Peter Rabover, CFA

Portfolio Manager
Artko Capital LP

July 14, 2018

Dear Partner,

For the second calendar quarter of 2018, an average partnership interest in Artko Capital LP returned
5.5% net of fees. At the same time, an investment in the most comparable market indexes—Russell 2000,
Russell Microcap, and the S&P 500—gained 7.8%, 10.0%, and 3.3%, respectively. For first six months of
calendar 2018, an average partnership interest in Artko Capital LP returned 11.2% net of fees, while
investments in the most comparable aforementioned market indexes were up 7.7%, 10.7%, and 2.4%,
respectively. Our monthly results and related footnotes are available in the table at the end of this letter.
Our results this quarter came from contributions from Gaia, Skyline Champion, Leaf Group, Friedman
Industries and Joint Chiropractic. Pullbacks in Hudson Technologies, Premier Exhibitions and our hedging
strategy detracted from the overall performance.
Inception Inception
3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 YTD 1 year 3 year
7/1/2015 Annualized
Artko LP Net 1.9% 4.1% 5.5% 5.5% 11.2% 18.1% 19.7% 71.3% 19.7%
Russell 2000 Index 5.7% 3.3% -0.1% 7.8% 7.7% 17.6% 11.0% 36.6% 11.0%
Russell MicroCap Index 6.7% 1.8% 0.7% 10.0% 10.7% 20.2% 10.5% 34.9% 10.5%
S&P 500 Index 4.5% 6.6% -0.8% 3.3% 2.4% 14.4% 11.9% 40.2% 11.9%

On Making Sale Decisions

“Selling a stock is a more difficult decision than buying one” – Monhish Pabrai

One of the more significant books we’ve read during our career was Monhish Pabrai’s “The Dhandho
Investor” and if you ever get a chance we highly recommend you pick it up. Investing doesn’t have to be
complicated, and Mr. Pabrai’s buy "low risk, high uncertainty" stocks with the “heads I win, tails I don’t
lose much” attitude naturally appealed to our margin of safety-oriented investing style. However, the
most influential part of the book was the chapter on the art of selling. The book aptly focuses on an ancient
legend of an Indian warrior who, in order to help his family defeat the rival clan in an epic battle, enters
the enemy’s very effective spiral army formation to disrupt their leadership. Unfortunately, the young
warrior never learns the secret to exiting the spiral and eventually succumbs to the enemy. For us, the art
of selling our positions is always focused on not getting trapped in an epic maze of complexity and
headstrong warrior mentality. Instead, we focus on constantly improving our ability to exit
underperforming investments without succumbing to massive injuries. Some of the most glaring mistakes
that well-known investors make, though few and far between, are exhibiting a headstrong attitude of
"must win at all costs" which usually ends up compounding the mistakes.

Mr. Pabrai presents seven questions that an investor should answer to continue to justify his holding in a
company. While we won’t list all of them, since you’d be better off reading his book yourself, chief among
those were:

• Is it run by able and honest managers?

• Do we know the intrinsic value of the business today and, with a high degree of confidence, how
is it likely to change over the next few years?

• Is the downside minimal?

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We added two more portfolio related questions to this list: “Do you have better opportunities to deploy
capital in the long term than this investment?” and “What are the tax considerations of letting go of these
investments at this price?” Most value-oriented investors, including ourselves, like to use tax analysis to
justify corporate transactions and apply valuations of Net Operating Loss (NOL) tax assets to their equity
investments. But when making their own portfolio capital allocation decisions looking at tax and other
capital redeployment opportunities, we tend to show a surprising blind spot.

This quarter we were faced with two of our positions, Hudson Technologies and Destination XL, showing
20% losses from our average purchase price, and significant changes in their investment theses. We have
been bullish on them as recently as a few months ago but were cognizant that a confident attitude that is
an important part of a concentrated portfolio investing strategy was likely doing us a disservice in this
case. We decided to completely rip up our original theses on these stocks and begin the research process
again to try to answer some of Mr. Pabrai’s and our own questions with a fresh set of eyes. While the two
stocks are very different in terms of the businesses in which they operate, they did have many similarities
that did not justify our holding them in the Core Portfolio in large concentrations:

• While surprising, given the significant ownership by the Hudson Technologies’ founder and CEO,
we found Hudson’s management team completely out of touch with the market realities and a
frustrating inability to the accept them. The Destination XL CEO, after a failed advertising strategy
and presiding over a 75% decline in stock over the last five years, was retiring. We did not want
to stick around to find out what happens next in either case.

• Given the volatile fundamental performances of both businesses and the self-inflicted wounds by
their management teams, we had little confidence in our estimates of the intrinsic value of these
enterprises. Hoping for an upside, the probability of which being realized has decreased
significantly, is never the answer.

• Both businesses, contrary to our usual Core Portfolio preferences, had financial leverage, which
given the above two points, increased our estimates of potential downside. In other words, we
no longer felt that we had a margin of safety in our positions. While Destination XL had debt when
we invested, the significant cut in Free Cash Flow generation ability of the company, which we
forecasted would pay down the debt in short order and considered our margin of safety, instead
magnified the problem. Hudson Technologies, which was mostly debt free when we originally
invested in the company, took on a significant debt load to purchase its competitor. Declining
prices for refrigerant gases took the likelihood of breaking covenants and needing to raise more
equity from a low probability event to a more than likely one. The leverage for both companies
took our downside estimates from 20% to almost a 100%, which made holding them in the Core
Portfolio at 6% to 8% concentrations an irresponsible proposition.

As a final note, microcap investing tends to happen in inefficient and illiquid markets with few professional
investors and eyeballs on the company relative to its mid- and large-cap counterparts. Having 10%
declines on low volume days are not unusual events. When we had originally invested in Hudson
Technologies, few people had heard of the company. In the two years since, the company has picked up
significant coverage from sell side and buy side investors with regular detailed reports published in
numerous mediums. It’s important to recognize when the stock goes from an inefficient low liquidity
play, where near term price action is inconsequential, to knowing when the company’s price performance
begins to signal trouble. Hudson Technologies became an overfished pond where we no longer had an
informational competitive advantage. Sitting on another 15% loss this quarter, and down over 50% from

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the recent high, and heading into the quarterly call we hedged and exited our position at a net price of
around $4.00 and avoided the subsequent additional 50% cut in the stock. We exited our Destination XL
investment at around $1.80 and recognized about 20% in permanent capital losses on both positions,
though we’ve also recognized significant gains in the past, as we reduced the position sizes at higher
prices. Given our significant realized taxable gains on the buyout of US Geothermal earlier in the year and
the opportunity to invest in our new ideas, discussed below, the answers to the last two questions were
contributory in finalizing our decisions.

We can certainly play up our wins to you in these pages and avoid or minimize the discussion of our losses
front and center, especially as we close our third year as a partnership with a track record of creating
value that we’re proud of. However, we feel its important to own our mistakes, even in a context of a well
performing portfolio, to maintain a sense of transparency and integrity in our investing process.

Core Portfolio Additions

• Ecology & Environment Inc (EEI) – We added a 10% position to our Core Portfolio in a small, cash rich,
environmental consulting company. At our average entry prices under $12.00 per share, the
company’s equity was worth $52mm and with $17mm of cash on the balance sheet, or $4.00 per
share, an Enterprise Value of $35mm. For over 40 years, Ecology & Environment has been a staple in
the niche space of environmental impact assessments and remediation consulting for federal and
state governments as well as for the global energy and infrastructure sectors. The company has
recently suffered a triple slump in its business via a slowdown in approval of federal government’s
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projects due to persistent understaffing, substantial
underspending in the energy infrastructure space and a brutal multiyear recession in Brazil. Despite
the slowdown, the company continued to generate a (cyclical low) run rate of approximately $5.5mm
in Free Cash Flow and $6.5mm in EBITDA on $100mm in revenues and paying out a 3.3% dividend
yield.

We believe Ecology and Environment could generate $120mm in revenues and a $15mm EBITDA run
rate within the next few years for two main reasons. The first is that the South America region is
showing signs of economic growth flowing through to the segment results. The second is that the
energy infrastructure segment that serves the oil & gas, energy transmission, wind, and solar service
industries is beginning to see significant pent up demand. We are mindful of the weak state of the
federal government business but note that today it only represents approximately 17% of low margin
revenues with at least half of them on long-term contracts and diversified into other federal agencies
such as military bases. Some of the work left over by the EPA is being picked up by state governments
and should keep this segment’s revenues at close to flat growth in the intermediate term though not
without some shorter-term volatility.

With the stock trading at 16% Free Cash Flow yield and 5.5X a depressed EBITDA with a cash rich
balance sheet, we believe the current valuation provides us with a good margin of safety. In 2015,
Mill Road Capital, a reputable long-term capital hybrid private and public equity fund and holder of
11% EEI stock offered to buy the company at "$13-$14 per share", when EEI did not have $4 per share
in cash on the balance sheet it does now and was losing money, which was rejected by the board of
directors. Since then Mill Road has won two seats on the board completely controlled by the
company's 80-year-old founders, with the explicit intention to create significant value through
improved corporate governance, such as cutting out the founders’ multi-million-dollar "board bonus"
payments; and potential transactions, such as joint ventures with strategic Engineering & Consulting
(E&C) partners. We believe that with the opportunity to significantly improve profitability in the

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 intermediate term through operating leverage (with competitors trading or having been acquired at
11X to 13X forward EBITDA), a 200% - 300% upside potential with a 10-20% downside scenario and a
likely standing buyout offer by current board members, EEI represents a good "low risk, high
uncertainty" type of investment in our Core Portfolio.

Enhanced Portfolio Additions

• Rosehill Resources Warrants and Stock Units (ROSEW/ROSEU) – We added a 5% position (a split of
2.5% and 2.5%) in the September 2022, $11.50 strike warrants and equity units (one stock plus one
warrant) of Rosehill Resources (ROSE), an Exploration and Production (E&P) company in the prolific
Delaware Basin in Texas and New Mexico. As we’ve talked previously in our letters we have an
aversion to investing in commodity companies given our inherent belief that for the most part
investors are better off gaining commodity exposure through direct ownership of commodity indexes
rather than trying to pick companies that produce and service those commodities. This mindset
usually leaves us with a relatively high hurdle to invest our partnership’s capital in energy stocks in
meaningful positions and our research process into Rosehill was not an exception.

The reason we invested in the capital structure of this $300mm market cap company was due to the
very favorable risk reward ratios as well as the presence of near term catalysts to unlock significant
value. Rosehill is a relatively new public company formed through a 2017 merger of a Special Purpose
Acquisition Company (SPAC) KLR Energy Acquisition Corp and Tema Oil & Gas Company, a privately
held E&P company that has operated in West Texas for over 50 years and traces its origins back to
American Oil Co. (Amoco). As a result of the merger and subsequent acreage acquisitions in the
Northern Delaware Basin, the company was left with a low liquidity stock, tiny float, and a somewhat
byzantine capital structure full of convertible and non-convertible preferred equity; high cost debt;
and warrants, whose dilution numbers stand at almost 80% of current shares outstanding.
Complicated is an understatement and on a fully diluted basis the company’s Enterprise Value stood
somewhere between $600mm to $700mm at the time of our entry into the position.

Since the company is relatively new, in fact having started with just land assets last year, its recent
production and profitability numbers do not reflect the earning power underlying the business. For
2018 and 2019 calendar years, the company expects to earn approximately $180mm and $280mm in
EBITDAX. This placed its valuation multiples at 3.5X and 2.2X EBITDAX versus the small cap E&P peers
trading at over 7X and 5.5X, valuing the company at a punitive 50% discount to its peers despite having
a debt load that’s in line with the peer averages on a relative EBITDA basis, at below 1.4X on forecasted
2018 numbers. There are several ways the company should be able to close the discount to its peers
in the near future. We believe as the company continues to grow production, as planned, it will be
able to expand its borrowing capability under a cheap $500mm credit line, led by the venerable JP
Morgan Chase corporate lending arm. Rosehill Resources may also do a secondary equity offering or
access the high yield debt markets which would allow it to refinance the most expensive parts of its
capital structure as well as create liquidity to make the stock more attractive to institutional investors.
Additionally, we expect the company to add more Delaware Basin acreage to its economic inventory
and the publishing of audited reserve economic numbers for its latest acreage additions in the next
annual report, in early 2019, should generate additional interest from investors. We consider this
more of a special situation/event driven type of an investment and less of a bet on oil prices. However,
we should note that the company guidance is based on 2018 and 2019 estimated production that is
50% hedged at $55/bbl oil prices which are currently trading above $70/bbl leaving potential for
higher results than implied by the current guidance.

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 With our average entry price below $1.00 for the warrants and $9.15 for the units, we believe we are
well positioned for significant gains in this investment. The September 2022 expiration warrants have
a cap at a stock price of $21.00, the price at which the company would still only be valued at
approximately 5.0X 2019 EBITDA (still below its median peer) but would represent a potential 1000%
upside from our entry price. If we’re completely wrong in our assessment, a situation we always take
into consideration, we believe we are facing a potential 50% downside in the warrants due to the
natural time decay inherent investing in option instruments and a 12.5% downside in the units to
around $8.00 per unit. With an estimated 20-1 risk-reward ratio on both instruments in the next 18
to 24 months we feel that we are well compensated for venturing into rarely visited waters of risky
commodity-oriented investing. In the meantime, we’ll continue to actively monitor issues that could
trip up our thesis including widening basis differentials, infrastructure constraints, capital market
developments and other industry specific issues.

• Where Food Comes From, Inc. (WFCF) – We added a 2% position to our Enhanced Portfolio in a
$45mm market cap company that specializes in tracking and verifying the food sources in the
domestic and global food chain. When we go to Whole Foods and pay a significant price premium for
the organic, grass fed steaks the implicit assumption that a consumer rarely thinks about is the grocer
has verified this claim. But how? That is where WFCF comes in. For example, through farm audits and
RFID tracking of cattle Where Food Comes From ensures that the premium foods that an increasingly
growing portion of our society consumes on a regular basis are what they claim to be. In addition to
our cattle example, WFCF services 17 other food groups, including grapes and grains, and over 40
standards such as gluten free or non-GMO.

The company has spent the last five years consolidating the small nascent food verification industry
to be able to provide the unmatched full suite of recurring revenue services with an increasing shift
toward a higher margin technology offering. The company services over 15,000 customers with blue
chip names such as Costco, McDonalds, Dannon and Tyson with a high retention ratio and a strong
industry reputation for quality. We believe the company has put itself in an excellent position to
benefit through several secular tailwinds for many years to come. Producers, packers, distributors,
retailers and brands increasingly view verification and traceability as key competitive differentiators
that drive millions of dollars in premiums for their products. With the USDA’s Animal Disease
Traceability (ADT) set to require mandatory ID verification in the next decade and key export markets
(EU, Saudi Arabia and China) already requiring verification today, we believe WFCF is in an excellent
position to grow its revenue base exponentially in the intermediate future with an ~80% market share
in the cattle tracking market whose current penetration rate stands at less than 10%.

The “consolidation spree” has masked the true profitability potential of this nano cap with a cash
positive balance sheet. The recent trade and tariff uncertainty has cut the price of this tiny stock in
half and gave us the opportunity to buy in at below $2.00 per share. Much like our investment in
Research Solutions, we view this investment as one with incredible operating leverage potential and
do not think that showing the ability to generate over $10mm in Free Cash Flow a year in the next five
years is out of the question. We anticipate the value of this investment to be worth multiples of
today’s stock price in the long term and given its enviable leadership position in a fast-growing market
that today’s price represents a good value for us, or for any potential acquirer.

• We added a small, under 2%, Enhanced Portfolio position, in the 2020 put spreads of a large domestic
auto manufacturer who we believe is on the verge of declaring bankruptcy and has shown signs that
in the past signaled strong potential for the presence of fraud. It’s a crowded and risky trade, but we
feel our small portfolio sizing and the high potential upside from this position are worth the risk.

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Other Portfolio Updates

• Friedman Industries (FRD) – On the last trading day of the 2nd quarter Friedman Industries, a 2.2%
nano cap position in the Enhanced Portfolio, announced significantly improved results led by demand
from the E&P sector for metal pipe, which sent the stock surging close to 50% over the subsequent
few days. Our original thesis on FRD, which was trading at 35% below its liquidation book value at the
time of our purchase, was that once the demand for energy pipes comes back the stock should at
least appreciate to our estimate of its book value of around $9.00. While historically the stock traded
at 1.5X to 2.0X book value during strong market demand, we decided to recognize our gains from our
average purchase price of around $6.00 and exited our position in July 2018 at around $8.70 price
levels. There is likely more upside to be had in this stock, however, the next leg of gains would have
to be dependent on its performance as a going concern rather than liquidation play. This would be a
much tougher upside proposition for an unspectacular steel product manufacturer, and a
combination of relatively high energy markets exposure through our new investments in
aforementioned EEI and ROSEW/ROSEU, as well as higher return potential on capital redeployment
opportunities elsewhere in the portfolio made this a somewhat easy sale decision. As always, we will
continue to keep an eye on the company and may invest again if the right opportunity presents itself.

Market Outlook and Commentary

In the 12 months preceding the last two market peaks the Russell 2000 index had gained ~50% in 2000
and 20% in 2007 as the domestic economy continued to expand beyond the peaks. In fact, it would take
a fall in the market of approximately 20% from each peak before the first negative GDP numbers would
begin to show nine to twelve months later, as the GDP continued to grow at close to a 2% rate for a few
more quarters in 2000 and 2007. While lightning rarely strikes the same spot twice, we continue to worry
seeing a flattening yield curve which has signaled the last nine recessions and a strong twelve-month 20%
gain in the Russell 2000 index (through mid-July 2018), that we are witnessing the last gasps of a relentless
bull market led increasingly by one sector. We generally believe in forecasting the performance of the
market and our individual investments in probabilities rather than grandiose definitive bull or bear terms.
If you’ve ever tried to count cards in single hand black jack than you know that if out of the first 26 cards
the first 15 were face cards the odds of winning the rest of the hands out of this deck are very low. Our
position remains that we’re at the point of the market cycle where the deck is almost out of face cards
and the odds of winning the next hand are increasingly against the broad market participant.

We’ve tried to select a portfolio of investments that should perform better in an economic slowdown and
large market drawdown than the overall small cap markets. With the sale of Hudson Technologies and
Destination XL our Core Portfolio, which with nine positions is approximately 80% of the overall portfolio,
has a median net cash position of 7%. We own only one company in the Core Portfolio, Viad, that has any
debt and even their borrowings are close to only one turn of EBITDA. Our median portfolio valuation
multiples have increased from 6.0X EBITDA and 12% Free Cash Flow yield to about 8.0X and 9% in the last
three years though is still significantly below the double-digit multiples of major indexes and prices at
which private equity funds and strategic investors are still paying for small cap companies. We are
confident in the significant long-term upside potential in our portfolio and are comfortable with an overall
unhedged estimated 7-1 risk-reward ratio. The portfolio is still a 100% hedged through year end 2018 via
cheap put spreads on the Russell 2000 index against a 35% drop in the small cap markets and we will
continue to reassess our temporary hedging strategy with the market conditions with our main focus
remaining on partnership capital preservation.

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Partnership Updates

We welcomed five new partners to the partnership this quarter, bringing our total to 32 at the end of
June. We are excited about closing the third year of the partnership, the continued growth in partners
and assets under management and as always are thankful for your business.

Next Fund Opening

Our next partnership openings will be August 1, 2018, and September 1, 2018. Please reach out for
updated offering documents and presentations at info@artkocapital.com or 415.531.2699

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 Appendix: Performance Statistics Table

Artko LP Russell MicroCap

Artko LP Net Russell 2000 Index S&P 500 Index
Gross Index

Jul-15 2.1% 1.7% -1.2% -3.2% 2.1%

Aug-15 -3.7% -3.7% -6.3% -5.4% -6.0%
Sep-15 1.6% 1.4% -4.9% -5.8% -2.5%
Oct-15 1.7% 1.5% 5.6% 5.4% 8.4%
Nov-15 4.1% 3.3% 3.3% 3.8% 0.3%
Dec-15 0.2% 0.0% -5.0% -5.2% -1.6%
Jan-16 -5.2% -5.4% -8.8% -10.4% -5.0%
Feb-16 0.9% 0.8% 0.0% -1.5% -0.1%
Mar-16 8.9% 7.5% 8.0% 7.1% 6.8%
Apr-16 1.4% 1.1% 1.6% 3.2% 0.4%
May-16 3.5% 2.7% 2.3% 1.3% 1.8%
Jun-16 2.3% 1.8% -0.1% -0.6% 0.3%
Jul-16 12.4% 10.0% 6.0% 5.2% 3.7%
Aug-16 0.5% 0.4% 1.8% 2.7% 0.1%
Sep-16 0.1% 0.1% 1.1% 2.9% 0.0%
Oct-16 -1.5% -1.3% -4.8% -5.7% -1.8%
Nov-16 13.5% 11.0% 11.2% 11.6% 3.7%
Dec-16 1.8% 1.4% 2.8% 4.6% 2.0%
Jan-17 -2.2% -2.3% 0.4% -1.5% 1.9%
Feb-17 2.3% 2.2% 1.9% 1.0% 4.0%
Mar-17 -3.4% -3.5% 0.1% 0.9% 0.1%
Apr-17 2.7% 2.7% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
May-17 0.1% 0.1% -2.0% -2.3% 1.4%
Jun-17 6.6% 5.4% 3.5% 5.2% 0.6%
Jul-17 3.4% 2.7% 0.7% -0.6% 2.1%
Aug-17 -2.0% -1.7% -1.3% -0.8% 0.3%
Sep-17 1.1% 0.9% 6.2% 8.2% 2.1%
Oct-17 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% -0.2% 2.3%
Nov-17 1.2% 0.9% 2.9% 2.5% 3.1%
Dec-17 2.8% 2.3% -0.4% -0.5% 1.1%
Jan-18 5.9% 4.8% 2.6% 2.5% 5.7%
Feb-18 -2.6% -2.2% -3.9% -3.2% -3.7%
Mar-18 3.6% 2.9% 1.3% 1.5% -2.5%
Apr-18 0.6% 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 0.4%
May-18 5.9% 4.8% 6.1% 7.2% 2.4%
Jun-18 0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 1.3% 0.6%

Artko LP Russell MicroCap

Artko LP Net Russell 2000 Index S&P 500 Index
Gross Index
YTD 14.5% 11.2% 7.7% 10.7% 2.7%

1 Year 23.6% 18.1% 17.6% 20.2% 14.4%

3 Year 25.8% 19.7% 11.0% 10.5% 11.9%
Inception 7/1/2015 99.0% 71.3% 36.7% 34.9% 40.2%
Inception Annualized 25.8% 19.7% 11.0% 10.5% 11.9%

Monthly Average 2.0% 1.6% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0%

Monthly St Deviation 3.9% 3.3% 4.0% 4.4% 2.9%
Correlation w Net - 1.00 0.79 0.72 0.61

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 Legal Disclosure

The Partnership’s performance is based on operations during a period of general market growth and
extraordinary market volatility during part of the period, and is not necessarily indicative of results the
Partnership may achieve in the future. In addition, the results are based on the periods as a whole, but
results for individual months or quarters within each period have been more favorable or less favorable
than the average, as the case may be. The foregoing data have been prepared by the General Partner and
have not been compiled, reviewed or audited by an independent accountant and non-year end results
are subject to adjustment.

The results portrayed are for an investor since inception in the Partnership and the results reflect the
reinvestment of dividends and other earnings and the deduction of costs, the management fees charged
to the Partnership and a pro forma reduction of the General Partner’s special profit allocation, if
applicable. The General Partner believes that the comparison of Partnership performance to any single
market index is inappropriate. The Partnership’s portfolio may contain options and other derivative
securities, fixed income investments, may include short sales of securities and margin trading and is not
as diversified as the indices, shown. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index contains 500 industrial,
transportation, utility and financial companies and is generally representative of the large capitalization
US stock market. The Russell 2000 Index is comprised of the smallest 2000 companies in the Russell 3000
Index and is generally representative of the small capitalization U.S. stock market. The Russell Microcap
Index is comprised of the smallest 1,000 securities in the Russell 2000 Index plus the next 1,000 securities
(traded on national exchanges). The Russell Microcap is generally representative of the microcap segment
of the U.S. stock market. All of the indices are unmanaged, market weighted and reflect the reinvestment
of dividends. Due to the differences among the Partnership’s portfolio and the performance of the equity
market indices shown above, however, the General Partner cautions potential investors that no such
index is directly comparable to the investment strategy of the Partnership.

While the General Partner believes that to date the Partnership has been managed with an investment
philosophy and methodology similar to that described in the Partnership’s Offering Circular and to that
which will be used to manage the Partnership in the future, future investments will be made under
different economic conditions and in different securities. Further, the performance discussed herein does
not reflect the General Partner’s performance in all different economic cycles. It should not be assumed
that investors will experience returns in the future, if any, comparable to those discussed above. The
information given above is historic and should not be taken as any indication of future performance. It
should not be assumed that recommendations made in the future will be profitable, or will equal, the
performance of the securities discussed in this material. Upon request, the General Partner will provide
to you a list of all the recommendations made by it within the past year.

This document is not intended as and does not constitute an offer to sell any securities to any person or
a solicitation of any person of any offer to purchase any securities. Such an offer or solicitation can only
be made by the confidential Offering Circular of the Partnership. This information omits most of the
information material to a decision whether to invest in the Partnership. No person should rely on any
information in this document, but should rely exclusively on the Offering Circular in considering whether
to invest in the Partnership.

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