THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER

The battle of Gaza, 312 BC

Doomed men of distinction

The horsemen reached Azotus (modern Ashdod, Israel) near mid- as their fellow rulers” (Politics 1287b) and
would, after 306, be called the “king’s
night. Their horses, lathered in sweat in spite of the crisp December
Friends”. More importantly all these senior
night, made directly for their stabling and water. Of the elite cav- men – the closest of the Friends – were,
alrymen who had earlier left these winter quarters, few returned. before anything else, the important mili-
tary officers of Antigonus’ armed forces.
The survivors, a defeated and desultory lot, made their way toward If not accorded specific commands, they
their general’s lodging. Here, in “council” (synhedrion) with what fought in their patron’s cavalry guard
or agema along with the other ‘lesser’
remained of his “Friends” (philoi), Demetrius canvassed his options. Friends. Such men often had their own fol-
Many of the Friends, “the most distinguished of whom were Pithon lowing amongst the troops and a contin-
ued share of a kingdom’s acquisitive raids
[son of Agenor], who had shared the command on equal terms
was mandatory if they weren’t to defect to
with himself, and Boeotus, who for a long time had lived with his another more successful patron.
father Antigonus and had shared in all his state secrets”, lay dead Antigonus, Demetrius’ father, set the
example in the winter 319/18 when he
on the battlefield (Diodorus 19.85.2 – all references to this source informed the “council of his Friends” of
and book unless noted). Still in his blood and grime covered armour his intention to seize power and “assigned
satrapies to some of the more important
and struggling to come to terms with events, Demetrius had an
Friends and military commands to others”
envoy sent to Ptolemy “about the burial of the dead since he was saying he “had in mind to go through Asia,
very anxious at any cost to honour those who had perished with remove the existing satraps, and reorgan-
ise the positions of command in favour
the funeral that was their due” (85.1). More than a few of those of his Friends” (18.50.5). These Friends
who’d perished had sat in another council prior to the battle; a of Antigonus Monophthalmus (the One-
Eyed) were at the heart of the current
council of war. war.
In the late spring of 316 – having over
the winter provided the members of
By Michael Park Antigonus’ rigged court for the satrap of
Media, Pithon Crateua (who was promptly
executed) – the Friends along with the bul-
In the late November of 312 (all dates are that Demetrius should “not take the field lion of Ecbatana followed their patron to
BC; for the chronology of this article see against so great a general and a superior Persis (46.1-5). At the head of the largest
sidebar), Demetrius (see Ancient Warfare force” (81.1). They pointed out that the army operating in Asia, Antigonus “was
III.2 for a description of his life and cam- enemy were commanded by “generals granted the dignity of kingship by the
paigns), on the news that a large Egyptian who were almost the greatest” and “who inhabitants as the acknowledged lord of
army was marching for Coele-Syria, had had taken part with Alexander in all his Asia”. With sedulous flattery providing
“summoned his soldiers to Old Gaza from wars and had often led armies indepen- opportunity, Antigonus wasted little time
their winter quarters” where they’d gone dently” (81.5). and, “sitting in council with his Friends,
into camp to await the enemy. Ptolemy’s considered the question of the satrapies”.
army “marching through the desert from Antigonus and Friends He removed the popular Peucestas in the
Pelusium”, made for the same location, The Friends in this council were the func- process and then set off for Babylonia.
where it made camp near to Demetrius’ tionaries or “officials” who, while acting Along the way, he added the coin and
forces (80.5). The size of the enemy variously as governors, strategoi, nauarchs, bullion from the treasury of Susa to that
encampment confirmed the reports diplomats, treasurers and advisors, facili- which he’d removed from Media “so
that the Egyptian army outnumbered tated Antigonus’ rule over the vast ter- that in all twenty-five thousand talents
Demetrius’ own. In council the Friends, ritory now under his sway. The various were gathered together” (48.8) as well as
who included Alexander’s veterans Diadoch dynasts all kept a wide number appointing Aspisas as satrap.
Nearchus of Crete, Pithon, Andronicus of of persons who, in Aristotle’s words, were Arriving in Babylon, Antigonus
Olynthus and Philip (69.1), were adamant “friends of their rule and of themselves demanded Seleucus give an accounting of

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his stewardship of the satrapy.With Pithon’s
experience before Monophthalmus’ coun-
cil of Friends only too recent, Seleucus
correctly reasoned that “Antigonus
seemed eager to put out of the way all
of his associates who were of high rank
and were capable of claiming a share in
the government” (55.4). Seleucus fled to
Ptolemy who had “a multitude of Friends
[…] gathered about him on account of his
fairness” (18.14.1). Antigonus appointed
Pithon, son of Agenor in his place and
headed west towards the sea.
In November of 316, Antigonus, his
increasingly naked ambition made plain
by actions taken without reference to any
authority other than his Friends, arrived
in Cilicia and, after appropriating 10,000
talents from Cyinda, sent his army into
winter quarters. Here he received envoys
from Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus
in council with his Friends. Their demands
“that Cappadocia and Lycia be given
to Cassander, Hellespontine Phrygia to
Lysimachus, all Syria to Ptolemy, and
Babylonia to Seleucus, and that Antigonus
should divide the treasures that he had
captured after the battle with Eumenes”
were more hopeful than optimistic.
Antigonus and his Friends “bade them
make ready for war”. The “politics of dis-
trust” (Heckel, see further reading) that
passed for normal diplomatic relations
between the Diadochs were put aside and
the “coalition of the convenient” was for-
malized (57.1-3). The war, on land and sea,
would be fought across three fronts – Asia
Minor, Greece and Syria – and Antigonus’
Friends operated in every theatre.
Shoring up or seeking alliances, the
Friends Agesilaos and Aristodemus were
sent to Cyprus and the Peloponnesus
respectively, Idomeneus and Moschion
went to Rhodes, whilst Antigonus’
nephew Polemais led an army into
Cappadocia (57.3-5). In the late spring of
315, Antigonus laid siege to Tyre as the
lynchpin of a wider Phoenician campaign
to build a navy comparable to Ptolemy’s
(58.1-6). Later in the summer, Andronicus
would press the siege as Antigonus took
Joppa and Gaza. In the winter of 315,
after the capture of his admiral Theodotus
and his armament, Antigonus failed in an
attempt to detach Ptolemy from the coali-
tion in negotiations at Ecregma, though
he recovered his Friends. Seleucus was,
certainly, the sticking point (64.5-8). In the
late autumn of 314, with Tyre captured,
AW nr6 dec11.indd 27
THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER
Early Diadochoi chronology
Nothing, other than the comings and goings of the chorus line of Macedonian
support actors, is more confusing (or contentious) in this period than its chro-
nology. Whilst Ancient Warfare isn’t necessarily the place to argue such arcane
matters, some explanation of the article’s chronology is in order as it conflicts
with several general works on the period.
Much of the last century saw two firmly entrenched and palisaded
chronological camps for early Diadochoi history (323-311): the ‘high’ and the
‘low’. Very generally the former dates Perdiccas’ death and Triparadeisos to
321 and Gaza to very early spring 312; the latter 320 and early winter 312
respectively. In between fall the crucial dates of Antigonus’ settlement with
Eumenes (317/16 or 316/15) and Seleucus’ flight to Egypt (316 or 315). Except
for the period winter 320- spring 318 these systems are mutually exclusive. As
so often, neither position is totally correct.
This article follows the ‘eclectic chronology’ – so called by Tom Boiy to
whom it owes much. Without delving into detail, this position argues that
Diodorus’ inherit narrative chronology is correct – if occasionally confused.
This confusion results from Diodorus following a narrative source which
relates events by the campaigning season (à la Thucydides) and trying to
mate that with his method of following Athenian archon years. That the
campaigning might continue over a given winter only adds to the confusion
as the odd winter disappears south for the summer (e.g. the missing winter of
315/14).
The argument, involving cuneiform, inscriptional and literary evidence is
occasionally complicated. In short, the answer lay in the reconciling of those
campaigning seasons and the recorded “winter quarters” with Diodorus’
archon years. Fixed chronological pointers help this. Stylianou, back in 1994
for example, irrefutably demonstrated that Cassander presided over the
Nemean games of 315. Thus Seleucus’ flight to Egypt, the previous summer,
can only have occurred in late summer of 316 and Antigonus’ return to the
west in November of that year. Diodorus, himself, was clearly aware of the
issue and eventually structured his narrative so that the campaign season
narrative, whilst at least partially under the correct archon, commenced in
the spring before that archon took office. The result is the chronology utilised
here, a chronology which by far best fits the evidence and which sees the
deaths of Eumenes and Olympias in early 316, the siege of Tyre beginning in
315 and Gaza being fought in early December of 312.
For those afflicted by the author’s fascination with the subject the seminal
publications are P. J. Stylianou’s ‘The Pax Macedonica and the Freedom of the
Greeks of Asia (with an Appendix on the Chronology of the Years 323- 301)’,
in: Epeteris tou Kentrou Epistemonikon Ereunon 20 (1994) and Tom Boiy’s
Between the High and the Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period
(Oikoumene. Studien zur antiken Weltgeschichte 5; Frankfurt am Main 2007).
The most succinct and recent exposition of this chronology is ‘Diodorus and
the Chronology of the Third Diadoch War’ (A. Meeus, Phoenix, forthcom-
ing). Others of interest include Pat Wheatley’s ‘The Chronology of the Third
Diadoch War, 315-311’, in: Phoenix 52 (Autumn-winter 1998), pp. 257-281,
and ‘The Year 22, Tetradrachms of Sidon and the Date of the Battle of Gaza’,
in: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 144 (2003), p. 268-276, as well as
Tom Boiy’s ‘Royal and Satrapal armies in Babylon during the Second Diadoch
War. The Chronicle of the Successors on the events during the seventh year
of Philip Arrhidaeus(=317/316 BC)’, in: Journal of Hellenic Studies 130 (2010),
p.1−13.
Ancient Warfare V-6 27
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 THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER

Antigonus crossed the Taurus range to

deal with Cassander and Lysimachus. His
support of a rebellion against Lysimachus
proved somewhat costly and negotia-
tions at the Hellespont with Cassander
in the summer of 313 achieved nothing.
More importantly, Antigonus’ departure
from Syria – only just won – necessitated
him leaving Demetrius “to lie in wait for
Ptolemy, whom he suspected of intend-
ing to advance from Egypt with an army
against Syria” (69.1). Understanding his
son’s youthful impetuosity, Antigonus left
five of his senior Friends to head his coun-
cil of Friends: Nearchus of Crete, Pithon,
son of Agenor, Andronicus, Boeotus and
Philip (69.1).

The Friends in 312

Advice from this inner circle of the Friends
was hardly ever to be ignored lightly.
Though the Friends’ arguments were
cogent and well-reasoned, they had fatal-
ly misread their patron’s heir-apparent
who dismissed them out of hand (81.1).
Vaunted generals Ptolemy and Seleucus
might well be, but they had come to him
and Demetrius would not have to be asked
twice to this dance. Laying out his battle
plan to the Friends and promising “gifts
to them as they were deserved” (81.5),
he “confidently prepared for the conflict
even though he was very young” (81.1).
Ordering an assembly of the officers and
those of the army who could get close
enough, Demetrius encouraged all “with
words suitable to the occasion” and prom-
ising “to yield the booty to the soldiers”
(81.5) prepared to break camp. The Third
Diadoch War would finally have its set
piece and it would prove decisive, though
not in the usual fashion. Demetrius was
outnumbered in infantry with 11,000 pha-
lanx infantry and some 2,200 light troops
to Ptolemy’s 18,000. On the positive side,
he had a slight edge in cavalry numbers
and, with one successful campaign under
his father behind him, all the confidence
of youthful invincibility. More important-
ly, he fielded forty-three elephants – the
only elephants on the field. His battle
plan, agreed to by his rather less sanguine
council of Friends, was to concentrate
these advantages onto the one offensive
© José Antonio German

wing. Reversing his father’s battle order

of Paraetecene, Demetrius would, like
Eumenes at Gabiene, command from a
forward left wing with his right refused.
Battle deployment

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Around his command position on the left
Demetrius arranged “the two hundred
selected horsemen of his guard, among
whom were all his other Friends” (82.1).
These Friends included Pithon, Boeotus
and, although not specifically named
by Diodorus, Nearchus and Philip “men
advanced in years who had accompanied
Alexander on his whole campaign” (cf
69.2). Armed with the 3.6 – 4 meter cavalry
lance, or xyston, they formed Demetrius’
agema and would discharge their ultimate
duty: the defense of Antigonus’ appointed
‘heir’.
Immediately to the right of this posi-
tion, Demetrius posted “the cavalry who
were called the Companions, eight hun-
dred in number and after them no less
than fifteen hundred horsemen of all
kinds”. Forward of his agema Demetrius
stationed one hundred and fifty xysto-
phoroi in three troops as an advance guard
with a further one hundred and fifty, again
in three troops, forming a flank guard.
“Stationed separately outside the wing”
were three smaller troops of ‘Tarantines’,
totaling one hundred horse, who rounded
out the cavalry wing. Lastly, thirty ele-
phants, the spaces between them filled
with “units of light-armed men, of whom
a thousand were javelin-throwers and
archers and five hundred were Persian
slingers” (82.1-3), stood across the front of
the whole wing.
To the right of the cavalry the
Antigonid phalanx infantry turned into
line. Adjacent to his left wing, Demetrius’
2,000 Macedonian sarissa-armed foot
formed up. To their right stood the 1,000
similarly armed Lycians and Pamphylians,
and after them battalion after battalion of
the 8,000 Antigonid mercenaries. Thirteen
elephants with “sufficient” lightly armed
troops were placed across the front of the
phalanx. The cavalry of the right, which was
lead by Antigonus’ garrison commander of
Tyre, Andronicus of Olynthus, numbered
1,500. Andronicus was “ordered to hold
his line back at an angle and avoid fight-
ing, awaiting the outcome of the conflict
fought by Demetrius” (82.4). Exercising
his first independent command at twenty-
three precocious years of age, Demetrius
would rely on the shock of the elephants,
supported by his best cavalry, to drive the
enemy right wing cavalry back and onto
his own right infantry. Envelopment of
the enemy before his deficit in infantry
numbers could affect the outcome was
AW nr6 dec11.indd 29
the intended result.
Across the field, Demetrius’ some-
what leisurely deployment was observed
by Ptolemy and Seleucus. Of Ptolemy’s
18,000 infantry “some were Macedonians
and some were mercenaries, but a great
number were Egyptians, of whom some
carried the missiles and the other bag-
gage but some were fully equipped and
serviceable for battle”. Whilst Diodorus
gives us no breakdown, the greater part
of the phalanx infantry would have been
mercenary. Given that Antigonus thought
2,000 Macedonian foot were sufficient
for his son’s force, Ptolemy would have
had few more. However, he would have
brought most – if not all – that he had
(Antigonus would give Demetrius 5,000
for his raid into Babylonia in 311 – see
100.4). Of the Egyptians “fully equipped
and serviceable for battle”, there is a good
possibility that a number were sarissa-
armed (Suda s.v. basilikoi paides: “six thou-
sand royal boys; by order of Alexander
the Macedonian they were doing military
drill in Egypt”) as the usually cautious
Ptolemy was unlikely to seek a showdown
in Coele-Syria with few sarissaphoroi and
a plethora of lightly-armed natives and
porters. In any case, of the 18,000 infantry,
possibly some 15,000 were line troops,
with Ptolemy’s Macedonians accounting
for perhaps 2,400.
Having no elephants, Ptolemy was, by
necessity, far more defensive in posture
and deployment. The Antigonid elephants
had to be countered and to do so meant
awaiting their deployment. Originally
planning to strike with their own left wing,
Ptolemy and Seleucus quickly redeployed
on the scouts’ reports that Demetrius
had posted himself on his left wing along
with the bulk of his elephants and heavy
cavalry. “The three thousand strongest
of their cavalry, along with whom they
themselves had decided to fight” were
now stationed on the right wing, part of
which was posted as an advance guard
(83.1). One thousand remained on the
left wing to deal with Demetrius’ refused
wing should it come to that. The merce-
nary phalanx likely retained the centre as
Ptolemy deployed his best infantry – the
Macedonian foot – to its right alongside
his cavalry.
As the right wing cavalry of the
Ptolemaic line reformed, a dense screen
of light infantry spread across its front.
Hardly there for the exercise, they hid the
THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER
work of those whose task it was to stretch
out the “spiked devices made of iron and
connected by chains that they had pre-
pared against the onset of the elephants”
behind them. The ‘mines’ and their han-
dlers now in order, the light infantry for-
ward of them (javelin men and archers)
formed into battle order. They had only
the one instruction from their general: “to
shoot without ceasing at the elephants
and at those who were mounted upon
them” (83.1-3). Satisfied with the prepara-
tions, Ptolemy gave the signal and “they
advanced upon the enemy with a great
shout”. Across the field “their opponents
also advanced” (83.3).
The battle of Gaza
The extreme wings of each army came
into contact first. Demetrius’ advance
guard charged out and forward of the
wing’s elephant screen seeking out their
opposites. The Ptolemaic advance guard,
riding around their lightly armed skirmish-
ers, met them at the gallop. The long
cavalry lance – the xyston – was thrust
and driven at any unarmoured target. In
the sharp conflict of spears “the men of
Demetrius had much the better of it” and
though Ptolemy’s men fought desperately
they were stopped as spear points found
both man and mount. (83.3).
As his advance guards fought and
died, Ptolemy’s light infantry, ahead of
his main body of heavy cavalry, advanced
slowly. Behind them came alternate lines
of Egyptian porters, lengths of chained
mines between them. Following behind
his light troops, Ptolemy allowed the
advance to continue some way into the
no-man’s land between the armies before
he gave the signal for the infantry of the
line to commence a similarly measured
advance. Once the mainline infantry were
underway, Ptolemy and Seleucus turned
their cavalry ile by ile to the right and led
them in that direction. Having got well
to the right of their elephant mines and
light infantry, they then wheeled left by ile
(squadron) and galloped for the Antigonid
left wing.
Demetrius, as yet unaware of
Ptolemy’s move and with his advanced
guard clearly carrying the day against their
rivals, signaled for the elephants and light
troops to advance. Lumbering forward
with their attendant light troops, they
headed toward the Ptolemaic right wing
“to inspire terror, just as if no one were
going to withstand them” and drive the
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 Demetrius (centre), surrounded by his Friends and Companion cavalry, victorious in the cavalry
fight so far, is confronted and encircled by rallied Ptolemaic cavalry. Formations and manoeuvres
were abandoned as the troopers of both sides slogged it out.

© Igor Dzis

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 THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER
light troops and cavalry back and towards
their own infantry (84.1). The companion
and mixed cavalry readied for the signal
to charge and take advantage of the dis-
order that the elephants were expected
to cause. To their right the infantry also
awaited its signal to follow.
The Ptolemaic light infantry com-
manders watched as the Antigonid ele-
phants closed the distance. Between
them the Antigonid light infantry support
jogged and the cavalry could gradually be
made out moving behind them. As they
approached, the din carried across the
field: men’s shouts and war-cries pierced
by bellowing elephants, all underscored
by the thudding of the animal’s feet. When
the elephants had covered over half the
distance, the signal was given and the
Ptolemaic light infantry advance abruptly
ceased. Behind them, the ‘mine’ carriers
laid their mines onto the field in rows and,
having done so, ran from the field. To
the left, the phalanx, somewhat behind
their light infantry, continued a slow and
deliberate advance. At the signal, the light
infantry turned and started back into the
‘minefield’.
Demetrius, his elephants at the point
of crashing into the Ptolemaic line, sent
his mixed cavalry off and, with his agema
of Friends, set out to deliver a flank attack
as his elephants struck home. To his right,
the Companion cavalry would follow the
mixed cavalry forward. The Antigonid
infantry, refused right trailing behind,
advanced following their elephants and
light troops. At this point, Ptolemy and
Seleucus, “with cavalry drawn up in
depth”, charged in towards Demetrius’
flank (83.4). Demetrius, realizing that
this was no mere flanking detachment,
immediately led the Friends of his agema
towards the threat and sent orders for his
companion cavalry to follow him.
The Indian mahouts, seeing the
Ptolemaic light troops falling back, urged
their beasts and light infantry on. The
Antigonid mixed cavalry prepared to
charge through and around their ele-
phants. As the elephants closed on them,
the Ptolemaic light infantry stopped in
the minefield and, facing the enemy once
more, sent “their missiles unremittingly”
and “began to wound severely the ele-
phants themselves and those who were
mounted upon them”. Keeping up their
heavy fire, the Ptolemaic troops gradu-
ally fell back through the minefield and
32 Ancient Warfare V-6
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now “while the mahouts were forcing the
beasts forward and were using their goads,
some of the elephants were pierced by the
cleverly devised spikes”. As the Ptolemaic
phalanx infantry joined up with their light
troops, the Antigonid elephant charge
came to an abrupt halt.
Lances couched, the Ptolemaic cav-
alry ilai, in a deep column of wedges,
circled around the victorious Antigonid
advance cavalry and powered into the
Tarantines. Terribly outnumbered, the
Tarantines loosed javelins and wheeled
away. Demetrius’ flank guard heavily
engaged the attackers as Demetrius and
his Agema drove in along with units of
the companion cavalry. Now “there was
severe fighting because of the zeal of
both sides” and this “fighting was with
spears, most of which were shattered”. As
each troop charged, spears found horse
and man “and many of the antagonists
were wounded” (83.4-5). Under the gaze
of their commanders, the bloody battle
was both furious and deadly.
The Antigonid elephants, nailed by
mines and assailed by missiles, refused
the commands of those mahouts still alive
and began to turn away from the hail of
missiles showered upon them. Elephant
reversed into elephant or simply refused
to move and order promptly became
disorder. The advance, so crucial to the
Antigonid battle plan, faltered and then
fell apart as the Antigonid mixed cav-
alry charged into and around their stalled
elephant brigade. Into the melee coursed
the Ptolemaic light troops, loosing jav-
elins and arrows. Antigonid mahouts were
shot down in increasing numbers and their
animals captured. The Antigonid cavalry,
stalled and penned in, turned away from
the evolving disaster as the Ptolemaic
infantry line advanced upon the disor-
dered and retreating enemy.
Spears shattered, Ptolemy and
Seleucus rallied their cavalry and, with
kopis drawn, “rushed into battle at sword’s
point”. Tactical formations abandoned,
the cavalry battle was now more an infan-
try battle on horseback as riders, “all of
whom had been selected for bravery”,
became “locked in close combat”. Swords
hacked and thrust as “the very command-
ers, endangering themselves in front of all,
encouraged those under their command
to withstand the danger stoutly” (83.5).
Men fell to be trampled under hoof whilst
others, unhorsed and using whatever was
at hand, fought for their lives.
Away to the right, the elephant attack
in which Demetrius had invested so much
had proven a tactical masterpiece – for
Ptolemy. “After most of the mahouts had
been shot down, all the elephants were
captured”. Amid the utter disorder, com-
pounded by the loss of the elephants,
the Antigonid light infantry broke and
ran. They were joined by the Antigonid
mixed cavalry which galloped through and
over them as they fled in the direction of
Gaza. As this left wing disaster became
plain, the alarm spread and “most of
Demetrius’ horsemen were panic-stricken
and rushed into flight” (84.1-5). Worse,
as the Ptolemaic infantry advanced,
some of the Antigonid infantry (likely the
Macedonians), seeing the flight of the
cavalry, “preferred to leave their lines and,
abandoning their heavy arms” joined in
the flight (84.7).
The cavalry battle about Demetrius
raged as the Friends of both combat-
ants hacked, stabbed and died. The panic
in the Antigonid ranks, once begun, was
proving irresistibly contagious. As his
mixed cavalry left the field, Demetrius’
Companion cavalry also began to flee.
For Demetrius, the battle was still to be
won if he could rally his cavalry. His royal
armour bloodied, Demetrius showed him-
self openly in an attempt to stem the
flight. Boeotus and Pithon, loyal to the
end, now died protecting the ‘heir’ of their
patron, Antigonus, along with many more
of the Friends. The panic, though, was
now terminal and Demetrius “since no one
heeded him when he begged them each
to stand and not desert him” turned from
the death about him and fled with the rest
(84.5).
The flight now became headlong.
Those infantry who preferred to do so,
the great bulk of them mercenaries, laid
up arms and surrendered. The right wing
of the Antigonid cavalry, unengaged
throughout, took their cue and made for
Gaza. On the Antigonid left, those of the
cavalry unable or unwilling to flee were
surrounded and forced to surrender. The
victorious Ptolemaic cavalry pursued.
Those who escaped with Demetrius kept
order in the flight until they reached Gaza.
Here, at sunset, some of his cavalry pre-
ferred to rescue their baggage and “there
arose such confusion around the gates
that when the troops of Ptolemy came up
no one was able to close the gates in time”
04-01-2012 18:03:00

with the result that the pursuers “dashed
within the walls, and the city came into
the possession of Ptolemy” (84.8).
Aftermath
Of Demetrius’ forces, over five hundred
had been killed “the majority of whom
were cavalry and men of distinction” (85.3)
along with not a few of those assigned to
the elephants. Of the fallen, most were the
elite cavalry of Demetrius’ left wing, the
“men of distinction” being those Friends
who’d died in the furious battle fought
to defend him. “More than eight thou-
sand had been captured” at battle’s end
along with Demetrius’ ‘Royal’ baggage
and those “who had been accustomed
to be in attendance at the court” (85.3).
These latter (“those who passed time with
the court”) being the Friends who survived
the battle.
Ptolemy and Seleucus, on receiving
Demetrius’ envoy, “permitted the recov-
ery of the dead, and they returned to
Demetrius without ransom the royal bag-
gage” (ibid). Also returned without ran-
som were the captured Friends. If acqui-
sition was the ‘raison d’être’ of all the
Diadochs and their subsequent Hellenistic
kingdoms, then plunder and spoil was
the fuel. Ptolemy was no different. If he
was profligate regarding the baggage and
Friends, he was conspicuously parsimoni-
ous with the rank and file troops: these
he sent “off into Egypt, ordering them to
be distributed among the nomes” (85.4).
Friends Ptolemy had aplenty; good infan-
try – Greek or Macedonian – was another
matter entirely.
In the wake of the battle, Ptolemy
“went with his forces against the cities of
Phoenicia, besieging some of them and
winning others by persuasion”. Demetrius,
in need of soldiers, retired to Tripolis to
gather what forces remained from his gar-
risons in Cilicia (85.4-5). Ptolemy, having
gained control over the “open country”
about Gaza and won over Sidon, laid siege
to Tyre. Here, having escaped the bat-
tlefield, the Antigonid Friend Andronicus
refused to be persuaded by Ptolemy’s
promises of “gifts and abundant honours”.
Eventually his troops rebelled and expelled
him. Capturing him, Ptolemy “gave him
gifts and kept him in his court, making him
one of his Friends and advancing him in
honour” (86.2). Such a man, as with many
of the Friends, was clearly useful.
At this stage Ptolemy might have felt
AW nr6 dec11.indd 33
THEME: CLAD IN GOLD AND SILVER
his duty to the coalition to have been
discharged. Certainly he had what he
wanted, but one of the war’s casus belli
Further Reading:
remained: Seleucus. In the early spring of
The war is described by Diodorus
311, Ptolemy supplied Seleucus with forc-
– our only real narrative source –
es numbering “no more than eight hun-
in the following chapters: 19.55-
dred foot soldiers and about two hundred
64; 66-69; 73-75; 77-93 (including
horse” (91.1 or 1,000 and 300 - Appian
the battle); 105.1 - the Peace of
Syr.54). On the way to Babylon, Seleucus
The Dynasts. The most accessible
“persuaded some of the Macedonians
treatment of the war and battle
who were settled at Carrhae to join his
is Richard Billows’ Antigonus the
forces, and compelled the rest”. These
One-Eyed and the Creation of the
were, in all likelihood, a detachment of the
Hellenistic State (Berkeley 1990).
Argyraspids. In Babylonia the people came
Divine, ‘Diodorus’ Account of the
over to him as did a certain Polyarchus
Battle of Gaza’ (Acta Classica, 27
along with 1,000 troops. Antigonus’ men,
(1984), 31-40), treats the battle
seeing the population switch sides, retired
itself. H. H Scullard, The Elephant
to the citadel of Babylon, which Seleucus
in the Greek and Roman World,
took by storm and “recovered the persons
Cornell 1974, 95-97 and R. E. Gaebel
of all his Friends” (91.1-4).
Cavalry Operations in the Ancient
Although Demetrius had, in spring
World, Norman 2002, 221-222 offer
311, retrieved his position in Coele-Syria
shorter discussions.
with a victory over Ptolemy’s Macedonian
On the Friends, see Christian
Friend Cilles, in Greece his father’s nephew
Habicht’s ‘The Ruling Class in the
Telesophorus “betrayed the friendship of
Hellenistic Monarchies’, in: The
Antigonus” and deserted. Ptolemy with-
Hellenistic Monarchies. Selected
drew to Egypt on the advice of his Friends
Papers (Ann Arbor 2006), 26-40.
where he prepared to deal with Antigonus.
G Herman ‘The Friends of the
For Antigonus, though, a continuing war
Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants
on three fronts could not be won and so he
of Officials?’, in: Talanta (1981),
hammered out the basis of a settlement
103-141. Rolf Strootman, Doctoral
with Cassander and Lysimachus. Ptolemy,
thesis, Utrecht University 2007,
not wanting to be isolated, sought to be
The Hellenistic Royal Court. Court
included. Antigonus acquiesced for, at this
Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology in
time (the autumn of 311), there came to
Greece, Egypt and the Near East,
Antigonus “a dispatch-bearer with a let-
336-30 BCE (chapter thee). Also see
ter from Nicanor, the general of Media
Billows (above) chapter seven (esp.
and the upper satrapies” (100.3) detailing
242-245 and excellent prosopog-
his defeat at Seleucus’ hands. Seleucus
raphy) and W. Heckel, ‘The Politics
“already possessing a king’s stature and
of Distrust: Alexander and his
a reputation worthy of royal power” had
Successors’, in: D. Ogden (ed.), The
“easily won over Susiane, Media, and
Hellenistic World: New Perspectives
some of the adjacent lands” (92.5). In
(London 2002).
arrogantly going to war against a coalition
For the participation Egyptian
of three Diadoch “kingdoms”, Antigonus
natives in Ptolemy’s army at Gaza,
had facilitated a fourth.
see: N. G. L. Hammond ‘Alexander’s
Seleucus’ rise to power in the central
Non-European Troops and Ptolemy
satrapies of the old Persian Empire was
I’s Use of Such Troops’, in: BASP 33,
the direct result of the battle of Gaza
99-109 and ‘Royal Pages, Personal
and would, eventually, prove decisive.
Pages and Boys Trained in the
For some two years (310-309/8) the One-
Macedonian Manner during the
Eyed would campaign across Babylonia
Temenid Monarchy’, Historia 39,
and Media grappling, fruitlessly in the
1261-290 as well as A. B. Lloyd, The
end, with an enemy largely of his own
Egyptian Elite in the Early Ptolemaic
making. •
Period: Some Hieroglyphic Evidence,
in D. Ogden (above).
Michael Park is a regular contributor
to Ancient Warfare.
Ancient Warfare V-6 33
04-01-2012 18:03:09