IN RE CUNANAN (Caressa)

PART II READINGS: LEGAL ETHICS
Compiled by: Caressa Rafols
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946
to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who
had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948,
and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with
that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy
per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed
in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing
general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they
are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A
complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in
different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members
of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the
question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and
of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton,
and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task.
The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it
is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved
by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal
profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports
began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of
the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited
to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the
students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments
of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution
itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on
the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more
than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the
power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated
by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and
not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are
exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in
the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,
the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the
court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect
to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required
of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of
the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to
admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re
Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting.
Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115
P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right
upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney
is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises
from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious
practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be
a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of
the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of
the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise
of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the
court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments
of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to
the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. —
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or
reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to
its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does
not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law
and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment
or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has
the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards
for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is
desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional
limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment
of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without
a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An
Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for
the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass
the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows
that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon
which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which
the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier
statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases
we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of
their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to
present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña,
pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of
the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend
the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license
under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y.,
p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular
course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36
weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and
privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their
admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions,
such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill.
98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to
be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the
rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed.
No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion
of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything
with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date
of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those
who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study,
while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete
two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma,
is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed
course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation
to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its
aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted.
That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord
equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those
desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen
of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject
only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This
right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued
as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is,
the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the
state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the
requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect
the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom
it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th,
1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the
ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re
Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished
from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of
citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and
other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just
and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am.
Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per
cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per
cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated
by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been
given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates
of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those
who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946
those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in
1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by
reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to
undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that
the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952
as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of
the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and
correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such
duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because
they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve
and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and
is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and
may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of
our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates
that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX 1
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding
490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average
in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in
1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75
per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the
Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and
16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the
practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10
per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have
obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if
the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose
the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all
the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to

repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per
cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven
Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a
bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to
insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the
one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is
nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year
in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the
examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number
of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person
is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and
proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as
presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a
candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is
more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal
subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will
be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly
in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even
in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal
doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing
and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who
may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average
fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the
Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the
subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order,
or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of
the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that
year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he
was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted,
and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and
unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve
as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege
to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill
No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar;
Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more
of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity
to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those
who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by
altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the
passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of
passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a
gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to
1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination,
74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate
shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available
reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding
the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of
our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which
they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights
already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent
was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the
principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is
accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions
of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the
correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the
correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special
laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The
problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the
rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in
the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing
it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered
972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and
the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power
(to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the
exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination,
the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required
grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain
a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with
grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of
the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory.
Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the
privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to
admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on
motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to
pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28,
1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and
for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents
set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or
con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average
from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This
bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill
similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later
bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar
subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4)
the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave
due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill
first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing
the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic
Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or
separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said
Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue
of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and
members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to
argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some
doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects
past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the
Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners,
thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods
after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this
Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been
the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post
facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended
to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from
the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may
also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic
Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined
by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can
fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited
by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating
appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic
Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of
one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained
a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it
in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in
August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was
supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the
Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter
may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public
hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court,
to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On
the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic
Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court
may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and
should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power
(to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the
exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination,
the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required
grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain
a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with
grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of
the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory.
Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the
privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to
admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on
motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to
pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28,
1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and
for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents
set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or
con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average
from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This
bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill
similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later
bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar
subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4)
the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave
due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill
first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing
the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic
Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or
separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said
Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue
of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and
members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to
argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some
doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects
past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the
Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners,
thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods
after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this
Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been
the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post
facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended
to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from
the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may
also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic
Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined
by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can
fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited
by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating
appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic
Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of
one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained
a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it
in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in
August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was
supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the
Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter
may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public
hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court,
to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On
the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic
Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court
may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and
should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" - on the basis of the said Report and the
proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views
and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" - that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as
in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were
admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment
in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose
of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as
Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds
in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity)
of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and
observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration,
as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them
by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration.
It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration
on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice
and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in
order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over
the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote
public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Resolution of the second issue - whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional -
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on
Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
- Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
- The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
- Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
- These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be
no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute
to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient
means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to
pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional

freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to
the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has
long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the
Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax
is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required
payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he
wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience
as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to
pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which
they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they
have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective
manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and
old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue - whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time - requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration
has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2)
greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the
individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5)
elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and
more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar;
and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration
have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada
and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the
abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar,
enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly
improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled
by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers
from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per
cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157
(or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and
lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar
association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per
cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with
the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining
the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the Commission is composed of
Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then
Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito
Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional
Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta,
Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the
unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in
convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the
Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar
Association and the Manila Bar Association.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in
favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar
integration.
5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. —
Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members
of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular
standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be
allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in

the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission
who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the
United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of
any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that
they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July
4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the
Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and
successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved
and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a
certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and
further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law,
labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science,
logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file
with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen
(15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this
rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5,
and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their
admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates
as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits
as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published

by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for
at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3

and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor
and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law,
Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation;
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions
shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to
each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will
be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such
examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be
allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on
the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines
shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated
by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows:
First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation
(afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile
Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of

bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a
Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the
court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office
for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each
volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member
of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other
nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any
other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a
failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be
taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and
Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political
and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February
15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file
its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee
shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court
has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they
show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review
classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall
certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects
under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular
subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a
member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to
that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of
court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his
certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless
of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion
of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears,
and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. —
An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled

to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire.
In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket
of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in
the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall
not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of
First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of
such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts
involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney
from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be

removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon
reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and
to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary
to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the
attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court
for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may
be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de
oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this
rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any
case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One
hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies
other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official
or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of
the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any
case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the
purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the
Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing
such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and
to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO

LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA

FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO,
ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ,
RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
GERARDA H. VILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO

CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 151258
G.R. No. 154954

G.R. No. 155101
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 1, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
×Ads by Cinema-Plus-1.8c The public outrage over the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa –
the victim in this case – on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.
[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.
[2] The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for
joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to
counteract the exculpatory implications of “consent” and “initial innocent act” in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5]
Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged – those of Frederick
Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe
Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval
Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle
in our criminal justice system – “[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law.”[7]
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace
as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist
being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the
offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
×Ads by Cinema-Plus-1.8cBefore the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No.
151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as
follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto
Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny” Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes
were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites included the
“Indian Run,” which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans,
each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes to
sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the neophytes were held at the
back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance
to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms
or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During
this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived
their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.
The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries
to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11]
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340
was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with
reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial
court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by
then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were
also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000
and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their
right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10
January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice
of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13
March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21]
Petitioner sets forth two main issues – first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial court’s forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same “ratio decidendi that served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.”[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since
a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to
Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking
for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and
in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like
the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not
tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official
activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites “decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation
so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling….”[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of
the Solicitor General that “the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have
resulted in Lenny’s death.”[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, “on the contrary,
Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.”[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lenny’s father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter did not
have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the
parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the “psychological initiation.” He then cites
the testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte – witness Marquez – who admitted knowing “it was not
true and that he was just making it up….”[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes,
who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places
with Lenny to prevent the latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with
Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victim’s well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable
for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The
said article provides: “Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
in setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
CA’s Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to “several pending incidents,” the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal
Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For “various
reasons,” the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years
after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence
were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court
took note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term “personal
penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term
“pecuniary penalties” (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him
deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October
1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that “it will not entertain any postponement and that all the
accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down
the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when
required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.”[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his
client – Antonio General – would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37]
Because of this development and pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the parties “should be
ready at all times down the line,” the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date – 25 August 1993 – instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were
supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was
not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a
Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and
that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The
trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for
postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40]
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a
waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial
court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25
August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial
dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also
points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.
[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused …
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel…” This constitutional right includes the
right to present evidence in one’s defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend
oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense’s
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to “lack of quorum in the regular membership” of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an
Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his
surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because
of his nonappearance at “yesterday’s and today’s scheduled hearings.” In ruling against the
Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo’s
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for
trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates…
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver
must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo
did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is
called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a
waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned
of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive
Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his
absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is
not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so
that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August
1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the
excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused – General – had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since
Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned
five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly,
the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we
ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any “procedural unfairness or irregularity” that would substantially prejudice
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set
forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter.
Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the
trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa
by alleging in his Petition that “all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites,” and
that “the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the
fraternity.”[49] He even argues that “Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated
only after the activity was sanctioned.”[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another – at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties.
This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key
facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should
not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of
the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that “the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this
case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.”[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is
attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the
right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the
length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or
a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather,
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
xxx xxx xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay
of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial
has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of
the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order
requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of
the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995.
Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not
at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in
granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29,
1996, followed by petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x
x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De
Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of
the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or
inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of
cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the
instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.
[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records
that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again
be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found
in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III – Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)
there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s express
consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, “[a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as
an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty.”[76] We further stressed that “an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.”[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of
the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79]
or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review
must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the
Petition, “the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x.”[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted
the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and
failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the
finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the
facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90]
Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra
Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when
the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave
abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the
physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of
the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the
medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a
prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty
depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be
proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v.
Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the
crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA,
59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule
that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight
and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of “the death
of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or
medical attendance required.”[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of
that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
because the victim’s injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa
involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling
cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused “were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment
undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.”[99] It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officer’s findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the
“multiple traumatic injuries” he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA
found that the “physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,”[101] it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is
a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.
The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty
in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of
a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of
felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be
held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103]
the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have
been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition
in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime,
the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a
quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been
no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were
liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused –
Victorino et al. – were acquitted; 4 of them – Tecson et al. – were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 – Dizon and Villareal – were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or
to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man –
driven by his own desire to join a society of men – pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order
to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we
deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional
felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with
reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not
enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or “malice.”[113]
The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with
power to choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability
to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and
an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.
[117]
The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains
to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the “moving power”
that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the “purpose” of using a particular means
to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term “felonious” means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus – that the act or omission be done “willfully,”
“maliciously,” “with deliberate evil intent,” and “with malice aforethought.”[123] The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a
felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8
of the Revised Penal Code – which provides that “conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it” – is to be
interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase “coming
to an agreement” connotes the existence of a prefaced “intent” to cause injury to another, an
element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the
injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful
deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results
in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in
conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132]
Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with
lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple
negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout
history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from
military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back
to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as
servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to
demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern
fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.
[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a “tradition” or “ritual”
whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization
in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The
neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the “program,” neophytes are
required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter
history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point
average; to participate in the organization’s activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters
require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte
stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite
for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the “recruit,” “pledge,” “neophyte,” “initiate,”
“applicant” – or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person – is
generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly,
foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero – Andres Bonifacio – organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunan’s ideology
was brought home to each member through the society’s initiation ritual.[152] It is said that
initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a
series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were made to go
through vigorous trials such as “pagsuot sa isang lungga” or “[pagtalon] sa balon.”[154] It would
seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of “pangherong bakal sa pisngi” and to
endure a “matalas na punyal.”[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was
made to sign membership papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or
drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy
during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the “mattress-rotating barrel
trick.”[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto
connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161]
Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle
candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the
neophyte paratroopers’ chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as
others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members
subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the
nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back
with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and “body slamming,” an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The
fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being
pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot
sauce, butter, and “yerks” (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items);
(5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and
yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m.
“meetings,” during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) “running the
gauntlet,” during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture,
psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
from hazing activities during the fraternity’s initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates
went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for
more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in Florida – sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The
pledge’s efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on
his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as “preliminaries,” which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days
of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during
the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial “birth by fire,” through
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some
organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process
enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures
the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and
the esprit d’corp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183]
The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress
prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois
passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct “whereby any one sustains an injury
to his [or her] person therefrom.”[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee
to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to
enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had
enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat
hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death
or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death
or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.[191]
Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a
Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an
element of a Class C felony – criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury, death
falls under the category of “serious bodily injury.”[194] A person who commits a Class C felony
is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not
more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious
bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted
of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.
[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony,
the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or
both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no
hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
wherein Barry Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no
anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation – in this case, fraternity initiation rites – does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind – whether or not there is
a contextual background or factual premise – they are still criminally liable for intentional
felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that – with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon – accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this
finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that
the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
father’s parking space had been stolen by the victim’s father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said
that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had
a hand in the death of Villareal’s brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted
with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is,
to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquez’s testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to
what to expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and
their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride
a van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place
of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms
and then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside
the van, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, “Villa akin ka,”
“Asuncion Patay ka” and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these
remarks uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their
voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through,
what were the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness “Villa akin ka,” “Asuncion patay ka,” “Recinto patay ka sa amin,” etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the
rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was
there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere,
actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether “matigas pa
yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.”
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I

could not really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol
Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that
you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he
would say that and I quote “ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko,” so that would
in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he
would jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that
“this guy, his father stole the parking space of my father,” sir. So, that’s why he inflicted more
pain on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your
family have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir.
So he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express,
he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father
stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance
when that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people
who heard from time to time, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny
Villa’s father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and
when Lenny Villa’s turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa’s father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand
up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon “you or your family had his brother killed,” can you inform this
Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that
his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that
it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued
inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on
another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer,
and he said and I quote: “Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung
pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin,” sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness That’s all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician
came around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to
expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during
the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would
be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school.
All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school
uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face
would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your
body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or
paddle, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his
brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you
did not believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I
have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation,
this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those
things was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was
hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also
administered by another master on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
Villareal were “baseless,”[213] since the statements of the accused were “just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes”; that “[t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez”; and that the “harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.”[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion
on the part of the CA – it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy
cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal
had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of
homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as reproduced above, it was
Dizon who uttered both “accusations” against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation
whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was “Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on
[Marquez’s] thigh”; and who told witness Marquez, “[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko.” It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa’s thighs while saying, “[T]his guy, his father
stole the parking space of my father.” With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no
basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of
witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed,
and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, “Patay ka, Recinto,” “Yari ka, Recinto,”
“Villa, akin ka,” “Asuncion, gulpi ka,” “Putang ina mo, Asuncion,” “Putang ina nyo, patay kayo
sa amin,” or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused
Marquez of the death of the former’s purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa’s
father for stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father. According to the Solicitor General, these
statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation
employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so
that he could “justify” giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation
and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-
up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during
the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as
follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase “or psychological pain and suffering.”
xxx xxx xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the
recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like
playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte
or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization
or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump
outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump
towards the inside portion of the building – these are the mental or psychological tests that are
resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the
public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even
lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternity’s psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each
other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-
neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he “knew it was not true
and that [Dizon] was just making it up….”[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the
utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: “[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were
not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity
initiation rites x x x.”[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi
cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that
none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since
all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and
death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an
act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In
Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students
behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from
the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight
physical injuries, this Court stated thus: “Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent
… the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent.” Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that “as a matter of
law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil.” In People v.
Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our
Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a “ritual or treatment” – plunged the head of the victim into
a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him
on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of “nervous breakdown” by expelling
through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the
death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding
of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the
accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under
Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain on
the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato,
we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the
accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that
the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury
was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the
rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings,
that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first
night, they were subjected to “traditional” initiation rites, including the “Indian Run,” “Bicol
Express,” “Rounds,” and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round.” The beatings were predominantly
directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to “traditional” initiation rituals.
When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes
were subjected to another “traditional” ritual – paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who
were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their
regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to “pump” their legs
in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity
or “round”; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them
whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.[231] A few days before the “rites,” he asked
both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny
would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as
follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before
admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment
would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of
hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In
fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that “after a week, you
can already play basketball.” Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew
that the initiates would be hit “in the arms and legs,” that a wooden paddle would be used to hit
them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs…. Indeed, there can be no fraternity
initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in
this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting
physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven
was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional “rounds” on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially
reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members
still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to
tradition. Other than the paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same
process of “traditional” initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken
into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may
also be determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method
used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing
Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be
penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,

fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted
in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain
acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but
it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very
same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group
of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes,
Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called “hazing.” Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong
kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
“Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo.”
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor.
But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any
crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate,
the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the
Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in
the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, “We did
not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have
any intention to kill or maim.”
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include
sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of
sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the
act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase
“without consent” for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it
is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of
concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In
fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or
without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity
with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation
which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr.
President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or
whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no
moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a
fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim
can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the
part of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman
from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions,
and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when
they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can
do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the
mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable
because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, “Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it.” So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the
consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering
is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries
merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that
he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will
not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose
that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of
mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of
mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing –
unique as against typical crimes – cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as
an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny’s parents
would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternity’s initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that “in our nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.”[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing – or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering – has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior
to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or
animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his
death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which
an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger
is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage
ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm
to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act.
Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree
of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on
account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in
order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much
care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or
diligence that may be required of an individual, “from a transitory glance of care to the most
vigilant effort.”[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend
upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart
to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the
present case, the victim’s heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the “channeling” of
the blood supply from the entire circulatory system – including the heart, arteries, veins, venules,
and capillaries – to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256]
indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist
blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished
as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs,
were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a
previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on
him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they
were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms,
legs, and thighs.[261] They were also “paddled” at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and
slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez
testified on Lenny, saying: “[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.”[265] The NBI medico-legal officer
explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered
by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations
of defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased
Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit “G-1” to “G-14” individually by themselves would
not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit “G-1” to “G-14”?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is
not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during
the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269]
With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal – restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in
the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation
rites – having in mind the concept of “seniority” in fraternities – the implication of the presence
of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of
the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court
submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly – or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing
and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish
“kinship.” A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail
himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did
not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did
not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their
fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were
entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been
in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime
of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.’s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.
[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his
death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the
Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from
slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with
respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.[274]
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in the
amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the
victim’s death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the “spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.”[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱50,000, and
moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the
rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de
oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include
the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during
hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by

Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
“x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street,
a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.”[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano
sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled
him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of “the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano.”[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent

be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
“1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
“2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving
a taxi, had overtaken him;
“3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to
his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
“4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
“5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had
shot Complainant;
“6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled
by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
“7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant.”[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as
follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his
guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.”[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the
crime would have been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter
to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to
the courts, as explained thus:
“x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x.”[16] (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:
“x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and
had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then
forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the
attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife
from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor
of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of
any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.”[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself.
In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind
him that, both in his attorney’s oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound
himself to “obey the laws of the land.”
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his
civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could
never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of
their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and
unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-
court settlement with complainant’s family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent
concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
“The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,]
if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.”[28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or
allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. “Law is a noble profession,
and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable --
lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His
actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances –
not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE CUNANAN (Caressa)

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IN RE CUNANAN (Caressa)

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PART II READINGS: LEGAL ETHICS

Compiled by: Caressa Rafols

Republic of the Philippines

Resolution March 18, 1954

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

xxx xxx xxx

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to

xxx xxx xxx

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO

ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO