Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO
REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners, 
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH
NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.

Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.

Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary

Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992,
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, 
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III;
Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III;
and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition
also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the
preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to
Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw
and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition.

On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp.
124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation" (Rollo, 
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively,
averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN
in the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the
original supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).

On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-
203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health
to comment on the said motion.

On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH

Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus
Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-
ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with: 

(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda,
et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their
preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp.
50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious
falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and
fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).

On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation
attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).

On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992,
alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing
respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed
to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992;
and 
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid
resolution" (Comment attached to Rollowithout paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).

In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply
with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:

It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the present controversy was the situation
obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992
wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective positions, the
Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their
respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be
lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under
their authority desist and refrain from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until further orders from the
Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition
and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been
met in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor
General that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected
with his office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel
and to cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without pagination).

The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents

(Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may

preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
 investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay
in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law."

On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation
conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.

They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has
three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against
public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,
censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).

The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one
bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a
preventive suspension.

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All
the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis,
the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex
(Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate
official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an
intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an
investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and
efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger
of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of
witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
administrative charges should be preventively suspended.

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz
Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the
procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v.
Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said
statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will
hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed
for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of
Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940];
Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).

In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not
a penalty, said:

Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such

investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in
administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the
phrase "suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.

The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend
any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."

Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."

However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the
Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with
the President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase
"subordinate officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase
"under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).

The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to
"preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation" (Sec. 51).

The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the
phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word
"subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the
Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed "in his
office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint
is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he
can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.

In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording
petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary
conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and
Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that
assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public
officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order
remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the
parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension
meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . .
(Nera v. Garcia., supra).

There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the
preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees
under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the
basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of
preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the
charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-
289; Annex 4, Rollo, 
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23
cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and
the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and
documentary evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits
(Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).

Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de
Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of
petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion
in acting favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or
otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered
by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The
Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we
find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said
lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private
respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private
Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; 
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and
Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer,
both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing
counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides,
the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which
is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons
from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the
discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the

Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No. 188315
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
   
  Present:
   
  CORONA, C.J.,
  Chairperson,
  VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
  DEL CASTILLO, and
  PEREZ, JJ.
   
   
   
  Promulgated:
ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA,  
Accused-Appellant. August 25, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
 
DECISION
 
PEREZ, J.
 
 
On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of rape.
 
In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission
of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant was
accused of raping AAA,[2] allegedly committed as follows:
 
 That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of
complainant who was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force
and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.[3]
 
 
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the
parties stipulated on the following facts:
 
1.                  AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;
2.                  Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3.                  AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife
since AAA was one and a half years old.[4]
 
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
 
The following facts are undisputed:
 
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,[5] since she was just a few months old.[6] BBB
is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997
and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00
p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week.
Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin
Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp.
Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecutions version of the facts follows
 
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the
house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as there
was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked appellant why the
latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to
anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA
immediately went back to sleep.
 
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again
touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he
will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up
and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed
his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into
AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to
penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her
by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three
(3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years
old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house
of her friend, Marvin.[7]
 
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00
p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for
going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have done to
her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped
by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.[8]
AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She,
together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with
the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape.[9]
 
PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of Makati Police
Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She
then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination.[10]
 
 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on
AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the hymen is
with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 2
oclock positions at the time of examination. Said report concluded that AAA is in a non-virgin
state physically.[11] P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been caused by any
solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia.[12]
 
Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10
p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon
Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of appellant
to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep
and asked appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant
voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police station.[13]
 
Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to
AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping
AAA.[14] He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even once caught
stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked
permission to go out to buy a project. She never came home.[15]
 
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y
LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED
AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3,
Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1.Taking into account the
minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the
fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to
pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP
150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP
50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape.[16]
 The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of
rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed straightforward, consistent
and credible. The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since
1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses,
and admission made by AAA.[17] Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants defense of denial as
self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive testimony.[18]
 
Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court
of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[19] However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellants brief. [20] When
the case was brought before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review
by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and
mandatory.[21]
 
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by
appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.
 
The fallo of the Decision reads:
 
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as
follows:
 
1.      Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to
03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is
hereby acquitted;
 
2.      Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and
03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified
through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count.[22]
 
 
 The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape
in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.[23] With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate court, the
testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of
three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court
concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape.[24]
 
On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals
Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any
Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs,
respectively.[25]
Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged
assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away from her and
the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to
notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the circumstances of minority and
relationship as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent
is not included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent,
appellant argues that the term adopting parent must be given a definite and technical meaning in
that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must
have been issued.[26]
 
The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that
appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to
establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill
motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.[27]
 
The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not
dent her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she
was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from reporting
said incidents.[28]
 
The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
 
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
 
Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the span of
three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the
acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with appellants
conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
 
In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a
woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof.[30]
 
Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC considered
it straightforward and consistent on material points, while the Court of Appeals described it as
spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions. Well-entrenched is the legal
precept that when the culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when
duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect,
even finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal.[31] We see no reason in this case
to depart from the principle.Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts assessment of
AAAs credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.[32]
 
 Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that when the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her.[33]
 
Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to
prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,[34] the Court of Appeals correctly
declared, thus:
 
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260)
imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she
was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of three (3) times a week from
February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAAs bare statement is evidently inadequate
and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of
rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the
victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly
insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required
quantum of evidence.[35]

As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him, thus:

Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?

A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.
Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you
noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
xxxx
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was
holding a knife?
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Papa
Q: When you said Papa, you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what
happened?
A: He slowly parted my legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?
A: Hinampas ko po siya sa braso.
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko.[36]

 
Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal
knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission of the first
incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth certificate.[37]
 
As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated:
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until
when?
 A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he
removed my shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left
the house.[38]
 
 
Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of rape,
the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having
carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
 
AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical findings of
the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed laceration only
confirms AAAs claim of rape.
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in
imposing the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
 
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
 
xxxx
 

 
The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that
AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her
guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a
minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation
and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of
relationship.
 
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of
AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its
penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted
by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the
prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.[39]
 
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with
his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early
case of People v. De la Cruz.[40] The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape victim
could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living
and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal
guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this
contention and ruled as follow:
 
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
 
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos
deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o
abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por
dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the question
whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary absence
of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we
cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary
custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor
(legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra,
 must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.[41]
 
 
Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a
guardian as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a
12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of the
victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the
amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with
the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the
Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse:
 
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party,
her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to
commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held
that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as
understood in the rules on civil procedure.
 
xxxx
 
It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third
paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the
"guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in
the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion
of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written
complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his
inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should
the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or
judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
 
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on
this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of
"guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original
provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian
as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to
be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state
"guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian.
It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian.
 Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged
in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111,
would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory
guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the
ward.
 
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying
circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly,
cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that,
just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act
No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have
changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof
punishable by the higher penalty of death.
 
xxxx
 
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous
relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the
guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its
objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that
matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or
another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the
exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
 
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act
No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect
to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is
actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose
the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.[42]
 
 
People v. De la Cuesta[43] adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the
mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the
relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.[44]
 
Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar[45] where it was held that the
guardian envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal
relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court
held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de
facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty
pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term guardian in this
manner:
 
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction
of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which
it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the
circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will
justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this
description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person
who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established
either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption
(legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.[46]
 
 
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even
mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the adopting
father of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
 
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant
could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
 
We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00
to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.[47] The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.[48] While no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly
weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
 
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the
crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple
rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also
ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00.
 
SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

ARROYO v. PEOPLE

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and
Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other
officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and
Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b)  of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public
treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which
were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was
strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas  then separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective
petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:

Procedural:

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder:
(a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total
amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
RULING:

Re procedural issue:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to
this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal
the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal
that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do
so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of
the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct  grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted
by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is
because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character
and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence
of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege
that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February
26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking
about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not
only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the
charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to
the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be
informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50

Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth

valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead
to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired
ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence
showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest
possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted
to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
(under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds
[See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase
that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a
good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;”
and malversationoccurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds
all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that
raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasurysimilarly requires such use of the property
taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation
and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE
the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6,
2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence;
DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs
of suit.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175109             August 6, 2008

PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP., petitioner, 

vs.
A.C. ORDOÑEZ CORPORATION and FRANKLIN SUSPINE, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the July 17, 2006 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93073, which reversed and set aside the September 21,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 582 and reinstated the August
25, 2000 and September 26, 2000 Orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
66,3 which admitted respondent’s Answer and set the case for pre-trial, as well as its October 12,
2006 Resolution4 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner Paramount Insurance Corp. is the subrogee of Maximo Mata, the registered owner of a
Honda City sedan involved in a vehicular accident with a truck mixer owned by respondent
corporation and driven by respondent Franklin A. Suspine on September 10, 1997, at Brgy.
Panungyanan, Gen. Trias, Cavite.

On February 22, 2000, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, a
complaint for damages against respondents. Based on the Sheriff’s Return of Service, summons
remained unserved on respondent Suspine,5 while it was served on respondent corporation and
received by Samuel D. Marcoleta of its Receiving Section on April 3, 2000.6

On May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default; however, on June
28, 2000, respondent corporation filed an Omnibus Motion (And Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default) alleging that summons was improperly served upon it
because it was made to a secretarial staff who was unfamiliar with court processes; and that the
summons was received by Mr. Armando C. Ordoñez, President and General Manager of
respondent corporation only on June 24, 2000. Respondent corporation asked for an extension of
15 days within which to file an Answer.

Pending resolution of its first motion to declare respondents in default, petitioner filed on June
30, 2000 a Second Motion to Declare Defendants in Default.

On July 26, 2000, respondent corporation filed a Motion to Admit Answer alleging honest
mistake and business reverses that prevented them from hiring a lawyer until July 10, 2000, as
well as justice and equity. The Answer with Counterclaim specifically denied liability, averred
competency on the part of respondent Suspine, and due selection and supervision of employees
on the part of respondent corporation, and argued that it was Maximo Mata who was at fault.

On August 25, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, issued an Order
admitting the answer and setting the case for pre-trial, thus:
When this case was called for the hearing of Motion, the Court’s attention was brought to the
Answer filed by the defendant.

WHEREFORE, in order to afford the defendants a day in Court, defendant’s answer is

admitted and the pre-trial is set for October 17, 2000 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that the Metropolitan Trial Court gravely
abused its discretion in admitting the answer which did not contain a notice of hearing, contrary
to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It also assailed respondent corporation’s
Omnibus Motion for being violative of Section 9, Rule 15 because while it sought leave to file an
answer, it did not attach said answer but only asked for a 15-day extension to file the same.
Petitioner also averred that assuming the Omnibus Motion was granted, the Motion to Admit
Answer and the Answer with Counterclaim were filed 26 days beyond the extension period it
requested.

On October 16, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58 issued a temporary
restraining order, and on May 22, 2001, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On September
21, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision7 granting the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby
GRANTED. The Orders of public respondent dated August 25, 2000 and September 26,
2000 are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
May 22, 2001 is hereby made permanent.

The case is hereby remanded to the court a quo to act on petitioner’s (plaintiff’s) "Second
motion to declare defendants in Default" dated June 29, 2000.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent corporation moved for reconsideration but it was denied; hence, it appealed to the
Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision dated July 17, 2006, thus:

By and large, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the first level court in the
contested orders.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED, the

challenged RTC Decision dated September 21, 2005 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered REINSTATING the Orders dated August 25, 2000 and
September 26, 2000 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. No pronouncement
as to cost.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition raising the
following issues:

I. WHETHER THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON DEFENDANT AC

ORDONEZ CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION.

II. WHETHER A PARTY WITHOUT CORPORATE EXISTENCE MAY FILE AN

APPEAL.

III. WHETHER THIS COURT ERRED IN NOT CALLING THE PARTIES INTO
MEDIATION.

IV. WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER IN ITS

PLEADINGS.

The petition lacks merit.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons
on behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporation’s
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house
counsel, is not valid.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase
‘agent, or any of its directors’ has been conspicuously deleted.8 Moreover, the argument of
substantial compliance is no longer compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as opposed to
Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the
rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have done so
in clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is required.9

Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporation’s Receiving Section through Samuel D.
Marcoleta is defective and not binding to said corporation.

Moreover, petitioner was served with a copy of the Sheriff’s Return which states:
 3. MANNER OF SERVICE: DULY SERVED thru SAMUEL D. MARCOLETA
(receiving section-A.C. Ordonez Construction Corp.,) and who was authorized by A. C.
Ordonez Construction Corp., management to receive such court processes.

On its face, the return shows that the summons was received by an employee who is not among
the responsible officers enumerated by law. Such being invalid, petitioner should have sought the
issuance and proper service of new summons instead of moving for a declaration of default.

Consequently, the motions for declaration of default filed on May 19, 2000 and June 30, 2000
were both premature.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion when the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted
respondent corporation’s Answer. Although it was filed beyond the extension period requested
by respondent corporation, however, Sec. 11, Rule 11 grants discretion to the trial court to allow
an answer or other pleading to be filed after the reglementary period, upon motion and on such
terms as may be just. An answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant
was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to plaintiff. The hornbook rule is that default
judgments are generally disfavored.10

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s claim that respondent corporation lacks legal
personality to file an appeal. Although the cancellation of a corporation’s certificate of
registration puts an end to its juridical personality, Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code, however
provides that a corporation whose corporate existence is terminated in any manner continues to
be a body corporate for three years after its dissolution for purposes of prosecuting and
defending suits by and against it and to enable it to settle and close its affairs.11 Moreover, the
rights of a corporation, which is dissolved pending litigation, are accorded protection by law
pursuant to Sec. 145 of the Corporation Code, to wit:

Section 145. Amendment or repeal. No right or remedy in favor of or against any

corporation, its stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor any liability
incurred by any such corporation, stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or
officers, shall be removed or impaired either by the subsequent dissolution of said
corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of this Code or of any part
thereof. (Emphasis ours)

Dissolution or even the expiration of the three-year liquidation period should not be a bar to a
corporation’s enforcement of its rights as a corporation.12

Finally, the decision to refer a case to mediation involves judicial discretion. Although Sec. 9 B,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A. M. No. 04-2-04-SC, requires the payment of
P1,000.00 as mediation fee upon the filing of a mediatable case, petition, special civil action,
comment/answer to the petition or action, and the appellee’s brief, the final decision to refer a
case to mediation still belongs to the ponente, subject to the concurrence of the other members of
the division.
As clarified by A. M. No. 04-3-15 (Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation in
the Court of Appeals) dated March 23, 2004:

II. SELECTION OF CASES

Division Clerks of Court, with the assistance of the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC),
shall identify the pending cases to be referred to mediation for the approval either of
the Ponente for completion of records, or, the Ponente for decision. Henceforth, the
petitioner or appellant shall specify – by writing or by stamping on the right side of the
caption of the initial pleading (under the case number) that the case is mediatable.

Any party who is interested to have the appealed case mediated may also submit
a written request in any form to the Court of Appeals. If the case is eligible for
mediation, the Ponente, with the concurrence of the other members of the Division, shall
refer the case to the PMC. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, for cases pending at the time the said guidelines were issued, the Division Clerks of Court,
with the assistance of the Philippine Mediation Center, shall identify the cases to be referred to
mediation. Thereafter, the petitioner or appellant shall specify, by writing or by stamping on the
right side of the caption of the initial pleading (under the case number), that the case is
mediatable. Further, any party who is interested to have the appealed case mediated may also
submit a "written request in any form to the Court of Appeals." In the instant case, petitioner
failed to write or stamp the notation "mediatable" on its Memorandum of Appeal. Moreover, it
failed to submit any written request for mediation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 17, 2006 reinstating the August 25, 2000 and September 26, 2000 Orders of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66 which admitted respondent corporation’s
Answer and set the case for pre-trial, as well as the Resolution dated October 12, 2006 denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

G.R. No. 113092                    September 1, 1994

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to
determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for
unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good
faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to
determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy.
Facts:

This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for
the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.

In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund
drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.

The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay,
a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive

contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.

In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.
Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose.

Held/Ratio:

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately
and independently of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was
not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The
world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
acquitted of the offense charged.