 171, 172
S
Scientific spirit, 64, 65, 75
P Semantics, 25, 28, 38–42, 45
Pedagogy, 15, 21, 131, 133, 136, 152, Settlement house, 179, 188
179, 186–190, 192 Skepticism, 41, 68–70, 72, 73
Peirce, C.S., 37, 41, 161 Social democracy, 57, 61, 182,
Persuasion, 12, 19, 79, 80, 157, 159, 185–187
180, 182, 184, 208, 214, 217 Social interaction, 2, 8, 11, 16, 57
Philosophical pragmatism, 1–9, 11, Socrates, 11, 12, 167
15, 16, 18, 21, 40, 57 Sophists, 10, 11, 16, 60, 65
Plato, 2, 12–14, 26, 31, 93, 167, 173 Spinoza, 26, 200–202, 207
Pluralism/Plurality, 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 16, Symbolic action, 115
24, 27, 29, 34, 37–39, 42, 43,
46, 57, 59, 63, 76, 79, 105, 116,
117, 168, 170 T
Political philosophy, 81 Terministic screen, 36
Posthuman, 197, 199, 200, 208, 210,
219
Protagoras, 60, 68 U
The Public and Its Problems, 18, 19, United Nations Educational, Scientific,
32, 125, 133, 153, 157, 208, 212 and Cultural Organization
Public listening, 184 (UNESCO), 27–29, 36–38
Publics, 32, 38, 158, 197–199, University of Chicago, 24, 27, 28, 36,
206–211, 216, 217, 220 132, 135, 136, 139, 145, 153
Q W
Quintilian, 12 Westbrook, Robert, 4, 5, 132