771007

research-article2018
PSPXXX10.1177/0146167218771007Personality and Social Psychology BulletinPereira et al.

Empirical Research Paper

Personality and Social

The Ego-Defensive Role of Legitimacy:

Psychology Bulletin
1–14
© 2018 by the Society for Personality
How Threat-Based Justifications Protect and Social Psychology, Inc
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DOI: 10.1177/0146167218771007
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218771007
pspb.sagepub.com

Cicero Roberto Pereira1, José Luis Álvaro2, and Jorge Vala3

Abstract
This article analyzes the ego-defensive role played by legitimation, by examining the hypothesis that threat-based justifications
attenuate the negative effect on an individual’s self-esteem caused by his or her becoming aware of his or her own
discriminatory behavior. Across three studies (including a pilot experiment), participants who were led to believe that they
had acted in a discriminatory way experienced a decrease in their self-esteem. In Study 1 (N = 116), this effect was nullified
when discrimination was justified by either symbolic or realistic threat perceptions. Study 2 (N = 250) replicated this pattern
of results and went further by showing that discrimination affects self-esteem only in more egalitarian individuals, whereas
for those less egalitarian, it affects their social image. According to the ego-defensive role of legitimation, a meta-analytical
integration of the results confirmed that the influence of discrimination in depressing self-esteem is moderated by threat-
based justifications.

Keywords
discrimination, legitimacy, self-esteem, threat perception, egalitarianism

Received May 29, 2017; revision accepted March 18, 2018

Self-esteem is a key concept for understanding the motiva-
tion underlying intergroup behavior. For instance, systematic
research, carried out over the past five decades, has shown
that individuals value their ingroup by discriminating against
outgroups to positively distinguish their group of belonging
from other groups. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1979) suggests that ingroup bias has a positive impact on
personal and collective self-esteem because individuals are
motivated to achieve, maintain, and enhance a positive social
identity (for reviews, see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin &
Hewstone, 1998). It occurs especially in the minimal group
contexts (e.g., Lemyre & Smith, 1985), but only when
ingroup bias is in accordance with the ingroup norm
(Iacoviello, Berent, Frederic, & Pereira, 2017).
In contemporary societies, however, individuals are
socialized in cultural environments that disseminate a
social discourse stressing that good people are egalitarian
and nondiscriminatory and should treat others fairly.
Consequently, acting in a discriminatory way could entail
negative psychological consequences that affect individu-
als’ self-evaluation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner
& Dovidio, 1986; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005). This
occurs because they experience a value-based motivational
conflict between the values that underpin unjust and preju-
diced discriminatory behavior (e.g., the descriptive meri-
tocracy; Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Son Hing et al., 2011)
and the egalitarian values that stand against prejudice (e.g.,
Katz & Hass, 1988). In fact, it has already been demon-
strated that a similar value-based motivational conflict
causes psychological discomfort, including feelings of
compunction, guilt, and self-criticism (Devine, Monteith,
Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993). These negative
feelings are signals that being perceived as unjust and prej-
udiced can directly depress an individual’s image, because
it is a person’s overall emotional evaluation of his or her
own worth (Rosenberg, 1965). Accordingly, the different
role played by discrimination in self-esteem suggests that
individuals are influenced by two contrasting motivations:
On one hand, they are motivated to discriminate because of
the distinctiveness motive; on the other hand, they are moti-
vated not to discriminate because they have internalized
egalitarian values into their self-concept. Little attention is
given to the ego-defensive strategies individuals use to pro-
tect their personal and social self-esteem in egalitarian
contexts.
1
Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, Brasil, and Instituto de
Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
2
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
3
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
Corresponding Author:
Cicero Roberto Pereira, Departamento de Psicologia, Universidade
Federal da Paraiba, 58051-900 João Pessoa, Brasil.
Email: crp@labesp.org
2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
We argue that becoming aware of their own discrimina-
tory behavior leads individuals to feel less positive self-
esteem only when they cannot legitimate discrimination. In
fact, recent theorizing and research on the legitimacy of
social inequality suggests that individuals act as if they have
adopted a compromise solution that allows them to discrimi-
nate against minority groups without threatening the egali-
tarian beliefs that they hold (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).
This solution involves a legitimating process, in which dis-
crimination is allowed when it can be justified on the basis of
unprejudiced arguments (e.g., Tyler, 2010; Uhlmann &
Cohen, 2005). Indeed, the legitimation of discrimination
may have an ego-defensive function, in which individuals
can discriminate against minority groups and still maintain
their positive self-esteem because legitimacy protects their
self-concept of being fair and unprejudiced individuals.
However, as far as we know, there is no experimental evi-
dence concerning the specific effect that legitimation has on
individuals’ self-esteem when they become aware that they
are acting in a discriminatory way against a minority group.
In this research, we, therefore, examined this issue by testing
the hypothesis that when individuals become aware of their
own discriminatory behavior, they experience a decrease in
self-esteem, although only if they cannot engage in any legit-
imating process of discrimination. We also predicted that the
ego-defensive role of legitimation is particularly necessary
for individuals who endorse egalitarian values.
Threat Perceptions as Justifying Beliefs
That Legitimate Discrimination
An action is legitimate when it is in accordance with the
norms and procedures that are accepted as just and fair by a
specific group or by society as a whole (Costa-Lopes,
Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013; Tyler, 2006). In democratic
societies, where the sense of justice and equality is one of the
organizing principles, legitimization is crucial to individuals’
ability to manage their personal and social image and to
develop a meaningful sense of self as worthwhile and fair
individuals (see Jost, 2001). Thus, individuals need to justify
their behavior to show that they are acting in a legitimate way
(e.g., Tajfel, 1984). Accordingly, if individuals engage in
unfair discrimination without recourse to a legitimating pro-
cess, they could then experience a decrease in their feeling of
personal and social worth. However, system justification the-
ory (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2003) predicts that these negative
feelings can be buffered because individuals legitimize the
status quo by using justifying beliefs to maintain personal and
social self-esteem (see also O’Brien & Major, 2005).
Perceiving the outgroup as a threat is a good example of
justifying beliefs that legitimate discrimination (see Crandall
& Eshleman, 2003; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010).
Threat perceptions are beliefs that outgroup members repre-
sent a danger to the economic power and physical or material
well-being (i.e., a realistic threat; Stephan et al., 2002) or to
the culture and way of life of the ingroup (i.e., a symbolic
threat; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Perceiving outgroups as a
threat legitimates discrimination because it does not directly
involve the idea of prejudice. It, thereby, allows individuals
to contend that they have no prejudiced attitude against the
outgroup, by arguing that outgroup members may represent
a threat to the survival of the ingroup because they increase
competition for scarce resources and disrupt the core values
of the ingroup’s cultural matrix. Thus, individuals can dis-
criminate against minority groups and dissociate their behav-
ior from prejudice-motivated discrimination. Indeed, Pereira
et al. (2010) demonstrated that symbolic and realistic threat
perceptions legitimate discrimination, and so mediate the
relationship between prejudice and discrimination. The legit-
imizing function of threat perception is especially important
in egalitarian contexts (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009),
where it is supposed that the use of symbolic or realistic
threats as justifications could buffer the negative effect of
discrimination on the self-esteem of those engaging in dis-
criminatory behavior.
We argue that when an individual becomes aware that he
or she has discriminated against a member of a minority
group, he or she may perceive himself or herself to be less
valuable than an individual who has also engaged in discrimi-
nation but justifies it by using nonprejudiced reasons. For
instance, if individuals are confronted with evidence that they
have unjustly opposed the presence of immigrants in their
country, this confrontation might negatively affect their self-
esteem because the meaning of this action contrasts with the
antiprejudice norm, which prescribes that “good people are
egalitarian and non-discriminatory.” However, individuals
can reframe the situation by actively ascribing another mean-
ing to the motivation behind their behavior. They can believe
that their opposition to immigrants is not motivated by preju-
dice but rather reflects their genuine concern for the values,
customs, and traditions that give their country its identity or
even for the socioeconomic situation of the country, which
can no longer receive more immigrants because immigration
flows increase competition for very scarce resources. In other
words, individuals may use the perception that the outgroup
represents a threat to the ingroup as a justification for their
behavior (Bahns, 2017). Thus, threat-based justification legit-
imizes discrimination and can, therefore, be ego defensive by
preserving individuals’ self-esteem.
Maintenance of self-esteem involves a self-regulation
process (Crocker & Park, 2004) that is moderated by indi-
viduals’ values (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007).
Accordingly, the ego-defensive role of threat-based justifica-
tions must be especially relevant for individuals who identify
with egalitarianism and social justice. Indeed, the motivation
to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998) is mainly based
on egalitarian values (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien,
2002). In this case, being perceived as a discriminator can
represent a threat to individuals’ self-perception of being
nonprejudiced, which can negatively affect their self-esteem.
Pereira et al.
In the contrast, for individuals endorsing egalitarian values
less, the compliance with the norm of behaving in a nondis-
criminatory manner would involve an external motivation to
maintain a positive social image and avoid the costs of being
perceived as discriminators (Plant & Devine, 1998). Thus,
becoming aware of one’s own discriminatory behavior
should threaten the personal self-esteem of egalitarians and
the social image of nonegalitarians.
Overview of Studies
This research examines whether individuals express less
positive self-esteem after they become aware that they have
acted in a discriminatory way toward immigrants. We ana-
lyze whether the influence of discriminatory behavior on
self-esteem depends on whether or not individuals are able to
justify their behavior. Specifically, we propose that the influ-
ence of discrimination on individuals’ self-esteem is moder-
ated by threat-based justifications. This hypothesis was
tested in two experiments and a pilot study.
In the pilot study (see full description in online supple-
mentary materials), we developed an experimental paradigm
in which the participants received fictitious feedback about
their behavior toward immigrants (participants reported no
suspicion following the study procedures). In this paradigm,
participants (N = 52) were informed of how they had acted
toward immigrants in a previous task and of the motivations
for their behavior. The information about behavior character-
ized them as discriminatory (vs. nondiscriminatory), whereas
the information about the motivations for their behaviors
was designed to justify (vs. not justify) the discrimination on
the basis of a perceived symbolic threat. After reading the
feedback depicting their behaviors, the participants answered
a self-esteem scale that measured how they were feeling at
that moment. Results indicated that individuals’ self-esteem
was affected when they became aware that they had discrim-
inated against a minority group: They expressed less positive
self-esteem (M = 3.92, SD = 0.46) than participants who had
received feedback indicating that they had acted in a nondis-
criminatory manner (M = 4.53, SD = 0.54), F(1, 48) = 9.19,
p < .01, d = −0.87. Significantly, when symbolic threat was
used as a justification for discrimination, the participants’
self-esteem was not affected when they were informed of
their discriminatory behavior.
We then conducted two experiments using a test–posttest
design aiming to analyze whether participants who were led
to believe that they had acted in a discriminatory way toward
immigrants experienced a decrease in their self-esteem (Study
1), because discrimination clashes with the idea that “good
people are egalitarian and nondiscriminatory” (Study 2).
Thus, a decrease in self-esteem should be observed, espe-
cially in individuals who support more egalitarian values. For
less egalitarian people, justifications will have the function of
restoring their social image. Thus, if legitimation plays an
ego-defensive role by protecting individuals’ personal and
3
social self-esteem, then discrimination should not influence
participants with symbolic or realistic threat-based justifica-
tions for their behavior.
Study 1
Using the experimental paradigm developed in the pilot
study, participants were informed of how they had acted
toward immigrants in a previous task and of the motivations
for their behavior. The information about behavior character-
ized them as discriminatory (vs. nondiscriminatory), whereas
the information about the motivations for their behavior was
designed to justify (vs. not justify) the discrimination on the
basis of a perceived symbolic or realistic threat. We mea-
sured self-esteem before and after providing participants
with feedback on how they had acted toward immigrants.
According to our rationale, because unprejudiced values
have been internalized into individuals’ self-concept, as pre-
dicted by contemporary theory on prejudice and discrimina-
tion (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), they should experience
discomfort at being described as discriminatory and should,
therefore, experience a decrease in self-esteem. Because
symbolic and realistic threats are used by people as justifica-
tion to legitimize discrimination (Bahns, 2017; Pereira et al.,
2009), it should have an ego-defensive effect by buffering
the negative consequences of discrimination on individual’s
self-esteem. Thus, awareness of discrimination should not
decrease the self-esteem of participants who have been pro-
vided with a symbolic or realistic threat-based justification
as a reason for their behavior.
Method
Participants. One hundred sixteen undergraduates (60%
women; M age = 19.17 years, SD = 2.22 years) voluntarily
participated in this study. Applying G*Power (Faul, Erd-
felder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to our research design, we
estimated that this sample size provided 95% of power to
detect a medium effect size of d = 0.34.
Procedures and Design
The procedures were made up of two phases. In the first
(T1), participants completed a questionnaire consisting of a
self-esteem measure and some questions about attitudes
toward immigrants. One week later (T2), they were ran-
domly assigned to one of six experimental conditions accord-
ing to a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs.
nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3 (threat-based justifications:
symbolic vs. realistic vs. nonjustification) factorial design.
Manipulation was carried out by giving participants ficti-
tious feedback on how they had acted in Phase 1. The cover
story stressed that they were receiving the results of their
performance, which had ostensibly been calculated by the
computer in the previous phase of the study. Thus,
4 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
each participant was informed that he or she was receiving a
personalized “psychological report” describing his or her
pattern of behavior toward immigrants. The report contained
one figure depicting the alleged participants’ performance
that had supposedly been obtained from their reaction to sev-
eral stimuli. In the first paragraph, participants read the fol-
lowing text, which informed them that the study contained a
subliminal test assessing the extent to which they had acted
in a discriminatory way toward immigrants:
The questionnaire that you have answered contained a subliminal
test which evaluated your prejudiced attitudes and willingness to
act in a discriminatory manner towards immigrants. The figure
below shows your responses to critical stimuli and was generated
by the data analysis software that traced the psychological
profile of your attitudes. Look at the figure carefully.
The figure provided the participants with a text explaining
what each stimuli evaluated. Specifically, the text indicated
that
The stimuli measured the following aspects: a) Stimuli 1, 2 and
3 evaluated discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants; b)
Stimuli 4, 5 and 6 evaluated the reasons why you expressed such
attitudes; c) The stimuli ranging from 7 to 10 evaluate your
intention to discriminate against immigrants in the future.
The second paragraph manipulated the participants’ dis-
criminatory behavior (i.e., discriminatory vs. nondiscrimina-
tory), whereas the third manipulated the threat-based
justification for their behavior. Afterward, participants filled
out a self-esteem questionnaire. Finally, all participants were
thanked and fully debriefed.
Manipulation of discrimination. In the discriminatory-behavior
condition, the participants read the following text describing
a discriminatory profile:
Analyzing your results, we can observe high values of both
discriminatory attitudes and intentions to discriminate against
immigrants. We have therefore observed that you acted in a
discriminatory way towards immigrants.
In the nondiscriminating condition, they read the follow-
ing text describing a nondiscriminatory profile:
Analyzing your results, we can observe low values of both
discriminatory attitudes and intentions to discriminate against
immigrants. We therefore observed non-discriminatory
responses towards immigrants.
Manipulation of threat-based justifications. This manipulation
took place after reading that they had acted in a discrimina-
tory (vs. nondiscriminatory) way against immigrants. In the
non–threat-based justification condition, participants read
no information concerning the reasons for their behavior.
In the symbolic threat-based justifications condition, the
participants read the following description of the reasons for
their behavior:
The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the
reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a
sincere concern for the values and culture of our country. Your
attitudes reveal a reaction to the threat posed by the presence of
immigrant groups that could undermine our core values, culture
and national traditions.
In the realistic threat-based justifications condition, the
participants read the following description of the reasons for
their behavior:
The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the
reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a
sincere concern for the socio-economic situation of our country.
Your attitudes reveal a reaction to the threat posed by the
presence of immigrant groups that could increase unemployment
in some sectors of our economy, thereby weakening it and
increasing crime rates in our country.
Self-esteem measurement. We used the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The 10 items of this scale
were originally drawn to evaluate individuals’ global self-
worth and has been used as a trait self-esteem measure. How-
ever, in this and in subsequent research, our proposal was to
evaluate contextual changes in participants’ self-esteem
resulting from the feedback they received on their discrimi-
natory behavior. Thus, our focus was to evaluate the state
self-esteem, and, for this, we presented them with the follow-
ing instructions: “Below is a list of statements dealing with
your feelings about yourself at this moment. Please indicate
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement
about what you are thinking at this moment.” So, participants
indicated (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) the
extent to which they agreed with each of the 10 items on the
scale (e.g., “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”;
“At times I think I am no good at all,” reversed). This mea-
sure showed adequate internal consistency both in T1 (α =
.80) and T2 (α = .85) and a very strong test–retest reliability
(rT1–T2 = .87, p < .001). We then computed the general self-
esteem measure by averaging the participants’ scores across
the items in each phase (T1 and T2).
Manipulation check. We asked participants to gauge the
extent to which they perceived themselves to be a person
“with a tendency to discriminate against immigrants”
(0 = nondiscriminatory tendency, 10 = discriminatory ten-
dency). Factorial ANOVA showed that this perception was
higher in the discrimination condition (M = 3.29, SD =
2.35) than in the nondiscrimination condition, M = 2.07, SD
= 1.76, F(1, 110) = 10.25, p < .01, d = 0.59, which indicates
that the manipulation of discrimination was successful in
increasing individuals’ self-perception as potential discrim-
inators. There was no reliable main (d = 0.20) or interaction
Pereira et al.
Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Self-Esteem in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1) and After (T2)
Discriminatory or Nondiscriminatory Feedback (Study 1).
Nondiscrimination condition
T1
Nonjustification 4.03 (0.53)
Symbolic justification 3.88 (0.56)
Realistic justification 3.79 (0.44)
Total 3.90 (0.51)
effects (η2 = .00) involving threat-based justifications, F(1,
110) < 1, ns.
Results
Preliminary analysis. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
for self-esteem measured in T1 and T2 in the light of each
experimental condition. We analyzed the self-esteem score
obtained in T1 using a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory
behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3 (threat-based
justifications: symbolic vs. realistic vs. nonjustification)
between-subject factorial ANOVA. The results showed
that none of the main or interaction effects was reliable:
FDiscrimination(1, 110) = 2.07, ns, d = 0.27; FJustification(2, 110)
= 1.21, ns, d = 0.19; FInteraction(2, 110) = 0.25, ns, η2 = .00.
These results showed the participants’ initial self-esteem
did not differ between the experimental conditions.
Main analysis. We submitted the self-esteem scores to a 2
(time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: dis-
criminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 3
(threat-based justifications: symbolic vs. realistic vs. non-
justification) repeated measured factorial ANOVA in which
the two last variables were between-subject factors. The
results showed a reliable interaction between time and dis-
crimination, F(1, 110) = 8.27, p < .01, η2 = .07. As we pre-
dicted, self-esteem was less positive in T2 (M = 3.96, SD =
0.51) than in T1 (M = 4.03, SD = 0.53) in the discrimination
condition, F(1, 110) = 5.64, p < .05, d = −0.44, whereas it
was marginally more positive in T2 (M = 3.95, SD = 0.55)
than in T1 (M = 3.90, SD = 0.51) in the nondiscrimination
condition, F(1, 110) = 2.82, p = .096, d = 0.31, see the last
row in Table 1. Significantly, these effects were qualified by
a reliable interaction between time, discrimination, and jus-
tifications, F(2, 110) = 3.56, p < .05, η2 = .06. As we can see
in Table 1, self-esteem was less positive in T2 than in T1 in
the discrimination condition when participants had no justi-
fication for their behavior, F(1, 110) = 12.60, p < .001,
d = −0.67. We found no change due to discrimination in self-
esteem when participants had either symbolic, F(1, 110) =
0.12, ns, d = –0.06, or realistic justifications for discrimina-
tion, F(1, 110) = 0.01, ns, d = 0.00. Thus, discrimination
reduced self-esteem when participants did not have a
5
Discrimination condition
T2 T1 T2
4.12 (0.54) 4.13 (0.49) 3.89 (0.48)
3.92 (0.60) 3.97 (0.50) 3.95 (0.43)
3.82 (0.48) 4.02 (0.60) 4.02 (0.65)
3.95 (0.55) 4.03 (0.53) 3.96 (0.53)
threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior.
None of the other main or interaction effects was reliable, Fs
< 1.25, ns, d < 0.28.
We further analyzed the three-way interaction from
another perspective to address an alternative possibility
according to which threat-based justifications depress self-
esteem overall, rather than buffering the discrimination effect.
Results indicated this was not the case. First, we found no
significant interaction between time and justification, F(2,
110) = 1.25, ns, η2 = .02. Second, there was no reliable change
in self-esteem in the nondiscrimination condition when par-
ticipants did not have a justification, F(1, 110) = 2.66,
ns, d = 0.30, or when they had symbolic, F(1, 110) = 0.36,
ns, d = 0.11, or realistic justifications for their behavior, F(1,
110) = 0.46, ns, d = 0.13. Finally, threat-based justifications
did not decrease self-esteem in T2 when participants discrim-
inated, F(2, 110) = 0.26, ns, d = 0.14, or when they did not
discriminate, F(2, 110) = 1.58, ns, d = 0.32.
We also analyzed the possibility that the effects obtained
were stronger for those individuals who initially had a higher
self-esteem, by performing an additional analysis in which
we submitted the self-esteem scores measured in the T2 to a
full factorial ANCOVA using the self-esteem measured in T1
as a covariate (see online supplementary material). Results
showed no reliable interactions involving the manipulations
and the self-esteem measured in T1, which means that
becoming aware of discrimination affects individuals to the
same extent, regardless of whether their previous self-esteem
was low or high.
Discussion
The pattern of results found in this study are consistent
with our prediction that the participants would express
less positive self-esteem after receiving feedback describ-
ing them as discriminatory individuals. The discrimina-
tion effect on decreasing self-esteem was completely
dissolved when individuals had a symbolic justification
for their behavior. Moreover, the current study also
showed that using the idea that immigration is a threat to
national economic and social resources as a reason for dis-
criminatory behavior plays the same ego-defensive role as
the idea that it is necessary to protect the country’s values,
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
customs, and traditions. It suggests that the mere accessi-
bility of one or another kind of threat perception might be
enough to allow individuals to maintain positive self-
esteem even after being confronted with the socially unde-
sirable aspects of their behavior, such as discriminatory
attitudes.
In sum, the results of the current study represent a robust
test for our hypothesis predicting that discrimination affects
self-esteem when individuals become aware of their discrim-
inatory behavior, employing the threat-based justification as
a means of protecting their self-esteem. According to our
rationale, discrimination affects self-esteem because it trig-
gers a conflict between the motivation to pursue the egalitar-
ian goals promoted by the antiprejudice norm and the
individuals’ consciousness that they have contravened it. So,
the threat-based justifications have the function of dissolving
the conflict and protecting the threatened self-concept. This
explanation suggests that the impact of discrimination on
self-concept depends on the individuals’ motivation to com-
mit to egalitarian goals. This possibility, however, was not
addressed in previous studies and will be the focus of analy-
sis in the next study.
Study 2
Study 1 showed that individuals have their self-esteem
affected when they are informed that they discriminated
against immigrants and that both realistic and symbolic
threat-based justifications buffer the discrimination effect
in self-esteem. Study 2 goes further by testing the hypoth-
esis that this effect occurs in more egalitarian individuals,
whereas for less egalitarian ones, discrimination should
affect the concern about their social image. To address
these ideas, we measured participants’ endorsement of
egalitarian values in this current study. According to
Schwartz (1992), values are trans-situational goals that
serve as guidelines in an individual’s life or social group. In
the recently refined theory of basic human values, Schwartz
et al. (2012) identified universalism-concern values as a
measure of the individual’s commitment to equality, jus-
tice, and protection for all people. According to our ratio-
nale, becoming aware of having discriminated against
immigrants should trigger different processes depending on
individuals’ endorsement of universalism-concern values.
Those who identify more with these type of values are more
likely to experience a decrease in their self-esteem when
they are accused of discrimination, whereas those who feel
little identified with these type of values are more likely to
be worried about the possibility of being disapproved of by
others and, so, should experience an increase in their con-
cern over their social image. However, because legitimiza-
tion plays a defensive role by protecting both personal
self-esteem and social image, discrimination should not
affect participants provided with symbolic and realistic
threat-based justifications for their behavior.
Method
Participants. Two hundred fifty undergraduates at Com-
plutense University of Madrid (66% women; M age = 20.48
years, SD = 2.41 years) voluntarily participated in this study.
Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), we estimated that this
sample size provided 95% of power to detect a small effect
size of d = 0.23.
Procedures and Design
The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, with the addi-
tion of the universalism-concern measure at T1 when the
participants also completed a self-esteem scale, a measure of
concern about their public image, and some questions about
attitudes toward immigrants. In the second phase (T2), they
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental condi-
tions according to a 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behav-
ior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) × 2 (threat-based
justifications vs. nonjustification) factorial design. The
manipulation carried out was similar to that used in our pre-
vious study, in which participants received fictitious feed-
back on how they had acted in Phase 1. However, because
Study 1 showed that both realistic and symbolic threats
equally nullified the effect of discrimination on participants’
self-esteem, in the current research, we combined these two
threats as the content of justification condition. Thus, partici-
pants read the following text about the reasons for their
behavior:
The analysis of your responses to stimuli 4, 5 and 6 indicate the
reasons for your behavior. Your answers were motivated by a
sincere concern for the socio-economic situation and for the
values and culture of our country. Your attitudes reveal a reaction
to the threat posed by the presence of immigrant groups that could
increase unemployment in some sectors of our economy, thereby
weakening it and increasing crime rates in our country, besides
undermining our core values, culture and national traditions.
Measurements
Universalism-concern values. At T1, we first asked partici-
pants to respond to the three universalism-concern items of
the Schwartz et al. (2012) revised Portrait Values Question-
naire: “Here we briefly describe some people. Please read
each description and think about how much each person is
or is not like you” (1 = not like me at all, 6 = very much like
me). The three items are as follows (α = .79): “Protecting
society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to
him[her]”; “He[she] thinks it is important that every person
in the world have equal opportunities in life”; “He[she]
thinks wants everyone to be treated justly, even people
he[she] don’t know.”
Self-esteem. As in our previous study, we used the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale that showed adequate internal consistence
Pereira et al.
Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Self-Esteem in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1) and After (T2)
Discriminating or Nondiscriminating Feedback (Study 2).
Nondiscrimination condition
T1
No justifications 3.88 (0.69)
Justification 4.00 (0.68)
Total 3.94 (0.68)
both in T1 (α = .84) and T2 (α = .87) and a very strong test–
retest reliability (rT1–T2 = .88, p < .001).
Social image. Aiming to explore participants’ concern about
their public image, we asked them to indicate the extent to
which (1 = strongly disagreement to 5 = strongly agreement)
they agreed with two items taken from the social self-esteem
scale of Heatherton and Polivy (1991): “I am worried about
whether I am regarded as a success or failure”; “I am wor-
ried about what other people think of me.” The participants’
answers to these two items are positively correlated (r = .45,
p < .001 in T1; r = .59, p < .001 in T2) and, so, we aggregate
them in a measure of concern about their social image,
which has a very strong test–retest reliability (rT1–T2 = .86,
p < .001).
Manipulation checks. We asked participants to rate the extent
to which the feedback they received had showed they were
a person “that discriminates against immigrants” (1 = non-
discriminator, 4 = discriminator) and we found this percep-
tion to be higher in the discrimination condition (M = 3.26,
SD = 0.92) than in the nondiscrimination condition (M =
1.40, SD = 0.73), F(1, 246) = 335.20, p < .001, d = 2.26. It
was also higher in the threat (M = 2.45, SD = 1.25) than in
the nonthreat condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.23), F(1, 246) =
12.71, p < .001, d = 0.29. Despite this difference, the per-
ceived discrimination did not exceed the midpoint of the
scale, t(125) = −0.43, ns. Importantly, there was no reliable
interaction between discrimination and threat, F(1, 246) =
0.05, ns, η2 = .00. We also asked the participants to rate two
additional items in which they have to indicate how much (1
= not at all, 4 = very much) the feedback described them as
“a person concerned with our values, culture and national
traditions” (symbolic threat) and “a person who cares about
the unemployment situation in our country, as well as its
economic situation and criminality” (realistic threat). For
symbolic and realistic items, scores were higher in the
threat-based justification condition (M = 3.36, SD = 0.73; M
= 3.25, SD = 0.74) than in the control condition (M = 2.50,
SD = 0.82; M = 2.63, SD = 0.85), F(1, 246) = 75.77, p <
.001, d = 1.10, and F(1, 246) = 38.08, p < .001, d = 0.78,
respectively. There were no reliable main or interaction
effects involving discrimination for symbolic or realistic
threat perceptions, F(1, 246) < 1, ns, η2 = .00. Thus, both
7
Discrimination condition
T2 T1 T2
3.96 (0.73) 3.95 (0.58) 3.81 (0.60)
3.99 (0.71) 3.94 (0.67) 3.92 (0.63)
3.97 (0.72) 3.95 (0.63) 3.87 (0.62)
discrimination and threat-based justification manipulation
worked successfully.
Results
Preliminary analysis. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics
for self-esteem and for social image measured in T1 and T2
in each experimental condition. For each dependent variable,
we analyzed the score obtained in T1 using a 2 (discrimina-
tory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior feedback) × 2
(threat-based justification vs. control) between-subject facto-
rial ANOVA. The results showed that none of the main or
interaction effects was reliable for self-esteem or for social
image: Fs(1, 246) < 1, ns, d < 0.07. These results showed the
participants’ initial self-esteem and social image as mea-
sured in T1 did not differ between the experimental condi-
tions. We then tested our prediction, first for self-esteem and
then for participants’ concerns with their social image.
Self-esteem. A repeated measured factorial ANOVA showed
a reliable interaction between time and discrimination, F(1,
246) = 7.42, p < .01, η2 = .03. Self-esteem was less positive
in T2 (M = 3.87, SD = 0.62) than in T1 (M = 3.94, SD = 0.66)
in the discrimination condition, F(1, 246) = 7.43, p < .01, d =
−0.34, whereas there was no change in participants’ self-
esteem in the nondiscrimination condition (MT2 = 3.97, SD =
0.72 vs. MT2 = 3.94, SD = 0.68), F(1, 246) = 1.21, ns, d =
0.14. This influence of discrimination was qualified by a reli-
able three-way interaction between time, discrimination, and
justifications, F(1, 246) = 6.98, p < .01, η2 = .03. As we can
see in Table 2, self-esteem was less positive in T2 than in T1
in the discrimination condition when participants had no
threat-based justification for their behavior, F(1, 246) =
12.44, p < .001, d = −0.45, whereas discrimination did not
influence self-esteem in the justification condition, F(1, 246)
= 0.13, ns, d = −0.04. None of the other main or interaction
effects was reliable, Fs < 1.42, ns, d < 0.15. Thus, discrimi-
nation affected participants’ self-esteem only when they did
not have a threat-based justification for their discriminatory
behavior.
We also analyzed whether the threat-based justifica-
tions depress self-esteem rather than buffer the discrimina-
tion effect. As in Study 1, it was not the case because there
was no reliable interaction between time and justifications,
8 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Figure 1. Self-esteem as a function of discrimination and threat-based justification (Study 2) in participants with low and high
universalism-concern values.
F(1, 246) = 0.27, ns, η2 = 0.00, indicating that changes in
self-esteem between T1 and T2 were not caused by threat-
based justifications. In addition, we found no change in
self-esteem in the nondiscrimination condition when par-
ticipants did not have a threat-based justification, F(1,
246) = 3.30, ns, d = 0.23, or when they had a justification,
F(1, 246) = 0.09, ns, d = 0.04. Moreover, threat-based jus-
tification did not decrease self-esteem in T2 neither when
participants discriminated, F(1, 246) = 0.82, ns, d = 0.01,
nor when they did not, F(1, 246) = 0.06, ns, d = 0.00.
We also analyzed whether the decrease in self-esteem
buffered by threat-based justification was due to individuals’
self-esteem scores in T1. We then submitted the self-esteem
scores in T2 to a factorial ANCOVA using the self-esteem
measured in T1 as a covariate (see online supplementary
material). Replicating Study 1, there were no reliable interac-
tions between discrimination and the self-esteem measured
in T1, indicating that the effects were not driven by the self-
esteem score in T1.
The role played by participants’ values in self-esteem. The
current study proposed a further hypothesis predicting that
being accused of discrimination should affect, in particular,
individuals who are more motivated to pursuit egalitarian
goals, such as those who endorse universalism-concern val-
ues more strongly. To test this prediction, we submitted, in each
threat-based justification condition, the self-esteem scores to a
2 (time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: dis-
criminatory behavior vs. nondiscriminatory behavior) repeated
measured factorial ANCOVA with universalism concern as
covariates.
In the threat-based condition (see Figure 1b), we found no
reliable main or interaction effects involving time, discrimi-
nation, or universalism-concern values, F(1, 122) < 1, ns,
d = 0.00. In fact, self-esteem of participants with high (+1SD
from universalism-concern mean) or low (–1SD from univer-
salism-concern mean) endorsement of universalism-concern
values was not affected by discrimination when they had a
threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior.
Pereira et al.
Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Concern About Social Image in Each Experimental Condition Before (T1)
and After (T2) Discriminating or Nondiscriminating Feedback (Study 2).
Nondiscrimination condition
T1
No justifications 2.98 (1.09)
Justification 2.95 (1.00)
Total 2.96 (1.04)
Nevertheless, in the non–threat-based condition (see
Figure 1a), we found a three-way interaction between time,
discrimination, and universalism-concern values, F(1, 120)
= 3.19, p = .07, η2 = .03. In participants with a high endorse-
ment of universalism-concern values (+1SD from the mean),
self-esteem was less positive in T2 (point estimated = 3.91,
SE = 0.13) than in T1 (point estimated = 4.17, SE = 0.12) in
the discrimination condition, F(1, 120) = 15.10, p < .001, d =
−0.70, whereas there was no difference in participants’ self-
esteem between T2 (point estimated = 4.05, SE = 0.12) and
T1 (point estimated = 3.96, SE = 0.12) in the nondiscrimina-
tion condition, F(1, 120) = 2.02, ns, d = 0.20. Importantly, in
participants with low endorsement of universalism-concern
values (–1SD from the mean), however, there was no change
in their self-esteem when they were accused of discrimina-
tion, F(1, 120) = 0.83, ns, d = 0.00, or when they were not
accused, F(1, 120) = 0.53, ns, d = 0.00. This pattern of results
indicates that being accused of discrimination affects self-
esteem only in participants who more strongly endorsed
universalism-concern values.
Social image. As we predicted, participants’ concern about
their social image was stronger in T2 than in T1 after receiv-
ing feedback describing them as discriminators without a
threat-based justification (see Table 3, F(1, 246) = 4.78, p <
.05, d = 0.28). However, the participants’ social image was
not influenced by discrimination when they received a justi-
fication, F(1, 246) = 0.13, ns, d = −0.04. Furthermore, there
was no change in social image in the nondiscrimination con-
dition when participants did not have a threat-based justifica-
tion, F(1, 246) = 0.05, ns, d = 0.03, or when they had a
justification, F(1, 246) = 0.01, ns, d = 0.00. Despite this pat-
tern of results being in accordance with our prediction dem-
onstrating that discrimination affected participants’ concern
about their social image only when they did not have a
threat-based justification for their discriminatory behavior,
we found no reliable main or interaction effect of time, dis-
crimination, and threat-based justification, F(1, 246) < 1.95,
ns, d < 0.18.
The role played by participants’ values in social image. We sub-
mitted the social image scores to a 2 (time of measurement:
T1 vs. T2) × 2 (discrimination: discriminatory behavior vs.
nondiscriminatory behavior) repeated measured factorial
9
Discrimination condition
T2 T1 T2
2.96 (1.15) 3.00 (0.95) 3.15 (1.00)
2.95 (1.09) 2.85 (1.00) 2.82 (1.09)
2.95 (1.11) 2.93 (1.01) 2.99 (1.05)
ANCOVA with universalism concern as covariates within
each justification condition. In the threat-based condition
(see Figure 2b), we found no reliable main or interaction
effects involving time, discrimination, or universalism-con-
cern values, F(1, 122) < 1, ns, d = 0.00, which indicates that
social image of participants with high or low universalism-
concern values was not affected by discrimination when
they had a threat-based justification for their discriminatory
behavior.
However, in the non–threat-based condition (see Figure 2a),
we found a three-way interaction between time, discrim-
ination, and universalism-concern values, F(1, 120) = 4.94,
p = .01, η2 = .04. The participants with a lower endorsement
of universalism-concern values expressed more concern
about their social image in T2 (point estimated = 3.20, SE =
0.18) than in T1 (point estimated = 3.00, SE = 0.17) in the
discrimination condition, F(1, 120) = 5.39, p < .05, d = 0.41.
In the no-discrimination condition, the participants tended to
express lesser concern about their social image in T2 (point
estimated = 3.08, SE = 0.22) than in T1 (point estimated =
3.28, SE = 0.21), F(1, 120) = 3.53, p = .06, d = 0.35.
In participants with a higher endorsement of universal-
ism-concern values, however, there was no change in their
social image concern when they were accused of discrimina-
tion, F(1, 120) = 0.97, ns, d = 0.00, or when they were not
accused, F(1, 120) = 2.00, ns, d = 0.20. This pattern of results
indicates that being accused of discrimination affects con-
cern about social image only in participants who endorsed
universalism-concern values less strongly.
Discussion
The pattern of results found in this study replicates the previ-
ous ones, in that the participants expressed less positive self-
esteem after they received feedback describing them as
discriminatory individuals. These results go further by dem-
onstrating that only individuals more motivated to pursue
egalitarian goals, as measured by universalism-concern val-
ues (Schwartz et al., 2012), showed less positive self-esteem
after receiving feedback describing their behavior as dis-
criminatory. Importantly, this effect occurred only when the
participants did not have a threat-based justification for their
behavior. For individuals less motivated to commit to egali-
tarian goals, the effect observed for those thought to have
10
Figure 2. Social image concern as a function of discrimination and threat-based justification (Study 2) in participants with low and high
universalism-concern values.
behaved in a discriminatory way was not on their self-esteem
but on their social image. And, this was only observed for
those with no justification for their behavior.
In sum, the current study follows the direction of our
hypothesis according to which not all individuals are affected
when being accused of discriminating. Only those who
endorse values that promote egalitarianism feel affected in
their self-esteem, just because acting in a discriminatory way
threatens their self-concept that they are fair and egalitarian.
Importantly, the mere accessibility of symbolic and realistic
threat perceptions allow these individuals to maintain posi-
tive self-esteem even after being confronted with the socially
undesirable aspects of their behavior, such as discriminatory
attitudes. Thus, perceiving outgroup members as a threat to
the ingroup’s prerogatives plays a defensive role in self-con-
cept of egalitarian individuals, nullifying any dissonance
between the image they have of themselves and the conse-
quences of their behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Small-Scale Meta-Analysis
We conducted a meta-analytic effect size for the influence of
discrimination on self-esteem in each justification condition
across the three studies (i.e., pilot study, Study 1, and Study 2).
We considered seven effect sizes, three being in the nonjusti-
fication conditions (one condition in each study) and four in
the justification conditions (one in the pilot, two in Study 1,
and one in Study 2). We used Cohen’s d as an indicator of
effect size and estimated meta-analytical effects with the
meta-regression command in the R Package Meta (Schwarzer,
2017). We obtained meta-analytical effects both with ran-
dom- and fixed-effects models by using the restricted maxi-
mum likelihood method of estimation. Figure 3 shows the
effect size in each condition with its respective confidence
interval, besides the estimated three meta-analytical effects.
The estimated overall meta-analytical Cohen’s d = −0.28,
confidence interval (CI) = [–0.52, –0.04], indicates that
Pereira et al.
Figure 3. Forest plot of meta-analytic results.
Note. TE = treatment effect; seTE = standard error of the treatment effect; CI = confidence interval.
discrimination effectively decreased participants’ self-esteem
across conditions. The reliable heterogeneity in the random
effect model (tau2 = 0.0694, p < .01) indicates that the esti-
mated effect size is not constant, which means that it varies
between experimental conditions. In fact, the meta-analytical
Cohen’s d of –0.58, CI = [–0.80, –0.35], in the nonjustifica-
tion conditions is reliably different from zero, but it is not in
the threat-based justification conditions, d = −0.03, CI = [–0.20,
0.14]. This means that discrimination consistently decreased
participants’ self-esteem when they were not provided with
justification for their behaviors, and that discrimination did
not affect self-esteem in the conditions where the participants
received feedback with threat-based justifications for their
discriminatory actions. Therefore, this set of results repre-
sents robust evidence for our proposal that becoming aware
of one’s discriminatory behavior toward immigrants nega-
tively affects self-esteem when there is no justification for
discrimination.
General Discussion
Across three experiments and a meta-analytical summary of
results, we provided a systematic investigation about the role
played by threat-based justifications in protecting the self-
esteem of individuals accused of discrimination against
immigrants. In the pilot study, the participants expressed less
positive self-esteem when they received feedback indicating
that they had acted in a discriminatory way. By using a test–
posttest design, Study 1 not only replicated this effect but
also showed that individuals experienced a decrease in their
self-esteem after being accused of discrimination. Study 2
reinforced the evidence for this effect and went further by
11
demonstrating that only in more egalitarian individuals is
their self-esteem affected after receiving feedback describing
their behavior as discriminatory, whereas less egalitarian
participants experienced an increase in the concern about
their social image. This phenomenon occurs because of two
main reasons. First, during the last half of the century, the
majority of individuals living in democratic societies learned
a norm prescribing that good people are egalitarian and non-
discriminatory. Consequently, acting in a discriminatory way
entails negative psychological consequences that affect indi-
viduals’ self-evaluation. Accordingly, more egalitarian indi-
viduals experience a value-based motivational conflict
between the values that underpin unjust and prejudiced dis-
criminatory behavior and the egalitarian values that support
the antiprejudice norm. In fact, previous research has demon-
strated that these values are the motivational basis for indi-
viduals to control prejudiced attitudes (Plant & Devine,
1998) and any failure to control them leads to guilt and
shame (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993). Second, even
nonegalitarian individuals are affected by the antidiscrimina-
tion norm, but it occurs due to external reasons. Because they
do not have an internal motivation to eliminate prejudiced
attitudes and promote justice and equality, they only need to
preserve a social image that adapts to social norms in the
expression of prejudice (see Crandall et al., 2002).
Importantly, in each of the experiments, the influence of
discrimination on self-esteem (and on individuals’ concern
about their social image in Study 2) occurred when the par-
ticipants had no threat-based justifications for their supposed
discriminatory behavior. Discrimination had no effect when
the participants were led to believe that their actions were
motivated by a symbolic or realistic (Study 1) or by a
12
combination of symbolic and realistic (Study 2) threat-based
justification. This defensive effect of threat-based justifica-
tions is due to a well-documented role played by justifications
in the legitimation of social inequality (Costa-Lopes et al.,
2013; Jost & Major, 2001). In fact, a justified act of discrimi-
nation allows individuals to maintain their positive self-
esteem because legitimacy protects their personal and social
image of fair and unprejudiced individuals. It is the defen-
sive role of threat-based justifications that maintains the self-
esteem of more egalitarian individuals and protects the social
image of less egalitarian ones.
Theoretical Implications
This work provides new theoretical information about the
role played by legitimization in the discrimination against
minority groups. Research into contemporary prejudice and
discrimination has been based on a widely accepted assump-
tion that individuals need to justify discrimination to avoid
any feelings that might threaten their self-concept as unprej-
udiced and egalitarian people (see Crandall & Eshleman,
2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Lima-Nunes, Pereira, &
Correia, 2013; Vala, Pereira, Lima, & Leyens, 2012). The
current set of experiments directly addressed this assumption
by demonstrating that individuals evaluate themselves in a
less positive way when they become aware of their discrimi-
natory behavior. Importantly, the results showed that this
phenomenon occurs only when individuals do not have a
threat-based justification for their behavior. In fact, the self-
esteem of participants who had symbolic or realistic justifi-
cations for their behavior did not change after they were
informed that they had acted in a discriminatory way. Thus,
engaging in a legitimating process of discrimination is an
ego-defensive strategy used by individuals to maintain posi-
tive evaluations of their self-concept, especially for those
who are motivated to pursue egalitarian goals.
The current studies also serve to combine different theo-
ries of discrimination in democratic societies that have dis-
seminated egalitarian values. First, it supports theories
concerning the contemporary expression of prejudice
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), especially with regard to the
role played by legitimization in helping individuals to dis-
criminate without being personally and socially sanctioned.
Second, the results are in accordance with the predictions
derived from theorizing and research on the legitimacy of
social inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which proposes that
individuals are pressured by the antidiscrimination norm to
control prejudiced attitudes, and so use justifying factors to
prevent their actions from being perceived as discriminatory
(Lima-Nunes et al., 2013). Third, the results are consistent
with recent research into the redefining of symbolic and real-
istic threat perceptions, not only as a key variable in predict-
ing intergroup behavior (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002) but also
as legitimizing factors for discrimination against outgroups
(Bahns, 2017; Pereira et al., 2010). In fact, current research
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
has shown that threat perceptions legitimate discrimination
by buffering the negative effects of socially undesirable
behavior on the self-esteem of perpetrators of discriminatory
behavior. Finally, the Study 2 pattern of results represents the
first explanation of why nonegalitarian individuals also need
to legitimate discrimination. They are motivated by external
sources of control over prejudice and discrimination, which
is relevant to the literature on internal and external motiva-
tions to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).
Finally, our work also offers additional meaning to the
discussions about the psychological consequences of legiti-
macy (e.g., Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; Jost & Major, 2001;
Tyler, 2010). Demonstrating that legitimacy plays an ego-
defensive role in intergroup discrimination is important in
understanding the psychological condition that allows indi-
viduals to accept their blatant discrimination without suffer-
ing any negative feelings associated with it. In fact, if
individuals are not psychologically affected by their damag-
ing behavior against minority groups, they might believe that
it is not necessary to change any aspect of their behavior,
making it more difficult to confront discrimination effec-
tively. Indeed, one of the most important functions of legiti-
mization is to support the maintenance of the status quo (Jost
& Banaji, 1994), the first step of which involves not produc-
ing motivations for change, as revealed by the fact that par-
ticipants’ self-esteem is unaffected when discrimination is
justified. In the domain of discriminatory behavior, this func-
tion helps individuals to discriminate against minority groups
despite social norms and laws prohibiting this behavior.
Limitations and Further Directions
There is more work to be done to fully understand the role
played by threat-based justification on legitimacy of preju-
diced attitudes and behaviors. The current research program
only focused on deliberative effect of discrimination on
individuals’ self-esteem. We do not know yet what would
occur with individuals’ implicit self-esteem; also, we do not
know how threat-based justifications affect at an implicit
level. For instance, calling individuals implicitly racist can
result in more, not less, automatic intergroup bias (Frantz,
Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004) because of implicit self-
esteem compensation (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007).
It is possible that implicit self-esteem increases even when
explicit self-esteem decreases when the individual’s self-
concept is under threat. The current research introduces a
new aspect in the study of self-esteem that is the role played
by symbolic and realistic threat-based justifications as
important regulators of the negative affect that occurs due to
a breach of normative prescriptions. It is important to
develop the study of the ego-defensive roles that are played
by these justifications in implicit self-esteem and its regula-
tory function of intergroup attitudes. It would also be useful
for future research to include a control group in which the
participants did not have information about their attitudes
Pereira et al.
toward immigrants. Furthermore, it would be highly benefi-
cial for research such as this to be done with other groups
than immigrants. Finally, our studies were circumscribed to
undergraduate students at the same university, which pre-
cludes generalization into other socially relevant contexts.
Despite these limitations, the phenomenon reported in
this work helps to open up new research possibilities that
aim not only to increase understanding of the psychologi-
cal consequences of discrimination but also, more gener-
ally, to enhance knowledge of how individuals manage the
conflict between the need for distinctiveness that moti-
vates them to show ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner,
1979) and the antiprejudice values that motivate them not
to discriminate (Lima-Nunes et al., 2013). In fact, the
results demonstrated that merely being exposed to a justi-
fication for past negative behavior helps individuals to
maintain a meaningful sense of themselves as worthwhile
and fair individuals, as reflected by their ability to main-
tain a positive self-image.
Acknowledgment
The authors thank Chris Crandall and three anonymous reviewers
for their insightful comments that greatly contributed to improving
this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
work was supported by a grant from the Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia (PTDC/PSI-PSO/114159/2009).
Supplemental Material
Supplementary material is available online with this article.
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