Congressional Record, 79th Congress First Session, Vol 91 Part 5, June 12, 1945

PAGE 5974

THE POLL TAX

The SPEAKER. The Chair thinks under the rule he must recognize the gentleman from
New York [Mr. MARCANTONIO]. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. SUMNERS] will be
designated to control the time in opposition to the bill.

Mr. MARCANTONIO. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H. R. 7) making unlawful the requirement for the payment of a poll tax as a
prerequisite to voting in a primary or other election for national officers.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Obviously a quorum is not present.

Mr. RAMSPECK. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:
The SPEAKER. On this roll call, 338 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

On motion of Mr. RAMSPECK, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

THE POLL TAX

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York
[Mr. MARCANTONIO].
The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 7, with Mr. BULWINKLE in the
chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

Mr. MARCANTONIO. Mr. Chairman, I first yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. BENDER], to be yielded by him as he sees fit, and of my remaining 30
minutes I yield at this time 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER].

<Sumners doesn’t come up until later>

PAGE 5993

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas; Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that this bill is going to pass; so it seems to me that
the time at my disposal ought to be used to discuss some of the basic principles involved
in this proposal.

I believe that we must agree that whenever we propose to bring to Washington a power
that heretofore has resided in the States, the contemplated transfer of that power is
perhaps more important than the particular matter proposed to be dealt with. As power
is more and more taken from the States and moved to Washington these transfers
become more and more important.

We must determine soon whether we are going to permit to remain in the States the
governmental powers which they are capable of discharging or bring those powers here,
and, by reason of that concentration, overload the machinery of the Federal Government
and convert the greatest democracy of all times into a great Federal bureaucracy. That
proposition lies at the foundation of this question. We must decide some time soon what
we are going to do about this. The control of the qualification of voters has

PAGE 5994
been with the States since the organization of the Government. That statement will not
be challenged. We are now proposing to transfer that exclusive control from the States
to the Federal Government—and I make the statement in good spirit—in order to do
that we are going to violate the plain language of the Constitution.

Twice that language which fixes this power in the States has been incorporated in the
Constitution; once when the Constitution was written and the second time when we
provided for the election of Senators by direct vote of the people. It does not take a
lawyer to know what the language means. It is as plain as can be. Let me read it to you.
This is the language which was incorporated in the seventeenth amendment, adopted in
1913:

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures.

Whoever the States make qualified to vote for the most numerous branch of the State
legislatures it is provided in the Federal Constitution may vote for Members of
Congress. That is the plan incorporated in the Constitution. It is a mighty serious thing
for the Congress to attempt to disregard this plain provision of the Constitution of the
United States in order to establish a Federal power over the State that has not since the
formation of the Government ever been recognized as belonging to the Federal
Government. In the beginning practically all the States had a poll tax. The States are
with great rapidity abolishing the poll tax. Does anybody doubt that?

Mr. PATRICK. Yes; I doubt it. My State failed to repeal it in June of this year. How can I
doubt it?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. The record shows that one by one the States are abolishing the
poll tax, and nobody can question it. There are only about seven left, I believe. The
importance of this proposition from the poll-tax standpoint is decreasing, but its
importance from the standpoint of additional Federal power over the States is
increasing.

When you see a movement going in the direction that you want it to go and favor its
going, why, then, this hurry? Why this questionable act? Is it not better to have the
people of the States consent in doing a thing that is right, according to your view, than to
force it upon those people?

I want to call attention to another thing in connection with this debate which I believe is
hurtful. The statement is made here time after time that the requirement of a poll tax
disfranchises able-bodied men and women. That is bad business. The sort of
government we are running is just like a lodge, like a labor organization. It is an
association of private people engaged in the common enterprise of governing
themselves. Such a government requires some money to operate it just like a labor
organization does. It is not entirely without support in reason in human experience to
say that able-bodied people who belong to an organization which requires money to
operate ought to pay something to maintain it. Such a payment would tend to make a
better people, more self-respecting people, a more fit-to-govern people. I was discussing
this matter with one of my labor-union friends. I asked him, "Why do you not try this
out in your own organization and provide that everybody who joins may vote for officers
without paying a cent?"

How can you hope to have a self-respecting people, people who will look the world in the
face and say, "I am no pauper or a governmental panhandler," when people are peddling
that sort of poison over the country? I was up in New York, the home of the
distinguished gentleman, the proponent of this bill: I went by a place of recreation for
children. I said; "Is this free?" They said, "No." I said, "Why not?" They said, "The
children have to pay a few cents. It helps them to keep their self-respect." I am not
arguing for the poll tax, but I do feel strongly the duty respectfully to urge against this
destructive argument. The appeal should be to every citizen to pay something toward
the expenses of the Government of which he is a part. That would tend to make better
citizens of them—give them more self-respect. Tell me that an able-bodied person ought
not to pay one dollar or two a year for the privilege of being a citizen in this great
country of ours and receiving its protection and free schools for his children?
Tell me that you are helping to make good citizens in America by telling them they ought
not to pay a dollar or two a year contribution to maintain the greatest Government on
earth?

We have some hard sledding ahead of us in America. It is going to take great people to
do this job in America. We are going to have to turn back to the States in America the
power which is within their governmental capacity. Now do not make any mistake about
that. Whenever you have so much power here in Washington that is beyond the
governmental capacity of a democratic system of government to discharge, then you
have to have a nondemocratic system to do the job. There is not a person in this House
who does not know it. We are menacing our system of government by the concentration
of power in Washington. Nobody doubts that. What do you propose to do by this bill?
You not only propose this additional reduction of State power and increase of Federal
power, but propose, as I see it, to violate the Constitution of the United States in order to
do it. That is my judgment. To violate the Constitution of the United States in order to
bring power to Washington that has been reserved by the State since the Constitution
was written is not a good direction for us to be going.

Mr. SAVAGE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I yield.

Mr. SAVAGE. If one person should pay a dollar to be a citizen of the United States, why
should not everyone have to pay it? I was also going to ask you how do you explain away
the fourteenth amendment 'to the Constitution, as raised by the lady from Connecticut
[Mrs. LUCE]?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I will let the lady who raised it take care of it. I have got
something else to talk about.

Mr. REED of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I yield.

Mr. REED of New York. I just want to say this. It seems to me if we are going down this
path of ignoring the Constitution, in order to save our self-respect, we ought to abolish
or attempt to abolish by constitutional amendment, the oath of office.

Mr. WORLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I yield.

Mr. WORLEY. If, under the argument of the proponents, the Congress has the power to
tell the several States they cannot levy a poll tax, would not the Congress have the same
power to tell all the States that they must levy, or Congress would levy a poll tax for $100
or even $1,000, and thus disfranchise millions of American citizens?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. It would seem that under that construction, the
Congress might do that, insofar as this provision of the Constitution is concerned;
I mean their construction of the provision with reference to the "time, place, and
manner of holding an election."

Mr. WORLEY. The founders of the Constitution did not intend the Congress to have any
such power?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. Certainly not. We are not dealing with poll tax merely. We are
dealing with the most fundamental principles involved in our whole scheme of
democratic government, made up of the States and the Federal organization.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I yield.

Mr. LEWIS. I would like to read some language in the Constitution. "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States."
Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. That is right. That language is in the Constitution now. I thank
my friend.

There is also section 20 of the Criminal Code, which is as follows:

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom willfully
suggests or causes to suggest to any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District, the
deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both.

If this bill is constitutional there is now ample law on the statute books to protect every
person in any right which he may have under the Constitution to vote without paying a
poll tax. We have got the language in the code now. But with that law on the statute
books now the Supreme Court has held against the constitutionality of what is here
proposed.

Mrs. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. I yield.

Mrs. LUCE. I noticed with considerable interest in the 3 years I have been on the floor of
this House that the gen

PAGE 5995

tleman has voted almost without exception for every piece of New Deal legislation which
concentrated power in Washington. This seems to be a rather notable exception that the
gentleman is taking in his stand today. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. Yes.

Mrs. LUCE. What is more fundamental about the Constitution than the spirit of it which
says there shall be no discrimination on account of race, color, or creed? Does the
gentleman deny that the poll tax is an attack on the spirit of the Constitution?

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. There is no discrimination today on account of race, color, or

creed. The requirement in a State that there shall be a poll tax applies to every person
who presents himself or herself to vote regardless of race, color, or creed. As a matter of
fact, the establishment in Texas of the "payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting,
a part of the Terrell election law, grew out of an election fraud committed in Dallas,
Tex., in 1902, entirely by white persons.
Let me call attention to another thing: This attempt to arouse section and race and creed
here is not a good thing either. I do not believe in this baiting by anybody. I do not
believe in baiting anybody; but I want to tell these minorities that are behind this bill
that there is such a thing as going too far in baiting the descendants of the people whose
ancestors established this Government. That is just something for some of you to think
about.

There are not people in this country who have more frequently appealed to this
Constitution for protection than these minorities. Destroy it, destroy reverence for its
institutions, destroy its strength, destroy the sense of duty on the part of the Congress to
defend it, destroy the sense of duty on the part of the courts to construe it as it is
written, make it the football of politics and the instrumentality through which sectional
minorities may be coerced, and the day must come when those who flee to it for
protection will find they have destroyed its ability to protect.

Before concluding I want to discuss further the constitutionality of this bill.

These are the applicable provisions of the Constitution:

Article I, section 2: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen

every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislature.

Article I, section 4: The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places
of choosing Senators.

The time of holding the elections for Members of Congress, the place of holding such
elections, and the manner in which they are to be held Congress may determine. That is
provided by this latter section of the Constitution.

Mr. Madison and Mr. Hamilton wrote under the common title "Publius." In the
Federalist of February 19, 1788, this appears under that title:

Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives?

They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the
corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.

On February 8, 1788, in the Federalist, this appears written by either Madison or

Hamilton or both, under their common pen name:
 The first view to be taken of this part of the Government relates to the qualifications of
the electors and the elected.

Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous
branch of the State legislature. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly
regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the
Convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it
open for the occasional regulation of the Congress would have been improper for the
reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States
would have been improper for the same reason, and for the additional reason that it would
have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the Federal
Government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the
different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have
been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the
Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to be the best that
lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to
the standard already established, or which may be established by the State itself. It will be
safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable
by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter
this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them
by the Federal Constitution.

Mr. King, of Massachusetts, served with Hamilton on the Committee on Style and this is
what he says (vol. 2, p. 51, Elliot's Debates):

The power of control given by this section (art. I, sec. 4), extends to the manner of
election, not to the qualifications of the electors.

The word "manner" is sought in this debate to be twisted into some sort of relationship
to qualification.

Mr. Nicholas, of Virginia, a delegate to that State's convention which ratified the
Constitution, made this statement (vol. 3, p. 8, Elliot's Debates):

In this plan there is a fixed rule for determining the qualifications of electors, and that
rule the most judicious that could possibly have been devised, because it refers to a
criterion which cannot be changed. A qualification that gives a right to elect
representatives for the State legislatures, gives also, by this Constitution, a right to choose
representatives of the General Government. As the qualifications of electors are different
in the different States, no particular qualifications, uniform through the States, would
have been politic, as it would have caused a great inequality in the electors, resulting
from the situation and circumstances of the respective States. Uniformity of qualifications
 would greatly affect the yeomanry in the States, as it would either exclude from this
inherent right some who are entitled to it by the laws of some States at present, or be
extended so universally as to defeat the admirable end of the institution of representation.

In the North Carolina convention (vol. 4, p. 71, Elliot's Debates), Mr. Steele said:

The power over the manner of elections does not include that of saying who shall vote
(that never left State control); the Constitution expressly says that the qualifications (are
those) which entitled a man to vote for a State representative.

Mr. Davie, in the same convention (vol. 4, p, 61), said:

They may alter the manner of holding the election. • • • They cannot alter the nature of
the elections; for it is established as fundamental principles, that the electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislature shall elect the Federal representatives, * * *
power is given to Congress, and extending only to the time of holding the place of
holding, and the manner of holding the election. Is this not the plain, literal, and
grammatical construction of the clause? Is it possible to put any other construction on it,
without departing from the natural order, and without deviating from the general meaning
of the words, and every rule of grammatical construction? Twist it torture it, as you may,
sir, it is impossible to fix a different sense upon it.

The ratification of the seventeenth amendment was the last expression of popular
judgment as to what should be the qualification of electors. It was the identical
arrangement as to the electors of the Members of the House of Representatives
embodied in article I, section 2, of the Constitution. It is as follows:

The electors in each State—

Of Senators—

Shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures.

With the clear, uninvolved language of the Constitution squarely against the
construction which the proponents of this bill would have us accept, and with the clear-
cut statements of such contemporaries as Madison and Hamilton King, Nicholas, Steele,
and Davie, which I have quoted, clearly against its constitutionality, this is a most
remarkable proceeding, remarkable even if there were no pronouncements by the courts
of the land against its constitutionality. Many times the shadow of this question has
come within the notice of the courts. Not once insofar as I know has the court indicated
a belief in its constitutionality.
I direct consideration now to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
against the constitutionality of this bill with the identical question here indicated
squarely before it. I refer to the case of Breedlove v. Suttles (302 U. S. 277), a unanimous
opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Butler. The case arose in Georgia. I quote from the
opinion:

A Georgia statute provides that there shall be levied and collected each year from every
inhabitant of the State between the ages of 21 and 60 a poll tax of $1, but that the tax
shall not be demanded from the blind or from females who do not register for voting
(Georgia Code, 1933, sec. 92-108). The State constitution declares that to entitle a person
to register and vote at any election he shall have paid all poll taxes that he may

PAGE 5996

have had opportunity to pay agreeably to law (art. II, sec. 1, par. III; Code, sec. 2-603).
The form of oath prescribed to qualify an elector contains a clause declaring compliance
with that requirement (sec. 34-103). Tax collectors may not allow any person to register
for voting unless satisfied that his poll taxes have been paid (sec. 34-114). Appellant
brought this suit in the superior court of Fulton County to have the clause of the
constitution and the statutory provisions above-mentioned declared repugnant to various
provisions of the Federal Constitution and to compel appellee to allow him to register for
voting without payment of poll taxes. The court dismissed his petition. The State supreme
court affirmed (183 Ga. 189; 188 S. E. 140).

The pertinent facts alleged in the petition are these: March 16, 1936, appellant, a white
male citizen 28 years old, applied to appellee to register him for voting for Federal and
State officers at primary and general elections. He informed appellee he had neither made
poll-tax returns nor paid any poll taxes and had not registered to vote because a receipt
for poll taxes and an oath that he had paid them are prerequisites to registration.
He demanded that appellee administer the oath, omitting the part declaring payment of
poll taxes, and allow him to register. Appellee refused.

Appellant maintains that the provisions in question are repugnant to the equal protection
clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment and to the
nineteenth amendment.

You are all familiar with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
also with the nineteenth amendment, the woman's suffrage amendment:

1. He asserts that the law offends the rule of equality in that it extends only to persons
between the ages of 21 and 60 and to women only if they register for voting and in that it
makes payment a prerequisite to registration. He does not suggest that exemption of the
blind is unreasonable.
Then follows some discussion of the history and nature of the poll tax, which I will omit,
though very interesting and illuminating and is of weight. I further quote from this
opinion at page 281, as follows:

2. To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or
immunity protected by the fourteenth amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from
the United States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the fifteenth and
nineteenth amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may
condition suffrage as it deems appropriate. (Minor v. Happersett (21 Wall. 162, 170, et
seq.); Ex parte Yarbrough (110 U.S. 651, 664-665); McPherson v. Blacker (146 U.S. 1,
37-38); Guinn v. United States (238 U. 8. 347, 362).) The privileges and immunities
protected are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States and
not those that spring from other sources. (Hamilton v. Regents (293 U.S. 245, 261).)

Next the Court makes some analysis of the contention that this Georgia law violates the
nineteenth amendment and holds—bottom page 283:

Its purpose is not to regulate the levy or collection of taxes. The construction for which
appellant contends would make the amendment a limitation upon the power to tax. (Cites
cases.) The payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable
regulation long enforced in many States and for more than a century in
Georgia.

The Supreme Court was then composed of Chief Justice Hughes and Associate Justices
McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts, Cardozo, and Black.

Since that decision this identical question, stripped of every detail which could possibly
aid the most skilled expert in the art of confusing, reached the Supreme Court of the
United States by application for a writ of certiorari. That case is Pirtle v. Brown (118 F.
(2) 218). It was decided March 18, 1941, by the circuit court of appeals. On July 19, 1941,
Senator PEPPER, of Florida, appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
support of S. 1280, "a bill concerning the qualification of voters or electors within the
meaning of section 2, article I, of the Constitution, making unlawful the requirement for
the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in a primary or general election for
national offices," the same subject matter as the bill here under discussion.

I quote from Senator PEPPER'S statement found on page 7 of the Senate hearings:

In the Pirtle case the question was squarely presented as to whether or not the State could
condition the right of a citizen to vote for a Congressman in an election, not the primary,
but a special election called to elect a Member of the House of Representatives, because
that citizen had not complied, or had failed to pay a poll tax, thus allowing him to vote.
 Notice that this was not for a State election nor any primary and that it was admitted that
he had done everything to qualify but pay the poll tax.

Now, that is Senator PEPPER's explanation of the facts.

I continue to quote from Senator PEPPER, page 9, Senate hearing:

Behold the suggestion that the right to vote for a Member of Congress of the United
States, the President of the United States, the Vice President, or the electors, is
conditioned by the State upon such terms as the State wants to impose; that the right "is
conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the fifteenth and nineteenth
amendments" regarding race, color, or previous conditions of servitude and other
provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems
appropriate. • • •

So that in that case the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, held that the State still had
the right to condition the exercise of the franchise in any way it wanted to do so.

I continue to quote from the Senate committee hearings; this colloquy took place:

Senator O'MAHONEY. Was there any dissent in that case? "

Senator PEPPER. No; it was a unanimous decision of the three judges, and now it
appears that there is a writ of certiorari pending before the Supreme Court relative to that
case, and I venture to predict that that petition for certiorari will be granted, and I do not
expect that decision to stand.

On the 13th day of October 1941, the Supreme Court of the United States, with the
application of the writ of certiorari seeking to bring the questions involved in the Pirtle
case before it, refused to grant the writ. It could not do otherwise.

Whatever may be the opinion of members of that Court with regard to the poll-tax
qualification, it is their business to interpret the Constitution as it is written. As it is
written the States cannot deprive a person of the right to vote on account of sex, because
the Constitution has been amended. The Supreme Court so holds, of course. The States
cannot deprive a person of the right to vote because of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude. The Supreme Court so holds. The States cannot deprive a person of the
right to vote for Members of Congress if he is qualified to vote under the laws of his
State for the members of the most numerous branch of the legislature. The Supreme
Court so holds.

By the decision in the Classic case (313 U.S. 299) it was held that included in the rights
secured by the Constitution are the rights of a qualified voter to have his physical
opportunity to vote undisturbed and to have his vote counted, within the protection of
sections 19 and 20 of the Federal Criminal Code.

The citizen is entitled to Federal protection as to the time of holding elections, the place
of holding elections, and the manner in which elections are conducted, conditioned only
that the voter is qualified to vote for a member of the most numerous branch of his own
State legislature. Now it is contended that even though he may not be qualified to vote
for a member of the most numerous branch of his own State legislature—that standard
of qualification which is set up in the Constitution—Congress can get rid of that
standard by making it unlawful. That seems to be on the theory that its enforcement
would deprive the non-poll-tax payer of a Federal constitutional right which Congress
would have the right to enforce by appropriate legislation.

Deleting from section 20 of the Criminal Code that part thereof made non-applicable by
the decision in the Classic case, it reads as follows:

Section 20 of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., title 28, sec. 52):

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States • • • shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both."

In other words, if this bill is constitutional, corrective legislation, from the standpoint of
the proponents of this legislation, is already on the statute books. If a person has a
constitutional right to vote without paying a poll tax, he is protected by existing law.
Whatever constitutional rights the citizen has to vote without complying with the poll-
tax requirement of a State have been protected. Furthermore, existing legislation covers
the whole field of the citizen's constitutional rights.

Each time where in our governmental history before this effort it has been deemed
advisable to establish a new limitation upon the power of States to control election
qualifications it was recognized that it could not be done as here attempted, by act of
Congress, but had to be done by the States themselves.

After the Supreme Court refused to disturb the circuit court's holding in the

PAGE 5997

Pirtle case, the proponents fell back on the Classic case. But in the Classic case there was
not involved one single question which could arise in a case testing the general
constitutionality of this proposed legislation.
So we have this situation. We have the clear language of the Constitution and we have
the interpretation of the men who helped to fashion the Constitution and the men who
discussed it when the States ratified it; we have the philosophy of democratic
government and we have the clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court holding that this
proposed legislation is unconstitutional.

If you do succeed in breaking through the constitutional barrier, ignoring the

interpretation made by the contemporaries of the Constitution, its practical
interpretation since its adoption and the decisions of the Supreme Court, and should
secure judicial approval you would then have a situation under which there would be no
effective restraint upon the power of Congress to fix the qualifications of those who vote.
The power to fix it down is the power to fix it up. You would be putting into what is
coming to be a great Federal bureaucracy the power to deny the States the right to
control suffrage. They are the organizations that are close to the people.

This attack is being made upon the Constitution in the name of the poor man. I want to
call to witness the history of the ages, that they are the sort of people who suffer most
when constitutional government is destroyed.

The men who fashioned this Constitution and who read deeply into the mysteries of life
knew that there would come a time when the institutions of freedom would be
imperiled. They did the best they could. They required that before we enter this
Chamber we pledge ourselves by our solemn plight that we will defend the Constitution.
Now is the time, and this is the hour.

Mr. Chairman, I look over my country. I see the picture in the world today. I recognize
that my country, perhaps, stands as the last great independent constitutional
government in the world. I see a time that has come now in the history of my country
when the Constitution is no longer revered among the people—not much. I wonder, too,
if your Nation and my Nation is to be added to the list of those from which freedom has
departed. It departs with the departure of constitutional government.

I know from all that I have been able to learn that freedom cannot endure among any
people who do not have fundamental laws that hold them true to the course of their
destiny against the pressure of expediency and the whim of the moment.

PAGE 5998

Mr. SUMNERS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all Members who
have spoken on this bill may have permission to revise and extend their remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.