Of Intrinsic Validity - A Study On The Relevance of Pūrva Mīmā Sā

Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā
Author(s): Daniel Arnold

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 26-53
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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OF INTRINSIC VALIDITY: A STUDY ON THE
RELEVANCE OF PORVA MIMAMSA
DanielArnold
Doctoral inPhilosophy
Student ofReligions, ofChicago
University
Introduction
As one ofthesix"orthodox" schoolsofbrahmanical thought thatareoftentakento

representthe main philosophical options India,PRrvaMTmmsais usuallythought
of
towarrant at leastcursory treatment indiscussions ofIndianphilosophy; afterall,the
six orthodoxschoolscollectively represent Indian so if
"philosophy," MTmamsa is
to be discussed,surelyitis undertherubricof"philosophy."'However,MTmamsa
seemsinthisregardrarely to receivemuchmorethancursory treatment,a factthat
is explained,ifat all, by itshavingcontributed littleof "philosophical"relevance.
Indeed,MTmrmsa's constitutiveconcernwithdemonstrating the authority of the
Vedas prompts many Western observers to characterize this traditionas virtually
antithetical
totruly philosophical inquiry.
Thus,despiteitssignalinfluencein the intellectual milieuof classical India,
MTmamsa receives relativelyscant attention in the Western literatureon intellec-
tualpracticein India.In Surendranath Dasgupta'sHistory ofIndianPhilosophy, for
example,MTmapsa receives a review about one third the lengthof those accorded
to thetraditions of Nyaya-Vaidesika and Sarmkara's Vedanta.In introducing his re-
view of the MTmamsa doctrineconcerning the authority of gabda("language"or
"testimony"), Dasguptaapologizesforthusintroducing a topicomittedfromhis
discussionsofotherschools,sayingthatdiscussionofthistopic"has butlittlephil-
osophicalvalueand I havetherefore omitted togiveanyattention to itinconnection
withthe Nyaya,and the Samkhya-Yoga systems."Thisdiscussion,he continues,
"has butlittlevaluewithus,thoughitwas a veryfavourite themeofdebateintheold
days of India."2 The philosophically sophisticated B. K. Matilal, thoughadvancing
a helpfuldiscussionofthedoctrine thatwe willconsider, dismissively observesthat
"the scriptural way of knowingis by definition infallible! Thisis a sortof funda-
mentalism."3 Evenso sensitivean observeras FrancisClooney,in discussingthe
relationbetweenPurvaMTmamsa and UttaraMTmamrsa (also knownas Vedanta),
in one place refers us to one of his earlierworksfor"a description of the non-
philosophical MTmamsa whichis thetruepredecessor to Advaita."4Finally, in the
context ofBuddhist studies(where,itseemsto me,muchofthephilosophically rich
discussionof Indianthoughtcurrently takes place), therehas been ratherconsider-
able attentionto the significanceof Naiyayikasas interlocutorsof Indian Buddhists,
butverylittleanalysisof the role played by MTmrmsskasin thisregard.
As a modestcorrectiveto thisimbalance, I would liketo develop a sympathetic
account of one of the chiefdoctrinesof MTmamsa,namelythatof svatahpramanya,
26 PhilosophyEast & West Volume 51, Number1 January2001 26-53

? 2001 by University
of Hawai'i Press
or "intrinsic validity."Thisdoctrineis the cornerstone of MTmimsaka attempts to
explaintheauthoritativeness oftheVedas,and, insofar as thatprojectis deemeda
fundamentalist exerciseantithetical totrue"philosophy," itis no doubtcentral tothe
that
widespreadperception MTmarmsd has "but little philosophical value." And in-
deed,a glibcharacterization ofthisideaof"intrinsic validity" might wellleadone to
considerthisamongthelessseriouscontributions to issuefromIndiandiscussions of
pramaa, or "criteria ofvalid knowledge"; forthe too
doctrine, briefly stated, is that
verbaltestimony (gabda)-likeall otherforms ofknowledge-isto be judgedan in-
trinsically validcriterion ofknowledge, untiland unlessprovenotherwise.
I wouldliketo suggest, however, thatthereis an important philosophical insight
here,and thatitis one thatwas developedwithsomesophistication inthecourseof
thetradition's elaboration. Specifically, thedoctrineof svatahpraminyacan fruit-
fully be seen as a compellingcritique foundationalist
of epistemologies.5 Under-
stoodas such,thisinsight can come to be seen as an important contribution to a
discussionin whichfoundationalist options(thoseof the Naiyayikas, and particu-
larlythoseofIndianBuddhists inthetradition ofDignagaand DharmakTrti) predomi-
nated.Moreover, thisdoctrine, moresympathetically elaboratedthanhasoftenbeen
the case, can be seen as quite relevant, afterall, to contemporary Westerndis-
cussionsin thephilosophy of religion.In orderto showthis,as well as to provide
someconceptualtoolsfora sympathetic accountoftheMTmamsaka doctrine, I will
develop the latter in conversation with William Alston's recent Perceiving God: The
of
Epistemology ReligiousExperience.6 Alston'swork,liketheMTmamsaka project,
startsfroma powerfulcritiqueof foundationalist epistemologies, one withsome
striking formalsimilarities withMTmamsa(although, to be sure,some important
differences as well). Moreover, Alston'sproject,too, can be seen as a "protective
strategy" notunlikethatof MTmamsa; thatis, it is one designedto rendercertain
discursive practices invulnerable to critique.7
The pointin developingthe MTmamsaka doctrineof svatahprdmdnya in this
way will not be to mount a full-scaledefense of theentireMTmdmsa system, several
keymovesin whichI would notendorse.Nor,forthatmatter, will I be endorsing
theentirety of Alston'sproject.Rather, the pointis to deployAlston'sconceptual
toolsintheretrieval ofa too-often-neglected voice in Indianphilosophy. Moreover,
thepairing ofthesetwoapproachesmayshedsomelighton bothsystems, which,for
all theirimportant differences, have somequitestriking similarities.I willconclude
bysuggesting that,despitetheradically different contexts from whichthesesystems
have issued,theremight be somecontextual similaritiesto accountfortheaffinities
intheiranti-foundationalist critiques.Inthecase of thechieffactorcould
be
plausibly argued to be the threatof Buddhism, andMTm.msd,
I willtherefore suggest thatthe
Buddhist-MTmamsd dialogue warrants much closer attention than ithas yet received.
POrvaMTm ms&and the Validityof

Pramn.as
Letus see, then,what motivatesthe developmentofthe MTmrmsadoctrineof svatah
pra~maya, or "intrinsicvalidity,"and how it unfolds.The principaldiscussion of
DanielArnold 27
thisdoctrinecenterson the second of Jaimini's MTmrmsasutras.8 Thisstatesthat
"dharmais an end whichis definedby injunction."'The pointat stakehereis the
questionof whatcan and whatcannotserveto conveyknowledgeof dharma,
which,as an unseenquality,is notavailableto senseperception.10 The answer,for
Jaimini, is thatthe defining characteristic (laksana) of dharma is itsbeingavailable
onlyby means of (Vedic)injunctions (codana). Since such injunctions are an in-
stanceofverbaltestimony (gabda),thiscontention effectively raisesthequestionof
thestatusoflanguageas a meansofvalidknowledge (a pramina).Hence,theentire
MTmrpmsa projectis launched,and theconcernwill be to showthatlanguageas
suchis intrinsically valid,and thatsuchvalidity is onlycompromised bytheagency
or intentions of speakers(withthe Vedas, as authorless, thusbeingimmuneto
chargesofinvalidity on thisscore).
The earliestof the extantcommentaries on Jaimini's sitras is thatof Saba-
rasvamin, the so-calledSabarabhisya.11 It is in commenting on Jaimini's second
sutrathatSabarafirst develops what will become the doctrine of intrinsicvalidity.
Sabara elaborateshis pointin responseto an objectorwho notesthatwe are all
awareofmanycases inwhichpeoplespeakfalsely.Sabara'sresponse,insofar as it
grounds the laterdevelopment of thedoctrine in question, is worth at
quoting length:
This(which was) saidis (i.e.,saying
contradictory, both)"says" "is false"-(for)
and by
"says"is meant conveys some knowledge; itis the causeof(someone's) knowing. That
canbe saidtocauseonetoknowwhen, givenitsexistence as a cause,onedoesknow.
Andifitis understood (that)"whenthereis an injunction, heavenoccursdueto the
agnihotra howcouldonesayitis notso?Moreover,
sacrifice," howcoulditbe known
thatitis notso?Itiscontradictory (tosay)"oneknows a nonexistent object."Andfrom
thesentence "onedesirous ofheavenshouldsacrifice," a doubt-"doesheavenexistor
not?"-isnotunderstood; and,beingunderstood as determinate [i.e.,as notambiguous],
thiscouldnotbefalse.Forthatisa falseconception which, having arisen, isoverturned;
andthisoneis notcontradicted atanyother time, norwithrespect toanyother person,
anyother oranyother
situation, place.Therefore, itisnotfalse.12
Atthispoint,theepistemologicaldoctrineinquestionis presupposed ratherthan
statedand arguedfor,but,beforeturning to thearguments thatweredevelopedby
latercommentators on Sabara,we can pause brieflyto signalthekeyissuesas they
figureinSabara'srejoinder-forthekeyelements ofthedoctrine areall inplayhere.
First
ofall,mytendentious rendering avabodhayati "conveyssomeknowledge"
of as
shouldnot be understoodin the strictsense delimitedin contemporary Anglo-
Americanphilosophy; fortheclaimhereis clearlynotthatlinguistic utterancesin-
duce anything truebelief."The point,rather,
likestatesof "justified, is simplythat
utterances
linguistic are understood,and,thusbeingintelligible,theyimpart some
conceptualcontent;thus,theyconstituteepisodesof"knowledge"onlyinthelooser
sensethattheyconveysomeunambiguous meaning.13
This bringsus to the second point,which is Sabara's contentionthat "being
understoodas determinate,[a linguisticutterance]could notbe false." The pointwe
should notice here is that it is an utterance'sbeing "determinate"(nicitam) that
qualifiesitas impartingknowledgeof the sortintendedhere. "Determinate,"more-
28 East& West
Philosophy
over,seemsto meannotambiguous, thatis, notnecessarily regarding the referent
of the utterance (which, in the case of is but
dharma, unseen), simplyregarding
itsmeaning.Ambiguity is thusimplicitly introduced as one criterion of invalidity.
Moreover,thattheremightbe othersuch criteriaof invalidity is suggestedby
Sabara'spointthat,withrespect totheclaimmadebythesentenceheadducesinhis
example(i.e., one willattain heaven due to performance oftheagnihotra sacrifice),
one could neverbe in a positionto knowthatit is false.In otherwords,Sabara is
hintingat theinsight thatone can neverdemonstrate certainty, onlythatone can in
certaincases falsify Of
knowledge-claims. course, point the that Sabara wantsto
makespecifically withrespectto his chosen,Vedic example,is that,insofar as it
concernsa case thatis notaccessibleto anycriteria offalsification otherthanam-
biguity,itmust be allowed to stand as true.
Whetheror not we wish to defendthisapplicationof the argument to the
authority oftheVedas,we can appreciatethatSabarahas herebegunan important
critiqueoffoundationalist epistemologies. Thatis, he has effectively challengedhis
foundationalistopponents to demonstrate that,in this case, heaven is notbrought
aboutbyVedicsacrifice. Sabaracan, moreover, be understood thusto have issued
a seriouschallenge,one thatshouldcause some consternation on the partofthe
foundationalist.Statedmorestrongly, Sabara'sinsight is thatfoundationalists can no
moredemonstrate thetruth oftheirownclaimsthantheycan demonstrate thefalsity
oftheVedic claim.Accordingly, thepointshouldnotbe to attempt foundationalist
demonstrations ofcertainty, which,as we willsee thelaterMimamsakas argue,are
boundto lead to infinite the
regress; point,rather, should be to judge ourselves jus-
tifiedin creditingbeliefsthathave notbeen falsified. Anticipating thetermsintro-
duced laterin thisessay,then,we can say thatSabaracould plausiblybe readas
holdingthatwe are primafaciejustified in takinglinguistic utterances to be valid,
andthatthisisthebestwe can hopeforwithrespect tootherbelief-forming practices
as well.
Thatthe insight herecan be expandedto coverotherbelief-forming practices
was recognized byKumarila Bhatta,whoseSlokavartika isthelocusclassicusforthe
development of the doctrineof intrinsic validity, as well as formostof the other
characteristicdoctrinesofMimamsaepistemology.14 TheSlokavartika isframed as a
commentary on Sabara's bh&sya. Accordingly, Kumarila's elaboration of the doctrine
ofintrinsicvaliditycomesina discussion thattakesofffrom Sabara'scommentary on
Jaimini'ssecondsutra.Here,in responseto a moreelaborately imaginedobjector,
Kumdrila countersthechargethatvalidity cannotbe said to belongto
Vedicinjunctions. Kumarila answers:"You should
(praman.ya)
understand thatthevalidity ofall
validcriteriais intrinsic;
fora capacity(forvalidity) thatdoes notexistintrinsically
cannotbe producedbyanything else."15 Inotherwords,infinite regress willensue
ifwe takeour criteria (ourpramnas) themselves to requirecriteria of validity(if,
thatis, themselvesare taken to representan epistemologicalproblem).'6
pramanas
Kumarilacontinuesin thisvein, expandingthe argumentintoa full-blowncritique
of foundationalismsuch as we have seen to be implicitin Sabara. Specifically,
Kumarilaargues not only thatwe are primafacie justifiedin takinglinguisticutter-
DanielArnold 29
ances to be valid, butalso thatthisis the onlydegree ofvaliditywe are everjustified
in judgingto obtainwithrespectto any belief-forming practices.He argues,thatis,
thatifwe cannot demonstrate thetruthofVedic claims,such claims are no worsefor
that,since we cannot demonstratethe certaintyof putativelymore well-founded
claims, either.Thus:
Ifan objectwerenotdetermined-even whenconsciousness (ofit)has arisen-untilthe

faultlessnessofthecause (ofthatconsciousness) wereestablished by someothervalid
cognition, then theproductionof thissubsequentawareness, based on anothercause,
woulditself havetobe awaited;forfaultlessness
(ofcause) is as good non-existent
as until
it is decisivelysettled.Now,onlyifthecause ofthis(secondcognition) werefaultless
would therebe validity withrespectto the awareness(it produces).Butthis(second
cognition) would have thesame(problem),and hence,nothing at all is settled.17
BeforeexplicatingKumdrila'sargument,let us firstsupplementthese passages

with some of the commentson them fromSucarita Migra'ssub-commentary, the
KiSika. Furthermakingclear the ways in which the argumenthas been expanded
to cover all belief-forming practices,Sucarita Migraelaborates on Kumarila'scon-
tentionthat,ifthe validityof our belief-forming practicesis not assumed, then we
will not be able to findany indubitablesource thatcould providesure foundations;
forno such demonstration could be noncircular,and we are compelled to assume
the validityof those practicesthatseem reliable,ifwe are to have any knowledgeat
all. Thus, ifthiscapacitywere not intrinsic,
then no knowledgeat all is possible. As
SucaritaMigrasays:
It is notthecase thatawarenessdoes notarisepriorto ourawarenessofthevirtue(of

thesource),orpriorto awarenessofthecorrespondence (ofwhathe sayswiththeactual
stateof affairs). Nor is itthecase that,even though(awareness)has arisen,itappears
as essentially ambiguous.We do notperceivea potwhichhas madecontactwithour
senses(in sucha way as to think,) "thismayor maynotbe a pot";rather, awareness
arisesas essentially determinate, (such thatwe "this
think,) is a pot!"Thisis whyitisonly
afterawarenesshas arisenon thepartofall subjectsthattheactivity ofcommunication
is seen (totakeplace). Foreven mistakenly cognizedsilver,justlikecorrectly cognized
silver, is seen conducing to effectiveaction.Thisdoes notmakesenseon thepartofa
doubtful (awareness),so certainty (mustbe said to have)been produced.Whatvalidity
couldtherebe otherthanthis?Evenifthereis correspondence orawarenessofthevirtue
(ofa sourceofcognition), thereisonlyso muchreality tothevalidity; thereis no increase
at all. So what'sthe use of (anyfurther Ifone objects:Thereis need of
validation)?
something extrinsicbecause theremaybe deviationof such (validity)-(wewouldre-
spond,)No, because even in thiscase, it'spreciselybecause of the independence of
awarenessthat,evenon thepartofone whowas previously deceived,awarenessarises
independently and as essentiallydeterminate. The subjectmaydoubtthereality ofthe
judgment becauseofitssimilarity withthecognition thathadjustdeceivedhim.Buteven
on thepartof(an awarenesswhich)is doubtful, thecapacityofvalidity does notdimin-
ish,becausetheascertainment oftheobjectto be knownis justas previously indicated
(i.e.,is validinthesamewayalreadyspecified). Rather,a subject'sdoubthas itsoriginin
thesightof some deficiency (in his epistemicsituation).This(doubt)disappearswhen
30 East& West
Philosophy
there
isascertainment
ofeither
thepresence
orabsenceofthis(deficiency);
awarenessof
is not
correspondence required. Forifthere
isalready
awarenessofa pot,whatwillone
whoisdoubtful
effectbyanotherawarenessofthepot?18
Atthispoint,we clearlyhave inplace a fairly sophisticated and cogentcritique
offoundationalist epistemologies, with the case forverbal testimony beinglinkedto
a critiqueof thosepramnas thatare putatively moreindubitable thanlanguage
(chiefly,perception). The central point of thiscritique is that we must,atsomepoint,
assumethevalidity ofsomecognition, ifwe areto claimanyknowledge at all. This
is becausetherecan be no demonstration ofthevalidity ofanypramanathatdoes
notitself appealto someotherpramana,whichcan inturnbe problematized. Thus,
if challengedto demonstrate thatcorrectperformance of the agnihotra sacrifice
yieldsheaven,theMimamsakacan rejoinby askingthefoundationalist to demon-
stratethevalidity ofanyclaim.Appealto putative pramanas is no help in this regard,
since we can alwaysask a second-order questionaboutpramnas; of the person
who claimsto knowthatthisis a pot,forexample,we can ask,howdo you know
thatyou know?Andtherecan be no answerto thisquestionthatdoes notin turn
presupposethe validityof some othermeansof knowledge.Thus,ifwhat is in
questionisprecisely thevalidity ofourcriteria ofknowledge, thenwe aredoomedto
circularity, since it is onlyby some criterion of knowledgethatwe can claimto
answerthequestion.To ask thesesecond-order questionsis not,then,to makea
trivial
point, but to get at a real problem with the foundationalist project.
Of course,thecriticoffoundationalism mustthenprovidean accountofwhy
someclaimsshouldnonetheless be preferred to others, or else be committed to the
viewthatanything goes. In this regard, itwould be important to be clear about what,
exactly,MTmamsakas meanbyjhiana,whichI havetranslated as "awareness"(and
whichis oftenrendered as "knowledge").Inthepassagestranslated above,itseems
thata validinstanceof"awareness"is qualifiedas suchsimplybyitsbeingcoherent
or "determinate" (nikcita),as opposedto "essentially ambiguous"(sam"sayatmaka). It
might therefore be objectedthatifMTmamsaka arguments forsvatahpramanya de-
pend on this of
understandingjfhana, then these arguments are advanced at
only the
costofeliminating important content from the term-namely the content givento it
byrenderings ofjhana as "knowledge," is, that inthe sense of"justified truebelief."
In otherwords,ifthe MTmamsaka argument dependson takingjfainato consist
simplyof "determinate-ness" or "lack of ambiguity," thenhave for-
feitedanyclaimto be talking abouttruth? Thereseemto meto be important
MTmmr.sakas reasons
forthinking thatthisquestion,insofar as itturnson thepresupposition of "knowl-
edge" as "justified true belief," is not relevant here. First of all, it is preciselythe
point of the MTmamsaka critique of foundationalism to argue that the demonstration
ofsuchjustification is preciselywhatis problematic. Moreover, as KarlPotterhas
cogentlyargued,thereis a real point at stake in the debate over svatahpramJnya
howeverwe understandjfidna.As Potterputsit:
Thesvatahtheorist
holdsthat,whatevercausesus to be awareof[judgment] J1causesus
itspurpose,i.e.,can lead to successful
to be awarethatJ1can satisfy oftherel-
activity
DanielArnold 31
evantsort.Theparatahtheorist
deniesthis, thatinorder
holding tobecomeawarethat J1
cansatisfyitspurpose
weneeda further awareness,
presumably whichisover
inferential,
andbeyond theawarenesswhichcausesustobeawareofJ1 itself....
Notice
thatitdoesn't
mattertothepramanya debateso posedwhetherJ1istrue
or false, thought true
or tobe or
Nor it
false.... does matter whethera theorist
thinksthat
only trueawarenesses
can lead
tosuccessful thinks
or,alternatively,
activity that
someawarenesses capableofleadingto
successful canbe false.Theissueconcerns
activity whether,whenonebecomes aware
thatJ1isa potential hedoesso through
purpose-satisfier, thesameawareness bywhich
hebecameawareofJl'soccurrence, orthrough
someother awareness.19
The same pointis made particularly clear in our passagefromSucaritaMigra,
who saysthat"even mistakenly cognizedsilver"can be conduciveto "effective
action"(arthakriyayai).20His point,thatis,is in partprecisely to refusethenotionof
"knowledge"as "justified truebelief";forwhatuse couldwe possiblyhaveofany
further "justification" we are alreadydirectedtowardeffective
when actionbyour
awareness?Moreover, howcouldwe knowthatwe had reachedanyfurther justifi-
cationapartfromthedifference thismightmaketo effective action?Itis,then,the
efficacy of the awarenessitselfthatmakesit worthwhile, and not thatof some
second-order awarenessthatjustifiesthe first-order cognition.Thus,a cognitive
eventqualifiesas jnana preciselyinsofar as it is determinate whichis all
(nikcita),
thatis requiredforthe"activity ofcommunication" (vyavaharapravrtti) tobe possible
and effective.Thisis theonlykindofvalidity therecan be, and thereality ofthis
validity would be no greater at all for itshaving some second-order justification,
even ifitwerepossibleto demonstrate thelatter without circularity.
Thus,giventhatawarenessisjudgedto be validorcorrect chiefly inregard to its
pragmatic efficacy,MTmamrsakas proceed to ask what is most effectively conducive
to therealization of dharma.Andtheiranswer,as we saw, is thatitis onlyVedic
injunctions thatare effectivein thisway. It is in thisconnectionthat
offer theirarguments regarding theauthorlessness oftheVeda. Without MTm.msakas
necessarily
this
endorsing argument, I would like to suggest thatit is not an unsophisticated
move.Anticipating Alston,we can saythattheMimamrsakas are arguing, in effect,
thatwe shouldcredittheVeda as authoritative becausethisis a sociallyvalidated
practice;thisis whathas alwaysbeendone,as farbackas anyonecan remember.21
Thus,the claim could be read as beingthat,lackingthe possibility of any non-
circulardemonstration of the validityof knowledge, we shouldcreditas reliable
whatevermeanscarrythestampof social sanction.Thisis not,of course,an un-
problematic argument (neither in thecase of MTmams- nor,we willsee, in thatof
Alston).Nonetheless, MTmamsaka criticsof foundationalism are in a good position
we
to claimthat might not,after all,be able todo anybetter thanthiswithrespect to
anybelief-forming practices.
Let us concludeour surveyof svatahpr;mamnya by quotingfroma late (ca.
seventeenthcentury)commentaryon Sabara, namelythatof VaidyanathaSastri.22
While this commentaryis rathertoo late to be relevantto the questions I hope
eventuallyto pursue (i.e., those concerningBuddhistresponses to this MTmamps
critiqueof foundationalism),itnonethelessprovidesa particularly
clear statementof
32 East& West
Philosophy
thewholeargument, fromthepointofviewoftheMTmamsaka tradition
following
Kumarila.Thispassage is Vaidyanatha's commentary on the passage from Sabara
thatwe consideredabove and fromwhich Kumdrilalaunchedhis discussion.
Vaidyanatha framesthisdiscussionby first
quotingthe keyversefromKumarila's
Slokavartika("You shouldunderstand thatthe ofall validcriteria
validity is intrinsic;
fora capacitythatdoes notexistintrinsically
cannotbe producedbyanything else").
Having thus locatedhimselfinthe tradition
of he
Kumdrila, continues:
Thus,inthissystem, becauseoftheintrinsic-nessofthevalidityofawareness, a ground of

isnotnecessary.
validity Butthereisreliance ona ground ofinvalidity;
(thus,)nonarising
ofawareness isa ground essential
(ofinvalidity); ambiguityof(such)awareness (as has)
arisen(isa ground); thearisingofanother, contradictory
conception at a latertime(is
a ground);andawareness oftherebeinga deficiency intheinstrument(ofcognition) (isa
ground).Withrespect tothissubjectat hand:as isgoingtobe proven usinga groupof
arguments, suchas (that)
there doesnotexistanymemory ofanagent, onthepartofthe
Veda,(which ischaracterizedby)authorlessness,therecan'tbe consideredtobe aware-
nesswhichis basedon a defective instrument.Nor,moreover, doesthesentence "one
desirousofheaven shouldperform theagnihotra haveambiguity
sacrifice" as itsessence;
itproduces awareness. Nor,moreover, istherecontradictoryawareness withrespect to
theawareness arisenfromthissentence, "heavendoesnotexistas a result
(ofthesort:) of
theagnihotra"; (for)
when, andonthepartofwhom, (couldsuchawareness) arise?Noris
itthecasethatawareness doesnotariseatall.Hence,basedonthenonapprehension of
one
any among (these
options)consideredas of
grounds invalidity, the
through complete
rejectionofdoubtas to invalidity, validitystands,without exception,as intrinsically
established.23
The argument is by nowquitefamiliar, although, as we willnote,Vaidyandtha
herelaysitout in a way thatcompelsus to attendto the largerMTmapmsaka goal
thatis servedbytheelaboration ofthedoctrine thatwe haveso farsurveyed. What
Vaidyanatha's elaboration adds is a particularemphasison thecriteria thatcan be
takento overridesuch knowledge-claims as have been provisionallyaccepted.As
we willsee, theMTmamsaka foroverriding
criteria claimsthatwe wereprimafacie
justifiedin acceptingare quitesimilarto the "overriders" thatAlstonappeals to.
Thus,thereare clearlyfallibility clauses, with a clear provisionforthe arisingof
subsequent cognitions thatforceus to reviseearlierbeliefs,
andone providing forthe
realizationthatourcognitive apparatus is defective. the
Again,though, emphasisis
on nonambiguity, andthepointisthatwe areprimafaciejustified increditingclaims
thatare intelligible. In thiscontext,noteagaintheuse of"awareness"(or"knowl-
edge,"jfina) in all ofthis.The pointis thatthesentencesin questionsimplyim-
part some particular and specifiablecontent,some intelligible meaning;it is not
claimedthattheyimpartanything like "justifiedtruebelief."Again,though,in
notingthis,I do notintendto weakenthe MTmamsaka position;indeed,thevery
strengthof the MTmamsakapositiondepends on notingthis,forit is integralto the
MTmamsakapositionthatstrictnotionsof "justifiedtruebelief" are to be eschewed,
of such justificationis preciselywhat is here shown to be
since the demonstration
problematic.
DanielArnold 33
Of course,itis againVaidyanatha'spointto showthat,giventhesecriteria (and
given other,more questionable arguments forthe authorlessnessof theVedas), there
is no possibility
ofshowingtheVedasto be anything otherthanvalid.Certainly, we
can appreciatetheforceofthe MTmamsa critiqueof foundationalism without fol-
lowinghimdownthatpath.Nonetheless, itis importantto notethatthisisthemajor
concernof the MTmamsakas, and thatdefending the Vedas fromattackon the
that
grounds they take to be admissibleis,therefore,the"constructive" partoftheir
project.Thus,beforeturning forfurtherelucidation to theworkofWilliamAlston,I
wouldliketobe clearaboutwhatI do anddo notwishtocommendintheMTmamsa
project--Iwish,thatis,to notebrieflysomething ofthelarger argument inwhichthe
doctrine ofsvatahpramanya so importantly.
figures Indeed,Vaidyanatha's passage
invitesustoconsiderthelarger context,as he drawsourattention toa keypartofthe
argument, theimportance ofwhichI have so farminimized. In a different
context,
SheldonPollockhas aptlycharacterized thedialecticofwhichsvatahpramannya is
one moment:
First-this
is wherewe encountertheessentiala prioriofMTmassa-dharma is stip-
orrather
defined,
ulatively positedwithout
argument, as a transcendent
entity, so is
and
unknowable byany formofknowledge notitselftranscendent.
Second-and thisisthe
basicepistemological of
position MTmmsa-allcognitions must be acceptedas true
unlessanduntiltheyarefalsified
byothercognitions.The first eliminates
principle as
sourcesofknowledgeofdharma and
perception anycognitive actbasedon perception
(verbal
communication, andthelike).Thecommitment
inference, tofalsifiability
(without
Popper's that
corollary what is notfalsifiable
cannot count as true)rendersthe truth
claimsofa transcendent
sourceofknowledge-revelation-inviolable.24
Thus,thekeypresupposition is thatthemostimportant sortofknowledge concerns
an object(dharma) thatcannot be known by the kinds of cognitive thatare
acts
capableofbeingfalsified bysuchcriteria as Vaidyanatha laysoutas admissible, and
the mainargument based on thispresupposition is thatthe one valid meansof
knowing thatobject(namelytheVeda) is notfalsified byanyofthesecriteria, pre-
ciselyinsofaras theVeda is authorless(apauruseya)-for the admitted criteriaof
are
falsifiability all concerned
centrally with the intentionality of some agent, and
wherethereis no agentofwhom,say,a defective knowledge-instrument could be
predicated,there is,ipsofacto, no basisfor claiminginvalidity.
Itdoes notseemnecessary to spendtimearguing thatthereare good reasonsto
doubttheseclaims.We can, nonetheless, appreciatethattheMimmamsaka goal of
elaboratingsuch a protectivestrategyled to theformulation of a sophisticatedcri-
tique offoundationalism. A sympathetic of
retrieval this critique seems to me to be a
worthy inthecontextofIndianepistemology,
project,particularly inwhichfounda-
tionalism(intheform ofvariousdoctrines ofpramana)haspredominated. KarlPotter
has aptlycharacterized,withrespectto the foundationalismof Nyaya,the predica-
mentthatthe perceived:
MTm.msakas
The Naiyayikasaysthatthewaytojustify
thevalidity
ofjudgmentp is byshowingthatit
is groundedin a pramana.Buta prambnais, on Nyayagrounds,anotherjudgment,q.
34 East& West
Philosophy
Thereforeinorder thatq be showntobe valid,appealwillhavetobe madetoreasons
theinclusion
justifying ofthatpramdnaas a proper
ground.Sucha reason willbeanother
judgment,r.Itinturnwillhavetobegrounded, andso forthandso on,ad infinitum.
Thus
itwouldseemthatsomewhere eventheNaiyayika must admit thattherearejudgments
thatareself-validating.
Andoncehe hasadmitted this,he hasadmittedhisinabilityto
answermyquestion. Forhe couldas wellhavesaid,to myproblem abouthowp is
known tobevalid,thatitisself-validating-since
whatheintends todo insteadwilllead
himeventually to asserttheself-validating
character
ofsomeotherjudgment which
groundsp.25
ThoughPotterheremakeshis pointwithoutspecificreference to theMimamsaka
doctrineof svatahpraminya,his characterizationof the problemcould verywell
serve as a summaryof preciselythe argumentadvanced by Kumarilaand his
followers(and hintedat by Sabara). Potter'ssensitiveaccountof the difficulties
encounteredby the Naiyayikaprojectshould returnus to the conclusionthat
although theMTmamsa projectis notunproblematic,itcontainsa sophisticated
and
cogentphilosophicalcritiqueoffoundationalism.
WilliamAlstonand theReliability
ofDoxasticPractices
Inmyexplication ofsvatahpramaya,I haveanticipated theintroduction ofWilliam

Alstonto thediscussionbymakinguse ofsometermsand conceptsdrawnfromhis
Perceiving God. Thus,whenwe turnnow to Alston'scritiqueof foundationalism,
whichis similarly in theserviceofa defenseofcertainreligious commitments, we
shouldfinditfamiliar. Alston'sworkrepresents a particularly sophisticatedcontri-
butionto the philosophicalliterature on "religiousexperience,"which,Alston
argues,we are justified in crediting forthesame kindsofreasonsthatinclineus to
creditbeliefsbased in sense perception. The point,thatis, is to showthatin both
cases we are primafaciejustified in consideringthesedoxastic("belief-forming")
to
practices provide bases for true beliefs-and thisdespitethefactthatin neither
case is itpossibleto demonstrate, withoutcircularity,thereliabilityoftheseprac-
tices.Thisis, then,a critiqueof theclassicalfoundationalist project(whichseeks
precisely such a a
demonstration)-andcritique,moreover, which,likethatofthe
MTmdmrsakas, is intended to defendcertainwaysofderiving religiousbeliefas being
no lessreliablethansenseperception (which,forus as for,say,theNaiyayikas, tends
to be creditedas theparadigm case ofa reliablebasisforknowledge). In surveying
Alston'sdiscussion, I willventure to be morecriticalthanI havebeen inthecase of
MTmamsa, withmycritique, I think, beingrelevantto bothcases. Thus,whileI have
so farattempted a sympathetic accountof theMTmdmsa project,I will heremake
moreclearmysenseoftheproblems withsuchan account.Inthisway,we willsee
thatboththestrengths and problems oftheMTmamsa projectremainin playinthe
contemporary Anglo-Americanphilosophyof religion.
In Alston'sview, putativeexperiences of God (which issue fromwhat he calls
"mystical"practices)are to be accounted as a species of perception;and the ques-
tion of whetherpersonsare epistemicallyjustifiedin creditingsuch perceptionsis
DanielArnold 35
analyzedbycomparing theseperceptions withsensoryperception, whichis gener-
belief.Alston'sprincipal
allyheldto be themostreliablesourceofjustified goal isto
showinthiswaythatthedoxasticpractices thathe labels"mystical" areprimafacie
inthesamekindofwayas, and forthesame reasonsas applyin,thecase
justified,
ofsensory"practices."As Alstonsays,theonlyway ofarguing, froma standpoint
"outside any practiceofforming
beliefs... thatpeople do genuinelyperceiveGod,"
is to arguefortheepistemological thatbeliefs
position formed on thebasisofsuch
(putative) are facie)
perceptions (prima justified. Ifthat
is the we
case, havea goodreason
forregarding manyof theputative as
perceptionsgenuine; forifthe werenot
subject
often X
perceivingwhy
really shouldtheexperience involvedprovide for
justification
beliefsaboutX?Thisreverses
theusualorderofprocedure inwhich wefirst
seektoshow
thatS really
didperceiveXandthengo ontoconsider whatbeliefsaboutX,ifany,are
justified
bybeingbased onthat
perception.
(p. 10;cf.
pp. 68, 227)
In otherwords,theprocedureis to showthatthesubjectsof religious experiences
are primafaciejustifiedin thinking the experienceto be an experiencesuch as
it seems,phenomenologically, to be; and, ifone is thusjustified, thentheexpe-
riencecan, ipso facto,be takenas genuinely an experienceofwhatseemsto be
experienced.
Thisis precisely theoppositeofa foundationalist approach,whichwouldseekto
groundjustification in a causal storythattakesX indubitably to have caused the
perception. That is, what foundationalistsclaim is that "true" beliefs are theones
thatcan be specifiedas havingbeen caused in such a way as to guaranteetheir
foundations incertainty. On thisview,thereliability ofpracticesis inextricably tied
to thequestionoftheirtruth, sincefora practiceto be reliableis precisely foritto
have been caused in sucha wayas to guaranteeitstruth. Againstthis,Alstonvery
persuasivelyargues that no doxasticpracticecan be demonstrated to be reliableina
way thatdoes notalreadypresupposeitsreliability. As LewisCarrollshowedwith
respectto inference, itis a to
fallacy suppose that "what ittakesfora condition, C,
to be sufficientforP (call this"whatittakes"'A') mustitselfbe partof anysuffi-
cientcondition forp."26 Inotherwords,whilewe mightreasonably claimto know
something, we can never demonstrate conclusively how we know that we know;for
itis notpossibleto knowsomething independently of the ways in which we know
things!Alston strongly the
emphasizes importance of thus seeing the issue as a
function of different "levels" or "orders"of knowing.Thus,the inescapability of
epistemic circularity is not a problem once we realize that itobtains only at thelevel
of second-order claimsabout knowledge;and thisrecognition is sufficientforus
to takethe first-order beliefsas nonetheless reliablesince,accordingto Alston's
theoryofepistemic.justification, "thereare no 'higher-level' requirements forjusti-
fiedbelief" (p. 87). As Alstonsays,
I willbe workingwiththeconceptof a subjectS's beingjustified in believingthatp,
ratherthanwiththeconceptofS's justifyinga belief.Thatis,I willbe concernedwiththe
stateorcondition
ofbeingjustified inholdinga certainbelief,ratherthanwiththeactivity
ofjustifying
a belief.... The crucialdifference
betweenthemis thatwhileto justify a
36 East& West
Philosophy
beliefis to marshallconsiderationsin itssupport,in orderforme to be justified
in
believing thatI havedoneanything
thatp itisnotnecessary bywayofanargument forp
orformyepistemic situation p. UnlessI amjustified
vis-a-vis inmanybeliefswithout
arguingfor them, there
is precious I
little believe.
justifiably (p. 71)
Withrespect,therefore, to thequestionof how Alston'sepistemicreliability is

related to the likelihood of a belief's this
beingtrue, important distinction between
levelsis whatentitlesus to assumeour reliablepracticesto be "truth-conducive."
Thatis,Alstoncan acknowledge that"we havefinally settledforan epistemic status
forSP ["sensorypractice"](and derivatively fortheepistemicstatusof perceptual
beliefs)thatfallsshortof likelihoodoftruth," and yetgo on to emphasizethatthis
reducedepistemic status"attachestothehigher-level claimthatSP is reliable,notto
theparticular perceptual beliefs that issue from that practice.As forthelatter, what
we are claimingis stillthefull-blooded (primafacie)justification ... thatinvolves
likelihood oftruth" (p. 181). And, as he adds in a footnote to "This
this, does not,of
course,imply that the higher-level claim is notjustified in the truth-conducive sense.
It is justthatwe have givenup on showingthatit is." In otherwords,whilewe
cannotshowthatitis "likelytrue"thatwe knowthatwe know,we are nonetheless
justified inclaimingto know.
Alstonconsidersseveraldifferent attempts to argue,to thecontrary, thatthere-
liabilityofsenseperception can infactbe demonstrated. Amongthese,forexample,
is theverificationist hypothesis proposedby the logicalpositivists. Alstonnotesthat
thiscould be criticizedby questioning the coherenceof theveryidea of factual
meaningfulness, but his pointhere is specifically to show thatthe verificationist
approach cannot demonstrate reliability without epistemic circularity.Inthiscontext,
then, the relevant objection is that the very criterion invoked by verificationists
"presupposes by the and largereliability of sense perception. What wouldbe the
pointofrequiring empiricalverifiability or confirmability ofp as a necessary condi-
tionofthefactualmeaningfulness ofp unlessitwerepossibleto verify or confirm a
hypothesis it
by relating properly to the results of observation?" (p. 111). In other
words,onlya corroboratory perception could be countedas confirming the relia-
of The
bility perception. point, then, is not unlike that of Sucarita Misra, who, as
we saw,askedhowawarenessofa potcould possiblybe anyfurther "justified"by
anotherawarenessofa pot.Alstonhas ineffect notedherethatwe couldtakeour-
selvesto be better justified bya secondawarenessofa potonlyifwe alreadypre-
supposed that perceptual awareness grantsjustification-in whichcase, whynot
settleforthejustification granted by the firstawareness?
Havingcanvassedinthiswaysomeoftheattempts todemonstrate suchsecond-
orderjustification, then,and havingshownthemall tofail,Alstonconcludesthat"a
firmly established doxasticpracticeis rationally engagedinunlessthetotaloutputof
all our firmly
establisheddoxasticpracticessufficiently In
indicatesits unreliability.
otherterms,a firmlyestablisheddoxasticpracticeis rationallyengaged in providedit
withotherfirmly
and itsoutputcohere sufficiently establisheddoxasticpracticesand
theiroutput" (p. 175; emphasis original).He then proceeds to make his case that
Daniel Arnold 37
"Christian mysticalpractice"("CMP") qualifiesas one such "firmly established
doxasticpractice."Here,itis important to notetheroleplayedbyAlston'sconstraint
thatitis "firmly establisheddoxasticpractices"thatwe shouldtakeas primafacie
justified; thislimitation provideAlstonwithhis mostsignificant
for will evaluative
InAlston'sview,one ofthechiefcharacteristics
criteria. of"firmly established dox-
asticpractices"is thattheyspecify whatcan countas overriding beliefsapparently
generated bythepractice.Thus,"overriders" are integral to Alston'scase forCMP
beingon a parwithSP. As Alstonreminds us,"thejustification ofperceptual beliefs
is alwaysprimafacie,subjectto beingoverridden by sufficient indicationsto the
This
contrary. gives us another way in which a belief
can be relevantto the justifi-
cationofanotherbelief.Itcan be negatively relevant by constituting an (actualor
possible)overrider orbyruling outsuch"(p. 90). Thisnotionis muchlikethatofthe
MTmamsakas, who, as we saw, heldthatonlyinvalidity is extrinsic.
Whatitis most
significantto note in Alston,though, is his contention that relevant overriders can
come,inthecase ofCMP,onlyfromthecontext(essentially, I submit,thetradition
or canon)thatconstitutes it as a "firmly established"practice.This is key,since
Alstonwantsto insistthathisepistemological approachdoes notentailtheconclu-
sionthat"anything goes." Rather, he thinks thatCMP is on a parwithSP sinceitis
bothsimilarly and
justified similarly falsifiable.We can, then,see thattheformal
similaritieswiththe MTmdrmsa projectbegin line up withstriking
to regularity,
suchthatwe are now perhapsin a betterpositionto see therealproblemwiththe
Mimamrsaka project(and to see thattheirproblemis nota sillyone, butremainsa
problem playincontemporary
in discourse).
Inconsidering whether ornotAlston'smovehereis problematic, muchdepends,
it seemsto me, on the sharpnesswithwhichAlstonindividuates differentdoxas-
tic practices(both"sensory"from"mystical"and "Christian mystical" from, say,
"Vedic mystical..."). Moreover,it is herethatwe begin to see mostclearlythe ex-
tentto whichAlston'sprojectcan be characterized as a protectivestrategy;for,
having individuatedthesedifferent
doxasticpractices,Alstonthen wantsto maintain
thatwe shouldcountas significant overriders onlythosebelief-outputs thatare
"appropriate" to therespectivepractices-and,perhapsnotsurprisingly, theseturn
outto be theoutputsthatare generatedwithin thepracticein question.Thus,the
extentto whichAlston'sindividuation ofdoxasticpracticesis empiricallyadequate
becomesquitesignificant, sincetheseanalyticcutsprovideus notonlywiththe
objectsof our inquirybutalso withthecriteriaforevaluatingthem.Despitethe
directrealismof hisexternalist
epistemology, then,Alston'sprojectherehas close
withWittgensteinian
affinities fideism,and his persuasiveprojectbeginsto
hitherto
seemmoreproblematic.
Thatourevaluativecriteria fora doxasticpracticeshouldbe takenfromwithin
thatpracticeisa pointquiteclearlyemphasizedbyAlston.Stressing the"irreducible
of
plurality doxastic Alston
practices," insists
that"the of
criteria arequite
justification
different doxastic practices,and only confusionresultsfroman attempt
fordifferent
to subjectthe outputsof one practiceto the standardsof another,withoutgood rea-
son forsupposingthatthose standardscarryover" (p. 220). Stillmoreclearly:
38 East& West
Philosophy
Thus,to a largeextentat least,thepractice supplies boththetester andthetestee;it
gradesitsown examinations.There is a certaincircularity involved in the
supporting
Onehastousethepractice,
choiceoftests. including the in
tests question,toshowthat
thesetests
aretherightonestouse.Choosing tests[is]an 'inside'job.Andthiscircularity
attaches
as fullyto universal
practiceslikeSP thataretaken, inpractice,tobe unprob-
as itdoestocontroversial
lematic, practiceslikeCMP.(p.217)
withrespectto doxasticpracticesotherthanSP, onlya privileged

Finally, fewcan
properlyclaimto be "inside"
sufficiently the to
practices judge whetheror notthe
testshavebeen passed,for
relevant
in religious
the normalsituation communities (and our fragmentedand spiritually
isnotatalltypical
society
impoverished inthisrespect)
isfortheyoung tolearnhowto
perceptually
recognizeGodwellbefore anycritical on theprocess.
reflection Butjust
is so muchat themercy
becausethepractice ofsocialinfluences,
itis possible
fora
persontotakeupthepracticeafter attheageofreason,
arriving thoughthisremains the
rather
exception thanthe rule.
(p. 187)
Itis important to noticehow muchofAlston'sargument standsorfallswiththe

adequacyofthisempirical descriptionoftheepistemic situationsofpersonspastand
present. In order for the evaluation of beliefsissuing from CMP to be (as Alston
insists)reallya matter internalto CMP, itmustbe thecase (1) that"mystical"dox-
astic practicesreallyare as cleanlyseparablefromsensorypracticesas Alston
maintains, and (2) thatparticular "mysticalpractices"(e.g.,Christian)mustbe indi-
viduatablein sucha wayas to makeclearwhether or notcandidateoverriders are
properly internal
to them. In regard to the former point, I am notconvinced that
Alstonhas adequatelymetan objectionfromRichardGale, whichAlstonhimself
cites.Gale has notedthetensionbetweenAlston'sdemands,"on theone handfor
parityoftreatment ofthereligious and senseexperiencedoxasticpracticesand,on
theother,thatwe notbe chauvinistic, thatwe notupholdtheepistemological prin-
ciplesofone practiceas a standardbywhichto judgetheadequacyofothers."27
WhatGale has noted,inessence,is theproblemofwhether different
doxasticprac-
ticesare infactas easilyindividuated as Alstonseemsto presuppose. Thisisformally
relatedto the second point,withrespectto whichwe shouldconsidertheextent
to whichAlston'slistof possibleoverrider sourcesforCMP (whichlist,I submit,
essentially represents Alston'ssense of what theChristian canonshouldbe takento
include)is a controversial one. According to Alston,"CMP takestheBible,theecu-
menicalcouncilsofthe undividedchurch,Christian experiencethrough theages,
Christian thought, and more generally theChristiantradition as normativesources of
itsoverrider system"(p. 193).
To be sure,Alstonacknowledgesthe controversialcharacterof all of these,and
his problem is perhaps no differentfromthat of any such stipulativedefinition.
Nevertheless,it seems to me particularlyimportantforAlston's case thatthis de-
be right,
scription since it is Alstonwho has so insistedthatthe properevaluative
criteriaforassessingthe outputsof CMP are those internalto CMP; accordingly,it is
DanielArnold 39
incumbent on Alstonto show thatit is (in factor even in principle)possibleto
specifywhichcriteria qualifyas thusinternal.
Despite the sophisticated epistemological apparatusand the eminently non-
Wittgensteinian realism, then, Alston's position seems to me to be, in the end, vul-
nerableto the same critiques as can be leveled the
against Wittgensteinian-fideist
positionsof, say,D. Z. and
Phillips George Lindbeck. Thisisemphatically notto say
thatAlston'spositiondoes notrepresent an advanceoverthesepositions. The really
valuablepartof Alston'sargument is his sophisticated and compellingcritiqueof
foundationalistepistemologies. This,to be sure,maybe readas partofa "protective
strategy,"insofar as itpointsoutthattheproponent ofhard-core sensedatacannot
meetherownburdenofproof-insofar, thatis,as Alston'sprojectconsistsofshifting
the burdenof proof.Butthispartof his argument seemsto me unexceptionable.
When it comes to his applicationof theseconclusionsto specifically "mystical"
the
practices,though, project becomes more problematic, and I would shiftthe
of
burden proof back to Alston;for now he must show, more persuasively thanhe
has,thatdoxasticpracticesare as neatlyseparableas he takes them to be, and that
criteriaforevaluating themmustindeedbe takenfromwithin them.
Thispoint,itseemsto me,is whatis mostproblematically raisedbythe"prob-
lemofreligious diversity." In regardto this, Alston seems to me to be astutein his
characterization ofitas a problem:"Butwhenpracticeboundaries arecrossedinthe
exchangethings become stickier.Now a question arises for the recipientas to
whether in
thepractice question is an acceptableone, and that introduces additional
possibilitiesfordoubt,errorand lack ofjustification" (p. 283). Thatis, thefactof
religiousdiversity undermines theepistemic justification ofbeliefsissuingfrom CMP
since itforcesthe questionof external justification paratahpramnya!); is,
(of that
evenifwe grantthatwe wouldbe primafaciejustified intaking theoutputs ofCMP
as reliable,thefactof religiousdiversity forcesthequestionofwhetherthisis the
doxasticpracticeto whichwe shouldbe committed. AndI wouldsuggest-contra
and
Alston'sassurancethat"ourfragmented spiritually impoverished societyis not
at all typical"withrespectto themoreusualsituation ofsomeMP being"normally
acquired and engaged in well before one is explicitly aware ofthepracticeas such
and before one comes to reflectcriticallyon it" (p. 187)-that perhapstheproblem
of religious diversity is notso new and unprecedented as itseems;thatperhapsit
would notbe veryeasy to individuate, withrespectto anyhistorical situation, the
doxasticpracticesthatobtain.In anycase, itseemsclearthata judgment on this
empirical questionturnsoutto be quiteimportant forAlston'sposition.
Nonetheless, Alstonhas developedan argument thatrepresents a veryinterest-
ingtwiston the morefamiliar projectsof the manyphilosophers of religionwho
claimthemantleofWittgenstein. Thus,once he has gottenhisprojectunderway
and has individuated doxasticpractices, hisapproachlooksverymuchlikethatof
other"Wittgensteinian fideists";thatis, the pointthen becomes to insistthateval-
uative criteriabe selected only from"within" respectivepractices.But his way of
individuatingsuch practicesis decidedly different fromotherWittgensteinian argu-
ments,which typicallyturn on Wittgenstein's notions of "language games" or
40 East& West
Philosophy
"formsof life."Alston'smove is to individuate doxasticpracticesby meansof a
specificallyepistemological approach.Thatis,he generates a differentiated fieldof
the of a
playthrough development particularly nuanced critiqueoffoundationalism.
Thiscritiquepersuasively showsthatwhenwe makesecond-order problems ofour
knowledge-claims (andask, thatis, how we know thatwe know), we cannot escape
epistemiccircularity; forthe answerto the question"How do we knowthatwe
know?"can only be "By meansof some way of knowing"--andthisway can
alwaysinturnbe problematized. Itis,however,onlyat thissecond-order levelthat
we are inescapablyfacedwiththeproblemofcircularity, and we are (ifwe are to
claimany knowledgeat all!) entitled to assumethe reliabilityoffirst-order knowl-
edge-claims thatare not"overridden" byany ofthe ways thatAlston specifies. This
epistemological approach allows Alston to abide by theclaim that he is a directre-
alist,suchthathisistheverystrong claimthatalthoughno practicecan be shownto
be reliable,we are nonetheless entitled to considerourselvesprimafaciejustified in
thinking ourselvesto in
experience, fact, what we seem to ourselvesto experience.28
Conclusion
Alston'sproject,itshouldbe clear,has striking affinitieswiththatoftheMTmdmsa-

kas.Havingsurveyed Alston'sproject,we are now ina better positionto see whatI
have borrowedfromhimin myelaboration of the doctrineof svatah
We arealso ina better position to see whatMTm.msaka
is problematicintheMTmam-
priminnya.
saka projectin a way thatmakesitsproblemsmorerelevant to contemporary dis-
cussionssuchas Alston's-thatis,ina waythatcouldinspire a critique
ofMTmamsa
thatis moreconstructive and less dismissive thanhas oftenbeen thecase. I have
readthelatter positionas amounting to theclaimthatwe are primafaciejustified in
crediting (inthiscase) the verbal testimony of theVedas, and
precisely only insofar
as itis onlyprimafaciejustification thatwe are ina position to hopeforwithrespect
to any belief-forming practices.That the latteris the case has been persuasively
arguedbyKumdrila and hisfollowers, whopointoutthatwhenwe asksecond-order
questionsaboutthepramanasthataretakento validateourknowledge-claims, infi-
niteregressmustensue,since itwillonlyeverbe to otherpramanasthatwe can
appeal.Thisis,I suggest, effectivelythesameclaimAlstonhas madeinarguing that
we cannotdemonstrate thereliability ofdoxasticpracticeswithout epistemic circu-
larity.BothAlstonand theMTmamsakas havethrown downa veryseriouschallenge
beforethe proponent of foundationalism, and, to the latter'srequirement thatwe
demonstrate of "Christian"
the reliability or "Vedic mysticalpractice,"theycan
quitecompellingly rejoin:demonstrate thevalidity ofyourclaimevento see a pot!
BothAlstonand the MTmamsaka have good reasonto thinkthatthefounda-
tionalistwillbe unableto meetthis,herownchallenge.Thus,sincewe mustassume
the reliabilityof some belief-formingpractices,the mostrigorouschallenge we will
ever be in a positionto meetwill be thatoffalsification;
and, absentfalsification,
we
are entitledto creditbeliefsformedon the basis of socially sanctioned practices.
Moreover,in both cases, what is shown to be a problem is the demonstrationof
DanielArnold 41
second-order claimsabout reliability, withfirst-order claimsallowedto standas
truth-conducive. Thus,in thecase oftheMTmamsakas, first-ordercognitive events
(i.e., instancesofjfhina)are heldto be "determinate" (nikcita),such thateffective
action(arthakriya) and socialpractice(vyavaharapravrtti) areenabledbythem,while
thesecond-order question of the pramnya(validity or,perhapswe could saywith
Alston,reliability) ofsuchcognitive eventsis the levelat whichregress becomesa
The
problem. problem, then, is not whether or not meaningful and useful cognition
is possible,but simplywhetherthe reliability of cognitions can ever be demon-
strated, or mustinsteadbe assumed.29
Again,though,it becomes problematic to unpackand defendthe various
notionsof "sociallysanctioned"thatare in playin bothoftheseprojects, particu-
larlyfrom theperspective ofconcernforquestionsofpowerand ideology;for,while
thisis notwhatAlstonsays,itwouldcertainly notbe unreasonable to suspectthat
whatis thusproposedis thatthe"official"or "authoritative" traditions shouldbe
as
accepted truth-conducive, and no others. In the case of Alston, we have seenthat
thereare moreformal problems withthisaspectoftheproject,as well;specifically,
thosehavingto do withhow sharplyit is possibleto individuate belief-forming
practices, and,accordingly, howclearlywe can specify whichevaluativecriteria are
internal (and,hence,"appropriate") to certainpractices, and whichexternal. Inthe
case ofMTmmrpsa, theproblemis similar.Havingchallengedthefoundationalist to
demonstrate thetruth ofanyclaim,theMTmmsakarestscontentthattheinvulner-
ability oftheVedashasthusbeensecured.Butwe areentitled to rejoinbyasking:on
whatbasishas dharmabeen individuated fromotherobjectsofknowledge, and on
whatbasishavetheVedasbeen individuated as theexclusivearbiters ofthis?Thisis,
as Pollockrightly noted,the"essentiala prioriofMTmrpmsa," and we can allowthe
MTmdmsd critiqueoffoundationalist epistemologies without concurring thatthisis a
reasonableposition.
And in fact,MTmarsakasthemselves were forcedto addressthe problemof
individuating theVedas as authoritative withrespectto dharma.Thisis particularly
clear in thecommentarial literature stemming fromthesectionof Sabara'sbhasya
dealing with smrti the
(i.e., smrtipada). In this branchofthediscourse, MTmamsakas
addressedthestatusof the manytextsclassifiedas smrti(i.e.,traditionally passed
down,as opposedto theVedas,whichare Sruti,"heard"or revealed).Insofar as
therewas reluctanceto disallowthe authoritative statusof all smrtitexts,it was
arguedin some quarters thatsmrti textsderivetheirauthority fromsomesrutitext
uponwhichtheyare based.Thatis,theauthority ofanysmrti textwas based inan
inferable relationto some?ruti text.Thisgave riseto thefurther problemthatnotall
ofthesmrti textsthatMTmamsakas might wish to retainhad an obvious basisinany
specifiable Sruti.
One response to this situation was to hold that the categoryof
"Veda" exceedsthereceivedtextoftheVedas;thatis,we might sometimes be jus-
tifiedin inferring theexistence of a ?rutitextas warranting some smrtitext,even
wheretheformer is no longerto be foundintheVeda as ithas comedownto us.30
To be sure, Kumariladid not followSabara in makingthisclaim. Nevertheless,the
need to discuss the issue is evidence of the problemI have identified-thatis, the
42 East& West
Philosophy
problemof presupposing thattheVedas (or anything else) can be individuated as
theuniquelyrelevant criterionforsomespecifiable rangeofconcern.
Thispresupposition can be seen to function rather likeAlston'scontentions re-
the
garding sharply "bounded" character ofdifferentbelief-forming practices. Thus,
inbothcases,thepointthatreasonably followsfromthecritiqueoffoundationalism
is greatlystretched:fromthiscritiqueitfollowsthatwe may,afterall,be justified in
creditingbeliefsderived from certain religiouspractices;but itdoes notfollow that
we areentitled to claimthatcertainkindsofbeliefslineup onlywiththesepractices.
Indeed,itcould be countered thatthisclaimitselfcan be falsified bythe kindsof
criteriathatAlstonand theMTmamsakas admit;fortheclaimthatwe willbe able to
(oreven can, inprinciple) specify whatis internaland whatis external to a practice
could turnout to be empirically false, such thatthis crucial presupposition could
turnoutto be overridden bycriteria thatAlstonand theMTmamsakas admit.Thus,
whileAlstonand theMTmamsakas can plausiblyclaimto have shownthatwe can
neverdemonstrate the reliabilityof knowledgecriteria, theywill have difficulty in
showingthatitfollowsfrom thisthatbelief-forming practices arecompartmentalized
in sucha waythat,forexample,all evaluativecriteria withrespectto dharmacan
issueonlyfromthe Vedas. Still,theymayyethave othermovesto make,and it
shouldbe clear at leastthatit is notself-evident thatattempts to completethese
projectswillstandon groundanylessfirm thanthatofthefoundationalist.
I shouldat leastbriefly point out that thisAlstonianreadingofMTmamsa's svatah
primnya is notthe onlypossiblereading of the doctrine. One possiblepointof
significantdifference, whichI have so farsuppressed, concernsthe notionthatI
rendered above as "capacity"(9akti).RecallthatKumdrila launcheshiscritiqueof
foundationalism "a
by saying, capacity that does not exist intrinsicallycannotbe
producedby anything else." While I have tendentiously seen the issue as one of
primafaciejustification, thereis somegroundhereforarguing thattheMTmmrsakas
have in mindsomething morelikean occult"power"thatis intrinsically possessed
by pramnas. In thatcase, arguments forthe doctrineof intrinsic validitywould
amountto theclaimnotsimplythatwe areprimafaciejustified increditing prami-
nas, but that pramnas (and, for the MTmamsakas, particularly gabda) intrinsically
and objectively"bear" the meansof theirvalidation.Certainly, thisis how some
Buddhistcriticsof MTmrmsa have wantedto understand the claim. Sdntaraksita
and KamalaiTla, forexample,in characteristically Madhyamika fashion,attackthe
for
MTmdmsakas introducing a causal entitythatcannot be coherently positedas
eitherthesameas or different fromthepossessorofthatentity.31
Awareofthestockcharacter ofthisMadhyamika approach,one shouldhesitate
to considerthisa damningaccusation.Theremay,nonetheless, be some basis
withinMTmamsaka discourseforsucha readingofthenotionofgaktias itfigures in
Kum~rila'selaborationof svatahpramaya. I hope to have shown,however,thatthis
doctrinecan also plausiblybe read as one thatargues only thatwe are primafacie
increditing
justified and thatthe"locus" ofthis?akti,as it
practices,
belief-forming
were, is the perceivingsubject. This is, perhaps,the pointthatPandeya and Manju
had in mind in writing,"The question of validityseems, in the system,
MTmam.s
DanielArnold 43
moreofa psychological phenomenon thanthelogicalone,becauseinkeepingwith
the logicof trutha valid cognitioncannotbe renderedinvalidsubsequently."32
Again,though, to putthematter thisway is to presupposea notionoftruth thatthe
MTmamsakas havetriedto showcan neverbe demonstrated, thatis,one suchthatit
couldmakesensetothink ofknowing whenone'scognition hasbeencausedbytrue
statesofaffairs.
Inanycase, havingshownsomething oftheaffinities
betweenthesearguments, I
wouldliketo concludebysuggesting someinteresting questions that are openedup
byourmoreseriousattention theMTmamsaka doctrine ofsvatahpramanya, and by
ourelaboration ofthisdoctrinein conversation withWilliamAlston.The kindsof
questionsI have in mindmostlyhaveto do withtheintellectual contexts thatgave
risetothesesimilar of
critiques foundationalism, which are similarlyin the serviceof
protective with to
strategies respect religious commitments and practices. I would
be reluctant to proposethatthereis some essentialsimilarity thatobtainswithre-
specttotheseverywidelyseparated culturalmilieux.Itmight, nonetheless, be tempt-
to on
ing speculate family resemblances between these differentsituations.
Fornow,I willleavespeculation regarding Alston'scontext(i.e.,ourcontext!) to
others,as I am mostinterested infurther exploringthecontext thatgave risespecifi-
callytotheMTmamrps doctrine.We haveseen,inthisregard, thatKarlPotter (rightly)
findsa dilemmasuchas Kumarila elaboratedto obtainspecifically withrespectto
Nyayaphilosophy. And,to be sure,theMTmdmsaka critiquecertainly appliesto the
case of Naiyayikafoundationalism. I would suggest,however,thatthe MTmamsr
elaboration ofan epistemological doctrine thatprotectsitslargerprojectwas chiefly
motivated bythethreat of Buddhist attacks.33Here,itis interesting to recurto Vai-
dyandtha, who beginsthediscussiontranslated above by layingout fourpossible
positionson thequestionofvalidity (pramainya).On thisschematization:
TheSamkhyas sayitisascertained thatthevalidityandinvalidity
ofawareness
isintrin-
sic;theLogicians saythatboth(validity
(i.e.,Naiyayikas) andinvalidity)
are(determined)
bycause,quality,deficiency,andso forth(i.e.,aredetermined theBud-
extrinsically);
dhists is)intrinsic-ness
say(there ofinvalidity,andexternal-dependence
ofvalidity;
but
theMTmamsakas say(that) isintrinsic,
validity andinvalidity
isdependent.34
Here,it is interestingto notethatit is the Buddhistswho are seen to hold a

the
positionprecisely opposite of thatdefended by the MTmamsakas. In theview
thusattributedto Buddhists, notonlyshouldwe supposethatvalidity can be dem-
onstratedwithrespectto such"external"meansas perception, but,indeed,we are
toldthatanything else is necessarily
erroneous.And,infact,thisseemsto metobe a
fairsummary ofthepositionelaboratedby Buddhist inthetradition
epistemologists
of Dignagaand DharmakTrti (whowere,respectively, and successorto
predecessor
Kumarila,who was an interlocutor in thesame broad streamof philosophicaldebate
sharedby thesegreatBuddhistepistemologists). In theirview, perception(pratyaksa)
is our onlymeans of undistortedknowledgeoftheworld,and the introduction of any
conceptual elaborationsof this necessarilyentailsdistortion,
since conceptual pro-
cesses are essentiallycharacterizedby error.While hold thatwe are
MTm.msakas
44 East& West
Philosophy
primafaciejustified in crediting anymeansthatimparts an intelligible
conception,
theseBuddhists holdthatthis'is exactlywrong-thatwe should,rather, assumeour
beliefsto be false,untiland unlesswe can eliminate thenecessarily distorting influ-
ence ofconceptualactivity. Moreover, theBuddhists ofthisepistemological tradition
would at leastrecognizethe thumbnail sketchof theirpositionas counteredby
Vaidyandtha, forthe same schematization ofpossiblepositions on validity is found
in relevant Buddhist sourcesas well.35
Withthisinmind,itbecomesinteresting to askjusthowBuddhists and MTmam-
sakas interacted withrespectto theseissues.Clearly, theMTmamsakas experienced
Buddhistepistemologists as representing a seriouschallengeto the worthiness of
theirenterprise, and Kumdrila was particularly concernedto respondto theargu-
mentsofDignaga(withKumdrila's critique in turn rebuttedbyDharmakTrti). Whatis
ratherlessclearis howlaterBuddhists wereaffected the
by MTmamsaka responses to
theirchallenges.Thereis some question,forexample,as to whatextentBuddhists
such as Santaraksita appreciatedtheforceof the anti-foundationalist critiquethat
goes with the MTmamnsaka defense of svatahprimnya.36 Whatever the case, it is
certainly truethat have notreceivedtheattention theydeserveas in-
fluential MTm.msakas
interlocutors ofIndianBuddhists, studiesofwhommuchmoreoftenattend
to the roleof Naiydyikas in thiscapacity.Atthe veryleast,then,I hope to have
shownthatMTmamsd represents an important voice in theinter-traditionalconver-
sationthatunfoldedas Indianthinkers ofvariousdispositions turnedto thetaskof
their
defending positions against theattacks ofother The
thinkers. MTmdmsd doctrine
of intrinsic is a
validity philosophically serious and tenable position,and the philo-
sophicallyproblematic character ofthelarger projectshouldnotkeepus
fromtakingitseriously as such. Moreover, MTm.msa
that theircritiqueoffoundationalism is
not onlyseriousbut also of contemporary relevanceshouldbe suggestedby its
affinities
withthesophisticated projectofWilliamAlston, who,in responseto chal-
lengesperhapsnot unlikethosethatBuddhists representedforMTmamsakas, has
madean important contribution tothecontemporary of
philosophy religion.
Thus,the movethatthe make in attempting to individuate the
Vedas as thesole arbiters MTm.msakas
ofdharma is, in fact,a movethatis stillin playin con-
temporary discourse, and the sophistication ofAlston'sargument fora similarmove
shouldindicatethatitis notan altogether untenable move.WhileI haveshownthat
thereare problems withthismove,and whileI wouldnotcommendeitherAlston's
projectorthatoftheMTmamsakas as worthy ofwholesaleadoption,I wouldnever-
thelessurgethattheybe takenseriously.
Notes
I would particularly
liketo thankSheldonPollockforhisconsiderablerole in my
understandingoftheMTmmrpsd material.I wouldalso liketo thankJonathan Gold,
Paul Griffiths,
and ParimalPatilfortheirsuggestions
regarding an earlierdraft
ofthis
essay.
DanielArnold 45
1 - On thecomplexquestionof applyingthecomparative categoryof "philoso-
phy"to thestudyof classicalIndiandarsanas,see WilhelmHalbfass,"Dar-
sana, Anviksiki,Philosophy,"in his India and Europe:An Essayin Under-
standing(Albany: State ofNewYorkPress,1988),pp. 263-286.
University
2 - Surendranath Dasgupta,A Historyof IndianPhilosophy (Cambridge,1922;
Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1975),vol. 1, p. 394.
3 - B. K. Matilal,Perception:
An Essayon ClassicalIndianTheoriesofKnowledge
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),p. 32.
4 - FrancisX. Clooney,TheologyafterVedanta:An Experiment in Comparative
Theology(Albany:StateUniversity of New YorkPress,1993), p. 212 n; my
emphasis.I hastento add thatthisproblematic characterization of MTmamsd
notwithstanding, I consider Clooney's an excellent book. Clooney'sobserva-
tionson thesubjectof apauruseyatva, or the "authorlessness" of theVedas,
represent a veryhelpfuldiscussionfroma literary-theoretical perspective (see
pp. 31-32). For another relevantand interesting discussion from Clooney
(thisone also informed by perspectives in ritualstudies),see his "Whythe
Veda Has No Author: Languageas Ritualin EarlyMimamsdand Post-Modern
Theology," Journal of the American AcademyofReligion55 (4) (1987): 659-
684.
Itis pertinentto notesomeoftheotherphilosophically sensitiveattempts to
explicateMTmamsa doctrines.In regardto philosophy of language,thereis
OthmarG5chter'sHermeneutics and Languagein PorvamTmamss: A Studyin
Sbara BhJsya(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass, 1983). G5chter's comparative lens
is quitedifferentfromtheone thatI willdeploy,as hisconcernsarewithher-
meneutical discussions as elaboratedbyHeidegger and,particularly, Gadamer.
Thisis surelya richvein,and students ofMTmrms5 couldcertainly be forgiven
forcomingto thinkthatHeideggersometimesseems almostlike a crypto-
MTmimsaka. Consider,especially,a passage in Sabarathatparticularly exer-
cises Gachter:Sabara,anticipating theargument thattheVeda is authorless,
considersthe case whenlanguageitselfspeaks(sabde bruvati;discussedin
G5chter, passim).Whilecomparisons withcontinental hermeneutics maybe
promising, then, I will here be considering MTmimsa in conversation witha
prominent trendin Anglo-American of
philosophy religion.
G. P. Bhatt'sEpistemology oftheBhattaSchoolofPurvaMTmamsp (Vara-
nasi:Chowkhamba Sanskrit SeriesOffice,1962),thoughdated,is quiteuseful
(see especiallypp. 129-145). Alsowithrespectto thedoctrine ofsvatahpr -
see FrancisX. D'Sa, in Sabara and Kumbrila: To-
wards a
mn.ya, Study of the MTmimsi of
Experience Language(Vienna:Institut
Sabdaprdmn.yam fOir
Indologieder UniversitItWien,SammlungDe Nobili,1980), pp. 180-191,
where D'Sa offerstexts,translations,
and close readingsof some relevantpas-
sages from Kumarila. See also PurusottamaBilimoria,Sabdaprambna: Word
and Knowledge (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1988), passim. Bilimoriais not entirely
sympatheticto the doctrineof svatahpra~mnya,and worksat "qualifyingand
46 East& West
Philosophy
tempering" it (p. 272). Also usefulis GanganathJha'sPurvaMTma~msa in its
Sources,2d ed. (BanarasHinduUniversity Press,1964),especiallypp. 75-79.
Fora morecomprehensive see
bibliography, Jean-Marie Verpoorten, MTmams,
vol.
Literature, 4, fasc. 5 of JanGonda, ed., A Historyof IndianLiterature
(Wiesbaden:OttoHarrassowitz, 1987).
5 - Bythephrase"foundationalist epistemologies," I meanto call attention to the
factthattheversions ofclassicalfoundationalism addressedhereareeminently
epistemological views.Thatis,theyare viewsthatattendin particular to puta-
tivefactsaboutourepistemicsituation, factsabouthow itis thatwe come to
hold beliefs.It is characteristic of foundationalist epistemologies, as I under-
standthem,to conflate thequestionofhowwe thuscometo holdbeliefswith
the questionof whether theyare true.In otherwords,theseviewsholdthat
the questionof how beliefsare caused is the same as the questionof how
we can know theyare true.In particular, what foundationalists claim is
that"true"beliefsare theones thatcan be specifiedas havingbeen caused
in such a way as to guaranteetheirfoundations in certainty; in otherwords,
onlybeliefsarrived at incertainways(usuallybycertainputatively irrefragable
sense-perceptions) are "true." Proponents of foundational justificationthus
holdthatitis possibleto specify whichbelief-forming practices tend to cause
truebeliefs,preciselybecause some belief-forming practices(and notothers)
are heldto be demonstrably reliableintheirtendency to producetruebeliefs.
To makethisclaim is, in effect, to hold thatwe can takeas mostcertainly
knownsimplywhatappearsmostclearlyto us. Itis,inotherwords,to mistake
ourreasonsforbelieving something forthekindsofreasonswe can offer forits
being true.Against this notion, John Henry Newman aptlyrejoined that "a
proposition,be itever so keenlyapprehended, may be trueor be
may false....
[W]e have no rightto considerthatwe have apprehendeda truth, merely
because ofthestrength ofour mentalimpression of it" (AnEssayin Aid ofa
Grammar ofAssent[University of NotreDame Press,1979], p. 80). Newman
anticipates,to a striking degree,the kindof projectadvanced by William
Alston,whoseworkfigures prominently inthepresent essay.ForMTmamrsakas,
whatcorresponds to thisnotionoffoundationalism is paratahpramanya, "ex-
trinsic
validity"--that is, theview that is
validity dependent on some specifi-
able extrinsicfactor(s). Forsome thoughts on whichopponentsof MTmamsa
mightbe saidto answerto thisdescription, and on thesenseinwhichvalidity
forthemis "extrinsic," see notes34 and 35 below.
6 - WilliamAlston,Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of ReligiousExperience
Cornell
(Ithaca: Press,1991).
University Alston's
critiqueof classicalfounda-
tionalismhas been separatelydeveloped, withoutthe constructive
concernthat
predominatesin the second halfof PerceivingGod, in his The Reliabilityof
Sense Perception (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1993). However, it is
Alston'sdeploymentof thiscritiqueas partof a projectin philosophyof reli-
gion thatmakes forinteresting withthe MTmamsakaproject,and so I
affinities
DanielArnold 47
havefounditimportant
to makeuse ofhiscritiquespecifically in
as itfigures
hisworkon philosophy
ofreligion.
Moreon thisbelow.
7 - The term"protective strategy"is thatofWayneProudfoot, who uses itpejo-
rativelyto characterizetheversions of fideism
philosophical thathe sees issu-
ingfromSchleiermacher. See his ReligiousExperience(Berkeley:University
ofCalifornia Press,1985), pp. 199-209. Alstonand theMTmamsakas, insofar
as theyjudgetheirown arguments to succeed,wouldofcourseobjectto the
pejorativeaspectofthischaracterization, whichI borrowsimplyas formally
apt.
8 - Dasguptadatestheseat ca. 200 B.C.E. (Dasgupta,History
ofIndianPhilosophy,
p. 370).
9 - Codanalaksano'rthodharmah (Jaiminisatra 1.1.2).
10 - Itis difficultto sayexactlywhatsortof "unseenquality"dharmais. The sutra
is
justquoted introduced bytheclaimthatdharmais what"connectsa person
withthehighest good" (sa [i.e.,dharma]hi purusamr samyunakti
itipratijanTmahe). Formoreon theMiTmmsa conceptionof dharma,and on
nih.reyasena
the kindsof arguments thatthisconceptionis thought to require,see N. S.
"The
Junankar, MTmarpms of
Concept Dharma,"Journal of IndianPhilosophy
10 (1982): 51-60. Junankar's mostsuccinctsummary statement is, "Whatis
conduciveto happinessis dharmaand whatis notso conduciveis adharma"
(p. 51). It is, of course,a complexquestionwhyitwas thought by MTmam-
sakas thatonlysome qualityunavailableto the sensescould answerto this
description.
11 - The datesofSabaraare uncertain, butone reasonableguessplaces himinthe
firstcentury C.E.(Dasgupta,History ofIndianPhilosophy, p. 370).
12 - The translation is mine,based on the editionof the Anandas'rama Sanskrit
4th
Series, printing (Pune,1976),pp. 16-17. The textis: Vipratisiddham idam
ucyate- "bravTti" ca iti.BravTtiityucyate'vabodhayati, budhya-
minasyanimittam bhavatiiti.
"vitatham." ca nimittabhote satyavabudhyate so
'vabodhayati. Yadi ca Yasmim.
codanayajm satyam"agnihotrat svargo bhavati" itigam-
yate,kathamucyatena tathabhavatiiti?Athana tathabhavatiiti katham
avabudhyate? Asantamarthamavabudhyata itivipratisiddham. Na ca svarga-
kamoyajetaity ato vacanatsamdigdham avagamyate bhavati va svargona va
bhavatiiti,na ca niscitamavagamyamanam idammithyJ syat.Yo hi janitva
pradhvamsate na etad evam iti, mithyapratyayah. ca esa kalantare
sa Na
purusntare'vasthantare desantareva viparyeti. Tasmadavitathah.
13 - We willreturn to thequestionof"knowledge"shortly.
14 - At least,characteristic
forthose MTmamsakaswho follow Kumarila.I will not
hereaddressthe questionof the Prabh~karaschool of MTmamsaand itsunder-
standingofthe doctrinein question.Kumarila'sdates are generallyaccepted to
be ca. 620-680.
48 East& West
Philosophy
15 - Svatah pramanyam itigamyatim/ Na hi svato'satTsaktih
sarvapramainnnam
kartum anyenasakyate//(Slokavartika 11.47).I have used the editionof the
Trivandrum Sanskrit Series(ed. K. SambasivaSastrT), whichincludesthecom-
mentary of
Kaslika Sucaritamigra (originallypublishedin 1913; reprinted, Tri-
vandrum:CBH Publications, 1990). Cf. GanganathJha,trans.,Slokavartika
(Calcutta,1900; Delhi: Sri Satguru,1983), p. 28. Jha'sintroduction to this
translation offers someusefulremarks on svatahpramaya (see pp. ix-xii).
16 - Thispointis reminiscent ofa remark fromWittgenstein: "Whenone saysthat
suchand sucha proposition can'tbe proved,ofcoursethatdoes notmeanthat
it can't be derivedfromotherpropositions; any proposition can be derived
fromotherones. Buttheymaybe no morecertainthanit is itself"(Ludwig
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M.Anscombeand G. H. vonWright [New
York:Harper,1972],p. 2). We willhaveoccasionto noticethispassageagain
whenwe bringAlstonintotheconversation, at whichtimeitwillbecomeim-
to
portant distinguish Wittgenstein's pointregarding propositionsfromAlston's
version, which (like that of the I
Mimamsakas,submit)has a specifically epis-
temological twistthatis ofsomeimportance.
17 - Slokavartika 11.49-51: j~te 'pi yadivijfanetavanna artho'vadharyate / Yavat
na
karanaauddhatvam pramanintarad bhavet // Tatrajjianantarotpadah pra-
trksyah karanantarat / Yavaddhina parichinna ?uddhistavadasatsama//Tasya
api karaneguddhetajjljinesyatpramnatj / tasyaapy evamitTttham ca na
kvacid //.
vyavatis.thate
18 - Textfromthe Trivandrum Sanskrit Seriesedition(see note 15 above). The
Sanskrit is: Na tavadgunaj~anatsamvadajianadvapragjianam naj yataeva.
Na vi utpannam api samsayatmakam avabhasate.Na hisyadvagha.tona vj iti
indriyasannikrstam ghatambudhyamahe, api tarhighataeva ayamitinilcayat-
makameva jid'namutpadyate. Ata eva jhianotpatter anantaram eva sarvapra-
matrnam vyavahirapravrttir upalabhyate. Bhrantisamviditarajato 'pi hi samya-
grajatabodhaiva arthakriyayai gha.tamino dr<yate.Tadasyasamriayanasya na
Ato Kim
utpannam. jato niscayah. anyatpraman yambhavisyati? Satyapi sam-
vadegunajf~ane va tavadeva pramnyasyatattvam na adhikamki?lsic]cid iti,
kimnas tadupeksanena? eva vyabhicarad astiparapekseti ced, Na.
Evamapi jnanasyaanapeksatvad, Tjdr.asyavipralabdhaporvasya api nirapeksam eva
nilcayjtmakam ji anam utpadyate. Pram-ta tu
tathatvam asiahkate. Sasantkasya api na prmamnyasaktir
vipralambhaka-buddhisadr.Syat
avasTdati,
porvavat pra-
meyaparicchedat. Pramatus tu sahnka dosadarsanaprabhava. Tadasautadbha-
vabhavayor anyataranis'caye nivartate, na samvidaj~hdnam apeksate.Satyeva hi
ghartajnine kim
jatas'ankah ghatajhanantarena karisyati?
19 - KarlPotter, "Does IndianEpistemology ConcernJustified TrueBelief?"Journal
of Indian Philosophy12 (1984): 307-327 at pp. 317-318. Cf. the notionof
("certaintyobtained subsequentto perception")
pratyaksaprs.thalabdhanikcaya
in note 35 below. In that case, just as Potterpoints out here, the "further
awareness" adduced by thatnotionis inferential.
DanielArnold 49
20 - The conceptofarthakriya,
or arthakriyatva,
is,ofcourse,highly complex,with
significant in
implications Buddhist contexts,as well. For a discussionof
thistermin the contextof Dharmakirti's
thought,see Masatoshi Nagatomi,
"Arthakriya,"
AdyarLibrary Bulletin
31-32 (1967-1968): 52-72. Itwouldbe
to comparetheuse ofthetermherewiththatin play in Dharma-
interesting
kirti's
work.
21 - Indeed,thisis a keypartin MTmamsp arguments fortheauthorlessness ofthe
Vedas.Theargument, inbrief,isthatwhilewe can ineverycase remember the
namesassociatedwithvarioustraditions ofknowledge (Panini and others with
respectto grammar; Kautilyaand otherswithrespectto politics), onlyin the
case of the Vedas is knowledgetransmitted withoutbeingindexedto some
names.Ina contextinwhichlineage(gurusisyaparamrpara) is so highly signifi-
cant, thisis not such a trivial
argument.
22 - This commentator is also referred to as VaidyanathaTatsat,Vaidyanatha
Bhatta, and Vaidyanatha His
DTksita. commentary, Prabha,is printedin the
AnandaSrama Sanskrit Series edition of Sabara's Bhasya.
23 - The passagetranslated hereis printed on thesame pagesas Sabara'spassage
(see note 12 above). The Sanskrit is: Tathaca siddhante jAinapramanyasya
svatastvatpramanyakaranamr na apeksyate. Aprimayam eva tukaranadhTnam:
tac ca jiannutpattih, utpannasya jfianasya tmakata, uttara-
karanamr Tatra
kale badhakapratyayantarotpattih, sams.ay
karanedosavattaija~namr ca. prakrte
vedasyakartrsmaranabhavadiyuktinicayena apauruseyatvasya sadhayisyama-
natvan na karanadosajf~anam akyasarnkam. Na api agnihotram juhuyat
svargakamah ityadivakyam samrnayatmakarn janam utpadayati. apy evad
Na
vakyajanyajnanasya agnihotrat svargo na bhavati iti kada
'pi kasyaapi jayate?Na va jnanam eva na utpadyate. badhakajna~nam.,
Ato
'pramnnyakara-
natvenasambhavitanarm madhyaiha kasyaapy anupalambhadapramanya-
sanikayadOripastatvena svatahsiddham praman yarnnirapavidamr iti.
tisthati
24 - SheldonPollock,"MTmarsaand theProblemofHistory inTraditional India,"
journaloftheAmericanOrientalSociety109 (4) (1989): 603-610 at p. 607.
25 - KarlPotter, Encyclopedia of IndianPhilosophies, vol. 2, IndianMetaphysics
and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Ganrgesa (Delhi:
MotilalBanarsidass, 1977), pp. 157-158. Cf.also thepassagefromWittgen-
stein'sOn Certainty (see note16 above).
26 - Alston,PerceivingGod, p. 86. Cf. LewisCarroll,"WhattheTortoiseSaid to
Achilles,"Mind4 (1895):278-280.
27 - RichardGale, On theNatureand Existenceof God (Cambridge: Cambridge
Press,1991); quoted in Alston,PerceivingGod, p. 223.
University
28 - This realisttwistis the differenceI had in mind in suggestingthatthe passage
fromWittgenstein (see note 16 above) would have to be qualifiedin the con-
50 East& West
Philosophy
textofAlston'sargument. Thus,whileWittgenstein putsthematter intermsof
thatmustobtainwithrespectto thehopeoftakingpropositions
thecircularity
Alstonalwayshas inmindthereality
as certain, ofthereferents ofpropositions.
WhenAlstonconcludes,therefore, thatalthoughwe lackanyway ofdemon-
thesecond-order
strating ofourbeliefswe are nonetheless
certainty entitled
to
considerthefirst-order claimsto be reliable,he also has in mindthatwe are
entitled
to considerourfirst-order claimsas true,thatis,thatwe areentitledto
assumenotonlythatsomepropositions aretrue,butthatcertain statesofaffairs
actuallyobtain(e.g.,itis reallyGodthatpeoplesometimes experience).Alston
has morefullydevelopedthesepointsin hismorerecentwork,A RealistCon-
ceptionof Truth(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press,1996).
29 - Thus,perhapsthe mostinteresting partof Matilal'sPerception
withrespect
to whichwe could situatethe doctrineof svatahprama~yais his chapter
5, "KnowingthatOne Knows."This chapterincludesa bit on Kumarila's
MTmaymsa, butsvatahpramanyais notemphasized.However,theproblemof
"knowing one knows"is precisely
that theproblemtherecognitionofwhich
the
guides development ofthesvatah prama~yadoctrine.
30 - Forsomeveryinsightful remarkson thiswhole lineof argument,
see thetwo
articlesofSheldonPollockcitedinnote24 above and note33 below.
31 - Thisargument is developedat lengthinthepenultimate chapterofthe Tattva-
samgraha, whichis titledSvatahpr-ama-yavadaparrksa-and whichis,interest-
ingly,among the longestchapters of the Tattvasamgraha (Swami Dwarikadas
of
Shastri,ed., TattvasarigrahaAcaryaShantaraksita, withthe Commentary
of ShriKamalashTla
'Panijika' (Varanasi:BauddhaBharati,1968), vol. 2, pp.
903 ff.See especiallythe passage at pp. 905-906, whichlaysout thisform
of thedilemma,which,accordingto Kamalasila,arisesfortheMTmarsakas.
Thus,the saktiadduced by the MTmarmsakas amounts,says KamalaiTla, to
somethingsvabhavikT ("natural,""essential,"etc.), and it mustbe asked
whether this"essence" is thesameas or different fromthepramanasto which
itbelongs:sa vyatirikta va bhaved,avyatiriktava yad va ubhayanubhayasvab-
hava iticatvarahpaksah.The ensuingsustainedcritiqueof the MTma-msaka
positionis an important sourcefora fullunderstanding ofthedoctrine(cf.note
35 below).
32 - R. C. Pandeyaand Manju, "PurvaMTma~rsaand Vedanta,"in BrianCarr
and IndiraMahalingam, eds., CompanionEncyclopedia ofAsianPhilosophy
(London:Routledge, 1997),pp. 172-188 at pp. 176-177.
33 - Cf.thisinteresting remark fromSheldonPollock("FromDiscourseofRitualto
of
Discourse Power in Sanskrit Culture,"
Journal ofRitualStudies4 [2] [1990]:
342 n): "As one famous contemporaryMTmamsakatold me, has
only one real enemy: Buddhism." MTm.msa
34 - Vaidyanatha's Prabha, p. 16 of Anandairama SanskritSeries edition (see
Daniel Arnold 51
note 12 above): Jhanasyapraminyamapramanyamn ca svata eva nirniyata
itiSamkhya-h. iti
Ubhayamapi karanagunadosdina Tarkikah. Apramanyasya
svatastvamr ca paratastvam itiBauddhah.Pramanyamr svato'pr5-
prambnyasya
manyameva parataititu In thisregard,G. P. Bhattmakesthe
Mimam.sakah.
obvious(and loaded) comparison: "The Naiyayikais likea judgewho sees
everymanappearingin his courtwithan unprejudiced eye and the Bhatta
[MITmamsaka] is likeone who believes that every man is innocentuntilhis
crimeis proved.Butthe attitude of the Buddhistis justtheoppositeof the
Bhatta[MTmamsa] attitude.He is likea judge who takeseverymanto be a
criminaluntilthe proofof his innocenceis available" (Epistemology of the
BhattaSchool of POrvaMTmamsa, Alstonat one point
p. 145). Interestingly,
(p. 153) usesexactlythe same image: "Thus we willfollow thelead ofThomas
Reidintakingall ourestablished doxasticpracticesto be acceptableas such,
as innocent untilprovenguilty. Theyall deserveto be regarded as primafacie
rationallyengagedin(or'acceptable',as we shallsay),pendinga consideration
ofpossiblereasonfordisqualification...."
35 - See Kamala~ila'span-jika on Santaraksita's Tattvasamrgraha, ad. verse2811:

Tathahicatvarah sambhavanti: kadacidubhe 'pi pramanyapramanye
paks.h
svataevetiprathamah, kadacitparatahevetidvitiyah, pramanyam parato'pra-
tu svataevetitrtTyah,etadviparyayas caturthah (Shastri,ed., Tattva-
mn.yamofAc-ryaShantaraksita,
sanrgraha p. 903. For the second paksa, Shastri follows
theearliereditionof Krishnamacharya in readingkadacidaparatah;thismust
be incorrect, althoughI have been unableto checktheTibetan.)To be sure,
thispresentation of thefourfold schemadoes notattribute thepaksasto par-
ticularphilosophical schools.Nevertheless, itlaterbecomesclearthatKama-
lafilaknowsthesameattributions; forhe has hisMimamsaka porvapaksin ask
the Buddhist siddhantinwhyhe acceptsparatahpramnnya: yadibhavatamna
vivadahkathamtarhiparatahpr-mnyam abhyupagatam....(Shastri,Tattva-
of
sanrgraha AcaryaShantaraksita, p. 909). Not surprisingly,KamalasTla refuses
thischaracterization of the Buddhistposition.Still,it mustbe stressedthat
thereis at leastsomebasisforcharacterizing particularlytheepistemology of
Dignaga and Dharmakirtias a of
species paratahJpramayavada. Again, is
this
trueinsofar as thesethinkers
contentiously define pratyaksa (which,forthem,is
thefoundational pramina)as kalpanapodham, "freeof conceptualactivity."
The problemis thatniscaya,"certainty" or "determination," is an eminently
conceptual function.(For of
MTmmnsakas,course, thereis no problemhere,
insofaras theywouldrefusethecharacterization ofpratyaksa as kalpanapod-
ham;indeed,as we haveseen,theyregardanycognitive eventthatis notam-
biguous as nicita, "determinate.")That is, any nicaya will, ipso facto,be a
judgment,a vikalpa-and this cannot come with the initialperception,but
mustbe subsequentto it.Hence, in orderforpratyaksato be thefoundationfor
nis'caya,itmustbe thecase thatthe latteris conferredby somethingsubsequent
(thatis,somethingextrinsic)to theoriginalcognition.Thatthisis so was clearly
52 East& West
Philosophy
recognizedbythetradition of Buddhist
epistemology subsequentto Dharma-
kirti.
Thus,among otherthings, Devendrabuddhi developsthe notionofpra-
obtainedsubsequent
"certainty to perception."
For
atyaksaprs.thalabdhanicaya,
good discussionof see
this, John Dunne, "Foundationsof Phi-
Dharmakirti's
losophy"(Ph.D.diss.,HarvardUniversity, 1999),pp. 318ff.
36 - Again,though,whetheror not the critiqueadvanced by Santaraksita and
has
KamalasTla any purchasedepends part in on what we understandthe
MTmamsakas to have meant by thesakti
of pramanas.
DanielArnold 53

Of Intrinsic Validity - A Study On The Relevance of Pūrva Mīmā Sā

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Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

Author(s): Daniel Arnold

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As one ofthesix"orthodox" schoolsofbrahmanical thought thatareoftentakento

26 PhilosophyEast & West Volume 51, Number1 January2001 26-53

POrvaMTm ms&and the Validityof

Ifan objectwerenotdetermined-even whenconsciousness (ofit)has arisen-untilthe

BeforeexplicatingKumdrila'sargument,let us firstsupplementthese passages

It is notthecase thatawarenessdoes notarisepriorto ourawarenessofthevirtue(of

Thus,inthissystem, becauseoftheintrinsic-nessofthevalidityofawareness, a ground of

Inmyexplication ofsvatahpramaya,I haveanticipated theintroduction ofWilliam

Withrespect,therefore, to thequestionof how Alston'sepistemicreliability is

withrespectto doxasticpracticesotherthanSP, onlya privileged

Itis important to noticehow muchofAlston'sargument standsorfallswiththe

Alston'sproject,itshouldbe clear,has striking affinitieswiththatoftheMTmdmsa-

Here,it is interestingto notethatit is the Buddhistswho are seen to hold a

35 - See Kamala~ila'span-jika on Santaraksita's Tattvasamrgraha, ad. verse2811:

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