G.R. No.
121777 January 24, 2001 herein tantamount [sic] to economic
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-
appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra
questions her conviction for illegal
recruitment in large scale and assails, as
well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of
the law and the conviction of the accused,
but reduces the penalty imposed upon
her.
The accused was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in
an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the
City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without having
previously obtained from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, a
license or authority to engage in
recruitment and overseas placement of
workers, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, offer and
promise for a fee employment abroad
particularly in Singapore thus causing
Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy
Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y
Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said
Maria Lourdes Modesto had already
advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the
accused for and in consideration of the
promised employment which did not
materialized [sic] thus causing damage
and prejudice to the latter in the said
sum; furthermore, the acts complained of
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to
sabotage in that the same were
committed in large scale.1
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused
pleaded not guilty2 to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five
(5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2
Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza,
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The
succeeding narration is gathered from
their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in
the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of
the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call
from an unidentified woman inquiring
about the legitimacy of the recruitment
conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol
Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include
the surveillance of suspected illegal
recruiters, immediately contacted a friend,
a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they
could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan
Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City,
where the recruitment was reportedly
being undertaken. Upon arriving at the
reported area at around 4:00 p.m.,
Bellotindos entered the house and
pretended to be an applicant. Ramos
remained outside and stood on the
pavement, from where he was able to see
around six (6) persons in the house's sala.
Ramos even heard a woman, identified as
Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible
employment she has to provide in
Singapore and the documents that the
applicants have to comply with. Fifteen
(15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out
with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred
with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the
organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. Also present were other
members of the CIS, including Col.
Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the
PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza,
and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group
planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the
next day by having Fermindoza pose as an
applicant.3
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00
p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to
SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the
Philippine National Police who was
assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to
conduct a surveillance of the area to
confirm the report of illegal recruitment.
Accordingly, he, along with Eileen
Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to
Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter
the house where the recruitment was
supposedly being conducted, but
Fermindoza interviewed two people who
informed them that some people do go
inside the house. Upon returning to their
office at around 8:30 a.m., the two
reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized
a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt.
Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza
and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off
and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30
that morning. There they met up with
Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then
proceeded to enter the house while the
rest of the team posted themselves
outside to secure the area. Fermindoza
was instructed to come out after she was
given a bio-data form, which will serve as
the team's cue to enter the house.4
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job
applicant to a man and a woman,
apparently the owners of the house, and
went inside. There, she saw another
woman, later identified as Jasmine,
coming out of the bathroom. The man to
whom Fermindoza earlier introduced
herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was
applying for a position. Jasmine, who was
then only wearing a towel, told her that
she would just get dressed. Jasmine then
came back and asked Fermindoza what
position she was applying for. Fermindoza
replied that she was applying to be a
babysitter or any other work so long as
she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave
her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol
arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that
Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza
asked Carol what the requirements were
and whether she (Fermindoza) was
qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she
had a passport, she could fill up the
application papers. Fermindoza replied
that she had no passport yet. Carol said
she need not worry since Jasmine will
prepare the passport for her. While filling
up the application form, three women who
appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived
to follow up the result of their applications
and to give their advance payment.
Jasmine got their papers and put them on
top of a small table. Fermindoza then
proceeded to the door and signaled to the
raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the
house, a married couple, for permission to
enter the same. The owners granted
permission after the raiding party
introduced themselves as members of the
CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party
saw some supposed applicants.
Application forms, already filled up, were
in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a
permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that
she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt.
Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest
Figueroa. He took the application forms
she was holding as the raiding party
seized the other papers5 on the table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a
certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three
women suspected to be applicants, to the
office for investigation.7
In the course of their investigation, the
CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had
many aliases, among them, Carol Llena
and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was
not able to present any authority to
recruit when asked by the
investigators.8 A check by Ramos with the
POEA revealed that the acused was not
licensed or authorized to conduct
recruitment.9 A certification10 dated
February 2, 1994 stating thus was
executed by Renegold M. Macarulay,
Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed
applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy
Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered
nurses working at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, who executed their respective
written statements.11
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted
that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house
in the afternoon of January 30, 1994.
Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino,
also a nurse at the Cabato Medical
Hospital, that a woman was there to
recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez
and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's
house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine
welcomed them and told them to sit
down. They listened to the "recruiter" who
was then talking to a number of people.
The recruiter said that she was
"recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta
and her friends then filled up bio-data
forms and were required to submit
pictures and a transcript of records. They
were also told to pay P2,000, and "the
rest will be salary deduction." Araneta
submitted her bio-data form to Carol that
same afternoon, but did not give any
money because she was "not yet sure."
On the day of the raid on February 2,
1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro
residence to submit her transcript of
records and her picture. She arrived at the
house 30 minutes before the raid but did
not witness the arrest since she was at
the porch when it happened.12
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in
Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30,
1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed
her that there was someone recruiting in
Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the
Alejandro residence, Lourdes was
welcomed by Jasmine.1âwphi1.nêt
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was
already briefing some people when she
arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they
would like a "good opportunity" since a
hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a
breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000
for the visa and the round trip ticket, and
P5,000 as placement fee and for the
processing of the papers. The initial
payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will
be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and
submitted it to Jasmine. After the
interview, she gave the initial payment of
P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes
that she was authorized to receive the
money. On February 2, 1994, however,
Lourdes went back to the house to get
back the money. Jasmine gave back the
money to Lourdes after the raid.13
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a
resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a
businessman from Cebu, the manager of
the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier
International Encyclopedia. They own an
apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging
to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to
Singapore to visit her relatives. She first
traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993
as a tourist, and came back to the
Philippines on October 20 of the same
year. Thereafter, she returned to
Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in
Singapore, the accused was invited to a
Christmas party sponsored by the
Zamboanga City Club Association. On that
occasion, she met a certain Laleen
Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife,
Malicay had been working in Singapore for
six (6) years. Her employer is a certain
Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent
P15,000 home for her father who was
then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure,
however, whether her father received the
money so she requested the accused to
verify from her relatives receipt thereof.
She informed the accused that she had a
cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro.
Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's
telephone number, address and a sketch
of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on
January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the
accused flew to Zamboanga City on
January 23, 1994 to give some presents
to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called
up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's
cousin, to inform her that she would be
going to her house. At around noon that
day, the accused, accompanied by her
friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the
house where she found Jasmine
entertaining some friends. Jasmine came
down with two of her friends whom she
introduced as her classmates. Jasmine
told them that the accused was a friend of
Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's
message regarding the money the latter
had sent. Jasmine assured her that they
received the money, and asked Carol to
tell Malicay to send more money for
medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine
also told her that she would send
something for Malicay when the accused
goes back to Singapore. The accused
replied that she just needed to confirm
her flight back to Cebu City, and will
return to Jasmine's house. After the
meeting with Jasmine, the accused went
shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The
accused was in the house for only fifteen
(15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to
the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the
morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to
Cebu City. She then proceeded to
Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past
8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who
asked her, "Are you Carol from
Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked
the woman if she could do anything for
her. The woman inquired from Carol if she
was recruiting. Carol replied in the
negative, explaining that she was there
just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The
woman further asked Carol what the
requirements were if she (the woman)
were to go to Singapore. Carol replied
that she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls
entered the house looking for Jasmine.
The woman Carol was talking with then
stood up and went out. A minute after,
three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA
official arrived. A big man identified
himself as a member of the CIS and
informed her that they received a call that
she was recruiting. They told her she had
just interviewed a woman from the CIS.
She denied this, and said that she came
only to say goodbye to the occupants of
the house, and to get whatever Jasmine
would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She
even showed them her ticket for Cebu
City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's
room and returned with some papers. The
accused said that those were the papers
that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to
give to her (the accused). The accused
surmised that because Laleen Malicay
wanted to go home but could not find a
replacement, one of the applicants in the
forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute.
Ramos told the accused to explain in their
office.
The accused denied in court that she went
to Jasmine's residence to engage in
recruitment. She claimed she came to
Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to
whom she could confide since she and her
husband were having some problems. She
denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that
she brought information sheets for job
placement. She also denied instructing
Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged
applicants as processing fee.14
The accused presented two witnesses to
corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified
that she met the accused for the first time
only on January 30, 1994 when the latter
visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's
message regarding the money she sent.
Carol, who was accompanied by a certain
Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house
for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came
back to the house a few days later on
February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning
to "get the envelope for the candidacy of
her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy
Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied
that the accused conducted recruitment.
She claimed she did not see Carol
distribute bio-data or application forms to
job applicants. She disclaimed any
knowledge regarding the P2,000
application fee.15
The other defense witness, Ernesto
Morales, a policeman, merely testified that
the accused stayed in their house in No.
270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four
(4) days before her arrest, although she
would sometimes go downtown alone. He
said he did not notice that she conducted
any recruitment.16
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
consideration[s][,] this Court finds the
accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena
and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment
committed in a large scale and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said
accused is entitled to the full time of the
period of her detention during the
pendency of this case under the condition
set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.17
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to
the trial court the following errors:
I RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF
P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF
POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES
ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY
SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR
ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS
PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION
3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2
[sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED
THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E]
ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME
COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE
ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2
[sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY
ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD
BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA
LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE
SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON
JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN
THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE
CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED
ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE
EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT
THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic]
COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE,
THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON
[sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY
SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE
EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE
OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND
PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE
PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,]
ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;
X As a rule, a statute or act may be said to
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE
ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO
FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID
NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER,
YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER
ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS.
SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION.18
In the first assigned error, appellant
maintains that the law defining
"recruitment and placement" violates due
process. Appellant also avers, as part of
her sixth assigned error, that she was
denied the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code defining "recruitment and
placement" is void for vagueness and,
thus, violates the due process clause.19
Due process requires that the terms of a
penal statute must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.20 A criminal statute
that "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute," or is so indefinite that "it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions," is void for
vagueness.21 The constitutional vice in a
vague or indefinite statute is the injustice
to the accused in placing him on trial for
an offense, the nature of which he is given
no fair warning.22
We reiterated these principles in People
vs. Nazario:23
be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and become an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its
face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified
by either a saving clause or by
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance that had made it illegal
for "three or more persons to assemble on
any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by." Clearly, the
ordinance imposed no standard at all
"because one may never know in advance
what 'annoys some people but does not
annoy others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred
to as a "perfectly vague" act whose
obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation
couched in imprecise language—but which
nonetheless specifies a standard though
defectively phrased—in which case, it may
be "saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to
any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority, recruitment
activities are punishable as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any
recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment or
any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by
a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. – (a) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority
found violating or causing another to
violate any provision of this Title or its
implementing rules and regulations, shall
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than five
years or a fine of not less than P10,000
nor more than P50,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of
the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee
nor a holder of authority under this Title
found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall,
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four
years nor more than eight years or a fine
of not less than P20,000 nor more than
P100,000 or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article
13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant
invokes People vs. Panis,24 where this
Court, to use appellant's term, "criticized"
the definition of "recruitment and
placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only
speculate on the meaning of the
questioned provision for lack of records of
debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor
Code had been enacted as a statute rather
than a presidential decree is that they
could be, and sometimes were, issued
without previous public discussion or
consultation, the promulgator heeding
only his own counsel or those of his close
advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power.
The not infrequent results are rejection,
intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant
case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts
usually reported in the legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on
the meaning of the questioned provision,"
appellant asks, what more "the ordinary
citizen" who does not possess the
"necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that
constitute "recruitment and placement"
suffer from overbreadth since by merely
"referring" a person for employment, a
person may be convicted of illegal
recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is
misplaced. The issue in Panis was
whether, under the proviso of Article 13
(b), the crime of illegal recruitment could
be committed only "whenever two or more
persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee." The
Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended
neither to impose a condition on the basic
rule nor to provide an exception thereto
but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity
is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or
more persons to whom, in consideration
of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
(of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not
an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers.
Any of the acts mentioned in the basic
rule in Article 13(b) will constitute
recruitment and placement even if only
one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing
with them shall be deemed to be engaged
in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in
article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, regarding the failure of a public
officer to produce upon lawful demand
funds or property entrusted to his
custody. Such failure shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be
deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word
"shall be deemed" should by the same
token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of
engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only
speculate on the meaning of the
questioned provision for lack of records of
debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor
Code had been enacted as a statute rather
than a presidential decree is that they
could be, and sometimes were, issued
without previous public discussion or
consultation, the promulgator heeding
only his own counsel or those of his close
advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power.
The not infrequent results are rejection,
intentional or not, of the interest of the
greater number and, as in the instant
case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts
usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here
adopted should give more force to the
campaign against illegal recruitment and
placement, which has victimized many
Filipino workers seeking a better life in a
foreign land, and investing hard-earned
savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit
of their dream, only to be awakened to
the reality of a cynical deception at the
hands of their own countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken
the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt
quoted above out of context. The Court,
in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of
records that would help shed light on the
meaning of the proviso. The absence of
such records notwithstanding, the Court
was able to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of the proviso by applying
principles in criminal law and drawing
from the language and intent of the law
itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a
"perfectly vague act" whose obscurity is
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso
therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper
construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and
inoperative on the ground of vagueness
and uncertainty, only upon a showing that
the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable
degree of certainty, what the legislature
intended. x x x. In this connection we
cannot pretermit reference to the rule that
"legislation should not be held invalid on
the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of
any reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. An Act will not
be declared inoperative and ineffectual on
the ground that it furnishes no adequate
means to secure the purpose for which it
is passed, if men of common sense and
reason can devise and provide the means,
and all the instrumentalities necessary for
its execution are within the reach of those
intrusted therewith."25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what
appellant apparently considers as
customary and harmless acts such as "
labor or employment referral" ("referring"
an applicant, according to appellant, for
employment to a prospective employer)
does not render the law overbroad.
Evidently, appellant misapprehends
concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad
where it operates to inhibit the exercise of
individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as
the freedom of speech or religion. A
generally worded statute, when construed
to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that
it fails to give adequate warning of the
boundary between the constitutionally
permissible and the constitutionally
impermissible applications of the
statute.26
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on
Elections,27 for instance, we struck down
as void for overbreadth provisions
prohibiting the posting of election
propaganda in any place – including
private vehicles – other than in the
common poster areas sanctioned by the
COMELEC. We held that the challenged
provisions not only deprived the owner of
the vehicle the use of his property but
also deprived the citizen of his right to
free speech and information. The
prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so
broad that it covered even constitutionally
guaranteed rights and, hence, void for
overbreadth. In the present case,
however, appellant did not even specify
what constitutionally protected freedoms
are embraced by the definition of
"recruitment and placement" that would
render the same constitutionally
overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal
protection clause28 in her defense. She
points out that although the evidence
purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even
received Lourdes Modesto's payment,
appellant was the only one criminally
charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,
remained scot-free. From this, appellant
concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of
regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana
while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and
the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that
courts are not confined to the language of
the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grossly discriminatory in its
operation.29 Though the law itself be fair
on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and
unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material
to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.30
The prosecution of one guilty person while
others equally guilty are not prosecuted,
however, is not, by itself, a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.31 Where the
official action purports to be in conformity
to the statutory classification, an
erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the
statute, is not without more a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.32 The
unlawful administration by officers of a
statute fair on its face, resulting in its
unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial
of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
This may appear on the face of the action
taken with respect to a particular class or
person, or it may only be shown by
extrinsic evidence showing a
discriminatory design over another not to
be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not
presumed, there must be a showing
of "clear and intentional
discrimination."33 Appellant has failed to
show that, in charging appellant in court,
that there was a "clear and intentional
discrimination" on the part of the
prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute
depends on the prosecution's sound
assessment whether the evidence before
it can justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense.34 The
presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their
duties,35 and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary,
not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence
to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was
charged with the commission of a crime,
while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in
appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to
support a conclusion that the prosecution
officers denied appellant equal protection
of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in
sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to
be treated on a basis of equality before
the law, it does not follow that they are to
be protected in the commission of crime.
It would be unconscionable, for instance,
to excuse a defendant guilty of murder
because others have murdered with
impunity. The remedy for unequal
enforcement of the law in such instances
does not lie in the exoneration of the
guilty at the expense of society x x x.
Protection of the law will be extended to
all persons equally in the pursuit of their
lawful occupations, but no person has the
right to demand protection of the law in
the commission of a crime.36
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce
the criminal laws as to some persons
should be converted into a defense for
others charged with crime, the result
would be that the trial of the district
attorney for nonfeasance would become
an issue in the trial of many persons
charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a
complete breakdown.37
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth
assigned errors, all of which involve the
finding of guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two
elements concur. First, the offender has
no valid license or authority required by
law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers.
Second, he or she undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" defined
under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element
is added: that the accused commits said
acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.39
In this case, the first element is present.
The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge
Macarulay states that appellant is not
licensed or authorized to engage in
recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present.
Appellant is presumed engaged in
recruitment and placement under Article
13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified
that appellant promised them employment
for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate
each other on material points: the briefing
conducted by appellant, the time and
place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant
has not shown that these witnesses were
incited by any motive to testify falsely
against her. The absence of evidence as to
an improper motive actuating the principal
witnesses of the prosecution strongly
tends to sustain that no improper motive
existed and that their testimony is worthy
of full faith and credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the
positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses. Affirmative testimony of
persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact
asserted easily overrides negative
testimony.41
That appellant did not receive any
payment for the promised or offered
employment is of no moment. From the
language of the statute, the act of
recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it
suffices that the accused "promises or
offers for a fee employment" to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto,
coming as they do from credible
witnesses, meet the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
committed recruitment and placement.
We therefore do not deem it necessary to
delve into the second and third assigned
errors assailing the legality of appellant's
arrest and the seizure of the application
forms. A warrantless arrest, when
unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the
search incidental thereto and the articles
so seized are rendered inadmissible in
evidence.42 Here, even if the documents
seized were deemed inadmissible, her
conviction would stand in view of Araneta
and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the
prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth
assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the
POEA supposedly "planted" the application
forms. She also assails his character,
alleging that he passed himself off as a
lawyer, although this was denied by
Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed
by the Court with disfavor for it can easily
be concocted but difficult to prove.43 Apart
from her self-serving testimony, appellant
has not offered any evidence that she was
indeed framed by Ramos. She has not
even hinted at any motive for Ramos to
frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to
have performed their duties regularly in
the absence of evidence to the contrary.44
Considering that the two elements of lack
of license or authority and the undertaking
of an activity constituting recruitment and
placement are present, appellant, at the
very least, is liable for "simple" illegal
recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale? We find that
she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal
recruitment must be based on a finding in
each case of illegal recruitment of three or
more persons whether individually or as a
group.45 In this case, only two persons,
Araneta and Modesto, were proven to
have been recruited by appellant. The
third person named in the complaint as
having been promised employment for a
fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in
court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at
least three victims testify at the trial;
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the
offense was committed against three or
more persons.46 In this case, evidence
that appellant likewise promised her
employment for a fee is sketchy. The only
evidence that tends to prove this fact is
the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said
that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra
Aquino, came to the briefing and that they
(she and her "friends") filled up
application forms.
The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with
Araneta cannot support Araneta's
testimony. The affidavit was neither
identified, nor its contents affirmed, by
Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that
appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the
affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.48 In
any case, hearsay evidence, such as the
said affidavit, has little probative value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for
recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or
even the other persons present in the
briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is
accused of recruiting only the three
persons named in the information —
Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The
information does not include Fermindoza
or the other persons present in the
briefing as among those promised or
offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and
placement of persons other than those
alleged to have been offered or promised
employment for a fee would violate her
right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.50
In any event, the purpose of the offer of
the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and
Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as
follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the
oral testimony of the witness, as one of
those recruited by the accused, and also
to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify the
accused.51
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the
witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact
about her recruitment by the accused and
immediately before the recruitment, as
well as to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution, and also the accused in this
case, Your Honor.52
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at
around that date Your Honor, she was
connected with the CIS, that she was
instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where
the illegal recruitment was supposed to be
going on, that she acted as an applicant,
Your Honor, to ascertain the truthfulness
of the illegal recruitment going on, to
identify the accused, as well as to identify
some exhibits for the prosecution.53
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence
only for the purpose for which it was
offered,54 and the purpose of the offer of
their testimonies did not include the
proving of the purported recruitment of
other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned
error that the information is fatally
defective since it charges her with
committing illegal recruitment in large
scale on January 30, 1994 while the
prosecution evidence supposedly indicates
that she committed the crime on February
2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the
prosecution regarding the date of the
commission of the crime does not vary
from that charged in the information. Both
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto
testified that on January 30, 1994, while
in the Alejandro residence, appellant
offered them employment for a fee. Thus,
while the arrest was effected only on
February 2, 1994, the crime had already
been committed three (3) days earlier on
January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors,
respectively, pertain to the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court
as well as the constitutionality of the law
prescribing the same, appellant arguing
that it is unconstitutional for being unduly
harsh.55 Section 19 (1), Article III of the
Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed
upon appellant must be reduced. Because
the prosecution was able to prove that
appellant committed recruitment and
placement against two persons only, she
cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment
in large scale, which requires that
recruitment be committed against three or
more persons. Appellant can only be
convicted of two counts of "simple" illegal
recruitment, one for that committed
against Nancy Araneta, and another count
for that committed against Lourdes
Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each
count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to
six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P30,000.00. This renders
immaterial the tenth assigned error, which
assumes that the proper imposable
penalty upon appellant is life
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional
trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is
hereby declared guilty of illegal
recruitment on two (2) counts and is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the
penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145734-35 October
15, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS, ANGEL
MATEO, AIDA DE LEON (at large) and
JEAN AM-AMLAW (at
large), appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Illegal recruiters prey on our gullible and
impoverished people by inveigling them
with false or fraudulent promises of
attractive employment in foreign shores.
Such vultures deserve the full sanction of
the law.
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo
appeal the March 6, 2000 Joint
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City (Branch 138), finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment and estafa. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court rules –
"1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,]
accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel
Mateo are pronounced guilty of violating
Section 6, of Republic Act No. 8042, the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and they are both sentenced
to suffer life imprisonment. Pursuant to
the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic
Act No. 8042, considering that both
accused are non-licensers or non-holders
of authority, they are both sentenced to
pay fines of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are
ordered to indemnify both complainants
jointly and severally of the amount
of P118,000.00, the net amount after
deducting the recovery of P40,000.00.
They are likewise ordered to pay both
complainants jointly and severally the
amounts of P24,000.00 as reimbursement
for traveling expenses; P4,000.00 as
rental for boarding house,
and P100,000.00 as unrealized income;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,]
accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel
Mateo are guilty of violating Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and
they are both sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal.
"No civil liability need be imposed
considering that in Criminal Case No. 99-
1112 the same was already provided.
"Let the case as against Jane Am-amlao
and Aida de Leon be sent to the archives
to be revived upon arrest, surrender or
acquisition of jurisdiction over their
person.
"SO ORDERED."2
Two separate Informations,3 both dated
April 20, 1999, charged appellants with
syndicated illegal recruitment under
Republic Act (RA) 80424 and estafa under
paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.5
In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, they were
charged as follows:
"That on or about March, 1998 and
thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit
the herein complainants, MELCHOR F.
DEGSI and PERPETUA L. DEGSI for
employment as an office worker and as a
cook or mechanic in Japan, for and in
consideration thereof, they were required
to pay the amount of P158,600.00 as
alleged placement and processing fees,
which the complainants delivered and paid
the amount of P158,600.00 Philippine
Currency, without the accused having
deployed the complainants despite the
lapse of several months, to their damage
and prejudice."6
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, the
Information reads:
"That on or about March, 1998 and
thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit
and promise employment to spouses
MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI in Japan
for a total consideration of one hundred
fifty eight thousand and six hundred pesos
(P158,600.00) as placement and
processing fees, knowing that they have
no capacity whatsoever and with no
intention to fulfill their promise, but
merely as a pretext, scheme or excuse to
get or exact money from said complainant
as they in fact collected and received the
amount of P158,600.00 from said
MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI to their
damage, loss and prejudice for the
aforesaid amount."7
With the assistance of their counsel de
oficio,8 appellants pleaded not guilty to
the charges during their arraignment on
July 27, 1999.9
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
relates how appellants, despite their lack
of authority or license, represented
themselves as persons who had the
capacity to send the victims abroad for
employment. We quote its version of the
facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented three
witnesses, namely, Melchor Degsi and
Perpetua Degsi (‘Complainants’ for
brevity) and Priscilla Marreo (or Priscilla
Marelo).
"The prosecution and appellants stipulated
that appellants are not licensed or
authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad, in lieu of the
testimony of Senior Labor Researcher
Johnson Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
"Complainants are husband and wife,
residents of Baguio City. They made a
living earning an average of P20,000.00 a
month by selling fish and vegetables in a
rented stall in said City, at least until
March 24, 1998 when they closed shop for
reasons of attending to the demands of
the promised jobs for them in Japan. Both
categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or
Jean Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in
Baguio City Market, as the person who
approached them and assured them that
she knew a legal recruiter, an ex-POEA
employee, who had the capacity to send
them both abroad. Jane Am-amlaw (or
‘Am-amlaw’ for brevity) recruited
complainants and personally accompanied
them on March 24, 1998 to meet the
person she earlier referred to, or Aida de
Leon (or Alma de Leon), in the latter’s
apartment at No. 7280 J. Victor St., Pio
del Pilar, Makati.
"Complainants likewise categorically
identified Aida de Leon (‘de leon’ for
brevity) as the person who arranged a
meeting in her apartment on March 24,
1998 between complainants and appellant
Angel Mateo (‘Mateo’ for brevity) whom de
Leon introduced as their contact person
for Japan-bound workers. In said meeting,
Mateo represented himself as having the
capacity to send people abroad and
showed complainants various documents
to convince them of his legitimate
recruitment operations. Convinced that
Mateo had indeed the capacity to facilitate
their employment as an office worker and
as a cook or mechanic in Japan,
complainants, on that same day, handed
Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo required
them to pay for their processing fees. This
was to be the first of a series of sums of
money to be extracted from complainants.
"Complainants were able to positively
identify Mateo in court as the contact
person of de Leon and who collected from
them, from March 24, 1998 to June 23,
1998, sums of money for the alleged
necessary expenses relative to the
promised jobs awaiting them in Japan in
the total amount of P158,600.00.
Complainants likewise categorically
identified Mateo as the same person
whose authorization was needed for the
recovery of P40,000.00 of the P45,000.00
they gave Mateo who in turn deposited it
to Sampaguita Travel Agency under his
own name.
"Complainants likewise positively
identified appellant Vicenta ‘Vicky’ Lapis
(‘Lapis’ for brevity) in Court as the person
introduced to them by Mateo as his wife
on April 29, 1998 at Max’s Restaurant in
Makati when Lapis required complainants
to pay P49,240.00 for their plane tickets
and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the
live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis told
complainants that she was helping to
speed up the process[ing] of their papers
relative to the promised jobs awaiting
them in Japan. Complainants met again
Lapis, who was with Mateo on May 2,
1998 at the Makati Restaurant, annex of
Max’s Restaurant, when Lapis assured
them that Mateo could really send them
abroad and even wrote in a piece of paper
appellants’ address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk
13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite. On May
17, 1998, complainants once more met
Lapis who was with Mateo, de Leon and de
Leon’s husband in Baguio City at the
house of Priscilla Marreo’s daughter. Both
appellants updated complainant as to the
status of their paper and reiterated their
promise that complainants would soon be
leaving for Japan, then collected from
complainants unreceipted amount
of P20,000.00. Complainants met again
with Lapis, who was again with Mateo, on
May 19, 1998 at the Sampaguita Travel
Agency. Mateo extracted P45,000.00 from
complainants and deposited it under his
name. On that occasion, Perpetua wanted
to ask from the Sampaguita Travel
Agency’s employees where to pay
the P45,000.00 but failed to do so
because Lapis took her attention away
from asking while Mateo asked Melchor to
hand over to him said sum.
"Priscilla Marreo (‘Priscilla’ for brevity) is
the sister of Melchor who loaned
complainants part of the P158,000.00
which appellants extracted from
complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself
present in most of the meetings between
complainants and appellants together with
the two other accused where she
witnessed the assurances and promises
made by appellants relative to
complainants’ immediate departure for
Japan and their corresponding demands of
sums of money. The testimony of Priscilla
underscored the testimony of
complainants showing that Am-amlaw, de
Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed
corroborated and confederated in the
commission of illegal recruitment.
"The prosecution presented documentary
evidence, such as varied unofficial receipts
all bearing the signature of Mateo;
‘Sinumpaang Salaysay’ of Perpetua L.
Degsi executed on July 21, 1998; Affidavit
executed by complainants on July 21,
1998; Requirement for Guarantee Letter
of Visa bearing the names of both private
complainants; Request for Certification of
POEA-CIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes
Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch of
POEA as represented by Johnson Bolivar,
Senior Labor Researcher of POEA, and the
various documents that complainants
alleged to have been shown to them by
Mateo to prove the legality of his
recruitment operations."10 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they
were engaged in recruitment activities,
and that they promised foreign
employment to the victims. Below is the
version of the facts presented by the
defense:
"VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she
is the live-in partner of her co-accused
Mateo. They have been living together for
almost three (3) years. According to her,
she first met both complainants at Max’s
Restaurant in Makati when they talked to
accused Mateo. She was there only to
accompany her live-in partner. The
subject of the conversation between the
complainants and accused Mateo was a
contract in Baguio City. She did not see
complainant deliver money to accused
Mateo while they were in that meeting.
She also has no knowledge about the
transaction between complainant and
accused Mateo. She admitted that she
went to Baguio City together with accused
Mateo to talk to the City Mayor. She
likewise admitted that the handwriting
appearing in Exhibit ‘F’ is hers but the
reason why she gave it was only to
comply to the request of the complainant
Perpetua Degsi regarding a matter to be
followed up at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The result of her
follow-up rendered was that complainant
Perpetua Degsi has a pending case of
estafa.
"ANGEL MATEO averred that he is
engaged in the importation of heavy
equipment and containers but he has
never been engaged in recruitment. To
prove that he was really engaged in the
delivery of heavy equipment, he
presented a document of Import Service
signed by a certain Alexander Arcilla
addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr.,
City Mayor, Cavite City dated March 14,
1997 and were marked as Exhibit ‘1’ and
‘1-a’. He also presented another document
of Import Services issued by the
Department of Trade and Industry
addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite; a
photocopy of a Bill of Lading from Trade
Bulk cargoes by Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc.; and Invoice of used vehicles,
airconditioners and washing machines and
the packing list which were all marked as
Exhibits 3 to 5. Sometime in March 24,
1998, he met the complainants at Pio del
Pilar, in Makati City at the apartment of
accused Aida de Leon. He went there to
follow-up their transaction about heavy
equipment with Mayor Binay because, it
was accused de Leon who entered the
transaction with Mayor Binay. While he
was there, the complainants were
introduced to him by accused de Leon. He
admitted meeting the complainants on
April 29, 1998 at Max’s Restaurant but the
reason was for him to meet Mrs. Marero in
person and also because complainant
Perpetua Degsi has a pending case for
large scale estafa and she needed a
clearance. He denied having signed
Exhibit ‘B’. He further claimed that the
topic of their meeting was to supply heavy
equipment in Baguio City. He denied
having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6,
1999. He likewise denied signing the
receipt showing the total amount
of P158,600.00."11
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court held that the evidence for
the prosecution sufficiently established the
criminal liability of appellants for the
crimes charged. It ruled in this manner:
"Evidence for the prosecution clearly
established that both complainants were
enticed by accused Mateo and were led to
believe that the latter has the capacity to
send them for employment to Japan.
Complainant Melchor Degsi and his wife
Perpetua Degsi both testified to this fact.
Acting on their belief that indeed accused
Mateo can deploy them to Japan, amounts
were disbursed by both complainants to
accused Mateo to cover the processing
and placement fees. x x x The Court finds
the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to establish that accused Mateo
violated Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8042 when he demanded amounts for
placement and processing fees but he
failed to deploy both complainants. The
Court has a similar conclusion insofar as
the accusation for estafa is concerned as
the evidence shows accused Mateo knew
beforehand that he has no capacity to
deploy both complainants abroad and that
the enticement to work abroad was
merely a scheme or plan to exact money
from both complainants. Deception was
proven.
"Insofar as the accused Lapis is concerned
it is to be noted that the theory of the
prosecution is that she acted in conspiracy
with her co-accused Mateo who is her live-
in partner. Evidence for the prosecution
shows that at least on three (3) occasions
accused Lapis was present when accused
Mateo asked and received money from
complainants in connection with their
intended employment in Japan. x x x The
Court conclude[d] that accused Lapis has
knowledge of the intention of her co-
accused Mateo in asking for money from
both complainants. There was active
participation on her part in the
recruitment of both complainants and in
deceiving them about the capacity to
secure employment. The Court believes
that conspiracy was established beyond
reasonable doubt. Her defense of
ignorance of the transaction cannot be
considered given the positive evidence
presented by the prosecution which
should prevail over her plain denial."12
Hence, this appeal.13
The Issues
In their Brief, appellants interpose the
following assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violations of Republic
Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers’ and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) committed
by a syndicate and Article 315 paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding
accused-appellant Vicenta Medina Lapis
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment and estafa.
"III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate.
"IV
The court a quo gravely erred in finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended."14
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of
syndicated illegal recruitment by the lower
court was erroneous; its conclusion that
the offense was committed by three (3) or
more persons had no factual or legal
basis. Allegedly, without sufficient
evidence, the trial court wrongfully
presumed that all of them had acted in
conspiracy. According to them, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that they had conspired
and confederated in illegally recruiting
complainants. Appellants conclude that, if
at all, they could only be held liable for
illegal recruitment in its simple form. We
disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when
these two elements concur: (1) the
offenders have no valid license or
authority required by law to enable them
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers, and (2) the
offenders undertake any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and
placement15 defined in Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practices enumerated in Article
34 of the Labor Code.16
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and
placement refers to "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers[;] and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not." In the simplest terms,
illegal recruitment is committed by
persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad
for employment purposes.17
We believe that the prosecution was able
to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The case records reveal that
appellants did in fact engage in
recruitment and placement activities by
promising complainants employment in
Japan. Undisputed is the fact that the
former did not have any valid authority or
license to engage in recruitment and
placement activities. Moreover, the pieces
of testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly show
that, in consideration of their promise of
foreign employment, they indeed received
various amounts of money from
complainants totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made
misrepresentations concerning their
purported power and authority to recruit
for overseas employment, and in the
process, collected from complainants
various amounts in the guise of placement
fees, the former clearly committed acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.18 In
fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters
need not even expressly represent
themselves to the victims as persons who
have the ability to send workers abroad. It
is enough that these recruiters give the
impression that they have the ability to
enlist workers for job placement abroad in
order to induce the latter to tender
payment of fees.19
It is also important to determine whether
illegal recruitment committed by
appellants can be qualified as a syndicated
illegal recruitment or an offense involving
economic sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage when it is
committed by a syndicate or carried out
by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one
another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has
been deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating
with each other in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under Article 38(b) of
the Labor Code.20
In this case, it cannot be denied that all
four (4) accused -- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida
de Leon, Angel Mateo and Vicenta Medina
Lapis – participated in a network of
deception. Verily, the active involvement
of each in the various phases of the
recruitment scam formed part of a series
of machinations. Their scheme was to lure
complainants to Manila and to divest them
of their hard-earned money on the pretext
of guaranteed employment abroad. The
prosecution evidence shows that
complainants were convinced by Jane Am-
amlaw to go to Manila to meet someone
who could find employment for them
abroad. Upon reaching the city, they were
introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel
Mateo; Mateo claimed to have the
contacts, the resources and the capacity
to employ them overseas. After that initial
meeting, complainants made several
payments to him, supposedly for the
processing requirements of their
deployment to Japan. Later on, they met
Vicenta Medina Lapis who volunteered her
assistance in the processing of their
employment papers and assured them
that Mateo could easily send them abroad.
Complainant Perpetua Degsi testified on
the devious trail of transactions with all of
the accused as follows:
"Q How did you come to know the accused
in this case?
A They were introduced to me by one Aida
de Leon and Jane Am-Amlao.
Q Who is this Jane Am-Amlao you are
referring to?
A She is our co-member in Baguio.
Q What is she in relation to your
recruitment by Angel Mateo and Vicenta
Lapis?
A She was the first one who mentioned to
us that she knows somebody who has the
capacity to send us abroad.
Q When was this?
A March, 1998.
Q When Jane Am-Amlao told you that she
knows somebody who has the capacity to
send you abroad what happened next?
A On March 24, 1998 Jane accompanied
us here in Manila.
Q Where in Manila particularly?
A At No. 72 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar,
Makati in the apartment of Aida de Leon.
Q So what happened at the apartment of
Aida de Leon?
A Jane told us that Aida de Leon was an
ex-employee of POEA and she was able to
send many workers abroad.
Q Were you able to meet Aida de Leon?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q What happened when you met her?
A Aida called us by phone and according
to her she has the contact person who can
explain [to] us the details on how to be
able to work abroad.
Q After Aida called you up on the phone
what happened next?
A We waited because according to her,
that person is coming over to the house.
Q A[fter] waiting what happened after
that?
A ANGEL MATEO arrived and he was
introduced to me as the contact person
and we could ask him how we could work
abroad.
Q Who is this siya, you are referring to?
A ANGEL MATEO.
Q Who introduced you to ANGEL MATEO?
A AIDA DE LEON.
Q After introducing you to ANGEL MATEO
what happened?
A ANGEL MATEO showed us some
documents AND HE WAS ABLE TO
convince us that he has the capacity to
send us abroad.
Q What documents were shown to you?
A Incorporation documents of two
companies one, Philippine company and
one is Japan company and some other
documents they made in order to send
workers abroad.
Q After convincing you that he can send
you abroad what happened after that?
A He asked for a processing fee and I
asked him how much.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that he does not know
because AIDA DE LEON will be the one to
give us the price.
Q After that what happened?
A I asked AIDA how much and she
answered, twenty thousand pesos.
Q After telling you that the amount
is P20,000.00 what happened next?
A We went to the bank to
withdraw P20,000.00 but we were only
able to withdraw P15,000.00 and then we
handed the P15,000.00 to ANGEL MATEO,
in front of Jane Am-Amlaw.
Q After receiving said amount from you by
ANGEL MATEO what happened next?
A We parted ways.
Q Was there anything else that happened
after that?
A Before we parted ways, [he] asked from
us other documents like ID, birth
certificate, marriage contract in order for
him to begin processing our papers.
Q After that what happened next?
A On March 31, we went back to [him]
and we gave [him] the other documents
needed and we also gave [him] the
balance for the processing fee.
Q Who is this niya or he you are referring
to?
A Angel Mateo.
Q Where did you meet?
A [He] called me and we met in the
apartment of AIDA.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in
the apartment of AIDA DE LEON?
A Yes.
Q What happened there?
A We gave [him] the documents and we
started processing the documents
Q What are those documents that you
gave to ANGEL MATEO?
A Birth certificate authenticated, marriage
contract and passport IDs and then we
went to Pasay City to start the processing
of the passport.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO asked
for the balance of P5,000.00, were you
able to pay the said amount to ANGEL
MATEO?
A Yes, ma’am.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After receiving said amount
of P5,000.00 what happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we
parted ways but [he] did not issue us any
receipt so on April 15, [he] again called us
up and told me that he needs NBI
clearance so we processed our NBI
clearance.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called
you, where were you at that time?
A Baguio City.
Q Were you able to come here in Manila?
A Yes ma’am, we met in Quiapo.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in
QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.
Q So what did you do?
A We proceeded [to] the NBI and we
called up AIDA and asked her why ANGEL
MATEO did not arrive and whom did AIDA
talk to.
Q What was the reply of AIDA DE LEON?
A She told me that whatever ANGEL
MATEO would tell us, that’s what we
should follow.
Q After that what happened?
A The processing of our NBI clearance did
not finish so on April 15 ANGEL MATEO
asked for P2,000.00 in order to help us
process the NBI.
Q After calling you on April 15, what
happened next?
A On April 29, 1998 me, my sister,
Melchor, and Melchor’s sister together
with ANGEL MATEO met at Max’s
Restaurant in Makati.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes ma’am, they arrived together with
somebody whom [she] introduced to us as
[his] wife.
Q Who is this wife you are referring to?
A She is Vicky Lapis, and later on we
found out that she is Vicenta Medina
Lapis.
Q What was this meeting all about?
A We were updated on what was
happening on our papers and then ANGEL
MATEO AND VICENTA LAPIS asked for a
plane ticket.
Q What was the update for the processing
of your papers?
xxxxxxxxx
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just
helping to speed up the processing of
papers so that we could be sent abroad
immediately and she even showed us
some documents and I even told her that
I could help them in typing those
documents."21
The foregoing testimony very clearly
demonstrates that the individual
actuations of all four (4) accused were
directed at a singular criminal purpose --
to delude complainants into believing that
they would be employed abroad. The
nature and the extent of the former’s
interactions among themselves as well as
with the latter clearly show unity of action
towards a common undertaking. Certainly,
complainants would not have gone to
Manila to meet Aida de Leon and Angel
Mateo without the prodding of Am-amlaw.
They would not have made various
payments for their travel and employment
papers without the fraudulent
representations of Mateo De Leon.
Moreover, they would not have complied
with further instructions and demands of
Mateo without the repeated assurances
made by Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of
the accused were not necessarily
indispensable to the commission of the
offense, conspiracy would have still been
present. Their actions, when viewed in
relation to one another, showed a unity of
purpose towards a common criminal
enterprise and a concurrence in their
resolve to commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,22 the Court had
occasion to discuss the nature of
conspiracy in the context of illegal
recruitment as follows:
"Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas
contract workers was evident from the
acts of the malefactors whose conduct
before, during and after the commission of
the crime clearly indicated that they were
one in purpose and united in execution.
Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary as it may
be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused
pointing to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of
interest. As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally
guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment
since in a conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all."23 (Emphasis supplied)
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential
that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every
act. It is sufficient that they acted in
concert pursuant to the same objective.24
Conspiracy is present when one concurs
with the criminal design of another,
indicated by the performance of an overt
act leading to the crime committed.25
The OSG avers, as an incident to this
issue, and in line with People v.
Yabut,26 that complainants are entitled to
recover interest on the amount
of P118,000, which the trial court awarded
from the time of the filing of the
Information until fully paid. We agree with
the OSG’s observation and hereby grant
the legal interest on the amount prayed
for.
In a number of cases,27 this Court has
affirmed the trial court’s finding that
victims of illegal recruitment are entitled
to legal interest on the amount to be
recovered as indemnity, from the time of
the filing of the information until fully
paid.
Second Issue:
Appellants’ Liability for Estafa
Appellants argue that in a prosecution for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indispensable that the element of deceit,
consisting of fraudulent representations or
false statements of the accused, be made
prior to or simultaneous with the delivery
of the thing; and that such
misrepresentations or false statements
induce the complainants to part with the
object of the crime. The former allege that
the prosecution failed to point out with
certainty whether their misrepresentations
or false statements were made prior to or
at least simultaneous with the latter’s
delivery of the money.
Under the cited provision of the Revised
Penal Code, estafa is committed by any
person who defrauds another by using a
fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business; by
imaginary transactions or similar forms of
deceit executed prior to or simultaneous
with the fraud.28 Moreover, these false
pretenses should have been the very
reason that motivated complainants to
deliver property or pay money to the
perpetrators of the fraud. While appellants
insist that these constitutive elements of
the crime were not sufficiently shown by
the prosecution, the records of the case
prove otherwise.
During almost all of their meetings,
complainants paid various amounts of
money to appellants only after hearing the
feigned assurances proffered by the latter
regarding the former’s employment
prospects in Japan. Even as early as their
first meeting in the house of Aida de Leon,
the payment by complainants of the initial
amount of P15,000 was immediately
preceded by an onslaught of promises.
These enticing, albeit empty, promises
were made by Angel Mateo, who even
showed them documents purportedly
evincing his connections with various
foreign companies. Equally important,
they relied on such misrepresentations,
which convinced them to pay the initial
amount as "processing fees." Complainant
Melchor Degsi testified on the matter in
this wise:
"Prosecutor Ong:
So when Angel Mateo arrived at the
apartment of Aida de Leon, what did he
do, if any?
Witness:
He introduced himself to us and told us
that he can easily send us to Japan
because he knows many Japanese
employers and he also showed us some
documents, ma’am. (Nagpakilala siya at
ang sabi niya ay kayang-kaya niya kaming
padalhin sa Japan dahil marami siyang
kilalang Japanese employer at may
ipinakita siyang mga dokumento, ma’am).
Q What are these documents, if you
remember, that were shown to you?
A Papers of Japanese companies, Clean
Supplies Co. Ltd., Arabian Boy Express
Corporation and that is the reason why we
were convinced, ma’am.
Q So, after being convinced that Angel
Mateo can send you abroad, what did you
do after that?
A Nakumbinsi nga po kami at pagkatapos
noon ay nag-usap-usap silang tatlo nina
Jean Am-amlaw at humihingi na sila ng
processing fee na P20,000, ma’am.
Q So what did you do when they were
already asking for the amount of P20,000
from you as processing fee?
A We told them that we do not have any
money that time and we have to withdraw
from the bank and then we went to Pasay
and we withdrew the amount
of P15,000.00 so that was the only
amount we were able to give them that
time, ma’am.
Q Who were with you when you withdrew
the said amount from the bank in Pasay?
A Jean Am-amlaw and Angel Mateo,
ma’am.
Q Who received the amount of P15,000?
A Angel Mateo in front of Jean Am-amlaw,
ma’am."29 (Emphasis supplied)
p align="justify">From the foregoing, it is
evident that the false statements that
convinced complainants of the authenticity
of the transaction were made prior to their
payment of the various fees. Indubitably,
the requirement that the fraudulent
statements should have been made prior
to or simultaneous with the actual
payment was satisfied.
Verily, by their acts of falsely representing
themselves as persons who had the power
and the capacity to recruit workers for
abroad, appellants induced complainants
to pay the required fees.30 There is estafa
if, through insidious words and
machinations, appellants deluded
complainants into believing that, for a fee,
the latter would be provided overseas
jobs.31
Although we agree with the ruling of the
RTC convicting appellants of estafa, we
note that it failed to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing
the penalty. Under Section 1 of that law,
the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be the penalty properly
imposed, considering the attending
circumstances; while the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the
Code.32 Hence, pursuant to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial
court should have fixed the minimum and
the maximum penalties.33
The Revised Penal Code provides the
penalties for estafa as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -- Any
person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000.00 but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be." (Italics
supplied)
Considering that complainants were
defrauded in excess of the P22,000 limit
fixed by law, the maximum penalty of
prision mayor should be imposed in its
minimum period, or six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years, plus one (1)
year for each additional P10,000 in excess
of the P22,000 limit. The total amount
defrauded from the complainants
was P158,600 -- or P136,600 in excess
of P22,000, which translates to an
additional prison sentence of thirteen (13)
years based on the aforementioned
computation. Accordingly, the maximum
penalty to be imposed should be nineteen
(19) years and one (1) day to twenty-one
(21) years, thus raising the penalty to
reclusion temporal. However, the penal
provisions for the crime of estafa provide
that the total penalty to be imposed
should not in any case exceed twenty (20)
years imprisonment.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113 for estafa,
consonant with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellants should thus be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor which
is the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
Indeed, the expression "the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for
the offense," used in Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, means the
penalty next lower than that determined
by the court in the case before it as the
maximum.34
Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator
Finally, appellants contend that the trial
court should not have convicted Vicenta
Medina Lapis because the prosecution
evidence did not sufficiently prove her
participation in the conspiracy to defraud
the victims. They maintain that she
merely accompanied Angel Mateo during
his meetings with complainants and that
she had no knowledge of the intentions of
her co-accused. They add that mere
knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one
as a co-conspirator.
We are not persuaded. As discussed
earlier, Lapis not only knew of the
conspiracy, but she also offered her
assistance in the processing of the
employment requirements of
complainants. Contrary to her claim that
she was merely an unknowing spectator in
the underhanded transactions, she
deliberately inveigled them into pursuing
the promise of foreign employment. The
records clearly bely her claim of innocence
and indicate that her participation in the
criminal scheme transcends mere
knowledge or acquiescence. Complainant
Melchor Degsi describes one of the many
instances of how deeply involved Lapis
was in the whole recruitment charade:
"Prosecutor Ong:
Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that
you were at Max Restaurant together with
Vicenta Lapis and Angel Mateo?
Witness:
Yes, ma’am.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta
Medina [Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent to
Japan sooner as OCW, ma’am.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She said ‘Sigurado kay, makakapunta
kayo ng Japan’, ma’am.
Q: During that time that she was telling
you ‘sigurado kay makakapunta kayo
ng Japan’, did she show you anything?
A: Tinanong namin ang address nila at
kusang loob na ibinigay ni Vicenta Medina
[Lapis] sa amin ang address at direksyon
para makapunta kami sa Imus, Cavite,
ma’am.
Q: What was the reason why Vicenta
Medina Lapis gave you the address?
A: Para sigurado raw kami na hindi sila
illegal kaya ibinigay niya ang address nila,
ma’am."35 (Emphasis supplied)
Once conspiracy is established, the act of
one becomes the act of all regardless of
the degree of individual
participation.36 Moreover, the precise
modality or extent of participation of each
individual conspirator becomes merely a
secondary
consideration.37 Notwithstanding
nonparticipation in every detail of the
execution of the crime, the culpability of
the accused still exists.38
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112,
appellants are ordered to pay legal
interest on the amount of P118,000 from
the time of the filing of the Information
until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113,
appellants are sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for
illegal recruitment alleged to have been
committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period
from August to September 1984, in
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused representing
herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit
and promise employment/job placement
abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA,
NARCISO CORPUZ, 1 NECITAS R. FERRE,
GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L.
CAMA, without first securing the required
license or authority from the Ministry of
Labor and Employment. 2
After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the
Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the
case, 3 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE
CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused
ROSA C. RODOLFO as GUILTY of the
offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and
hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of
imprisonment of EIGHT YEARS and to pay
the costs. 4 (Underscoring supplied)
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court
took note of the fact that while the
information reflected the commission of
illegal recruitment in large scale, only the
complaint of the two of the five
complainants was proven.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly
synthesized the evidence presented by the
parties as follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution]
shows that sometime in August and
September 1984, accused-
appellant approached private
complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso
Corpus individually and invited them to
apply for overseas employment in Dubai.
The accused-appellant being their
neighbor, private complainants agreed
and went to the former’s office. This office
which bore the business name "Bayside
Manpower Export Specialist" was in a
building situated at Bautista St. Buendia,
Makati, Metro Manila. In that
office, private complainants gave certain
amounts to appellant for processing and
other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as
processing fee (Exhibit A) and
another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise,
Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit
D). Appellant then told private
complainants that they were scheduled to
leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984.
However, private complainants and all the
other applicants were not able to depart
on the said date as their employer
allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their
departure was rescheduled to September
23, but the result was the same.
Suspecting that they were being
hoodwinked, private complainants
demanded of appellant to return their
money. Except for the refund
of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not
able to return private complainants’
money. Tired of excuses, private
complainants filed the present case for
illegal recruitment against the accused-
appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no
authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment, the prosecution presented
Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas
Employment Officer of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
who testified that accused-appellant was
neither licensed nor authorized by the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment to
recruit workers for overseas employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever
approaching private complainants to
recruit them for employment in Dubai. On
the contrary, it was the private
complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor
and friend, she brought the private
complainants to the Bayside Manpower
Export Specialist agency because she
knew Florante Hinahon, 5 the owner of the
said agency. While accused-appellant
admitted that she received money from
the private complainants, she was quick to
point out that she received the same only
in trust for delivery to the agency. She
denied being part of the agency either as
an owner or employee thereof. To
corroborate appellant’s testimony,
Milagros Cuadra, who was also an
applicant and a companion of private
complainants, testified that appellant did
not recruit them. On the contrary, they
were the ones who asked help from
appellant. To further bolster the defense,
Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and
cashier of the agency, testified that
appellant is not connected with the agency
and that he saw appellant received money
from the applicants but she turned them
over to the agency through either
Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda
Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In light thereof, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court
but modified the penalty imposed due to
the trial court’s failure to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellate court thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the
appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and
AFFIRMS the appealed Decision EXCEPT
the penalty x x x which is hereby changed
to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7)
years as maximum with perpetual
disqualification from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of
workers. 7 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied, 8 the present petition
was filed, faulting the appellate court
I xx
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING
WITNESSES, [AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-
ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals to credit
the testimonies of her witnesses, her
companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto
C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of
the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial court’s
and the appellate court’s failure to
consider that the provisional receipts she
issued indicated that the amounts she
collected from the private complainants
were turned over to the agency through
Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At
any rate, she draws attention to People v.
Señoron 10 wherein this Court held that
the issuance or signing of receipts for
placement fees does not make a case for
illegal recruitment. 11
The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the
legal provisions applicable when the
offense charged was
committed, 12 provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. – (a) Any
recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x
Article 39. Penalties. – x x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee
nor a holder of authority under this Title
found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall,
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four
years nor more than eight years or a fine
of not less than P20,000 nor more
than P100,000 or both such imprisonment
and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense of illegal
recruitment, which must concur, are: (1)
that the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; and (2) that the offender
undertakes any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement
under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the Labor Code. 13 If another element is
act against three or more persons,
individually or as a group, it becomes an
illegal recruitment in a large scale. 14
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines
"recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)
That the first element is present in the
case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose
Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, testified that
the records of the POEA do not show that
petitioner is authorized to recruit workers
for overseas employment. 15 A
Certification to that effect was in fact
issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of
the Licensing Division of POEA. 16
Petitioner’s disclaimer of having engaged
in recruitment activities from the very
start does not persuade in light of the
evidence for the prosecution. In People v.
Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts
of recruitment and placement without first
complying with the guidelines issued by
the Department of Labor and
Employment. She contends that she did
not possess any license for recruitment,
because she never engaged in such
activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing
contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must be given
to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than to the denial
of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly
shows that illegal recruitment is an
offense that is essentially committed by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee means any person,
corporation or entity to which the labor
secretary has not issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and
placement; or whose license or authority
has been suspended, revoked or cancelled
by the POEA or the labor secretary. A
license authorizes a person or an entity to
operate a private employment agency,
while authority is given to those engaged
in recruitment and placement activities.
xxxx
That appellant in this case had
been neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment
was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero,
officer-in-charge of the Licensing and
Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S.
Mendoza, manager of the Licensing
Branch – both of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. Yet, as
complainants convincingly proved, she
recruited them for jobs in
Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
The second element is doubtless also
present. The act of referral, which is
included in recruitment, 18 is "the act
of passing along or forwarding of an
applicant for employment after an initial
interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or
bureau." 19 Petitioner’s admission that she
brought private complainants to the
agency whose owner she knows and her
acceptance of fees including those for
processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts
indicating that the amounts she received
from the private complainants were
turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and
Florante Hinahon does not free her from
liability. For the act of recruitment may be
"for profit or not." It is sufficient that the
accused "promises or offers for a fee
employment" to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment. 20 As the appellate
court stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor
Code] does not require that the recruiter
receives and keeps the placement money
for himself or herself. For as long as a
person who has no license to engage in
recruitment of workers for overseas
employment offers for a fee an
employment to two or more persons, then
he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment. 21
Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted
the payment of fees from the private
complainants when, in light of her claim
that she merely brought them to the
agency, she could have advised them to
directly pay the same to the agency, she
proferred no explanation.
On petitioner’s reliance
on Señoron, 22 true, this Court held that
issuance of receipts for placement fees
does not make a case for illegal
recruitment. But it went on to state that it
is "rather the undertaking of recruitment
activities without the necessary license or
authority" that makes a case for illegal
recruitment. 23
A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial
court failed to apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which also applies to
offenses punished by special laws.
Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to
Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence
and Parole for All Persons Convicted of
Certain Crimes by the Courts of the
Philippine Islands; To Create A Board of
Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide
Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes)
provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a
prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
(As amended by Act No. 4225)
(Underscoring supplied)
While the penalty of imprisonment
imposed by the appellate court is within
the prescribed penalty for the offense, its
addition of "perpetual disqualification from
engaging in the business of recruitment
and placement of workers" is not part
thereof. Such additional penalty must thus
be stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accessory
penalty imposed by it consisting of
"perpetual disqualification from engaging
in the business of recruitment and
placement of workers" is DELETED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141221-36 - March 7, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ
(at large), KARL REICHL, and
YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-
appellants
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City
in Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430,
6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436,
6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and
6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses
Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de
Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa
and one (1) count of syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment.1
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for
syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment and eight (8) informations for
estafa were filed against accused-
appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda
Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez.
Only the Reichl spouses were tried and
convicted by the trial court as Francisco
Hernandez remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted
of the testimonies of private
complainants; a certification from the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) that Francisco
Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda
Gutierrez Reichl in their personal
capacities were neither licensed nor
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers
for overseas employment;2 the receipts
for the payment made by private
complainants; and two documents signed
by the Reichl spouses where they
admitted that they promised to secure
Austrian tourist visas for private
complainants and that they would return
all the expenses incurred by them if they
are not able to leave by March 24,
1993,3 and where Karl Reichl pledged to
refund to private complainants the total
sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the
amounts they paid for the processing of
their papers.4
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a
teacher, was first to testify for the
prosecution. She stated that Francisco
Hernandez introduced her to the spouses
Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence
of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she
also saw the other applicants Melanie
Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng,
Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel
Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told
Narcisa that they could find her a job as
domestic helper in Italy. They, however,
required her to pay the amount
of P150,000.00 for the processing of her
papers and travel documents. She paid
the fee in three installments. She paid the
first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14,
1992, the second installment
of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the
third in the amount of P75,000.00 on
December 27, 1992. She gave the money
to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of
the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence.
Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for
the first and second installment5 but not
for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to
leave on December 17, 1992 but was not
able to do so. Karl Reichl explained that
she would get her transit visa to Italy in
Austria, but she could not yet leave for
Austria because the hotels were fully
booked at that time because of the
Christmas season. Narcisa's departure
was again scheduled on January 5, 1993,
but it still did not push through. Narcisa
stated that they went to Manila several
times supposedly to obtain a visa from the
Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured
her that she would be able to leave once
she gets her visa. The accused set the
departure of Narcisa and that of the other
applicants several times but these proved
to be empty promises. In March 1993, the
applicants met with the three accused at
the residence of private complainant
Charito Balmes and asked them to refund
the payment if they could not send them
abroad. The meeting resulted in an
agreement which was reduced into writing
and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl
promised to ensure private complainants'
departure by April, otherwise, they would
return their payment.6
Private complainant Leonora Perez also
gave the following testimony: In July
1992, her sister, Analiza Perez, introduced
her to Francisco Hernandez at their
residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas
City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her
to apply for a job in Italy. When she
accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez
told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the
processing of her papers. In August 1992,
Leonora, together with her sister and
Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada
Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and
Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora
handed her payment of P50,000.00 to
Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her that
she would be able to work in Italy.
Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl
spouses told Leonora to wait for about
three weeks before she could leave. After
three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited
Leonora and the other applicants to the
house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City
to discuss some matters. Francisco
Hernandez informed the applicants that
their departure would be postponed to
December 17, 1992. December 17 came
and the applicants were still unable to
leave as it was allegedly a holiday.
Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless
assured Leonora of employment as
domestic helper in Italy with a monthly
salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez
and the Reichl spouses promised the
applicants that they would leave for Italy
on January 5, 1993. Some time in January
1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the
residence of Leonora and collected the
sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the
plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for
the payment. When the applicants were
not able to leave on the designated date,
Francisco Hernandez and the spouses
again made another promise. Tired of the
recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the
applicants decided to withdraw their
application. However, Karl Reichl
constantly assured them that they would
land a job in Italy because he had
connections in Vienna. The promised
employment, however, never
materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a
document stating that he would refund
the payment made by the applicants plus
interest and other expenses. The
document was executed and signed at the
house of one of the applicants, Charito
Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas City.7
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated
the latter's testimony that she paid a total
amount of P100,000.00 to the three
accused.8
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a
similar story when she testified before the
court. She said that Francisco Hernandez
convinced her to apply for the job of
domestic helper in Italy and required her
to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also
asked her to prepare her passport and
other papers to be used to secure a visa.
On November 25, 1992, she
gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez.
They proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez
introduced her to his business partners,
spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl.
Francisco Hernandez turned over the
payment to the spouses so that they could
secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses
promised her an overseas job. They said
she and the other applicants would leave
on December 17, 1992. On December 11,
1992, Charito paid the amount
of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in
the presence of the Reichls. Francisco
Hernandez again handed the money to the
spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito
paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez
who delivered the same to the spouses.
Francisco Hernandez did not issue a
receipt for the payment made by Charito
because he told her that he would not
betray her trust. Like the other applicants,
Charito was not able to leave the country
despite the numerous promises made by
the accused. They gave various excuses
for their failure to depart, until finally the
Reichls told the applicants that Karl Reichl
had so many business transactions in the
Philippines that they would not be able to
send them abroad and that they would
refund their payment instead. Hence, they
executed an agreement which was signed
by Karl Reichl and stating that they would
return the amounts paid by the applicants.
The accused, however, did not comply
with their obligation.9
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of
private complainant Melanie Bautista, also
took the witness stand. She stated that in
May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas
job through Francisco Hernandez.
Francisco Hernandez told her to
prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the
processing of her papers and plane ticket.
On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the
initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco
Hernandez who was then accompanied by
Karl and Yolanda Reichl.10 Upon receipt of
the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave
the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie
made two other payments: one on August
6, 1992 in the amount
of P25,000.00,11 and another on January
3, 1993 in the amount
of P51,000.00.12 Three receipts were
issued for the payments.13
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private
complainant Estela Abel de Manalo,
testified that his wife applied for the job of
domestic helper abroad. In June 1992,
Francisco Hernandez introduced them to
Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were
allegedly sending workers to Italy. Rustico
and his wife prepared all the relevant
documents, i.e., passport, police clearance
and marriage contract, and paid a total
placement fee of P130,000.00.14 They
paid P50,000.00 on June 5,
1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and
P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The
payments were made at the house of
Hilarion Matira and were received by
Francisco Hernandez who, in turn,
remitted them to the Reichl spouses.
Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for
the payment. The Reichls promised to
take care of Estela's papers and to secure
a job for her abroad. The Reichls vowed to
return the payment if they fail on their
promise. As with the other applicants,
Estela was also not able to leave the
country.15
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian
citizen, claimed that he entered the
Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this
date, he was in various places in Europe.
He came to the country on July 29, 1992
to explore business opportunities in
connection with the import and export of
beer and sugar. He also planned to
establish a tourist spot somewhere in
Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his
wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the Manila
Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992,
they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They
stayed there until August 26, 1992. After
they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went
to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl
Reichl returned to Vienna on September
19, 1992.16
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met
Francisco Hernandez through a certain
Jimmy Pineda around August 1992 at
Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco
Hernandez was allegedly looking for a
European equipment to be used for the
quarrying operation of his friend. Before
accepting the deal, he made some
research on the background of the
intended business. Realizing that said
business would not be viable, Karl Reichl
advised Francisco Hernandez to instead
look for a second-hand equipment from
Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco
Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in
September 1992.17
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on
October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez
allegedly approached him and sought his
help in securing Austrian visas purportedly
for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and
told him that he was planning to stay
permanently in the Philippines. On one
occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him
to an excursion at Sombrero Island.
Francisco Hernandez told him that he
would also bring some of his relatives with
him and he would introduce him to them.
There he met Narcisa Hernandez and
Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together
with Francisco Hernandez, later went to
see Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws
at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and
asked him if he could help her obtain an
Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was
firm on his refusal.18
In his testimony before the trial court,
Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about
Francisco Hernandez's recruitment
activities. He said that Francisco
Hernandez merely told him that he
wanted to help his relatives go to Europe.
He further denied that he promised
private complainants that he would give
them overseas employment.19 As regards
the document where Mr. Reichl undertook
to pay P1,388,924.00 to private
complainants, he claimed that he signed
said document under duress. Francisco
Hernandez allegedly told him that private
complainants would harm him and his
family if he refused to sign it. He signed
the document as he felt he had no other
option.20
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated
the testimony of her husband and denied
the charges against her. She claimed that
she was in Manila on the dates alleged in
the various informations, thus, she could
not have committed the acts charged
therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that
she did not know of any reason why
private complainants filed these cases
against her and her husband. She said
that several persons were harassing her
and pressuring her to pay private
complainants the sum of at
least P50,000.00.21
After assessing the evidence presented by
the parties, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting accused-appellants of
one (1) count of illegal recruitment in
large scale and six (6) counts of estafa.
The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused spouses
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ
REICHL -
1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated
and large-scale illegal recruitment as
charged in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as
charged in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal
recruitment, as charged, in the above-
mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429,
6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa, as charged, in the above-
mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428,
6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the
accused-spouses KARL REICHL and
YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL the
following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of
syndicated and large-scale illegal
recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429,
6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of Six (6) Years of prision
correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16)
Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa
Hernandez in the amount of P150,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision
correctional as minimum to eleven (11)
years of prision mayor, as maximum and
to indemnify the complainant Leonora
Perez in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision
correctional as minimum to sixteen (16)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
and to indemnify the complainant Melanie
Bautista in the amount of P150,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision
correctional as minimum to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum
and to indemnify the complainant Estela
Abel de Manalo in the amount
of P130,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years or prision
correctional as minimum to thirteen (13)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum
and to indemnify the complainant Charito
Balmes in the amount of P121,300.00;
and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellants appealed from the
decision of the trial court. They raise the
following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding
accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the
crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment
committed by syndicate and in large scale
based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution which miserably failed to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of illegal
recruitment on a large scale by
cummulating five separate cases of illegal
recruitment each filed by a single private
complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a
matter of course an automatic guilty
verdict against accused-appellant for the
crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a
separate crime for illegal recruitment. It is
submitted that conviction in the latter
crime does not ipso facto result in
conviction in the former."22
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal
recruitment as "any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor
Code), to be undertaken by non-licensees
or non-holders of authority." The term
"recruitment and placement" refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, including referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not, provided that any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.23 The law
imposes a higher penalty when the illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate
or in large scale as they are considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is
deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants engaged in
activities that fall within the definition of
recruitment and placement under the
Labor Code. The evidence on record
shows that they promised overseas
employment to private complainants and
required them to prepare the necessary
documents and to pay the placement fee,
although they did not have any license to
do so. There is illegal recruitment when
one who does not possess the necessary
authority or license gives the impression
of having the ability to send a worker
abroad.25
Accused-appellants assert that they
merely undertook to secure Austrian visas
for private complainants, which act did not
constitute illegal recruitment. They cite
the document marked at Exhibit "J"
stating that they promised to obtain
Austrian tourist visas for private
complainants. We are not convinced.
Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez,
Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes
categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda
Reichl told them that they would provide
them overseas employment and promised
them that they would be able to leave the
country on a specified date. We do not see
any reason to doubt the truthfulness of
their testimony. The defense has not
shown any ill motive for these witnesses
to falsely testify against accused-
appellants if it were not true that they met
with the Reichl spouses and the latter
represented themselves to have the
capacity to secure gainful employment for
them abroad. The minor lapses in the
testimony of these witnesses pointed out
by accused-appellants in their brief do not
impair their credibility, especially since
they corroborate each other on the
material points, i.e., that they met with
the three accused several times, that the
three accused promised to give them
overseas employment, and that they paid
the corresponding placement fee but were
not able to leave the country. It has been
held that truth-telling witnesses are not
always expected to give error-free
testimonies considering the lapse of time
and the treachery of human
memory.26 Moreover, it was shown that
Karl Reichl signed a document marked as
Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund
the payments given by private
complainants for the processing of their
papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr.
Reichl's claim that he was forced by
Francisco Hernandez to sign said
document. There is no showing, whether
in his testimony or in that of his wife, that
private complainants threatened to harm
them if he did not sign the document. Mr.
Reichl is an educated man and it cannot
be said that he did not understand the
contents of the paper he was signing.
When he affixed his signature thereon, he
in effect acknowledged his obligation to
ensure the departure of private
complainants and to provide them gainful
employment abroad. Such obligation
arose from the promise of overseas
placement made by him and his co-
accused to private complainants. The
admission made by accused-appellants in
Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain
Austrian visas for private complainants
does not negate the fact that they also
promised to procure for them overseas
employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of
the private complainants paid the amount
of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C",
which was executed on a later date,
accused-appellants promised to refund to
each complainant an amount
exceeding P150,000.00. This is an
acknowledgment that accused-appellants
received payments from the complainants
not only for securing visas but also for
their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and
alibi fail to impress us. The acts of
recruitment were committed from June
1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City.
Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29,
1992 until September 19, 1992, and then
he returned to the Philippines and stayed
in Batangas from October 21, 1992.
Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand,
claimed that he was in Manila on the dates
alleged in the various informations. It is of
judicial notice that Batangas City is only a
few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if
the spouses were staying in Manila, it
does not prevent them from going to
Batangas to engage in their recruitment
business. Furthermore, it appears that the
three accused worked as a team and they
conspired and cooperated with each other
in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly
to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez
introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the
job applicants as his business partners.
Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave
assurances to private complainants that
they would seek employment for them in
Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the
payments given by the applicants to the
Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to
process the applicants' papers. There
being conspiracy, each of the accused
shall be equally liable for the acts of his
co-accused even if he himself did not
personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial
court erred in convicting accused-
appellants of illegal recruitment in large
scale by cummulating the individual
informations filed by private complainants.
The eight informations for illegal
recruitment are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
"That on or about July 14, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Narcisa
Autor de Hernandez and to more than
three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa
Autor de Hernandez relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the
said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6431
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime
prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Leonora
Perez y Atienza and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Leonora Perez y
Atienza relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6433
"That on or about June 26, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Melanie
Bautista y Dolor and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Melanie Bautista y
Dolor relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6435
"That on or about July 12, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Annaliza
Perez y Atienza and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Annaliza Perez y
Atienza relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the
said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6437
"That on or about August 15, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Edwin
Coling y Coling and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling
relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the
said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6439
"That on or about June 5, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel
de Manalo and to more than three other
persons, job placement abroad, by reason
of which said Estela Abel de Manalo
relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation
of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6529
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime
prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta.
Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Anicel
Umahon y Delgado and to more than
three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Anicel
Umahon y Delgado relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the
said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6531
"That on or about November 25, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and
Employment or any other authorized
government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Charito
Balmes y Cantos and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Charito Balmes y
Cantos relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
We note that each information was filed
by only one complainant. We agree with
accused-appellants that they could not be
convicted for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale based on several
informations filed by only one
complainant. The Court held in People
vs. Reyes:27
"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of
illegal recruitment 'committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group,' it must be understood as
referring to the number of complainants in
each case who are complainants therein,
otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes
of illegal recruitment can be cummulated
to make out a case of large scale illegal
recruitment. In other words, a conviction
for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons
whether individually or as a group."28
This, however, does not serve to lower the transactions, or by means of similar
penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. deceits executed prior to or
The charge was not only for illegal simultaneously with the commission of the
recruitment committed in large scale but fraud. The offended party must have
also for illegal recruitment committed by a relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed or fraudulent means of the accused-
committed by a syndicate if carried out by appellant and as a result thereof, the
a group of three (3) or more persons offended party suffered damages.29 It has
conspiring and/or confederating with one been proved in this case that accused-
another in carrying out any unlawful or appellants represented themselves to
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme private complainants to have the capacity
defined under the first paragraph of Article to send domestic helpers to Italy,
38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown although they did not have any authority
that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and or license. It is by this representation that
Francisco Hernandez conspired with each they induced private complainants to pay
other in convincing private complainants a placement fee of P150,000.00. Such act
to apply for an overseas job and giving clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315
them the guaranty that they would be (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
hired as domestic helpers in Italy although IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal
they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed
hold that accused-appellants should be from is hereby AFFIRMED.
held liable for illegal recruitment Cost against appellants.
committed by a syndicate which is also SO ORDERED.
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the
Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also
proved the guilt of accused-appellants for
the crime of estafa. A person who is
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Art.
315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
provided the elements of estafa are
present. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds
another by using a fictitious name, or
falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary
G.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012
November 18, 1983
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE
SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA
RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO
LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO
ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG
SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO
ACOSTA, and JOSE
ENCABO respondents.
Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent
NLRC,
Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte
Pena Marcos Law Offices for private
respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Before the Court en banc is a motion to
reconsider the decision promulgated on
July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision
of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission and reinstated the decision of
the National Seamen Board.
To better understand the issues raised in
the motion for reconsideration, we
reiterate the background facts of the case,
Taken from the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It appears that on different dates in
December, 1978 and January, 1979, the
Seamen entered into separate contracts of
employment with the Company, engaging
them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a
period of twelve (12) months. After
verification and approval of their contracts
by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their
vessel in Japan.
On 10 January 1919, the master of the
vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula,
received a cable from the Company
advising him of the possibility that the
vessel might be directed to call at ITF-
controlled ports said at the same time
informing him of the procedure to be
followed in the computation of the special
or additional compensation of crew
members while in said ports. ITF is the
acronym for the International Transport
Workers Federation, a militant
international labor organization with
affiliates in different ports of the world,
which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a
port by preventing its loading or
unloading, This is a sanction resorted to
by ITF to enforce the payment of its
wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF
rates, if the wages of the crew members
of a vessel who have affiliated with it are
below its prescribed rates.) In the same
cable of the Company, the expressed its
regrets for hot clarifying earlier the
procedure in computing the special
compensation as it thought that the vessel
would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.
On 22 March 1979, the Company sent
another cable to complainant Bisula, this
time informing him of the respective
amounts each of the officers and crew
members would receive as special
compensation when the vessel called at
the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-
controlled port. This was followed by
another cable on 23 March 1979,
informing him that the officers and crew
members had been enrolled as members
of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and that
the membership fee for the 28 personnel
complement of the vessel had already
been paid.
In answer to the Company's cable last
mentioned, complainant Bisula, in
representation of the other officers and
crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a
cable informing the Company that the
officers and crew members were not
agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they
were not contented with their present
salaries 'based on the volume of works,
type of ship with hazardous cargo and
registered in a world wide trade': that the
'officers and crew (were) not interested in
ITF membership if not actually paid with
ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50%
increase based on present basic salary
and that the proposed wage increase is
the 'best and only solution to solve ITF
problem' since the Company's salary rates
'especially in tankers (are) very far in
comparison with other shipping agencies
in Manila ...
In reply, the Company proposed a 25%
increase in the basic pay of the
complainant crew members, although it
claimed, that it would "suffer and absorb
considerable amount of losses." The
proposal was accepted by the Seamen
with certain conditions which were
accepted by the Company. Conformably
with the agreement of the parties which
was effected through the cables
abovementioned, the Seamen were paid
their new salary rates.
Subsequently, the Company sought
authority from the NSB to cancel the
contracts of employment of the Seamen,
claiming that its principals had terminated
their manning agreement because of the
actuations of the Seamen. The request
was granted by the NSB Executive
Director in a letter dated 10 April 1979.
Soon thereafter, the Company cabled the
Seamen informing them that their
contracts would be terminated upon the
vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979
they Arere asked to disembark from the
vessel, their contracts were terminated,
and they were repatriated to Manila.
There is no showing that the Seamen
were given the opportunity to at least
comment on the Company's request for
the cancellation of their contracts,
although they had served only three (3)
out of the twelve (12) months' duration of
their contracts.
The private respondents filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
earned wages with the National Seamen
Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine
Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for
breach of contract and recovery of excess
salaries and overtime pay against the
private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the
NSB rendered a decision declaring that
the seamen breached their employment
contracts when they demanded and
received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over
and above their contracted rates. The
dismissal of the seamen was declared
legal and the seamen were ordered
suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the
NLRC which reversed the decision of the
NSB and required the petitioner to pay the
wages and other monetary benefits
corresponding to the unexpired portion of
the manning contract on the ground that
the termination of the contract by the
petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen
Shipping filed the present petition.
The private respondents submit the
following issues in their motion for
reconsideration: têñ.£îhqwâ£
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID
VIOLENCE TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF
FACT OF THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD
THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR
CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN
THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT
THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR
CONTRACT.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S HAVING
AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE
SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.
C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED
WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE
ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING
THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT
COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS
HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT
FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAD VIOLATED THE SAME.
D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER
VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED
BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS,
THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND
JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH
TERMINATION.
E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY
PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND
THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT
WERE NOT MADE IN BAD FAITH.
F. THIS HONORABLE COURT
INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
At the outset, we are faced with the
question whether or not the Court en banc
should give due course to the motion for
reconsideration inspite of its having been
denied twice by the Court's Second
Division. The case was referred to and
accepted by the Court en banc because of
the movants' contention that the decision
in this case by the Second Division
deviated from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc.
v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37,
February 20, 1981), a First Division case
with the same facts and issues. We are
constrained to answer the initial question
in the affirmative.
A fundamental postulate of Philippine
Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is
only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts are required to
take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of
First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v.
Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of
Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of
the Court's work is now performed by its
two Divisions, but the Court remains one
court, single, unitary, complete, and
supreme. Flowing from this nature of the
Supreme Court is the fact that, while '
individual Justices may dissent or partially
concur with one another, when the Court
states what the law is, it speaks with only
one voice. And that voice being
authoritative should be a clear as possible.
Any doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the Court, whether en banc or in
Division, may be modified or reversed
only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3),
Article X, Constitution.) In the rare
instances when one Division disagrees in
its views with the other Division, or the
necessary votes on an issue cannot be
had in a Division, the case is brought to
the Court en banc to reconcile any
seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an
earlier decision, and to declare the Court's
doctrine. This is what has happened in this
case.
The decision sought to be reconsidered
appears to be a deviation from the Court's
decision, speaking through the First
Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon.
Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced
with two seemingly conflicting resolutions
of basically the same issue by its two
Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to
transfer the case to the Court en banc.
Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment
on the third motion for reconsideration
states that the resolution of the motion
might be the needed vehicle to make the
ruling in the Wallem case clearer and
more in time with the underlying
principles of the Labor Code. We agree
with the petitioner.
After an exhaustive, painstaking, and
perspicacious consideration of the motions
for reconsideration and the comments,
replies, and other pleadings related
thereto, the Court en banc is constrained
to grant the motions. To grant the motion
is to keep faith with the constitutional
mandate to afford protection to labor and
to assure the rights of workers to self-
organization and to just and humane
conditions of work. We sustain the
decision of the respondent National labor
Relations Commission.
There are various arguments raised by the
petitioners but the common thread
running through all of them is the
contention, if not the dismal prophecy,
that if the respondent seamen are
sustained by this Court, we would in effect
"kill the en that lays the golden egg." In
other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly
among the best in the world, should
remain satisfied with relatively lower if not
the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for
higher wages while their contracts of
employment are subsisting, should accept
as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the
side contracts which require them to
falsely pretend to be members of
international labor federations, pretend to
receive higher salaries at certain foreign
ports only to return the increased pay
once the ship leaves that port, should
stifle not only their right to ask for
improved terms of employment but their
freedom of speech and expression, and
should suffer instant termination of
employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from
their Government and their courts.
Otherwise, the petitioners contend that
Filipinos would no longer be accepted as
seamen, those employed would lose their
jobs, and the still unemployed would be
left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be
the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be
used to argue against the interests of
labor; where efforts by workingmen to
better their terms of employment would
be characterized as prejudicing the
interests of labor as a whole.
In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years
ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey was ponente of the
court's opinion declaring as a conspiracy
the threat of workingmen to strike in
connection with their efforts to promote
unionism, têñ.£îhqwâ£
It is difficult to believe that a right exists
in law which we can scarcely conceive can
produce, in any posture of affairs, other
than injuriois results. It is simply the right
of workmen, by concert of action, and by
taking advantage of their position, to
control the business of another, I am
unwilling to hold that a right which
cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to
the employee, and which must always be
hurtful to the employer, exists in law. In
my opinion this indictment sufficiently
shows that the force of the confederates
was brought to bear upon their employer
for the purpose of oppression and mischief
and that this amounts to a conspiracy,
(State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867.
Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on
Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied)
The same arguments have greeted every
major advance in the rights of the
workingman. And they have invariably
been proved unfounded and false.
Unionism, employers' liability acts,
minimum wages, workmen's
compensation, social security and
collective bargaining to name a few were
all initially opposed by employers and
even well meaning leaders of government
and society as "killing the hen or goose
which lays the golden eggs." The claims of
workingmen were described as
outrageously injurious not only to the
employer but more so to the employees
themselves before these claims or
demands were established by law and
jurisprudence as "rights" and before these
were proved beneficial to management,
labor, and the nation as a whole beyond
reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any
major advance in the rights of labor and
the workingmen. The private respondents
merely sought rights already established.
No matter how much the petitioner-
employer tries to present itself as
speaking for the entire industry, there is
no evidence that it is typical of employers
hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak
for them.
The contention that manning industries in
the Philippines would not survive if the
instant case is not decided in favor of the
petitioner is not supported by evidence.
The Wallem case was decided on February
20, 1981. There have been no severe
repercussions, no drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen,
and none of the dire consequences
repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner.
Why should Vir-jen be all exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in
international shipping are shouldered by
the foreign principal. The local manning
office is an agent whose primary function
is recruitment and who .usually gets a
lump sum from the shipowner to defray
the salaries of the crew. The hiring of
seamen and the determination of their
compensation is subject to the interplay of
various market factors and one key factor
is how much in terms of profits the local
manning office and the foreign shipowner
may realize after the costs of the voyage
are met. And costs include salaries of
officers and crew members.
Filipino seamen are admittedly as
competent and reliable as seamen from
any other country in the world. Otherwise,
there would not be so many of them in
the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea
on this globe. It is competence and
reliability, not cheap labor that makes our
seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino
seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan and
other developed nations. But certainly
they are entitled to government protection
when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer.-, and when
they exercise the right to petition for
improved terms of employment, especially
when they feel that these are sub-
standard or are capable of improvement
according to internationally accepted
rules. In the domestic scene, there are
marginal employers who prepare two sets
of payrolls for their employees — one in
keeping with minimum wages and the
other recording the sub-standard wages
that the employees really receive, The
reliable employers, however, not only
meet the minimums required by fair labor
standards legislation but even go way
above the minimums while earning
reasonable profits and prospering. The
same is true of international employment.
There is no reason why this Court and the
Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its
agencies and commissions should come
out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous
or inefficient shipowners, who claim they
cannot survive without resorting to tricky
and deceptive schemes, instead of
Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of
honorable, competent, and law-abiding
employers, domestic or foreign.
If any minor advantages given to Filipino
seamen may somehow cut into the profits
of local manning agencies and foreign
shipowners, that is not sufficient reason
why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand
by the former instead of listening to
unsubstantiated fears that they would be
killing the hen which lays the golden eggs.
Prescinding from the above, we now hold
that neither the National Seamen Board
nor the National Labor Relations
Commission should, as a matter of official
policy, legitimize and enforce cubious
arrangements where shipowners and
seamen enter into fictitious contracts
similar to the addendum agreements or
side contracts in this case whose purpose
is to deceive. The Republic of the
Philippines and its ministries and agencies
should present a more honorable and
proper posture in official acts to the whole
world, notwithstanding our desire to have
as many job openings both here and
abroad for our workers. At the very least,
such as sensitive matter involving no less
than our dignity as a people and the
welfare of our workingmen must proceed
from the Batasang Pambansa in the form
of policy legislation, not from
administrative rule making or adjudication
Another issue raised by the movants is
whether or not the seamen violated their
contracts of employment.
The form contracts approved by the
National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign
shipowners who can take care of
themselves. The standard forms embody'
the basic minimums which must be
incorporated as parts of the employment
contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code.) They are not collective bargaining
agreements or immutable contracts which
the parties cannot improve upon or modify
in the course of the agreed period of time.
To state, therefore, that the affected
seamen cannot petition their employer for
higher salaries during the 12 months
duration of the contract runs counter to
established principles of labor legislation.
The National Labor Relations Commission,
as the appellate tribunal from decisions of
the National Seamen Board, correctly
ruled that the seamen did not violate their
contracts to warrant their dismissal.
The respondent Commission
ruled: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In the light of all the foregoing facts, we
find that the cable of the seamen
proposing an increase in their wage rates
was not and could not have been intended
as a threat to comp el the Company to
accede to their proposals. But even
assuming, if only for the sake of
argument, that the demand or — proposal
for a wage increase was accompanied by a
threat that they would report to ITF if the
Company did not accede to the contract
revision - although there really was no
such threat as pointed out earlier — the
Seamen should not be held at fault for
asking such a demand. In the same case
cited above, the Supreme Court
held: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of
private respondents was justified because
the latter threatened the ship authorities
in acceding to their demands, and this
constitutes serious misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor Code. This
contention is not well-taken. But even if
there had been such a threat,
respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for
them to employ some means of pressing
their demands for petitioner, the refusal to
abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the
same, They were only acting in the
exercise of their rights, and to deprive
them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is
no serious misconduct to speak of in the
case at bar which would justify
respondents' dismissal just because of
their firmness in their demand for the
fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it
entered into without any coercion,
specially on the part of private
respondents. (Emphasis supplied).
The above citation is from Wallem.
The facts show that when the respondents
boarded the M/T Jannu there was no
intention to send their ship to Australia.
On January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a
cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula
informing him of the procedure to be
followed in the computation of special
compensation of crewmembers while in
ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets
for not having earlier clarified the
procedure as it thought that the vessel
would trade in Carribean ports only.
On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent
another cable informing Bisula of the
special compensation when the ship would
call at Kwinana Australia.
The following day, shipmaster Bisula
cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and
crews were not interested in ITF
membership if not paid ITF rates and that
their only demand was a 50 percent
increase based on their then salaries.
Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates
were "very far in comparison with other
shipping agencies in Manila."
In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25
percent increase. Only after Kyoei Tanker
Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps
sum amount given monthly to Vir-jen was
the decision to terminate the respondents'
employment formulated.
The facts show that Virjen Initiated the
discussions which led to the demand for
increased . The seamen made a proposal
and the petitioner organized with a
counter-proposal. The ship had not vet
gone to Australia or any ITF controlled
port. There was absolutely no mention of
any strike. much less a threat to strike.
The seamen had done in act which under
Philippine law or any other civilized law
would be termed illegal, oppressive, or
malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it
was mild compared to accepted valid
modes of labor activity.
We reiterate our ruling
in Wallem. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of
private respondents was justified because
the latter threatened the ship authorities
in acceding to their demands, and this
constitutes serious misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor Code. This
contention is not well-taken. The records
fail to establish clearly the commission of
any threat, But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior
should not be censured because it is but
natural for them to employ some means
of pressing their demands for petitioner,
who refused to abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to honor and respect
the same, They were only acting in the
exercise of their rights, and to deprive
them of their form of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. ...
Our dismissing the petition is premised on
the assumption that the Ministry of Labor
and Employment and all its agencies exist
primarily for the workinginan's interests
and, of course, the nation as a whole. The
points raised by the Solicitor-General in
his comments refer to the issue of
allowing what the petitioner importunes
under the argument of "killing the hen
which lays the golden eggs." This is one of
policy which should perhaps be directed to
the Batasang Pambansa and to our
country's other policy makers for more
specific legislation on the matter, subject
to the constitutional provisions protecting
labor, promoting social justice, and
guaranteeing non-abridgement of the
freedom of speech, press, peaceable
assembly and petition. We agree with the
movants that there is no showing of any
cause, which under the Labor Code or any
current applicable law, would warrant the
termination of the respondents' services
before the expiration of their contracts.
The Constitution guarantees State
assurance of the rights of workers to
security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II,
Constitution). Presumptions and
provisions of law, the evidence on record,
and fundamental State policy all dictate
that the motions for reconsideration
should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the motions for
reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
Being the ponente of the Wallem case,
upon whose ruling the decision of the
Court en banc in this case is mainly made
to rest, at least insofar as said Court now
finds that the respondent seamen have
not committed any misconduct which
would constitute a just cause for the
termination of their services just after
three months of the 12-month term of
their contract, a brief explanation why I
voted in the Second Division in favor of
the petitioner company in the instant
case, and not the respondent seamen, as
I did in the Wallem case, is obviously
called for.
During our deliberations in the Division, it
was made clear that in the instant case,'
threat was employed by the seamen
against the company or shipowners to
obtain consent to the 50% raise of wages
as proposed by the seamen upon being
informed that they would touch on ITF-
controlled ports. I joined my colleagues in
the Second Division in concurring in the
decision penned by Justice Barredo, now
retired, in the belief that threat was
indeed committed, constituting a just
cause for termination of the services of
the seamen with still nine months to go of
their 12-month contract with the
petitioner. As the facts are more
thoroughly and accurately presented and
discussed in the decision so brilliantly
written by Justice Gutierrez, I am
persuaded that on the basis of the ruling
of the Wallem case, a mistake was
committed in finding the existence of a
just cause for the instant and unexpected
termination of the services of the seamen.
The facts of this case show that to the
proposal of the seamen for a 50%
increase, made because they were
informed that they would touch on ITF-
controlled ports, the company countered
with an offer of only 25% raised The
proposal of 5% was much lower than the
rates which the ITF would surely force
upon the company When the company
made a counter proposal of 25% raise the
seamen accepted. The trip went on
smoothly until upon arriving at a port
which afforded haven and safety to the
shipowner, the latter suddenly, and with
imperious finality, terminated the services
of the seamen and repatriated them to
Manila. These are the simple facts that call
for the application of the law, mainly the
provisions of the Labor Code. That law is
none other than what is indicated in how
the Walem case was decided — in
vindication of how the Seamen were given
a raw deal in being lulled into a false
sense of security in their employment
contract only to be rudely terminated and
ordered repatriated.
In the Wallem case, the seamen pressed
their demand for the enforcement of a
special agreement entered into by the
shipowner or company with the ITF. For
this act, their services were terminated
and they were repatriated by their better left to the Batasan Pambansa. We
employer shipping company. What the should confine ourselves to applying the
First Division said in favor of the seamen, law as it is. In so doing, We are not
is in my opinion, the correct ruling which allowed to apply it to suit, or to respond
We should reaffirm in the instant case. to, the demands of what We may deem
Thus — têñ.£îhqw⣠the better policy than what the law clearly
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of intends. The policy is the law, and the law
private respondent was justified because is the policy. We might be treading on
the latter threatened the ship authorities forbidden ground to bend the law to what
in acceding to their demands, and this We perceive to be a desirable policy.
constitutes serious misconduct as Courts are called upon only to apply the
contemplated by the Labor Code. This law. Does the law permit the termination
contention is not welltaken. But even en if of the services of the seamen in violation
there had been such a threat, of their contract except only upon a just
respondents' behavior should not be cause? This is the only question to be
censured because it is but natural for answered in this case. The answer is given
them to employ some means of pressing with eloquent persuasiveness in the
their demands on petitioner, who refused decision in which I concur wholeheartedly.
to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the
same. They were only acting in the
exercise of their rights, and to deprive
them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is
no serious misconduct to speak of in the
case at bar which would justify
respondents' dismissal just because of
their firmness in their demand for the
fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it
entered into without any coercion,
specially on the part of private
respondents. (Emphasis supplied).
This above ruling is the law on the matter
and, in my opinion. controlling on the case
at bar. Whatever policy may prove more
beneficial to the cause of labor in general,
as is sought to be offered as argument in
support of the Second Division decision, is
not a proper ground for making said policy
prevail over the applicable law or
jurisprudence, Questions of policy are
G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995
ESALYN CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. HON.
EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO
T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H.
ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO,
CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA,
JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC. Respondents.chanrobles
virtual law library
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society
today is that while our laws appear to
protect the poor, their interpretation is
sometimes anti-poor. In the case at
bench, petitioner, a poor, uncounselled
entertainment dancer signed a contract
with her Japanese employer calling for a
monthly salary of One Thousand Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later
had to sign an immoral side agreement
reducing her salary below the minimum
standard set by the POEA. Petitioner
invoked the law to collect her salary
differentials, but incredibly found public
respondent straining the seams of our law
to disfavor her. There is no greater
disappointment to the poor like petitioner
than to discover the ugly reality behind
the beautiful rhetoric of laws. We will not
allow this
travesty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro
bles virtual law library
This is a petition for certiorari to review
the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), 1 dated
December 29, 1992, which affirmed the
Decision of public respondent Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento, dated
February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's
complaint for unpaid salaries amounting
to Six Thousand Dollars
(US$6,000.00).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The facts are
undisputed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an
entertainment dancer, entered into a
standard employment contract for
overseas Filipino artists and entertainers
with Planning Japan Co., Ltd., 2 through its
Philippine representative, private
respondent Centrum Placement &
Promotions Corporation. The contract had
a duration of two (2) to six (6) months,
and petitioner was to be paid a monthly
compensation of One Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On
December 5, 1888, the POEA approved
the contract. Subsequently, petitioner
executed the following side agreement
with her Japanese employer through her
local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
Date: Dec. 10, 1988
SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
DATE OF DEPARTURE:
_________________chanrobles virtual
law library
ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby
with my own free will and voluntarily have
the honor to authorize your good office to
please deduct the amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from
my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as
monthly commission for my Manager, Mr.
Jose A. Azucena,
Jr.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner) 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for
Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six
(6) months, until June 10, 1989. She
came back to the Philippines on June 14,
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for
underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the
payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid
portion of her basic salary for six months.
Charged in the case were private
respondent Centrum Promotions and
Placement Corporation, the Philippine
representative of Planning Japan, Co.,
Inc., its insurer, Times Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents
Promotion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
The complaint was dismissed by public
respondent POEA Administrator on
February 17, 1992. He ratiocinated, inter
alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications,
complainant (referring to petitioner
herein) was satisfied and did not have any
complaint (about) anything regarding her
employment in Japan until after almost
two (2) years (when) she filed the instant
complaint on February 21, 1991. The
records show that after signing the
Standard Employment Contract on
December 1, 1988, she entered into a
side agreement with the Japanese
employer thru her local manager, Jaz
Talents Promotion consenting to a
monthly salary of US$750.00 which she
affirmed during the conference of May 21,
1991. Respondent agency had no
knowledge nor participation in the said
agreement such that it could not be
faulted for violation of the Standard
Employment Contract regarding the
stipulated salary. We cannot take
cognizance of such violation when one of
the principal party (sic) thereto opted to
receive a salary different from what has
been stipulated in their contract,
especially so if the contracting party did
not consent/participate in such
arrangement. Complainant (petitioner)
cannot now demand from respondent
agency to pay her the salary based (on)
the processed Employment Contract for
she is now considered in bad faith and
hence, estopped from claiming thereto
thru her own act of consenting and
agreeing to receive a salary not in
accordance with her contract of
employment. Moreover, her self-imposed
silence for a long period of time worked to
her own disadvantage as she allowed
laches to prevail which barred respondent
from doing something at the outset.
Normally, if a person's right (is) violated,
she/he would immediately react to protect
her/his rights which is not true in the case
at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The term laches has been defined as one's
negligence or failure to assert his right in
due time or within reasonable time from
the accrual of his cause of action, thus,
leading another party to believe that there
is nothing wrong with his own claim. This
resulted in placing the negligent party in
estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . .
Likewise, the Supreme Court in one case
held that not only is inaction within
reasonable time to enforce a right the
basic premise that underlies a valid
defense of laches but such inaction
evinces implied consent or acquiescence
to the violation of the right . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Under the prevailing circumstances of this
case, it is outside the regulatory powers of
the Administration to rule on the liability
of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if
any, (it) not being a licensed private
agency but a promotion which trains
entertainers for abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
(Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision,
thus:
We fail to see any conspiracy that the
complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to
the respondents. She has, to put it
bluntly, not established and/or laid the
basis for Us to arrive at a conclusion that
the respondents have been and should be
held liable for her
claims.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobl
es virtual law library
The way We see it, the records do not at
all indicate any connection between
respondents Centrum Promotion &
Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents
Promotion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal.
Hence, We affirmed. 4chanrobles virtual
law library
Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision,
petitioner instituted the present petition,
alleging that public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding: that she is guilty of laches; that
she entered into a side contract on
December 10, 1988 for the reduction of
her basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty
U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which
superseded, nullified and invalidated the
standard employment contract she
entered into on December 1, 1988; and
that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private
respondents are not solidarily liable to her
for Six Thousand US Dollars
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. 5
The petition is
meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
Firstly, we hold that the managerial
commission agreement executed by
petitioner to authorize her Japanese
Employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty
U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her
monthly basic salary is void because it is
against our existing laws, morals and
public policy. It cannot supersede the
standard employment contract of
December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA
with the following stipulation appended
thereto:
It is understood that the terms and
conditions stated in this Employment
Contract are in conformance with the
Standard Employment Contract for
Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1986. Any alterations or changes made in
any part of this contract without prior
approval by the POEA shall be null and
void; 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the
provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section
2(f), Rule I, Book VI of the 1991 Rules
and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment, thus:
Book V, Rule IIchanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The
Administration shall determine, formulate
and review employment standards in
accordance with the market development
and welfare objectives of the overseas
employment program and the prevailing
market
conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
obles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract.
The following shall be considered the
minimum requirements for contracts of
employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working
hours and overtime pay for services
rendered beyond regular working hours in
accordance with the standards established
by the Administration;
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 3. Standard Employment Contract.
The administration shall undertake
development and/or periodic review of
region, country and skills specific
employment contracts for landbased
workers and conduct regular review of
standard employment contracts (SEC) for
seafarers. These contracts shall provide
for minimum employment standards
herein enumerated under Section 2, of
this Rule and shall recognize the
prevailing labor and social legislations at
the site of employment and international
conventions. The SEC shall set the
minimum terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals
shall adopt the SEC in connection with the
hiring of workers without prejudice to
their adoption of other terms and
conditions of employment over and above
the minimum standards of the
Administration. (Emphasis supplied.)
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
Sec. 2. Grounds for
suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
f. Substituting or altering employment
contracts and other documents approved
and verified by the Administration from
the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the
Administration's approval.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand
Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties'
standard employment contract is in
accordance with
the minimum employment standards with
respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus,
the side agreement which reduced
petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred
Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and
void for violating the POEA's minimum
employment standards, and for not having
been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this
side agreement is a scheme all too
frequently resorted to by unscrupulous
employers against our helpless overseas
workers who are compelled to agree to
satisfy their basic economic
needs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale
demands"' cannot be applied to petitioner.
Laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, 7 thus
giving rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it. 8 It is not
concerned with mere lapse of time; the
fact of delay, standing alone, is
insufficient to constitute laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims, and is
principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or asserted. 10 There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.
The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and since it
is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her
claim well within the three-year
prescriptive period for the filing of money
claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor
Code. 12For this reason, we hold the
doctrine of laches inapplicable to
petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178
(1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while
prescription is based on law. Our courts
are basically courts of law not courts of
equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to
resist the enforcement of an existing legal
right. We have ruled in Arsenal
v. Intermediate Appellate Court . . . that it
is a long standing principle that equity
follows the law. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and
have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . .
., this Court was more emphatic upholding
the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly
described as a "justice outside legality,"
this applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or, as in this
case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the
three-year statutory period, recovery
therefore cannot be barred by
laches. Courts should never apply the
doctrine of laches earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and
Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd.
- the agency's foreign principal - are
solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid
wages. This is in accordance with
stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard
employment contract which provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning
Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private
respondent Centrum Promotions &
Placement Corporation) shall be jointly
and severally responsible for the proper
implementation of the terms and
conditions in this Contract. 13 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the
provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V,
Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended, thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment.
- Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the
Bureau the following
documents:chanrobles virtual law library
a) A formal appointment or agency
contract executed by a foreign-based
employer in favor of the license holder to
recruit and hire personnel for the former .
. . . Such formal appointment or
recruitment agreement shall contain the
following provisions, among others:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued
jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the
violations of the recruitment agreement
and the contracts of employment.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our overseas workers constitute an
exploited class. Most of them come from
the poorest sector of our society. They are
thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile
shows they live in suffocating slums,
trapped in an environment of crime.
Hardly literate and in ill health, their only
hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in
our country. Their unfortunate
circumstance makes them easy prey to
avaricious employers. They will climb
mountains, cross the seas, endure slave
treatment in foreign lands just to survive.
Out of despondence, they will work under
sub-human conditions and accept salaries
below the minimum. The least we can do
is to protect them with our laws in our
land. Regretfully, respondent public
officials who should sympathize with the
working class appear to have a different
orientation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
robles virtual law library
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent
POEA Administrator and NLRC
Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-
02-199 (ER), respectively dated February
17 and December 29, 1992, and the
Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23,
1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondents are held jointly and
severally liable to petitioner for the
payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs
against private
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycha
nrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND
PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT
SUPPLY, petitioners
vs.
NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer &
San Vicente for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public
respondent.
Benjamin B. Vergara for private
respondent
GANCAYCO, J.:
On November 2, 1982, a "crew
Agreement" was entered into by private
respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and
Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply
(hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the
latter employed the former as able
seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz"
(renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly
salary of US $ 300.00. Said agreement
was processed and approved by the
National Seaman's Board (NSB) on
November 3, 1982. 1
While on board said vessel the said parties
entered into a supplementary contract of
employment on December 6, 1982 2 which
provides among others:
1. The employer shall be obliged to insure
the employee during his engagement
against death or permanent invalidity
caused by accident on board up to:
US $ 40,000 - for death caused by
accident
US $ 50,000 - for permanent total
disability caused by accident. 3
On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an
accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a
result of which he was hospitalized at the
Suez Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he
was repatriated to the Philippines and was
hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center
from October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984.
On August 19, 1985 the medical
certificate was issued describing his
disability as "permanent in nature."
Balatongan demanded payment for his
claim for total disability insurance in the
amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for
in the contract of employment but his
claim was denied for having been
submitted to the insurers beyond the
designated period for doing so.
Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a
complaint against Philimare and Seagull
Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called
Seagull) in the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for
non-payment of his claim for permanent
total disability with damages and
attorney's fees.
After the parties submitted their
respective position papers with the
corresponding documentary evidence, the
officer-in-charge of the Workers
Assistance and Adjudication Office of the
POEA rendered a decision on May 2, 1986,
the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondents are hereby ordered to pay
complainant the amount of US $
50,000.00 representing permanent total
disability insurance and attorney's fees at
10% of the award. Payment should be
made in this Office within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof at the prevailing rate
of exchange. This Office cannot however
rule on damages, having no jurisdiction on
the matter.
SO ORDERED. 4
Seagull and Philimare appealed said
decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986.
Pending resolution of their appeal because
of the alleged transfer of the agency of
Seagull to Southeast Asia Shipping
Corporation, Seagull filed on April 28,
1987 a Motion For Substitution/Inclusion
of Party Respondent which was opposed
by Balatongan. 5 This was followed by
an ex-parte motion for leave to file third
party complaint on June 4, 1987 by
Seagull. A decision was promulgated on
December 7, 1987 denying both motions
and dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit. 6 A motion for reconsideration of
said decision was denied for lack of merit
in a resolution dated February 26, 1988. 7
Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this
petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
based on the following grounds:
1. Respondent POEA erred in applying the
Supplemental Contract;
2. Respondents POEA and NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in holding
that the Supplemental Contract was
signed on board MV Santa Cruz by and
between private respondent and your
petitioner; and
3. Respondent NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not giving due
course to your petitioners' Motion for
Leave to File Third Party Complaint as well
as their Motion for Inclusion/Substitution
of respondents. 8
On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the
questioned decision and resolution of
public respondents.
Petitioners argue that prior to private
respondent's departure he executed a
crew agreement on November 2, 1982
which was duly approved by the POEA;
that the supplementary contract of
employment that was entered into on
board the vessel "Turtle Bay" which
provides for a US $ 50,000.00 insurance
benefit in case of permanent disability was
neither approved nor verified by
respondent POEA; and that the same
violates Article 34(i) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides as follows:
Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. - It shall be
unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(i) to substitute or alter employment
contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of expiration of
the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor.
Petitioners also call attention to Article
VIII, paragraph 2 of the Supplementary
Contract which provides as follows:
2. Notwithstanding his claim against the
insurers the employee hereby expressly
waives all claims of his own or his heirs
for compensation of damages due to
death or permanent invalidity which he
suffered during his engagement against
the employers ... unless his death or
permanent invalidity has been caused by
willful act of any of the above-named
persons. 9
Petitioners stress that while public
respondents upheld the applicability of
said supplementary contract insofar as it
increased the benefits to private
respondent, public respondents
considered the provision on the waiver
against all claims by private respondent to
be contrary to public policy.
In its questioned decision dated December
7, 1987, the respondent NLRC made the
following disquisition:
The focal issue for determination is the
validity and enforceability of the second
contract of employment entered into by
and between complainant and
respondents on board the vessel where
the former had served as a member of its
complement despite the absence of NSB
verification or approval. With respect to
the findings of facts in the appealed
decision, We consider the same as duly
supported by substantial evidence and the
admissions of the parties in their
pleadings.
Much stress and emphasis are made by
the respondents in their appeal that this
claim has no legal basis or footing
inasmuch as the second contract of
employment containing a total disability
insurance benefit of US $ 50,000.00,
much more than that embodied in the first
contract of employment which was
approved by the defunct NSB, was not
verified or approved by the latter.
Accordingly, the respondents posit the
argument that subject claim may not
prosper pursuant to the provisions of Art.
34(i) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which provides that it shall be unlawful for
any individual, entity, licensee, or holder
of authority '(T)o substitute or alter
employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor from
the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor.
Did the POEA commit a reversible error
when it considered the second contract of
employment as valid sans any verification
or approval thereof by the NSB? Our
answer to this query is in the negative.
Apparently, the intention of the law when
Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is
to provide for the prohibited and unlawful
practices relative to recruitment and
placement. As shown in the 'Explanatory
Note' of Parliamentary Bill No. 4531,
pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:
Many of the provisions are already
existing and were simply restated. Some
however were restated with modifications
and new ones were introduced to reflect
what in the past have been noted to be
pernicious practices which tend to place
workers at a disadvantage.'
it is indubitably clear that the purpose of
having overseas contracts of employment
approved by the NSB(POEA) is whether or
not such contracts conform to the
minimum terms and conditions prescribed
by the NSB (POEA). In other words, the
law did not at all prohibit any alteration
which provided for increases in wages or
other benefits voluntarily granted by the
employer. Precisely, under Section 2, Rule
1, Book V of the Rules and Regulations of
the POEA, '(t)he standard format of
employment contracts shall set the
minimum standards of the terms and
conditions of employment. All employers
and principals shall adopt the model
contract in connection with the hiring of
workers without prejudice to their
adopting other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum
standards of the Administration.' Where,
as here, it is admitted that the second
contract although not verified or approved
by the NSB (POEA) granted more benefits
by way of total disability insurance to the
complainant, the respondents may not be
allowed to disvow their own voluntary acts
by insisting that such beneficial contract in
favor of the seaman is null and void.
(Emphasis supplied.) 10
We agree.
The supplementary contract of
employment was entered into between
petitioner and private respondent to
modify the original contract of
employment The reason why the law
requires that the POEA should approve
and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of
the Labor Code is to insure that the
employee shall not thereby be placed in a
disadvantageous position and that the
same are within the minimum standards
of the terms and conditions of such
employment contract set by the POEA.
This is why a standard format for
employment contracts has been adopted
by the Department of Labor. However,
there is no prohibition against stipulating
in a contract more benefits to the
employee than those required by law.
Thus, in this case wherein a
"supplementary contract" was entered
into affording greater benefits to the
employee than the previous one, and
although the same was not submitted for
the approval of the POEA, the public
respondents properly considered said
contract to be valid and enforceable.
Indeed, said pronouncements of public
respondents have the effect of an
approval of said contract. Moreover, as
said contract was voluntarily entered into
by the parties the same is binding
between them. 11 Not being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy
or public order, its validity must be
sustained. 12 By the same token, the court
sustains the ruling of public respondents
that the provision in the supplementary
contract whereby private respondent
waives any claim against petitioners for
damages arising from death or permanent
disability is against public policy,
oppressive and inimical to the rights of
private respondent. The said provision
defeats and is inconsistent with the duty
of petitioners to insure private respondent
against said contingencies as clearly
stipulated in the said contract.
Petitioners however argue that they could
not have entered into said supplementary
contract of employment as Philimare was
a mere manning agent in the Philippines
of the shipping company managed by
Navales Shipping Management and Marine
Consultant (Pte) Ltd., its principal.
Petitioners assert that the said
supplementary contract was entered into
by private respondent with their principal,
Navales Shipping Management and Marine
Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the vessel
Turtle Bay so petitioners cannot be held
responsible thereunder.
This Court is not a trier of facts and the
findings of the public respondents are
conclusive in this proceeding. Public
respondents found that petitioner
Philimare and private respondent entered
into said supplementary contract of
employment on December 6, 1982.
Assuming for the sake of argument that it
was petitioners' principal which entered
into said contract with private respondent,
nevertheless petitioner, as its manning
agent in the Philippines, is jointly
responsible with its principal
thereunder. 13
There is no question that under the said
supplementary contract of employment, it
is the duty of the employer, petitioners
herein, to insure the employee, during his
engagement, against death and
permanent invalidity caused by accident
on board up to $ 50,000.00.
Consequently, it is also its concomitant
obligation to see to it that the claim
against the insurance company is duly
filed by private respondent or in his
behalf, and within the time provided for
by the terms of the insurance contract.
In this case, the private respondent met
the accident on October 6, 1983. Since
then, he was hospitalized at the Suez
Canal Authority Hospital and thereafter be
was repatriated to the Philippines wherein
he was also hospitalized from October 22,
1983 to March 27, 1984. It was only on
August 19, 1985 that he was issued a
medical certificate describing his disability
to be permanent in nature. It was not
possible for private respondent to file a
claim for permanent disability with the
insurance company within the one-year
period from the time of the injury, as his
disability was ascertained to be
permanent only thereafter. Petitioners did
not exert any effort to assist private
respondent to recover payment of his
claim from the insurance company. They
did not even care to dispute the finding of
the insurer that the claim was not flied on
time. 14 Petitioners must, therefore, be
held responsible for its omission, if not
negligence, by requiring them to pay the
claim of private respondent.
The Court finds that the respondent NLRC
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners, motion for leave to
file third-party complaint and substitution
inclusion of party respondent. Such
motion is largely addressed to the
discretion of the said Commission.
Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of
interest took place only after the POEA
had rendered its decision, the denial of
the motion so as to avoid further delay in
the settlement of the claim of private
respondent was well-taken. At any rate,
petitioners may pursue their claim against
their alleged successor-in-interest in a
separate suit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on March 21, 1988 is hereby
LIFTED. No costs. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT
AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C.
CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino
worker with shattered dreams. It is our
duty, given the facts and the law, to
approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for
review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals’ decision2 dated June 27, 2005.
This decision partially affirmed the
National Labor Relations Commission’s
resolution dated March 31,
2004,3 declaring respondent’s dismissal
illegal, directing petitioner to pay
respondent’s three-month salary
equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$)
46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse
the NT$3,000.00 withheld from
respondent, and pay her NT$300.00
attorney’s fees.4cralawred
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and
placement agency.5 Responding to an ad
it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles,
submitted her application for a quality
control job in Taiwan.6cralawred
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was
later asked to sign a one-year
employment contract for a monthly salary
of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that
Sameer Overseas Agency required her to
pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when
she signed the employment
contract.9cralawred
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,
1997.10 She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work
as quality control for one year.11 In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a
cutter.12cralawred
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr.
Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport.”13 She was asked
to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.”14cralawred
Joy claims that she was told that from
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned
a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.16cralawred
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a
complaint17 with the National Labor
Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal. She claimed that she was
illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the
return of her placement fee, the withheld
amount for repatriation costs, payment of
her salary for 23 months as well as moral
and exemplary damages.19 She identified
Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency’s foreign principal.20cralawred
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
alleged that respondent's termination was
due to her inefficiency, negligence in her
duties, and her “failure to comply with the
work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer].”21 The agency also claimed
that it did not ask for a placement fee of
?70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showed
Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10,
1997, bearing the amount of
?20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that
Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
(Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus,
petitioner asserts that it was already
substituted by Pacific
Manpower.25cralawred
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal
of petitioner’s claims against it.26 It
alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between
them.27 Therefore, the claims against it
were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that
the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employer’s
contractual obligations might be
identified.29 It further denied that it
assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal
acts.30cralawred
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting
Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos
ruled that her complaint was based on
mere allegations.32 The Labor Arbiter
found that there was no excess payment
of placement fees, based on the official
receipt presented by petitioner.33 The
Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a
discussion on petitioner’s transfer of
obligations to Pacific34 and considered the
matter immaterial in view of the dismissal
of respondent’s complaint.35cralawred
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor
Relations Commission.
37
In a resolution dated March 31, 2004,
the National Labor Relations Commission
declared that Joy was illegally
dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that
the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was based on a just or valid
cause belongs to the employer.39 It found
that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
failed to prove that there were just causes
for termination.40 There was no sufficient
proof to show that respondent was
inefficient in her work and that she failed
to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural
due process was not observed in
terminating respondent.42cralawred
The National Labor Relations Commission
did not rule on the issue of reimbursement
of placement fees for lack of
jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the
issue of the alleged transfer of obligations
to Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction
over that issue because Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to appeal the
Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the
matter.45cralawred
The National Labor Relations Commission
awarded respondent only three (3)
months worth of salary in the amount of
NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the
NT$3,000 withheld from her, and
attorney’s fees of NT$300.46cralawred
The Commission denied the agency’s
motion for reconsideration47 dated May
12, 2004 through a resolution48 dated July
2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency caused the filing of a
petition49 for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the National Labor
Relations Commission’s resolutions dated
March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the
decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission with respect to the finding of
illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of
salary, reimbursement of withheld
repatriation expense, and attorney’s
fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the National Labor Relations
Commission to address the validity of
petitioner's allegations against
Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although the public respondent found the
dismissal of the complainant-respondent
illegal, we should point out that the NLRC
merely awarded her three (3) months
backwages or the amount of
NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its
finding that she was dismissed without
due process, a finding that we uphold,
given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile
discussion upon the same in the
proceedings below or before us. Likewise
we sustain NLRC’s finding in regard to the
reimbursement of her fare, which is
squarely based on the law; as well as the
award of attorney’s fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the
instant case to the public respondent for
further proceedings, for the purpose of
addressing the validity or propriety of
petitioner’s third-party complaint against
the transferee agent or the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
and Lea G. Manabat. We should
emphasize that as far as the decision of
the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is
concerned, the same is hereby affirmed
with finality, and we hold petitioner liable
thereon, but without prejudice to further
hearings on its third party complaint
against Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed Resolutions are hereby
partly AFFIRMED in accordance with the
foregoing discussion, but subject to the
caveat embodied in the last sentence. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency filed this petition.54cralawred
We are asked to determine whether the
Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed
the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’
worth of salary, the reimbursement of the
cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s
fees despite the alleged existence of just
causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just
cause for termination because there was a
finding of Wacoal that respondent was
inefficient in her work.55 Therefore, it
claims that respondent’s dismissal was
valid.56cralawred
Petitioner also reiterates that since
Wacoal’s accreditation was validly
transferred to Pacific at the time
respondent filed her complaint, it should
be Pacific that should now assume
responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual
obligations to the workers originally
recruited by petitioner.57cralawred
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s
petition is without merit. We find for
respondent.
I security of tenure when they move to
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed
to show that there was just cause for
causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer,
Wacoal, also failed to accord her due
process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative
to impose productivity and quality
standards at work.58 They may also
impose reasonable rules to ensure that
the employees comply with these
standards.59 Failure to comply may be a
just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly,
employers cannot be compelled to retain
the services of an employee who is guilty
of acts that are inimical to the interest of
the employer.61 While the law
acknowledges the plight and vulnerability
of workers, it does not “authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the
employer.”62 Management prerogative is
recognized in law and in our
jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be
abused. It is “tempered with the
employee’s right to security of
tenure.”63 Workers are entitled to
substantive and procedural due process
before termination. They may not be
removed from employment without a valid
or just cause as determined by law and
without going through the proper
procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed
by our Constitution.64cralawred
Employees are not stripped of their
work in a different jurisdiction. With
respect to the rights of overseas Filipino
workers, we follow the principle of lex loci
contractus.
Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services,
Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep
the medical certificate requirement by
contending that since Osdana was working
in Saudi Arabia, her employment was
subject to the laws of the host country.
Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it
appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia
do not require any certification by a
competent public health authority in the
dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without
merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci
contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs
in this jurisdiction. There is no
question that the contract of
employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations,
and other laws affecting labor apply
in this case. Furthermore, settled is the
rule that the courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Here in the
Philippines, employment agreements are
more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section
3, guarantees the special protection of
workers, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
. . . .chanrobleslaw
This public policy should be borne in mind
in this case because to allow foreign
employers to determine for and by
themselves whether an overseas contract
worker may be dismissed on the ground
of illness would encourage illegal or
arbitrary pre-termination of employment
contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental
procedural rights, this court emphasized
in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC,67 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioners admit that they did not inform
private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed
to conduct a formal investigation to give
him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing applies
strictly only when the employment is
within the Philippines and that these need
not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas
employment.
The Court does not agree. The
provisions of the Constitution as well
as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino
employees whether working within
the Philippines or abroad. Moreover,
the principle of lex loci contractus
(the law of the place where the
contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners
and private respondent was executed here
in the Philippines with the approval of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor
Code together with its implementing rules
and regulations and other laws affecting
labor apply in this case.68 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) may only be terminated for a just
or authorized cause and after compliance
with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates
the just causes of termination by the
employer.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An
employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following
causes:cralawlawlibrary
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his
work;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his
duties;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized
representative;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized
representatives;
andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(e) Other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was
inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just
cause for termination under Article
282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just
cause for termination is on the employer.
“The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable
cause.”70 Failure to show that there was
valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal.71cralawred
To show that dismissal resulting from
inefficiency in work is valid, it must be
shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship
against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and
workmanship must have been
communicated to the employee; and 3)
the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and
jurisprudence on probationary employees,
which allow termination of the employee
only when there is “just cause or when
[the probationary employee] fails to
qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his [or her]
engagement.”72cralawred
However, we do not see why the
application of that ruling should be limited
to probationary employment. That rule is
basic to the idea of security of tenure and
due process, which are guaranteed to all
employees, whether their employment is
probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the
employer sets are the bases for
determining the probationary employee’s
fitness, propriety, efficiency, and
qualifications as a regular employee. Due
process requires that the probationary
employee be informed of such standards
at the time of his or her engagement so
he or she can adjust his or her character
or workmanship accordingly. Proper
adjustment to fit the standards upon
which the employee’s qualifications will be
evaluated will increase one’s chances of
being positively assessed for
regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work
performance does not stop after
regularization. The employer, on a regular
basis, determines if an employee is still
qualified and efficient, based on work
standards. Based on that determination,
and after complying with the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the
employer may exercise its management
prerogative of terminating the employee
found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly
attempt to prove to his or her employer
that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. This time, however, the
standards to be met are set for the
purpose of retaining employment or
promotion. The employee cannot be
expected to meet any standard of
character or workmanship if such
standards were not communicated to him
or her. Courts should remain vigilant on
allegations of the employer’s failure to
communicate work standards that would
govern one’s employment “if [these are]
to discharge in good faith [their] duty to
adjudicate.”73cralawred
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that
respondent failed to comply with her
foreign employer’s work requirements and
was inefficient in her work.74No evidence
was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify
what requirements were not met, what
efficiency standards were violated, or
what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that
respondent was sufficiently informed of
the standards against which her work
efficiency and performance were
judged. The parties’ conflict as to the
position held by respondent showed
that even the matter as basic as the
job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not
sufficient to support a claim that there is
just cause for termination. There is no
proof that respondent was legally
terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year
from hiring and her repatriation on the
same day show not only failure on the
part of petitioner to comply with the
requirement of the existence of just cause
for termination. They patently show that
the employers did not comply with the
due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid
cause and adherence to the valid
procedure of dismissal.75 The employer is
required to give the charged employee at
least two written notices before
termination.76 One of the written notices
must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her
dismissal.77 The other notice must
“[inform] the employee of the employer’s
decision.”78 Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be
given “an opportunity to be
heard.”79cralawred
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin
notices and hearing requirements.
Respondent started working on June 26,
1997. She was told that she was
terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on
the same day and barely a month from
her first workday. She was also
repatriated on the same day that she was
informed of her termination. The
abruptness of the termination negated
any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard.
Her constitutional right to due process of
law was violated.
II

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been
illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary
for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract that was violated
together with attorney’s fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from
her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states
that overseas workers who were
terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause “shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.”
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. –
Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after
filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and
the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be
joint and several. This provisions [sic]
shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for
all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may
be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the
entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment
or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or
voluntary agreement on money claims
inclusive of damages under this section
shall be paid within four (4) months from
the approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of twelve (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states
that “repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his [or her] personal
belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which
recruited or deployed the worker
overseas.” The exception is when
“termination of employment is due solely
to the fault of the worker,”80 which as we
have established, is not the case. It
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS;
EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The
repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his personal belongings shall
be the primary responsibility of the
agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas. All costs attendant to
repatriation shall be borne by or charged
to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of
remains and transport of the personal
belongings of a deceased worker and all
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by
the principal and/or local agency.
However, in cases where the termination
of employment is due solely to the fault of
the worker, the principal/employer or
agency shall not in any manner be
responsible for the repatriation of the
former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the
employee to 10% of the amount of
withheld wages as attorney’s fees when
the withholding is unlawful.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the National
Labor Relations Commission’s decision to
award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the
three-month equivalent of her salary,
attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for
her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is
entitled to all of these awards. The award
of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should, however,
be increased to the amount
equivalent to the unexpired term of
the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc.,82 this court ruled that the clause “or
for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less”83 is
unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due
process.84cralawred
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.”85cralawred
We are aware that the clause “or for three
(3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, as amended, is hereby amended to
read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damage.
Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC
shall endeavor to update and keep abreast
with the developments in the global
services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and
the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be
joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to de [sic] filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for
all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may
be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the
entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment
or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or
voluntary agreement on money claims
inclusive of damages under this section
shall be paid within thirty (30) days from
approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, or any unauthorized deductions
from the migrant worker’s salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee
and the deductions made with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory
judgement against a foreign
employer/principal, it shall be
automatically disqualified, without further
proceedings, from participating in the
Philippine Overseas Employment Program
and from recruiting and hiring Filipino
workers until and unless it fully satisfies
the judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory
periods for resolutions of case provided
under this section shall subject the
responsible officials to any or all of the
following penalties:cralawlawlibrary
(a) The salary of any such official who
fails to render his decision or resolution
within the prescribed period shall be, or
caused to be, withheld until the said
official complies
therewith;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety
(90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with
disqualification to hold any appointive
public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties
herein provided shall be without prejudice
to any liability which any such official may
have incured [sic] under other existing
laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of
this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated
on March 8, 2010. This means that the
reinstatement of the clause in Republic
Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the
time of respondent’s termination from
work in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042
before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an
actual case that clearly raises adversarial
positions in their proper context before
considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique
situation. The law passed incorporates the
exact clause already declared as
unconstitutional, without any perceived
substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of
the National Labor Relations Commission
and the Court of Appeals. At minimum,
the existence of Republic Act No. 10022
may delay the execution of the judgment
in this case, further frustrating remedies
to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this
constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the
constitutional duty to “[p]romulgate rules
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional
rights.”87 When cases become moot and
academic, we do not hesitate to provide
for guidance to bench and bar in
situations where the same violations are
capable of repetition but will evade
review. This is analogous to cases where
there are millions of Filipinos working
abroad who are bound to suffer from the
lack of protection because of the
restoration of an identical clause in a
provision previously declared as
unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution
is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in
any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence
of any law that supports such exercise.
The Constitution cannot be trumped by
any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is
null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured
by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law
or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings
submitted by the parties that the situation
has so changed so as to cause us to
reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of
judicial efficiency and economy that
attend to these cases.
The new law puts our overseas workers in
the same vulnerable position as they were
prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the
very ratio decidendi of that case will result
in the same untold economic hardships
that our reading of the Constitution
intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot
countenance added expenses for further
litigation that will reduce their hard-
earned wages as well as add to the
indignity of having been deprived of the
protection of our laws simply because our
precedents have not been followed. There
is no constitutional doctrine that causes
injustice in the face of empty procedural
niceties. Constitutional interpretation is
complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22,
2013, we ordered the parties and the
Office of the Solicitor General to comment
on the constitutionality of the reinstated
clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that
the clause was constitutional.90 The
legislators intended a balance between the
employers’ and the employees’ rights by
not unduly burdening the local
recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of
the view that the clause was already
declared as constitutional
in Serrano.92cralawred
The Office of the Solicitor General also
argued that the clause was valid and
constitutional.93 However, since the
parties never raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the clause as
reinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its
contention is that it is beyond judicial
review.94cralawred
On the other hand, respondent argued
that the clause was unconstitutional
because it infringed on workers’ right to
contract.95cralawred
We observe that the reinstated clause,
this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to
equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime that limiting wages
that should be recovered by an
illegally dismissed overseas worker to
three months is both a violation of
due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee
that persons under like circumstances and
falling within the same class are treated
alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.”97 It is a guarantee
against “undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of
inequality.”98cralawred
In creating laws, the legislature has the
power “to make distinctions and
classifications.”99 In exercising such
power, it has a wide
discretion.100cralawred
The equal protection clause does not
infringe on this legislative power.101 A law
is void on this basis, only if classifications
are made arbitrarily.102 There is no
violation of the equal protection clause if
the law applies equally to persons within
the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those
falling within the class and those who do
not fall within the class.103 A law that does
not violate the equal protection clause
prescribes a reasonable
classification.104cralawred
A reasonable classification “(1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.”105cralawred
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the
requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the
classifications made by the reinstated
clause. It distinguished between fixed-
period overseas workers and fixed-period
local workers.106 It also distinguished
between overseas workers with
employment contracts of less than one
year and overseas workers with
employment contracts of at least one
year.107 Within the class of overseas
workers with at least one-year
employment contracts, there was a
distinction between those with at least a
year left in their contracts and those with
less than a year left in their contracts
when they were illegally
dismissed.108cralawred
The Congress’ classification may be
subjected to judicial review. In Serrano,
there is a “legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class.”109cralawred
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded
special protection.110 Thus, this court
in Serrano, “[i]mbued with the same
sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to
labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the standard of
strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in
the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.”111cralawred
We also noted in Serrano that before the
passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the
money claims of illegally terminated
overseas and local workers with fixed-
term employment were computed in the
same manner.112 Their money claims were
computed based on the “unexpired
portions of their contracts.”113 The
adoption of the reinstated clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the
money claims of illegally dismissed
overseas workers with an unexpired term
of at least a year to a cap of three months
worth of their salary.114 There was no such
limitation on the money claims of illegally
terminated local workers with fixed-term
employment.115cralawred
We observed that illegally dismissed
overseas workers whose employment
contracts had a term of less than one year
were granted the amount equivalent to
the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally
dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were
granted a cap equivalent to three months
of their salary for the unexpired portions
of their contracts.117cralawred
Observing the terminologies used in the
clause, we also found that “the subject
clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose
contract periods are for more than one
year: those who are illegally dismissed
with less than one year left in their
contracts shall be entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portion thereof,
while those who are illegally dismissed
with one year or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the
reinstated clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three
months only.”118cralawred
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude
that these classifications do not rest on
any real or substantial distinctions that
would justify different treatments in terms
of the computation of money claims
resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their
classifications are entitled to security of
tenure, at least for the period agreed
upon in their contracts. This means that
they cannot be dismissed before the end
of their contract terms without due
process. If they were illegally dismissed,
the workers’ right to security of tenure is
violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-
period local worker is illegally terminated
are neither greater than nor less than the
rights violated when a fixed-period
overseas worker is illegally terminated. It
is state policy to protect the rights of
workers without qualification as to the
place of employment.119 In both cases,
the workers are deprived of their expected
salary, which they could have earned had
they not been illegally dismissed. For both
workers, this deprivation translates to
economic insecurity and disparity.120 The
same is true for the distinctions between
overseas workers with an employment
contract of less than one year and
overseas workers with at least one year of
employment contract, and between
overseas workers with at least a year left
in their contracts and overseas workers
with less than a year left in their contracts
when they were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to
the argument that “[overseas workers]
are contractual employees who can never
acquire regular employment status, unlike
local workers”121 because it already
justifies differentiated treatment in terms
of the computation of money
claims.122cralawred
Likewise, the jurisdictional and
enforcement issues on overseas workers’
money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the
computation of their money claims.123 If
anything, these issues justify an equal, if
not greater protection and assistance to
overseas workers who generally are more
prone to exploitation given their physical
distance from our government.
We also find that the classifications are
not relevant to the purpose of the law,
which is to “establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant workers, their families and
overseas Filipinos in distress, and for
other purposes.”124 Further, we find
specious the argument that reducing the
liability of placement agencies “redounds
to the benefit of the [overseas]
workers.”125cralawred
Putting a cap on the money claims of
certain overseas workers does not
increase the standard of protection
afforded to them. On the other hand,
foreign employers are more incentivized
by the reinstated clause to enter into
contracts of at least a year because it
gives them more flexibility to violate our
overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for
arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is
decreased at the expense of the workers
whose rights they violated. Meanwhile,
these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable
job overseas for the longer contract period
disregard other opportunities only to be
terminated earlier. They are left with
claims that are less than what others in
the same situation would receive. The
reinstated clause, therefore, creates a
situation where the law meant to protect
them makes violation of rights easier and
simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring
opinion in
Serrano:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these
well-laid rules and measures, and in fact
provides a hidden twist affecting the
principal/employer’s liability. While
intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law,
as worded, simply limits the OFWs’
recovery in wrongful dismissal situations.
Thus, it redounds to the benefit of
whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer – the direct employer
primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal.
In this sense, Section 10 – read as a grant
of incentives to recruitment/manning
agencies – oversteps what it aims to do
by effectively limiting what is otherwise
the full liability of the foreign
principals/employers. Section 10, in short,
really operates to benefit the wrong party
and allows that party, without justifiable
reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful
dismissals. Because of this hidden twist,
the limitation of liability under Section 10
cannot be an “appropriate” incentive, to
borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself
uses to describe the incentive it envisions
under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen
mode of granting the incentive: instead of
a grant that, to encourage greater efforts
at recruitment, is directly related to extra
efforts undertaken, the law simply limits
their liability for the wrongful dismissals of
already deployed OFWs. This is effectively
a legally-imposed partial condonation of
their liability to OFWs, justified solely by
the law’s intent to encourage greater
deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,
from a more practical and realistic view, is
really part of a scheme to sell Filipino
overseas labor at a bargain for purposes
solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered
particularly odious by its effect on the
OFWs — the benefits accruing to the
recruitment/manning agencies and their
principals are taken from the pockets of
the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract rightfully
belong. Thus, the principals/employers
and the recruitment/manning agencies
even profit from their violation of the
security of tenure that an employment
contract embodies. Conversely, lesser
protection is afforded the OFW, not only
because of the lessened recovery afforded
him or her by operation of law, but also
because this same lessened recovery
renders a wrongful dismissal easier and
less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost
of dismissing a Filipino will always be a
consideration a foreign employer will take
into account in termination of employment
decisions. . . .126
Further, “[t]here can never be a
justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one
sector, but imposes the same burden on
another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies,
while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no
less than the Constitution commands. The
idea that private business interest can be
elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious.”127cralawred
Along the same line, we held that the
reinstated clause violates due process
rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives
overseas workers of their monetary claims
without any discernable valid
purpose.128cralawred
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her
salary for the unexpired portion of her
contract, in accordance with Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the
three-month equivalence of respondent’s
salary must be modified accordingly.
Since she started working on June 26,
1997 and was terminated on July 14,
1997, respondent is entitled to her salary
from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To
rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may
violate an OFW’s security of tenure which
an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based
on an unconstitutional provision of
law.”129cralawred
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21,
2013, which revised the interest rate for
loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in
the absence of stipulation, applies in this
case. The pertinent portions of Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013,
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No.
796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the
following revisions governing the rate of
interest in the absence of stipulation in
loan contracts, thereby amending Section
2 of Circular No. 905, Series of
1982:cralawlawlibrary
Section 1. The rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods
or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express
contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above,
Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the
Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank
Financial Institutions are hereby amended
accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July
2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice
Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the
guidelines in computing legal interest
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130cralawred
II. With regard particularly to an award of
interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. When the obligation is breached,
and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 6% per
annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand
is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case
falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be
6% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments
that have become final and executory
prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be
disturbed and shall continue to be
implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans
and forbearance of money, goods, or
credits, and in judgments when there is
no stipulation on the applicable interest
rate. Further, it is only applicable if the
judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013.132cralawred

We add that Circular No. 799 is not
applicable when there is a law that states
otherwise. While the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas has the power to set or limit
interest rates,133 these interest rates do
not apply when the law provides that a
different interest rate shall be applied.
“[A] Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a
law. Only a law can repeal another
law.”134cralawred
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 provides that unlawfully
terminated overseas workers are entitled
to the reimbursement of his or her
placement fee with an interest of 12% per
annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No.
8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799
does not have the effect of changing the
interest on awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is
despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799,
which provides that the 6% interest rate
applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated
in contracts. “The contracting parties need
not repeat them. They do not even have
to be referred to. Every contract, thus,
contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions
that have any bearing on the
matter.”135 There is, therefore, an implied
stipulation in contracts between the
placement agency and the overseas
worker that in case the overseas worker is
adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of
his or her placement fees, the amount
shall be subject to a 12% interest per
annum. This implied stipulation has the
effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from
Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awards of
salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract under Republic Act
No. 8042. These awards are covered by
Circular No. 799 because the law does not
provide for a specific interest rate that
should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final
and executory before July 1, 2013 and
there was no stipulation in the contract
providing for a different interest rate,
other money claims under Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to
the 6% interest per annum in accordance
with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also
entitled to an interest of 6% per annum
on her money claims from the finality of
this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities of Wacoal
as principal and petitioner as the
employment agency that facilitated
respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides
that the foreign employer and the local
employment agency are jointly and
severally liable for money claims including
claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship and/or damages.
This section also provides that the
performance bond filed by the local
agency shall be answerable for such
money claims or damages if they were
awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s
policy of affording protection to labor and
alleviating workers’ plight.136cralawred
In overseas employment, the filing of
money claims against the foreign
employer is attended by practical and
legal complications. The distance of the
foreign employer alone makes it difficult
for an overseas worker to reach it and
make it liable for violations of the Labor
Code. There are also possible conflict of
laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural
rules that may be raised to frustrate an
overseas worker’s attempt to advance his
or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the
foreign employer must be impleaded in
the complaint as an indispensable party
without which no final determination can
be had of an action.137cralawred
The provision on joint and several liability
in the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 assures overseas
workers that their rights will not be
frustrated with these complications.
The fundamental effect of joint and
several liability is that “each of the
debtors is liable for the entire
obligation.”138 A final determination may,
therefore, be achieved even if only one of
the joint and several debtors are
impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case
of overseas employment, either the local
agency or the foreign employer may be
sued for all claims arising from the foreign
employer’s labor law violations. This way,
the overseas workers are assured that
someone — the foreign employer’s local
agent — may be made to answer for
violations that the foreign employer may
have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that
overseas workers have recourse in law
despite the circumstances of their
employment. By providing that the liability
of the foreign employer may be “enforced
to the full extent”139 against the local
agent, the overseas worker is assured of
immediate and sufficient payment of what
is due them.140cralawred
Corollary to the assurance of immediate
recourse in law, the provision on joint and
several liability in the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts
the burden of going after the foreign
employer from the overseas worker to the
local employment agency. However, it
must be emphasized that the local agency
that is held to answer for the overseas
worker’s money claims is not left without
remedy. The law does not preclude it from
going after the foreign employer for
reimbursement of whatever payment it
has made to the employee to answer for
the money claims against the foreign
employer.
A further implication of making local
agencies jointly and severally liable with
the foreign employer is that an additional
layer of protection is afforded to overseas
workers. Local agencies, which are
businesses by nature, are inoculated with
interest in being always on the lookout
against foreign employers that tend to
violate labor law. Lest they risk their
reputation or finances, local agencies
must already have mechanisms for
guarding against unscrupulous foreign
employers even at the level prior to
overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it
is not possible to determine whether there
was indeed a transfer of obligations from
petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an
obstacle for the respondent overseas
worker to proceed with the enforcement of
this judgment. Petitioner is possessed
with the resources to determine the
proper legal remedies to enforce its rights
against Pacific, if any.
V days, months, and years yearning to see
Many times, this court has spoken on
what Filipinos may encounter as they
travel into the farthest and most difficult
reaches of our planet to provide for their
families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141cralawred
The Court is not unaware of the many
abuses suffered by our overseas workers
in the foreign land where they have
ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in
pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach
of contract, maltreatment, rape,
insufficient nourishment, sub-human
lodgings, insults and other forms of
debasement, are only a few of the
inhumane acts to which they are
subjected by their foreign employers, who
probably feel they can do as they please
in their own country. While these workers
may indeed have relatively little defense
against exploitation while they are abroad,
that disadvantage must not continue to
burden them when they return to their
own territory to voice their muted
complaint. There is no reason why, in
their very own land, the protection of our
own laws cannot be extended to them in
full measure for the redress of their
grievances.142chanrobleslaw
But it seems that we have not said
enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their
travails and their heroism can be told a
million times over; each of their stories as
real as any other. Overseas Filipino
workers brave alien cultures and the
heartbreak of families left behind daily.
They would count the minutes, hours,
their sons and daughters. We all know of
the joy and sadness when they come
home to see them all grown up and, being
so, they remember what their work has
cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime,
and many other gadgets and online
applications will never substitute for their
lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy
afloat through the ebb and flow of political
and economic crises. They are our true
diplomats, they who show the world the
resilience, patience, and creativity of our
people. Indeed, we are a people who
contribute much to the provision of
material creations of this world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to
ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos.
We default by limiting the contractual
wages that should be paid to our workers
when their contracts are breached by the
foreign employers. While we sit, this court
will ensure that our laws will reward our
overseas workers with what they deserve:
their dignity.

Inevitably, their dignity is ours as well.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
Cabiles the amount equivalent to her
salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this
judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to
reimburse respondent the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent
attorney’s fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality
of this judgment.

The clause, “or for three (3) months for

every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August
15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR
DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO
CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS,
ISIDRO BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN,
ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN
MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and
VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES,
INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15,
1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR
DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO
PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA,
DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO
BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA,
VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE
BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN,
ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA,
ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN
MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and
WILFREDO CRISTOBAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration), and MAGSAYSAY
LINES, INC., respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peñ;a and
Nolasco for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for private
respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These petitions ask for a re-examination
of this Court's precedent — setting
decision in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al. (125 SCRA 577
[1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and
factual grounds, we find no reason to
disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen
Shipping and to turn back the clock of
progress for sea-based overseas workers.
The experience gained in the past few
years shows that, following said doctrine,
we should neither deny nor diminish the
enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the same
rights and freedoms taken for granted by
other working-men here and abroad.
The cases at bar involve a group of
Filipino seamen who were declared by the
defunct National Seamen Board (NSB)
guilty of breaching their employment
contracts with the private respondent
because they demanded, upon the
intervention and assistance of a third
party, the International Transport
Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of
wages over and above their contracted
rates without the approval of the NSB.
The petitioners were ordered to reimburse
the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency
representing the said over-payments and
to be suspended from the NSB registry for
a period of three years. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private
respondent, for failure of the petitioners to
return the overpayments made to them
upon demand by the former, filed estafa
charges against some of the petitioners.
The criminal cases were eventually
consolidated in the sala of then
respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo.
Hence, these consolidated petitions, G.R.
No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, which respectively pray for the
nullification of the decisions of the NLRC
and the NSB, and the dismissal of the
criminal cases against the petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned
decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-99.
From the records of this case it appears
that the facts established and/or admitted
by the parties are the following: that on
different dates in 1977 and 1978
respondents entered into separate
contracts of employment (Exhs. "B" to "B-
17", inclusive) with complainant (private
respondent) to work aboard vessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for
a period of 12 calendar months and with
different rating/position, salary, overtime
pay and allowance, hereinbelow specified:
...; that aforesaid employment contracts
were verified and approved by this Board;
that on different dates in April 1978
respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V
"GRACE RIVER"; that on or about October
30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with the
respondents on board, arrived at the port
of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages
under rates prescribed by the
Intemational Transport Worker's
Federation (ITF) in the total amount of
US$98,261.70; that the respondents
received the amounts appearing opposite
their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid
amounts were over and above the rates of
pay of respondents as appearing in their
employment contracts approved by this
Board; that on November 10, 1978,
aforesaid vessel, with respondent on
board, left Vancouver, Canada for
Yokohama, Japan; that on December 14,
1978, while aforesaid vessel, was at Yura,
Japan, they were made to disembark. (pp.
64-66, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners,
while the vessel was docked at Nagoya,
Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the
NSB Legal Department boarded the vessel
and called a meeting of the seamen
including the petitioners, telling them that
for their own good and safety they should
sign an agreement prepared by him on
board the vessel and that if they do, the
cases filed against them with NSB on
November 17, 1978 would be dismissed.
Thus, the petitioners signed the.
"Agreement" dated December 5, 1978.
(Annex C of Petition) However, when they
were later furnished xerox copies of what
they had signed, they noticed that the line
"which amount(s) was/were received and
held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for
SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein,
thereby making it appear that the
amounts given to the petitioners
representing the increase in their wages
based on ITF rates were only received by
them in trust for the private respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the
private respondent demanded from the
petitioners the "overpayments" made to
them in Canada. As the petitioners
refused to give back the said amounts,
charges were filed against some of them
with the NSB and the Professional
Regulations Commission. Estafa charges
were also filed before different branches
of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila which, as earlier stated, were
subsequently consolidated in the sala of
the respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo
and which eventually led to G.R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners
claimed before the NSB that contrary to
the private respondent's allegations, they
did not commit any illegal act nor stage a
strike while they were on board the
vessel; that the "Special Agreement"
entered into in Vancouver to pay their
salary differentials is valid, having been
executed after peaceful negotiations.
Petitioners further argued that the
amounts they received were in accordance
with the provision of law, citing among
others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code which provides that "the basic
minimum salary of seamen shall not be
less than the prevailing minimum rates
established by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in
the country whose flag the employing
vessel carries, whichever is higher ...";
and that the "Agreement" executed in
Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon
them and that intercalations were made to
make it appear that they were merely
trustees of the amounts they received in
Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent
alleged that the petitioners breached their
employment contracts when they, acting
in concert and with the active
participations of the ITF while the vessel
was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike
and by means of threats, coercion and
intimidation compelled the owners of the
vessel to pay to them various sums
totalling US$104,244.35; that the
respondent entered into the "Special
Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage
differentials because it was under duress
as the vessel would not be allowed to
leave Vancouver unless the said
agreement was signed, and to prevent the
shipowner from incurring further delay in
the shipment of goods; and that in view of
petitioners' breach of contract, the latter's
names must be removed from the NSB's
Registry and that they should be ordered
to return the amounts they received over
and above their contracted rates.
The respondent NSB ruled that the
petitioners were guilty of breach of
contract because despite subsisting and
valid NSB-approved employment
contracts, the petitioners sought the
assistance of a third party (ITF) to
demand from the private respondent
wages in accordance with the ITF rates,
which rates are over and above their rates
of pay as appearing in their NSB-approved
contracts. As bases for this conclusion, the
NSB stated:
1) The fact that respondents sought the
aid of a third party (ITF) and demanded
for wages and overtime pay based on ITF
rates is shown in the entries of their
respective Pay-Off Clearance Slips which
were marked as their Exhs. "1" to "18",
and we quote "DEMANDED ITF WAGES,
OVERTIME, DIFFERENTIALS APRIL TO
OCTOBER 1978". Respondent Suzara
admitted that the entries in his Pay-Off
Clearance Slip (Exh. "1") are correct
(TSN., p. 16, Dec. 6,
1979).lâwphî1.ñèt Moreover, it is the
policy (reiterated very often) by the ITF
that it does not interfere in the affairs of
the crewmembers and masters and/or
owners of a vessel unless its assistance is
sought by the crewmembers themselves.
Under this pronounced policy of the ITF, it
is reasonable to assume that the
representatives of the ITF in Vancouver,
Canada assisted and intervened by reason
of the assistance sought by the latter.
2) The fact that the ITF assisted and
intervened for and in behalf of the
respondents in the latter's demand for
higher wages could be gleaned from the
answer of the respondents when they
admitted that the ITF acted in their behalf
in the negotiations for increase of wages.
Moreover, respondent Cesar Dimaandal
admitted that the ITF differential pay was
computed by the ITF representative (TSN,
p. 7, Dec. 12, 1979)
3) The fact that complainant and the
owner/operator of the vessel were
compelled to sign the Special Agreement
(Exh. "20") and to pay ITF differentials to
respondents in order not to delay the
departure of the vessel and to prevent
further losses is shown in the "Agreement"
(Exhs. "R-21") ... (pp. 69-70, Rollo)
The NSB further said:
While the Board recognizes the rights of
the respondents to demand for higher
wages, provided the means are peaceful
and legal, it could not, however, sanction
the same if the means employed are
violent and illegal. In the case at bar, the
means employed are violent and illegal for
in demanding higher wages the
respondents sought the aid of a third
party and in turn the latter intervened in
their behalf and prohibited the vessel from
sailing unless the owner and/or operator
of the vessel acceded to respondents'
demand for higher wages. To avoid
suffering further incalculable losses, the
owner and/or operator of the vessel had
no altemative but to pay respondents'
wages in accordance with the ITF scale.
The Board condemns the act of a party
who enters into a contract and with the
use of force/or intimidation causes the
other party to modify said contract. If the
respondents believe that they have a valid
ground to demand from the complainant a
revision of the terms of their contracts,
the same should have been done in
accordance with law and not thru illegal
means. (at p. 72, Rollo).
Although the respondent NSB found that
the petitioners were entitled to the
payment of earned wages and overtime
pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to
December 14, 1978, it nevertheless ruled
that the computation should be based on
the rates of pay as appearing in the
petitioners' NSB-approved contracts. It
ordered that the amounts to which the
petitioners are entitled under the said
computation should be deducted from the
amounts that the petitioners must return
to the private respondent.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's
findings. Hence, the petition in G.R. Nos.
64781-99.
Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53 moved to quash the
criminal cases of estafa filed against them
on the ground that the alleged crimes
were committed, if at all, in Vancouver,
Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction. The respondent
judge denied the motion. Hence, the
second petition.
The principal issue in these consolidated
petitions is whether or not the petitioners
are entitled to the amounts they received
from the private respondent representing
additional wages as determined in the
special agreement. If they are, then the
decision of the NLRC and NSB must be
reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of
estafa must be dismissed because it
follows as a consequence that the
amounts received by the petitioners
belong to them and not to the private
respondent.
In arriving at the questioned decision, the
NSB ruled that the petitioners are not
entitled to the wage differentials as
determined by the ITF because the means
employed by them in obtaining the same
were violent and illegal and because in
demanding higher wages the petitioners
sought the aid of a third party, which, in
turn, intervened in their behalf and
prohibited the vessel from sailing unless
the owner and/or operator of the vessel
acceded to respondents' demand for
higher wages. And as proof of this
conclusion, the NSB cited the following:
(a) the entries in the petitioners Pay-Off
Clearance Slip which contained the phrase
"DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the
alleged policy of the ITF in not interfering
with crewmembers of a vessel unless its
intervention is sought by the
crewmembers themselves; (c), the
petitioners' admission that ITF acted in
their behalf; and (d) the fact that the
private respondent was compelled to sign
the special agreement at Vancouver,
Canada.
There is nothing in the public and private
respondents' pleadings, to support the
allegations that the petitioners used force
and violence to secure the special
agreement signed in Vancouver. British
Columbia. There was no need for any form
of intimidation coming from the Filipino
seamen because the Canadian
Brotherhood of Railways and Transport
Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor
union, backed by an international labor
federation was actually doing all the
influencing not only on the ship-owners
and employers but also against third world
seamen themselves who, by receiving
lower wages and cheaper
accommodations, were threatening the
employment and livelihood of seamen
from developed nations.
The bases used by the respondent NSB to
support its decision do not prove that the
petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the
ITF or deliberately sought its assistance in
order to receive higher wages. They only
prove that when ITF acted in petitioners'
behalf for an increase in wages, the latter
manifested their support. This would be a
logical and natural reaction for any worker
in whose benefit the ITF or any other
labor group had intervened. The
petitioners admit that while they
expressed their conformity to and their
sentiments for higher wages by means of
placards, they, nevertheless, continued
working and going about their usual
chores. In other words, all they did was to
exercise their freedom of speech in a most
peaceful way. The ITF people, in turn, did
not employ any violent means to force the
private respondent to accede to their
demands. Instead, they simply applied
effective pressure when they intimated
the possibility of interdiction should the
shipowner fail to heed the call for an
upward adjustment of the rates of the
Filipino seamen. Interdiction is nothing
more than a refusal of ITF members to
render service for the ship, such as to load
or unload its cargo, to provision it or to
perform such other chores ordinarily
incident to the docking of the ship at a
certain port. It was the fear of ITF
interdiction, not any action taken by the
seamen on board the vessel which led the
shipowners to yield.
The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy
not to intervene with the plight of
crewmembers of a vessel unless its
intervention was sought is without basis.
This Court is cognizant of the fact that
during the period covered by the labor
controversies in Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor (102
SCRA 835 [1981]; Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC (supra) and
these consolidated petitions, the ITF was
militant worldwide especially in Canada,
Australia, Scandinavia, and various
European countries, interdicting foreign
vessels and demanding wage increases for
third world seamen. There was no need
for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF
intervention. The ITF was waiting on its
own volition in all Canadian ports, not
particularly for the petitioners' vessel but
for all ships similarly situated. As earlier
stated, the ITF was not really acting for
the petitioners out of pure altruism. The
ITF was merely protecting the interests of
its own members. The petitioners
happened to be pawns in a higher and
broader struggle between the ITF on one
hand and shipowners and third world
seamen, on the other. To subject our
seamen to criminal prosecution and
punishment for having been caught in
such a struggle is out of the question.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra):
The seamen had done no act which under
Philippine law or any other civilized law
would be termed illegal, oppressive, or
malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it
was mild compared to accepted and valid
modes of labor activity. (at page 591)
Given these factual situations, therefore,
we cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's
finding that there was violence, physical
or otherwise employed by the petitioners
in demanding for additional wages. The
fact that the petitioners placed placards
on the gangway of their ship to show
support for ITF's demands for wage
differentials for their own benefit and the
resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do
not constitute violence. The petitioners
were exercising their freedom of speech
and expressing sentiments in their hearts
when they placed the placard We Want
ITF Rates." Under the facts and
circumstances of these petitions, we see
no reason to deprive the seamen of their
right to freedom of expression guaranteed
by the Philippine Constitution and the
fundamental law of Canada where they
happened to exercise it.
As we have ruled in Wallem Phil. Shipping
Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al. supra:
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of
private respondents was justified because
the latter threatened the ship authorities
in acceding to their demands, and this
constitutes serious misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor Code. This
contention is now well-taken. The records
fail to establish clearly the commission of
any threat. But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior
should not be censured because it is but
natural for them to employ some means
of pressing their demands for petitioner,
who refused to abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to honor and respect
the same. They were only acting in the
exercise of their rights, and to deprive
them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. ... (at
page 843)
We likewise, find the public respondents'
conclusions that the acts of the petitioners
in demanding and receiving wages over
and above the rates appearing in their
NSB-approved contracts is in effect an
alteration of their valid and subsisting
contracts because the same were not
obtained through. mutual consent and
without the prior approval of the NSB to
be without basis, not only because the
private respondent's consent to pay
additional wages was not vitiated by any
violence or intimidation on the part of the
petitioners but because the said NSB-
approved form contracts are not
unalterable contracts that can have no
room for improvement during their
effectivity or which ban any amendments
during their term.
For one thing, the employer can always
improve the working conditions without
violating any law or stipulation.
We stated in the Vir-Jen case (supra)
that:
The form contracts approved by the
National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign
shipowners who can take care of
themselves. The standard forms embody
the basic minimums which must be
incorporated as parts of the employment
contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code).lâwphî1.ñèt They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable
contracts which the parties cannot
improve upon or modify in the course of
the agreed period of time. To state,
therefore, that the affected seamen
cannot petition their employer for higher
salaries during the 12 months duration of
the contract runs counter to estabhshed
principles of labor legislation. The National
Labor Relations Commission, as the
appellate tribunal from the decisions of
the National Seamen Board, correctly
ruled that the seamen did not violate their
contracts to warrant their dismissal. (at
page 589)
It is impractical for the NSB to require the
petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor
struggle between the ITF and owners of
ocean going vessels halfway around the
world in Vancouver, British Columbia to
first secure the approval of the NSB in
Manila before signing an agreement which
the employer was willing to sign. It is also
totally unrealistic to expect the petitioners
while in Canada to exhibit the will and
strength to oppose the ITF's demand for
an increase in their wages, assuming they
were so minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition,
the agreement signed in Japan by the
crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and
a certain M. Tabei, representative of the
Japanese shipowner lends credence to the
petitioners' claim that the clause "which
amount(s) was received and held by
CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNER"
was an intercalation added after the
execution of the agreement. The clause
appears too closely typed below the
names of the 19 crewmen and their wages
with no similar intervening space as that
which appears between all the paragraphs
and the triple space which appears
between the list of crewmembers and
their wages on one hand and the
paragraph above which introduces the list,
on the other. The verb "were" was also
inserted above the verb "was" to make
the clause grammatically correct but the
insertion of "were" is already on the same
line as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06"
where it clearly does not belong. There is
no other space where the word "were"
could be intercalated. (See Rollo, page
80).
At any rate, the proposition that the
petitioners should have pretended to
accept the increased wages while in
Vancouver but returned them to the
shipowner when they reached its country,
Japan, has already been answered earlier
by the Court:
Filipino seamen are admittedly as
competent and reliable as seamen from
any other country in the world. Otherwise,
there would not be so many of them in
the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea
on this globe. It is competence and
reliability, not cheap labor that makes our
seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino
seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan and
other developed nations. But certainly
they are entitled to government protection
when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer and when
they exercise the right to petition for
improved terms of employment, especially
when they feel that these are sub-
standard or are capable of improvement
according to internationally accepted
rules. In the domestic scene, there are
marginal employers who prepare two sets
of payrolls for their employees — one in
keeping with minimum wages and the
other recording the sub-standard wages
that the employees really receive. The
reliable employers, however, not only
meet the minimums required by fair labor
standards legislation but even go away
above the minimums while earning
reasonable profits and prospering. The
same is true of international employment.
There is no reason why this court and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment or its
agencies and commissions should come
out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous
or inefficient shipowners, who claim they
cannot survive without resorting to tricky
and deceptive schemes, instead of
Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of
honorable, competent, and law-abiding
employers, domestic or foreign. (Vir-Jen
Shipping, supra, pp. 587-588)
It is noteworthy to emphasize that while
the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO)
set the minimum basic wage of able
seamen at US$187.00 as early as October
1976, it was only in 1979 that the
respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No.
45, enjoining all shipping companies to
adopt the said minimum basic wage. It
was correct for the respondent NSB to
state in its decision that when the
petitioners entered into separate contracts
between 1977-1978, the monthly
minimum basic wage for able seamen
ordered by NSB was still fixed at
US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of
the petitioners that the NSB not only
violated the Labor Code which created it
and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code but also
seeks to punish the seamen for a
shortcoming of NSB itself.
Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it
created the NSB, mandated the Board to
"(O)btain the best possible terms and
conditions of employment for seamen."
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code provides:
Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. —
The NSB shall devise a model contract of
employment which shall embody all the
requirements of pertinent labor and social
legislations and the prevailing standards
set by applicable International Labor
Organization Conventions. The model
contract shall set the minimum standards
of the terms and conditions to govern the
employment of Filipinos on board vessels
engaged in overseas trade. All employers
of Filipinos shall adopt the model contract
in connection with the hiring and
engagement of the services of Filipino
seafarers, and in no case shall a shipboard
employment contract be allowed where
the same provides for benefits less than
those enumerated in the model
employment contract, or in any way
conflicts with any other provisions
embodied in the model contract.
Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules
and Regulations provides:
Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-
seamen. — The basic minimum salary of
seamen shall be not less than the
prevailing minimxun rates established by
the International Labor Organization or
those prevailing in the country whose flag
the employing vessel carries, whichever is
higher. However, this provision shall not
apply if any shipping company pays its
crew members salaries above the
minimum herein provided.
Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus
Rules provides:
Section 8. Use of standard format of
service agreement. — The Board shall
adopt a standard format of service
agreement in accordance with pertinent
labor and social legislation and prevailing
standards set by applicable International
Labor Organization Conventions. The
standard format shall set the minimum
standard of the terms and conditions to
govern the employment of Filipino
seafarers but in no case shall a shipboard
employment contract (sic), or in any way
conflict with any other provision embodied
in the standard format.
It took three years for the NSB to
implement requirements which, under the
law, they were obliged to follow and
execute immediately. During those three
years, the incident in Vancouver
happened. The terms and conditions
agreed upon in Vancouver were well
within ILO rates even if they were above
NSB standards at the time.
The sanctions applied by NSB and
affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in
keeping with the basic premise that this
Court stressed in the Vir-Jen
Shipping case (supra) that the Ministry
now the Department of Labor and
Employment and all its agencies exist
primarily for the workingman's interest
and the nation's as a whole.
Implicit in these petitions and the only
reason for the NSB to take the side of
foreign shipowners against Filipino
seamen is the "killing the goose which
lays the golden eggs" argument. We
reiterate the ruling of the Court in Vir-Jen
Shipping (supra)
There are various arguments raised by the
petitioners but the common thread
running through all of them is the
contention, if not the dismal prophecy,
that if the respondent seamen are
sustained by this Court, we would in effect
"kill the hen that lays the golden egg." In
other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly
among the best in the world, should
remain satisfied with relatively lower if not
the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for
higher wages while their contracts of
employment are subsisting, should accept
as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the
side contracts which require: them to
falsely pretend to be members of
international labor federations, pretend to
receive higher salaries at certain foreign
ports only to return the increased pay
once the ship leaves that port, should
stifle not only their right to ask for
improved terms of employment but their
freedom of speech and expression, and
should suffer instant termination of
employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from
their Government and their courts.
Otherwise, the petitioners contend that
Filipinos would no longer be accepted as
seamen, those employed would lose their
jobs, and the still unemployed would be
left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be
the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be
used to argue against the interests of
labor; where efforts by workingmen to
better their terms of employment would
be characterized as prejudicing the
interests of labor as a whole.
xxx xxx xxx
Unionism, employers' liability acts,
minimum wages, workmen's
compensation, social security and
collective bargaining to name a few were
all initially opposed by employers and
even well meaning leaders of government
and society as "killing the hen or goose
which lays the golden eggs." The claims of
workingmen were described as
outrageously injurious not only to the
employer but more so to the employees
themselves before these claims or
demands were established by law and
jurisprudence as "rights" and before these
were proved beneficial to management,
labor, and the national as a whole beyond
reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any
major advance in the rights of labor and
the workingmen. The private respondents
merely sought rights already established.
No matter how much the petitioner-
employer tries to present itself as
speaking for the entire industry, there is
no evidence that it is typical of employers
hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak
for them.
The contention that manning industries in
the Philippines would not survive if the
instant case is not decided in favor of the
petitioner is not supported by evidence.
The Wallem case was decided on February
20, 1981. There have been no severe
repercussions, no drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen,
and none of the dire consequences
repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner.
Why should Vir-Jen be an exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in
international shipping are shouldered by
the foreign principal. The local manning
office is an agent whose primary function
is recruitment and who usually gets a
lump sum from the shipowner to defray
the salaries of the crew. The hiring of
seamen and the determination of their
compensation is subject to the interplay of
various market factors and one key factor
is how much in terms of profits the local
manning office and the foreign shipowner
may realize after the costs of the voyage
are met. And costs include salaries of
officers and crew members. (at pp. 585-
586)
The Wallem Shipping case, was decided in
1981. Vir-Jen Shipping was decided in
1983. It is now 1989. There has'been no
drying up of employment opportunities for
Filipino seamen. Not only have their
wages improved thus leading ITF to be
placid and quiet all these years insofar as
Filipinos are concerned but the hiring of
Philippine seamen is at its highest level
ever.
Reporting its activities for the year 1988,
the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stated that there
will be an increase in demand for seamen
based overseas in 1989 boosting the
number to as high as 105,000. This will
represent a 9.5 percent increase from the
1988 aggregate. (Business World, News
Briefs, January 11, 1989 at page 2)
According to the POEA, seabased workers
numbering 95,913 in 1988 exceeded by a
wide margin of 28.15 percent the year
end total in 1987. The report shows that
sea-based workers posted bigger monthly
increments compared to those of
landbased workers. (The Business
Star, Indicators, January 11, 1988 at page
2)
Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA
Administrator Tomas Achacoso is the
statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin
M. Drilon that the Philippines has a big
jump over other crewing nations because
of the Filipinos' abilities compared with
any European or westem crewing country.
Drilon added that cruise shipping is also a
growing market for Filipino seafarers
because of their flexibility in handling odd
jobs and their expertise in handling almost
all types of ships, including luxury liners.
(Manila Bulletin, More Filipino
Seamen Expected
Development, December 27, 1988 at page
29).lâwphî1.ñèt Parenthetically, the
minimum monthly salary of able bodied
seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by
the Philippines is now $276.00 (id.) more
than double the $130.00 sought to be
enforced by the public respondents in
these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present
vindicates the finding in Vir-Jen
Shipping that a decision in favor of the
seamen would not necessarily mean
severe repercussions, drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen,
and other dire consequences predicted by
manning agencies and recruiters in the
Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB
and NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding the petitioners guilty
of using intimidation and illegal means in
breaching their contracts of employment
and punishing them for these alleged
offenses. Consequently, the criminal
prosecutions for estafa in G.R. Nos. 57999
and 58143-53 should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
GRANTED. The decisions of the National
Seamen Board and National Labor
Relations Commission in G. R. Nos.
64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered holding the
petitioners not guilty of the offenses for
which they were charged. The petitioners'
suspension from the National Seamen
Board's Registry for three (3) years is
LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered
to pay the petitioners their earned but
unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance
from November 1, 1978 to December 14,
1978 according to the rates in the Special
Agreement that the parties entered into in
Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject
matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53,
are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION
and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his
capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, HON. BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and BASKETBALL COACHES
ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon
Law Office for petitioners.
Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for
respondent BCAP.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital
Region of the Department of Labor and
Employment issued Alien Employment
Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of
petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United
States citizen, as sports consultant and
assistant coach for petitioner General
Milling Corporation ("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC
and Cone entered into a contract of
employment whereby the latter undertook
to coach GMC's basketball team.
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation approved petitioner
Cone's application for a change of
admission status from temporary visitor to
pre-arranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC
requested renewal of petitioner Cone's
alien employment permit. GMC also
requested that it be allowed to employ
Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE
Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted
the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment
Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25
December 1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches
Association of the Philippines ("BCAP")
appealed the issuance of said alien
employment permit to the respondent
Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April 1990,
issued a decision ordering cancellation of
petitioner Cone's employment permit on
the ground that there was no showing
that there is no person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing to
perform the services required nor that the
hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to
the national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental
Motions for Reconsideration but said
Motions were denied by Acting Secretary
of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma in an
Order dated 8 June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a
Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June
1990, alleging that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion when he revoked
petitioner Cone's alien employment
permit; and
2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code is null and void as it is in violation of
the enabling law as the Labor Code does
not empower respondent Secretary to
determine if the employment of an alien
would redound to national interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition
for Certiorari, the Court considers that
petitioners have failed to show any grave
abuse of discretion or any act without or
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Secretary of Labor in
rendering his decision, dated 23 April
1990, revoking petitioner Cone's Alien
Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of
the appeal filed by private respondent
BCAP was cured when petitioners were
allowed to file their Motion for
Reconsideration before respondent
Secretary of Labor.1
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a
foreign coach is an employer's prerogative
has no legal basis at all. Under Article 40
of the Labor Code, an employer seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain
an employment permit from the
Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's
right to choose whom to employ is, of
course, limited by the statutory
requirement of an alien employment
permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. As
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, no
comparison can be made between
petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman Black as
the latter is "a long time resident of the
country," and thus, not subject to the
provisions of Article 40 of the Labor Code
which apply only to "non-resident aliens."
In any case, the term "non-resident alien"
and its obverse "resident alien," here
must be given their technical connotation
under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that
implementation of respondent Secretary's
decision would amount to an impairment
of the obligations of contracts. The
provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations
requiring alien employment permits were
in existence long before petitioners
entered into their contract of employment.
It is firmly settled that provisions of
applicable laws, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into
contracts.2 Private parties cannot
constitutionally contract away the
otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent
Secretary of Labor should have deferred
to the findings of Commission on
Immigration and Deportation as to the
necessity of employing petitioner Cone, is,
again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor
Code itself specifically empowers
respondent Secretary to make a
determination as to the availability of the
services of a "person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing at the
time of application to perform the services
for which an alien is desired."3
In short, the Department of Labor is the
agency vested with jurisdiction to
determine the question of availability of
local workers. The constitutional validity of
legal provisions granting such jurisdiction
and authority and requiring proof of non-
availability of local nationals able to carry
out the duties of the position involved,
cannot be seriously questioned.
Petitioners apparently also question the
validity of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, specifically Section 6 (c),
Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing
Rules, as imposing a condition not found
in the Labor Code itself. Section 6 (c),
Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing
Rules, provides as follows:
Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit
–– the Secretary of Labor may issue an
employment permit to the applicant based
on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his
employer with the requirements of Section
2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the
availability or non-availability of any
person in the Philippines who is competent
and willing to do the job for which the
services of the applicant are desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not
the employment of the applicant will
redound to the national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified
by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of
Investments or other appropriate
government agencies if the applicant will
be employed in preferred areas of
investments or in accordance with the
imperative of economic development;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as
follows:
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-
resident aliens. –– Any alien seeking
admission to the Philippines for
employment purposes and any domestic
or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the
Philippines shall obtain an employment
permit from the Department of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to
a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the
non-availability of a person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is
desired.
For an enterprise registered in preferred
areas of investments, said employment
permit may be issued upon
recommendation of the government
agency charged with the supervision of
said registered enterprise. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the
Secretary of Labor is not authorized to
take into account the question of whether
or not employment of an alien applicant
would "redound to the national interest"
because Article 40 does not explicitly refer
to such assessment. This argument (which
seems impliedly to concede that the
relationship of basketball coaching and the
national interest is tenuous and unreal) is
not persuasive. In the first place, the
second paragraph of Article 40 says:
"[t]he employment permit may be issued
to a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the
non-availability of a person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is
desired." The permissive language
employed in the Labor Code indicates that
the authority granted involves the
exercise of discretion on the part of the
issuing authority. In the second place,
Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a
statement of objectives that the Secretary
of Labor should, and indeed must, take
into account in exercising his authority
and jurisdiction granted by the Labor earlier decision does not appear in the
Code, record. If such reversal is based on some
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. –– It is view of constitutional law or labor law
the policy of the State: different from those here set out, then
a) To promote and maintain a state of full such employment permit, if one has been
employment through improved manpower issued, would appear open to serious legal
training, allocation and utilization; objections.
xxx xxx xxx ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
c) To facilitate a free choice of available DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack
employment by persons seeking work in of merit. Costs against petitioners.
conformity with the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the
movement of workers in conformity with
the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens,
including the establishment of a
registration and/or work permit system;
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on
the above points of constitutional law too
insubstantial to require further
consideration.1avvphi1
Petitioners have very recently manifested
to this Court that public respondent
Secretary of Labor has reversed his earlier
decision and has issued an Employment
Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek
to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on
the ground that it has become moot and
academic.
While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a
petition that clearly appears to have
become moot and academic, the
circumstances of this case and the nature
of the questions raised by petitioners are
such that we do not feel justified in
leaving those questions unanswered.4
Moreover, assuming that an alien
employment permit has in fact been
issued to petitioner Cone, the basis of the
reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his