“A critical review of judicial elections and the effect they have on

state judiciaries” – N0724138

When considering judicial power, major attention is directed towards the

Supreme and Federal Courts, however the state courts have major importance
as they review almost 95% of all filed cases in the country1 and have immense
powers similar to the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review 2. For example,
state supreme courts have ruled to equalise public school funding3 and even
declare the Connecticut death penalty unconstitutional4. However, this power
has led to elections dominated by political and interest groups who spend vast
sums of money to elect their preferred candidates5 with negative ads
suggesting, for instance, that judges issued “lenient sentences” and “[failed] to
protect women and children”6. These are believed to have caused a rise in
harsher sentences and more frequent rulings against defendants 7. Currently,
39 states utilise elections to either determine or re-elect their judges, however
the plethora of issues make it prudent to consider whether an overhaul or new
process is necessary.

Initially, judicial campaigns were simple, low budget affairs based mainly on
track records and judicial qualifications, whilst interest groups were around,
they were usually competing sections of the bar with minimal involvement 8.
However, by the 1980s, campaigns with funding ranging in the millions became
increasingly commonplace, with issues such as the death penalty causing
major conflicts between interest groups9. Alabama for instance is “a
battleground between businesses and those who sue them”10 which “is often
fought in elections for the Supreme Court of Alabama.” 11 Furthermore, the
1
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts (2016), p1
2
Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137; (1803)
3
Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan.2016)
4
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015)
5
Brennan Center for Justice, Spending in Pennsylvania Supreme Court Race Tops Out Over $16.5 Million,
November 6 2015, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/spending-pennsylvania-
supreme-court-race-tops-out-over-165-million (accessed 3 April 2020)
6
Brannan Center for Justice, Buying Time 2015 – Pennsylvania, 1 March 2016,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/buying-time-2015-pennsylvania (accessed 3 April
2020)
7
Kate Berry, Brannan Center for Justice, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases (2015), p7-11
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-judicial-elections-impact-criminal-cases
(accessed 5 April 2020)
8
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001) p1393-1394
9
Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 187, 198-99 (1996)
10
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. &
POL, (1999) 645-656
11
Ibid, 657
decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in 1993 that declared a proposed
reform to tort legislation unconstitutional12 resulted in a recurring battle every
two years13 between trial lawyer interest groups and their business
counterparts with both sides spending vast sums of money on the campaigns
of judges sympathetic to their views14. Between 1986 and 1996, the cost of
running for the Alabama Supreme Court rose by 776%15 with the races
described as “expensive mud-wrestling contests”16 where crime control
interests have made it so that “judge[s] who impose less than the maximum
possible sentence in cases evoking public outrage invite a bidding war with
future opponents.”17

This is now common practice across the country regardless of region or

population18 as demonstrated by the Ohio Chief Justice election which saw
costs increase from $100,000 in 1980 to $2.8 million in 1986 19. The decision in
Citizens United20 ending campaign spending restrictions for labour unions and
corporations has also helped make state supreme court races “nastier, noisier
and costlier”21 with average campaign spending increasing from $364,348 in
1990 to $892,755 in 200422 with lower court races starting to follow this
trend23.

The pure volume of spending by interest groups is concerning as there is

evidence to show that judges are facing pressure to decide cases in ways that
please their donors for smoother re-elections rather than determining cases
based on facts or law24. The majority of the public believe that campaign

12
Henderson ex rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993)
13
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001), p.1395
14
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. &
POL, (1999) 657
15
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001), p.1396
16
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. &
POL, (1999) 659 (quoting Shiela Kaplan, The Very Best Judges That Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 29, 1999)
17
Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, (1988), p2000-1
18
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001) p.1397
19
Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J. Vol 85, No. 5 (1999), p69
20
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
21
Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1998) p149-150
22
Chris Bonneau, “The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, 1990-2004” in
Matthew J. Streb Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections (2007),
p63
23
Scott Greytak, Alicia Bannon, Allyse Falce & Linda Casey, Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial
Elections 2013-14 (2015), p38-39
24
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts (2016), p6
spending impacts judges’ rulings25 and half of the state court judges agree26.
Furthermore, it has stated that “[e]veryone interested in contributing has very
specific interests… They mean to be buying a vote.”27 Resulting in a wealthy
minority have an unfair amount of influence over state courts due to the vast
sums spent on ensuring judges who share their ideology are elected 28. Indeed,
over 90 percent of contested state supreme court seats were won by the
candidate with the most money behind them29, further demonstrating this
issue.

Even more concerning is the fact that judges will often hear cases involving the
very people who have supported their campaign. Studies of Nevada’s Supreme
Court found that over half the civil cases decided in 2008-09 involved at least
one litigant, lawyer or firm that contributed to one of judges most recent
election bids30. Studies show the judges are more likely to rule in favour of
those who have contributed to their campaign as “it is pretty hard in big
money races not to take care of your friends” 31. The Ohio Supreme Court rules
in favour of contributors 70 percent of the time32 and Caperton v Massey33
demonstrates this issue perfectly: Before appealing a previous verdict that
would result in him paying $50 million in damages, Massey Energy’s CEO
donated $3 million to the High Court bid of Justice Benjamin who was later
elected, refused to excuse himself from the appeal and formed part of the
majority overturning the previous decision. Despite the Supreme Court
overturning the decision, it begs the question of how can a court possibly be
impartial when the people it decides cases in favour of are the same people
who elected the court in the first place?

When judges once sought election based on their skills and experience and
avoided politics wherever possible34, a practical reversal of this has now
25
National Poll 10/22-10/24, Justice at Stake & Brennan Centre. For Justice (Oct. 2013), p3,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/press-releases/JAS%20Brennan%20NPJE%20Poll
%20Topline.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020)
26
State Judges Frequency Questionnaire, Justice at Stake (2001), p5,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2001%20National%20Bipartisan%20Survey%20of
%20Almost%202%2C500%20Judges.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020)
27
Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y Times (Oct. 1, 2006),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 9 April 2020)
28
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, p6
29
Scott Greytak, Alicia Bannon, Allyse Falce & Linda Casey, Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial
Elections 2013-14 (2015), p7
30
American Judicature Society, Campaign Contributors and the Nevada Supreme Court (2010), p2
31
Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y Times (Oct. 1, 2006),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 9 April 2020)
32
Ibid
33
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)
34
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001), p1393
occurred due in part to the decision in White35 that allows judicial candidates
to state their views on legal or political issues. It is now commonplace for
candidates to describe themselves “as the judicial remedy to Obamacare” 36 or
as a “backstop” for the Ohio Republican governor and legislature37. This is a
significant issue as “people lose faith that the court is anything but a political
machine”38 when they continue to see rhetoric that is focused far more on
advancing political agendas than upholding the law.

Current appointment systems are not devoid of this issue either and they “can
be just as unseemly and corrupt as modern judicial elections.” 39 For example in
2010 New Jersey’s governor declined to reappoint the state’s only black
Supreme Court justice due the “out of control” activism of his rulings against
the state on issues including housing segregation.40 This demonstrates that
even when judges do not have to answer to the public, concerns about their
future careers could lead to them supporting the government litigants
controlling their reappointment more often.41

In the majority of states, judges must seek additional terms through election or
reappointment, making them vulnerable to political retaliation. Interest groups
have created a “relatively new phenomenon”42 known as attacks ads targeting
judges they disagree with. One such ad used in North Carolina in 2014
described a justice as someone who “sides with child predators” based on their
decision that monitoring bracelets shouldn’t be imposed on defendants who
had already been sentenced.43 Perhaps in response to this, judges impose
harsher and longer punishments that are more likely to be death sentences

35
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
36
Eric Benson, Don Willett’s Quiet Revolution, (17 Nov 2016) https://www.texasobserver.org/don-willett-
trump-supreme-court/ (accessed 10 April 2020)
37
Scott Greytak, Alicia Bannon, Allyse Falce & Linda Casey, Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial
Elections 2013-14 (2015), p21
38
Katelyn Ferral, As Wisonsin’s Supreme Court Reaches New Levels of Discord, Voters Navigate Another Heated
Elections, The Cap. Times (Mar.30, 2016), <http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/as-
wisconsin-s-supreme-court-reaches-new-levels-of-discord/article_5f2f4d79-29d6-5603-9587-
8e1518dd9d38.html> (accessed 9 April 2020)
39
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The People’s Courts, Harvard University Press (2012), p4
40
Richard Perez Pena, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court (3 May 2010),
<https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04christie.html> (accessed 10 April 2020)
41
Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. (2009) 1589, 1617-21
42
James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New Style”
Judicial Campaigns, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 1 (2008), p62
43
Tom Bullock, WFAE 90.7, Controversial ‘Justice for All NC’ PAC Returns for Late Push on Judges (Oct 30 2014)
< https://www.wfae.org/post/controversial-justice-all-nc-pac-returns-late-push-judges#stream/0> (accessed
11 April 2020)
closer to re-election44 with some even using their record of upholding death
sentences as a sort of advertisement that they are tough on crime.45

Another issue with elections is the severe lack of diversity and community
representation as only 8.4 percent of state court judges are people of colour 46
despite them making up a quarter of the population. Women make up 26.4
percent of the bench47 compared to half the population and in 2010, 26 state
supreme courts were all white.48 Therefore “both elective and appointive
systems are producing similarly poor outcomes in terms of the diversity of
judges.”49

Rising costs and the issue of raising enough money for an effective election
campaign is another barrier for women and minority candidates50 causing
deciding not to campaign at all.51 Low information campaigns fail to resolve
this issue as racial stereotypes are shown to be a major factor in voter decision
making52. Take, for example, the 2012 re-election bid of the Washington
Supreme Court’s first Mexican American justice: Steven Gonzalez. His only
opponent: Danielson did not campaign or spend any money on his bid53 and
was rated as “inadequate” at best by bar and legal associations vetting the
candidates54, however Gonzalez almost lost his campaign despite being
significantly more qualified for the role. Substantial racial block voting occurred
and this “racial voting bias distorted the Gonzales-Danielson race in certain
Washington counties”55 with predominantly white populations.

44
Kate Berry, Brannan Center for Justice, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, p 7, 9
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-judicial-elections-impact-criminal-cases
(accessed 5 April 2020)
45
Brennan Centre for Justice, Barrage of Radio Ads Hits Tennessee Airwaves in Judicial Retention Race:
Americans for Prosperity Launches Radio Ad, (July 23 2014) <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/barrage-ads-hits-tennessee-airwaves-judicial-retention-race-americans> (accessed 10
April 2020)
46
National Centre for State Courts, Diversity of the Bench (2009),
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/bench_diversity/index.cfm?state (accessed 10 April 2020)
47
Ibid
48
Ibid
49
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Monica Chase & Emma Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity (2010), p4
50
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Answering the Call for a More Diverse Judiciary: A Review of
State Judicial Selection Models and their Impact on Diversity (2005), p14-15
51
Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard L. Fox, Why are Women Still Not Running for Public Office?, Brookings
Institution Issues in Governance Studies (2008), p13-14
52
Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections, 51 Pol. Res. Q. 895 (1998), 912-
13
53
Theodoric Meyer, Primary to Determine One State Supreme Court Race, Seattle Times (July 25 2012),
<https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/primary-to-determine-one-state-supreme-court-race/>
(accessed 11 April 2020)
54
Bruce Danielson, VotingForJudges, <http://votingforjudges.org/12pri/supreme/8bd.html> (accessed 11 April
2020)
Whilst there have been some attempts at reforming these election systems,
they have been slow and have done little to solve the problems with
elections.56 Merit selection systems did go through a period where 14 states
adopted its use, however no state has moved away from contested elections in
over 30 years.57 For merit selection systems to be effective, the way in which
the members of the nominating commission are chosen must also be clear as
special interest groups could still exercise control over them.58

When considering reforms to the judicial nomination process, the foremost

priority should be ensuring “the capacity of individual judges to decide cases
without threats or intimidation that could interfere with their ability to uphold
the rule of law.”59 Judges must have independence and shouldn’t fear reprisals
for their decisions, for instance after the ruling in Brown60, “impeach Earl
Warren” signs became commonplace across the South but the life tenure of
Supreme Court judges and other constitutional provisions61 meant he was
protected from any political backlash. Whilst this may not be possible for state
court judges, an election method should still be chosen that values
independence, accountability and selecting good quality judges with public
confidence in their judgements in order to restrict the ever increasing outside
influence seen today.

Judicial independence must also “be tempered by judicial accountability”62.

Advocates for judicial elections often view this as “the need for a majoritarian
check on judges”63 as they argue that judges use their political preferences to
make decisions and these unrestricted preferences are just as dangerous as
the tyranny of the majority64. Whilst it is undeniable that judges’ decisions are
shaped by their experiences, presuppositions, judicial philosophies, and even
political instincts”65, systems are in place that prevent judges exercising powers
without consequence such as appellate review of lower court decisions and

55
Paula WIssel, Racial Bias a Factor in Washington Supreme Court Election, Research Finds, knkx (Sep 26 2012)
< https://www.knkx.org/post/racial-bias-factor-washington-supreme-court-election-research-finds> (accessed
12 April 2020)
56
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, p16
57
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The People’s Courts, Harvard University Press (2012), p286-87
58
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, p17
59
Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and their Impact on Judicial Independence, 137 Daedalus
(2008), 86
60
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
61
U.S. Const. art. III, §2
62
Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and their Impact on Judicial Independence, 137 Daedalus
(2008), p87
63
Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, p21
64
Ibid
65
Ibid
rules regarding unethical conduct.66 Codes have been laid out to ensure that
judges “shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”67 with severe
penalties should these codes be violated. This demonstrates that the judiciary
is able to hold itself accountable and will work in the public’s best interests
without requiring elections.

In the United Kingdom before 2006, appointments were done by a government

minister, and whilst political considerations were not a relevant factor there
were still concerns that one member of the government being responsible for
judicial appointment68 could lead to biased nominations. Furthermore, the
selection process was done from a narrow pool of applicants, so the Judicial
Appointments Commission, an independent body, was created in April 2006
with the goal of “encourage[ing] diversity in the range of persons available for
selection for appointments”.69 The current method has the advantage of total
independence from any political agendas whilst also ensuring through a
statutory mandate that they will select judges both on merit and to represent
all sections of society in order to ensure public confidence.70

Canada has a similar process that also values transparency, the skill of
applicants, diversity and unbiased appointees. Independent Judicial Advisory
Committees representing the bench, bar and general public are given anti-bias
training and review judicial applicants based on their skills and personal
character.71 This selection of committee members ensure that judges both
have sufficient skills to perform their role as well as public support whilst also
remaining independent of any political manoeuvring.72

Both these systems provide a possible alternative for State Court nomination
systems as they avoid the plethora of issues that can be seen in an election
system whilst also avoiding vesting too much appointment power into a single
state governor. Having members of appointment committees come from
various areas of the law alongside members of the local community would
ensure that the appointed judges have the skills and ability to uphold the law.
66
Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and their Impact on Judicial Independence, 137 Daedalus
(2008) 86, 88
67
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (American Bar Association, 2007)
68
Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Judicial Appointments <www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-
the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/jud-appts/> (accessed 12 April 2020)
69
Ibid
70
Ibid
71
Department of Justice, Changes to the Appointments Process for Federal Judges
<https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/scapq-pncsq.html> (accessed 12 April 2020)
72
Ibid
Furthermore, it would ensure greater levels of trust in both the judge and the
process of appointing them and help improve transparency and reduce the
power of political groups and wealthy minorities to influence these decisions.

Word Count: 1982

Bibliography:

Books:

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (American Bar Association, 2007)

Chris Bonneau, “The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections,
1990-2004” in Matthew J. Streb Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal
Stakes of Judicial Elections (2007)

Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The People’s Courts, Harvard University Press (2012)

Cases:

Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)

Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)

Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan.2016)

Henderson ex rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993)

Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137; (1803)

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)

State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015)

Journals:

Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts (2016)

American Judicature Society, Campaign Contributors and the Nevada Supreme Court (2010)

Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Election, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391 (2001)

Charles G. Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection and their Impact on Judicial Independence,
137 Daedalus (2008), 86

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Monica Chase & Emma Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity (2010)

Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, (1988)

James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory
and “New Style” Judicial Campaigns, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 1
(2008)

Jennifer L. Lawless & Richard L. Fox, Why are Women Still Not Running for Public Office?,
Brookings Institution Issues in Governance Studies (2008)
Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. (2009) 1589, 1617-
21

Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Answering the Call for a More Diverse
Judiciary: A Review of State Judicial Selection Models and their Impact on Diversity (2005)

Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J. Vol 85, No. 5 (1999)

Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections, 51 Pol. Res. Q.
895 (1998)

Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1998)

Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 198-99 (1996)

Scott Greytak, Alicia Bannon, Allyse Falce & Linda Casey, Bankrolling the Bench: The New
Politics of Judicial Elections 2013-14 (2015)

Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in
Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL, (1999)

News Articles

Eric Benson, Don Willett’s Quiet Revolution, (17 Nov 2016)

https://www.texasobserver.org/don-willett-trump-supreme-court/ (accessed 10 April 2020)

Paula WIssel, Racial Bias a Factor in Washington Supreme Court Election, Research Finds,
knkx (Sep 26 2012) < https://www.knkx.org/post/racial-bias-factor-washington-supreme-
court-election-research-finds> (accessed 12 April 2020)

Richard Perez Pena, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court (3 May 2010),
<https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/nyregion/04christie.html> (accessed 10 April 2020)

Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in
Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL, (1999) 659 (quoting Shiela Kaplan, The Very Best Judges That
Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1999)

Theodoric Meyer, Primary to Determine One State Supreme Court Race, Seattle Times (July
25 2012), <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/primary-to-determine-one-
state-supreme-court-race/> (accessed 11 April 2020)

Tom Bullock, WFAE 90.7, Controversial ‘Justice for All NC’ PAC Returns for Late Push on
Judges (Oct 30 2014) < https://www.wfae.org/post/controversial-justice-all-nc-pac-returns-
late-push-judges#stream/0> (accessed 11 April 2020)
Statute

U.S. Const. art. III, §2

Websites:

Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y Times (Oct.
1, 2006), <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all>
(accessed 9 April 2020)

Brannan Center for Justice, Buying Time 2015 – Pennsylvania, 1 March 2016,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/buying-time-2015-
pennsylvania (accessed 3 April 2020)

Brennan Center for Justice, Spending in Pennsylvania Supreme Court Race Tops Out Over
$16.5 Million, November 6 2015, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/spending-pennsylvania-supreme-court-race-tops-out-over-165-million (accessed 3
April 2020)

Brennan Centre for Justice, Barrage of Radio Ads Hits Tennessee Airwaves in Judicial
Retention Race: Americans for Prosperity Launches Radio Ad, (July 23 2014)
<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/barrage-ads-hits-tennessee-
airwaves-judicial-retention-race-americans> (accessed 10 April 2020)

Bruce Danielson, VotingForJudges, <http://votingforjudges.org/12pri/supreme/8bd.html>

(accessed 11 April 2020)

Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Judicial Appointments <www.judiciary.uk/about-the-

judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/jud-appts/>
(accessed 12 April 2020)

Department of Justice, Changes to the Appointments Process for Federal Judges

<https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/scapq-pncsq.html> (accessed 12 April 2020)

Kate Berry, Brannan Center for Justice, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases (2015),
p7-11 https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-judicial-elections-
impact-criminal-cases (accessed 5 April 2020)

Katelyn Ferral, As Wisonsin’s Supreme Court Reaches New Levels of Discord, Voters Navigate
Another Heated Elections, The Cap. Times (Mar.30, 2016),
<http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/as-wisconsin-s-supreme-court-
reaches-new-levels-of-discord/article_5f2f4d79-29d6-5603-9587-8e1518dd9d38.html>
(accessed 9 April 2020)
National Centre for State Courts, Diversity of the Bench (2009),
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/bench_diversity/index.cfm?state
(accessed 10 April 2020)

National Poll 10/22-10/24, Justice at Stake & Brennan Centre. For Justice (Oct. 2013),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/press-releases/JAS%20Brennan%20NPJE
%20Poll%20Topline.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020)

State Judges Frequency Questionnaire, Justice at Stake (2001), p5,

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2001%20National%20Bipartisan
%20Survey%20of%20Almost%202%2C500%20Judges.pdf (accessed 8 April 2020)