SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of

Manila

G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007

Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila

reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.

REPORT THIS AD

Issue

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their
duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER

OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
 of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc
or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It
does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that

the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is
already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their

position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the

subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this

court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account .
. . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

PBM Employees vs PBM

Facts: 
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held: 
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did
not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind
their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm
were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To
regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can
be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will
be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

CARLOS BALACUIT ET.AL V. CFI OF AGUSAN

DEL NORTE - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
CARLOS BALACUIT ET.AL V. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE                   G.R. No. L-
38429 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any person, group of persons,
entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12)
years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half
of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a complaint before the
Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City assailing the constitutionalit of
Ordinance No. 640.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional
and valid.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to
fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater
have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We
could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade,
it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.

Lozano v. Martinez
G.R .No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes
a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at
putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the
public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection
clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed
because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise
of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since
contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal
protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally,
BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention,
the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On
the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in
question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD                       G.R. No. 166494  June 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG,
specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute
and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as
the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant
of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation   of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because according to them drugstores impose a
mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of
the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly
and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or
not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses.
However,petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted
from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable
expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per
transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of
petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately
reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners
cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount.
In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers
consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on
the amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business
and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31
July 1967]
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31
July 1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave

Facts: 
On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila and
approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of
Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling
up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein
the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief
of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two
classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are
required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party in
case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
(EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition
against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the
submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and
rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially
restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or
constitutional.

Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It
was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was
intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and
to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract,
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in
all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command
of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being
devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of
the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state. 
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G.R. No. L-42571-72 – 123 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Subject Shall Be
Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after
due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA
938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due
process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,

prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then

regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such
a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under
the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only
regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts:
 In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City
of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They
contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due
process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of
police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment
are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in
order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice
Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been
given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is
the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, 
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION,

 FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when
in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was
this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the
ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals
declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

G.R. No. 118127 – 455 SCRA 308 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Police
Power

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers
that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In
the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their
rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA
to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and
order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.