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Preparation for negotiation Issue and process
Fells, Ray. Personnel Review 25.2 (1996): 50-60.

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Abstract
The task of preparing for negotiation, making the distinction between preparation for handling
the issue and giving consideration to the process itself, is examined. Data from 28
negotiation simulations suggest that negotiators will tend to take a position-based approach
on the issue, but at the same time will try and establish orderly if not cooperative forms of
interaction. Some practical implications are discussed, the principal one being that more
attention could usefully be given to behavioral aspects of the process rather than
concentrating on issue-based strategies when preparing for a negotiation.
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Full Text
Ray Fells: University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Western Australia
The importance of preparation
Most practitioners and writers on negotiation would agree that "the foundation for success in
negotiating is the planning that takes place prior to the actual interaction process"[1, p. 127]
(an article in a business magazine goes so far as to describe negotiation as "a contest of
preparation"[2]). Much of the written advice on negotiation preparation and planning is
prescriptive (e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6]), typically presenting an all-embracing checklist of key points.
While this is a device which is attractive to an audience wanting guaranteed solutions
presented in a simple format, it is one which can fail to offer clear direction. In contrast to the
confidence of the prescriptive writing, the academic research on the subject is being
"conducted in a fragmented and descriptive manner" and has still to provide a full
understanding of the critical role played by planning in the negotiation process[7, p. 38]. If
this is so, what guidance can be given to negotiators having to plan for a forthcoming
negotiation?
In order to develop a framework for exploring the issue of preparation, it is possible to draw
on the distinction which is commonly made about negotiation itself. This distinction is that
negotiation either is distributive and competitive in character, with win-lose outcomes, or is an
integrative, problem-solving process leading to win-win results. In a similar manner, it is
possible to identify two broad approaches to preparation - one approach revolves around the
establishment of positions with which to enter the negotiation, the other emphasizes the
development of principles against which outcomes can be judged. Comprehensive reviews of
preparation such as Lewicki et al.[1] suggest incorporating both, but they are contrasting
approaches and it is instructive to explore the balance of emphasis within negotiators'
preparation activities.
Such an exploration was undertaken through an examination of how negotiators prepared for
a simulated negotiation exercise. One of the findings was that although the negotiators
tended to give close consideration to what they might achieve, they tended not to give
consideration to how they might achieve it. This gives rise to a second distinction with regard
to preparation, that is preparation for the process of negotiation rather than simply with
regard to the issue. In order to explore this aspect further, a further round of negotiation
exercises was conducted with the participants being asked specifically about their process
preparation.
The findings are presented later in the paper. They are only preliminary and point the way for
further examination of precise aspects of preparation but they do indicate the breadth of
preparation activities which might be needed for effective negotiation.
Preparation for the issue
As indicated above, there are two broad approaches, one which focuses on establishing a
position, the other which emphasizes the development of principles. These two approaches
will be described in turn.
The position approach to negotiation
A commonly recommended approach to preparation is that of establishing a negotiating
position which has two elements, a minimum or resistance point and an objective or target
point (see, for example, [8, 9]). The difference between these two points gives the negotiator
room to move and the relationship between the resistance and target points of the two sides
sets the scope of the bargain.
Setting the resistance point is often viewed as central to a party's planning strategy and
tactics[10]. The resistance point is the minimum outcome to be achieved through the
negotiation; it is the point at which a negotiator would walk away rather than continue to
negotiate and end up agreeing to less. This way of looking at the lower limits of a bargaining
range is inherent in the Fisher and Ury[11] notion of best alternative to a negotiated
agreement (BATNA). The suggestion is that prior to embarking on negotiations a negotiator
should consider what alternatives might be feasible should bargaining fail; the best of these
alternatives will help determine the resistance point.
The positioning of the resistance point also has to take account of the other party's expected
position on the issue because if a resistance point is too high (that is, it is more than the other
party will ever be willing to offer) then the bottom-line positions of the two parties are
incompatible. However, this does not mean that the negotiations will necessarily fail.
Douglas[12, p. 73] quotes the observation of a mediator that "in negotiations your committee
is usually standing on sand, not rock". A minimum position which is firm prior to the
negotiation may quickly be abandoned for a lower (or on occasions, higher) resistance point
as the negotiator's reading of the situation changes following an encounter with the other
party.
The target point represents the best possible outcome that may reasonably be expected and
could be an important anchor for negotiators[13, p. 385]. Setting the appropriate target is
important. Too high a target gives rise to a greater propensity to deadlock but, in accordance
with the predictions of goal-setting theory, higher targets lead to higher outcomes[14].
However, the notion of target points has received less attention than the impact of the
minimum position. To a degree, this reflects the realities of negotiation in that although the
parties might start out arguing for what they want to get, the focus of attention increasingly
turns to what they are able to get as the negotiations progress.
A principled approach to negotiation
In contrast to the position approach which is inherently distributive, a principled approach to
negotiation is viewed as one which avoids conflict and provides the basis for the
development of integrative solutions. Fisher and Ury[11] developed the approach when they
proposed "principled negotiation" or "negotiation on the merits". They exhort negotiators to
separate people problems from the issues; focus on underlying interests, not stated
positions; and generate options for mutual gain and insist on objective criteria for measuring
outcomes. These four basic propositions apply during analysis and planning of a negotiation
as well as during actual discussions. It is therefore necessary to prepare in terms of interests
and not enter the negotiation with a fixed position.
An "interest" is a fundamental need or requirement which is driving the negotiator's
behaviour. Positions emerge out of interests; interests sit behind any negotiating position but
they may not be obvious. The interests approach advocated by Fisher and Ury[11] and by
others of the Harvard research group such as Lax and Sebenius[15] starts from the point that
if negotiators initially focus on positions then they quickly get locked into those positions. The
negotiations stall and get turned into a win-lose situation; conflict levels rise and this inhibits
the finding of solutions. Alternatively, by focusing on finding objective principles, negotiators
will enable mutually beneficial outcomes to be achieved. Even when negotiators enter
discussions with a "fixed pie" assumption there is a learning process within the negotiation
itself, which enables negotiators to find integrative solutions[16]. Arguably, then, if negotiators
give consideration to objective principles prior to the negotiation, this would assist in that
learning process.
In their study of diplomacy, Zartman and Berman[17] found that negotiators tend to negotiate
first at the level of principle in order to set up the basic framework of an agreement and then
move into a level of detail to work out the final settlement. This suggests that the notion of
objectivity, which is central to the principled approach, comes under scrutiny and that
"objective'' principles are also negotiable.
As noted above, negotiators' best alternative or BATNA is a factor which could be taken into
account when establishing the resistance point. It is also an integral part of Fisher and
Ury's[11] approach to principled negotiation, enabling the negotiator to judge whether to
abandon the negotiation. Also, when considering the antecedents of good integrative
bargaining, Pruitt and Carnevale[18, p. 169] suggest that "high aspirations provide a
challenge to the parties, stretching creativity to the limits of the integrative potential". It could
be argued that a combination of a BATNA and an aspiration is not so very different from a
minimum position and an objective. The distinction would lie in that the BATNA is an
alternative to negotiation and an aspiration is less concrete, in terms of its means of
achievement, than an objective. A worker may aspire to more income and make that interest
known; a position would be a claim for a higher hourly rate, which would rule out other ways
of meeting the aspiration, such as a bonus scheme.
Outline of the negotiation simulation
The negotiation task involved four participants taking the roles of managers who each had to
negotiate to obtain a salary increase for a member of their staff. The exercise replicated the
fundamental characteristics of negotiation, including negotiator interdependence and
opportunity for sequential interaction through the presentation of offers and proposals until
agreement is reached[10, p. 44; 19, pp. 6-18]. In the first round of 15 negotiations the amount
of money available for distribution was fixed and was at a level which would permit each
manager to obtain a 10 per cent increase for his/her staff member. It was, therefore, a zero
sum, variable pay-off game with a mutually prominent outcome. Other principled outcomes
were also possible, such as an equal money distribution and the context was such that the
fates of all were related, thus making a clear common interest that all should be
accommodated for their mutual benefit. However, in recognition that this scenario might be
so distributive in nature that it constrained the approach of the participants, the second round
of 13 negotiations included non-salary elements, which increased the potential for integrative
bargaining[18, 20].
There were no rules about the process of negotiation, except that if no agreement was
reached in 25 minutes then no staff member would receive an increase. (In the exercises, the
negotiations were allowed to go on for up to 30 minutes if agreement appeared imminent at
the 25-minute mark.)
The participants were all university graduate students in Master's programmes, typically part-
time students with practical work experience. All had received instruction on negotiation
strategy and behaviour, including both positional and principled approaches to the task of
reaching agreement and on the nature of the negotiation process. Data were collected by
means of questionnaires which asked them to reflect on various aspects of their preparation
and the negotiation itself. There were a total of 99 usable questionnaires.
Findings
A reliance on objectives and minimum positions
There was no significant difference in the results of the first and second rounds of
negotiations, and the results are combined. It was generally the practice for negotiators to
establish objectives and/or minimum positions as part of their preparation. Of the 99
participants, 62 set both an objective and a minimum position. In addition, nine participants
set the same figure as being both an objective and their minimum position. Arguably, an
objective which is also a minimum position (the "final offer first" strategy, or Boulwarism)
could most appropriately be classified as being a minimum position; but the participants
themselves tended not to see it that way. Fourteen participants established only a minimum
position, seven had only an objective and only seven entered the negotiation with neither an
objective nor a minimum position.
All but four of the 85 instances of minimum positions were stated in terms of a clear money
figure or percentage, and in this respect the minimum positions had a degree of firmness
about them. The non-minima objectives, however, were not always so explicit. In 44 (64 per
cent) of the 69 instances where a negotiator set an separate objective, that objective was
stated clearly, in money or percentage terms. In the remaining 29 (36 per cent) cases the
objectives were much more general, as in "to get $2,310 (i.e. the minimum) and some extra
amount", "greater than 10 per cent share" or a "substantial increase". Broad principles were
sometimes annunciated, particularly in terms of pay equity, although what "equity" would
mean was not defined. Given the general nature of some of the stated objectives, it would
appear that minimum positions take a more dominant place in preparation.
The participants' comments in respect of the usefulness of having objectives and minimum
positions when they negotiated suggest that having them did help. Having an objective
provided focus and a position around which to negotiate. It was felt that having both an
objective and a minimum helped in terms of setting the bargaining range and generally gave
structure to the negotiations. This worked in two ways: first, by providing the negotiator with a
benchmark against which to evaluate others' positions and proposals and, second, as a
means of indicating to others the scope of the negotiator's own position. This scope would
emerge as negotiators moved away from just stating their objectives and began to indicate
their lower acceptable positions.
It was suggested above that minimum positions seemed to be more dominant in the
preparation. Once the negotiations started, the minima again appeared to have the greater
impact. Basically, it was the reference point to be used to either reject or consider others'
proposals, as in "it allowed me to compare the moves of other parties relative to my position".
Having a minimum was felt to provide a base for arguments and frequently was seen as a
core position which could not be bargained. In addition, it was "a psychological comfort", "it
led to greater confidence and a belief that I would not get pushed into an agreement I would
regret".
The nature of the arguments and use of principles
Participants were given background information relating to the four staff members who were
the subject of the negotiation. This information allowed the negotiators to develop their case
and, in particular, draw on one of four reasons as justification - extra reward for extra value,
catch up for forgone pay rises, gender and comparability. Although each justification
favoured a particular staff member, they were not exclusive and could, with some
redefinition, be applied to other staff. All four self-interest justifications could be developed as
equity arguments by using differing definitions of equity, particularly through the use of
different points of reference. In addition, various higher-order principles could be adduced
from the scenario, such as the need for the company to continue to be profitable or,
commonly, "a fair and equitable settlement".
The negotiators appeared to have developed their cases to different levels of argument. First,
some negotiators made their case in terms of the individuals' specific circumstances - work
performance, date of last pay rise and so on. Second, in some instances this factual
information was presented in terms of a principle, such as equity or contribution to the
company. This use of a principle was generally self-interested along the lines of "we all make
a contribution - but the contribution of my person is the greatest". Third, issues such as
justice and equity were put forward as guiding principles without reference to individual
circumstances and without specific claims being made on behalf of the staff members.
Negotiators tended to use different arguments to support their respective minimum positions
and objectives. Hence the arguments used for what was being sought (the initial objective)
such as "extra reward for extra value" did not flow through to be the reason to justify the
minima; these tended to be "equal share" with equality defined in money or percentage
terms. Second, there was a lack of correlation between the arguments used and the specific
amounts set as negotiating objectives. Negotiators acting on behalf of the same staff
member could mount the same arguments but then ask for different amounts.
Process preparation
The participants in the first round of negotiation simulations did not give any indication that
they gave attention to how the negotiations might proceed in the way that they did to what
they might achieve. Although 29 (60 per cent) of them gave thought to how negotiations
should begin, this was either a strategic consideration such as whether to go first or not (as in
"to start first so that the negotiations would move where I wanted" and "let others go first so I
could counter-punch") or simply an intention to get the negotiations started through everyone
having a turn in an orderly, non-competitive manner. There seemed to be little or no
consideration of what might happen after that.
It was to explore this aspect further that the second round of 13 negotiation simulations was
conducted using a new group of similar students. (There are only 51 responses since one
negotiation had only three participants.) Those involved in this second round were asked a
series of open-ended questions about their preparation. These questions were necessarily
broad so as to avoid reflecting any particular perspective on the negotiation process, and
simply asked what preparation the participants had given to how the negotiations would start,
progress and end. In recognition of the fact that the negotiations might not run smoothly, two
further questions explored the extent to which the participants had given consideration to
deadlocks in the forthcoming negotiation.
In response to the question asking what preparation, if any, they did with respect to how the
negotiations might start, the most frequent expectation was that each negotiator should put
his/her case in turn (45 per cent of the 51 responses), an approach which would get the
negotiations off to an orderly start. Others (12 per cent) gave consideration as to how they
might establish a problem-solving approach in the group, which again reflects a desire for a
co-operative approach to the task of reaching an agreement. Eight participants (16 per cent)
indicated that they only gave consideration to presenting their own case (which does not, of
course, preclude the orderly approach), while three were explicitly competitive, as in the case
of one who decided to take the chair "to control direction and content". Eleven of the 51 (22
per cent) did not consider this aspect in their preparation. Nevertheless, the responses
suggest the conclusion that the intention of the negotiators in their planning was that the
process should be an orderly and open discussion, with an emphasis on problem solving; it
should be co-operative not competitive.
This conclusion (that the negotiators had an expectation of co-operative negotiation) is
reinforced by the answers to the second question which asked what preparation was done
with respect to how the negotiations might proceed. Twenty-three (45 per cent) envisaged
that the process would be co-operative, whereas only four (8 per cent) indicated they
expected the negotiations to be competitive. Again, nearly one-quarter of the participants did
not give any consideration to this aspect in their preparation, while the remaining responses
referred to how the issue should be handled rather than to the process.
The high expectation of co-operation meant that less thought was given to the prospect of
deadlocks and 21 (41 per cent) of the negotiators did not give consideration as to how a
deadlock might occur. The cause of deadlocks was seen exclusively as arising out of
intransigence of positions. (An alternative explanation would be that poor negotiation
behaviour or out-of-phase activity would give rise to a deadlock[21]). In contrast to those who
did not consider the prospect of deadlocks, some other respondents indicated that they went
so far as to consider how a deadlock might be avoided, typically by behavioural process-
oriented strategies such as "trying to avoid not listening to all negotiators", or "use lots of
we's" and "use suggestions to the group".
As would be expected, a number (25 per cent) did not consider how a deadlock might be
overcome[22]. The notion of strategic choice[23] suggests three issue-based strategies to
overcome a deadlock. The first is to contend and get the other to concede, the second
includes creating new options and the third is to make concessions. Given that the
participants viewed a deadlock in terms of intransigence, it is not surprising that of the 40
who did respond to this question, the largest group (48 per cent) expected the deadlock to be
overcome by one of the two concession-related strategies. One quarter of the respondents
considered that the deadlock might be overcome by integrative strategies. A similar number
(23 per cent) indicated that they viewed the task of overcoming any deadlock from a process-
related rather than issue-related perspective, suggesting strategies such as "to put the
difficulties of an issue to one side and just seeing where it leads to", "keeping communication
open and information exchange going", "changing the focus" or "clarifying the issues". While
these strategies will inevitably involve discussion of the issues, they do contrast with the view
which sees the resolution of differences principally through one or more parties giving
ground.
There was a wide range of comments in response to the question which asked if the
negotiators had prepared for how agreement might be finally reached. The only theme to
emerge (13 responses, 26 per cent) was that the participants expected the negotiations to
conclude and reach agreement by means of concession making.
Practical implications
This paper has sought to make a preliminary examination into the approaches which might
be taken when preparing for negotiation. It has made the distinction between preparing with
regard to the issue and preparing for the process itself. Two broad approaches to preparing
for the issue have been identified, one which tends towards being distributive in approach,
the other is oriented towards a problem-solving approach to negotiation. The experience of
negotiators in the simulated exercise suggests a reliance on the former. Arguably, this could
have been because the negotiating situation was fundamentally distributive but this, of itself,
did not preclude attempts being made to negotiate in a co-operative manner and, indeed,
prescriptions to encourage co-operative approaches to negotiation should have some
applicability to competitive situations if they are to be effective.
To the extent that the simulation represented a typical, inherently distributive negotiation, we
can infer that negotiators will tend to consider the situation in terms of their minimum position
and a target point or objective. This has several important practical implications with regard
to preparation, particularly for a negotiator who wants to pursue a co-operative, interest-
based approach in the negotiation. First, notwithstanding the negotiator's own preference for
an interest-based approach, he/she should anticipate that the other negotiator will enter the
negotiation with a positional approach and so should prepare for that eventuality. Second,
even where both parties are seeking to approach the negotiation through a co-operative
identification of interests, the negotiator should still give consideration to her/his own
minimum position and objective. In doing this, the negotiator should take note of the
tendency for the minima to be more concrete than the objective, and so should seek to give
more attention to clearly articulating, and anchoring with a firm justification, what might be
achieved. The minimum will become more salient as the negotiations progress but, before
that occurs, having a more concrete objective will give structure to the negotiations as well as
indicate firmness of aspiration.
Ury[24, pp. 84-5] suggests that the key point in changing from positional to problem-solving
negotiation is to reframe, to take whatever the other negotiator is saying and direct it against
the problem. Notwithstanding a negotiator's desire for a co-operative process, the tendency
to rely on positions might mean that attempts to find bridging principles or criteria around
which to structure a solution will be difficult and, in practice, could be influenced by self-
interest. This has a further practical implication, or perhaps rather a note of caution relating to
any attempt to introduce principles or criteria as a means of breaking out of a competitive
positional negotiation. Negotiators who attempt to do this should guard against the real
possibility that they are (perhaps inadvertently) advancing only those principles or criteria
which incline to favour their own case. As a result, the action may engender a degree of
skepticism from the other negotiator and so undermine the intention of establishing a more
co-operative
approach. That the other negotiator might be sceptical should not be a surprise because
some negotiators quite deliberately advance their case under the guise of a principle
approach by "dressing up" a position to look like something which is in everybody's interests.
Consequently any approach towards trying to introduce common principles or criteria should
be handled with caution. Essentially, the approach has to become a joint one, meaning that
any attempt to establish co-operative interaction has to become the subject of discussion and
negotiation itself as part of an exercise in building trust[25].
Having the parties address the issue of how to approach the negotiations before they start
would be preferable, but even this does not guarantee the actual course of the negotiations.
In the simulations the participants found that having minima and objectives helped them
during the negotiation. From this we can infer that even where negotiations are set up so as
to explore fundamental interests and objective criteria, the negotiators will nevertheless begin
to formulate what they want to get out of it and will tend towards positional bargaining in the
closing stages. This eventuality should be planned for, irrespective of the emphasis being
placed on achieving an agreement through principled negotiation.
This expectation of positional bargaining emerging towards the end of a negotiation finds
support from the overall approach taken by the participants in their preparation with regard to
the process[26]. Noting that on each aspect of process preparation approximately 25 per
cent of the respondents did not give it any consideration at all, there was a general
expectation that if deadlocks emerged it would be due to intransigence, and that they would
be overcome by concession making to reach agreement. However, to balance this, the
respondents also viewed the negotiations as going to be co-operative and they set out to
create an orderly consideration of each person's case. A significant number viewed the
process in behavioural rather than issue terms.
What the findings suggest is that negotiators should be aware of both the behavioural and
issue-related responses to situations which might emerge in a negotiation. For example, it
would generally be wise to consider the eventuality of a deadlock, no matter how much effort
is going to be put in to establish a co-operative framework for the negotiations. If a deadlock
emerges as a prospect then the preparation should consider not only the issue-related
strategies but also the process-related ones. Rather than only explore how to get or give a
concession, or seek new options, perhaps the first element of preparation in an emerging
deadlock situation should be to consider the process and what negotiation behaviours would
be appropriate by considering, for example, how to keep the dialogue going, tone down the
dogmatic statements or how can we clarify the situation and maintain an exchange of
information.
In conclusion, it is possible to make some general suggestions about how to handle aspects
of negotiation though preparation. Negotiators are going to have something to anchor on but
are going to anticipate the negotiations will be orderly and co-operative. But if the other
negotiator takes a positional approach from the outset, how will one respond? The situation
is not fatal, a positional approach does not necessarily lead to competitive or destructive
negotiation. Making sure that the start of the negotiations is orderly will be laying the base for
co-operative interaction even if the debate is over competitive positions. A second aspect of
preparation should be based on the anticipation that if negotiators are taking a positional
approach, then the positions may well harden into intransigence and so explicit consideration
should be given to behavioural strategies which might forestall a potential deadlock. It is also
prudent to prepare for the eventuality that a deadlock might emerge and how it might be
handled, not only in terms of issue-related strategies but also how the process of interaction
between the negotiators might be handled.
While the focus of preparation will inevitably be on the issues being negotiated, giving greater
and more specific attention to the process of how the agreement might be achieved will open
the way for a better management of the negotiation. This will enhance the effectiveness of
the interaction between the parties and enable them to achieve more than otherwise would
be possible.
Notes and references
1. Lewicki, R.J., Litterer, J.A., Minton, J.M. and Saunders, D.M., Negotiation, Richard D.
Irwin, Burr Ridge, IL, 1994.
2. Byrnes, J.F., "Ten guidelines for effective negotiating", Business Horizons, May-June
1987, pp. 7-12.
3. Fuller, G., The Negotiator's Handbook, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1991.
4. Leritz, L., No-Fault Negotiating, Warner, New York, NY, 1987.
5. Morrison, W.F., The Pre-Negotiation Planning Book, John Wiley &Sons, New York, NY,
1985.
6. Sperber, P., Fail-Safe Business Negotiating, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983.
7. Roloff, M.E. and Jordan, J.M., "The fruits and foibles of planning ahead", in Putnam, L.L.
and Roloff, M.E. (Eds), Communication and Negotiation, Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1992, pp.
21-45.
8. Rojot, J., Negotiation: From Theory to Practice, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991.
9. Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R.B., A Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotiations, McGraw-
Hill, New York, NY, 1965.
10. Lewicki, R.J. and Littler, J.A., Negotiation, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, IL, 1985.
11. Fisher, R. and Ury, W., Getting to Yes, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, MA, 1981.
12. Douglas, A., Industrial Peacemaking, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1962.
13. White, S.B. and Neale, M.A., "Reservation prices, resistance points and BATNAs:
determining the parameters of acceptable negotiated outcomes", Negotiation Journal, Vol. 7
No. 4, 1991, pp. 379-88.
14. Pruitt, D.G., Negotiation Behaviour, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1981.
15. Lax, D.A. and Sebenius, J.K., The Manager as Negotiator, Free Press, New York, NY,
1986.
16. Thompson, L. and Hastie, R., "Judgment tasks and biases in negotiation", in Sheppard,
B.H., Bazerman, M.H. and Lewicki, R.J. (Eds), Research on Negotiation in Organizations,
Vol. 2, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1990, pp. 31-54.
17. Zartman, I.W. and Berman, M.R., The Practical Negotiator, Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT, 1982.
18. Pruitt, D.G. and Carnevale, P.J., Negotiation in Social Conflict, Open University Press,
Buckingham, 1993.
19. Rubin, J.Z. and Brown, B.R., The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation,
Academic Press, New York, NY, 1975.
20. The difficulties associated with drawing conclusions from negotiation simulations are well
known, particularly that the one-off nature of an exercise reduces the inducement to further
co-operation which comes from an expectation of future co-operative interaction. Further, the
motivational orientations of the participants can be manipulated, typically to require each
negotiator to be interested in the other party achieving its outcomes, as in the dual-concern
model. The interesting question is the extent to which co-operative negotiation behaviour
emerges without these particular inducements, that is, the extent to which co-operation is
generated simply by the mixed motive nature of the negotiation process itself. The simulation
used in this research is a one-off, generally competitive situation which is the worst case as
far as the development of co-operative interaction is concerned. It is felt that this provided a
better test of how negotiators might react than in a situation which is constructed so as to
encourage co-operative approaches.
21. Fells, R.E., Movement, Phases and Deadlocks, Industrial Relations Research Monograph
No. 12, University of New South Wales, Kensington, 1986.
22. As this number is less than those who did not consider or think that a deadlock would
occur, it is possible that some respondents gave consideration to the issue in response to the
question itself, not actually as part of their preparation.
23. Pruitt, D.G., "Strategic choice in negotiation", American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 27 No.
2, pp. 167-94.
24. Ury, W., Getting Past No, Bantam, New York, NY, 1991.
25. Fells, R.E., "Developing trust in negotiation", Employee Relations, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 33-
45.
26. Preparation for a negotiation would be influenced by the circumstances of the case and
also by one's understanding of the essential nature of the process. Notwithstanding the
generally distributive nature of the negotiation simulation, the participants did not prepare as
if it was to be a competitive interaction. However, their reliance on positions suggests that
they were not anticipating the ideal-type problem-solving situation either. The participants
were not asked whether they were working to a particular model or understanding of the
negotiation process, but the findings do suggest that a broad phase model (see, for example,
Douglas[12]) might have underpinned their approach.
_______________________________________________________________
Indexing (details)

Subject Bargaining;Simulation;Studies;Contract negotiations

Classification 2600: Management science/operations research, 6300: Labor
relations, 9130: Experimental/theoretical
Title Preparation for negotiation Issue and process
Author Fells, Ray
Publication title Personnel Review
Volume 25
Issue 2
Pages 50-60
Number of pages 0
Publication year 1996
Publication date 1996
Year 1996
Publisher Farnborough
Publisher Emerald Group Publishing, Limited
Place of publication Farnborough
Country of publication United Kingdom
Journal subject Business And Economics--Management
ISSN 00483486
CODEN PRRVAQ
Source type Scholarly Journals
Language of publication English
Document type Feature
Subfile Studies, Bargaining, Contract negotiations, Simulation
ProQuest document ID 214804996
Document URL http://gateway.library.qut.edu.au/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/
docview/214804996?accountid=13380
Copyright Copyright MCB UP Limited (MCB) 1996
Last updated 2010-06-08
Database ProQuest Central

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