ARTICLE 150

JEAN ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.

Facts:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid
Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950.Where the petitioner,
Jean L. Arnault, refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions related to the said amount .Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution
No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special
committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. Petitioner  contends that the Senate has no power to punish
him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already
rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its
findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Arnault be punished for contempt for refusing to answer questions by the Senate inquiry?
Ruling:

YES.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.  we find that the question for the refusal to
answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is
obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is
not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the
uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and by the President and that
they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is
nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation.

Persons liable under Art. 150

1. Any person who commits any of the above acts
2. Any person who:
a. Restrains another from attending as a witness;
b. Induces him to disobey a summons; and
c. Induces him to refuse to be sworn to such body
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or
seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from
10 to P100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3600

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3600 - AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE BREAKERS AND THE TRANSPORTING
OR ESCORTING BY PEACE OFFICERS AND/OR ARMED PERSONS OR PERSONS SEEKING TO REPLACE STRIKERS IN
ENTERING AND/OR LEAVING THE STRIKE AREA, AND TO PROVIDE PENALTIES THEREOF

Section 1. Hereafter, it shall be unlawful for any employer to employ any strike breaker, or for any person to be knowingly employed as
a strike breaker.

"Strike breaker" shall mean any person knowingly employed for the purpose of obstructing or interfering by force or threats peaceful
picketing by employees during any labor controversy affecting wages, hours or conditions of labor; or the exercise by employees of any of
the rights of self-organization or collective bargaining.

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any commanding officer of troops in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or individual soldier or any
member thereof or any peace officer and/or armed person to bring in, introduced or escort in any manner any person who seeks to replace
strikers, in entering and/or leaving the premises of a strike area or to work in place of the strikers.

"Strike area" shall mean the establishment of the employer struck against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used in by picketing
strikers in marching to and from before all points of entrance and exit to and from said establishment.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prevent any commanding officer of troops in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or any
member thereof or any peace officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order and/or protect life and property.

Sec. 3. Any of the persons mentioned above violating the provisions of Section two hereof shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than five thousand pesos or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, at the discretion
of the court.

If the violation is committed by a firm, association or corporation, the manager, or in his default, the persons acting as such, shall be
liable.

Sec. 4. In case the strike be judicially declared illegal, any criminal liability arising from violation of any of the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed extinguished; Provided, That during the pendency of the legality or illegality of the strike prosecution for violation of any
provision shall be deemed suspended or held in abeyance.

Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Case:

G.R. No. L-6874 March 8, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

CAYETANO RAMAYRAT,

Facts:

That, on February 1, 1910, who Sabino Vayson filed suit against Cayetano Ramayrat, in the justice of the peace court of Misamis
(Exhibit A), for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land belonging to the said Sabino Vayson; that, on March 9, 1910, the said
justice of the peace court rendered judgment by sentencing the said Cayetano Ramayrat to deliver the possession of the said land to the
plaintiff, Sabino Vayson (Exhibit B); that, when Cosme Nonoy, the deputy sheriff of the municipality of Misamis, demanded of the
defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, on April 29, 1910, in this municipality of Misamis, Province of Misamis, within the jurisdiction of this
court, that he deliver the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, the said defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully and
criminally refused, and still refuses, to deliver the said land to the aforementioned Sabino Vayson. The exhibits A, B, and C form an
integral part of this complaint. Said crime was committed in violation of the law and, particularly, of article 252 of the Penal Code.

By an order of February 9, 1911, the court sustained the demurrer interposed by the defense and therefore dismissed the
complaint, with the costs de oficio. From this order an appeal has been taken by the Attorney-General.

Virtually, it is stated in the order appealed from that the defendant grossly disobeyed the order of the justice of the peace court (Exhibits B
and C) to deliver the land in question to Sabino Vayson; that such disobedience, were it punishable, would fall within the sanction of the
sections 232 and 236 of Act No. 190 (Code of Procedure in Civil Actions), and not article 252 of the Penal Code, which latter in the
opinion of the court, was repealed by the two former, in so far as it be incompatible therewith; and that, inasmuch as the said sections of
Act No. 190 punish the disobedience to judicial orders only when these latter are legal, and that the order herein concerned of the justice
of the peace is manifestly illegal, the result follows as a necessary conclusion, according to the trial judge, that the disobedience charged
to the defendant in the complaint does not constitute a penally actionable matter, pursuant to the law. And it is said in the same order
appealed from that the aforementioned order of the justice of the peace is illegal for the reason that it was issued in an action brought for
the recovery of possession of land, which could not validly be heard by a justice of the peace court, as such classes of actions come
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority.

Held: Yes, In view of the opinion we have formed of the facts alleged in the complaint, it becomes unnecessary for us to decide the
aforementioned questions set up in the Attorney-General's brief. We do not think that the defendant disobeyed any judicial order
whatever. The order issued by the justice of the peace (Exhibit C) and alleged to have to have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and
addressed, as was natural and proper, to the competent sheriff, and not to the defendant. In it the sheriff is commanded to place the
plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, who had won in the suit against the herein defendant for the recovery of the property, in possession of the said
disputed land. Such command is made solely and exclusively to the sheriff, and not to the defendant. Absolutely no order whatsoever is
made to the latter; nothing is demanded on him and he is not restrained from doing anything, neither is he required to do anything; he is
not told to perform, or not to perform, any act whatsoever; in a word, the writ or order in question in no wise refers to him. Nor could this
process, indeed, be addressed to the defendant, for the reason that it wholly concerns the execution of a judgment, the serving of which is
specially and exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff. And it is superfluous to add that the defendant could hardly disobey an order that in
no wise concerned him. The order itself leaves to this be clearly understood by warning the sheriff, and no one else, that he shall be liable
to the penalties of the law in case of noncompliance. "Failure to comply with this order," it says literally, "will subject you," the sheriff,
"to the penalties of the law." The warning is solely for the sheriff, because the writ must be served by him, and he alone it was who could
fail to comply with or disobey it.

But, while the defendant did not disobey the said writ of execution, may it be said that he disobeyed the sentence of the justice of the
peace who ordered that he restore the disputed land to the plaintiff, Vayson? It is contended by the Attorney-General in his brief that he
did. He says that the act performed by the defendant in setting forth in Exhibit C-2 that he was not willing to deliver the land to Vayson
was one of the disobedience to the said sentence. This may be true, and undoubtedly is, in a certain sense, — in the same sense that it may
be said that he who infringes or violates any law passed by the legislative power disobeys its authority; or that the defendant who refuses
to surrender himself voluntarily and of his own free accord to the prison authorities for the purpose of serving his sentence disobeys the
sentence that imposes imprisonment upon him. But this is not the disobedience that is punished as a crime by article 252 of the Penal
Code. The juridical conception of this crime consists in a failure to comply with orders directly issued by the authorities in the exercise of
their official duties, and not with legal provisions of a general character, nor with judicial decisions merely declaratory of rights or
obligations, such as those proper to be rendered in a civil suit relative to property or possession of land, like that which gave rise to the
present controversy. Nor even do the violations of prohibitory decisions, although undoubtedly of a more serious character, constitute the
crime of disobedience to the authorities provided for and punished by the aforecited article of the Penal Code, for they give rise only to a
civil action. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of September 25 and October 4, 1889, and June 30, 1893.)

The judgment of the justice of the peace which is supposed to have been disobeyed, orders, it is true, the herein defendant to return the
land, the subject of the suit, to the plaintiff, Vayson, but it does not order him, nor could it legally order him, to effect the return himself.
As hereinbefore stated, this is the duty of the sheriff, to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments.
152

Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; who shall be deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of the
preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or
on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by PD No. 299, Sept. 19, 1973 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).

Person in authority Agent of a person in authority

To be a person in authority, one must be:
1. Directly vested with jurisdiction;
2. Has the power to and authority to govern and
execute the laws
Examples: Mayor, division superintendent of schools,
president of sanitary division, teachers and professors,
provincial treasurer.
To be an agent of a person in authority (person who
comes to the aid of person in authority), one must be
charged with:
1. The maintenance of public order; and
2. The protection and security of life and liberty.
Examples: policeman, constabulary soldiers, municipal
treasurer, sheriff, agents of the BIR, barangay chief
tanod.

Note: see articles 148 and 151 also (Article 148, the second part, protects only public officers who are either persons in authority or their
agents. Not every public officer is at the same time a person in authority or an agent of it.)

PEOPLE V. FELIX BENITEZ

Facts:

Defendant Felix Benitez, a special agent in the office of the Provincial Governor punched D’Artagnan Williams who was a
Division Superintendent of School in Negros Occidental for his supposed acts or remarks that caused an outrage or offense to the
Provincial Governor in connection with the appointment of teachers.

Defendant, on an indictment for assault upon a person in authority, was found guilty and thereby sentenced to from six (6)
months and 1 day to four (4) years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P500 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

Issue:

Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is a person in authority

Ruling:

Yes. Under the law (within the meaning of article 148, in connection with article 152, of the Revised Penal Code), a division
superintendent of schools is given the power of general superintendence over schools and school interests in his division, with the right to
appoint municipal school teachers and to fix their salaries, and moreover, since education is a state function and public policy demands an
adequate protection of those engaged in the performance of this commission. Therefore, we believe and so hold that a division
superintendent of schools should be regarded as person in authority.

]
Article 153. Tumults and other disturbance of public orders; Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance. — The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.

The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character.

The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with
means of violence.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting, association, or public place, shall make any outcry
tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.

The penalty of arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos shall be imposed upon these persons who in violation of the provisions
contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.

What are tumults and other disturbances of public order?

They are:

1. Causing any serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment;

2. Interrupting or disturbing performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Arts. 131 and 132;

3. Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association or public place;

4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place;

5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.

Elements:

1. Any person who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public
performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.

2. Any person causing any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character. Disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be
tumultuous if caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence.

3. Any person who in any meeting, association, or public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in
such place shall display placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.

4. Any person who in violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body of a
person who has been legally executed. (Article 85 -  In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held
with pomp.)
ARTICLE 154

G.R. No. L-2578 July 31, 1951

PEOPLE vs LADISLAO BACOLOD

Facts: The above-named accused, with deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis court in connection
with the town fiesta, cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded one Consorcia Pasinio,
thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the said dance who ran and scampered in all directions

Issue: Whether or not there is a tumultuous disturbance.

Ruling: Yes. There is a tumultuous disturbance. The elements of Article 153 are as follows:

1. Any person who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public
performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.
 Ladislao Bacolod fired a machine gun, during a dance held in the municipal tennis court in connection with the town
fiesta.

2. Any person causing any disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character. Disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be
tumultuous if caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence.
 Bacolod fired a sub-machine gun and injured one Consorcia Pasinio.

There was a willful discharge of firearm, during a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and the people in
attendance became panicky and terrified after Bacolod fired a sub-machine gun causing a tumultuous disturbance.
ARTICLE 154

People vs. Arrogante, CA, 38 O.G. 2974

Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances. —

The penalty of arresto mayor* and afine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who by means of printing, lithography,or any other means of publication shall publish or cause to be published as
news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State;
2. Any person who by the same means, or by words,utterances or speeches, shall encourage disobedience to the law or to the
constituted authorities or praise, justify, or extol any act punished by law;
3. Any person who shall maliciously publish or cause to be published any official resolution or document without proper authority,
or before they have been published officially; or4. Any person who shall print, publish, or distribute or cause to be printed,
published, or distributed books,pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printer's name, or which are
classified as anonymous.
(As amended by Com. Act No. 202.)

Facts: Defendant distributed leaflets urging the people to disobey andresist the execution of that portion of the National Defense Act
requiring compulsory military training. He was convicted of inciting to sedition by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused liable for sedition.

Held: The crime is not inciting to sedition. The acts charged which are subversive in nature fall under paragraph 2 of Art. 154, which
states:

2. Any person who by the same means, or by words,utterances or speeches, shall encourage disobedience to the law or
to the constituted authorities or praise, justify, or extol any act punished by law.
Art. 157- Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of final judgment.
However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or
floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements:

(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;

(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and
(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence

G.R. No. L-7775 December 19, 1955

CARLOS AMAR, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE SEGUNDO C. MOSCOSO

Facts:

Carlos Amar was tried in Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. While his appeal was pending, he was transferred to Davao wherein he
made his escape but was recaptured 6 days later, sometime in 1952. Accused filed a petition for certiorari for to declare void and annul the
judgment to his conviction of evasion of service of sentence pursuant to Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code. He claimed that he could
not be convicted of evasion of service of sentence since he was not yet convicted by final judgment to the crime of frustrated homicide.
Solicitor General found out that the accused was guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide and such verdict and sentence became final in
1954. However, accused pleaded guilty for the crime of evasion of service of sentence.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of service of sentence.

Ruling:

The first element of the evasion of service of sentence indicates that the offender is a convict by final judgment. However, based on the
facts given, the accused pleaded guilty for committing the crime of evasion of sentence. Amar was a detention prisoner and not a convict
when he escaped from prison, because upon arraignment he entered a plea of guilty to the crime of evasion of service of sentence charged
against him in the information, and the Court was not aware of the fact that at the time of his escape he was just a detention prisoner; and
that not having been apprised of the fact that the defendant, now petitioner, was a detention prisoner and in view of his plea of guilty, the
respondent court properly and lawfully entered the judgment complained of. Petitioner in effect admitted that he entered a plea of guilty
to the information filed against him for evasion of service of sentence, the Court is powerless to review by a writ of certiorari, it having
been rendered by a competent court and being now final and executory. Hence, his petition was denied.
ART. 159 – Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executve, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired
portion of his original sentence.

Elements:

1. That the offender was a convict

2. That he was granted a conditional pardon by the Chief Executive

3. That he violated any of the conditions of such pardon

SALES VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Facts:

On August 31, 1939, Fidel Ariston was convicted of frustrated murder and sentenced to suffer from 1 year and 8 months of prisión
correccional to 7 years of prisión mayor. After serving 2 years, 3 months, and 1 day of that sentence, he was released on January 6, 1942,
by virtue of a conditional pardon granted him by the President of the Philippines, the condition being that he shall not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law.

On February 1, 1950, said prisoner was recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons after having been convicted of estafa and
sentenced to suffer 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor

On April 10, 1950, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President and by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by
section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, ordered the Director of Prisons to recommit to prison the said prisoner Fidel Ariston to
serve the remaining unexpired portion of the sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, in view of the f act that he had
violated the condition of his pardon in that he was subsequently convicted of estafa

The present petition for habeas corpus is premised upon the contention that the President has no authority to order the prisoner's
recommitment to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, because violation of a conditional pardon is an offense penalized by
article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, unless the prisoner is prosecuted for and convicted of that offense, he cannot be
compelled to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.

Issue: WON the above-quoted provision of the Revised Administrative Code has been repealed by section 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals
among other Acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted? On the
contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly
preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 65 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Held: No. The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any
person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In
this connection, we observe that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration
of Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the
original sentence. We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as
an offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to
prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the
proceeding under one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. Take, for instance, the case of the present prisoner
Fidel Ariston. Although under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code he has been recommitted to serve the remitted portion of
his original sentence— 4 years, 8 months, and 29 days—for having violated the condition of his pardon, he may still be prosecuted under
article 159 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer prisión correccional in its minimum period. In other words, one who
violates the condition of his pardon may be prosecuted and sentenced to suffer prisión correccional in its minimum period without
prejudice to the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to recommit him to serve the
unexpired portion of his original sentence, unless such unexpired portion exceeds 6 years, in which case the penalty of prisión
correccional in its minimum period provided by article 159 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer be imposed.

There is no dispute in this case as to the identity of the prisoner and as to the violation by him of his conditional pardon.
Article 160
People of the Philippines vs Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin
G.R No. L-38624
July 25, 1975
FACTS:
Mandatory review of the death penalty imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal in its decision in case "CC-VII-847-Rizal" for Murder, entitled "People vs. Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin”.
Prisoners George Daeng, No, 56088-P; Rolando Castillo, No. 31087-C (these two already sentenced previously); Conrado Bautista, No.
71055-P; Gerardo Abuhin, No. 61409-P who are serving sentence by virtue of final judgment, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, were accused of Murder, committed as follows:
On December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforementioned accused while then confined at the said institution, conspiring, confederating and acting together and each armed with
improvised deadly weapons, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and would therewith one Basilio Beltran, No.
71495-P, another convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of serving the accused breakfast,
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the accused, as a
result of which the said Basilio Beltran died instantly.
That the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness.
ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed is correct?
RULING:
Yes. The penalty imposed is correct.
They consider it an exercise in futility to discuss further the alleged errors committed by the trial court in considering as generic
aggravating circumstances the presence of obvious
ungratefulness and evident premeditation so as to impose the maximum penalty of death, because Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that “any person who shall commit a
felony after having been convicted by final judgment or while serving the same, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony”.
However, it is may be stated that the consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances is for the purpose of fixing the proper
penalty within the minimum, medium or maximum as provided by law, but we have no choice here other than to impose the maximum
because by mandate of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code a person convicted of a crime while serving sentence for a previous crime
shall get the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony (murder), which is death, without further regard of the effect of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, or the complete absence thereof.
The trial court did correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery in
the commission of the crime of murder. It was proven that the accused in a sudden,
concerted and unprovoked act, all of them being armed with improvised deadly weapons, stabbed the victim to death after pushing their
cell door open, threatening and throwing off-guard Miranda when the victim who was holding in both hands the bread and coffee intended
for the breakfast of the assailants was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected assault
ARTICLE 160

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. YABUT

FACTS: On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, the accused Antonio Yabut, was a prisoner serving sentence in
the Bilibid Prison, killed Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and
unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon
him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter.

At the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the
crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals.

Upon arraignment, YABUT pleaded not guilty. We reject the testimony of Yabut that it was Prisoner Villafuerte, the squad leader of their
brigade, not YABUT, who gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the
Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the
death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of
Aseo. They further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind.

YABUT’s contention: YABUT places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article
160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is
committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the
appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in the
present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide).

ISSUE: Whether or not Quasi-Recidivism under art. 160 is applicable to Yabut?

HELD: Yes, Article 160 still applies. The language is plain and unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article
160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the
defendant is serving the penalty.

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in
resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of
sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as
anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a
convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the
unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.

Elements of the Crime under Art. 160:

a. The offender was already convicted by final judgement of one offense;

Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by
virtue of final sentence rendered by competent tribunals.

b. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same;

Yabut while serving his sentence by virtue of final judgement committed another crime by killing Sabas Aseo by hitting Aseo with a
wooden club fracturing the skull of Aseo inflicting him various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused the
death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter. Hence all the elements under Art.160 are present making YABUT guilty of
homicide under Article 249 in connection with Article 160 of the RPC, the court sentence the defendant to the maximum degree of
reclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement and to indemnify the heirs of Sabas Aseo, in the sum of P 1000.
ARTICLE 163

US VS BASCO
G.R. No. L-2747 April 11, 1906

FACTS:
The defendant of this case attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he bought a certain store with what
appeared to be silver coin but as a matter of fact, it was a Philippine copper cent. The defendant insisted that the owner of the
store should accept the same as a peseta, that is to say, a twenty cent piece, and that the latter refused to accept it upon
noticing what the real value and denomination of the coin was.
The defendant again insisted that the money be accepted and the owner of the store refused to do so and the quarrel
ensued between them thereafter. The policeman then interfered and upon knowing what happened, the latter arrested the
defendant and took him to the police station. However, upon the arrest, several Mexican and Japanese coins were found in his
possession together with a roll of Philippine copper cents which found out to be silver plated, and identical with the coin
which he had attempted to pass at the store as a twenty-cent piece. Upon the examination of these plated coins, it was found
out that they were genuine Philippines copper cents, and it was only whitened with quicksilver to give them the color and
brightness of silver.
When the defendant were asked as to where he had obtained the said coins, his first answer was the he received them
as change, but thereafter admitted that he had silvered them himself. The court below found that these facts constituted the
crime charged in the complaint — that is to say, the counterfeiting of money.
The Attorney-General, in his brief filed in this court, contends that these facts do not constitute the crime of
counterfeiting money, but that of estafa, and for this reasons asks that the defendant be acquitted of the crime charged in the
complaint without prejudice to the filing of another complaint against him for estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney-General’s contention is correct?

RULING:
Yes. Attorney-General’s contention is correct.

There can be no counterfeiting of money in the case at bar for the reason that no spurious or clipped coin was
used. Under Article 163, there can be counterfeiting when a spurious coin is made. There must be an imitation of the
peculiar design of a genuine coin.
The coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore their original designs and inscriptions. The defendant did
not make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give them
the appearance of silver pieces for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate
the peculiar design of such coins. The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding third persons by
deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime of estafa and not of counterfeiting money.
There were not legal grounds upon which a charge for these latter offense could be based.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant acquitted of the charge of counterfeiting money
contained in the complaint, and the Attorney-General is directed to present another complaint against him for the crime of
estafa. It is ordered that the Mexican and Japanese coins found in the possession of the defendant be returned to him. The
costs of both instances are declared de oficio. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment, let the case be
remanded to the Court of First Instance from whence it came for proper procedure.

Elements
1. That there be false or counterfeited coins;
He made it appear that the copper coins look like silver coins
2. That the offender either made, imported or uttered such coins; and
He insisted to pay it to the store
3. That in case of uttering such false or counterfeited coins, he connived with the counterfeiters or importers.
 This element is in question. There is counterfeiting when a spurious coin is made. There must be an
imitation of peculiar design of a Genuine coin.

In this case the accused only made it to appear that the copper coin was a silver coin made from spain
and enforced it to be accepted by the store.

Republic Act No. 9194

[G.R. NO. 154522 : May 5, 2006]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Petitioner, v.
CABRINI GREEN & ROSS, INC., MICHAEL J. FINDLAY and JANE GELBERG, Respondents,

Facts:
In the exercise of its power under Section 10 of RA 9160,1 the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) issued
freeze orders against various bank accounts of respondents. The frozen bank accounts were previously found prima
facie to be related to the unlawful activities of respondents.
Under RA 9160, a freeze order issued by the AMLC is effective for a period not exceeding 15 days unless extended
"upon order of the court." Accordingly, before the lapse of the period of effectivity of its freeze orders, the AMLC2 filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA)3 various petitions for extension of effectivity of its freeze orders.
The AMLC invoked the jurisdiction of the CA in the belief that the power given to the CA to issue a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of injunction against any freeze order issued by the AMLC carried with it the power to
extend the effectivity of a freeze order. In other words, the AMLC interpreted the phrase "upon order of the court" to
refer to the CA.
However, the CA disagreed with the AMLC and dismissed the petitions. It uniformly ruled that it was not vested by RA
9160 with the power to extend a freeze order issued by the AMLC.
Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction to extend the effectivity of a freeze order?

Ruling:
During the pendency of these petitions, or on March 3, 2003, Congress enacted RA 9194 (An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001").6 It amended Section 10 of RA
9160 as follows:
SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. - The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC
and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The
freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.7 (emphasis supplied)
Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:
SEC 12. Transitory Provision. - Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC shall remain in force for a period of thirty
(30) days after the effectivity of this Act, unless extended by the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the jurisdiction of the CA over the extension of
freeze orders. As the law now stands, it is solely the CA which has the authority to issue a freeze order as well
as to extend its effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to extend existing freeze orders previously
issued by the AMLC vis - à-vis accounts and deposits related to money-laundering activities
Article 164.
Mutilation of coins; Importation and utterance of mutilated coins. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a
fine not to exceed P2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall mutilate coins of the legal currency of the United
States or of the Philippine Islands or import or utter mutilated current coins, or in connivance with mutilators or importers.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant and appellant,
vs.
TIN CHING TING, accused and appealed,
G.R. No. L-4620 January 30, 1952
FACTS:
TIN CHING TING was sued for possession of a counterfeit gold coin worth five dollars imitating the genuine five dollar gold coin
of the United States of America.
ISSUE:
Is TIN CHING TING liable for the crime of Mutilation of coins; Importation and utterance of mutilated coins under Article 164 of
the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
The Court held that NO. This is based on the contention that the defendant had not committed any infraction since the counterfeit
currency was no longer legal tender.
Article 166 par. 1
Del Rosario v People , 113 Phil. 626
Facts:
Del Rosario et.al tricked somebody into financing his money counterfeiting scheme. He did this by changing the last digits
of genuine treasury notes. In the litigation they contended that they were not in possession of illegal money, since they have only
altered genuine treasury notes.
Issue:
WON Del Rosario et.al are guilty of forgery?
Ruling:
YES.
The code states that:

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true
and genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or
signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and
his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1),
of the Revised Penal Code

Acts Punished
1. Forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer;
2. Importation of such false or forged obligations or notes; and
3. Uttering of such false or forged obligations or notes in connivance with the forgers or importers.
ARTICLE 166
TECSON VS CA
G.R. No. 113218
November 22, 2001

FACTS:
On April 26, 1990 a test-buy operation was ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank,
which resulted in the purchase from Tecson of one US dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos that was found to be counterfeit.
Consequently, a team to conduct a buy-bust operation was formed. During such occasion, Tecson was introduced to Pedro Labita
and Johnny Marqueta as persons interested in buying US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew ten pieces of US $100
dollar notes from his wallet. Upon such, the two introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Tecson. The
trial court found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168 and penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tecson can be held liable for the illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes

RULING:
Yes. The prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was
conducted by the combined agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret Service, and that the petitioner was
therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes. The testimony of
Pedro Labita which was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation during the trial of the ten counterfeit US $100
dollar notes, which were confiscated from the petitioner when he was arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime of illegal possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Acts Punished
1. Forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer;
2. Importation of such false or forged obligations or notes; and
3. Uttering of such false or forged obligations or notes in connivance with the forgers or importers.

DILI NI ARTICLE 168???

ARTICLE 166(4)
Furia Vs CA
FACTS:
Juana Doe obtained a United States Depository Check No.917,109 dated May 11,1949 in the amount of 384.96 pesos
payable to one Ines B. Bentoso. Such check is a public, official and commercial document in that the same is a written act of the
sovereign authority of the US. Doe, then write, print, imitate and forge the signature of the bearer at the back of the check.
Monzon, an employee in the Manila Post Office took advantage of his position by signing his signature at the back of the check as
identifier as well as Arzan. Having full knowledge that Doe is not Ines Bentoso, Furia and Monzon still introduced Doe as Ines to
prove her identification and even show a certificate of residence. Doe was never identified. Arzan and Monzon became state
witness against Furia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Furia be held liable in violation of Article 166 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
No. The Court held that based on evidences presented by Furia, he did not sign nor forge any document from a
foreign bank duly authorized, but acted as co conspirator of Arzan and Monzon . That not because of him introducing
Juana Doe as Ines Bentoso, encashing and misappropraition of the amount will not be possible. The crime committed is a complex
crime of estafa by means of falsification of public document as penalized in Article 172.

Acts Punished
1. Forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer;
2. Importation of such false or forged obligations or notes; and
3. Uttering of such false or forged obligations or notes in connivance with the forgers or importers.
Art. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following
means:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or order mentioned therein, the appearance
of a true genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

G.R. No. 12546. August 25, 1917

THE UNITED STATES v. MARIANO SOLITO
Facts:
Defendant Mariano Solito was a correspondence clerk and acting chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of
schools in the municipality of Dumaguete. He was intrusted with the care of the correspondence of said office, and was authorized
to open letters of an official character addressed to the office.
On the 19th day of April, 1915, a Treasury Warrant No. 428426 was issued to the said Alvah D. Riley for the sum of
P687.53 by the Auditor of the Philippine Islands directed to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands for payment and on the same
day (April 19th, 1915) said warrant was sent to the Director of Education. At the time the defendant presented said warrant to the
municipal treasurer for payment, he also presented a note purported to have been written and signed by Riley, in which the latter
requested the said treasurer to cash the warrant. Riley denies absolutely that he gave to the defendant said note and never signed it
nor authorized it.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of forging, uttering and passing an altered obligation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.

RULING:
Yes. As stated in Art. 169 of the Revised Penal Code: The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of
the following means:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true
genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.
Said warrant was a check issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands and, therefore, an obligation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to his order. When it was indorsed as
above indicated, it became a check or warrant payable to bearer. The indorsement made a material alteration in said warrant. The
indorsement changed said check from one payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he ordered it paid, to one payable to
bearer. The indorsement by the defendant had the effect of erasing the phrase "or order" upon the face of the warrant.
Changing the phrase "or order" to "bearer" is a material alteration. While the instrument was payable to Alvah D. Riley, or
order, it was negotiable by the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley only. The change made it payable to "bearer" and it was thereafter
negotiable and transferable by delivery simply. In constructing the effect of the indorsement we must not only look to said
indorsement, but to the face of the document also, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the indorsement operated to alter
the terms or conditions of the original contract.

Forgery Forgery is committed:

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein,
the appearance of a true and genuine document; or

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means the figures, letters, words, or sign
contained therein.
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 3.
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them.
ELEMENTS:
1. That a person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding;
2. That such person or persons made statements in that act or proceeding;
3. That the offender, in makiing a document, attributed to such person or persons statements other than
those in fact made by such person or persons.

SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE v. OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS)

GR No. 149148. April 5, 2002
FACTS:
There was a Special Proceeding for the will of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz and Santiago was one of the
oppositors. The said case was assigned to the sala of Judge Patricio. Santiao was initially the administrator of the
estate of Remedios but he was removed for patent neglect. His eldest brother Nicolas Villaruz, Jr. replaced him and
he filed a motion for the approval of his bond as administrator.
The motion was opposed by Jose Maria, another brother, and attached to their opposition was a certification
executed by Remedios, which authorized Santiago to take possession of her nipa, lands and gave Santiago the
option for leasing such lands.
Judge Patricio issued an order recognizing the validity of the certification and the administration of the new
administration was subject to them but this was not reflected in the dispositive portion of the order.
The case was, in the meantime, reassigned to Judge Pestano who approved Nicolas’ bond. After this
receiving Judge Pestano’s order, Susan Mendoza-Arce, prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) in favor of
Nicolas and this was based on the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerk of Courts. Acting on the LOA, Nicolas
took possession of the entire estate of Remedios including the nipa lands, which were leased to Santiago.
Santiago filed a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman claiming that Mendoza violated Article 171 of the RPC
and Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 for showing manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
The Ombudsman found sufficient basis for the filinf of the information against Mendoza. Mendoza claims
she was not guilty of the crimes and she merely issued the LOA based on the Manual.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Mendoza-Arce is guilty of the crime under Article 171.

RULING:
NO (refer to element No. 3). Susan Mendoza-Arce is not guilty of the crime under Article 171.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found a prima facie case for falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code against petitioner because she stated in the letter of administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr.
had been appointed administrator by Judge Sergio Pestaño when what the latter did was to approve the
administrator’s bond.
In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.
Petitioner prepared the letter of administration on the basis of the order of Judge Pestaño, dated October 12, 1998,
approving the administrator’s bond filed by Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. By the approval of his bond, Nicolas B.
Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that in a sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration"
[t]hat by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable Sergio Pestano, Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed Administrator of the estate of
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, deceased" is correct. There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner’s act
warranting her prosecution for falsification.
In re: Elements
1. That a person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding;
- Petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, prepared a
Letter of Administration (LOA).

2. That such person or persons made statements in that act or proceeding;

- Letter of Administration (LOA):

“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued
by Honorable Sergio Pestaño, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, Nicolas B.
Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed Administrator of the estate of Remedios BermejoVillaruz, deceased, with
full authority to take possession of all property/ies of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it
may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, he having filed
a bond satisfactory to the Court. Said Administrator shall within three months from the date of this
appointment return to the Court a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of the
deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge and shall render a true and just account of his
administration to the Court within one year and at any other time when required by the Court.”

3. That the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or persons statements other than
those in fact made by such person or persons.
- Ombudsman: stated in the letter of administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed
administrator by Judge Sergio Pestaño when what the latter did was to approve the administrator’s bond.

- Ombudsman contention is not meritorious. Petitioner prepared the letter of administration on the basis of
the order of Judge Pestaño, dated October 12, 1998, approving the administrator’s bond filed by Nicolas B.
Villaruz, Jr. By the approval of his bond, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that in a
sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration is correct.
ARTICLE 166
ESTHER PASCUAL, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 204873 | July 27, 2016
FACTS:
Pascual and Remegio Montero (Montero) were indicted for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document for
colluding and making it appear that they had facilitated the payment of the capital gains tax of private complainant Ernesto Y. Wee to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) when, in truth and in fact, they converted and misappropriated the money for their own personal
benefit.
 
Accused ESTHER PASCUAL a low ranking public officer, being an employee of the City Assessor’s Office, Las Piñas City,
while in the performance of her official function, committing the offense in relation to her office, and taking advantage of her official
position, conspiring and confederating with one REMEGIO MONTERO, a private citizen and helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ERNESTO Y. WEE thru LEONOR A. TIONGCO in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused received from said ERNESTO Y. WEE thru LEONOR A. TIONGCO the amount of ₱130,000.00 for the purpose of paying
the Capital Gains Tax on a real estate property which complainant bought in Las Piñas City, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
forge and falsify or cause to be forged and falsified BIR Official Receipt No. 2145148, in the amount of ₱102,810.00 as payment of
Capital Gains Tax of said ERNESTO Y. WEE by making it appear that they paid said amount of ₱102,810.00 with the BIR, when in truth
and in fact, accused fully well knew that there was no payment made with the BIR and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally take, convert and misappropriate for their own personal use and benefit the aforesaid amount of ₱130,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said ERNESTO Y. WEE in the aforesaid sum.

The RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 201, rendered judgment finding Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. Pascual filed a Motion for Reconsideration but same was denied by the RTC; hence
Pascual elevated her case to the CA.

Pascual insisted that no evidence had been adduced tending to prove that she falsified BIR Receipt No. 2155148. But her arguments failed
to impress the CA, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was proved to have been falsified a public document under Article 171 paragraph 2.

RULING:
Both the RTC and the CA correctly found Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document.
The State was also able to establish the following elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document: "(1) that the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies a document
by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding; (4) [and] that such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the proceeding.
Naturally, the accused attempted to deny having forged or falsified the BIR receipt, alleging that there was no direct evidence
presented that would link her to the charge of falsification.
Indeed, there was no one from the prosecution that witnessed the accused in the act of falsifying or forging the BIR receipt.
However, while direct evidence is scarce, the circumstances surrounding the events that led to her indictment speak of no one but the
accused as the perpetrator of the offense. For instance, she did not contradict Tiongco’s testimony that after she received the money
intended for the payment of the capital gains tax, she and her lady companion went inside the BIR office supposedly to pay the capital
gains tax. Neither did she deny Tiongco’s testimony that she later came out of the BIR office with the forged BIR receipt which she
furnished to Tiognco. Quite revealingly, the accused also remained mum about the testimony of the assistant revenue district officer, Ma.
Nimfa Peñalosa De Villa, who disclosed that the document under discussion was unauthentic because it did not come from the BIR.
Clear as they are, the circumstances mentioned earlier are indubitable manifestations that the person responsible for the falsity is
the accused herself given that she was the one who supposedly made the transaction inside the BIR, and that she had it in her possession
before she passed it off as an official transaction receipt from the BIR. Conviction is not always arrived at by relying on direct evidence
alone. Sometimes, the testimonies of witnesses, when credible and trustworthy, are sufficient to bring out a conviction and must be given
full faith and credence when no reason to falsely testify is shown.

ELEMENTS
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position:
 a. He has the duty to make or prepare or to otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or
b. He has the official custody of the document which he falsifies; and
3. That he falsifies a document by

ARTICLE 171(4)
ERNESTO M. FULLERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170583, September 12, 2007

FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, accused Ernesto Fullero being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga
City Telecommunication’s Office, while acting in said capacity falsified and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is
when he prepared his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi
City, he made it appear that he passed the Civil Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on May
30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon verification issued by PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and
another one in May, 1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.

Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2003 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification defined and
penalized under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 October 2005, the appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision. The appellate
court decreed that the prosecution has successfully established all the elements of the offense of falsification of a public document and that
the trial court correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant. Hence this petition.
Petitioner denied that he executed and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the board examinations
for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred that the PDS he accomplished and
submitted was typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since
the letters were typewritten in small and capital letters; that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his
genuine signature; that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him since he issued a memorandum against her for
the latter’s misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City; that he is not a licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the
BTO, Iriga City.
Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the exact date when he issued the alleged memorandum against Magistrado and when
during the trial of his perjury case against Magistrado, he claimed that he is a licensed civil engineer. He cannot also remember if he
submitted a letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications
Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor and the fact that he submitted therein a certification that he is a licensed civil
engineer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in sustaining the judgment of the regional trial court despite the fact that said lower
court convicted the accused in the absence of sufficient evidence i.e., proof to show that the accused actually performed the act of
falsification he is accused of;

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in sustaining the judgment of the regional trial court despite the fact that, even on the
assumption that accused filled up the personal data sheet (PDS) including the statement that he is a licensed engineer, accused was under
no obligation to state said data and no criminal intent was shown.

RULING:
NO.The documentary evidence consisting of petitioner’s signature in certain authentic instruments which are apparently similar
to the signature in the PDS. The RTC and the Court of Appeals have compared petitioner’s signatures in Magistrado’s daily time records
and petitioner’s signature in his application letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, with that of petitioner’s alleged
signature in the PDS. They observed that the slant position of the writing, as well as the stroke and the last rounding loop of the signature
in the PDS, does not differ from petitioner’s signatures in Magistrado’s daily time records and in petitioner’s application letter. They
noted that petitioner’s signatures in the said documents are "strikingly similar, such that through the naked eye alone, it is patent that the
signatures therein were written by one and the same person."
The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for which petitioner is charged were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

 a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
PDS is a public document
b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
CSC regulations requires the PDS to narrate the truth about their employment
c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
Petitioner admitted that he never passed the board exam

ARTICLE 171
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public. (satisfied)
2. That he takes advantage of his official position. (not satisfied)
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts

a) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.

b) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
c) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.
d) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
e) Altering true dates.
f) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
g) Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists,
or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
h) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book. (argued by
private respondent)
4. In case the offender is an ecclesiastical minister, the act of falsification is committed with respect to any record or document of
such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of Persons. (not satisfied)
PEOPLE VS. CAMACHO
FACTS:
On or about the 30th day of June 1920, in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, the municipal treasurer of said municipality
sent to herein accused, Eusebio C. Camacho, as municipal president, for his examination, certification and signature, the municipal
pay roll of said municipality for the payment of the salaries due the municipal functionaries and employees for the month of June
1920. The accused, allegedly, upon obtaining possession of said public document, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally put aside,
concealed and destroyed said document, which had been entrusted to him by reason of his office.
ISSUE:
Is Camacho guilty of falsification of public document?
RULING:
Even in the information that Camacho allegedly falsified the municipal pay roll by destroying it, the court rules to deny the
claim of the prosecution because not all of the elements of the crime of falsification are present in this case.
Camacho was indeed a public officer because he is the municipal president of the said municipality and his power and authority
where he is in position was not abused and takenadvantage. He was not also an ecclesiastical minister that alleged falsification
might affect the civil status of persons.
The said document that has been destroyed or falsified consist of a printed blank form called "Municipal Pay Roll" filed in
with the names of the municipal officials and employees to whom salaries were due, neither the certificate nor space for the
approval of the roll have been signed. The only signature on the roll is that of "A. Garcia" appearing by way of receipt for the salary
of the municipal secretary. In the absence of the approval of the president, the payment of that salary was contrary to law, and being
thus completely unauthorized, neither the payment nor the receipt therefor, nor the signature signifying such receipt can be
considered or official character.
Until approved or certified to by one or more of the proper officials, it would not be entitled to filing in any public office or
archive and might be disapproved or even destroyed by the official whose approval was necessary to give it effect, without giving
rise to criminal liability on his part.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant will stand acquitted of the offense charged in the
information.
 JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

That on or about 21 April 2005, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Salary Grade 30; Noel D. Reyes, Salary Grade 22;
and Aida B. Pandeagua, Salary Grade 9, holding the position of Governor, OIC-General Service Office, and Buyer II, respectively, all
public officers, taking advantage of their public positions, acting together, conspiring and confederating with one another and with one
Angelina H. Cabrera, owner of Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply, did then and there falsify Purchase Order No. 0628 involving the
purchase of various medicine by the Provincial Government by changing its original date from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 in order to
conceal that an order has been (sic) made with Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply prior to the bidding conducted on May
18, 2005 to the damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government.

An annual financial audit on the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte was conducted by the COA. The results of the
audit were embodied in its Annual Audit Report which revealed that: (1) there was no attached list of individual recipients to the voucher,
(2) the date of inspection was changed, and (3) Sales Invoice No. 4325 and PO were undated/apparently changed.

Issue:

Whether or not they are liable under article 171 par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:

YES. Petitioners were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public as defined in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3)
he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

The first element is indisputably present in this case. Petitioners were public officers being the Governor and Officer-in-
Charge of the General Services Office of the Province of Camarines Norte at the time of the commission of the offense.

As to the second element, the offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he
has the duty to make or to prepare, or otherwise to intervene, in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official
custody of the document which he falsifies.[49] In the case at bar, petitioners took advantage of their respective official positions
because they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene, in the preparation of the subject PO. Accused Pandeagua prepared
the subject PO and petitioner Reyes was the one who issued the same. Upon order of petitioner Reyes, the date in the subject PO was
changed by accused Pandeagua, and petitioner Typoco approved the subject PO.

As to the third element, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of the offense of falsification of public document
defined and penalized under paragraphs (5) and (6), Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently state:

Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

5. Altering true dates;

 The act of "altering true dates" requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the document is essential; and (b) the alteration of the
date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof.[50]

On the other hand, "making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document" requires a showing that: (a) there be an
alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (b) it was made on a genuine document; (c) the alteration or intercalation
has changed the meaning of the document; and (d) the change made the document speak something false.[51]

In the case at bar, the original date of the PO is essential because it affects not only the veracity or effect thereof but also
determinative of the time when it was prepared and approved so that the change or alteration made the document speak something false.

Article 171(7)

G.R. No. 172539, November 16, 2016 - ALBERTO GARONG Y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
The petitioner was charged with falsification as defined by Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal
Code. That on or about the 21st day of September, 1989, and dates prior and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Calapan,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a
government employee, and as such took advantage of his official position as Court Interpreter, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause, prepare and issue a Court Order dated August 11, 1989.
Making it appear that such Court Order was duly issued by the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 40, when in truth
and in fact, as said accused well knew, that Petition No. 12,701 refers to a Petition for the Issuance of new Owner's Duplicate copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3436, wherein EMERENCIANO SARABIA is the petitioner, and accordingly a
corresponding Court Order was duly issued by the then Presiding Judge Mario de la Cruz, thereby affecting the integrity and
changes the meaning and affect of the genuine Court Order.
In his defense, the petitioner stated that Silverio and Ricar had sought his assistance in the judicial reconstitution of
Silverio's title; that he asked them to produce certain documents for the purpose, but informed Ricar that he would be endorsing
them to Monica Sigue, the court stenographer, because he lacked the knowledge of the process of judicially reconstituting titles;
that he went to the RTC and requested Sigue to attend to Silverio and Ricar; that he did not know what transpired between them
afterwards until Ricar went to his house and turned over Exhibit B already bearing the stamp mark "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"
but without any signature; that Ricar then asked him to sign on top of the stamp mark, but he refused and advised Ricar to bring
Exhibit B instead to Atty. Felix Mendoza, the Branch Clerk of Court; and that because Ricar was insistent, he then signed Exhibit B
with hesitation.
The petitioner denied receiving P4,000.00 as processing fee from Silverio and Ricar. He insisted that he had signed Exhibit B only
to prove that it was a copy of the original; that he did not take advantage of his position as a court interpreter; that he had no
knowledge of the petition filed by Emerenciano Sarabia in the RTC; and that it was Sigue who had placed the docket number of
"Petition No. 12,701" on Exhibit B.

Issue: Whether or not Alberto Villanueva committed falsification of public officer?

Ruling:
Yes, he elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public as defined in Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his
official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.15
On the other hand, the elements of falsification by a private individual under paragraph 1, Article 1 72 of the Revised Penal
Code are that:
(1) the offender is a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) the offender committed any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
(3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.

It is not disputed in this case that the petitioner admitted having seen the original of the court order issued in Petition No. 12,701
bearing the signature of the Presiding Judge Dela Cruz. It is not also disputed that the petitioner was the individual who had
delivered to Silverio and Ricar the court order (Exhibit B) subject of this case. Such circumstances established the sole authorship
of Exhibit B by the petitioner. This was the unanimous finding of the RTC and the CA.
The penalty for falsification committed by a private individual is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and fine
of not more than P5,000.00.23 Having determined that taking advantage of his public office by the petitioner should not be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, the CA fixed the indeterminate penalty of two years and four months of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as the maximum, and fine of
P5,000.00. The CA thereby imposed the limit of the medium period of the penalty of imprisonment, and the maximum of the fine.
However, the CA should have tendered a justification for imposing the limits of the compound penalty. It should have done so,
considering that the seventh rule on the application of penalties containing three periods laid down in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code expressly mandated that the courts "shall determine [within the limits of each period] the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime."

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public
or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;

Alberto Garong y Villanueva v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172539, November 16, 2016
Facts:
I n the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being a government employee, and such took advantage of his official position as court interpreter, did then prepare and
issue a court order dated August 11, 1189 entitled “IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE PETITION OF TITLE NO. T-NO. 40361. In this court order, he falsified “Exhibit B” which bore the stamp mark
“ORIGINAL SIGNED” above the printed name of Judge Mario dela Cruz, presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and other
words “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” with a signature but no printed name appeared beneath the signature.
The RTC concluded the petitioner to have committed falsification committed by a private person under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, with a generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position under Article 14 (1) of the
same code. That his position as a court interpreter had facilitated the commission of the offense by him as a private individual.
However, on his appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the petitioner mainly argued that “the prosecution did not prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the failure to present the original pf the document in question.”
But the CA rejected the petitioner’s argument and thereby affirmed the conviction WITH MODIFICATION. CA disregarded the
RTC’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstance because his being a court interpreter did not facilitate the falsification,
observing that any person with access to or knowledge of the procedure for judicial reconstitution of titles could have committed
the crime. Thereby finding the accused guilty of falsification under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (2) of the RPC.
However, the petitioner continues to insist that the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the failure to establish his guilt.
Hence, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
The SC, denied the fact of the CA committing an error and therefore, uphold the petitoner’s conviction but WITH
MODIFICATION as to the characterization of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not Alberto Garong y Villanueva is found guilty of falsification under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision promulgated on January 25, 2006 or found Villanueva guilty of falsification.
All elements of the said offense are all satisfied in the case at bar.
(1) That the offender is a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position;
In the present case, the accused is a Court interpreter or a public officer which that has a duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document or has an official custody of the document which he falsifies. However,
inspite of being a public officer, it should be noted that the accused did not take advantage of his official position as guided by the
teaching in the case of People v. Sumaoy, GR. 105961, “If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his
position, then there is no abuse of public position”. Though having a knowledge of the falsification as he is a court interpreter, he
could have still committed the crime even as an outsider.
(2) The offender committed any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the RPC;
In this case, the accused committed the crime of falsification under Article 172 (1) of the RPC in relation to Article 171
paragraph 7 (modified by the SC).
Paragraph 7 provides- issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original
(3) The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.
 The document falsified herein is a public document. Public document is defined as any instrument authorized by a notary
public or competent public official, with the solemnities required by law (Cacnio, et al v. Baens).

Given these findings, the Supreme Court finds no reason to warrant the reversal of the judgment of conviction or that the SC finds
no merit of the contention of the accused. Hence, the case was dismissed.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods1 4 and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or
official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

FALSIFICATION UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF ART. 172.

Elements of falsification of private document:
1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, enumerated in Art. 171.
2. That the falsification was committed in any private document.
3. That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.

MANANSALA V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015

FACTS: On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy (Siy), former Vice President for Finance of Urban Finance and Leasing
Corporation, now UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista (Bautista), to withdraw via
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts.
Bautista was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount from the petty cash
custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the money.

On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao (Lacanilao) informed Siy that as per the Petty Cash Replenishment
Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the
amount of P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she immediately
rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash account.

As the checks were eventually encashed resulting in the replenishment of UMC's petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to
revise the subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.

In March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report, re-insert the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance
therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject
document, Siy was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On April 18, 2000, Siy was terminated from her job
and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the position she left vacant

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Manansala’s conviction for falsification of Private Documents.

RULING: Yes. The court ruled correctly and found Mansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Falsification of Private Documents.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are:

a) That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code;
- As UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she
prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; Manansala revised the subject report by deleting the
entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance.
 b) That the falsification was committed in any private document; and

- Manansala revised the subject report by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance;
c) That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
- She caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she
prepared.

Art. 173. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph and telephone messages, and use of said falsified messages. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon officer or employee of the Government or of any private
corporation or concern engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message who utters a fictitious wireless,
telegraph or telephone message of any system or falsifies the same.

Any person who shall use such falsified dispatch to the prejudice of a third party or with the intent of cause such prejudice, shall suffer the
penalty next lower in degree.

Elements:

1. That the offender is an officer or employee of the Government or an officer or employee of a private corporation, engaged in the service
of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message.

2. That the offender commits any of the following acts:

(a) Uttering fictitious wireless, cable, telegraph or telephonemessage; or

(b) Falsifying wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message.

THE UNITED STATES v. JOAQUIN ROMERO

Facts:

Joaquin Romero, a postmaster, received two telegrams for transmission. One telegram consists of 21 words, but when he
transmitted it, he omitted 12 words without the consent of the owner. The other telegram was shortened to 8 words. He profited by
reducing the words to be transmitted. The provincial fiscal charged Romero with the crime of falsification of telegraphs.

Issue:

Whether or not Romero is guilty of the crime of falsification of telegraphs.

Ruling:

Applying the elements in this case,

1. That the offender is an officer or employee of the Government or an officer or employee of a private corporation, engaged in the
service of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message.

The defendant Joaquin Romero was a public official in charge of the post-office and the telegraph station of the pueblo of Paniqui,
Province of Tarlac, was appointed by the Government to discharge the said positions, and as such official received salary from the public
treasury.

2. That the offender commits any of the following acts:

(a) Uttering fictitious wireless, cable, telegraph or telephonemessage; or

(b) Falsifying wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message.

The defendant admitted that he changed the wording of the telegrams which he received, by omitting several words in each of them. He
received P2.34 for the dispatch of the two messages, it is evident that the surplus money must have remained in his possession, since, on
striking a balance, instead of a surplus it was found that there was a shortage of P3 in the postal funds, as the defendant himself
confessed.Defendant obtained profit from the remainder of the sum received by him, equivalent to the price of the words omitted by him
from the two telegrams before mentioned.

No motive, other than that of intent of gain, can be ascribed as having determined him to reduce or diminish the number of words
contained in each of the telegrams. The defendant appropriated to himself P0.72, the cost of the twelve words therein omitted, and in the
second telegram he gained P0.48, the amount received for the eight words omitted. The court held that the defendant, with manifest
violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the unlawful act in question and has thereby incurred the penalty which he merits for his
criminal acts.

ARTICLE 175

NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES INC. VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

GR NO. 150918 (AUGUST 17, 2007)
FACTS:
NMEI, through its President and General Manager, Jacinto Tan Jr., applied for an P8 million Credit Accommodation with
respondent CBC. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over its properties. Subsequently, NMEI, through Tan, applied for an
additional Case-to-Case Loan. Both loans were respectively paid in 1996.

Petitioner NMEI re-availed the P8M credit line and failed to settle the obligation. The latter, through its counsel Atty. Diaz, sent
two letters to respondent requesting a detailed statement of account and to hold in abeyance any legal action. The latter replied that said
statement could not be released without proper board resolution or authorization. The petitioner’s properties were extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold in public auction, with respondent as the highest bidder.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure Sale with Damages and Preliminary Injunction. Respondent CBC
moved to dismiss the same on the ground that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to the relief
sought in the complaint. The RTC of Bacolod denied respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner later filed an Amended Complaint
impleading Tan and his spouse, Corazon Tan, as well as respondents Bacolod Branch Manager Ainalea Cortez. Respondent again sought
to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state cause of action and for failure to comply with the rules on non-forum shopping.

In the CA, it held that the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed because the accompanying certification against
forum shopping which was signed by petitioner's corporate secretary, Amelito Lizares, was defective, for lack of authorization from the
board of directors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because of using a false and unauthorized certificate

HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, Lizares was not authorized to file the complaint for and in behalf of petitioner corporation. Thus, the
complaint is not deemed filed by the proper party in interest and should be dismissed. There was no allegation that petitioner NMEI,
through a board resolution, authorized Lizares to execute the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Moreover, no such
board resolution was appended to the complaint or amended complaint.1

Elements of article 172.

a. A physician or surgeon had issued a false medical certificate, or public officer issued a false certificate of merit or service, good
conduct, or similar circumstance, or a private person had falsified any of said certificates;

“Lizares, a private person signed a certification against forum shopping under the name of his company Negros Merchan
Enterprises”

b. Offender knew that the certificate was false; and

Art. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed P10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make or
introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implements intended to be used in the
commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this Chapter.
Any person who, with the intention of using them, shall have in his possession any of the instruments or implements mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided therein.

People v. Magpale
G.R. No. L-46656
June 26, 1940
Facts: A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Province of Nueva
Ecija, charging him with a violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused had in his possession, custody and
control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva Ecija and used it for falsifying the official brand of the said
municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. Felipe Magpale made
an iron brand purported to be of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, with the intention of using it knowingly in the
falsification of certificates of ownership of large cattle, said manufactured brand having been found in the possession of said
accused.
Issue: Whether or not Felix Magpale violated Art. 176 of the RPC or the manufacturing and possession of instruments or
implements for falsification.
Held: ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall make or introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implemented intended to be
used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.
Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is criminally liable for the making
thereof. It also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to its inhabitants.

Punishable Acts
1. Making or introducing into the Philippines any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implements for
counterfeiting or falsification; and
2. Possessing with intent to use the instrument or implements for counterfeiting or falsification made in or introduced
into the Philippines by another person.
Art. 179. Illegal use of uniforms or insignia.
Elements:

1. That the offender makes use of insignia, uniform or dress.

2. That the insignia, uniform or dress pertains to an office not held by the offender or to a class of persons of
which he is not a member.

ELEMENT No. 2 in question. IT SHOULD BE THE EXACT IMITATION!!!

3. That said insignia, uniform or dress is used publicly and improperly.

People vs. Romero, C.A.,58 O.G. 4402

Facts:
A woman was roaming around alone asking for alms for orphans in the name of said organization.** The woman was
wearing the habit of the Daughters of St. Paul**. The Daughters of St. Paul had no orphans; asking for alms was not its
mission.
Issue: Whether or not an exact imitation of a uniform or dress is necessary for the person to be liable under Article 179.
Held: To bring a culprit within the coverage of Article 179 of the Revised Penal Code, on the illegal use of uniforms and
insignia, an exact imitation of a uniform is unnecessary. A colorable resemblance calculated to deceive the common run
of people — not those thoroughly familiar with every detail or accessory thereof — is sufficient.
A layman who wears publicly the ecclesiastical habit of a Catholic priest is liable under Art. 179.
Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases. - Any person found guilty of false testimony in a civil case shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed 6,000 pesos, if the amount in controversy shall exceed 5,000
pesos, and the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to
exceed 1,000 pesos, if the amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount or cannot be estimated.
G.R. No. 2709. December 28, 1905.
THE UNITED STATES v. ISIDORO ARAGON
FACTS:
E.H. Warner filed the following complaint: "United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the justice of the peace court of the
city of Manila. Edwin H. Warner, Plaintiff, v. Claro Magcauas, Defendant.” The accused gave the testimony set out in the
complaint, an action brought by the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the annual rent for a certain tract of land for the years 1899,
1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903. The defendant was summoned as a witness to appear before said justice of the peace, to give
testimony upon the trial of this cause.

The accused testified as follows:

"‘Q. Have you ever heard about the Pasay or Pineda estate?
"‘A. I have heard . . . question of lands.
"‘Q. Do you know the Pasay Estate?
"‘A. I do not know.
"‘Q. Do you know if the Augustinian Fathers, during the years 1895 and 1898, brought any action for forcible entry and detainer
against Agustin Montilla, and whether in said action, by reason of the decision ousting Mr. Montilla, the defendant, Claro
Magcauas, in this case was likewise ousted from his hand as a sublessee of Mr. Montilla?

"‘A. I do not remember, sir.

"‘Q. In the justice of the peace court where you were acting was there not a suit brought by Mr. Montilla for forcible entry and
detainer against the tenants of the Pasay estate, among them the defendant in this case, and for the lands in questions?

"‘A. I do not remember.

"‘Q. Can you not assure that in your court not even a single action for forcible entry and detainer was brought against Mr. Montilla?

"‘A. I do not remember, sir.

All these statements are absolutely false, and are essential to the case at issue wherein they were made, because really and truly the
accused had heard about the Pasay estate prior to the four last years, and he well knew that at the time there were brought in the
justice of the peace court at Pineda when he was filling that office many actions for forcible entry and detainer, instituted by
Augustin J. Montilla, against tenants of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the accused constitute false testimony?
RULING:
No. The elements of false testimony are as follows:
1. That the testimony must be given in a civil case.
2. That the testimony must relate to the issues presented in said case.
3. That the testimony must be false.
4. That the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false.
5. That the testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in said case.
During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave false testimony he was asked
certain question with reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers invariably were that he did not remember, or that he
had no recollection concerning those facts. The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to which the
defendant was questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with reference to those facts were false. The mere
fact that the defendant had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient to prove that he stated a
falsehood when he stated in December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or relations." The evidence
adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show that the defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in
the complaint.
The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show that the defendant committed the crime charged in the
complaint. The judgment of the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed.

ARTICLE 181
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BALBINO ADOLFO, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

The accused in this case is charged with the crime of falso testimonio (perjury) in that on the 12th day of February, 1907,
while testifying as a witness in the case of the United States vs Lorenzo Tupas, who was charged with assassination, he swore
positively that he did not see one Raymundo Monuz, deceased, on the 13th of November 1906, nor at any other time between
that date and the 17th day of that month; the fact being that on the 13th of November, 1906, he was present and saw Lorenzo
Tupas, the accused in the former case, assassinate the said Raymundo Munoz.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of false testimony in favor of the defendant.

Held:
Yes. The trial court found the accused guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code which states that
one who gives false testimony in favor of the defendant will be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree to prision correccional in its medium degree. In the case at bar, the false testimony given by the defendant was
manifestly intended to favor the accused in the former case, and would undoubtedly have had that effect if the court had
accepted it as true, but, since the accused in the former case was convicted of the crime with which he was charged, the false
testimony can not be said to have favored him. Therefore, the trial court imposed and found the defendant guilty of the crime
of false testimony, together with the costs of the proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

ARTICLE 183
G.R. No. 168301 - ANTONIO B. MONFORT III, ET AL. v. MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, ET AL.
FACTS:
Tangential to another perjury suit in relation to a claim in shares over a company, Monfort et.al accused Salvatierra et.al for
committing perjury. Respondent Salvatierra erroneously stated the date of a BOD meeting in the general information sheet which
was filed in an affidavit, required and authorized by law, and submitted it to the city Prosecutor’s office of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. Salvatierra upon knowledge of the error, ordered to change the date accordingly; the respondents’ party was not aware
of the error because it was simply prepared by their accounting firm and signed it, thinking it to be true. Petitioner Monfort claims
the act is still violative of Art. 183 of the RPC?
ISSUE:
WON Monfort et.al are guilty of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC?
HELD:
No. The third element of perjury under Art. 183 was not satisfied. The respondents were not aware of the said errors at the time
they subscribed and swore to the correctness of the 1996 GIS of the company. The party of Salvatierra, then, did not willfully and
deliberately make false statements nor did they have malice in doing such act. They acted in good faith and even corrected their
errors upon their knowledge of the same.
Article 185. Machinations in public auctions. - Any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a consideration
for refraining from taking part in any public auction, and any person who shall attempt to cause bidders to stay
away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises, or any other artifice, with intent to cause the reduction of the price
of the thing auctioned, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine ranging
from 10 to 50 per centum of the value of the thing auctioned.

Acts punished:
By soliciting any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any public auction.
By attempting to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts, promises or any other artifice.

Elements of soliciting gifts or promise:

1. That there be a public auction.
2. That the accused solicited any gift or promise from any of the bidders.
3. That such gift or promise was the consideration for is refraining from taking part in that public auction.
4. That the accused had the intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned.

**Note: It is consummated by mere solicitation of gift or promise as consideration for not bidding**

OUANO vs. CA,

G.R. No. 40203. August 21, 1990.

FACTS:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered under Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).Said property was offered for bidding for the second time because the first bidding was
nullified due to Ouanos protest. It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would
make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of
their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan
to desist from presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact
withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ouano committed machinations in public auction punishable under the RPC.

RULING: YES.
Two material facts, however, about which Ouano and Echavez are in agreement, said facts being determinative of this dispute on
an altogether different ground. These facts are:chanrob1virtual 1

1) that they had both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding called by the RFC, and that if it was
accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties; and

2) that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property — a
group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan — to desist from presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan’s group to
withdraw from the sale, paying said group P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.

These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a
consideration for Ouano’s refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in
causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they
committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only one bid — that of Echavez — was
entered for the land in consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the
parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to
disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil
Code.

Art. 188. Subsisting and altering trade-mark, trade-names, or service marks. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 50 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall substitute the trade name or trade-mark of some other manufacturer or dealer or a colorable
imitation thereof, for the trademark of the real manufacturer or dealer upon any article of commerce and shall sell the
same;
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x

GSELL V. YAP-JUE
G.R. NO. 4720, JANUARY 19, 1909

Facts:

Gsell obtained a patent for manufacturing canes and umbrellas with a curved handle by means of a lamp or blowpipe
fed with mineral oil or petroleum. Yap-Jue made similar products using the same process but instead of using “a lamp
or blowpipe fed with mineral oil or petroleum,” he used a lamp fed with alcohol.

Issue:

Whether or not Yap-Jue is found guilty of Article 188 (1) of the RPC

Ruling:

Yes. Yap-Jue infringed on the patent of Gsell and thereby violated Artcile 188 (1) of the RPC. The Court held that
alcohol is an equivalent or a substitute for mineral oil or petroleum, in connection with blast lamps or blowpipes. It is
well-known fact at the time when the patent was issued to Gsell. The use of blast lamp or blowpipe fed with petroleum
or mineral oil, rather than one fed with alcohol, is an unessential part of some part of the patented process the use of
which was prohibited by the court in a prior proceeding.

It should be noted that under the Doctrine of “Mechanical Equivalents” which provides, the inventor of an ordinary
machine is protected against all mere formal alterations and against the substitution of mere mechanical equivalents. It
further protects the patentee from colorable invasions of his patent under the guise of substitution of some part of his
invention by some well-known mechanical equivalent
DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS INC.
G.R. NO. 180677
FEBRUARY 18, 2013

FACTS:
Levi Strauss and Company (Levi’s), a foreign corporation had been engaged in the apparel business. It is the owner of
trademarks and designs of Levi’s jeans like LEVI’S 501, the arcuate design, the two-horse brand, the two-horse patch, the
two-horse patch with pattern arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate. After receiving information that Diaz was selling
counterfeit LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring shops in Almanza and Talon, Las Piñas City, Levi’s Philippines hired a private
investigation group to verify the information. Surveillance and the purchase of jeans from the tailoring shops of Diaz
established that the jeans bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or imitations of LEVI’S 501.

Levi’s Philippines then sought the assistance of the NBI for purposes of applying for a search warrant against Diaz to be
served at his tailoring shops. NBI agents searched the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several fake LEVI’S 501 jeans from
them. Levi’s Philippines claimed that it did not authorize the making and selling of the seized jeans; that each of the jeans
were mere imitations of genuine LEVI’S 501 jeans by each of them bearing the registered trademarks, like the arcuate design,
the tab, and the leather patch; and that the seized jeans could be mistaken for original LEVI’S 501 jeans due to the placement
of the arcuate, tab, and two-horse leather patch.

ISSUE:
WON there was infringement of trademarks committed by Diaz in this case.
- No, Diaz did not infringe any trademark.

HELD:
Elements:
1. THE VALIDITY OF PLAINTIFF’S MARK
- the jeans Diaz produced were easily recognizable because the label "LS Jeans Tailoring," and the names of the
customers were placed inside the pockets, and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab; that "LS" stood for
"Latest Style;" and that the leather patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not two horses

2. THE PLAINTIFF’S OWNER OF THE MARK

- "LS Jeans Tailoring" was registered with the Intellectual Property Office; that his shops received clothes for
sewing or repair; that his shops offered made-to-order jeans, whose styles or designs were done in accordance
with instructions of the customers.

3. THE USE OF THE MARK OR ITS COLORABLE IMITATION BY THE ALLEGED INFRINGER
RESULTS IN “LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION”
- There is no confusion in this case.

- Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" for the jeans he produced and sold in his tailoring shops.
His trademark was visually and aurally different from the trademark "LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing on the
patch of original jeans under the trademark LEVI’S 501. The word "LS" could not be confused as a derivative
 from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS" being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby openly
suggesting that the jeans bearing the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or were bought from the
tailoring shops of Diaz, not from the malls or boutiques selling original LEVI’S 501 jeans to the consuming
public.

The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied the "two horse design" of the petitioner-private complainant
but the evidence will show that there was no such design in the seized jeans. Instead, what is shown is "buffalo
design." Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals which an ordinary customer can easily
distinguish.

The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied by the accused. However, evidence will show that the
red tab used by the private complainant indicates the word "LEVI’S" while that of the accused indicates the
letters "LSJT" which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even an ordinary customer can distinguish the
word LEVI’S from the letters LSJT.

Notes:

This case escalated from RTC to CA on the ground that Diaz appealed at the CA for the RTC’s ruling since evidences were
lacking, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the ground that Diaz had not filed his appellant’s brief on time
despite being granted his requested several extension periods. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the case should prosper
since the filing of the late brief is due to the negligence of Diaz’ counsel. That the court should not dismiss the case due to
technicality since in this case, there are meritorious evidences that were found for the case to prosper.

Art. 189(2). Unfair competition, fraudulent registration of trade name, trademark, or service mark, fraudulent
designation of origin, and false description. — The penalty provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon:

2. Any person who shall affix, apply, annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, and shall sell such goods or
services.

G. R. No. L-10612, May 30, 1958

People vs. Lim Hoa Ting

Facts:

Lim Hoa Ting, the owner of Lantern Brand Food Seasoning, was accused of unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code for deceiving or defrauding A Tung Chiongco Trading, an authorized representative of Barrelson Inc. The
two products are identical with its packaging, in which case it would have induced the public to believe that Lantern Brand
Food Seasoning, a product made in the Philippines, was a product of Oak Barrel Brand Food Seasoning, which is made in the
US. Accused made an appeal alleging that he had secured the registration, in the Patent Office of his trade mark “Lantern.”
The said trademark appears to be very much distinct to the naked eye from that of Barrelson Inc.

Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of unfair competition?

Ruling:

No, upon examining the respective labels of these brands, the court agreed that the labels appeared to be different and
distinct from each other. It would not be proper to say, as yet, that the similarity in the general appearance of the two (2)
labels involved in the case at bar is such as to warrant the conclusion that the defendant intended to engage in unfair
competition. Instead, the information herein alleges that defendant, likewise, "caused to be affixed or used in his labels a
false designation of origin or false description or representation," such as, that his products are "packed by Chams Products
Co., San Francisco, California," - although in fact they are packed by defendant in the Philippines. Such false representation
falls under the second paragraph of Article 189 of out Revised Penal Code. Since this part of information was not contested
in the motion to quash, only the last part of the information charges an offense, namely a violation of said paragraph (2) of
Article 189.