1 WILLIAMS v.

WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY

2 D.C. App. 1964
3
4 District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
5 Ora Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant,
6 v.
7 WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY, Appellee.
8 No. 3389.
9
10 198 A.2d 914
11
12 Argued Feb. 3, 1964.
13 Decided March 30, 1964.
14
15
16
17R. R. Curry and Pierre E. Dostert, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
18Harry Protas, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
19
20Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.
21QUINN, Associate Judge.
22
23Appellant, a person of limited education separated from her husband, is maintaining
24herself and her seven children by means of public assistance. During the period 1957-
251962 she had a continuous course of dealings with appellee from which she purchased
26many household articles on the installment plan. These included sheets, curtains, rugs,
27chairs, a chest of drawers, beds, mattresses, a washing machine, and a stereo set. In 1963
28appellee filed a complaint in replevin for possession of all the items purchased by
29appellant, alleging that her payments were in default and that it retained title to the goods
30according to the sales contracts. By the writ of replevin appellee obtained a bed, chest of
31drawers, washing machine, and the stereo set. After hearing testimony and examining the
32contracts, the trial court entered judgment for appellee.
33
34Appellant's principal contentions on appeal are (1) there was a lack of meeting of the
35minds, and (2) the contracts were against public policy.
36
37Appellant signed fourteen contracts in all. They were approximately six inches in length
38and each contained a long paragraph in extremely fine print. One of the sentences in this
39paragraph provided that payments, after the first purchase, were to be prorated on all
40purchases then outstanding. Mathematically, this had the effect of keeping a balance due
41on all items until the time balance was completely eliminated. It meant that title to the
42first purchase, remained in appellee until the fourteenth purchase, made some five years
43later, was fully paid.
44
45At trial appellant testified that she understood the agreements to mean that when
46payments on the running account were sufficient to balance the amount due on an
47individual item, the item became hers. She testified that most of the purchases were made

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48at her home; that the contracts were signed in blank; that she did not read the instruments;
49and that she was not provided with a copy. She admitted, however, that she did not ask
50anyone to read or explain the contracts to her.
51
52 We have stated that ‘one who refrains from reading a contract and in conscious
53ignorance of its terms voluntarily assents thereto will not be relieved from his bad
54bargain.’ Bob Wilson, Inc. v. Swann, D.C.Mun.App., 168 A.2d 198, 199 (1961). ‘One
55who signs a contract has a duty to read it and is obligated according to its terms.’
56Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, D.C.App., 188 A.2d 348, 349 (1963). ‘It is as
57much the duty of a person who cannot read the language in which a contract is written to
58have someone read it to him before he signs it, as it is the duty of one who can read to
59peruse it himself before signing it.’ Stern v. Moneyweight Scale Co., 42 App.D.C. 162,
60165 (1914).
61
62A careful review of the record shows that appellant's assent was not obtained ‘by fraud or
63even misrepresentation falling short of fraud.’ Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v.
64Gibson, supra. This is not a case of mutual misunderstanding but a unilateral mistake.
65Under these circumstances, appellant's first contention is without merit.
66
67Appellant's second argument presents a more serious question. The record reveals that
68prior to the last purchase appellant had reduced the balance in her account to $164. The
69last purchase, a stereo set, raised the balance due to $678. Significantly, at the time of
70this and the preceding purchases, appellee was aware of appellant's financial position.
71The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of appellant's social worker and her
72$218 monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that
73appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount,
74appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.
75
76We cannot condemn too strongly appellee's conduct. It raises serious questions of sharp
77practice and irresponsible business dealings. A review of the legislation in the District of
78Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest court in this
79jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts
80in question contrary to public policy. We note that were the Maryland Retail Installment
81Sales Act, Art. 83 § § 128-153, or its equivalent, in force in the District of Columbia, we
82could grant appellant appropriate relief. We think Congress should consider corrective
83legislation to protect the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case
84at bar.
85
86Affirmed.

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