B R I TA I N

llENTRIsMl.

AND THE LABOUR PARTY a

!1-9-l-!-:-l -2-1-D-

by John Archer

First published in French in "Cahiers Leon Trotsky'', No. 15,

December 1983.

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BRITAINT AND THE LABOUR PARTY, 1931 1937

I. I ntroduc t ion

The British Sec!ion of the Incernational Left opposition Has formed abo_uE
the end of 1931 , after Navil1e, GloEzer and Shachtnan had visiEed several
rniLitants vho discussed the problens presented by Stalinism frorn differing
viewpoint.s. The first. Trot.skyist Broup, t.he "Balhanr Group", ras uho11y
prolelarian draving in Communist.s seeking to overcorne the obsEacles by xhich
the "Third Period" prevented Comrnunist influence from groving. They oHed
much to the Communist League of Anerica, the "Militant" and Pioneer Publishers.

The StaIinisL apparatus drove them out of the Cornrnuni st ParEy in Autumn 1932.
During 1933 some forty militants began discussing r.he difficulties of
establishing themselves in the sorkers I moyement. The first issue of ',Red i
Flag" appeared in May. They concurred Bith the international "turn" to
forming new parties and a neH lnternatlonal and declared lhernselves to be
the Cormuni st League.

The Comrnuni st ParEy had aluays been

slral1, cheoretically irunature,
polilicall,y heEerogeneous and under great pressure from the belaLed
development of the Labour Party. In 1924 - 1925 it fe11 an easy vicrim t.o
Stalinism. By I931 feH of th€ experienced militants of it.s early years
vere stil1 active, and they had mostly been absorbed into it.s apparatus.

The first British TrotskyisEs vere young and vere lherefore cut off from
acEual experience of the Conununist. International in Lenin,s lifetime. Nor
had they the neans t.o anaLyse the experiences and debales of the organisations
vhich preceded the ConLnunisE Part.y in Bsig3in.

Their dispures, which vere their only means t.o deternine how !o penetrate
Ehe rnass movement, xere inevitably narked by "Left-ism" and s),ndicalisr,
despite Eheir serious efforEs to masler such of Lenin, s rritings as they
could Bet, as ve1l as Trotskyrs r.riEings, mainly those on the United FronE
in Germany. Earlier norks by TroEsky, shich the Communist part.y published
or circulat.ed up to 1926, had become rare.
Nonetheless, Ehe efforEs of the TrotskyisEs in Ehe 1930,s have Hon Ehem a
dislinctive place in the history of the Labour Movenent, Hhich cannot be
obliterated and to vhich ample docr.rnentation bears vit.ness. They nounted

I
a principled opposition t.o socia l-Democra cy and stalinism, shen no one erse
did so. Where today are the heroes of Brandler's ',Communisf, Opposition,,,
of the "London Bureau" or the 'tlilitant Soclalist International', vho stood
in their r^,ay? Even today leading figures claiming to express sonething of
Trolskyism in Balgain cannot soLve rhe probLens rdhich the Trotskyists set.
thenselves in the 1930's and hunt for self-justificarion in texts recovered
fron decades of obl ivion.

II. The Problems Presented by the lndependen! Labour Party

The Comrnunist League helped during 1933 to break up a Brandler-ite faction

in the rLP' This the "Revolutionary policy coffnitree", sone members of
'.as
which came to the Fourth International . It al. so contributed to the formaEion
of lhe cadre which later founded the LSSP in Csyten.
Howeverr the League broke apar! at the end of 1933, after having been
dishonestly nis-inforned by a representative of lhe International Secrelariat
Hho deserted the moverrlen! a feH weeks laEer (Witte). Trotsky was BrealLy
disappointed. The "llajority't, vhich could no! resolve the problem of applying
Trolskyrs proposal that the greater part of the forces of the LeaBue should
"enEer" the ILP, folloved a diverBent course from that of the "flinority",
some fifteen of the younter and less experienced Trotskyists, irho entered
the ILP early in 1934. The IS then recognised both troups as "sympathisers",
in order Eo protect the ILP "entrists" from being atLacked as "ats\-ts of an
outside body". The 'llajority" mi s- int.erpreted Ehe "denotion" as a 'punishmenr"
for rejecting TroEskyrs advice, a mi sunder sEandinB Hhich persisted and led
to difficulties in 1936 - 1937.

The "Minority" hoped to test in struggle rrhether they could a1ly themselves
vith rhe nilitants in the ILP who had already shoved Ehat lhey xere deveLopinB
in a revolutionary direction. They hoped to break up the uneasy acconnodaEions
beEHeen Stalinism and the CenLrist. leadership of Maxton and Brockway, and,
at best, t.o win the ILP to seek a neH relation r.ith the rank and file of the
Labour Party and lhe Trade Unions in a st,ruggle against reformism, and to
break the influence of Stalini$r, which was paralysing the ILP militants by
isolafing Ehem from Ehe nass movement.
In rhe "minority" drer, iEs periphery, about 100, into the
November 1934
Marxist Group in the ILP. This Group produced eight issues of its "Marxist
Bu11etin", addressed to ILP nenbers, in the folloring fourteen months.
Some rho joined rere not convinced in advance of Ehe need to call on che lLP
to declare for the Fourth InternaEional, buE the Hork of the Group uas based
on the docluents of the Inlernational Communis! LeaBue.
 rt attracted some vho had earlier taken part in the sEruggle in 193L - 1932
foI the dis-affiliation of the ILP frorn t.he Labour party, yhich Trotsky approved.
Anyone who opposed dis-affiliation vas autornaEically aligned vith reforrisr
and with acceptance of the "Standing Orders., imposed on Ehe parliamentary
Labour Party by the reformist leadership. Some had already known ,'Red-F1agi'
and uelconed the entry of the "ninority'r. They rere an advance-guard of
a nuch rnore Hide-spread movenent in the working-class, on rhom a sudden real-
isation had burst in 1933 that the consequences of Hitler's victory L'ere
farmore seri,...,s rhan Ehe hacks of Social-Democracy and Stalinisn had recognised.
"Democraiic illusions" were by no means destroyed by Ehe victory of Nazism.
On the contrary, the sentinenE to defend the past Bains of the vc- -.ers'
movenent and democratic institutions Has treatly strengthened. ln 1933
and 1934 the Labour Party von back in elections rnuch of the tround los!
to therrNaiional Coalition" in 1931 .
At the end of 1934 Eheinternational Stalinist apparatus launched atLacks of
unprecedented ferociiy aBainst lhe TrotskyisE troups outside Russia. These
lrere based on the Sovie! reports fotlowing the assination of the Leningrad
party boss, S M Kirov: Trot.skyists vere alleged to be accomplices of Hit.Ler
in plocs !o over EhroH the Soviet state, and the Bround Has prepared for the
sti11 more serious attacks which followed the "Moscow Trials" of 1936 - 1938.

The "Marxis! Group" quickly ri.posEed by publishing its onn translation of

TroEskyrs Panrphlet, "The Kirov AssassinaEion", and reached t.he peak of its
infl-uence in Spring 1935. I'he ILP had, hovever, already reached an advanced
stage of deconposition, to yhich the reports flsrn Russia conEributed. They
encouraged the illusion that the only way te defend the Revolution and the
results of Sovie! construction rJ.as to ral1y uncritically to SEalinism.
They also fed ant.i-l4arxist scepticismr whlch artued that, if acts of

I lefforism took place in Russia, they resulted inevitably fron Leninism,

the Trotskyisis nust share responsibility for thern and the victirns Here as
nuch to blame as their persecutors. EiEher conclusion helped Eo denoralise
militants.
Speculation arose !.hecher Ehe Soviet Union should be labelled "state-
capj-ta1ist", to suggest. that the product ion-rela t ion s did not differ, in
a historical sense, from those in imperialist countries. This vieu xas met only
in Centrist circles hostile to Trotskyisr.
In 1935, the Marxist Group began to discuss leaving the ILP and
surruner
entering the Labour Party. Hovever, rdith the approach of the General
ElecEion in NeysnSg. 1935, the Group decided to try !o effect an alliance
vith the CentrisE Leaders of the ILP. Hitherto it had ca11ed upon the ILP
to supporE a1I Labour candidates except in cerlain places in the Glasgoi'
area vhere the ILP had a historical claim and the irorker s retarded Labour
candidat.es as disruptive. In the hope of avoiding social-patriotisn, the
Marxist Group nov decided to call for support for all ILP candidates and
for only a very fen, pacifist Labour candidates.
Condit.ionaL support for Labour candidates (such as is embodied in the
forrnula "Labour to Pover on a SocialisE Programme"), inplying support. for
some but. not fcr others, or for none, was a nisEake, r,hich r.,as to have
serious con. rices, even Ehough the Group vas noE larBe and could noE
influence the election re sul t s.

T5s Labour Party leadership shoved up miserably, recovering only sone 120
seats, but the Marxist Group isolated itself from the general movemen! to
Bet rid of Ehe reactionary Boverrunent, leavint a space in the Labour Party
lrhich the Stalinists eagerly fi1Ied.

Thgresults strengthened Ehe reforrnist riBhE rrinB. They also fed the
opportunistic idea thaE effective opposition Eo the C overnnent needed a
"Popular Front" of the Labour Party, the Conununi st Party and certain Liberals.
The Labour leaders yehemenEly opposed these proposals, no! because they objecEed
on principle to collaboration irith bourgeois parties, but because they sav
no reason t.o share their control of the Labour Movemen! and the personal
benefits of being the sole netotiators for the ,nasses with the bourBeoisie.
Before lhe elections they had aBreed with the Conservatives Eo sErenBthen
the povers of the police and to start preparing for re-arnament. Their
noisy denunciations of lhe Stalinists obscured all questions of principle
and enabled the latter to ma squerade as "progressives".

Soon after the elecEions the Marxist Group decided thac its policy had been
rron8, but ltle problem Has not thorouBhly discussed and its perspeclive
renained unclear. Left-ist lendencies began to queslion, not merely Hhether
on principle revol. ut ionari.e s should ever supporE Labour candidates, but
whether they should ever enter mass reformist parties.
Nor did the capiculation of the llarxist Group to Lhe Centrists Hin them
any re specE from Ehe latter.

III. The "Maiority" in 1934

The 'rRed Flag" published in Spring 1934 nade an important criticism of -the
ultra-leftisrlr of the Comrnuni st Party and the ILP leadership. In this Groves
hailed Ehe success of the Labour Party, rhich for the first tire Hon control
of the London County Council, presenting it as a proleEarian reply to the
reactionary vlolence irhich drove Soc ia l-Democra cy fronr control of Berlin
and, only a feH days before, of Vienna. Anolher of hj-s articLes began to
estimale Ehe significance of Palme Dutl, the theoretician of the Comrunist
Part.y, and his rnechanical, Bukharinist conception of Marxism.

The "majority" then tried !o extend its influence by adoptlng a course

toBards 1iqr.l :: ionisrn. ILs members Here to be free lo choose their own
perspective, Eo occupy lhemselves in xhaEever sector of the Labour Movement
they preferred. They vould meet, not to i{ork ou! a colTLnon line bu! as
"friends" to exchange opinions.
Groves joined the Labour Party. "Red F1at" was discontinued and Ehe
Comnunis! League dissolved. He entered the Socialis! League, a heEeroBeneous
gatherinB of left reformists and Centrists, led by the rich laryer, Stafford
Cripps. This r{as formed, and Has recognised by the Labour Party, in auEumn
1932, largely from the opponenEs of disaffiliation in the ILP. However, it
had evolved torards the Left by 1934, and produced several sEalenents
rejecting the Labour Partyrs official policy of reliance on lhe League of
Nations as an agency for peace. It refused in advance t.o support British
Imperialisr in a future imperialist var rhich, it rarned, $ould be presented
as "defendinB dernocracy" or, even, "defending SovieE Russia". Its leadershiP
lra s petty bourgeois, buE it lIas a nationally recognised organisation of
some 4,000 members, not lrithout roots in the rrorking class. In 1934 - 1936
it could have been decisive as a centre for vorking-class opposition to
imper ia)- i st rrar.

IV, The Labour Party Leasue of Youth

Hhile such supporters of lhe former "majority" as remained caffied on

almosE rrithout contact with the IS or che Marxist. Group' a third Trotskyist
tendency emer8ed, in the Labour Party League of Youth, toirards the end of
1935. The Labour Youth League had had a remarkable BroHEh, Eo which not
merely hatred of lhe Conservatives bu! fear of war and of fascism contribut.ed.
In summer 1934 the Yotmg Conununis! LeaBue attracted a stront follolrint ir lt
by its exposure of irhat fhe forelBn policy of the reformists neant- Ehat
young xorkers would have to fiBht their felloy-rrorkers in the forces of the
enernies of Bricish Imperialisn in a yar sanctioned as " just." by the LeaBue
of Nations.
Then in the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations! The
sept.ember 1934
anEi-lrar fracEion in the Labour LeaBue of Youth broke up, and rhe TrotskyisEs,
led by Roma Dewar, atEracted important. forces. Charles van Gelderan from
South Africa and Ken Alexander from Canada joined them tovards the end of
1935, and they worked xith a srall group Ied by Harber, vhich had left the
Marxisf Group earlier to join the Labour Party. Hith the help of members
of the Marxist Group, they betan !o produce the TroEskyist youth paper,
i'Youth MilitanE", directed t.o tbe Labour Youth.

They believed that "Entry" in the Labour League of Youth vould necessarily
have a short perspecEive. The reformis!s and the StalinisEs could not
tolerate their activity, and they had to be al.erE !o seize the best moment
Eo forestall the ineyitable expulsions and lead a break-avay.

v. Sprine 1936: The Crisis of the Harxist Group

In November 1935 Aiexander and another Canadian comrade, Robertson'

visited Trotsky in Norray, rrhere Ehey discussed a Proposal Ehat the Marxist
Group should launch a campaign to establish precisely whaE influence it had
in the ILP, so thaE it could decide sithin tHo or three nonEhs, whether
or not to prepare at once to enter the Labour Party- Signatures sere to
be collected to a manifesto; it Hould be in several paraBraphs and ILP
nenbers Hould be asked !o subscribe only Lo those Hith which they aBreed.
(See T^16326 and T^16359). Robertson reported thal Trotsky believed the
lz
Marxist Group to have been correct to act lriih prudence' buL thaE the situ-
aEion had been changed by the cooling of relaEions betYeen the ILP and the
Stalinists and the sharp differences xhich lhe approach of var nas causint
belween pacifists and revolut ionar ie s. Sections of the "manifeslo" could
call on rhe ILP tor
. create fractions in the Labour Party, Trade Unions and Co-operative
organisaEionsi
. send its srna1l youEh section inlo the Labour League of Youth;
a repudiat.e pacifisn by means of a special conferencei this secti.on Bould
not mention Ehe Fourth International;
o acknowledge Ehe bankruptcy of the "London Bureau" and declare lhe Fourth
Intetnational.

If lhe Centrist leadership tried to suppress the Marxist Group, it vould

reply by leading a fiBht for inner-party denosracy. Robertson reported
Trotsky' s opinion:

"Stalinisrn entrenched in the youth of the Labour Party vi1l be the mosE
ruEhless enemy He could face... Even if the nain irork irith the masses,
as you believe, can noi be carried on lhrough trade union and co-operative
work, rdithou! actual membership of lhe Labour Party, lhis condition may
no! last! rior should Ehe MarxisE Group count loo much upon the Labour
ParEy left,-uing splittinB and coming into the lLP."

TroEsky also suBBesied that Ehe four ILP Members of Parliarnent ough! to use
Parliament, not as individual improvisationists, but as the bearers of lhe
slogans and platform of the pargy. Internationalist declarations tnade by them
lrould have world-vide impact. The Marxist Croup should al so take up a
suBgestion (by Fenner Brocknay durin8 Ehe shorc period in vhich Maxton
allowed him to advocate nobilising British rorkers to preven! the
bourgeoisie from supporEing the Italian agBression on Abyssinia wi,th var
rnaterials) that "Conrnittees of Action" be forned, as bridges becHeen
official and unofficial strikes and betBeen revoluEionary groups and lhe
mass organi sations.

Some rnernbersof the Marxis! croup, hoHever, hoped to sEay indefinitely in

the ILP. Arguing that iE offered a basis for anti-var propaganda, they
questioned !.heEher, "on principl.e" they ought ever to join rhe Labour Party
under iEs openly social-patr io t ic Leadership. others hoped to ein more
support in the ILP or even !o uin iE as a rhole. Some believed that the
CenErists uould soon drlve them out. of the ILP and wanted to form a new,
"open" group. 0thers again vacillaEed beiween these viel?oints.

The political roots of these differences lay, first, in the conflict betHeen
the "pu11" of the st"ugBles in the Labour Party and tbe "Left-ist" methods
encouraBed in tbe "Tbird Period", and' secondly, in the atmosphere of the
ILP itself, bankrupt and disinEegraled, and in Ehe disappoinEmenE of their
hope s.

0n December 18, 1935, the Executive Committee of Ehe Marxist CrouP agreed,
"after considerable discussion" (T216327), to recomroend launching a decisive
campaS-gn up to Ehe Annual Conference of the ILP at EasEer 1936, thaE organisers
be sent. to Scotland and to South wa1es, that a disciplined fraclion be forned
in the Labour League of Youth and that Robertson should negotiate ylth
Harber and Groves to set up a broad conunittee. The rnernber s agreed, but
they also aBreed a notion fron James that "we do not recommend Ehat al1
conLacEs go into the Labour League of Youth" (T2 16328).

In February 1936 Peter Sctunidr came to London. He gas a former leader of

the LefE in the Dutch Soc ial-Democra t i c ParEy and a menber of the Inlerna-
tional Secretariat. As Trotsky feared, he discouraged preparations for
shiftj,ng the TroEskyis! forces into the Labour Parly. Robertson atain
proposed (T2 4277 and T, 16334), shortly before returnint Eo the NeH
Horld at the end of February, that lhe menbers of the Marxist Group should
join Ehe Labour Party individually, join the Trolskyists there, creaEe the
editolial board for an "independent, paper and, uilh Ehese ends in view,
pur sue the campalgn around Lhe manifesto. Discussion of his rnotion was
refused and llttle appears co have been done !o orBanise the "campaign"
(r^ 16 335) .
z

VI . The Conferences at Easter 1936

t.lhile the llarxist Group hesitated, the "entrists" in the Labour League of
Youth and the Labour ParEy formed lhe clandestine " Bol shevik-Lenini st Croup
in the Labour Party" in mid-March 1936. They defined its object as bein8,!

"to disseminaEe in the so-calIed "organised" Labour Hovement the principles

of the Trotskyists, to form a vider group round cerEain points and build
up a rmilitant' wing to advocate openly lhe Fourth International and
it.s Hhole programoerr. (T2 2083)

"Youth Militant" had four deletates at the Conference of Ehe Labour League
of Youth at Easter, and another four nEre folloHers of Groves. Their
prospects seerned favourablei in the leadership elections, a reformisE headed
pol1 Hith 160 votes out of 180, ?ed l{illis (then the leadint Slalinist
agent, Hho r{as in due clurse elevated to the House of Lords) got 120 votes
and Roma DeHar tot 90 votes, which Alexander told Trotsky "about ilLuslrates
the relation of forces" <T2 2084).

The refornist bureaucrats, alarrned at the opposiBion lendencies influenced

by Trot skyi sm and by stalinism in the Labour Youlh League, confront€d Ehe
Conference wilh a denand that the maxirnurn age for membership be reduced to
21 and that nembers must, not make political declaracions. These proposals
nere laid before the Annual Conference of the Labour Party six nonths lacEr'
Hhlch accepEed them, buE chey overshadoued the Youth Conference, rhere the
Stalinist.s sere able to present Eheir political capitulation !o reformis:n
as a move for "unity", in ttte Light of vhich the proposals of the right
wint rrere not. an act of policy bu! "unrea sonable'r. rhe conference accepted
a proposal to "struggle for peace" by Hay of "councils" conbining represenE-
atives of Labour Youlh viEh those of Ehe young Comrnuni st LeaBue and of such
bourgeois organisations as the Boy Scouts.

The MarxisE Group, on lhe contrary, suffered a heavy defeat at the conference
of the rLP Hbich took place at the sarne time. The central political debate
Has on a motion supporring independent $orkint-class accivity to prevent rEalian
Imperialisn from receiving rrar maEerials for use against Abyssinia. The
opener i.as cLR Jamesl irhose remarkabl.e oraEory brought out the international
significance of the strutgles of oppressed peopres for sel f- det.ermina tion and
Ehe duties of vorker s in imperialist countries. The motion nas carried, against
the leadership, by 70 voces to 57, a poliEical defeaE for the pacificts, vhose
slogan "a plag,ue on both their houses" rejecled responsibility for defending
Abyssinia, and alLoned Ehem t.o retret the Har Hithou! opposing, except in
Hords, those who made or profitLed from it.

The result. Has important,no! as providing practical help, for Hhich it came
too late, but as shoHint that a "bloc" of Trot.skyists with anti-Trotskyist
Centrists wanted Eo vin the ILP to "resist rar", not by individual, pacifist
abstenlion, but by challenBin8 the grip of the refornist leaders on the
vorkers' organisations.
Maxton well kneH Hha! tr.as a! stake. At once he declared that the four ILP
Menbers of Parliament uould leave the party if they had to support this
decision. Brockway then saved the days in orderto "preserve the unity of
the party'r, 1et the question be referred to a "plebiscite" of the nhole parEy
mernbership. There was a tradition for this device for avoiding hard
decisions far back in the past of the ILP. It was obviously intended to
rnobilise the backsard, inactive and super-annuated members against the Trotskyists,
buE Ehe Left Centrists refused to break lJith the pacifists and the proposal
was carried by a larte majority.

The Trotskyists then suffered furEher defeats, culminatint in overlrhelming

support for the "London Bureau" against the Fourth InEernalional. A
"democraiic" cover having been provided for submergint the ILPr s principles,
the MPs could noH protect themselves from having Eo apologise for their
tolerance of Trotskyisls in the party. A motion Has Passed prohibitint
organised factions or lhe distribution of factional literalure in the ILP,
aimed directly at preventinB the Trotskyists from presentinB their vieHpoint
in the "p1ebiscite". The Stalinists had been unable to suslain rhe fiction
tbat they vere a "loyal opposition" and had left the ILP3 che Centrists Llere
then able to dispense r{iEh the Trotskyists, rrhom they no longer needed as a
counterveight to Ehe stal ini st s.

At. once the Marxist Group proposed to the Left CentrisEs (who enEhusiastically
supported the "ban" on groups) a joint carnpaign to vin the plebiscite, in the
hope that lheir organising vork up and down Ehe country Hou1d mahe lhen a
rallying-point. In fact there Has litt1e to rally. Brockway phrased Ehe
quesEions in the "plebiscite" so as to obscure the issues and the leadership
von by a nEjority of sorne three Eo two in a poIl of about 1,750, or, according
to another account, by 740 to 555.
\TI. The "Genev-a" Conference and the Discussions in Autunn 1936
The "First International for the Fourth InternationaI", the so-ca11ed
Conference
"Geneva" Conference, flas held on 29 - 31 July 1936. The Marxist Group vas
represented by James (whorn it had elecled in preference to Matlor. because
the latter favoured organised lrithdraxal fron lhe ILP)i llarber represent.ed
the Bo1 shevik-Lenini st Group in the Labour Part.y, and the delgation from
Britain included at least tHo others.

Trotsky had done his besE, eithout success, to secure the presence of a
representative of Groves' group (see llrritinBss 1935-1936, page 361); after
the conference Braun, a mernber of the International Secretariat, r{-rote to him
rfryly:

"Frorn vha! has happened, I rnust declare that the Groves Group, in order
to create an impression of sincerity, is really using your articles just
for purposes of decoration, a la Nin. Groves' Group did not really fail
on financial Erounds to send a representative, because one of their people
irent, at the same time Eo the olympiade at Barcelona." (This was Derar, J,A.)
(T^ 5998).
I

The Bolshevik -Leninist Group contributed a st.atement on "British Perspective"

to the Conference (T^I 16357)r this conLained the nosc developed formulation
of Ehe 'renErist" perspective up to that time, probably drafEed by Harberi

"The present economie situation in Britain is characterised by a definite

'Boorn-letr, party due t'o lhe inevifable uplrard tendency which has foll,oxed
Lhe 1929 - 1933 crisis, and partly to the grea! expansion of arrnaments...
No imrnediaEe return to crisis condiEions is to be looked for... It seems
 probable He are on the thresheld of a strike Lrave... due to the increasin6,
,nil.itancy vhich usually accompanies an uprard economic Eurn... (vhich) vilL
bring about. a definite Lef!-Hard sving in the political movement, t.hus
reversing che order of events in France. Under pressure from beloH, the
Labour leaders will be forced to shoH the semblance of a fiBht and .1ead,
the irorker s in order to betray them. Thr firsr results of such a ,left.
turn... wiLl be Ehe flocking of rnasses of rrorkers inro the Trade unions
and lhe Labour Party... in the neasure that the masses lose confidence
in the Labour Party leadership through experience of its betrayals, large
sections wiLl turn t.o what seems to t.hen the revolutionary alt.ernative,
Ehe cornmunis! Party... rt does not seem probable Ehat the sociarist League
will play an important part in the sring to t.he left... iUs influence
is groving in the industrial areas... this process is not sufficiently
rapid... Work in the ILP has nox become entirely unproductive... our
f ig,ht cannot be uon by renaining shut up in a rninute centrist. 'party'
and Haiting for the nasses to Bet disillusioned vith reformism and
Stalinis'n of their ovn accord... He must go !o the masses, interpreting
lheir own experiences to thern, until. the time is ripe to break away to
form... the British Section of the Fourth Internati.onal .,'
CLR James made a treat personal impression on the "Ceneva" Conference, but
the resolulion vhich emerged fron the British Commission, and Hhich it
approved, spoke of!

"... a mos! urBent necessity to effect in the shortest possible period of

tine the unificaEion of the three English groups... The experience
inside Ehe ILP should be brought Eo a close, and the group nov functioning
lrithin that organisaiion should transfer its field of operations to the
mass organisations, specifically to lhe Labour Party and lhe Labour League
of Youth. The Bol shevik-Lenini st s in fhe ILP could carry on trade union
vork, but they could do this far more effect.ively if they Here not
associated in Ehe minds of lhe workers $ith the bankrupt ILP. Menrbership
of the ILP sets up an impenetrable ra11 betHeen lhe Bol shevik-Lenini st s
and lhe mass youth movemenL... The concreEe neans of effecting their
departure from the ILP and Eheir entry into the Labour: Party and the
Youth organisation, as rreLl as effecting the unification of the forces of
the Fourth Internatj-onal in England Hithin the Labour ParEy, must be left
to the EnBlish comlades to elabotate..."
Tvo conferences ln London, on october 10 and 11, 1936, discussed the '!eneva"
resoluElon, and there the real poliBical differences, lalent in Ehe discussion
and going far beyond any personal disaccords between Ehe three tendencies,
beBan Eo be probed. James brought to the meeting on Ociober 10, a conference
of the Marxisg Gtoup, all shom he bel,ieved Eo oppose total entry in to'the
labour Party, numbering thirty-four. He adrranced an all-embracing proposal,
that the three groups should fuse, and that the resulling group, vhich nould
not be stront enouBh to rork completely in the open, rould do fraction Hork
both in the Labour Party and in lhe ILP. The perspective of vork of Ehese
fractions had, it appears, not been considered, beyond "tathering forces"
for the nev, "indcpenden!" group. The Labour Parly yould be the main field
of vork, but no one xould be asked to leave the ILP if they did not sish to
do so. The nen troup xoul.d adopt, and sell, the nen jourrral, vhich Janes
had managed t.o produce on hls own initiative, and vhich called openly for
the Fourth International.

Against James, Collinsr the laxi-driver rho vlsited Trotsky earlier in

Sarn

the surflmer and produced the rrell-knorrn "Int.ervien on British Problems"

(writints: 1935 - 1936, p.377) supported the letEer of the "Geneva" proposals.:
cooper, Hho rranted lhe nain concentration to be on a longer sray in the lLPt
forced from Jarnes an admission that he did not think that the ILP rrouLd soon
collapse, and that he thought it the besE platforn fo! revolutionary
propaBanda.

Harber, rho nas there as fraternal deleBaEe frora his group, Ehen excracted
from Jarnes lhe admission ttlat, thougb he had taken part in draftint the "Geneva"
resolution, he did not interpret it as Ehose rrho drafted it intended. Here
lra s a treaE step tor.ards clarity. The vot.ing for his proposal vas 11 aBainst
I0. The meeting then elected a nex leadership for the Marxist Group, rhicb
made a futile effort to bind all those present to support Janes' proposals
at the joint meetinB of all the groups the folloving day, Hhether they a8reed
vith tbem or noE.

0n october 11, the "Conference of A11 the British Bol shevik-Lenini st s" opened
irith a report from the Harber - Alexander Group. This claimed some sixty
nembers in London, forEy of them in the Labour League of Youth. Sales of
"Youth Hilitant had reached 800 of the ocEober issue. The increase in
rnenbership had come from the rank and file of the La bour Party' besides a
few from the Marxist Group and thirleen ex-menber s sg glg Communist Party.
The sEatement declaredl
 "He are agreed on the principle of fuslon... on Ehe basis of Ehe Geneva
Conference... He have been approachi.ng the Harxist League (Groves Group)
for a joint rnembers' meeEing... these efforts have been unsuccessful ...
lJith respect to the Harxist Group, ve have endeavoured to arrange joint
activity on specific subjects, recognisinB Ehe impossibilicy of fusibn
vith the existing poliLical differences... The James reso1ution...
lriEh its insistence that the main field of xork is in the La bour Party
provides a basis for at leas! a discussion of lhe possibility of fusion
of all Lhe groups...rr
Groves' Group (the "Marxist League") gave no infoEnaEion about ils size or
activity. lt expressed the opinion that "the period for exclusive vork in
lhe Labour Party is drawing to a close", and sugBested thaE "the comrades in
the ILP draH up a proBrarnme of aclion for lhe lLP vork and set !o uork !o nin
the ILP menbers t.o i8... It vould be fantastic for the comrades of the ILP
to break with that. body because it refuses to support Ehe Fourth International
and then to join the Labour Party... l,,le must secure an effective s*inging-over
of as much of Ehe ILP as possible !o unit,ed work and close coniact Hith Labour
Party and Trade Union members...r'

The Marxist Group claimed some forty members in London, with provincial
groups making about 80 in all . lt "vas responsible for" about 1,800 copies
of "Fitht.". Members sere on Trade Councils etc.
The Conference formed a Co-ordinating Corunittee uhich, ic lra s hoped, vould
"serve as a cohesive force to all the f,roups, trith a vieH to organisalional
fusion, make arrangements so thal the jourrBL s should supplemenE and nol
ovsrlap or compele uith each other, instilute a plan of joint Hork and
produce a joint political Ehesis and internil bu1letin. The commiEtee
carried out, in facE, none of these, and after its firsE meeting the Harber
Group pointed to the underlying difficulty in a statement shich asked3
Did Lhe Marxist Group sti1l cling to the ILP as the main field of vork vhile
paying lip-service Eo the need for nore rork in ghe Labour Party? Fusion
could nol be reached without aBreement on a cornmon tactic.

"Fight" No. 1 appeared just before october 1o. Its front Page denounced
the lLP leaders. At once the lat.ter expelled James and threaEened to expel
anyone else rrho supported "Fig,ht". Maxt.on and the other MPs r,0re sPeculating
irith a pact in Parllarnent HiLh the Liberal opposition. Brockway uas also
involved in negotiating rliEh Ebe leaders of the Communist Party and the
Socialj.st League a "Unlty Campaign" - a scheme Eo nobillse the Left to
 pers'ade the reformist.' to admit the stallnists inlo the Labour parry,
based
on an a8reenent not to criticise social_patriolisn. Brockiay seems
also,
charact er i st ica11y, to have toyed Hith rhe illusion that he could
somehov
Eurn aside the hostility of rhe Stalinists torards the pOW, if he could
dernonstrate thaE it and the lLP vere ,'not really Trotskyist.,'l

The rs r.ote to the Marxist Group on November 7 urging them to counter-aEtack

politically and prepare for a break. It particularly vroLe: ,,He greatly
regret. lhat you did not pubricly take a position in rel.ation to the Brussers
Peace Congress... such a reso1uEion... from the very base of the ILp,
vould have been of enornous \ralue lo combat the centrisEs of the London
Bureau". This eas the "International Contress',, ca11ed by Brockway, s
"International Bureau for Revolutionary SocialisE Unity.', ac the end of
October 1936. The functions of this Congress lrere to dissociate tls
centrist' participants, especially the POUM, from any hinE of association
sith Ehe FourEh International, to present the PotJM as the \ranBuard of the
European RevoLution, to bask in its reflected glory and Lo raise in the
minds of its leaders expectations of help lrhich the other participants could
noL possibly ful fill ,

0n November 15, rnenbers of the Marxis! Group me! in London and atreed, by
16 - 6, Jamesr new proposaL, that the uaTxist Group leave the ILP and
declare itself a new "open", independent. troup. Cooper and some of those
lrhom the ILP had not expelled sEil1 santed to stay in it. Then, on December 13,
the International Bureau net (T2 16505). Alexander Has present. Ir senE a
1ong, explanatory letter to lhe Marxist Group, draving on the experience of
"entry" in France and Belgiurn, and yarned:

if we scay outside, ve sha11 be considered as poverless and incurabie

sectarians, Hho fear contact with t.he nasses, but Hho Hant to impose
themselves on the masses as sage counsellors, from out.side."

Then the Harber Group, readinB too rnuch into this letter, vhich stated that
the IS mighg "consider itself obliged to r€-consider its relations., with a
minority that opposed ttre rJiI1 of the majorit.y" then srote Eo t.he IS on
December 29. Truthfutly enough, it report.ed that the Marxist. League uas
organising lhe distribution of the Bulletin of Ehe POUM in Britain and opposing
nYouth Militan!" in the yorth
section of the Socialist LeaBue. It also said
thet James vas moving.aray from Trotskyisn in an ulEra-left direction. It.
recom,nended that the best rray Eo te! a united British Section vould be for
Ehe Bureau t,o t ithdrax recogniuion from Ehe olher troups, so that they nould
dislnt.egrate and thelr best elenents Joln the Harber Group. The Bureau did
not aBree. James also lra s disEurbed about the possibiliEy of being repudiated
by the Bureau, and rrrote Eo Vareecken, asking him and Lesoil to intercede on
his behalf. Vereecken replied to the effect that the tnernbers of the Bureau
irere unlikely to deaL r{ith the problen tbat vay.

VIII. The Civil tlar in Spain and the Differences about the Role of the IoUH

Groves' main concern appears to have been Eo continue to avoid corunilment to

working either vith the lnLernational Secretariat or Hith the llarber -
Alexander Group. Already on ltay 28, 1936, his 8rouP, the Marxist LeaBue,
had vritten in reply !o an appeal from Trotsky (T, 2061)l

"You say 're nant to enter into reBular associatlon vith the IS at once'.
If by association you mean the exchante of docunents, He can no doubt agree.
But He feel that He cannot bind ourselves to accept lhe decisions taken by
a body about vhich ve have no information regarding election, etc., and
ve r,rould rather lherefore like to enter into discussion Hith them before
bindlng our sel.ve s. '

In re-appeared. It replied to specific slanders

May 1936 "Be<l F1ag" had
against Trotsky, but did nor address ttself to organisint resistance to the
Sfalinist penelratlon to yhich the Soclalist League had become very suscepEible.--
At the same time the youn8 supporters of the ltarxist LeaBue, vho conlrolled
"Socialist Youth"l the monlhly journal of the youth section of the Socialist
League, opposed the Harnings of "Youth Militant," that a S9!g lra s being
prepared atainst the Left.

Ar the outbreak of the Civil Har in Spain in July 1936, the leaders of the
Socialist League supported Ehe revolutionary strutgle of the rrorker s' rnilitias
and commiitees and the land seizures by the Peasants. ln the aulunn, hosever,
they retreated under Stalinist and bouEteois pressute, and Gtoves faced a
capitulation by them all alonB the line, for vhich he eas unPrePared and irhich
isolated him po1itical1y. The Sfalinist apparatus nounted a savaBe campaign
of character assassinat.ion agains! hlm, ghile hls colleagues in the petty
bourgeois leadership of rhe League refused to defend him and its rank and
file did not undersEand Hhat rra s happening.
After the "lloscov Trials" in AuBust 1936, horrever, Harry l{icks, a close
associate of Groves, and CLR James, made an funporEan! conEribution to the
Trotsky Defence coruniEtee ancl the defence of Trotskyis Political honour. The
MarxisE League and the llarxist Group, however, Yere developint a PoliEical
adaptaEion in the press of both trouPs to the Centrism of the ILP and its
Spanish associate' Ebe PoUM, defendlnt the failure of the lalter to mount
a consistenE opposiLion Eo ghe bourgeois Popular Eront Government; and
 !o

proEecting it atainst the crilicisms of Trotsky. The effect in Spain rra s to

undermine theHork of the Spanish Seclion and Eo strengthen the artuments of
Centrists such as Fenner Brockway that the Fourth Incernational Has unnecessary.

At the end of 1934, the najority of those in Spain rho had regarded thems-elves
as partisans of Ttotsky had decided, afler a long discussion, to rejecl his
advice to enler the Socialist Party, to vhich rhe masses uere turning. Instead,
Ehey fused rirh the so-called "llotkers' and Peasanlsr B1oc", led by Joaquin
Maurin, to forn the PoW. The Maurin Group had a conception of Stalinism quite
differenE from th4t of Trotsky. They believed that Slaltn and Dukharin had
been correc! to subordinate the Comnunist. Party of China to Ehe Kuomintang in
1925 - 1927, and criticised only Ehe ultra-1eft asPects of Sralinism vhich
eere to the fore from 1928 onHards to 1935. Hhat mighL superficial.ly apPear
to be a debate about hisEory had very serious practical consequences. Early
in 1936, the PoUM signed the proBr:mme of the Popular Front, which oPPosed
the nationalisacion of rhe landed estales and of the .banks. one of its leaders,
Andreas Nin, entered the bourgeois governmen! in Caralonia as Minister of
Justice. The P01JM rra s nov trapped hopelessl.y in inconsistencies. lt failed
to recoBnise thaL the policies of Stalin and of his agents in Spain vere to
put dorrn the revolutionary rnovements of the Horkers and Peasants (in the
hope of inducing the toverrunenEs of Britain and France to Buarantee Soviet
Russia's frontiers atainst Hitler. lts efforts to placate the Popular Fronr
Goverrunent and at the sane time to defend the militlas, the Land seizures and
the lrorkers' control in indusgry uere overvhelmed by the slander that it nas
"Trotskyist" and in league riEh Hitler to brint dosn the Popular Front and
1et Franco vin.

The policies advocated by the PoW, shich Groves and James defended' have
cotne later to be called lhose of
rrlhe Popular Front of Struggle". They con-
sisted of references in radical lantuage !o "Socialisn" and to "the revolution",
combined nith ca1ls to "push the Popular Front forsard", to "force it to lhe
Left", to "go beyold" Ehe coalition of xorkers' Parties uith bourgeois parties,
in vhictr the PoUM had helped to subordinaEe the interests of the proletariat
to the defence of the bourgeois suate.
Early in May 1937 lhe Popular Front, Hilh the helP of the GPU agents ln spain
drove lhe Anarchis! Eorkers ou! of lheir hold on the rDain telephone exchange
in Barcelonar shich Has enablinB then to follot the intrigues Eoint on in the
leadership of the Government. The AnarchisE xorkers and Ehe supPorEers of the
POiJ}l leadership t.old Ehen to sgop fithtin8 in the inEerests of 'runity" rrirh
t.he Govermnen!. This surrender, Like the efforEs of the Poul{ leadershlp to
distance themselves from "Trotskyi sn" did noEhinB lo save thern fron nerciless
perseculion by the GPU.
Hhen in the P0U!1 ras unable to save itseLf from deslruction
May and June 1937,
at the handsof lhe armed forces of the Popular Front and lhe GPU, the demoral-
isation of those in Britain nho had placed their faith in it ira s all the xorse.
The last issue of "Red F1ag" vas in May 1937; Janes' "Fig,ht" lasted until
November.

creat in Bricain in thg Popular Front in Spain.

hopes rtere placed by Horkers
The destruction of the POUM and the defeat of the revolutionary neasures
taken by the Horkers and peasants at Ehe beginninB of fhe Har helped to
strengthen the reformisE leaders of the Labour Party in lheir efforts Eo
protec! the bourgeois staEe againsE vorking-class iniriatives seekint to
oppose the preparations for var and the Lolerated activity of the fascists.
While the right HinB manoeuvred to nainEain its g,rip on the Constituency
Labour Parties, the Stalinists were seeking, to "apply pressure" to the
Conservative Goverrunent., by presentint "Left Unity", on a proBra,nne acceptable
ro the Liberals in Parliament, as their ,protressivd" alternative Eo the policies
of the I-abour 1ea der ship.
within this franevork, the TrotskyisEs suffered Evo bloxs in Spring 1937.
At the East.er Conference of the Labour Party League 6f YouEh, Ted Hillis
the leader of the StaLinisE faction, heavily defeated "Youth |li1itant" and
"Socialist Youth", in an atmosphere in Hhich the bureaucratic repressions
had had a demoralisinB effect. From August 1936 onr.rards rhe Stalinisrs had
concenErated cheir fire of the left in lhe Labout Youlh League, utilising
tlio argument s a

"War is irnninentl the possibility of revolutionary opposition !o it is

utopian; it can be delayed by an aLliance betueen Britain and lhe Sovie!
Union to protect the ueslern fronEiers of Russia,'.

"Anyone vho rarnedthat fhis line led the youth into a I sacred union, with
the British bourgeoisie nade himself an a1ly of Hitler against the,,defence
of democracy".
In mid-May 1937, the StalinisE agents in the Socialist League
reached aBreemenr
rrith the leaders to brint it to an end. They deprived .he Left of
a foot_hol.d
in the hope of thereby inducing the refomist leaders to advise the Governmenc
to guarantee the Russian frontiers in exchange for political support
in the
coming wal, removing from the palh of Ehe Ceslqnisg parEy
vha! could have
become a serious political .bstacle and a ralr.ying-point
for nilitants approachinS
the Fourth InternaEional.
IX. Conclu sion

The documents of the Internaliona1 fucretariat and of Ehe Harber - Alexander

Gaegp (" Bol shevik-Lenini st Group in lhe Labour Party") leave no doubt that
this group had devel.oped a much more sophislicated conception of Labour Parcy
entry than either of the other troups. Its stalement to t.he "Geneva" Cohference
had already skeEched the idea of rallying to the Fourth International Ehose
forces of the proletariat Hho Here able to s!rug81e only Ehrouth the reformist
apparatus at that titne, and vhose sirugg,les, therefore, tended Eo produce
dislocating cri se s.

only by combining experience of refonni s! betrayals siEh TroEskyisl politics

could these militants be Ied to recognise that they could noE fu1fi11 their
aspirations excepE by joining i.n Ehe construction of the Fourth International .
t'Entrism" would not be a short-term raiding party to pull a handful of nilitants
i-nto some minuscule "independent" group, but an element in saving militants
for Bolshevism in the historlc crisis of the refornist apparatus.
The grounds on rhich the "Geneva" ResoluEion reconrnended "entry" had been sound,
asfarastheywEnt,butre1ative1yrestricted.Neitheritnoranyofthe
letters of the IS in Autumn 1936 analysed the historical pecullarities of the
Labour Party and the background to the discussion on "entrisn" in Britain in
the early years of the Conrnunist InternationaL. Nor did lhey recall that t.he
"turn" to Ehe ILP lHo years earlier sas intended to lead the vanguard back
into a proper relationship Hith the masses of Horkers Hho placed their confidence
in the Labour ParEy. Hoeever, there uas close collaboration between t.he leaders
of the Group and the IS in the irint,er of 1936 - 1937.
In January 1937, the Group energed from clandestinity and announced itself
openly as the 'rMilitant[ G16up. It began to publish iLs monlhly journal,
the "Militant.", vhich conLinued to appear regularly as the organ of the
entrists until Ehe end of 1939. The 'rMilitant" tried to present the programme
of Trotskyisrn ln concrete terms for rrorkers oriented towalds the Labour Party.
It attacked Soclal-Democra cy and Slalinisn in lhe context of Tesistance to
the Har-p1ans of BriLish imperial i srn and published news of Ehe novement for
the Fourth InternationaL. It accepted t.hat it could noE call directly for
the Fourt.h International, for the reason that the reformist bureaucrat.s would
seize on this pretext !o drive t.he group out prematurely, on an issue whicb
lhe uorkers whom it needed time Eo influence xould not imrediateLy understand.
Hhile the Socialist League remained in existence they made such efforLs as
they could to oppose it.s dissoLution. After May 1937 they Eried lo collaborate
vith Groves' slpporters in rep).acing it and mobilising vhat remained of its
left wing in a new peripheral group, the "Socialist. Left Federation". Croves
rried Lo isolaEe his contacts from then and the SLF foundered. They then Eried
to construc! another peripheral organisation, the "IlilitanE Labour League", based
on class opposition !o xar-prepara t ion s. This attract.ed a fer nilitants who
later joined TrotskyisTr, but. did not make much proBress. The Labour Party
proscribed it at the ouEbreak of Ehe war.

These atlempts to orBanise their periphery did not provide much practical
experience and, for lhaE reason, did not present the problen of becoming an
obstacle to the Trotskyists in the hands of a CenEris! tendency, though Harber
recognised this possibility in one of his documenrs.

"Entrisn" on these lines would have been inconceivable wilhout identifying

with lhe desire of Labour Party nembers to defeat condidates of bourgeois
parties in elect.ions. Their vork for Labour vict.ories enabled Lhenr to raise
the question of forcing the reformisls to break siEh the bourgeoisie and of
depriving them of their excuse for inactiviEy that they vere ou! of office.

There cou1d, of course, be not the slightest suggestion that "entry" could
"transform" the Labour Party into an agency by which socialisrn could be
achieved, or Ehat Trot.skyists need present their ideas in such a vay as
suBgested thar the Labour Party could be "transformed", rather than destroyed.

Nor was it ever sugtesEed, afler the debacle of the llarxist Group in the
1935 General Election, that support for Labour candidates could be condit.ional
or that supporE should be given to the Labour parEy only if its programme could
be conslrued as a sociarist one. The electorar. sr.ogan of the Group vas "Labour
to Pouer"; the slogan "Labour to poHer on a SocialisE programme.' was as yet
unheard of.

There are, horever, signs in the press that differences arose in the leadership
of the Group about how to relaEe to Ehe left reformists. Harber, influenced
no doubt by the "Third Period", tended to outright denucration, shile Alexander
felt that this snacked of ultimatisln.
The inexperience of Ehe Group can
be seen, aIso, in its characterisation of its
perspective as Lhat. of a "split,'. It. sas without doubt influenced by
the
precedent of the split in Gernan Soc ia1-Democracy in 1917 Hhich produced
rhe
rndependent SocialisEs by a "clean,' split rather than a
Beneral dislocation of
lhe appar.Eus of the "parcnE" body, vhictr 1ed them to overlook orher possible
development s.
Similarlyp another feature of their difficulties vas their heavy ernphasis
that their perspective had to be carried out by a Group, g!! members of vhich
rere in the Labour Party. This vould be hard Eo sustainas a general proposition,
since evidently, given agreement on ho!, to relat.e to the Labour Party, an
"open" group and an "entrist" troup under the same leadership could each trelp
the Hork of lhe other. In 1936 - 1937, however, they had a reason lalid
for their irunediate circr.mstances. They r.rould have had difficulEy in finding
anyone to carry on "open vork" who agreed with Lheir perspecEive. Those vho
opposed the "enEry" did so, not because they llanled to supporE i.t from outside,
but because they had a different alt.itude to Lhe Labour Par !y, characler i sed by
ultra-leftisr in various forrn s.
Remote though Lhese events and discussions may seem today, the "entry" vork
which r.as developint rrirh all its limitations in 1937 have not been systematicalLy
continued and the problerns involved are to this day imperfectly undersEood'
which may help to explain Hhy fhe vast sacrifices Hhi.h have been made in the
cause of Trotskyisn in Britain in later years have so far failed to make
any serious influence in the Labour Movement, Hhere Ehe Brip of the reformist
bureaucracy is stil1 donina nt .

Very fev of the i'Militant" Glsup had extensive experience of the Labour Party.
They expected lheir "entry" to be a matter of years rather lhan decades, on
the jusrifiably optinristic assumpEion Ehat it would be effectively carried.ouL'
that the reformist apparaEus uould be throvn inlo disarray, that Ehey vould
neulralise the Stalinist.s and that there would be lhe possibility of a large
exodus of Horkers organised under Trotskyist influence.

There is an interestinB inconsislency betlreen the handlinB in "Milirang" and

thar in "Youth Militant" about hoH to handle politically Ehe capitulation to
Stalinisn of the leaders of the Socialist League. These differences lrere not
desEructive, buE they were significant and not accidental . The editorial of
the "Milirant'r for March 1937 sug8ests Ehat any hope of influencing these
leaders nust be rritLen off:
,'The srruggle of the Horkers for their immediate demands must be co-ordinaled
and supported by the Hhole Labour Movement, and in the course of the
siruggle can be forged the Horkersr united front against capitalism and for
the conquest of pover... the realisation of a proBralnme based on lhese
demands means a struggle against Ehe rea cLionary l eader sh ip of the Labour
Party and the sham rl,efts' from C;ipp5 to Pol1icE..."
 2L

This ls the characteristic, ulLirnat.istic' propagandist languaBe L'hicb "Third

Period', stalinisn harl popularised betireen 1928 and 1934. But in the June 1937
"YouEh Mi1icant,,, Al,exander struck a note better caLculaled to encour.Be those
rernnants of Ehe SociaList League Hhose firs! hope Hould be to appeal'
to Cripps
to lead a sErutBle againsE lhe demand by the riBhr si'ng thal the Socialist
League rnust dissolve, instead of neekly givinB in to it3

Socialist
"In spite of the specious promises nade by CriPps and others tha! the
League would be in no danger of expulsion, whitsun saH Ehe end
of Ehat body'
Every Constituency Labour Party should have a resoluEion to the
National
Conference demanding the re-instatement of the SociaList
League.''

But his next sentence belrays Ehe pressure on hin against "curint
their illusions
on Ehe ba sis of Eheir i1I u sion s": he pro c1a ilne d I
,,!le must get to work Eo replace the Socialist League by an organised Left-
ving vhich sees as its first task the achieving of a revolutionary
working-
class mass parEy... The Socialist LeaBue has paid the Price of
its own folly" '
Nevertheless that is no reason Hhy He should noE use the Socialist
League as

a club agains! our own reactionary 1eaders"

"'
on 1 - 2 August 1937'
The National Conference of the "Milicanc" GrouP sas held
EiBht of these
at whi.ch i! was rePorted t'hat the Group had fifteen branches'
Glasgov' Leeds' Liverpool'
vere in the London area and there Has one each in
and their
Hull, Sheffield' Leicester and Norvich' There Here about 100 members
reports give an lrnpression of 1ive1y acEivity'

political discussion cenEred on rhe question of hoH to Hork in the

Labour
The
of
Party in condiiions created by the approach of Har and lhe dissolution
Harber movedc
the Socialist League. on behau of the Executive Committee'

Hork for the creacion of Ehe neH revolutionary

party can besl be
open organisation'
carried ouL by the fotmation inside lhe Labour Party of an
prograrnme rrrusE sluffnarise our
based on a partial Protratnme. Such a parEial
lr
ful1 revolutionary programne, Hith the exception of one viEal PoinE'
party of the
viI1 not openly advocate the creation of a nev revolutionary
Fourth InEernational. "
it
The creation of the "open orSanisation, based on a partial progranrme" had'
seems, already been.discussed wilh the IS earlier
in Ehe year' In May' Cripps
people in Ehe Labour Party
had thrown on to EhelT own resources the numerous
 22

vho yanted an orBanisation of the Left Hithin it, and anunber of its rnember s
met to form a neH Broup !o replace it. This r'a s call'ed the "Socialist Left
Federat ion" .

The secretary of the 'rMilitant" Group, Starkey Jackson, for severaL years a
cadre of the Connuni s! Party, Hho had applied to join the |larxisL Group in
Harch 1936, reporEed co the Augus! 1937 Conference:

"The Socialisc Left Federation is a sma1l orBanisation of about 100 rnembers,

but. is in contact r.it.h hundreds of ex-Social.ist Leaguers' and ne could Bain
contacE Hith these comrades throuBh the sLF. The platform of Ehe sLF certainly
does not come up co the prograrnrne which ve vould adYance, but it is in no
sense a final prograrune... f6g SLF actually exists, and, despite Groves
and Co., there is no reason lrhy we should not win ther I'eadership - not
meehanically buE by political neans... He must either enter 369 SLF or
smash it. To ignore it is to cut ourselves off from Ehe left vinB of the
01d Sociali st League . "

Outside London the branches of the "Militant" Group could not do nuch to rally
support for the SLF, largely because lhe menbers of the Socialist League had
either been Eaken in tov by Stalinism or had become discoura8ed and inactive'
Then the "MilitanE" Group ran into a Political oPPosition rhich prevented iE
from esEablishina Ehe relation of corunon Hork irith the SLF at Hhich it had
a imed.

The October 1937 ,'Militant" reports that Ehe sLF had lrelcomed the Militant'l
Group into membership, concedin8 Ehat it had "no desire to inEerfere in any
vay wiuh the act.ivities or Publicarions of your orBanisalionrr. The sane
issue report.s, hoHever, thaE on 23 September the SLF demanded Ehat pubLicaLion
of the "MiliEant" be ceased. "To nobilise all forces behind the $'F and its
proposed organ.,' Then the November 1937 "Militant" reporls that the sLF had
been split by iEs Leadership, and the supporters of Ehe "Miligant" expelledl

The only evidence of aclivity by the Socialist Left Federation lra s

subsequent
Ehe producEion of one issue of "fhg Ca11"1 its paper, in March 1938' This
reads as if the f ig,ht agai.nst Ehe riSht wing of the Labour Party could be
carriedonHithoutrelationtotheconniunistParty'sPresentaLionofa
rprogressive' alternaEive Eo the collaboration of lhe
"Popular FronE'r as a
reformist leaders Hilh Ehe Tories. Indeed, it ignored t'he conlroversies which
fil}ed the left-wi-ng press, such as the alleBations thaE Ehe Trotskyisls'
the ILP and the POLM rere all "allies of Hit1er". At Ehe same rime, it carried
a favourable revieH by Groves of Eugene Lyons' "Assigrunent. ln Utopia" vhich,
unlike its contemPorary by Trotsky, "RevoluEion Betrayed", argued that the
 23

foundations of the Horkersr sLate in Russia had already been undermined, HiEh
essent ial1y pessirni stic conclusions.

The "Ililitanc" to nake a fresh effort loorganise the left in

Group decided
lhe Labour Party, by forming the "Militanr Labour League", on the basis outlined
at the AuBus! Conference. The conditions for tesEinB the correctness of this
lactic vere not favourable, but it nust be put on record that none of those irho
have subsequently ponlificated on lhe question of "entrisn" had lried to
evaluate it,

The break-up of the socialisE Left Federation eas not due primarily to any
personal i11-feeling belveen Groves and Harber. Thepolitical divergences
Here reaL ones, uhatever may be thoughE of the device of fhose Hho controlled
the SLF nhen they confronced the "MiliEanE" Group uith a demand rhich they
kneH it Hould not accept, rithout a discussion between che memberships.

!{hen Ehe SLF starled, it produceda "Declaration" vhich appealed to 1ocal

Labour Parties to protes! against the refusal of Ehe Parliarnentary Labour
Party to voEe aBainsE the arms eslimates of the Tory Govsrnnent, and against
its decision to abstain on lhe vote. The "Declaration" did not, hoHever, go
into the political differences anon8 those who criticised the abstention.
l,lhen the "Mi1itant." Helcomed the "Declaration", ir comnenEed3

"The ininority of the Parliamentary Labour Party, as uell as Ehe Comrnunist

Party are pursuing the identical policy lrit.h the najoriEy in the sphere of
foreign affairs... the only reason vhy the minority and the Conmunists (sicl)
do not openly support the arms plan is because they do not iErustr the
Government... If the interests of Brtfish capitalism demand a temporary
alliance vith France or fhe Soviet Union, this opposition would co}lapse...
lhis decision fol10116 1ogica11y from lhe vhole false conception of relying,
on imperialist alliances, and not on vorking-class acEion !o srop l,ar...,'