jour nal of

Articles
peace
R E S E A R C H

Journal of Peace Research

50(5) 545–561
War and famine, peace and light? ª The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permission:
The economic dynamics of conflict sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343313492991
in Somalia 1993–2009 jpr.sagepub.com

Anja Shortland
King’s College London
Katerina Christopoulou
Risk Management Solutions
Charalampos Makatsoris
Brunel University

Abstract
The literature on war economies argues that prolonged civil wars have an economic logic: certain groups may obtain
material gains from committing acts of violence and hence resist peacebuilding efforts. Objective tests of these pre-
dictions have so far been limited, as corruption and conflict prevent the collection of reliable economic data on the
ground. Remote sensing and Geographic Information Science techniques enable us to overcome these problems of
terrestrial data collection. Electricity consumption manifested as night-time light emissions recorded in satellite
images is proposed as a proxy for changes in disposable income in Somalia’s cities. The nightlight images provide
striking illustrations of economic decline and recovery and clearly show the contrast between the stable regions of
Northern Somalia and the chaos and anarchy of Southern Somalia. Based on geospatial analyses of settlement pat-
terns in Somali cities, we argue that specific metrics of light output can be used to proxy for the incomes of different
social groups. We use geo-coded conflict event data to analyze the economic impact of conflict on local light output
and therefore incomes. We find a significant peace dividend for poorer households located at the margins of cities,
which benefit both from local stability and more peaceful conditions in the country as a whole. By contrast, the cen-
tral business districts are relatively well insulated from the effects of local conflict, and violence in Mogadishu has
positive effects on light output from cities where humanitarian aid agencies are located. Future peace initiatives need
to confront these economic incentives for continued conflict and state failure in Somalia.

Keywords
aid, economic development, GIS, night-time lights, remote sensing, Somalia, war economy

Introduction consensual central governance have failed, either through

domestic ‘spoilers’ or through the intervention of neigh-
There is currently much political and academic interest
bouring countries (Menkhaus, 2007a, 2009). Questions
in Somalia. Addressing issues of governance in Somalia
are raised about the potentially counterproductive effects
is important for maritime security, for regional stability
of international intervention in Somalia. Eminent coun-
and to help millions of victims of periodic drought and
try experts argue that international actors may contribute
conflict. Considerable political and financial resources
have been invested by the international community to
resolve the civil conflict over the last two decades. How- Corresponding author:
ever, so far all attempts to bring about effective and Anja.Shortland@kcl.ac.uk
546
to the ‘war economy’ and (inadvertently) fund the con-
flict (Hansen, 2007; Hansen et al., 2012; Menkhaus,
2009). To design more effective interventions we need
evidence on how the Somali war economy operates.
The literature on ‘war economies’ argues that in some
countries war is not a temporary breakdown, but a sus-
tainable, alternative form of social order. The absence
of central government creates economic opportunities
for some groups, which have no interest in bringing the
conflict to an end (Duffield, 1998). Conflict can there-
fore become entrenched as ‘economics by other means’
(Keen, 1998). The simplest form of the ‘war economy’
is banditry and looting. In more advanced war econo-
mies armed groups provide ‘protection’ for (legal and illi-
cit) businesses, tax production, trade and financial flows
and manipulate and divert humanitarian and develop-
ment aid. Warlords provide government functions in
so-called ‘shadow states’ (Reno, 1998, 1999). Violence
is an integral part of the war economy as elites use it to
extract, contest and redistribute economic rents and
attract and divert humanitarian aid.
The literature on war economies is based on detailed
case studies and generates clear testable implications for
the economic dynamics of conflict. However, because
of the absence of regular and reliable data collection, the
economic dynamics of civil war have not yet been statis-
tically explored. In this article we use remote sensing and
geographic information science techniques to recover the
economic history of Somalia’s cities during the civil war
from the archives of images of night-time light emissions.
This allows us to test key hypotheses of the ‘war econo-
mies’ literature with economic data that are not manipu-
lated by any of the conflict parties. Night-time light
emissions have been shown to be an excellent proxy for
income especially in statistically underdeveloped and
corrupt countries (Chen & Nordhaus, 2011; Hender-
son, Storeygard & Weil, 2011). We present striking
images of the patterns of economic decline and recovery
across Somalia from 1993 to 2008, indicating the effec-
tiveness of informal governance in supporting local eco-
nomic development as well as the costs of high intensity
conflict.
We create proxies for changes in income for different
social groups by looking at changes in the intensity of light
use among those already using electricity and changes in
access to electricity at the cities’ margins. We show how
these correlate with exogenous economic shocks and var-
iations in local and overall conflict intensity derived from
the EDACS geo-coded conflict event data on Somalia.
Finally, we statistically explore the economic dynamics
of the Somali conflict in a multivariate statistical model.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)
We show that the rich are relatively well insulated
from the economic costs of violence, whereas the poor
experience significant peace dividends. Conflict outside
a city may even bring local benefits, either through
diverting investment from more violent areas or through
triggering international aid flows. Changes in light emis-
sions from Somalia therefore provide evidence for the
existence of a profitable war economy. This may explain
the apathy and occasional resistance from political and
business elites to previous international efforts to resolve
state failure in Somalia.
The article is structured as follows: in the second sec-
tion we review the literature on war economies and
derive our hypotheses. In the third section we review the
nightlights literature, introduce our method and data
and present visual images of the economic history of
Somalia’s cities. In the fourth section we show correla-
tions between nightlight emissions, conflict and exogen-
ous economic shocks, providing preliminary evidence of
the validity of the income proxies and the war economy
hypotheses. We then present the results of a full multi-
variate econometric model. The fifth section concludes.
Literature on war economies
Intractable civil wars contradict the idea that war repre-
sents a means to a political end. In some countries vio-
lence is prolonged by a proliferation of actors or
organizations who gain wealth and status in the absence
of a central government enforcing law and order (Duf-
field, 1998; Keen, 1998). Violent entrepreneurship can
take various forms: the looting of resources, extortion,
kidnapping for ransom, the provision of ‘private security
services’ (if only to guarantee protection from the provi-
der’s own henchmen), the ‘taxation’ of trade, produc-
tion and financial flows and the diversion of aid. War
can thus be a rational economic activity (Berdal & Keen,
1997; Collier, 2000) and ‘postmodern conflicts’ can be
viewed as alternative forms of social order. Warlords or
insurgent movements provide (limited) government
functions in specific territories – so called ‘shadow
states’ – and spend significant resources to keep central
government and other challengers at bay (Duffield,
1998; Reno, 1999).
Theories of war economies are highly relevant to (and
sometimes based on) Somalia, a failed state which has
experienced civil conflict of varying intensity since the
collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 (Bakonyi &
Stuvoy, 2005; Grosse-Kettler, 2004; Hansen, 2007;
Harford & Klein, 2005). Subsequent domestic and
international efforts to broker (or enforce) peace deals
Shortland et al.
and establish consensual governance from Mogadishu
have failed, largely because of the presence of local ‘spoi-
lers’ (Elmi & Barise, 2006; Menkhaus, 2007a,b, 2009).
We therefore use the war economy literature to derive a
number of testable hypotheses about the economic
dynamics of conflict in Somalia.
The central hypothesis of the war economy literature
is that a state of war or ‘near war’ provides opportunities
for personal financial gain.1 Violence is used to manipu-
late economic activity in favour of rent-extraction by
those with military power and to secure and expand their
land-holdings. Hansen (2007) speaks of a ‘combat econ-
omy’ centred on warlords, weapons and drugs dealers,
and fighters with a direct interest in the continuation
of war. Conflict would have a positive effect on incomes
of actors in the ‘combat economy’, who through acqui-
sition of others’ wealth, foreign transfers and incomes
join and eventually become the economic elite of the war
economy.2 On the other hand, violence in the process of
the asset transfer could lead to the (partial) destruction of
resources and the disruption of ‘taxable’ activity (see
below). It is therefore not clear how conflict will affect
elite incomes in the short term. However, for the war
economy to be sustainable in the long term, on average
elite incomes must be relatively resilient to conflict.
Hypothesis 1: Elite incomes are resilient to local violent
conflict.
State failure is sustainable if informal governance pro-
vides sufficient stability to encourage ‘taxable’ economic
activity. Investment in agriculture, productive capacity
or stock for a trading venture requires stable supply lines,
access to markets and the confidence that the local war-
lord will not loot the premises, extract the entire surplus
or cause the migration or impoverishment of workers
and customers (Hansen, 2007). Somalia has seen consid-
erable business investment from the diaspora in areas and
times of low conflict intensity (Hammond et al., 2011).
We would therefore expect to observe a ‘peace dividend’
when governance is stable and not contested by rival mili-
tias, leading local power-brokers to act as ‘stationary ban-
dits’ (Olson, 1993). Menkhaus (2007b), Leeson (2007)
1 3
Recent empirical contributions on conflict onset support redis-
tribution as a conflict motive, with civil wars more likely to start in
relatively poor regions (see Buhaug et al., 2011; Rustad et al., 2011).
2
In Somalia not all of the economic elite seek to benefit from the
war economy. In more peaceful areas there has been considerable
diaspora investment, creating business elites which thrive on
peaceful economic development.
547
and Walls (2009) all point to the considerable achieve-
ments of ‘governance without government’ in Somalia.
We expect that local stability would have particularly pos-
itive implications for low and middle income households
through decreased cost of staples, job creation and invest-
ment into utilities.
Hypothesis 2: Low and middle income households gain
significantly from political stability, both in their
own city and in the country in general.
The Somali diaspora is a key contributor of financial
transfers into the country. Remittances go directly to
family members in need and are the main source of
income for those displaced by violent conflict in Somalia
(Horst, 2006). The remittances literature shows that
Somali families are quick to react to hardship befalling
family members and support them generously. It is
impossible to measure remittance flows, but there is
good evidence that remittances increased for example
after the upheaval of the Ethiopian invasion in 2007
(Hammond et al., 2011; Lindley, 2010). Remittances
stimulate local demand and whenever possible displaced
people use remittances to set themselves up in business,
thereby making a further positive contribution to the
host community. Peaceful cities receive disproportionate
diaspora investment, with conflict effectively diverting
investments that would otherwise have gone into more
violent cities (Hammond et al., 2011).
Hypothesis 3: Elite incomes in relatively peaceful cities
respond positively to violence in other cities.
The war economy literature further examines the role
of international aid in sustaining conflict (Anderson,
1999; de Waal, 1997; Duffield, 1994; Hoffman, 2004;
Jean, 1996; Polman, 2011). While aid could reduce the
need for the use of violence to extract resources from the
local economy, most authors have considerable reserva-
tions regarding the impact of aid.3 Aid agencies can inad-
vertently undermine peacetime economic incentives by
providing employment opportunities in security services,
aid distribution and services to foreign aid workers. Aid
can be embezzled or diverted at road checkpoints by
The statistical evidence on aid is contradictory: Collier et al. (2004)
do not find a significant relationship between economic intervention
and civil war duration, but Collier & Hoeffler (2007) show that
foreign aid raised the probability of civil war onset. De Ree &
Nillesen (2009) show that increased aid raised the probability that
a war would end, but Fielding & Shortland (2012) show that in
the Peruvian civil war certain types of aid raised conflict intensity.
548
‘protection rackets’ and those charged with its transport
and delivery. Biased distribution of aid can legitimize
armed factions, if the aid is channelled to and through spe-
cific groups, and divert labour from the productive sector
towards the further pursuit of war (Anderson, 1999; Duf-
field, 1994; Jean, 1996). Therefore aid often benefits the
most influential actors as well as the targeted vulnerable
and war-affected populations.
Complex humanitarian emergencies and migration
may therefore be the result of intentional conflict strate-
gies, where refugees are exploited as assets. Hunger pol-
icies or violence targeted at civilian populations create
mass migrations which can be directed to intended target
locations by manipulating the security environment for
both refugees and aid providers (Jean, 1996; Kaldor,
1999; Keen, 1998; Menkhaus, 2002, 2009; Polman,
2011). Accounts of long-distance migration in Somalia
document that people start their migration with limited
resources (as their livelihoods have been compromised by
conflict) and arrive with very few (if any) possessions
after paying for transport and/or being robbed by bandits
on the journey (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Lindley,
2009). This creates humanitarian emergencies which
trigger (lootable) international aid. Allegations of aid
diversion in Somalia are made regularly, regarding all lev-
els of the World Food programme (WFP) distribution
chain.4
Hypothesis 4: Incomes in cities hosting international
emergency relief operations grow disproportio-
nately during high intensity conflict events.
Although commonly perceived to have been a country
in civil war for two decades, conflict intensity across
Somalia has varied greatly across region and over time.
Somaliland and Puntland in Northern Somalia have
been relatively peaceful since the late 1990s and early
2000s, respectively. Southern and central Somalia, how-
ever, experienced several waves of (sometimes extreme)
violence particularly in and around Mogadishu (Walls,
2009; Hansen & Bradbury, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007a).
Chojnacki & Metternich (2008) analyse the spatial dis-
tribution of reported conflict events in Somalia and
show that the central and southern agricultural areas
(with their potential for producing cash crops) and the
capital’s transport nodes are most actively contested. Con-
trol over these assets is central for any contender for power
in Mogadishu. In this article we therefore examine the
4
For example, Channel 4 News (2010).
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)
effects of local violence and remote violence on Somalia’s
city economies.
To test the hypotheses above we need to create proxies
for changes in disposable income for both elites and
poorer households at the city level and correlate them
with conflict intensity while controlling for exogenous
economic shocks. There has been no comprehensive ter-
restrial data collection in Somalia and we therefore turn
to remote sensing to reconstruct the unrecorded eco-
nomic history of Somalia.
Night-time light emissions from Somalia
Nightlight emissions as a proxy for income
The literature exploiting nightlights as a proxy for eco-
nomic development is based on the analysis of annual
composite images of ‘stable nightlights’ available from
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency
(NOAA).5 These contain the information from daily
observations taken by US Air Force Weather Agency satel-
lites between 8.30 and 10.00 pm, discarding all images
affected by cloud cover, sunlight, moon glare, aurora
borealis and ephemeral lights associated with fires and
lightning strikes. Each pixel represents an area of
approximately 1 km2. The intensity of light emissions
is coded on a six-bit scale, that is, from 0 to 63 (black
to white). Observations of intensities ranging from 1
to 2 or 3 are discarded by NOAA to reduce noise in the
data.6
Nightlight emissions have been shown to be an excel-
lent proxy for economic development at the country,
regional and city level (Sutton, Elvidge & Ghosh,
2007; Ghosh et al., 2010; Kulkarni et al., 2010). They
can be used to measure changes in electricity consump-
tion for any settlement with sufficiently reliable electric-
ity generating capacity. Information on changes in
nightlight emission can be used to significantly improve
estimates of economic growth in least developed coun-
tries (LDCs), where data collection is weak and where
much economic activity takes place in the informal sec-
tor (Chen & Nordhaus, 2011; Henderson, Storeygard &
Weil, 2011). The night-light emissions data are readily
available and are not (yet) manipulated by governments,
making them ideal for objective tests of policy effective-
ness (see Hodler & Rashky, 2010).
Changes in total nightlight emissions reflect both
changes at the extensive margin (changes in the area
5
Available from http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/download.html.
6
See data description at http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/gcv4_readme.txt
and Henderson, Storeygard & Weil (2011).
Shortland et al. 549

Table I. Total light emissions

South Min total Max total Years Total D Total
central WFP emissions emissions observed casualties 1993–2009
Baidoa/Baydhabo 1 1 50.07 384.6 17 915 –217.9
Beletweyne 1 1 0 451.6 13 247 –378.2
Berbera 0 0 384.5 919.2 17 21 353
Boraama 0 0 20.5 286.1 17 16 166
Bossaso 0 1 414.3 985.2 17 151 504.4
Burao/Burco 0 0 0 793.6 16 89 387.7
Ceerigavo/Erigavo 0 0 0 105.9 10 33 81.8
Galkaio 0 0 0 430.9 15 195 369.5
Garowe 0 1 0 483.2 13 36 483.2
Hargeisa 0 1 218.1 2428.4 17 96 1984.8
Jowhar 1 0 0 246.8 16 110 246.8
Kismayo 1 0 30.8 288.5 17 927 –135.3
Las Anod/Lascaanood 0 0 0 293.3 16 18 146.1
Mogadishu 1 1 1386.4 5173.3 16 12504 –3356.4
Qardho 0 0 93.9 369.3 17 19 109.3
Intercalibrated data.

being lit) and at the intensive margin (changes in the
intensity of light leakage). However, in cities in highly
developed countries (and in densely populated mega-
cities elsewhere) sensors often do not pick up changes
at the intensive margin. Beyond the maximum digital
value of 63, pixels are ‘top-coded’, meaning that further
increases in light intensity are not recorded within the
pixel. Instead, sensors become over-saturated and light
measurements may ‘bleed’ into neighbouring pixels.7
Where top-coding is prevalent, changes in the intensity
of light use are measured with significant noise.
Somalia’s nightlights history
In Somalia, nightlight emissions are a particularly power-
ful tool to measure changes in household income for
three reasons. Firstly, in Somalia sensor saturation is not
a problem: sensors are able to observe changes at the
intensive margin without concern that information is
lost through top-coding or neighbouring pixels being
affected by over-saturation. Secondly, there are no major
power stations. Electricity is generated at the household
level using diesel generators or by entrepreneurs offering
contracts to several households to provide electricity for
specific appliances by the hour (Nenova & Harford,
2004). Only the largest and richest cities have some
7
Neither Hyde Park nor the river Thames is visible on the night-time
image of central London.
8
UN Habitat (2007) and (2009b) record public provision of
electricity in some central areas of Hargeisa and Bossaso, respectively.
public power generation towards the end of the period.8
Observed changes (particularly at the extensive margin)
are therefore strongly linked to household disposable
income (and fuel prices). Finally, because diesel genera-
tors are portable and can easily be switched off, there is
little concern about ‘ratchet effects’. These arise where
electricity is produced by power stations and capacity
once installed continues to be used, making light use
insensitive to short-term economic fluctuations (Hen-
derson, Storeygard & Weil, 2011).
Most city pixels are so faintly lit that Somalia is barely
visible on the global nightlight images (see also Short-
land, 2011). While light is occasionally detected from
small settlements in the Juba and Shabelle riverine areas,
none of this is stable across years. Northern Somalia’s
nomadic populations and fishing villages never left a
trace on the stable nightlight images, as outdoor electric
lighting (as opposed to leakage of indoor lighting or
camp-fires) is required for detection. Table I gives infor-
mation on 15 cities which regularly emitted detectable
light during the 1993–2009 period. Of these, five cities
were only detected in the later images and three cities
became ‘extinct’ for one or several years. Three regional
capitals in South Central Somalia never featured on
the stable nightlight images.9 There are huge variations
in city lights over time, both at the intensive and the
extensive margin. There is a clear geographic split, with
growing light output in Northern Somalia and a collapse
9
Buaale, Marka and Xuddur.
550
Figure 1. Change in light output for four cities, using intercalibrated light output measures
Hargeisa is the principal city of Somaliland; Bossaso and Garowe are located in Puntland.
of light emissions in the more violent Southern and Cen-
tral Somalia.
Figure 1 illustrates this further with the images of four
Somali cities in 1993 and 2009. We can see increasing
wealth in Somaliland’s capital city Hargeisa, Puntland’s
principal port town Bossaso and its capital Garowe
(which was not even visible in 1993). In contrast light
output in violent Mogadishu has collapsed: the ‘ghost
towns’ in the centre created by mass migration are obvi-
ous, while the huge impromptu refugee camps of the
Afgooye corridor to the northwest are reflected in dimly
lit urban sprawl (Lindley, 2009; Human Rights Watch,
2011).
Figure 2 shows the light emissions of the city of Burao
over time. The city experienced its nadir in 1996, when
electricity supplies were so poor that the city was no lon-
ger visible to the satellites. However, a refugee camp in
its vicinity was sufficiently well lit to feature in the global
nightlights image. Over time the city changed both in
size and in the intensity of emissions from the central
areas, but the changes in size are not highly correlated
with light emissions from the centre.
Income proxies
The common proxy for changes in income in the night-
lights literature is the change in total light emissions over
a specific area (city, district, province, country), which
can be interpreted as a proxy for average income.
We also measure the change in emissions from the
brightest pixel, located in the central area of each city.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)
We propose this as our proxy for changes in elite
incomes. High resolution satellite images show that cen-
tral areas are settled by the well-off, indicated by high-
walled compounds with dwellings built from stone and
concrete. According to UNDP (2002) only 24% of
houses in Somalia were constructed using durable mate-
rials at the time.10 Figure 3A shows a residential area
between the Al Huda Mosque and the central market
in Garowe as an example. We observe significant eco-
nomic development between 2002 and 2009 concurrent
with increases in night-time light emissions: the Mosque
and many houses were enlarged, the central market stalls
acquired permanent roofing and new villas and business
premises were built. In the main thoroughfares traffic
increased considerably and cars are parked within central
private compounds in the later image. Similar images are
available from Google Earth for Hargeisa and Burao,
which also indicate an upgrading of housing stock and
an increase in car use in central areas, but no significant
changes in building density.11
Unlike many other cities, Somali cities have not yet
developed high-end suburbs. The exception proving this
10
UNDP (2002) further reported that only 22.2% of urban
households (and 0.5% of rural households) used electricity as a
lighting fuel; the rest relied on Kerosene. This indicates that
electricity was a luxury unavailable to most.
11
Rising emissions could be caused by additional households settling
in an area. However, we cannot calculate per capita income, as no
census data exist.
Shortland et al.
Figure 2. Nightlights of Burao, using intercalibrated light output measures
In 1996 Burao is not detected by the satellite sensors, but the refugee camp to its southeast is clearly visible.
rule is a suburban development to the northwest of Har-
geisa of what appears to be high-end housing with walled
compounds. However, this was a speculative develop-
ment and most buildings remained unfinished (UN
Habitat, 2007). Central properties are arguably more
secure and definitely better able to access services. Even
in 2009 Burao (UN Habitat, 2009b) and Baidoa
(FSNAU, 2009) had no public provision of electricity
and in Hargeisa and Bossaso only a few central areas had
a public provider (UN Habitat, 2007, 2009a). Private
providers’ contracts are more expensive and often only
available during limited hours. Similarly, access to water
and garbage collection is considerably cheaper in the cen-
tre than in the periphery (UN Habitat, 2007). Changes
in emissions from the brightest, central pixel are there-
fore interpreted as an indicator of the disposable incomes
of the elite.
Conversely, poor households are literally marginalized
in Somali cities. UN Habitat’s (2007, 2008, 2009a,b)
geospatial city surveys show that the poorest households
are always located at the edges of the cities: a long way
551
from the city centre’s jobs, shopping, hospitality and reli-
gious facilities and entirely lacking public services. The
proportions of large houses, houses built from durable
materials, car ownership and the size of plots decline
with distance from the centre.12 To illustrate this, figure
3B shows an area on the northern edge of Garowe bor-
dering the Togga-Garowe river in 2002 showing a mix-
ture of refugee tents and small dwellings. The larger
dwellings mostly lack the perimeter walls which are a
classic feature of domestic architecture in Somalia. By
2009 the area appears to be considerably wealthier: the
refugee camps have disappeared and new, larger dwell-
ings and perimeter walls have been built. We therefore
use the change in the total number of pixels lit as our
proxy for incomes in poorer households, that is, those
12
The settlement pattern is not completely radial, because
settlements are often geographically constrained in at least one
direction by rivers, coastlines and mountain ridges.
552
Figure 3A. Central area of Garowe in 2002 (top) and 2009
(bottom) showing new as well as upgraded/extended homes,
greater activity in the market with roofed stalls and a new Mosque
Figure 3B. Northern outskirts of Garowe in 2002 (top) and
2009 (bottom): housing upgraded and newly built; temporary
shelters have mostly disappeared in later image
at the margins of the city which gain (or lose) access to
electricity.
Nightlights methodology and data
We used ArcGIS 9.3. We created a polygon shape-file
for each city. The polygon was adjusted annually to cover
the entire city area.13 This method addresses the issue of
13
We excluded ephemeral lights outside cities, which are often
associated with refugee or military camps and hence not linked to
income generation within the city.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)
slight geographic shifts between images from year to
year. We calculated the total light emissions from each
city, by summing the light intensity across all pixels in
the polygon. We additionally used the Spatial Analysis
tool to extract the following ‘zonal statistics’ for each
city-year: a count of all lit pixels and the level of light
emissions from the maximum pixel.
To take into account that the light sensitivity of indi-
vidual satellites might change over time (as well as vary
across satellites) we used the calibration coefficients cal-
culated by Elvidge et al. (2009) to make the digital num-
bers derived from the annual images comparable to each
other. The intercalibrated data were used for the visual
analysis (Figures 1 and 2) and as an alternative measure
of light output in the statistical analysis (as in Chen &
Nordhaus, 2011).
In the analysis below we use the change in nightlight
emissions from year to year (Dtotal, Dpixel count,
Dmax), thereby eliminating time-invariant city effects.
We use only strictly positive observations of known cities
to create the change variables: as light emissions are cen-
sored at the lowest levels, there is a discontinuity in mea-
surement as cities appear and disappear from view.
Mogadishu is also excluded from the statistical analyses.
Mogadishu received international assistance directly tar-
geted at electricity generation and contained brightly lit
military camps, so that light output is not a good proxy
for income. Moreover, urban ‘growth’ in Mogadishu is
not a sign of increasing affluence among the poor;
instead it means that refugees settled in the scrub-land
surrounding the city.
Conflict data
The violence data are derived from the EDACS dataset
on ‘Armed Conflict beyond the State’ (accessed May
2011) (Chojnacki et al., 2012).14 The dataset is based
on international news reports of incidents in which at
least one casualty occurred as a direct result of armed
force. The EDACS dataset records all reported violent
events in Somalia, including those with unknown actor
participation and low-level conflict dyads. This is impor-
tant in a setting of limited statehood, characterized by
shifting and ill-defined alliances and impromptu mobili-
zation of clan militias. Where there are conflicting
reports on the number of casualties in an event, we use
the minimum number of casualties, as this statistic is the
most widely available. Each event is recorded with its
14
The complete dataset is not yet published. See EDACS (2010) for
further information.
Shortland et al.
date and its geographic location. For every year we sum
the total number of casualties within a 50 km zone
around each city centre.
Conflict intensity varies temporally and spatially. Most
events are reported from in or around the capital Moga-
dishu (see Table I). The use of news reports is disputed
as a useful measure of conflict intensity (see e.g. Davenport,
2010). Patrick Ball has developed rigorous statistical tech-
niques to refine the estimate of total conflict victims by
pooling evidence from several different sources.15 How-
ever, the alternative data sources for geo-coded conflict
data in Somalia (the ACLED and UCDP-GED datasets)
are subsets of the events reported by EDACS, as neither
includes events with unknown actor participation and
UCDP-GED applies a 25 fatalities per year and dyad
threshold (Sundberg & Melander, 2013; Raleigh et al.,
2010). Therefore we cannot improve the quality of the
EDACS data and have to take the shortcomings of the
data collection process into account when using and
interpreting the data and results.
Firstly, violence in the principal cities is generally better
covered by international news reports than violence in sec-
ondary cities and the hinterland. We therefore do not
include violent clashes outside a 50 km radius from the city
centres (which are in any case unlikely to systematically
impact on incomes in cities). Secondly, more violent areas
are less likely to be systematically and reliably covered by
international news reporters. The high intensity observa-
tions are therefore measured with significant noise and
should receive less weight in the analysis. Moreover, the
response of people to risk is non-linear. Risk-averse individ-
uals react to the first signs of insecurity, but those who do
not respond immediately are also less sensitive to further
increases in fatalities (Fielding & Shortland, 2009, 2012).
We therefore use a logarithmic transformation of the
casualty data. The violence intensity variables are thus
(a) ln(1 þ casualties in 50 km radius) for local violence,
(b) ln(sum of all non-local violence) to capture general
instability outside each city and (c) ln (Mogadishu casual-
ties only) to specifically capture the large-scale refugee
flows associated with high intensity violence in Moga-
dishu. We use these variables separately in the regressions.
Aid variable
The United Nations World Food programme (WFP) is
the largest aid organization operating in Somalia, with a
15
https://hrdag.org/coreconcepts/.
16
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Somalia/Operations (accessed May
2012).
553
planned 1.9 million beneficiaries in Somalia in 2012.16
We include a dummy for cities in which the WFP had
a regional logistics or distribution centre.17 We use a
multiplicative interaction term between violence in
Mogadishu and local WFP presence to capture the eco-
nomic effect of the influx of conflict refugees to locations
where aid is distributed, and hence scope for extracting
rents from aid agencies (Lindley, 2009; Human Rights
Watch, 2011).
Control variables
A number of further variables could affect (observed)
light output and violence, for example rainfall abnormal-
ities, satellite changes and food price rises. We therefore
include the following additional controls.
Rainfall. Somalia has an arid climate and a relatively
large agricultural sector. Rainfall shocks are therefore
likely to be a major determinant of economic perfor-
mance. We use the dataset of total annual rainfall within
each administrative region from 1993 to 2009 from
Fjelde & von Uexküll (2012). We generate the total
standardized rainfall deviation from the period average
and split the rainfall deviations into positive and negative
deviations: in an arid climate above-average rainfall has
more benign effects than below-average rainfalls. How-
ever, given the potential for catastrophic flooding, we
generated a ‘flood’ dummy when the rainfall abnormality
exceeded one standard deviation.
Recently there has been a surge of research into the
link between climate shocks and civil conflict, raising the
issue of rainfall abnormalities affecting both economic
well-being and conflict. While several papers argue that
climate shocks increase the likelihood or intensity of vio-
lent conflict (Burke et al., 2009; Fjelde & von Uexküll,
2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Hsiang, Meng &
Cane, 2011; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012), other research
questions the robustness of this link (Buhaug, 2010;
Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). In our data there is no statisti-
cally significant relationship between annual city level
violence and contemporary or lagged regional rainfall
abnormalities, supporting the more cautious view. How-
ever, it is possible that conflict related to water shortages
or flooding erupts in the countryside rather than in the
regional capitals.
17
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Somalia/Contacts (accessed October
2011). We were unable to obtain information about which years the
centres were operational so the dummy is time-invariant.
554 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)

Table II. Descriptive statistics.

Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dcount 178 2.92 9.59 –25 34
Dmax 178 0.28 2.71 –6 10
Dtotal 178 22.26 116.30 –375 615
ln(casualties elsewhere) 178 6.50 0.73 4.25 7.64
ln(1þlocal casualties) 178 1.28 1.61 0 5.65
Count 178 47.4 38.71 0 197
Standard deviation 178 1.96 2.29 0 10.874
Food price index 178 111.70 19.66 92.9 164.5
178 sample observations, uncalibrated lights data.

Table III. Pearson correlations

D Pixel count D Maximum light D Total
(least well-off) output (elites) light output
ln50 kmt–1 –0.2285 (0.0022) –0.1769 (0.0183) –0.1901 (0.0110)
ln(casualties elsewhere)t–1 –0.1891 (0.0115) 0.0060 (0.9366) –0.0685 (0.3633)
ln(Mogadishu casualties)*WFPt 0.1256 (0.0948) 0.1319 (0.0792) 0.1709 (0.0225)
WFP 0.1415 (0.0596) 0.0912 (0.2261) 0.1238 (0.0996)
FAO food price index –0.1351 (0.0722) –0.0661 (0.3807) –0.0695 (0.3563)
Sample of 178 observations, uncalibrated lights data.

City characteristics. It is possible that larger cities and
those where incomes are more equitably distributed have
different growth patterns. We therefore control for each
city’s total light emissions and the standard deviation of
light output within the city polygon.
Exogenous economic shocks. As Somalia depends on
foreign food and oil imports we include the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) food
price index (which is highly correlated with oil price
indices) as an additional control for international price
movements which might impact on local disposable
incomes and raise conflict intensity (Fielding & Short-
land, 2009).
Satellite changes. For the regression models with the
data directly derived from the images, we take into
account that sensor settings could have varied between
satellites. We use the image produced by the most
recently launched satellite available for each year and add
a year dummy when the satellite changes.18 These year
dummies are omitted in the models using intercalibrated
data.
Correlations, model and results
Correlations
Table II shows some descriptive statistics of the sample
and Table III shows the Pearson correlations (and signifi-
cance levels) between some of the variables. We observe
support for a local peace dividend which is stronger for the
average and poorer households than for the rich, backing
up Hypothesis 2. Emissions from poor households are
negatively correlated with violence in other cities, but
richer households show no significant correlation. High
intensity conflict in Mogadishu is associated with faster
growth in light emissions for WFP cities with stronger and
more significant correlations in better-off areas.
Rising food prices (which are also highly correlated
with fuel prices) have an impact on the cities’ poorer
households, which at the margin make the decision
between food purchases and electricity use. The electric-
ity consumption of the better-off is not significantly cor-
related with food prices.

18
F10 in 1993, F12 in 1994–96, F14 in 1997–99, F15 in 2000–03 Economic model
and F16 in 2004–09. In the models the 1993/94 change is dropped The above correlations could be related to or obscured
due to collinearity, leaving three satellite changes. by other shocks, some of which may cause changes in
Shortland et al.
both electricity consumption and violence. We therefore
investigate the effect of violence on light emissions in an
economic model which controls for exogenous economic
shocks. We have a panel dataset of 14 cities observed for
between six and 14 years and estimate the following
relationship:
Dlightsit ¼ a þ b1 Dlightsit1
þ b2 lnð1 þ local casualtiesÞit 1
þ b3 lnðcasualties elsewhereÞit 1
þ b4 lnðMogadishu casualtiesÞt WFPi
þ b5 ðCCÞit þb6 ðR Þit þb7 ðFÞt þb8 ðSÞt eit :
The dependent (lights) variables are Dtotal light out-
put, Dpixel count and Dmaximum emissions, subscript i
refers to the location and subscript t to the time period.
The main variables of interest are lagged local and
remote violence. We control for current violence in Moga-
dishu interacted with WFP for the aid distribution loca-
tions to track the effect of humanitarian intervention on
light output. With CC we control for city characteristics,
namely the town size and income distribution. The R vec-
tor includes both positive and negative deviations from
long-term average rainfalls as well as the flood dummy.
The vector F controls for world food prices and vector S
for satellite changes (unless we use intercalibrated data).
We performed the regression in several ways, to test the
robustness of the result to using different estimation tech-
niques. We firstly used a standard fixed effects panel
regression model with robust standard errors. This model
treats all explanatory variables as exogenous, but we in-
clude a lagged dependent variable, as one would expect
changes in light emissions to be influenced by past
changes. We also report a random effects model for each
dependent variable, which produces very similar results to
the fixed effects models in the pixel count and maximum
emissions models.
We additionally use the dynamic panel estimator
developed by Arellano & Bond (1991), which explicitly
takes into account that the process may be dynamic and
that the dynamics are likely to be more complicated than
what is captured by a single lagged dependent variable.
Moreover, some of the regressors could be endogenous –
for example, relatively poorer towns may be more vio-
lent. Other regressors may not be strictly exogenous in
the sense that they are influenced by past disturbances.
The weakness of this methodology in this context is that
it was developed for panels with large N and small time
periods whereas the (at best 178) observations in this
panel are strongly balanced.
555
To explore how sensitive the results are to how the
light output is measured, we report results for models
using the data derived directly from the satellite images
and models using the annual intercalibration coefficients
of Elvidge et al. (2009) to adjust annually for different
satellite settings (as in Chen & Nordhaus, 2011). The
intercalibration coefficients only apply to the total and
maximum light output measures, not to the town size
(pixel count) variable.19
Results and interpretation
Given the potential shortcomings of each estimation
methodology, we are cautious about potential biases in
the coefficients obtained by the models and mainly com-
ment on the sign, significance and robustness of the
results across the models.
Table IV reports the results for the change in the
number of pixels lit, that is, the effect of conflict on the
lower income groups in the city. Regardless of the meth-
odology or measurement, there is a clear ‘peace dividend’
in line with Hypothesis 2 for the poor, both regarding
local violence and the general disruption caused by vio-
lence in the country. In the fixed effects panel regressions
the local violence effect is at the border of statistical sig-
nificance if town size is included in the explanatory vari-
ables, but it is significant at the 5% level otherwise. In
the dynamic panel models the local peace dividend is
significant at the 1% level. Violence elsewhere exerts a
further negative effect on low income groups, mostly sig-
nificant at the 5% level.
The control variables provide evidence that the count
variable works well as a proxy for changes in income
among the poor. Changes in international food prices are
associated with falling light output from the poorer areas
of towns (mostly at the border of statistical significance),
while positive rainfall deviations raise agricultural pro-
ductivity and are associated with increased light output.
This indicates a food versus electricity choice made by
poorer households. Floods have highly significant nega-
tive effects on light output. However, as floods also dis-
rupt electricity generation and distribution, the observed
effect in nightlights may overstate the true effect on
income. Negative rainfall deviations – which would raise
prices for locally produced food – do not have significant
effects on light output. A possible explanation is that
any negative effects on electricity usage are offset by
improved visibility of lights due to reduced cloud cover.
19
The intercalibration coefficients are applied to the measured digital
numbers; they do not change the number of non-zero observations.
556 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)

Table IV. Change in pixel count (city size)

Fixed Random Fixed Dynamic panel Dynamic panel
effects effects effects (abond) (abond)
Local violencet–1 –1.209 –1.164** –1.388* –1.559** –1.699**
(0.574) (0.401) (0.566) (0.593) (0.572)
Violence elsewheret–1 –3.198* –3.548* –2.010 –3.531** –2.124*
(1.352) (1.421) (1.423) (1.066) (1.041)
Mogadishu violence and WFP centret 1.326 0.989 1.561 1.526* 1.560*
(1.023) (1.090) (1.033) (0.922) (0.933)
Lagged dependent variable –0.308** –0.275** –0.327** –0.279** –0.332**
(0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.050) (0.056)
Town lit areat 0.199** 0.228** 0.274**
(0.031) (0.034) (0.048)
Town income distributiont –2.864* –2.540** –0.175 –3.924** –0.899
(1.154) (0.656) (0.735) (1.172) (0.849)
FAO food indext –0.076 –0.071 –0.079 –0.096* –0.089
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.039) (0.048)
Positive rainfall deviationt 0.063* 0.063* 0.061 0.072** 0.079**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.020) (0.026)
Negative rainfall deviationt –0.012 –0.012 –0.011 –0.017 –0.014
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Floodst –8.518* –8.225** –9.303* –9.201** –11.568**
(3.139) (3.073) (3.718) (3.173) (3.624)
Satellite change 1 –1.756 –1.044 –5.059 –1.161 –4.961
(3.343) (3.123) (3.316) (3.247) (3.552)
Satellite change 2 2.683 2.776 –0.121 2.834 –1.177
(3.569) (3.250) (3.673) (3.371) (3.466)
Satellite change 3 –0.293 –0.339 –0.660 –0.255 –0.635
(2.550) (2.004) (2.629) (2.353) (2.669)
WFP –4.185
(6.574)
Constant 26.751* 28.795** 24.173* 29.382** 27.688**
(9.406) (9.897) (9.426) (7.636) (6.431)
Observations 178 178 174 163 163
Number of cities 14 14 14 14 14
R-sq overall 0.27 0.34 0.17
R-sq within 0.29 0.28 0.24
R-sq between 0.28 0.76 0.05
Model chi-squared statistic 12,872.73 2,260.40
Sum of squared differenced residuals 15,870.35 19,771.36
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

Larger towns with more equal income distributions see
faster growth on average, perhaps because they attract
more inward migration.
Table V shows the models for light emission from the
maximum pixels. Light output in central districts does
not change significantly in response to local violence,
showing that the incomes of the better-off generally do
not suffer from local violence. This supports Hypothesis
1. The support for Hypothesis 3 is more ambiguous. In
the models using the original light data, hosting a WFP
centre is significantly correlated with faster light output
growth in high conflict years in Mogadishu. However,
when using the intercalibrated data we only have a result
that elites benefit somewhat from violence elsewhere,
which is at the border of statistical significance (10%
level).
From the control variables we see that the light output
from rich areas is not responsive to food prices, as would
be expected, though income growth is faster in years with
higher than average rainfalls, as long as there is no out-
right flooding. Elite incomes grow faster in towns with
large initial income differentials, but more slowly in
Shortland et al. 557

Table V. Change in light output from maximum pixel

Fixed Random Dynamic Fixed effects Dynamic panel
effects effects panel (abond) (recalibrated) (recalibrated)
Local violencet–1 –0.117 –0.097 –0.263 –0.086 –0.161
(0.156) (0.133) (0.149) (0.134) (0.131)
Violence elsewheret–1 0.063 –0.110 –0.146 0.484 0.386
(0.235) (0.280) (0.217) (0.254) (0.218)
Mogadishu violence and WFP centret 0.849* 0.901** 1.057** 0.325 0.468
(0.346) (0.350) (0.348) (0.258) (0.294)
Dependent variablet–1 –0.117 0.001 –0.115* –0.086 –0.054
(0.056) (0.064) (0.047) (0.099) (0.102)
Town lit areat –0.068** –0.039** –0.078** –0.059** –0.056**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011)
Town income distributiont 1.454** 0.883** 1.644** 1.034** 1.099**
(0.250) (0.165) (0.213) (0.147) (0.286)
FAO food indext 0.011 0.012 0.004 –0.008 –0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Positive rainfall deviationt 0.014** 0.016** 0.014** 0.012* 0.013*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Negative rainfall deviationt 0.014** 0.015** 0.011** 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Floodst –2.056** –1.981* –2.609** –2.326* –2.419*
(0.671) (0.835) (0.660) (0.915) (0.943)
Satellite change 1 –0.108 0.458 0.346
(0.509) (0.625) (0.405)
Satellite change 2 3.988** 4.463** 3.564**
(0.953) (1.024) (0.827)
Satellite change 3 3.070** 3.688** 2.753**
(0.717) (0.779) (0.637)
WFP –4.880*
(2.106)
Constant –4.046** –1.664 –1.959 –2.340 –1.651
(1.008) (1.216) (1.622) (1.539) (1.230)
Observations 178 178 163 174 159
Number of cities 14 14 14 14 14
R-sq overall 0.24 0.49 0.13
R-sq within 0.54 0.52 0.25
R-sq between 0.14 0.28 0.07
Model chi-squared 19,158.61 1,127.08
Sum of squared diff. residuals 961.60 658.72
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

larger towns, possibly because there is more competition
among businesses.
Table VI contains the total light output models.
Overall, household incomes appear to suffer from vio-
lence in and around their own city, but violence else-
where does not significantly reduce city performance.
However, the effect of contemporaneous violence in
Mogadishu is now strongly and significantly positive
in WFP locations across all model specifications. This
suggests that the increased presence of aid providers pro-
vides additional income opportunities as locals provide
hospitality, distribution, taxi and construction services
for aid agencies.
The calculated regression coefficients are economically
significant. For example, depending on the model, the cal-
culated coefficients in the pixel count model predict that
ceteris paribus the growth in the light footprint of a city
decreases by between 20% and 29% of one standard
deviation in response to a standard shock in local violence
and by between 16% and 27% to a standard shock in
remote violence. There is therefore a significant peace div-
idend for those living at the margins of the cities.
558 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 50(5)

Table VI. Change in total light output

Fixed Random Dynamic panel Fixed effects Random effects
effects effects (abond) (recalibrated) (recalibrated)
Local violencet–1 –8.783* –4.911 –13.721* –7.662 –12.005**
(3.606) (5.172) (6.540) (3.980) (4.112)
Violence elsewheret–1 –6.646 –15.833 –9.131 –14.216 –16.574
(8.549) (10.735) (12.761) (11.419) (9.469)
Mogadishu violence and WFP centret 42.260** 45.210** 45.466** 13.513* 10.273*
(9.257) (9.067) (11.886) (5.714) (4.947)
Dep. variablet–1 –0.564** –0.451** –0.575** –0.098 –0.056
(0.111) (0.122) (0.067) (0.079) (0.058)
Town lit areat –1.873* –0.695 –2.230** 0.183 0.688*
(0.888) (0.462) (0.591) (0.190) (0.364)
Town income distributiont 61.074** 35.757* 71.038** 4.419 –2.940
(10.823) (14.444) (11.941) (7.692) (10.144)
FAO food indext –0.191 –0.105 –0.359 –0.677* –0.757*
(0.341) (0.381) (0.537) (0.237) (0.301)
Positive rainfall deviationt 0.221 0.299 0.186 0.495* 0.530**
(0.299) (0.249) (0.259) (0.185) (0.148)
Negative rainfall deviationt 0.079 0.122* –0.001 –0.071 –0.106
(0.064) (0.057) (0.140) (0.088) (0.061)
Floodst –45.117 –45.031 –56.803 –85.750** –89.000**
(41.535) (44.321) (34.879) (21.103) (21.510)
Satellite change 1 –38.440* –12.328 –34.886
(17.177) (19.436) (31.224)
Satellite change 2 100.237** 125.664** 82.265*
(27.345) (36.814) (32.727)
Satellite change 3 15.227 44.079** 0.039
(14.413) (14.056) (29.180)
WFP –249.748**
(63.520)
Constant –29.776 98.209* 10.472 151.725* 180.817**
(39.599) (57.823) (72.981) (71.482) (62.142)
Observations 178 178 163 174 159
Number of cities 14 14 14 14 14
R-sq overall 0.25 0.51 0.16
R-sq within 0.57 0.55 0.13
R-sq between 0.22 0.35 0.30
Model chi-squared 203.77 801.45
Sum of squared diff. residuals 1,751,942.59 1,246,815.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

Conclusions southern provincial centres. In contrast, the more stable

areas of Somaliland and Puntland have made huge prog-
This article uses detailed photogrammetric analysis to
ress in terms of providing access to electricity to urban
study local economic performance in a conflict environ-
households since stabilizing politically in the mid to late
ment, where no income data have been collected for the
1990s, respectively.
last two decades. We analysed the NOAA nightlight
Our suggested proxies for the disposable incomes of
emission images and high resolution satellite images
different groups are well supported by geospatial surveys
using cutting edge GIS software to visualize (and create
and high resolution satellite imagery and produce highly
data for) the local economic histories of Somalia. We
intuitive results in statistical tests. Specifically, the night-
showed that endemic violence in Southern Somalia is
lights in the poorest areas correlate well with food price
reflected in the collapse of nightlight emissions from
indices, while the richer inhabitants of the central areas
Shortland et al.
do not generally appear to choose between food purchases
and electricity. We also get a robust result that in the arid
climate of Somalia positive rainfall shocks raise disposable
incomes as long as there are no outright floods. There are
many sub-Saharan African countries to which this fine-
grained nightlights analysis could be fruitfully extended.
Our statistical models show evidence in line with the
predictions of the literature on war economies. There is a
clear and sizable peace dividend for poorer sections of
society. Urban households at the margins of cities clearly
benefit from stable governance, both locally and further
afield. However, for Somalia’s urban elites conflict is not
necessarily problematic: local conflict does not signifi-
cantly change light output from the central ‘business’
districts. Violent contest elsewhere can bring financial
benefits by triggering and diverting investment and
remittances from the Somali diaspora to stable areas of
Somalia. High intensity conflict in Mogadishu brings
humanitarian aid into WFP centres and boosts local eco-
nomic activity, allowing local households to increase
their (electricity) consumption as a result.
Two caveats apply to this analysis. Firstly, there are some
powerful elites (particularly in Southern Somalia) which
were excluded from the analysis, because their communities
have not developed mixed-use urban areas with outdoor
lighting and thus they remain invisible to the night-time
satellites. The results therefore only apply to inhabitants
of cities with sufficient political stability to encourage
investment in generating capacity and night-time eco-
nomic and social activity. Secondly, changes in light output
may overstate the effect of conflict on incomes, as genera-
tors could be destroyed or moved during conflict.
Despite these caveats, the results suggest a clear peace
dividend from stable governance in Somalia for the urban
poor. By contrast, among elites in well developed urban
centres there is no economic incentive to end the conflict
through a political solution, but instead a perverse incen-
tive for elites in WFP host cities to torpedo a peace settle-
ment in Southern Somalia. The international community
should consider these incentives in its state-building
efforts in Somalia. If a central government is created
through ‘power-sharing’ among regional elites, significant
fiscal transfers might be needed to contain ‘spoilers’
whose fortune depends on the continuation of the war
economy. In contrast, a transition to democracy would
help empower the poor to demand lasting peace.
Replication data
Replication files for this article can be found at www.
prio.no/jpr/datasets.
559
Acknowledgements
We thank Hanne Fjelde and Nina von Uexküll for their
regional rainfall data, Sven Chojnacki for the EDACS
geo-coded conflict event data for Somalia (May 2011)
and Chris Elvidge of NOAA for the intercalibration
coefficients for the nightlights data. Brunel University
provided grants for the acquisition of high resolution
satellite images and change detection software. Detailed
comments were received from Julia Amos, Eli Berman,
David Fielding, Charles Grant, Geoffrey Penney, Marc
Vothknecht and Phani Wunnava as well as two anon-
ymous referees. Helpful suggestions were received at
research seminars at the Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO), Ottawa, Essex and Brunel Universities and
from conference participants at the 2012 Network of
European Peace Scientists conference and the 2013
American Economic Association conference.
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ANJA SHORTLAND, b. 1973, PhD in International
Relations (LSE, 2002); Reader in Political Economy at
King’s College London; current research interests are conflict
dynamics, piracy, the peace dividend and the politics of
financial development.
KATERINA CHRISTOPOULOU, PhD in Geographic
Information Science (University College London, 2008);
Senior Catastrophe Risk Modeller at RMS; current research
interests are spatial data mining and pattern extraction and
the application of AI techniques to risk management from
prevention to mitigation.
CHARALAMPOS MAKATSORIS, b. 1972, PhD in
Computer Aided Systems Engineering (Imperial College
London, 1997); Chartered Engineer and Reader in
Engineering Systems in the School of Engineering at Brunel
University; research interests include informatics and
machine learning with application to complex systems,
robotics, mathematical modelling and optimization.